The Holocaust Historiography Project

Partial translation of Document 4024-PS

TOP SECRET

The Higher SS and Police Chief in the Operational Zone of the Adriatic Coast

Trieste, 1/5/1943.

Gl./Go.-Diery No. 1/44 Top Secret PK.

To the Reichsfuehrer SS and Reich Minister of the Interior Heinrich Himmler Berlin

Reichsfuehrer,

I am taking the liberty of submitting to you in the enclosed a report on the economic development of the Action Reinhardt, as you, Reichsfuehrer, ordered in your letter of 9/22/1943 that I should have this completed and submitted by 12/31/1943. However the recognition given me for the Action also impels me to give you, Reichsfuehrer, an account of the economic side, in order that you, Reichsfuehrer, may thereby see that in this respect also, the work was in order. Though SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl has not yet had time to take over, I nevertheless hope that these data will be of assistance.

A proper winding up and my relief is necessary because I carried out this activity within the framework of the SS and it must therefore be wound up in a proper manner with regard to the competent Reich authorities. The Action Reinhardt was also too dangerous.

In addition, however, a certain odium still rests upon me to the effect that in all economic matters I do not maintain the necessary order, and in this respect I must advance indisputable proof that this is not so.

The total accounting is composed of two parts:

  1. The economic part of the Action Reinhardt with the subdivisions
    1. Accounting and delivery of the assets seized and
    2. Accounting of the assets attained by the work.
  2. The Settlers' Economic Association, the conduct of whose economy also rested on my work, and which is now being transferred to civilian hands.

There is one additional factor to be added to the total accounting of "Reinhardt" which is that the vouchers dealing with it must be destroyed as soon as possible after the data have already been destroyed by all other works concerned in this matter. With regard to the SWG (Settlers' Economic Association), the question is not only the financial order, but also a transfer so that this institution may be maintained for the settlers.

Only after I have been relieved of both matters will my functions in both be terminated.

I request, Reichsfuehrer, that you lay down a deadline by which the final winding up has to be completed on the spot on the basis of my data.

I have taken the liberty of sending a copy to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl.

Heil Hitler
Yours obediently
[signed] GLOBOCNIK

[Rubber Stamp:]
Personal Staff, Reichsfuehrer SS,
Rec'd: 10 Jan. 1944.
Diary No. 1851?44 Top Secret
To: RF


TOP SECRET

4 copies, first copy

Economic Aspect of the Action Reinhardt,

gathered together in the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office — Special Task "G", which I am in charge of and of which I have not been relieved:

The entire Action Reinhardt is divided into four spheres:

  1. The expulsion itself.
  2. The employment of labour.
  3. The exploitation of property.
  4. Seizure of hidden goods and landed property.

A. The Deportation

This is settled and completed. In this case the prerequisite was to get hold of the people with the small forces available and to cause as little economic damage as possible to war production by methodically appropriate measures. On the whole this was achieved. Considerable damage occurred only in Warsaw, where, owing to ignorance of the position, the methods applied in the final action were entirely wrong.

I was no longer able to carry out the action in Litzmannstadt (Lodz) myself because of my transfer.

The equipment which was provided for this action from seized goods, which however are to be considered as Reich property, have been removed completely. For reasons of surveillance in each camp a small farm was created which is occupied by an expert.

An income must regularly be paid to him so that he can maintain the small farm.

B. Employment of Man Power

The entire manpower was put into closed camps, to which essential war production was transferred.

For this purpose the following conditions had to be created:

1. Erection of all camps.

2. Erection of work shops with all the working equipment, such as the installation of machinery, power supply, etc.

3. The organization of provisions, by making use of the TWL's as well as by the creation of farms in the vicinity of the camps.

4. Equipment for the establishment of adequate sanitation and hygiene.

5. Security measures. a. Achieved by adequate security precautions

b. By organizing a security organization within the camp

c. by adequate guarding

For this purpose the SS guards were developed, the overwhelming majority of whom carried out their duties satisfactorily led by Germans.

Their reliability was to be increased by mixing these guards with Reich German guards from the concentration camps.

d. The preconditions for a satisfactory security system were created by these camps being taken over by the concentration camp department of the SS Economy and Administrative Head Office.

6. The proper administration and methodical treatment were made possible thanks to extensive training of the German leading personnel. It became apparent that the working capacity of the Jews in the camps was constantly increasing.

7. By the creation of a works management and factory conditions the technical and commercial aspects were ensured. For this purpose the "Osti" was created and as second works management the German Equipment Works (Deutsche Ausruestungswerke). A total of 18 works was established; it was intended to add more. About 52000 workers were available. These conditions of work made it possible to accept urgent orders both from the Armament Inspectorate and from Speer, the Reich Ministry, and thus to replace bombed out works.

The demand from these offices was considerable. "Osti" and the German Equipment Works were firms under my own supervision, whereas other concerns, such as the Heinkel aircraft works were only looked after by me.

Enclosure 1 contained factory reports and output figures. The number of orders was so large that the German Equipment Works (DAW) was fully occupied up to March and the other -factories had enough work for 2-3 months.

C. Exploitation of Property.

The exploitation of property which was carried out by Reinhardt. It has been completed as shown in Enclosure 2.

D. Seizure of Hidden Goods.

The seizure of hidden goods and exploitation of landed property is divided into:

1. Property such as machinery, raw material, etc., handed over by the "Osti" to Aryans. To date the result is 6.3 million Reichsmarks; a further 7-8 million Reichsmarks are yet to be brought in. This seizure had furthermore the advantage that all those were affected who had built up industries for themselves in this manner, with the help of Jews without cost to themselves and had become rich without effort.

2. Seizure of Jewish assets at home and abroad in that the camp inmates were ordered to cede these claims to the "Osti", which then carried out the recovery. The first attempt resulted in a cession of an amount of 11 million Zloty, at least half of which appeared obtainable. However, since it was also possible to discover money that had been smuggled abroad, this action could have brought valuable foreign currency to the Reich.

3. Real estate was transferred to the Real Estate Administration of the Government General for exploitation. All the above mentioned arrangements were functioning satisfactorily at the time of my departure. As I received an indication from the Reichsfuehrer SS that a potential transfer might be possible some time during the year, I immediately go down to finally settling and consolidating the organization I had created, and for this purpose handed over the entire organization to the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office.

The measures taken were as follows:

(1) On the 8/13/1943 the SS Training Camp of Trawniki was handed over by SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl (see letter of 8/18/1943-Chief A/Fr./S-Enclosure 3).

(2) On the 9/7/1943 in a conference with SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl the taking over of 10 SS Working Camps in the Lublin District as subsidiaries of Lublin Concentration Camp was decided on and in addition the further handing over of further working camps in the Government General. The head of the Lublin Concentration Camp was provided with suitable contracts. This conference was brought about by SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger and SS Standartenfuehrer Schell (see file note of the Chief of the SS-WVHA (SS Economic and Administrative Head Office)) of 9/7/1943-D II/L (Ref. No. 29 Ma./F.) (Enclosure 4).

(3) In pursuance thereof, a letter of the Commandant of the Lublin Concentration Camp, dated 9/143/1943 to the SS Working Camps announced that they had become subdiaries of the Lublin Concentration Camp. The mixing of guards of foreign race with the German Concentration Camp guards from the Reich has also been initiated.

(4) On the 10/22/19/43 SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl announced that he had ordered taking over of the following Working Camps by Amtsgruppe D: (1) Old Airport Lublin (2) SS Working Camp Trawniki (3) SS Working Camp Poniatowa (4) Forced Labor Camp and SS Workshops in Radom (5) Forced Labor Camp and SS Workshops in Budzyn (6) Main Camp Cracow Placzow (7) German Equipment Works, Lublin (8) Armament stores in Lemberg.

(5) During the conference on 10/22/43, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl stated that I would be replaced as first manager of the "Osti" by the second manager and a new second manager would be appointed. My relief was also approved. I also explained everything fully to my successor and called his attention to his supervisory duty. I thereby created all the conditions for the continuation. The principles of security existed and were guaranteed by the Leadership by the Concentration Camps. The relief has not yet been effected.

On 11/3/1943 the workers were withdrawn from the labor camps and the works shut down. The Camp leaders were not informed of this action although the responsibility rested with them. I was thus impeded in my supervisory duty. I have ordered the Camp Leaders to wind up and continue determining the contracts and/or transferring stocks.

On the day before the evacuation of the camps, General Schindler of the Armaments Inspectorate, Cracow, arranged with the Camp Leaders on the basis of a promise from SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, that (a) In the future only armament contracts were to be given to the labor camps. b. He had received the assurance on 2.11 that a further 10000 Jews were to be removed for armament work.

It was no longer possible to carry out with this arrangement.

[Sgd] Globocnik. SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lt. General of Police.

These enclosures are the papers mentioned in SS Gruppenfuehrer Globocnik's letter of the 1/5/1943. They have been taken out to facilitate depositing.

Report On the Administrative Development of the Action Reinhardt

I. All the assets acquired as a result of this Action were centrally mustered by an administration set up by me, duly classified and booked. The muster extends to the entire Government-General. The personnel came from the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office (WVHA).

The utilization and winding up of the assets was carried out on the basis of directives by the Reichsfuehrer SS. During the course of the Action this was summed up in a directive of 9/26/1942 and 12/9/1943, and the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office was given the task of winding up with regard to the Reich authorities.

The assets I collected were regularly delivered to the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office against receipts, and they in turn passed on the assets to the Reichsbank, the Reich Ministry of Finance, textile concerns, etc.

On the orders of the Reichsfuehrer SS, necessary articles could be removed for the maintenance of persons of the German race. The Reichsfuehrer SS forbade any appropriation for the purposes of the SS.

What is remarkable about the accounting is that no hard and fast basis for the amount collected existed, as the collection of the assets was carried out under orders and only the decency and honesty, as well as the surveillance, of the SS men used for this purpose could guarantee a complete delivery. Nevertheless what was seized and collected and received by the Department Reinhardt was listed and delivered without error and with the greatest accuracy. A preliminary examination up to 4/1/1943 by SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Vogt of the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office has already taken place and has revealed perfect order. For the balance, the preliminary examination has still to be carried out.

In accordance with an agreement with the Reich Ministry of Finance, this preliminary examination is final and the vouchers and data will be destroyed in accordance with Security regulations, cutting out the Reich Accounting Office.

II. The assets accounted for are divided into:

1. Sums of Reichsmarks and Zloty. The entire expenditure transport costs, dues, etc. incurred as a result of this Action were covered from these receipts. By far the greater portion was placed at the disposal of the SS Economist in the Government General and the amounts were credited to the Action Reinhardt in Reichsmarks by the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office by an accounting transaction and handed over to the Reichsbank.

A small portion was used for foreign currency reasons as a credit for various economic enterprises and then also credited by the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office by an accounting transaction.

In addition, differences arising from increases in the price of urgently required raw material supplies were covered. All these transactions were carried out with the consent of the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office. A further amount was placed at the disposal of the Concentration Camp currently for additional building operations, to develop the economic concern and to obtain the necessary agricultural machinery, etc. Exact accounts were kept of this, the purchases were always confirmed by me, and the documents covering this will also be attached to the final account. The accounts were kept by the Administrative Chief of the Concentration Camp and were actually kept separate from my administration, as the Concentration Camp Administration was independent of the SS Garrison Administration Lublin by order of the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office. The authority which finally takes over the concern will have to reimburse Reinhardt for these expenditures.

2. Foreign Currency in bank notes or coined gold was collected, sorted, and also handed over to the Reichsbank via the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office.

3. Jewels, jewelry, watches and such like were sorted according to their value and delivered to the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office. On orders from this office, watches of nonprecious metals were handed over to the troops, spectacles were repaired and placed at the disposal of wounded persons, and utensils of no value were principally handed over to Wehrmacht authorities to cover urgent needs. The necessary transfer vouchers are available.

4. Textiles, garments, underclothing, bed feathers and rags were collected and sorted according to their quality. The sorted articles had to be searched for hidden valuables and finally disinfected. More than 1,900 wagons were then placed at the disposal of the authorities named by the Reich Ministry of Economy by order of the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office. Out of these stocks not only foreign workers were clothed but a large portion was used for re-manufacture. No case of sickness became known, although these garments frequently came from persons suffering from spotted typhus. The disinfection therefore was adequate.

The best garments were separated and by order of the Reichsfuehrer SS were used for supplying persons of the German race. Shoes were also sorted according to how far they could be used and then either given to persons of German race or to concentration camps for supplying inmates, or else taken to pieces and used for wooden shoes for supplying inmates.

5. Individual valuables of a special kind, such as stamps, coins, and such like were sorted and delivered to the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office; worthless articles were destroyed.

6. Other articles received, such as soap, washing materials, crockery and cutlery, and the like, were used in the Jewish camps; glass, old iron articles, etc., were sent to the salvage centers for re-manufacture.

7. The food brought on the transports was used to help provision the Jewish camps.

8. Valuable furniture and household utensils were reconditioned and mainly put at the disposal of settlers of German race. But furniture was also loaned to German and Wehrmacht authorities against an accommodation bill. Inferior goods were either destroyed or given to the population as a reward for good work at the harvest, etc.

It was attempted to take from articles which could no longer be used parts such as locks, hinges, and the like, and to use these elsewhere.

The vouchers pertaining to the loaned articles were submitted monthly to the Higher SS and Police Chief East.

In accordance with the order of the Reichsfuehrer SS of the 22.9, the total takings are now closed, evaluated and passed on, so that there is hardly any mass left now.

Equipment which was necessary for carrying out the Action, such as barracks, camp equipment, vehicles, and such like, which had been purchased out of the monies obtained, is still on hand.

This equipment has been registered. A decision must, however, still be taken as to what purpose it is to serve.

The total value of the articles received is, according to the attached list, approximately 18 million Reichsmarks. However, minimum values have been assured, so that the total value is most likely twice as much, quite apart from the value of the articles obtained which are in short supply, such as textiles, of which alone more than 1900 wagons have been made available to German industry.

[signed] GLOBOCNIK SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lt. General of Police

Assets delivered from Action Reinhard

The following assets from the Action "Reinhard" were delivered to the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office, Berlin, for further transmission to the Reichsbank or to the Reich Ministry of Economics:

a. Reichsmark sums totaling RM 53,013,133.51

b. Currency in Bank notes from all the principal countries in the world (half a million dollars being particularly to be noted) to a total value of RM 1,452,904.65

c. Foreign currency in gold coins to a total value of RM 843802.75

d. Precious metals (about 1800 kg. of gold and about 10000 kg. of silver in bars) to a total value of RM 5353943.00

e. Other valuables such as jewelry, watches, spectacles, etc. (the number of watches being particularly worthy of noteabout 16000 in working order and about 51000 requiring repair: they have been placed at the disposal of the troops) RM 26089800.00

f. About 1000 wagons of textiles to a total value of RM 13294400.00

Total RM 100047983.91

1000 wagons of textiles and about another 50% of the above mentioned assets-which still have to be counted and valued-are warehoused here. It should be noted here that the estimated values were based on the officially established rates of exchange or prices, which however would be much higher on the open market, for instance in the sale of precious stones or precious metals abroad, as the flight to investments in articles whose value is not subject to much fluctuation is much greater there than with us. Besides these sales abroad bring us foreign currency. If these prices were taken as a basis of evaluation here, this was done in order to be able to give a picture of the assets delivered; in general this evaluation is not authoritative. The value of the acquisition lies principally in the fact that such large quantities of urgently needed raw materials can thereby be gained and that, on the basis of the assets obtained, foreign currency can be brought in, with which raw materials can in turn be bought by Reich authorities.

[Sgd.] Globocnik SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lieut. General of Police.

1 detailed list enclosed herewith.

List of Jewish property received for delivery up to 3.2.1943, showing values

[Editor's Note: The following tables are reproduced as they appear in original German document although accuracy of calculations is questionable.]

[rubber stamp]

Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS Ref. No. Secret/115

1. Cash in hand: RM 16,931,722.01; Delivery SS-Economist, Cracow: RM 31.5 million; SS-Econ.-Admin. Head Office Berlin-(RB): RM 5.58 million; [Total]: RM 53 million

2. Foreign currency in notes: USA Dollars: 505046.00 Rate of exchange: 2.50 RM 1.26 million Pal. Pounds: 1069/00/00 9.30 RM 9,941.70 Pengoes: 16,436.00 .60. RM 9,861.00 Roubles: 294070.00 .10 RM 29,407.00 English Pounds: 3822/00/00 9.30 RM 36,644.60 Canadian Dollars: 3840.76 2.60 RM 9,601.87 Pesetas: 131.00 2.40 RM 314.40 Czech Croons: 789630.00 .10 RM 78963.00 French Francs: 22767.60 .05 RM 1138.37 Brazilian Francs: 8.00 .09 RM .72 South African Pounds: 28/10/00 4.40 RM 125.40 Turkish Pounds: .5/50/00 1.90 RM 10.45 Dutch Gulden: 1720.00 1.33 RM 2287.60 Swiss Francs: 7530.00 5.80 RM 4,367.40 Lira: 883.00 .13 RM 114.79 Levas: 100.00 .01 RM 1.00 Australian Pounds: 15/10/00 2.60 RM 38.75 Lei: 13486.00 .02 RM 269.72 Egyptian Pounds: 4/lO/00 4.40 RM 19.80 Belgas: 4203.00 .40 RM 1681.80 Lats: 10.00 .10 RM 1.00 Argent. Pesos: 90.00 1.00 RM 90.00 Paragu.: 10.00 .60 RM 6.00 Swedish Croons: 455.00 .60 RM 273.00 Norwegian Croons: 165.00 .60 RM 99.00 Dinars: 30.00 .05 RM 1.50 Slov. Croons: 59,608.75 .10 RM 5,960.88 Litas 140.00 .10 RM 14.00 [Total]: RM 1452904.65

3. Currency in gold coins: USA Dollars: 116,425.00 Rate of exchange: 4.20 RM 488985.00 Roubles: 91,362.00 2.15 RM 196,428.30 English Pounds: 3822/00/00 20.40 RM 77,969.00 Austrian Crowns: 30,940.00 .85 RM 26,299.00 Austrian Shillings: 1,975.00 [none] RM 1185.00 Ducats: 2366.00 10.00 RM 23660.00 Finnish marks: 20.00 1.00 RM 20.00 Reichsmarks: 12730.00 1.00 RM 12730.00 Zloty: 1,080.00 .50 RM 540.00 Danish Crowns: 230.00 .52 RM 119.60 Czech ducats: 2.00 10.00 RM 20.00 Portuguese reis: 15000.00 (150 Ese) 1.00 RM 150.00 Pesetas: 25.00 1.50 RM 37.50 French francs: 8005.00 1.62 RM 12,968.10 So. African Pounds: 2/00/00 20.40 RM 40.80 Turkish pounds: 47/00/00 3.50 RM 164.50 Dutch gulden: 315.00 17.00 (f.10 Hf1) RM 535.50 Swiss francs: 490.00 16.50 (f.20 Frs) RM 404.25 Lira: 1,210.00 .50 RM 605.00 Australian pounds: 8/10/00 20.40 RM 172.60 Lei: 1,140.00 .50 RM 570.00 Belgas: 140.00 .50 RM 70.00 Swedish crowns: 2.00 11.20 RM 22.40 Norwegian Crowns: 35.00 11.20 RM 39.20 Dinars: 30.00 50 RM 5.00 Cuban pesos: 10.00 4.20 RM 42.00 Alb. francs: 20.00 .50 RM 10.00 Total: RM 843802.75 4

4. Precious metals: 1,775.46 kg. of gold in bars at RM 2784.00 RM 4,942870.00; 9639.34 kg. of silver in bars at RM 40.00 RM 385573.00; 5.10 kg. of (?) platinum at RM 5000.00 RM 25500.00; Total: RM 5.35 million

5. Other valuables: 5 Gold revolving pencils: at RM 30.00 RM 150.00 17 Gold fountain pens: at RM 70.00 RM 1190.00 4 Ladies' platinum watches: at RM 300.00 RM 1200.00 2894 Gentlemen's pocket watches, gold: at RM 500.00 RM 1.42 million 578 Gentlemen's wrist watches, gold: at RM 300.00 RM 173400.00 7313 Ladies' wrist watches, gold: at RM 350.00 RM 1.82 million 19 Platinum watch cases with brilliants and diamonds: at RM 1000.00 RM 19000.00 280 Bracelets with brilliants and diamonds: at RM 3500.00 RM 980000.00 6245 Gentlemen's wrist watches: at RM 10.00 RM 62450.00 3455 Gentlemen's pocket watches: at RM 20.00 RM 269100.00 1 Gentleman's pocket watch-gold with brilliants: at RM 600.00 RM 600.00 179 Ladies' gold watches with brilliants and diamonds: at RM 600.00 RM 107400.00 7 Ladies' ring watches, gold: at RM 150.00 RM 1050.00 4 Ladies' fob watches with pearls: at RM 200.00 RM 800.00 394 Ladies' fob watches with brilliants: at RM 600.00 RM 236400.00 228 Ladies' platinum and brilliant watches: at RM 1200.00 RM 273600.00 293 Ladies' fob watches, gold: at RM 250.00 RM 73250.00 2324 Spectacles: at RM 3.00 RM 66972.00 3 prs cuff links with brilliants: at RM 150.00 RM 450.00 1675 Rings, gold with brilliants and diamonds: at RM 1500.00 RM 11675000.00 7200 Ladies wrist watches: at RM 10.00 RM 75000.00 40 Gold brooches: at RM 350.00 RM 14000.00 1399 prs gold earrings with brilliants: at RM 250.00 RM 349750.00 169 Tie pins with brilliants diamonds: at RM 100.00 RM 16900.00 1974 Gold brooches with brilliants and diamonds: at RM 2000.00 RM 3948000.00 70.00 27 Gold bracelets with brilliants and diamonds: at RM 250.00 RM 6750.00 49 kg. Pearls: RM 4 million 7000 Fountain pens: at RM 10.00 RM 70000.00 130 Single large brilliants: at RM 1000.00 RM 130000.00 2 Necklaces with brilliants and diamonds: at RM 1500.00 RM 3000.00 1 Gold cigarette case: at RM 400.00 RM 400.00 1 Mother of pearl casket: RM 20.00 3 Gold Compacts: at RM 50.00 RM 150.00 2 Mother of Pearl opera glasses: at RM 50.00 RM 100.00 1.44 kg. Corals: RM 150 00 1370 Watches requiring repair: at RM 5.00 RM 256850 00 1000 Revolving pencils: at RM 3.00 RM 3000.00 350 Shaving equipment: at RM 2.50 RM 875.00 800 Pocket knives: at RM 1.00 RM 800.00 .00 3240 Money purses: at RM 1.50 RM 4860.00 1316 Brief cases: at RM 2.50 RM 3287.50 1600 prs Scissors: at RM 0.50 RM 750.00 230 Flashlights: at RM 0.50 RM 115.00 2554 Alarm clocks requiring repair: at RM 3.00 RM 7662.00 160 Alarm clocks in running condition: at RM 6.00 RM 960.00 477 Sun glasses: at RM 0.50 RM 238.50 41 Silver cigarette cases: at RM 30.00 RM 1230.00 230 Clinical thermometers: at RM 3.00 RM 690.00 Total: RM 26089800.00

6. Textiles 462 Wagons of rags: at RM 700.00 RM 323400.00 261 Wagons of bed feathers: at RM 10000.00 RM 2510000.00 317 Wagons of clothing and underclothing: at RM 33000.00 RM 10461000.00 Total: RM 13294400.00

Totals: 1. Cash and cash balance delivered: RM 53 million. 2. Foreign currency in notes: RM 1.45 million. 3. Foreign currency in gold coin: RM 843802.76 4. Precious metals: 5353943.00 5. Miscellaneous: RM 26 million. 6. Textiles: 13.29 million Total: RM 100 million.

Lublin, 2/27/1943.

/S/ [?] SS Sturmbannfuehrer

Situation with Regard to Orders of the Concerns of the SS and Labor Camps in Lublin District on 11/3/1943

I. The situation with regard to orders, according to Industrial concerns: 1. Ostindustrie G.n.b.H. (Eastern Industry Co., F Ltd.), Lublin: ZI 5.55 million. Encl. 2. German Equipment Works, Lublin ZI 7.98 million. Encl. 3. Textile Works, Poniatowa ZI 13 million. Encl. 4. Fur Works, Trawniki ZI 4.63 million. Encl. Total: ZI 31 million. [As it is almost entirely a question of wage. contracts, the situation with regard to orders represents essentially only wage and administration costs.The actual value of production if the concerns had to produce their own materials would therefore have been at least 50% higher.]

II. This total situation with regard to orders is divided up into the following manufacturing groups: Lumber: ZI 5.72 million. Metal: ZI 4.17 million. Textiles: ZI 10,338,200.00 Leather: ZI

1.967 million. Furs: ZI 4.81 million. Others: [Under other manufacturing groups the following are included amongst others: Production of peat or generator coke, the only roofing felt factory in Lublin district, 2 metal-making factories, 1 brush factory, the largest bristle preparing establishment of the Government General, basket and straw plaiting, and printing concerns, production of concrete parts for building huts.] ZI 4.054 million Total: ZI 31.077 million

[signed] GLOBOCNIK

Situation with regard to orders of the "Ostindustrie" G. Ltd., Lublin, the 11/3/1943

Factory: II Peat Mine Dorohucza Orders: (1) 420 tons peat coke (2) 4.5 tons tar Customer: (1) Waffen-SS (2) DAW Total value in Zloty: (1) 210000 (2) 4500 Of which Wehrmacht orders in Zloty: (1) 210000 Civilian orders Zloty: (2) 4500 III Brush Factory Factory for bristles, Wicker works factory: (1) 724000 painting brushes and brushes of various kinds (2) Repairs of 135000 ammunition baskets (3) 15000 kg bristles for dressing (1) W BA Berlin RWL II of the Waffen-SS etc. (2) Munition store Lublin (3) Various deliveries to Navy and to private firms (1) 1.592 million (2) 216000 (3) 210000 (1) 1.39 million (2) 216000 (3) 105000 (1) 200000 (3) 105000 V Mechanical and other factories in Lublin (1) Production of 1.5 million threaded fuses (2) Production of 4.5 million buckles (3) Repairs to 37500 tin packing receptacles (4) Taking to pieces of 3000 gun carriage installations (5) Repairs to 15000 motor car component parts (6) Repairs to about 3000 watches (or clocks) and other repairs of various kinds (7) Preparing 18000 articles of military equipment (1) Navy (Planning Syndicate) (2) Cossack division (Army) others (3) Munition store, Lublin (4) Airforce (Planning Syndicate) (5) HKP Lublin (6) Navy and civilian firms (7) Factory Kienle Stuggart for Navy (1) 1.35 million (2) 1.62 million (3) 150000 (4) 40000 (5) 75000 (6) 60000 (7) 25200 (1) 1,350,000 (2) 1.62 million (3) 150000 (4) 40000 (5) 75000 (6) 15000 (7) 25200 (6) 45000 {Totals]: Total value in Zloty: 5.55 million Of which Wehrmacht orders in Zloty: 5.198 million Civilian orders in Zloty: 354500

The above figures for orders include, together with the current orders for permanent orders, figures for 3 months only.

Enclosure 2

Situation with Regard to Orders of the German Equipment Works-Works Dublin on 11/3/1943

Manufacturing Group: Wood: Total value in Zloty: 5,728,000.00 Of this: Wehrmacht Orders in Zloty: 3.899 million Available Orders in Zloty: 1.82 million Metal: 151000.00 130000.00 21000.00 Textiles: 28000.00 14000.00 14000.00 Leather: 660000.00 570000.00 90000.00 Others: 1.422 million 162000.00 1.26 million {Total]: 7.989 million 4.775 million 3.21 million

Note.The above figures of orders contain, besides the current orders, figures for three months only for permanent orders.

The German equipment works were the best developed works.

41 Aryan leading personnel ran 5445 Jewish workers who worked 1.115 million working days in the first 10 months of the year 1943 with 31 million Zloty in the bank and till.

Woodworking was in the foreground, 7600 square meters [Editor's note: Cubic meters are obviously meant] of wood being dealt with.

Shoemaking also rose to 337250 pairs and was to be raised to 450000 pairs by the repair work shop which is being newly added.

331700 square meters of roofing felt were produced during this period.

Woodworking was to have been extended considerably by the purchase of a sawmill of their own and the byproducts utilized-as the production of wood for producer gas and the making of charcoal; the tar produced thus could again have been used in the production of roofing felt.

Another considerable production was the manufacturing of 2500 Finnish tents and the monthly preparation of 25000 packing containers.

71000 knapsacks and haversacks were also repaired.

5000 optical instruments were taken to pieces.

1270 motor cars were repaired.

Production in 1944 is said to have been:

Wood cut: 20000 cubic meters Manufacture of shelter equipment: 15000 units Doors, windows, shelves: .20000 units Bell tents: 5000 units Preparation of packing containers: 250000 units Wooden soles: 6000 units Brush handles: 4.8 million units Fuel for wood-burners: 20000 Rm. Charcoal: 4500 Kg. Roofing felt: 2 million Sq. m.

The capacity is best shown by the fact that 312 working unions of the partisans in the government, generally, did not even have twice the turnover of the DAW alone. The orders were covered by 83% work for the Wehrmacht and 17% for the civil field.

Situation with regard to orders of the textile works 11/3/1943

Manufacturing Group: Textile orders Orders: Production and repair of 1.53 million articles of clothing of all kinds. Customer: Wehrmacht primarily HBA. Warsaw and Posen and HBA, Berlin and civilian firms. Total value in Zloty: 10.28 million Of this: Wehrmacht orders in Zloty: 7.2 million Civilian Orders in Zloty: 3.085 million Fur clothing: Production of 28100 articles of fur clothing of various kinds Wehrmacht 280000 280000 Leather goods. Production of 132000 articles or pairs of leather goods of various kinds. Wehrmacht 1.31 million 1.31 million Iron orders. Production of nuts. Working Syndicate D-OKH 725000 725000 Reinforced concrete construction. Production of 20200 reinforced concrete nuts. Ministry of Armaments Speer (Armament-construction) 400000 400000 [Total]: 13 million 9.91 million 3.085 million

Note.-The above figures of orders contain, besides the current orders, figures for 3 months only for permanent orders.

Appendix 2

Provisional balance sheet of the Action "Reinhardt" till, Lublin, for 12/16/1943

The following money and stocks were brought to the German Reich during the course of the Action "Reinhardt", Lublin, during the period 4/1/1942-12/15/1943 inclusive:

Cash: Cash in hand Income: RM 17,470,796.66 To the Reichsbank Berlin, Reichsmark notes and coins RM 3,979,623.60 To the Reichsbank Berlin, Zloty notes and coins RM 5,000,461.00 To the SS economist, Cracow RM 60,416,181.37 Loans for SS industrial concerns RM 8,218,878.36 Income from title 21/E RM 656,062.40 Total RM 85,741,903.28

Cash: Personal taxes, title 21/7a Expenditure RM 96,207.28 Expenditure in goods (of which about 40% for J-Transports title 21/7b) RM 11,765,552.62 Counterfeit money (Zloty notes) RM 28,062.64 Total RM 11,889,822.54

Totals Income RM 85,741,903.28 Expenditure RM 11,889,822.64 Net income RM 73,862,080.74 [Totals] RM 86,741,903.28 RM 86,741,903.28

Precious Metals: 236 Gold bars 2,909.68 kg at RM 2,800.00 RM 8,147,104.00 2134 Silver bars 18,733.69 kg at RM 40.00 RM 749,347.60 Platinum 15.44 kg at RM 6,000.00 RM 77,200.00 [Total]: RM 8,973,651.60

Foreign Currency in Notes: USA Dollars 1,081,521.40 at RM 2.50 RM 2,703,803.50 English Pounds 15,646.11 at RM 9.30 RM 145,512.80 Palestine Pounds 4,922.60 at RM 9.30 RM 45,779.25 Canadian Dollars 8,966.25 at RM 2.50 RM 22,415.62 Roubles 2,454,278.36 at RM 0.10 RM 245,427.84 French Francs 1,468,486.35 at RM 0.05 RM 73,424.31 Swiss Francs 119,302.33 at RM 6.80 RM 691,953.51 Lire 6,465.08 at RM 0.10 RM 646.50 Protectorate Croons 1,746,601.60 at RM 0.10 RM 174,560.15 Turkish Pounds 39.60 at RM 1.90 RM 75.05 Belgas 12,449.25 at RM 0.40 RM 4,979.70 Lei 55,975.54 at RM 0.02 RM 1,119.51 South African Pounds 119.50 at RM 4.40 RM 525.80 Dutch Gulden 133,986.95 at RM 1.33 RM 178,202.64 Levas 9,995,421.00 at RM 0.01 RM 59,954.21 Australian Pounds 55.00 at RM 2.50 RM 137.50 Diners 435,641.00 at RM 0.05 RM 21,782.06 Karbowanetz 164,169.00 RM 0.10 RM 16,416.90 Pengoes 28,392.50 at RM 0.60 RM 17,035.50 Slov. Croons 103,538.35 at RM 0.10 RM 10,353.84 Drachmas 4,875,419.70 at RM 0.02 RM 97,508.29 Swedish Croons 4,377.00 at RM 0.60 RM 2,626.20 Norwegian Croons 775.00 at RM 0.60 RM 465.00 Argentinian Pesos 977.55 at RM 1.00 RM 977.55 Pesetas 1,471.00 at RM 2.40 RM 3,530.40 Finnish Marks 1,140.00 at RM 0.05 RM 57.00 Danish Croons 1,270.00 at RM 0.52 RM 660.40 Brazilian Milreis 63.00 at RM 0.09 RM 5.67 Egyptian Pounds 20/00/00 at RM 4.40 RM 88.00 Litas 175.00 at RM 0.10 RM 17.50 Yen (Japanese) 4.00 at RM 0.50 RM 2.00 Lats 20.00 at RM 0.10 RM 2.00 Paraguayan Pesos 12.00 at RM 0.60 7.20 Cuban Pesos 57.00 at RM 0.60 RM 28.20 Uruguayan Pesos 1.00 at RM 0.60 RM 0.60 Bolivian Pesos 4.50 at RM 0.60 2.70 Mexican Pesos 3.00 at RM 0.50 RM 1.50 Albanian Francs 195.44 at RM 0.10 RM 19.54 Rhodesian Pounds 8/00/00 at RM 4.00 RM 32.00 New Zealand Pounds 0/10/00 at RM 4.00 2.00 Algerian Francs 30.00 at RM 0.10 RM 3.00 Lux. Francs 40.00 at RM 0.50 20.00 Javan Gulden 10.00 at RM 1.30 RM 13.00 Danzig Gulden 1,038.00 at RM 1.00 RM 1,038.00 Columbian Pesos 1.00 at RM 0.60 RM 0.60 Mozambique Escudos 1.00 at RM 0.60 RM 0.60 Manchukuo Cents 15.00 at RM 0.50 RM 7.50 Chinese Dollars 1.00 at RM 1.50 RM 1.50 Total 4,521,224.13

Currency in gold coins: USA Dollars 249,771.50 at RM 4.20 RM 1,049,040.30 English Pounds 610/00/00 at RM 20.40 RM 12,444.00 Roubles 189,053.00 at RM 2.15 RM 425,813.95 Austrian Crowns 73,230.00 at RM 0.85 RM 62,245.00 French Francs 38,870.00 at RM 1.62 RM 62,969.40 Reichsmarks 23,485.00 at RM 1.00 RM 23,485.00 Portuguese Reis 20,000.00 at RM 200 Esc 1.00 RM 200.00 Swiss Francs 6,970.00 at RM 16.50 (f.20 Frs) RM 23,001.00 Ducats 6,614.00 at RM 10.00 RM 66,140.00 Lire 3,740.00 at RM 0.50 RM 1,870.00 Austrian Shillings 2,925.00 at RM 2.3 RM 1.950.00 Turkish Pounds 417/75/00 at RM 3.50 RM 1,462.12 Belgas 1,740.00 at RM 0 50 RM 870.00 Levas 30.00 at RM 0.50 RM 15.00 Lei 1,177.50 at RM 0.50 RM 588.75 South African Pounds 4/00/00 at RM 20.40 RM 81.60 Dutch Gulden 905.00 at RM 17.00 (f.10 Fl) RM 1,538.50 Australian Pounds 7/00/00 at RM 20.40 RM 142.80 Dinars 41.00 at RM 0.50 RM 20.50 Swedish Crowns 30.00 at RM 11.20 (f.10 Kr) RM 33.60 Norwegian Crowns 55.00 at RM 11.20 (f.10 Kr) RM 61.60 Pesetas 50.00 at RM 1.50 RM 75.00 Finnish Marks 80.00 at RM 1.00 RM 80.00 Zloty 2,060.00 at RM 0.50 RM 1,030.00 Danish Crowns 360.00 at RM 11.20 (f.10 Kr) RM 403.20 Czechoslovakian Ducats 17.00 at RM 10.00 RM 170.00 Yen 2.00 at RM 0.50 RM 1.00 Cuban Pesos 10.00 at RM 4.20 RM 42.00 Mexican Pesos 111.50 at RM 4.20 RM 468.00 Albanian Francs 20.00 at RM 0.50 RM 10.00 Jugoslavian Ducats 1.00 at RM 5.00 RM 5.00 Tunisian Francs 180.00 at RM 1.62 RM 291.60 Peruvian Libre 1.00 at RM 1.00 RM 1.00 Chilean Dollars 1.00 at RM 4.20 RM 4.20 Total RM 1,736,554.12

Jewelry and other valuables: 15,883 Rings, gold, with brilliants and diamonds Average in RM: 1,500.00 [Total] RM: 23,824,500.00; 9,019 Ladies' gold wrist watches 250.00 2,254,750.00; 3,681 Gentlemen's gold pocket watches 500.00 1,840,400.00; 353 Bracelets with brilliants and diamonds 3,500.00 1,232,000.00; 1,716 Gold earrings with brill. and diam. 250.00 429,000.00; 2,497 Gold brooches with brill. and diam. 2,000.00 4,994,000.00; 130 Single large brilliants 1,000.00 130,000.00; 2,511.37 Carat Individual brilliants 100.00 251,137.00; 13,458.62 Carat Individual diamonds 50.00 672,931.00; 291 Tie pins with brilliants 100.00 29,100.00; 660 Gentlemen's gold wrist-watches 100.00 66,000.00; 458 Ladies' fob watches with brilliants 500.00 229,000.00. 273 Ladies' watches of platinum & brill. 1,200.00 327,600.00; 349 Ladies' gold fob watches 250.00 87,250.00; 362 Ladies' gold watches with brill. & diam. 600.00 317,200.00; 27 Armbands with brill. & diam. 250.00 6,750.00; 40 Gold brooches 350.00 14,000.00; 18 Cufflinks with brilliants 160.00 2,700.00; 114.20 Kg. Pearls 6,000,000.00; 63 Plat. & Brill. watch cases 1,000.00 63,000.00; 4 Ladies' platinum watches 300.00 1,200.00; 3 Gentleman's pocket watches with brill. 600.00 3,000.00; 4 Necklaces of brilliants and diamonds 1,500.00 6,000.00; 8 Ladies' golden ring-watches 150.00 1,200.00; 4 Ladies' fob watches with pearls 200.00 800.00; 18 Gold fountain pens 20.00 360.00; 5 Gold revolving pencils 15.00 75.00; 1 Gold cigarette case 400.00 400.00; 60,125 Watches of various kinds 10.00 601,250.00; 7.80 Kg. Coral 600.00; 3 Golden compacts 50.00 150.00; 103,614 Watches to be repaired 2.00 207,228.00; 29,391 Spectacles 3.00 88,173.00; 350 Shaving equipment 2.00 700.00; 800 Pocket knives 1.00 200.00; 3,240 Money purses 1.50 4,860.00; 1,315 Briefcases 2.50 3,287.50; 1,300 Scissors 0.50 750.00; 230 Flashlights 0.50 115.00; 6,943 Alarm clocks, to be repaired 1.00 6,943.00; 2,343 Alarm clocks, in order 4.00 9,372.00; 627 Sunglasses 0.50 313.50; 41 Silver cigarette cases 15.00 615.00; 230 Clinical thermometers 3.00 690.00; Total: 43,662,150.00

Textiles: 1901 Wagons of clothing, underclothing, bed feathers and rags to an average value of RM: 26,000,000.00; Camp articles to an average value of 20,000,000.00 Total: 46,000,000.00

Total Compilation: Currency delivered, Zlotys and RM-Notes: RM 73,852,080.74; Precious metals RM 8,973,651.60; Foreign currency in notes RM 4,521,224.13; Foreign currency in gold coins RM 1,736,554.12; Jewelry and other valuables RM 43,662,450.00; Textiles RM 46,000,000.00; Total RM 178,745,960.59

[signed] Rzepa SS Oberscharfuehrer and Chief of Cash Office

[signed] Wippern SS Sturmbannfuehrer and Chief of Administration

[sgd] Globocnik

[Rubber Stamp:] Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS, Ref. No. Secret/115

[initialled] H. H. [Himmler]

Measures for Pacifying Foreign Nationals During Transfer of Populations

Z-Villages 1. Poles who are fit for work have already been resettled during previous expulsions on so-called z-farms within the colonization area, with an increase of their former property. These z-farms form the nucleus of the z-village, where the German settlers and Polish workers are lodged. Not only do these Polish workers receive a guaranteed wage and an employment book, but their food supply is also cared for through the SWG.

Security Questions. 2. Only elements with a bad record will be expelled for security reasons. For this reason the security police are at present carrying out the following:

a. Villages which lie within that part of the district of z-areas which is to be colonized will be combed for elements who are a danger to security, so that only the reliable part of the population will remain.

b. Villages which lie outside the colonization area and are considered to be bandit infested are subject to same action. The population mentioned under paragraph a will then be invited to emigrate voluntarily to the uninhabited farms mentioned under paragraph . By this action the colonization area will be free and can be colonized by Germans.

Security measures are always looked upon with understanding by the peaceful part of the population; this will therefore be a way to pacify the population.

The Question of Expropriation. 3. All Poles, including those who are being brought into the labor cycle in the Reich, are to be given certificates confirming what property they have left behind. They will be informed that they will receive a suitable compensation some time in the form of goods or cash. This applies also to those who have already been expelled to date. The certificates are to be issued by the DUT. I request the Reichsfuehrer SS to give his approval to this.

State Property. 4. Admission of the whole of the expelled population into State property is not possible because of the overcrowding of the space.

Time for Colonization. 5. Owing to the favorable weather, spring tilling can take place five weeks earlier than usual this season. Owing to this shift in time, colonization will be carried out after the completion of spring tilling. This has the advantage on the one hand that the Poles can till their fields normally and production will not be upset, while on the other hand the settlers will not run the risk of not being able, in view of the shortness of the time, to carry out their spring tilling, owing to ignorance of local conditions. The settlers will, therefore, have the benefit of the harvest, and their reconstruction work can be carried out without any hurry.

6. The classification into four groups could take place without any further ado, owing to the fact that Groups I and II, as racially valuable, have no objection to being transferred to the Reich anyhow; Group III, for the greater part, will remain here in any case, whereas Group IV will be sent for employment as laborers. The communications from persons previously sent to the Reich, reporting that they are getting on well there, and the people's realization of the fact that up to now nobody has been treated like the Jews have already taken away the frightening atmosphere surrounding this system of grouping. It is precisely in such cases that one has to await the results of measures; only then does the realization prevail. The rumor mongers are then proved to be liars without any further ado.

7. Again I request you to consider whether my former proposal to lodge the expelled Poles, and especially also the Ukrainians in the Eastern territories, especially the Ukraine, may not be feasible after all. I believe that there is not only sufficient space today because of the events of the war, but also that this form of transferring population with new allocations of land would have the best results and that it facilitates the expulsion. For the Ukrainians this would mean a return to their own area. A tendency in this direction exists already, and for the Poles it is a fact with which they have reckoned for a long time.

I therefore request the Reichsfuehrer SS to leave the hitherto existing measures as they are.

The above-mentioned facts may not have been known to governor Waechter when the report was made.

[signed] Globocnik SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lieut. General of Police

[Rubber stamp] Personal Staff, Reichsfuehrer SS Correspondence administration File No. Secret/115

Measures for the further transfer of populations

As many quarters express themselves against the transfer of populations on the grounds that it causes too much unrest among the foreigners, thus disturbing production, the following measures have been decided upon:

1. Verbal propaganda will spread news about the discontinuation of these transfers.

2. No authority will announce anything before the actual moment when the transfer of populations is to be carried out. Planning will be done secretly.

3. The time for immigration will be fixed for after the spring tilling of the fields, so that the foreigners will carry out the cultivation of the land, and the new settlers will already be able to make use of the harvest. This has the advantage that, under the above mentioned presuppositions, the foreigners will till their fields in all districts, while the German settlers will not run the danger, in view of the shortness of the time, of possibly being hindered in their spring work.

4. The transfer of Poles should be carried out in such a manner that the good elements are put, as much as possible voluntarily, in districts cleared by the Security Police, and the transfer is entitled "The Establishment of Security in the Partisan districts". The bad elements will be taken away gradually, where they are not employed as auxiliary workers.

5. The announcement of the time of immigration will be made only on the day of the transfer of population.

6. All villages will be occupied in advance by the "Landwacht" (country guard) in all parts of the organization formed by settlers, who, having received previous training, are to save the use of our own SS forces.

O. U. the 7/1/1943 [initialled] H. H. [Himmler]

1. In the course of the security operation Werewolf I, the area roughly west of the points colonization area via Bilgoraj-Tarnogrod, bordered on the West by the district frontier, extending southwards are far as Belzec and from there along the road via Tomasgow to Zamosc as far as the southern border of the colonization area has been cleared of the native population.

2. The part to the South of the Bilgoraj wood will be handed over to the Ukrainians and in such a manner that-

a. The Ukrainians already living there will receive more land up to an average area of 6 hectares, so that a part of the evacuated land will already be colonized in that way, and

b. Where there are too few native Ukrainians, Ukrainian families will be moved from the Hrubieszower area and resettled there. The Ukrainian inhabited area will thus be loosened there and ground will be freed adjoining the colonization area.

3. The Bilgoraj wood itself will be completely evacuated and will not be recolonized.

4. The part to the north of the Bilgoraj wood, limited roughly by the Tomasgow-Krasnobrod road and further, will also be newly colonized with Ukrainians as under 2b.

5. The area to the South of the present colonization area of Zamosc will thus remain vacant, and racial Germans and persons of German stock can be settled there. Persons of German stock from the district of Hrubieszow have already been collected for this purpose. This is all the more necessary as they are not being abandoned to Polishdom as stray Germans.

6. In the course of the operations, the towns of Tomasgow and Zamosc will also be evacuated of Poles, and Germans are to be settled there. Accordingly the Security operation would have the following effect:

(I) The population of this area, who have lived on robbery and banditry for decades, is removed.

(II) About 30000 workers are brought to the Reich.

(III) The territory surrounding the German settlement area will then be settled with Ukrainians, who form a sort of buffer and are more peacefully inclined toward Germandom.

(IV) In addition, as a result of this colonization, the state of tension of the Poles will be transferred to the Ukrainians, and they are turned into defense forces.

(V) A new agrarian structure arises as proletarian ownership disappears and an average farm area of 6 hectares is formed, which contributes to intensification and increased production.

(VI) The German colonization territory will be free for a further influx of Germans, this presupposing a security measure. But the German colonization territory will thereby be enlarged which helps toward the essential security of the territory. Pressure by the Poles can then be exerted only from the North and it is then easier to guarantee the security of the colonization territory from one side.

[Signed] Globocnik SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lt. General of Police.

Trieste, 11/4/1943

The Higher SS and Police Chief in the Operational Zone of the Adriatic Coastal Area. Gl./Go. Diary No. 225/43 [initialled] H. H. [Himmler]

To the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, Heinrich Himmler, Berlin

I concluded Operation Reinhardt, which I have been directing on the government-general, on 10/19/1943, and have dissolved all camps.

I take the liberty of submitting the attached portfolio to you, Reichsfuehrer, as my final statement.

My observations on Lublin showed that a special center of radiation existed in the government-general and particularly in the Lublin district, and I have tried, therefore, to capture these dangerous tendencies graphically. It may prove to be a good thing for the future if we can point to the elimination of this danger. I have, however, also endeavored to give a picture of the employment of labor, from which one can not only gather the extent of the work, but also with how few Germans this fatal effort was made possible. It has at any rate grown to such proportions today, that well known industries are interesting themselves in it.

I have meanwhile handed these labor camps over to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl.

Please, Reichsfuehrer, look through this portfolio.

During a visit, you, Reichsfuehrer, held out to me the prospect that a few Iron Crosses might be awarded for the special performances of this hard task after the work had been concluded. Please advise me, Reichsfuehrer, whether I may submit suggestions in this connection.

I beg to point out that such an award to the forces of the local SS and Police Chief was authorized for the work in Warsaw, which formed only a comparatively small part of the total work.

I should be grateful to you, Reichsfuehrer, for a positive decision regarding this matter, as I would like to see the hard work of my men rewarded.

Heil Hitler! [signed] Globocnik SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lieut. General of Police

Note for the files Action "Reinhardt" also comes under "Top Secret" 1851/43 Secret. [Initialed] H

Field-Command Post, 11/30/1943

The Reichsfuehrer SS RF/M

[Rubber Stamp] Personal Staff, Reichsfuehrer SS Correspondence Administration.

File No. Secret 155

To the Higher SS and Police Chief in the Adriatic Coast zone of operations, SS Gruppenfuehrer GLOBOCNIK

Dear GLOBOCNIK,

I confirm receipt of your letter dated 11/4/1943 and your notification regarding the termination of Action Reinhardt. Also I.thank you for the portfolio you sent me.

I express to you my thanks and my acknowledgment for the great and unique services which you have performed to the entire German people by carrying out the Action Reinhardt.

Heil Hitler! Sincerely yours [signed] H. H. [H. Himmler]

Document 4032-PS

Deposition of Karl Reif [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 770-771.

Deposition on oath of Karl REIF, male, German nationality, of Lubeck-Travemunde, Fehlingstrasse 71a, sworn before Captain Duncan ELLIS, East Surrey Regiment, Investigating Officer, of War Crimes Investigation Unit, HQ British Army of the Rhine, at Lubeck on 5/29/1946.

1. I was arrested in Munich by the Gestapo in 8/1936 as I had brought anti-Nazi leaflets and newspapers from Switzerland to Munich. After my arrest I was placed in the concentration camp at Dachau. On 9/29/1939, I was sent from Dachau to Mauthausen where I was interned until 6/22/1942.

2. I cannot remember the exact date, but one day at one o'clock in the afternoon in 5-6/1942 HIMMLER came with a party of thirty to thirty-five high-ranking officers of the SS, the Wehrmacht, and the Nazi Party and with them was also Ernst KALTENBRUNNER.

3. When they arrived I was working in the "Wiener Graben" quarry where the party parked their cars. I immediately recognized KALTENBRUNNER from the photographs of him which I had seen in the newspapers and KALTENBRUNNER was also recognized at once by many other Austrians who were working there in the quarry.

4. I was carrying stones from the quarry into the camp and saw the party inspecting everything in the camp under the guidance of Commandant ZIERREISS. They began with the hospital, then went to the scullery and the prisoners' cook-house and afterwards into the cells, in the cellar of which was situated the crematorium, the morgue, and the gas chambers connected with the crematorium by a special entrance. The party left the camp at about 18.30 hours.

[signed] Karl REIF

Sworn by the said Deponent, Karl REIF, at Lubeck, on 5/29/1946, before me,Captain Duncan ELLIS, East Surrey Regiment, Investigating Officer, War Crimes Investigation Unit, HQ, British Army of the Rhine, detailed by C-in-C British Army of the Rhine.

[signed] D. ELLIS, Captain East Surrey Regiment

Document 4033-PS

Deposition of Oswald Pohl [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 771.

Deposition on oath of Oswald POHL, male, of Armsen 89, sworn before William K. MURDOCH, Capt. P.C., of War Crimes Investigation Unit at Tomato on 5/28/46.

I can testify with certainty that I have spoken to and seen SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Ernst KALTENBRUNNER on official business in the fall of 1943 or spring of 1944 in the Officers' Mess in MAUTHAUSEN, located at the righthand side in front of the camp entrance. I had there with him my noonday meal.

[signed] Oswald POHL

Sworn by the said Deponent, Oswald POHL voluntarily at Tomato on 5/28/1946 before William K. MURDOCH, Capt. P.C., detailed by C-in-C, British Army of the Rhine.

Title: "Document 4039-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 772.

[Poster Displayed in Warsaw 5/1941]

PROCLAMATION

Several cases of damages inflicted upon military installations and equipment, serving the defense of the country, induce me to state that even the removal of insignificant objects (as wooden poles and iron parts) constitutes an injury to military installations.

The intentional damaging of military equipment and installations of the German army will be sentenced by death in pursuant to the decree concerning the combating of violence in the General Government dated 10/31/1939.

I reserve the right to arrest hostages from communities located in the territory where the crimes take place in all those cases when the culprit is not found.

Warsaw, 5/5/1941 The District Chief in Warsaw [signed] Dr. Fischer Governor

Document 4045-PS

Affidavit of Oswald Pohl [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 805-807.

I, Oswald Pohl, after being duly sworn, state the following:

1. My name is Oswald Pohl. I was born in Duisburg, Germany, on 7/30/1892. Since 2/1/1934 I was Chief of the Economic and Administration Main Office of the Elite Guard [Schutzstaffel] (WVHA) . I occupied this position permanently until Germany's capitulation.

2. Through my activity as Chief of the WVHA I remember clearly two large business deals between my office and the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Reich Bank of Mr. Walter Funk. One deal concerned textiles from persons killed in concentration camps. In this connection Himmler endeavored to procure through Reich Economics Minister, Walter Funk, a higher allotment for the SS in the uniform material distribution. The other business deal concerned the business connection of my office with the Reich Bank President, Walter Funk, and the Reich Bank with regard to jewelry, rings, gold teeth, foreign exchange and other articles of value from the possessions of people, particularly Jews, who had been killed in concentration camps.

3. The connection of my office with the Reich Bank with regard to textiles of persons who had been killed in concentration camps, was instituted in the year 1941-1942. At that time I received the order from the Reich Fuehrer-SS and the German Police, Heinrich Himmler, who was my chief, to get in touch with the Reich Economics Minister, Walter Funk, to obtain a higher allotment of textiles for SS uniforms. Himmler instructed me to demand from Funk that we receive privileged treatment. The Ministry of Economics was receiving from the concentration camps a large amount of textiles delivered. These textiles had been collected in the extermination cam, Auschwitz, and other extermination camps, and then delivered to the proper office for used textiles.

4. As a result of this order received from my superior, Himmler, I visited the Reich Economics Minister, Funk, in his offices. I waited only a short while in his ante-room and then met him alone in his office. I informed Funk of my instructions that I was to ask him for more textiles for Waffen-SS uniforms, as we could deliver so many old textiles from the actions against Jews. I told him that we required these textiles for the Waffen-SS. The meeting lasted around ten minutes. It was openly discussed that we earned perhaps privileged treatment on account of the delivery of old clothes of dead Jews. It was a friendly conversation between Funk and myself and he said to me that he would settle the matter favorable with the gentleman concerned. How the subsequent settlement between Funk and his subordinates and my subordinates was handled in detail I do not know.

5. The second business deal between Walter Funk and the SS concerned the delivery of articles of value of dead Jews to the Reich Bank. It was in the year 1941-1942 after larger quantities of articles of value, such as jewelry, gold rings, gold fillings, spectacles, gold watches and such, had been collected in the extermination camps. These articles of value came in packed crates to Berlin to the WVHA. Himmler had ordered us to deliver these things to the Reichsbank. I remember that Himmler explained to me that negotiations concerning this matter had been conducted with the Reichsbank and Mr. Funk. As a result of an agreement which my Chief had made, I discussed with Reichsbank Director Emil Puhl the manner of delivery. In this conversation no doubt remained that the objects to be delivered were the jewelry and valuables of concentration camp inmates, especially of Jews, who had been killed in extermination camps. The objects in question were rings, watches, eye glasses, gold bars, wedding rings, brooches, pins, frames of glasses, foreign currency, and other valuables. Further discussions concerning the delivery of these objects took place between my subordinates and Puhl and other gentlemen of the Reichsbank. It was a giant quantity of valuables, since the delivery continued for months and years.

6. A part of these valuables of people killed in death camps I saw myself when Reichsbank President Funk and Vice-President Puhl invited us to an inspection of the Reichsbank vaults and subsequently to dinner. I don't remember exactly whether this was in 1941 or in 1942, but I do remember that I already knew Funk personally at that time from the textile industry, as I have described above. Vice-President Puhl and several other gentlemen of my staff went to the vaults of the Reichsbank. Puhl himself led us on this occasion and showed us gold bars and other valuable possessions of the Reichsbank. I remember exactly that various trunks of objects from concentration camps were opened. At this time Puhl or Waldhecker, who accompanied him, stated in my presence and in the presence of the gentlemen of my staff that a part of these valuables had been delivered by our office.

7. After we had inspected the various valuables in the vaults of the Reichsbank, we went upstairs to a room in order to have dinner with Reichsbank President Funk; this had been arranged for the time following the inspection. Besides Funk and Puhl the gentlemen of my staff were present; we were about 10 to 12 persons. I sat beside Funk and we talked among other things about the valuables, which I had seen in his vaults. On this occasion it was clearly stated that a part of the valuables which we had seen came from concentration camps.

Nurnberg, 7/15/1946

Read, approved, signed under oath. Signed: Oswald Pohl

Witnesses: Dr. Robert M. W. Kempner Office of US Chief of Counsel; Walter H. Rapp Office of US Chief of Counsel; Edith Kirchholtes Office of US Chief of Counsel

Title: "Document 4053-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 812.

[Stamp] Foreign Office Pol. I M 2181 Secret Reich Matter Received: 7/11/1941

Received by Secret teleprinter

TELEPRINTER OFFICE of THE FOREIGN OFFICE Secret Reich Matter

Telegram: Special Train Westphalia No, 711. 7/11/1941. 1245 hours. Through Office of Reich Foreign Minister to Legation Councillor Kramarz. No. 637.

Reference Teletype No. 2110 of 5.7. from Washington, Herr Reich Foreign Minister requests you submit immediately a written report regarding who amongst those in New York arrested on suspicion of espionage worked with the Abwehr and who with the SD. Paragraph. Herr Reich Foreign Minister requests for your investigations that you contact the Abwehr and compose your report in collaboration with Minister Luther.

-Sonnleithner-

Received: 11.7. 13.31 hours.

Pol I M Secret Reich Matter 2 North America. Not mimeographed.

/s/ H. Kram.

Title: "Document 4054-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 812-813.

Kult: KF Consul General Dr. Gyssling Submitted to Ambassador Luther

1. Two things made the support of agents of the Security Service by the German Consulate in Los Angeles virtually impossible:

(a) Because it has been expressly forbidden by the Embassy in Washington to support such agents in view of the danger of a compromise. The agents in question had been advised not to refer to the Consulate under any circumstances.

(b) Because persons who have occasionally introduced themselves as members of the Security Service did not have any identification papers and, almost without exception, made a rather dubious impression, so that there was always the danger that it might merely be a matter of provocation.

Directives by the Embassy to individual persons who were presumably working for the Security Service and, as such, were pursued by the American Secret Service, were complied with. In the case of an agent who had been living in Los Angeles for about a year and a half and who identified himself by a receipt of the OKW for a sum of money received, the Foreign Office was asked for advice since he was in serious money trouble. On request of the Foreign Office, several thousand dollars were then paid to him. He did not comply with an order which had been transmitted through the Foreign Office and the Consulate at the beginning of the year stipulating that he was to return to Germany immediately, but instead he proceeded to Mexico with a girl and failed to make use of a ticket which had been put at his disposal. The man concerned did not speak good English and did not have any idea of general conditions in Los Angeles.

2. The cooperation by the German Consulate and the Military and Air Attache, Lt. General Freiherr von Boetticher, has been intensive since the beginning of the war. Since the importance of Los Angeles is almost exclusively centered around matters of airplane production-apart from the building of ships which has started only recently-the rendering of information to the above named Attache was concentrated on this matter. He was sent a large number of cuttings from approximately ten Southern Californian papers and other publications, daily, as well as a special report of the Chamber of Commerce in Los Angeles dealing with this matter. In addition, a gentleman in the Consulate was designated at the beginning of the year to form his own picture about twice a week regarding the amount in which individual types were manufactured and delivered by the factories concerned. his is possible in Los Angeles because, in view of the mild climate, almost the entire airplane production takes place in public, (open halls, etc.) . The cooperation of the Consulate in this matter has always been appreciated by Lt. General Freiherr von Boetticher.

3. The Navy Attache has been supported in a similar manner. e had, on the other hand, stated in former years that Consulates did not have to concern themselves with such matters. During the last months, the Consulate found an agent in Southern California with whom there will be established good cooperation.

Hereby submitted to Ambassador Dr. Dieckhoff.

Berlin, 11/4/1941.

[signed] Gyssling.

Title: "Document 4055-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 814-816.

Berlin, 3/12/1942

In Charge of the Office of the Reich Minister of Justice

Dear Reich Minister Dr. Lammers:

I am just being informed by my advisor about the result of the meeting of March 6 regarding the treatment of Jews and descendants of mixed marriages. I am now expecting the official transcript. According to the report of my advisor, decisions seem to be under way which I am constrained to consider absolutely impossible for the most part. Since the result of these discussions are to constitute the basis for the decision of the Fuehrer, and since one of the advisors from your Ministry participated likewise in these discussions, I urgently desire to discuss this matter with you on time. As soon as I have received the transcript of the meeting, I shall take the liberty in calling you to ask you if and when a discussion may take place.

With sincerest regards and Heil Hitler! Yours devotedly /s/ Dr. Schlegelberger

To the Reich Minister and Chief of the Party Chancellery Dr. LAMMERS, Berlin

In charge of the Office of the Reich Minister of Justice charged with the conduct of official business. IV b 40 g RE

Berlin W 8, 4/5/1942 Wilhelmstrasse 65 Secret Reich Matter

1. The Chief of the Party Chancellery SS-Oberfuehrer Klopfer

2. The Reich Minister of the Interior Attn: The Secretary of State Dr. Stuckart

3. The Chief of the Security Police and the SD SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich

4. The Deputy for the Four-Year-Plan Attn: State Secretary Mr. Neumann

5. The Foreign Office Attn: Undersecretary Luther

6. The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Attn: Gau Leader and State Secretary Dr. Meyer

7. The Race and Settlement Main Office of the Reichsfuehrer-SS Attn: SS-Gruppenfuehrer Hofmann.

RE: Final Solution of the Jewish Question.

1. The final solution of the Jewish question presupposes a clear-cut and permanently applicable definition of the group of persons for whom the projected measures are to be initiated. Such a definition applies only when we desist from the beginning from including descendants of mixed marriages of the second degree in these measures. The measures for the final solution of the Jewish question should extend only to full Jews and descendants of mixed marriages of the first degree, but should not apply to descendants of mixed marriages of the second degree [Note: first degree presumably those with two non-Aryan grandparents, and second degree with only one].

2. With regard to the treatment of Jewish descendants of mixed marriages of the first degree, I agree with the conception of the Reich Minister of the Interior which he expressed in his letter of 2/1/1942, to the effect that the prevention of propagation of these descendants of mixed marriages is to be preferred to their being thrown in with the Jews and evacuated. It follows therefrom that the evacuation of these half-Jews who are no more capable of propagation is obviated from the beginning. There is no national interest in dissolving the marriages between such half-Jews and a full-blooded German.

Those half-Jews who are capable of propagation should be given the choice to submit to sterilization or to be evacuated in the same manner as Jews. In the case of sterilization, as well as in that of evacuation of the half-Jew, the German-blooded spouse will have to be given the opportunity to effect the dissolution of the marriage. I see no objection to the German spouse's obtaining the possibility of divorcing his sterilized or evacuated spouse in a simplified procedure without the limitations of Par. 53 of the Marriage Law.

3. An exception might be worthy of consideration with respect to those half-Jews who have descendants who are to become a part of the German national community and who are to lose themselves in it, once and for all. If these descendants are to be incorporated into the German folk community as full-fledged members-which has to be the aim in the case of a genuine final solution of the Jewish question-it seems advisable to keep them from being judged as inferiors or from having feelings of inferiority which could arise easily out of the knowledge and the conscience that their immediate ancestors have been affected by the planned defensive measures of the racial brotherhood. It is for this reason that it should be considered whether or not half-Jews whose still-living descendants are likewise half-Jews should be spared from evacuation as well as sterilization.

4. I have no scruples against facilitation of divorce in marriages between racial Germans and Jews. This facilitation should then extend to marriages with those who are considered as Jews. The divorce will have to be granted upon the request of the German-blooded partner in a simplified procedure. I have considerable scruples about compulsory divorces, on motion of the public prosecutor. Such compulsion is unnecessary because the spouses will be separated in any case by the evacuation of the Jewish partner. An enforced divorce, moveover, is without avail, because, though it cuts the marriage ties, it does not cut the inner tie between the spouses; moreover, it does not relieve the German partner from the scorn to which he is exposed by clinging to his marriage. Finally, a clinging to marriage on the part of the German-blooded partner is to be expected only in the case of older marriages which have endured throughout many years. In these cases, in which the Jewish partner as a rule is not evacuated but confined to an old people's ghetto, the German-blooded partner who disclaims his membership in the German community should not be prohibited from being admitted to the ghetto.

[signed] Dr. Schlegelberger

Title: "Document 4057-PS, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 816-817.

[Stamp] To be treated as CONFIDENTIAL only.

(SECRET Coded Matter) (geh. Ch. V.)

Copenhagen, 4/25/1944 1000 Arrival, 4/25/1944 1645 No. 509 of 24.4

Since, after the first half of April had passed quietly, about 20 April some acts of sabotage and surprise attacks occurred again, especially in Copenhagen, I have decreed the following countermeasures:

1. Execution of a student convicted of an attack against a member of the Wehrmacht.

2. Act of counter-terrorism for every act of sabotage and attack.

3. Closing of moving picture theaters in the greater Copenhagen area until further notice.

4. Preliminary blockade of all communications, in person and by news, with Sweden (in order to achieve a shock effect and hamper enemy propaganda).

5. Preliminary putting into force of the authority of SS and Police Court XXX in Copenhagen for sabotage and similar crimes (here I refer to my simultaneous report made by cipher machine).

Title: "Document 4057-PS, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 817.

State Secretary Keppler

Under State Sec. Police/

Ambassador Ritter

Ambassador Gaus

Director Pers. Office

Director Harbor Police

Director Legal Police

Director Cultural Police

Director Press Police

Director Radio Police

Chief Protectorate

Dike Police/

Group Director Inl. I

Group Director Inl. II

Labor Expl. with Pol. VI

Ambassador von Rintelen

Minister Benzler

Minister Frohwein/

Minister v. Grundherr/

Vice Legation Councillor Melchers

Legation Councillor Grote

[Note: Names in above distribution list which have been checked in pencil are indicated thus: /]

[Penciled notes] St. S. i Daen 2458

Document 4058-PS

Affidavit of Kurt Schmitt [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 818.

Nurnberg, 8/1/1946.

I, Dr. Kurt Schmitt, at present at farm Tiefenbrunn, near Starnberg, Upper Batavia, make the following statement under oath:

I was born at Heidelberg on 10/7/1886. As Minister of Economics, I was a member of the Reich Cabinet from 6/30/1933 until the beginning of 1/1935. I resigned from the Cabinet, technically for reasons of ill health (6/28/1934), but factually because of deep differences of opinion with the policy of the Hitler Cabinet. I informed Hitler, Göring, Guertner, Schacht, von Papen, and Blomberg about these differences of opinion. The differences consisted mainly of the fact that an always increasing rearmament took place instead of a genuine reemployment program. Even at that time, this was in the year 1934, I recognized that this would lead to war and to a terrible disaster. Another fact was that I regarded the 6/30/1934, action of the regime as murderous. In Autumn 1935 I told this to the American Ambassador Dodd. The nationalistic tendencies of Hitler and his collaborators connected with the unlimited rearmament were the road to war. This policy became more and more apparent to the members of the Cabinet: When I pointed this out to Mr. Blomberg, who was at that time Minister of War, he declared: "I am a soldier and this development is a fate." When I saw the increasing and unscrupulous radicalism in all fields, such as rearmament, Jewish question, church matters, legislation, and foreign policy, I felt that I had to resign from the Reich Cabinet. I participated in about 20 or 25 meetings of the Reich Cabinet where Göring, Darre, Goebbels, Lammers and Frick had great influence. In addition to the above-mentioned reasons of my resignation, I have to say that the SA gained a more and more disastrous influence, as a destructive element in economic and Jewish matters; I have also to add the fact of the complete arbitrariness and lawlessness of the Gauleaders (Gauleiter) who executed arrests and confiscations.

Read, Sworn, Signed: Dr. Kurt SCHMITT Reich Minister of Economics from 6/30/1933, until middle of 1/1935

Sworn before me 8/1/1946 Dr. R. M. W. Kempner Office of US Chief of Counsel

Title: "Document 4064-PS, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp.

XXX Corps IC Ref. 752/41 Secret. [Stamp] 72. Division 11/27/1941 Diary No. Ic 356/41 Secret Army Headquarters, 11/20/1941

Army High Command 11 Ref: Dept Ic/AD No. 2379/41 Secret

Since 22.6 the German people are engaged in a life and death struggle against the Bolshevist system.

This struggle is not being carried on against the Soviet Armed Forces alone in the established form laid down by European rules of warfare.

Behind the front too the fighting continues. Partisan snipers dressed as civilians attack single soldiers and small units and try to disrupt our supplies by sabotage with mines and infernal machines. Bolshevists left behind keep the population freed from Bolshevism in a state of unrest by means of terror and attempt thereby to sabotage the political and economic pacification of the country. Harvests and factories are destroyed and the city population in particular is thereby ruthlessly delivered to starvation.

Jewry constitutes the middle man between the enemy in the rear and the still fighting remainder of the Red Armed Forces and the Red leadership. More strongly than in Europe, it holds all the key positions in the political leadership and administration, controls trades and guilds and further forms the nucleus for all unrest and possible uprisings.

The Jewish-Bolshevist system must be exterminated once and for all. Never again must it encroach upon our European living space.

The German soldier has therefore not only the task of crushing the military potential of this system. He comes also as the bearer of a racial concept and as the avenger of all the cruelties which have been perpetrated on him and on the German people.

The fight behind the lines is not yet being taken seriously enough. Active cooperation of all soldiers must be demanded in the disarming of the population, the control and arrest of all roving soldiers and civilians and the removal of Bolshevist symbols.

Every instance of sabotage must be punished immediately with the severest measures and all signs thereof must be reported.

The food situation at home makes it essential that the troops should as far as possible be fed o the land and that furthermore the largest possible stocks be placed at the disposal of the homeland. Particularly in enemy cities a large part of the population will have to go hungry. Nevertheless nothing which the homeland has sacrificed itself to contribute may, out of a misguided sense of humanity, be given to Prisoners or to the population-so long as they are not in the service of the German Wehrmacht.

The soldier must appreciate the necessity for harsh punishment of Jewry, the spiritual bearer of the Bolshevist terror. This is also necessary in order to nip in the bud all uprisings which are mostly attributable to Jews.

Title: "Document 4064-PS, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 827-828.

It is the task of leaders at all levels to keep constantly alive the meaning of the present struggle. Support for the Bolshevist fight behind the front by way of thoughtlessness must be prevented.

It is to be expected that non-Bolshevist Ukrainians, Russians and Tartars will be converted to the New Order. The non-participation of numerous, alleged anti-Soviet elements must give place to a definite decision in favor of active cooperation against Bolshevism. Where it does not exist it must be forced by suitable measures.

Voluntary cooperation in the reconstruction of occupied territory is an absolute necessity for the achievement of our economic and political aims.

It has as its condition a just treatment of all non-Bolshevist sections of the population some of whom have for years fought heroically against Bolshevism.

The ruling of this country demands from us results, strictness with ourselves and submergence of the individual. The bearing of every soldier is constantly under observation. It can make enemy propaganda ineffective or give it a springboard. If the soldier in the country takes from the peasant, the last cow, the brood sow, the last chicken or the seed, then no restoration of the economy can be achieved.

In all measures it is not the momentary success which is decisive. All measures must, therefore, be judged by their effectiveness over a period of time.

Respect for religious customs, particularly those of Mohammedan Tartars, must be demanded.

In pursuance of those concepts there are other measures besides to be carried out by the later Administration. The enlightenment of the population by propaganda, encouragement of personal initiative, e.g. by prizes, extensive detailing of the population towards fighting the partisans and expansion of the local auxiliary police must be given more significance.

For the achievement of this objective the following must be demanded: Active cooperation of soldiers in the fight against the enemy in the rear, No soldier to go about alone at night, All motor vehicles to be equipped with adequate armament, A self-assured, but not overbearing attitude from all soldiers, Restraint towards prisoners and the other sex, No waste of food.

Severest action to be taken:

Against despotism and self-seeking, Against lawlessness and lack of discipline, Against every transgression of the honor of a soldier.

The Supreme Commander /s/ von Manstein.

Distribution: right down to the Regiments and independent Batallions

Document 4065-PS

National Social Education Work in the Armed Forces, Part 01 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 829-831.

6.6.39

The Bearer of Arms-Political Soldier

Refs. (1) German Army Year Book 1939, Page 50, "Soldier and Politics". (2) "The Training Manual" 3rd Edition 1939, page 98.

The "political soldier" has already become a concept of the Third Reich. He is the man in whom "civil courage" is no longer lacking, to whom action in the political world has become self-evident for a soldier. His model is the old veteran ("alte Kaempfer").

At the side of the "political soldier" stands the soldier as bearer of arms. He also is not a "non-political soldier."

When it says in Paragraph 1) of No. 26 of the Defense Law of 5/1935 "the soldiers must not take part in political activity," that merely means that the soldier is not to talk politics.

According to the same paragraph the soldier still has the right to vote and to take part in elections. In this too there is no political disadvantage to be seen, but it is clear that the soldier is regarded as the political supporter of his Fuehrer and Supreme Commander. For him there is no question of "Yes" or "No".

In accordance with these paragraphs also lies membership of the Party and its organizations, as well as of one of its attached units, for the continuation of active military service. That is to say, the soldier on active military service has to act only in accordance with the orders of his military superiors. That is a clear and self-evident rule for the "political soldier" as well as for the soldier as bearer of arms, demanded by unconditional obedience on the part of the soldier and by military discipline.

Basically, however, the soldier as bearer of arms is a political soldier. He is a convinced National Socialist, a representative of the rules of living of National Socialism. He upholds the highest values of the National Socialist ideology,' honor, loyalty, arms, blood and soil, a people and a greater Germany without end, the common good before the individual good, etc.

Military training should and will bring to completion training in school, Hitler Youth and Reich Labor Service.

Above and beyond that it will have its effect on the future life of the soldier who leaves military service. The soldier should continue in the future to live the soldier's life of duty as the National Socialist life of duty.

Close liaison between the Armed Forces and Party, between the Armed Forces and people guarantees a clear sympathetic understanding with the common people. In it, by his behavior in and out of service, the soldier will be as much of a front-line fighter as is demanded of the political soldier.

In the experiences of the front are to be found the roots of National Socialism, in the experiences of the front the feeling of comradeship and common blood showed themselves with greatest effect.

The fearful collapse at the end of the Great War is an experience which the front-line fighter, and indeed those who come after him, must never forget. This experience teaches the value of the strong union of all classes. It demands the best and firmest partnership in battle. It demands that the soldier should know the rules of living of his people, that he should know what he must guarantee with his whole mind and endeavor, and with his life.

Ideological leadership in the Armed Forces should popularize these ideas more and more with all bearers of arms and educate them at the same time to be ideological fighters. Suitable measures are inserted according to plan in the training course.

The Armed Forces are endeavoring to fulfill to the utmost the Fuehrer's demand that they should be "the last and highest school of patriotic education," in which the soldier "should obtain from the strength of commonly felt esprit de corps the conviction of the insuperability of his nationality."

They know that above and beyond the handling of weapons and battle technique and their application in the service rendered in the struggle by the spirit, the spiritual attitude is decisive for the final action and success.

In their work of education they will awaken and strengthen the front-line courage, and here meet up on the same level with the work of education o the political soldier.

The heroic prototypes of soldiery are an encouragement to it, the fallen soldiers of the Great War and Spain stand beside those who fell for the movement, who by voluntarily pledging their lives in the political fight for power, created the basis for political freedom and the reassumed military force of the German people.

In political and ideological training the soldier should learn to know the greatness of the history of his people, the heroic figures from the different historical periods. The tasks of the present and of the future should be made known to him. A sense of German living space and of a national political aim should be awakened in him. His feeling of responsibility as a soldier and a National Socialist should be aroused to the utmost.

In him soldiery and National Socialism should blend into law, according to which he makes his start, according to which he fights, according to which he triumphs or dies.

Officers and soldiers know that weapon and ideology belong together and in common form the forces which will master all tasks.

[signature illegible]

Document 4065-PS

National Social Education Work in the Armed Forces, Part 02 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 831-832.

DRAFT of a speech for the opening of the training course for commanders in Munich.

[Handwritten noteillegible]

The next war will be the struggle for the victory of our ideology.

Democracies led by Jews and Freemasons against Totalitarian , States.

At the end of such a war there must be a clear decision-no compromise solution.

It is therefore a matter of existence or non-existence.

More than ever in the history of war will material play a large part. Material has value, however, only when man masters it.

Even in a material war the decisive factor is man his spirit, his soul.

Glance in the newspapers, serious times. The efforts of our opponents stand out more and more clearly. Uncertain when and how it will come to a decision. (But however the course.)

Weapon training is not sufficient because the spiritual greatness of the German soldier, yes of the whole German people, is decisive in a battle such as the coming one.

Therefore: Commanding is no longer sufficient-Leadership is necessary. The decisive importance of this ability to lead much too little recognized. Without the right attitude on our part we cannot educate and lead soldiers. In the fight for the victory of our ideology only he can fight who is himself permeated with this ideology.

(Course should be stimulus. Most diligent work demanded. The demands of war must be met in time of peace.

Pretence is crime. Only the deed counts.

The commonplace in peacetime secures the basis for victory.)

Manifold tasks in every sphere in the training of the Officer Corps and the NCO Corps, in the training of the troops, in their recruiting, (in the attitude of the commander as managing director). By his example the officer must continually be an educator and a living proof of the true greatness and truth of the National Socialist ideology.

(Only the commander, who possesses and shows this basic attitude, fulfills his duty.)

[More illegible handwritten notes]

Title: "Document 4067-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 832.

TELETYPE G. WNOL 03295 9/6 1345.

Here First Lt. Hartenberg GWNOL Captain Birnbach FRR [Note: Fuehrer-used as a priority symbol] G-WNOL 03295 9/6 1345.

FRR Panzer Army Africa via German General with the Supreme Command of the Italian Armed Forces, Rome.

For Panzer Army Africa via German General with the Supreme Command of the Italian Armed Forces in Rome.-OKW/Quartermaster General for information-General z.b.v. at OKH for information-Supreme Command of the Air Force/Quartermaster General for information-OKW/W R for information. Top Secret, only to be transmitted via officers. According to information received, numerous German political refugees are supposed to be amongst the Free French Units in Africa. The Fuehrer has ordered that they are to be treated with the greatest severity. They are therefore to be disposed of without mercy in battle. Where this has not happened, they are to be shot retroactively on the command of the nearest German officer immediately and without further ado, as long as they do not have to be kept back for the time being for screening purposes. Written handing on of this order is forbidden. Commanders are to be informed verbally.

Document 4069-PS

French High Command In Germany

Baden-Baden, 7/18/1946: Delegation Of The Ministry Of Justice For The Discovery Of War Crimes In Germany, General Direction Of Justice, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 832-834.

The Delegate. Reference. JUS/CG/No. 2680 832

President FURBY General Director of Justice Delegate in Germany for the Discovery of War Crimes. to The Secretary General of the French Delegation at the International Tribunal in NURNBERG

In reply to your telegram of 13 July received today, I have the honour to forward to you the file of the murder of General MESNY which I have in my possession.

I should be obliged if you would return it to me when you have no further use for it so that the inquiries I asked for can be continued.

THE DELEGATE [Stamp of the Military Government in the French Zone.] General Direction of Justice.

Inclosure:-1 file

On January 20th, in the morning, Commandant PRAWITT, head of Oflag IV-C, came into the rooms of the French Generals and spoke to us as follows:

"I inform you officially that General MESNY was shot yesterday in Dresden for trying to- escape. He has been buried in Dresden with military honors from a detachment of the Wehrmacht."

Two facts remain obscure in this sombre tragedy:

(1)--The transport of General MESNY alone (second car). The choice of General VAUTHIER, then the cancelling of the order seemed very suspicious to us giving the attitude of the general, who was a volunteer for work in Germany, and whose transfer to a reprisal camp seemed inexplicable.

(2)-General MESNY, whose eldest son is in a camp for political deportees in Germany, said to me several times during the course of conversation: "If up to 1944 I always tried to prepare my escape, afterwards I gave up trying altogether, even if I had t every chance of succeeding.-First of all, the end of the war is only a question of weeks,-moreover, and especially, I should be much too afraid that my flight would cost my eldest son his life."

An hour before his departure from KOENIGSTEIN on January 19th, General MESNY repeated these words to me again.

And how can one imagine that a general in uniform would attempt to escape, given the transport conditions described above?

If it is true that General MESNY was shot during the transport from KOENIGSTEIN to COLDITZ, it could not be for trying to escape.

Premeditation or the terrified act of a German officer (after a discussion or a request for a half of a few minutes), these are, we think the only explanations for this tragic drama.

General BUISSON

Document 4069-PS

French High Command In Germany

Baden-Baden, 7/18/1946: Delegation Of The Ministry Of Justice For The Discovery Of War Crimes In Germany, General Direction Of Justice, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 834-835.

Beurget du Lac 4/29/1945

Division Commander General Louis Buisson ex-prisoner of War in Oflag IV-C, repatriated from Germany on 4/20/1945.

to The Minister of War, on the subject of General MESNY who is supposed to have been shot in Dresden on 1/19/1945.

On 1/18/1945, the following 6 officers, all generals, from the camp of KOENIGSTEIN-Oflag IV B, were picked out and told to leave the Camp on 19 January in the morning-for an unknown destination: -1st car: 6 a.m. Generals DAINE and de BOISSE -2nd car: 6:15 a.m. Generals FLAVIGNY and BUISSON -3rd car: 6:30 a.m. Generals MESNY and VAUTHIER

On the 19 January, if the first car left at the appointed time, it was not the same for the other two, as both their order of departure and the times were changed.

Second car 7 a.m. General MESNY alone (for according to information given General BUISSON by the German interpreter ROSENBERG, an order had arrived from the German High Command during the night, cancelling General VAUTHIER'S departure).

Third car: 8 a.m. Generals FLAVIGNY and BUISSON.

The orders for the journey were draconian: -destination unknown, -it was strictly forbidden to make any halt on the way. -the door handles were taken of the cars, -there was a German officer in each car, with an automatic pistol on his knees and his finger on the trigger.

On our arrival in Colditz (Oflag IV-C) the reprisal camp, towards noon on 19th January, we noticed the absence of General MESNY, who had not arrived; we thought he had been sent to another camp, although his luggage was in the truck with that of the other four generals.

INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE CENTRAL AGENCY FOR PRISONERS OF WAR French Service EF.120.661 (RFOD 10.511) NJ/AJ.

Geneva, 4/5/1945

Madame MESNY 4, Place Puvis de Chavannes LYON

We regret to inform you that Monsieur DENZLER, attache at the Swiss Legation in Berlin, has just sent us the following information concerning General MESNY:

"On 2/6/1945 I visited Oflag IV D in Colditz and at the express request of the people concerned, I am sending you the following information:

The Generals FLAVIGNY, de BOISSE and BUISSON have been transferred from Oflag IV B in Koenigstein to Oflag IV C in Colditz. The Generals MESNY and VAUTHIER have also left Koenigstein in a private car for Colditz. According to a communication from Commandant PRAWILL General MESNY was shot near Dresden when he was trying to escape."

We immediately got in touch with our Delegation in Berlin in order to try and learn some details from the German authorities as to this tragic event. We shall not fail to send you any information we receive.

With our deepest sympathy, we beg to remain

Yours faithfully, International Red Cross Committee Central Agency for Prisoners of War GENEVA [Signed]: M. LENOIR

Document 4071-PS

Affidavit of Rudolf Schoenberg [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 836-837.

Garmisch-Partenkirchen 7/21/1946.

I, Rudolf Schoenberg, born at Krenau in Upper Silesia on the 5/10/1908, was deported on the 11/5/1940 with about 350 Jews from the town of Krenau in Upper Silesia to the camp of Sakrau in Upper Silesia. Sakrau Camp was a so-called "forced labor camp" in which all the inmates were Jews. I was later in eight other so-called forced labor camps: Sakrau, Mechtal, Markstedt, Klettendorf, Langbielau, Faulbrueck, Reichenbach and Annaberg in Upper Silesia. Almost the same conditions existed in all these camps. Very hard work with the minimum of food consisting of 200-400 grams of bread per day and a water soup. There was only rarely 20-25 grams of margerine in addition. These camps were mostly guarded by the SA, but at times also by the Wehrmacht or the Organization Todt. As has already been mentioned above, we had to carry out the hardest work with the minimum of food and in winter without sufficient clothing or shoes, while being very badly ill-treated by the guards and also in part-by the foremen who were also mostly SA men or other Party members. According to my experiences, these so-called forced labor camps were not far behind the concentration camps and perhaps not at all. These camps did not actually possess any crematoria or other "social installations" of Hitler rule. But there too (I should like to stress that these camps mostly contained 4 to 800 men, with the exception of Markstedt which had about 3000 Jews of different nationalities as well as Poles, Frenchmen, Belgians, Dutchmen and Greeks) there was no lack of deaths owing to ill-treatment and malnutrition; thus for instance as early as the beginning of 1942 so-called sick transports-i.e. people who were already so weakened by malnutrition and ill-treatment that they could not in practice do any more productive workwere deported from Mechtal camp to Kosel near Heidebreck in Upper Silesia where they were killed by injections or gassing. In Marstedt and Faulbrueck too, despite the relatively small number of inmates, 12 and more persons died daily. These men were laid to their last rest somewhere at the edge of the town or of the forest like dead cattle. The corpses were loaded on to a cart in sacks or, at best, in old packing cases and buried as described above.

In view of the quantity of material, I am unable to write down all the details of my five years of torture. I should only like to show by the above that, according to my experiences, the methods of the SA by no means lagged behind those of the SS. I am always ready to describe these statements of mine in detail orally. I am also ready-as I was in several camps and have therefore found a relatively large proportion of my comrades in misfortune again-to get hold of these to confirm my statements.

I should like to add also that I was carried off by SA men in Berlin as early as 3/1933-i.e. immediately after the taking over of powerand was very badly ill-treated, so that I had to be picked up in the street and taken to the Urban Hospital at Friedrichshain. It seems to me that the documents regarding this can be found in the hospital concerned. All I wish to say here is-that the SA in no way lagged behind the SS in their murderous and criminal methods at that time already.

I, Rudolf Schoenberg, hereby declare that the above statements are founded on pure truth and I am at all times ready to repeat and add to this testimony on oath.

Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 7/22/1946. Fichtackerstr. 4.

[signed] Rudolf Schoenberg

Certified a true signature of Schoenberg in the presence of the undersigned:

[signed] Melvin W. Nietz Major, Infantry Military Government Officer.

Document C-60

Reconnaissance And Attack Within Greek Territorial Water (Island Of Crete) [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp.

TOP SECRET FueHRER H Q. 3/24/1941 8 copies Copy Nr. 3.

High Command of the Armed Forces "WFST"/Dep. L (I Op) No. 00504/41 G.C. Top Secret Only by officer.

Effective immediately, the Leader and Supreme Commander has authorized reconnaissance and attack against all naval forces (including Greek forces) within Greek territorial waters surrounding the island of Crete.

The Chief of the High Command By Order [signed] JODL

Distribution: Supreme Command of the Air Force, Air Force General Staff Ia 1st copy

Supreme Command of the Army (Information) 2nd copy

Supreme Command of the Navy, naval situation report. 3rd copy

Chief, Armed Forces operational Staff 4th copy

Chief, Air; same copy for War Diary 5th copy

Air I L operational 6th copy

Air I H operational 7th copy

Air I K operational 8th copy

Document C-100

Sink at Sight Policy, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 838-840.

MID/24/T 7/45.

Throughout the latter part of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, the "sink at sight" policy was being evolved by the Germans. The following extracts from German documents all have some bearing on this subject.

I. Extracts from docments contained in "Kriegstagebuch 1 Skl. C. Heft VII. Oberlegungen des Chefs der Seekriegsleitung und Niedershriften ueber Besprechungen mit dem Fuehrer."

From a report on a conference in Zoppot between the Chief of Naval War Staff (Raeder) and the Fuehrer, at which Generaloberst Keitel was present:

"(2) The strengthening of A/S activity (planes, armed merchant ships) eliminates the possibility of searching British merchant ships. The Fuehrer agrees to the proposal that action without warning be taken against any merchant ship, definitely established as enemy (not passenger ships), on the assumption that she will be armed. When possible, neutrals should be specially well-treated, in order to show that the system has not been radically altered."

(P.3 of "Unterredung Chef der Skl. mit dem Fuehrer am 23.9 in Zoppot. (In Gegenwart Generaloberst Keitel)")

From a report, signed by Raeder (Ob.D.M.) [C. in C. of the Navy] on a meeting he had with the Fuehrer. General Jodl was present:

"(2) Report on the intensification of the war at sea, as an appendix to the memorandum sent to the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer has agreed to:

(a) the torpedoing of French and British merchant ships without warning.

(b) the torpedoing of passenger ships in convoy, provided that some time elapses between the announcement of this intention and the torpedoing. Ob.d.M. points out that passenger ships are already being torpedoed, if they sail without lights."

("Vortrag Ob.d.M. beim Fuehrer am 16.10.1939. Gegenwart General Jodl")

From a report, signed by Raeder, on a meeting he had with the Fuehrer. Gen.Ob. Keitel and Korv. Kapt v. Puttkamer were present:

"(3) The U-boat war …

Query: Should a proclamation, concerning the intensification of the U-boat war, be made to neutral countries at the time of the commencement of a land offensive, so that any protests to it, by being made at the same time as other, possibly stronger protests, create less stir in the world? Ob.d.M. suggests a much more gradual intensification-step by step-without, for the time being, taking a proclamation into account. At the moment, a proclamation such as this is less necessary, as the Americans have themselves announced a prohibited area for their ships round Britain and France, whereby encounters with the powerful neutrals are eliminated. (See appendix.)

Ob.d.M. suggests as the next step, the sinking without warning of enemy passenger ships, which are often heavily armed and used as troop transports, or for carrying contraband cargoes. It is known that these ships are armed; it is even shown in pictures. The Fuehrer agrees to this, provided that the names of the large ships concerned are announced, and that it is established that they are being used as auxiliary cruisers or troop transports. Ob.d.M. suggests, as a later step, the sinking without warning of neutral ships, which we definitely know carry contraband goods, whose port and time of departure and whose route are known to us (i.e. Greek steamers). The suggestion will be put forward by Ob.d.M. for consideration as soon as the possibility of a change in attitude among neutral nations is established (i.e. in the case of an offensive). The immunity from attack of ships owned by friendly nations (Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain) should be continued. Setting up of a communications and control organization in neutral ports (appendix, section B, final sentence)."

("Vortrag beim Fuehrer am 10.XI.1939 (Gegenwart: Gen.Ob. Keitel und K.Kpt.v. Puttkamer).")

Document C-100

Sink at Sight Policy, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 840-842.

Appendix to the above:

"I. Proclamation

By the declaration of a prohibited zone for American ships in the European area, a new situation has arisen in connection with the necessity of an announcement in the form of a proclamation. The possibility exists that the war at sea against- Britain can be intensified to such an extent by war measures, that almost the identical goal is attained as that aimed at by the proclamation.

The intentions of the general war directorate must be considered when the necessity for the issue of a proclamation, or the appointing of its time of issue, is settled.

II. Measures for the intensification of the war on merchant shipping.

(A) Present position.

(1) The following are not yet affected by the intense form of war on merchant shipping (sinking without warning): (a) all neutral merchant ships sailing alone, or under neutral escort; (b) passenger ships sailing-alone (even armed passenger ships), if they are built to accommodate a large number of passengers.

(2) The following are not, as yet, liable to capture: (a) merchant ships of friendly neutral states: Italy, Spain, Japan, Russia; (b) all neutral ships sailing alone towards an enemy port, provided that their manner is correct and their cargo does not include contraband goods; (c) all neutral ships, without contraband goods on board sailing from enemy ports.

(B) Suggestion for further intensification:

(as a measure to be put into force when the most intense form is required)

(a) freedom of action against all enemy ships, including passenger ships: Grounds: armament, use as troop transports. (b) further methodical laying of mines in British harbours and approach points. (c) concentrated attack by the operational air force on the main enemy import harbors. (d) support of these war measures by the setting up of a communications and control organisation in neutral ports, and by strong political and economic pressure on neutral countries for the purpose of terminating their merchant shipping traffic with Britain

(V) Further possibilities, which are, however, undesirable at the present time:

(1) merchant shipping warfare in accordance with the Prize Regulations against Italian, Spanish, Russian, and Japanese ships.

(2) the sinking without warning of all neutral ships which are known to be carrying contraband goods to Britain.

("Anlage zum Vortrage des Ob.D.M. v. 10.XI.39. Fuer Vortrag des Ob.d.M. beim Fuehrer"-in full.)

From a report, unsigned, on a meeting between Ob.d.M. (Raeder) and the Fuehrer, at which Gen.Ob.Keitel and Freg.Kapt. v. Puttkamer were present:

"(5) Intensification of the U-boat war. See appendix. The procedure, in force until now, of general intensification without any special announcement, has been successful. Should a proclamation of general intensification of the war be made the Fuehrer R has approved this), it is desired that it be merely a general intimation of intensification even of the war at sea, and that it contain no concrete definitions. Furthermore, it is requested that the Naval War Staff have full power to carry out any steps of intensification, which the general situation and the preparedness of the means of war allows. The full consent of the Fuehrer, however, must in every case be gained beforehand. The same process must be carried out even if no proclamation be made. The Fuehrer, | thus, gives his consent to:

(a) Merchant ships of nations which sell or charter ships to Britain-mainly Greek ships-may be fired on and sunk without warning within the American prohibited area. This may be done by one or more U-boats according to the situation, and will possibly be limited to specific areas.

(b) In those sections of the American prohibited area, in which the fiction of danger of mines can be maintained i.e. the Bristol Channel, all or single U-Boats may fire on and sink any neutral merchant ships except those of "friendly" neutral countries.

(c) The Fuehrer is reserving the announcement of the law in reply to the order in council until the moment of the general intensification of the war; should the offensive be long delayed, then until such time as special measures will have to be carried out in place of an offensive.

The good treatment of friendly neutrals is to continue."

(p.r. of "Vortrag des Ob.d.M. beim Fuehrer am 30.XII.39. (Gegenwart Gen.Ob. Keitel und Freg.Kpt. v. Puttkamer.)")

Document C-100

Sink at Sight Policy, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 842-844.

Appendix to the above:

(signed by Fricke of the Naval War Staff, 1st Division (1 Skl.))

"Intensification of the war on merchant shipping.

I. The position of the German war on merchant shipping at the end of 12/1939.

(a) Attacks by U-boats without warning: (1) against all enemy merchant ships, with the exception of passenger ships sailing in convoy. (2) against all neutral ships sailing in enemy convoys. (3) against all ships sailing without lights in the area: 20 degrees W, 62 degrees N, 3 degrees E, 44 degrees N, (4) against all ships which disobey when ordered to stop or to discontinue the use of their wireless, (5) against all tankers within the American prohibited area west of 2 E, with the exception of Italian, Russian, Spanish, American and Japanese tankers."

(From "Anlage zu Vortrag beim Fuehrer am 30.12.1939")

From a report, signed by Raeder, on a meeting he had with the Fuehrer. Gen.Ob. Keitel, Gen.Maj. Jodl and Freg. Kapt. v. Puttkamer were also present:

"(2) North Sea…

(d) Intensification of the U-boat war.

Up to the present, all ships sailing without lights (including passenger ships sailing without lights) could be fired on and sunk within the American prohibited area. It has now been established that-British ships sailing without lights have, of late, often been showing dim navigation lights. This is done, presumably, to avoid collisions. Besides flying their country's flag and showing the markings of their nationality, neutral ships are obliged to sail with lights so that they may be recognised beyond all doubt. Ob.d.M. proposes that even passenger ships sailing without lights, but showing navigation lights, be fired on and sunk (without warning) as this would signify that they were British. The British use passenger ships to a great extent for transporting troops and freight, owing to the shortage of freighters. The Fuehrer has agreed to this."

(P. 2. of "Vortrag des Ob.d.M. beim Fuehrer am 23.2.40--1030-Gegenwart: Gen. Ob. Keitel, Generalmajor Jodl, Freg.Kpt. v. Puttkamer".)

II. Extracts from documents contained in file: "1 Skl. Handakten, Korv. Kapt. Assamann."

From a memorandum entitled: "The position of the Naval War Staff to the question `Reaction to the Order in Council,' concerning the seizing of German export goods."

"I. The `order in council' was announced on 11/28/1939. According to its text and also according to the intention of the British, its purpose is to stop Germany from exporting goods in neutral ships…

II. This British measure calls for a counter-measure from Germany, whether it actually has a great effect or whether its effect has merely been over-estimated by the British. The Reich Government has so far `reserved further measures'…

III. … It is not necessary to reply merely by sea warfare. Retaliation in the political, economic and other spheres of war (i.e. the Luftwaffe) can also be given consideration…

V. … It would be possible to make the `order in council' grounds for a general intensification of the war. Should however, the moment for this be long delayed, then a reply if indeed any such is intended, must be made earlier, i.e. soon.

VI. Naval measures for intensifying the war on merchant shipping have so far progressed that only the last step is required to exhaust all the possibilities. The suggestion of the Auswaertigen Amt, of replying to the Order by a pronouncement of blockade or with similar measures, does not meet with the approval of Skl. [Seekriegsleitung-Naval War Staff]. This measure should be reserved for the general intensification of the war. A measure such as that sketched in the appendix might be considered as a reply to the `order in council.' This outline for a law, proposed -by Skl, has been approved by the Auswaertigen Amt, which relinquishes its earlier, more extensive proposal, since Skl intends a further intensification of the war on merchant shipping in the near future.

VIII. The proposal of Skl is: should the political authorities wish to reply to the `order in council' before the general intensification of the war, and if they consider that such an answer can be given only by intensifying the naval war, then the law should come into force about Dec. 15th."

("Stellungnahme der Seekriegsleitung zu der Frage `Reaction auf die order in council', betreffend Exportbeschlagnahme deutscher Waren." [This document is near the beginning of the file and has many underlinings in green pencil.])

Document C-100

Sink at Sight Policy, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 844-846.

Appendix to the above: "A Special Law in retaliation to the enemy measures against German Export.

Goods and materials, including fuel of all kinds, which are enemy property, or of enemy origin, or which have been loaded in an enemy port, are liable to be seized or taken into port, whatever the nationality of the ship carrying the cargo may be.

The terms of the Prize Regulations concerning contraband goods apply accordingly.

This law applies to goods and materials shipped after…

This law comes into force on its publication.

Grounds for the special law.

The grounds for the law are to be set out, in the preamble and in the notes given with its notification to neutrals, somewhat in the following way:

By the Order of 28.11, the British Government has subjected to attack export goods of German origin on neutral ships making for neutral ports, even when they are neutral property. It is immaterial where such export goods of German origin are encountered.

Threefold breaking of International Law by the British Government:

(1) by the attempt to carry out a permissible ban on merchant shipping in the form of an illegal `paper' blockade (as the first step to a formally declared and effective blockade), without employing the corresponding blockade forces,

(2) by extending the application of this `paper' blockade over all the seas; not limiting it to German waters.

(3) by subjecting neutral countries thereby to the effects of a procedure, permissible neither in form nor in content."

(The above appendix is attached to document `Stellungnahme' der Seekriegsleitung … Neither is signed nor dated).

From notes, undated and unsigned, on a memorandum on the intensification of the war at sea against Britain. (This does not seem to refer to any particular document contained in the file, none of which, however, contain any information on this subject which is not given in the extracts in Section I).

"The memorandum clearly shows that, for some time to come, we shall not be in a position to gain a decisive success in the economic war against Britain by war means, even if these are put into force in their most intense form. This fact leads to the logical conclusion that the economic war must be conducted so that, on the one hand, it should be operationally as successful as possible without, on the other hand, producing results which would unfavourably change the whole war situation. This latter would be the case if, as happened in the last war, our use of the most extreme form of naval economic warfare resulted in the entry of the USA into the war against us." (p. 2)

"… The American Neutrality Law is a shackle for the most war-loving of American Presidents, one which presumably cannot be shaken off so long as we do not provide him with the excuse to break this shackle and thus fulfill the dearest wish of the British! The terms of the neutrality law however, are such that, under them, we could conduct a very intense naval economic war against Britain without the fear of a conflict with the USA. The final stage of intensification, perhaps not yet to be employed because of the USA, would not outweigh the risk of war with the USA. This could be justified only when our general war position is so strong 1 and our naval resources for the economic warfare so formidable (either by our own strength or with Italian or Russian aid), that, even by their most severe employment, we could easily deal with such a decisive result as American aid to the enemy.

"Even if we are convinced that, should the war be of long duration, the USA will enter it in any case, … it must be our object to delay this event so long that American help would come too late." (pp. 3 and 4)

"Bemerkung zu der Denkschrift ueber die Verschaerfung des Seekrieges gegen England.")

III. Extracts from documents contained in file: "B.d.U. Operations-befehle, 1939/42".

 

From Operation Order No. 3 for Atlantic U-boats, (Operation order No. 3 for U-boats "Alarm practice North Sea") For U.26, U.53. The order is signed by Doenitz:

Document C-100

Sink at Sight Policy, Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 846-847.

"VI. DUTIES OF U-BOATS AFTER THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES WITH BRITAIN-FRANCE.

(a) Until the declaration of Danger zones: Merchant shipping warfare according to the "New Draft of the Prize Regulations."

As long as the war against Merchant shipping is to be conducted in accordance with the Prize Regulations, the following ships are the main ones to be attacked, and these, even under these regulations, may be sunk without warning:

(1) Troop transports i.e. any vessels on which troops or war materials can be seen, or which can be identified as such in other ways.

(2) Vessels escorted by enemy warships or planes.

(3) Vessels taking part in actions, or directly supporting hostile operations i.e. by sending signals. It should be assumed that a merchant ship is taking part in an action, as soon as ever it prepares to offer resistance, or takes steps calculated to endanger the U-boat.

(b) Should danger zones be declared by Germany, at the outbreak of, or during the war, limitless merchant shipping warfare, i.e. attack without warning on all vessels encountered, will be permitted within those areas. None of our own surface craft will be within the areas of such danger zones, therefore unrestricted action will be yours in these specific areas.

(c) Attacks on enemy warships from Flotilla leaders upwards and submarines; destroyers only if the opportunities of firing are favourable and sure.

(d) Opportunities for attacks against merchant vessels will present themselves in area T on the merchant shipping routes from North America (Canada) to the northern outlet of the Irish Sea and the Clyde Harbour, and in area M on the merchant shipping routes from South America - Cape Verde Island - West coast of Africa.

In area M, French troop transports may also be expected.

(f) Cooperation with neighbouring boats when important war targets are sighted (i.e. convoys, troop transports, steamships of importance). In such cases, boats in favourable positions may, and indeed must, leave their operational areas for the attack. Should only slight traffic be encountered in areas T, U, V, boats must cooperate even with less important targets.

(P. 4 of "Operationsbefehl Nr. 3 fuer U-boote Atlantik-Operations--befehl Nr. 3 fuer U-boote "Alarmuebung Nordsee". Fuer U.36,53. 23.8.39)

From Operation Order "North Sea No. 2" for the 3rd and 5th U-Flotillas, signed by Ibbeken (F.d.Ud West):

"(b) At the outbreak of hostilities with the Western Powers: …

Attacks on warships (destroyers and upwards, and submarines) will be permitted.

Merchant shipping warfare will be conducted according to the "New Draft of the Prize Regulations".

Ships which may be sunk without warning are: (aa) Merchant vessels sailing in convoy. (bb) Vessels on which troops or war material can be seen.

Armament on merchant ships does not in itself justify sinking without warning. However, all resistance by merchant vessels is to be broken by every measure.

Action is to be taken only if the ship prepared to resist, or if the U-boat is considered to be in danger."

(P. 2. of "Operationsbefehl `Nordsee Nr. 2' fuer 3. und 5. U-Flottille" dated 8/24/1939.)

Document C-100

Sink at Sight Policy, Part 06 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 847-848.

9/10/1939.

From Operation Order "North Sea No. 8" for U.15, U.24 signed by Doenitz:

"(b) Duties of U.14, U.24.

(1) Attacks on British surface vessels (destroyers and upwards, and submarines).

(2) Attacks on those merchant vessels which may be sunk without warning:" (a) (b) (see extract from Operation order No. 3 for Atlantic U (c) boats, sections a, b and c.) "(d) No action to be taken against passenger ships.

(3) No merchant shipping warfare according to the Prize Regulations.

(43 Only defensive action should be taken against French war and merchant-ships. Incidents with France are to be avoided."

(P. 3 of "Operationsbefehl `Nordsee Nr. 8' fuer U.14, U.24", dated 9/10/1939.)

B. "Teil II"

From various Operation Orders "North Sea". All orders are signed by Doenitz:

"III. Orders for U.47.

(3) Instructions: …

On the return journey: attack warships and those merchant ships which may be sunk without warning. These include enemy merchant ships definitely seen to be armed. Vessels sailing without lights are to be sunk without warning if they be encountered West of 3 degrees East." (P. 3).

("Operationsbefehl `Nordsee Nr. 16' (U.47)").

"III. Orders for U.19, U.24:

(1) Instructions.

(b) On the outward journey (outside your operational area) and on the return journey, attack warships (destroyers only when opportunities for firing are sure) and those merchant ships which may be sunk without warning. (Off the coast of Britain, at night, all ships sailing without lights may be sunk without warning up to 3 degrees West." (P. 3))

("Operationsbefehl `Nordsee Nr. 17' (U.19, U.24)")

"III. Orders for U.60, U.61:

(4) The war on merchant shipping in accordance with the Prize Regulations is permitted only north of 61 degrees." (p. 2)

("Operationsbefehl `Nordsee Nr. 21' fuer U.60, U.61.")

Document C-100

Sink at Sight Policy, Part 07 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 848-849.

10/19/1939.

"III. Order for U.56, U.57, U.58, U.59:

(4) The war on merchant shipping in accordance with the Prize Regulations is permitted west of the Fair-Island-Passage." (p. 2).

("Operationsbefehl `Nordsee Nr. 20' fuer U.56, U.57, U.58, U.59.")

"III. Orders for U.13:

(2) Instructions …

(b) Attack all ships which may be sunk without warning (see St.K.Befehl [Staendige Kriegsbefehl-Standing War Orders] Nos. 1 and 11 Sections 3 and 5). These include all merchant ships definitely recognised as enemy (not passenger ships); at night, also all ships sailing without lights west of 3 degrees East." (p. 2-3)

("Operationsbefehl `Nordsee Nr. 22' fuer U.13".)

IV. Orders for U.21, U.56:

(1) Instructions …

(b) Within the operational area, sink without warning all war and merchant-ships which are worth sinking.

(c) Outside the Operational area, attacks without warning are to be carried out in accordance with St.K.Befehl No. 18. This includes all armed enemy passenger ships also all tankers except those of Italy, Spain, America, Japan and Russia." (p. 3)

("Operationasbefehl `Nordsee Nr. 30' fuer U.56, U.21")

"III. Orders for U.9:

( 1 ) Instructions …

(c) On the outward and the return journeys, attacks without warning are to be carried out in accordance with St. K.Befehl in accordance with verbal instructions." (p.3)

("Operationsbefehl `Nordsee Nr. 12' (Firth of Moray) fuer U.9.")

"III. Orders for U.1:

( 1 ) Instructions …

(c) War to be conducted in accordance with St.K.Befehl 101-172, and in accordance with verbal instructions …

(f) In certain cases, duties are to be carried out in accordance with Appendix 2 to the order in a sealed envelope, which may on no account fall into enemy hands." (p. 3).

Document C-100

Sink at Sight Policy, Part 08 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 849-851.

("Operationsbefehl `Nordsee Nr. 15'-Cross Sand-fuer U.13.")

"III. Orders for U.9, U.7:

(1) Instructions …

(a) Until the issuing of the order "Execution of the War in accordance with St.K.Befehl is permitted," only enemy warships and enemy troop transports are to be attacked.

(b) After the issue of the above order, the war is to be conducted in accordance with St. K. Befehl." (p. 2)

("Operationsbefehl `Nordsee Nr. 19' (Sued) fuer U.9, U.7.")

VI. Extracts from the War Diary of Doenitz in his capacity as Befehlshaber (of Fuehrer) der Unterseeboote.

From the War Diary of F.d.U. (Skl)-for the period 15.8.3915.9.39, signed by Doenitz, Kapitaen z. See und Kommodore:

"1200. Telephone conversation between the duty Commander F.d.U. and Kplt. Fresdorf …

F.d.U. also requires that, when `Danger Zones' are declared, the areas occupied by U-boats up to the present are not reduced. The limits of the `Danger Zones' used in the exercises of 1938/1939-200 nautical miles west of Britain, are certainly not extensive enough.

1 Skl. (Fresdorf) replies at 1700 that the limits of the `Danger Zones' have not yet been arranged and that the demands made by F.d.U. will be taken into consideration as far as possible." (p. 5)

"Skl. sends a signal at 1400: `War on merchant shipping to be carried out by U-boats in accordance with the Operation order.' Commanders can not doubt this, as, in the Operation order, it is expressly laid down that the war on merchant shipping be conducted in accordance with the Prize Regulations." (p. 16)

"A further alteration of the dispositions is not yet being considered. So long as the convoy system is not fully in force and the war on merchant shipping is to be conducted in accordance with the Prize Regulations, the present dispositions are correct." (p. 17)

"The sinking of the `Athenia' gives grounds for looking over once more the orders issued to date. A simple error in interpretation is not conceivable. But, so that nothing may be neglected to make the matter clear, attention is once more drawn, in wireless telegram 1655-'In the case of warfare on merchantmen, Operation Order, section VIa remain in force unaltered."-to the waging of warfare on merchantmen in accordance with prize regulations. (p. 18)

("Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. Op. 15.8-15.9.39" on cover. The above are from the second section of KTB, F.d.U. beginning 23.8.39.)

From the War Diary of F.d.U. for the period 16.9.-30.9.39, signed by Doenitz, Kapitaen z. See und Kommodore, Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote:

"Then Ob.d.M. goes on to speak of the conduct of the war in general. He says he intends, before the declaration of unlimited danger zones, to propose the declaration of danger zones against British ships only (not neutral ships) as the next step in the intensification of the war at sea against Britain. He wishes to hear the opinion of F.d.U. on this subject.

My reply is that the execution of the War on merchant shipping in danger zones applying only to specific nations would, in my opinion, not produce the desired results:

(1) as the U-boat must be submerged to lie in wait for a suspicious steamer, and in most cases cannot identify the nationality of the ship in time to attack her without warning

(2) as the enemy will presumably carry on its merchant shipping traffic under the protection of neutral markings and flags.

Document C-100

Sink at Sight Policy, Part 09 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 851-854.

The results would be:

(a) either that many neutral ships, by being presumed enemy, would be sunk without warning; this is just what we wish to avoid, or (b) that many enemy ships would avoid being sunk by being presumed neutral; this is even less desirable." (pp. 3 and 4).

"Skl sends the following order to F.d.U. by most secret teleprinter: that it is confirmed beyond all doubt that all attacks on French ships are avoided. This order excludes the possibility of employing U-boats in the Channel against troop transports. This disposition (U.35; see also War Diary of D.d.U. West) was the result of the order of Skl that attacks are permitted on convoys north of the latitude of Brest, if the escort consists of French forces. It can be definitely understood that these transports sail by night. At night, however, the U-boat has to be able to make sure that a ship, sailing without lights in convoy, is an enemy. By day, it is often impossible to ascertain the nationality of a ship sailing in convoy, even if she is not flying the flag of a different nation; by night, it is quite impossible. I have informed Skl that, if this order is to be obeyed, I cannot permit U-boats to operate in the channel. Skl is reserving the final decision concerning the attitude towards French ships and informed me by telephone through Kpt.z.S. Fricke that today's order is to be rescinded and the old order to remain in force; i.e. the risk is to be taken that French ships may be sunk without warning, if they sail in convoy north of the latitude of Brest." (p. 6)

"It will be seen, from reports sent in by U-boats returned to base, that a great many steamships make use of their wireless after they are ordered to stop. As a result, aircraft appear over the position. In this way, steamships support the enemy action against the U-boat. I consider it necessary to operate by every means, and in this way to prevent steamships from taking part in the defensive action against the U-boat. I have asked Skl for a decision on this matter. The question of the attitude towards French ships is becoming more and more urgent in the present development of the war situation. (Troop transports, convoys)" (p. 8)

"The most secret signal, 8027, gives the decision of the Naval War Staff on this matter: French ships are to be treated in the same way as are British ships. The order concerning passenger ships remains unchanged. Merchant ships, which make use of their wireless after they are ordered to stop, are to be fired on. They are to be brought back to port, or sunk." (p. 8)

("Kriegstagenbuch B.d.U. Op. 16.9.-30.9.1939" on cover.)

From the War Diary of B.d.U. for the period 1.10.-15.10.39, signed by Doenitz, Konteradmiral und Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote:

"The Naval War Staff has declared an area around Britain, within which any ship sailing without lights may be attacked without warning This order facilitates the work of U-boats to a great extent. The area, however, is narrow. The practical results of this order will, in all probability, be few. It has been announced, from the German side, that British merchant ships have several times attacked U-boats, which, in accordance with Prize Regulations, have ordered them to stop. It was added that, if this continues, German U-boats will have to employ counter measures. As a reply to this, the Admiralty sent orders to all British merchant ships to ram any German submarine sighted …

"A further order of the Naval War Staff reads: Ships to be considered as passenger ships are those which, in the opinion of the Commander, are built to accommodate more than 120 passengers. Explanations will be found in M.D.V. 87. The following may be taken as clues: a great number of boats-approx. more than 4 on each side of the ship-length and number of promenade decks, port-holes.

"The boats have been informed of both these orders.

"The term `passenger ship' is very loose and its interpretation is left to the individual commander. It must be made clear that, in practice, more scope to the individual is given by the issue of this order, especially as the opportunities for observation are very limited in a submerged U-boat." (pp. 4 and 5)

"In connection with the conduct of the war on merchant shipping, the following orders have been issued by the Naval War Staff:

(1) The area, in which unrestricted use of armament is allowed against vessels sailing without lights, is enlarged westwards up to 15 degrees longitude.

(2) U-boats are allowed unrestricted use of armaments against enemy merchant ships, on which the presence of armament is definitely established, or which, according to concrete instructions from the Naval War Staff, are known to be armed. As far as circumstances permit, steps are to be taken for rescuing the crews when there is no possibility of the U-boat being in danger. Passenger ships which are not troop transports are, as before, NOT to be attacked even if they are armed. Both orders constitute a considerable advance in the prosecution of the war. They effect the essence of the U-boat attacks and increase their prospects." (p. 6)

(Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. 1.-15.10.1939.)

From the War Diary of B.d.U. for the period 16.10.-31.10.39 signed by Doenitz, Konteradmiral und Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote:

"As in the last war, losses of U-boats on the surface are, in most cases caused by:

(1) The dangers to which the U-boat is exposed when conducting the war on merchant shipping in accordance with the Prize Regulations.

(2) The dangerous position of the U-boat when carrying on an artillery battle with an armed merchant ship. A hit can render the U-boat incapable of diving and cause her to be a sure victim to destroyers …

Document C-100

Sink at Sight Policy, Part 10 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 854-855.

(3) Unexpected encounters with enemy, especially in bad weather …

(4) Possible unpreparedness on the part of the boat.

While the causes given in 3) and 4) can and must be met by the crew, the taking of prizes constitutes an extra danger and cause of losses which can be eradicated only: (1) by the ceasing of prize-taking i.e. only those ships would be attacked which may be sunk without warning or (2) by ordering limitless warfare,

In both cases, the U-boat would be forbidden the use of artillery (a) to stop a steamship (or break her resistance) (b) to sink a steamship." (p. 8-9)

"The channel as an operational area.

… The A/s defence is strongest in the Straits of Dover and north east of this line; better opportunities for attacks by U-boats are afforded in the more open section to the west. This presents a good operational area for U-boats, provided they can sink without warning. War on merchant shipping in accordance with the Prize Regulations cannot be considered here owing to the surveillance and the proximity of enemy bases." (p. 11)

"On the grounds of the conclusions entered in the War Diary on 23.10. I have decided on the following orders for the purpose of limiting the number of our losses:

1. The boarding of a steamship, in order to carry out a search is not permitted.

2. The steamship is to be sunk only by torpedo, even when this is required by reason of the search (which consists now only of an examination of the papers), or after the breaking of resistance with artillery." (p. 15)

"The Naval War Staff has ordered the unrestricted use of armament against passenger ships in enemy convoys." (p. 16)

("Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. 16.10.30.10.1939.")

From the War Diary of B.d.U. for the period 16.11.-30.11.39 signed by Doenitz, Konteradmiral und Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote.

"The order has been issued by SKL, that unrestricted use of armament is to be permitted against enemy passenger ships which are seen to be armed or are known to be armed. As most passenger ships are already armed, this is a distinct step forward in the conduct of the war. In practice, however, this seldom concerns any but those passenger ships whose armament can be seen by the boats. Only in very exceptional cases can commanders identify armament from written instructions issued to them owing to the fact that usually the type of ship can be established only a short time before a favourable firing position is gained. If lifts have to be referred to, to find out whether the ship is armed, further time is wasted. Once the ship has passed, the boat has to renew the chase; she must therefore be capable of a greater speed than the ship and, with passenger ships, this is not usually the case." (p. 3)

("Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. 16.11-30.11.1939.")

From the War Diary of B.d.U. for the period 1-.15.12.39, signed by Doenitz, Konteradmiral und Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote:

"B.d.U. has requested of SKL. an extension of the areas in which ships sailing without lights may be sunk without warning. The following is desired:

(1) With regard to a recent report from U.38, before and within the Westfjord. In all probability, British steamships sail without lights in this area. Almost all are painted grey, so that their visibility be limited, and are armed.

(2) For U-boat operations in the Mediterranean and off the Portuguese coast. Reports from boats, returning from operations, show that steamships sailing without lights have been sighted there. From this, the question arose, what was the correct procedure. Legal measures of prize-taking are difficult and dangerous to the U-boat, especially near Gibralter.

The decision of the Naval War Staff is negative. The zone for U-boats cannot be extended, since German steamships, breaking through or returning home, have to be considered both on the Norwegian and Spanish coasts." (p. 7)

("Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. 1.-15.12.39.")

Document C-100

Sink at Sight Policy, Part 11 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 856.

Appendix to German "Sink at Sight" Policy Prize Regulation

This document deals mainly with procedure in the taking of prizes and in dealing with captured vessels.

The following extract is Article 18 of the Prize Regulations dated 8/28/1939, with amendments made on 9/12/1939. (A copy of the unamended Regulations is not available.)

"The decrees of the VIth Agreement of the Hague Convention concerning the treatment of enemy merchant shipping on the outbreak of war remain intact.

Note 1. The Agreement governs in particular the treatment of merchant ships, which are in enemy ports on the outbreak of hostilities. It has not been put into effect in the present war."

Document C-119

[Deals With Demarches To Be Made On D-Day Vis-A-Vis Danish And Norwegian Governments], Part 01 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 856-857.

S.O. Only Access only through an officer Gp H.Qu. 3/13/1940

Group XXI O Qu/Qu 21/40 G.Kdos. Chefs.

From D-Day this instruction will be treated as secret. Most Secret

138 Copies 90th Copy

This order may only be issued at the same time as the tactical instructions.

Special instructions on the attitude to be adopted in the occupation of Denmark and Norway

(A) General.

(B) Special Military Measures. (Lays down steps to be taken regarding Danish and Norwegian troops, ships, aircraft, etc.)

(C) Attitude towards Danish and Norwegian author,ties. (Civil authorities, railways and police to continue to work. Communications to outside world to cease.)

(D) Economic Measures. (Lists German naval officers who are to see that Danish and Norwegian economic machine continues to work, and sets out the steps to be taken.)

(E) Other Measures. (Include treatment of enemy Legations, etc., enemy nationals, Danish and Norwegian wireless, press, cable service, propaganda and justice.)

[signed] v. Falkenhorst

Checked Col. Gen. Staff

Distribution:

Div Commanders 3 each 18

Infantry Brigade Commanders 1 each 18

Staff XXXI Army Corps 15

Division Commanders 3 each 9

Infantry Brigade Commanders 1 each 9

Work-Organization KNAUSS (L) together with Air Force Units 15

Work-Organization KRANCKE together with Command posts of the Navy 15

Main Headquarters (Lt/Col. WEINKNECHT 1

Army Administration Branch (Lt/Col. KOEHLER) 1

Supreme Command Armed Forces L. (Lt/Col. BOEHME) 3

Document C-119

[Deals With Demarches To Be Made On D-Day Vis-A-Vis Danish And Norwegian Governments], Part 02 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 857-858.

Group XXI. Chief 1

 

IIa III 1 each 2

IVa IVb IVc 1 each IV W1-8 11

Commander of H.Q. 1

BV. Technical Officer, Signals-Commander 1 each 2

O.Qu., Qu 1, Qu 2, Qu 3 4

O.Qu. Reserve 20

 

In the following pages of the document the names of the complete staff of the German Embassy in Oslo are published, as well as the names of the staff of the Consulates and Honorary Consulates in Norway. This is followed by naming the Military Attaches of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and the Norwegian and Danish Cabinet. In appendix three the constitution and history of Norway and Denmark are given in detail, in order to bring about an understanding with the population of these two countries once they have been taken over by Germany. Psychological reactions of the populations of Norway and Denmark are discussed in appendix four as is the way of treating these peoples if good results are to be achieved.]

"Guiding principles for the attitude of troops in the occupied areas"

The Hague Convention for Land Warfare assures the population of an occupied country far-reaching protection by the occupying power. Above all, the honor and the rights of families, the life of the citizens and private property, as well as religious convictions and services must be respected. (Articles 46, 55 and 56 of the Hague Convention for Land Warfare.)

Fundamental principle for the troops: the greatest caution and most extreme reserve vis-a-vis the civil population ! Inadvisable blind confidence can entail an endangering of the troops.

Firm cohesion, discipline among the troops, painstaking execution and superintendence of the required security measures are the best protection.

Only in the event of the civil population putting up a resistance or behaving rebelliously can the following decisions be carried out:

1. If the civilian population offers resistance or if attacks by the population on our troops or their lines of communications must be feared, the arrest of hostages should, on principle, be resorted to. Hostages should only be arrested on orders of a brigade commander, independent battalion commander or commander of equivalent rank.

The hostages should, if possible, be chosen from those circles of the population which are expected to carry out hostile acts.

When accommodating and feeding hostages it should be borne in mind that, although the hostages should be under the strictest guard, they are not imprisoned because of crimes.

Hostages and population are to be informed that the hostages will be shot at any sign of any hostile action. Previous sanction of the shooting by the Divisional Commander must, however, be obtained.

Should attacks on the troops or their lines of communication nonetheless occur, or signs of resistance make themselves apparent, the hostages are immediately to be moved under strict guard to a prisoners-collecting-camp (transport ticket). At the same time the Division is to forward with all speed a report about the occurrence and a proposal of the suggested measures (shooting or further detention).

2. Armed resistance by the civilian population is to be crushed by force of arms.

If danger is imminent, every commander is obliged to take all necessary measures.

Document C-119

[Deals With Demarches To Be Made On D-Day Vis-A-Vis Danish And Norwegian Governments], Part 03 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 859.

The death penalty will be imposed for violence of any kind against the German Armed Forces or their members in the occupied territory.

Immediate trials will take place by Field Court Martial (Summary Court or ordinary Court Martial). The Regimental Commander can appoint the Summary Court which will be composed of 1 Captain, 1 Sergeant, 1 Corporal, hear witnesses and draw up the sentence in writing. The verdict will be the Death penalty if guilty, otherwise acquittal. The sentence will be executed immediately after confirmation by the Regimental Commander.

The following, among others, are to be considered as acts of violence: sabotage, destruction of our lines of communication, cutting of telephone wires, demolitions, etc.

In par. 3 of this document instructions relating to the treatment of "franc-tireurs" are given. Franc-tireurs are to be shot in battle or in flight. Those taken prisoners are to be treated not as prisoners of war but as criminals, and if found guilty by the Field Court Martial, are to be condemned to death and the sentence must be carried out by shooting immediately on confirmation by the Commander who has appointed the Court.

[Note: Par. 4 lays down that looting will be very severely dealt with. Par. 5 deals with measures of force to restore order. Par. 6 declares that forced taxes are not to be collected.]

Document D-258

[Krupp Humboldstrasse Camp] [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 859-860.

SWORN ON OATH BEFORE A MILITARY COURT

Essen, 17.9.1945.

The requested investigation on the camp in HUMBOLDSTRASSE gave the following result:

The camp inmates were mostly Jewish women and girls from Hungary and Rumania. The camp inmates were brought to Essen at the beginning of 1944 and were put to work at Krupps. The accomodation and feeding of the camp prisoners were beneath all dignity. At first, the prisoners were accommodated in simple wooden huts. These huts were burned down during an air-raid and from that time on the prisoners had to sleep in a damp cellar. Their beds were made on the floor and consisted of a straw-filled sack and 2 blankets. In most cases it was not possible for the prisoners to wash themselves daily, as there was no water. There was no possibility of having a bath. I could often observe from the Krupps factory during the lunch break how the prisoners boiled their underclothing in an old bucket or container over a wood fire and cleaned themselves. A slit trench served as an air-raid shelter, whilst the SS guards went to the HUMBOLDT shelter which was bomb-proof. Reveille was at 5 a.m. There was no coffee or any food served in the morning. They marched to the factory at 5.15 a.m. They marched for ¾ hrs. to the factory poorly clothed and badly shod, some without shoes, and covered with a blanket, by rain or snow. Work began at 6 a.m., lunch break was from 12 to 12.30. Only during the break was it at all possible for the prisoners to cook something for themselves from potato peelings and other garbage. The daily working period was one of 10 to 11 hours. Although the prisoners were completely under-nourished, their work was very heavy physically. The prisoners were often maltreated at their work benches by Nazi overseers and female SS guards. At 5 or 6 in the afternoon they were marched back to the camp. The accompanying guards consisted of female SS who, in spite of protests from the civil population, often maltreated the prisoners on the way back by kicks, blows and scarcely repeatable words. It often happened that individual women or girls had to be carried back to the camp by their comrades owing to exhaustion At 6 or 7 p.m. these exhausted people arrived back in camp. Then the real midday meal was distributed. This consisted of cabbage soup. This was followed by the evening meal of water soup and a piece of bread which was for the following day. Occasionally the food on Sundays was better. An inspection of the camp as long as it existed was never undertaken by the firm of Krupp. On 3/13/1945, the camp prisoners were brought to Buchenwald Concentration Camp and from there some were sent to work. The camp commandant was SS Oberscharfuehrer RICK. His present whereabouts are unknown but inquiries should bring results. RICK often made Jewesses kneel in the snow and rain on the camp square according to his whims.

The commandant's deputy SS Unterscharfuehrer KERKMANN of Essen, who, formerly had a paper and art shop near the Minister in Essen, in the Bergstrasse, is now known as ZWOELFLING. Further inquiries must be instigated.

[signed] Hubert KARDEN.

Kriminalassistent on probation. TREES. [Stamp] C. E. LONG, Major President.

Title: "Document D-361 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 861-863.

Copy

Boiler Making Shop. 2/25/1942.

Herr HUPE via Herr WINTERS via Herr SCHMIDT

I received the enclosed letter of the 18th of this month, from the German Labour Front (sent to my private address) inviting me to the Office of the German Labour Front, 61 Steubenstr., room No. 20 for Friday the 20th of this month. On the 20th February between 8 and 9 o'clock, I tried to complete the business, which I did not know about, by telephone. The answer from the German Labour Front was that the matter was very important and demanded my personal appearance. Thereupon I asked Mr. Jungerich, of the Department for social labor matters whether I had to go. He answered "You probably don't have to but it would be better if you went." About 9.50 I went round to room 20 at this place and met Herr Prior.

The following event provided the cause for this conversation, which Herr Prior carried on in a very lively manner and which lasted about half an hour:

On the 16th inst, 23 Russian Ps.W. were assigned to No. 23 Boiler Shop. The people came in the morning without bread and tools. During both breaks the Ps.W. crept up to the German workers and begged for bread, pitifully pointing out their hunger. (At the first midday, the works had the opportunity of distributing the food which remained over from the French Ps.W., amongst the Russians.) In order to alleviate these conditions, I went to the Weidkamp kitchen on the 17th on instructions from Herr Theile and talked to the head of the kitchen, Fraulein Block, about the provision of the midday meal. Fraulein Block promised me the food immediately and also lent me the 22 sets of eating utensils which I asked for.

At the same time I asked Fraulein Block to give any food left over by the 800 Dutchmen messing there to our Russian Ps.W. at midday till further notice. Frl. Block promised to do this too and the following midday she sent down a container of milk soup, as an extra. The following midday the ration was short in quantity. Since a few Russians had collapsed already, I telephoned Fraulein Block and asked for an increase in the food as the special ration had ceased from the second day onwards. As my telephone conversation was unsuccessful, I again visited Frl. B. personally. Frl. Block refused in a very abrupt manner to give any further special ration.

Now, regarding the discussion in detail. Herr Prior, 2 other gentlemen of the D.A.F. and Frl. Block, head of the Weidkamp Kitchen, were present in the room. Herr Prior commenced and accused me, gesticulating in a very insulting manner, saying that I had taken the part of the Bolsheviks in too apparent a way. He referred to the Law paragraphs of the Reich government which spoke against it. I was unfortunately not clear about the legal position, otherwise I would have left the conference room immediately. I then tried to make it clear to Herr Prior, with special emphasis, that the Russian Ps.W. were assigned to us as workers and not as Bolsheviks. The people were starved and were not in a position to perform the heavy work with us in boiler making which they were supposed to do. Sick people are a liability to us and not a help to production. To this remark, Herr Prior stated that if one was worth nothing then another was, that the Bolsheviks were soulless people and if 100000 of them died another 100000 would replace them. On my remarking that with such a coming and going we would not attain our goal, namely the delivery of locomotives to the Reich railways which were continually cutting down the time limit Herr Prior said "Deliveries are only of secondary importance here."

My attempts to get Herr Prior to understand our economic needs were not successful. In closing, I can only say that, as a German, I know our relations to the Russian Ps.W. exactly and in the a/m case I dealt only on behalf of my superiors and in the sense of the increase in production which is demanded from us.

[signed] SOEHLING. Office chief, Locomotive Construction Works.

I have the following to add to the above letter: After the Russian Ps.W. had been assigned to us on the 16th of this month by Labour Supply, I got in touch with Dr. Lehmann immediately about their food. I learned from him that the prisoners received 300 gr. of bread each between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. I pointed out that it was impossible to last until 1800 hrs. on this ration of bread, whereupon Dr. Lehmann said that the Russians must not be allowed to get used to the Western Europe feeding. I replied that the Ps.W. could not do the work required of them in the Boiler Construction Shop on that food and that it was not practical for us to have these people in the works any longer under such conditions. At the same time I demanded that if the Russians continued to be employed, they should be given a hot midday meal and that if possible the bread ration should be split so that one half was distributed early in the morning and the second half during , our breakfast break. My suggestion has already been carried out by us with the French Ps.W. and has proved to be very practical and good.

Unfortunately, however, Dr. Lehmann took no notice of my suggestion and on this account I naturally had to take matters into my own hands and therefore told Herr Soehling to get the feeding of the Russian Ps.W. organized on exactly the same lines as French Ps.W. so that the Russians could as soon as possible carry out the work they were supposed to do. For the whole thing concerns an increase in production such as is demanded from us by the Minister of Munitions and Armaments and by the D.A.F.

[signed] THEILE.

Document D-419

[Internal Situation In The Warthegau [Western Poland Incorporated Into The Reich]], Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 865-867.

Secret Army General Staff Abt. 2. b.V. (o Qu IV) No. 6/12/39 secret [Stamped :] C i C Army C in C Army 1457/39 secret 5/12

[green pencil note:] O.Qu IV. wanted to make a complete report on that. 5/12 12/2/1939.

[pencil note.] 7/12/39 sent to Major Grossmith as well as O Qu. IV.

Enclosed we send a copy of a report of the District Military Command XXI with the request that you note and observe it.

Signature [illegible]

I enclosure (bound)

Distribution: Adjutant of the Army High Command. Adjutant of the Chief of Army General Staff. O Qu.I. G.Z. Operational Department. Organizational Department. Quartermaster General. Draft

Berlin, 30 Nov. 39.

Secret High Command of the Army Chief of Army armaments and Commander in Chief of the Reserve Army A h A/Group C in C Reserve Army (II) No. 66/39 secret.

Reference: District Military Command XXI. Intelligence officer 86/39 secret of the 23/11/39

Subject: Internal situation in Warthegau.

To the OKW for information Army General Staff (Abt .Z.bV. O Qu IV).

Enclosed please find a copy of a report of the District Military Command XXI. Clear administrative conditions and a treatment of the population which, while deliberately severe, should however be exercised in a way which is bearable for and within the comprehension of the German part of the population and the troops, are preliminary conditions for a genuine state authority. If that does not happen, there is a danger that, to guarantee order, military forces will be tied up to an extent which does not accord with our general situation.

By order 1 enclosure.

[signed] signature

Copy of Copy

Posen, 23.11.1939.

Army District Command XXI. Intelligence Officer 86/39 secret.

To the C in C of the Reserve Army.

The Warthegau can be regarded as pacified. Repeated rumors of rebellion have not been confined in any instance. The reason for this is not a change of heart of the Polish population but the realization of the hopelessness of a rebellion. That the large numbers of discharged prisoners and other returned Polish soldiers represent a danger which requires continuous supervision is not overlooked, particularly as numerous offices have not yet been seized. The keeping down of this danger is only possible through the military occupation of the country in its present form; the civil administration authorities with the available police forces are totally unable to do this.

The great work of construction in all spheres is not furthered by the intervention of SS formations who are given special racial political tasks and are not subordinate to Reich Governor in this. Here the tendency makes itself felt of interfering decisively in all spheres of administration beyond the framework of these tasks, and of forming a "state within the state." This phenomenon does not fail to have its effect on the troops, who are indignant about the ways the tasks are carried out and thereby generally get into opposition to administration and party. I shall exclude the danger of serious differences by strict orders. The fact that this makes a serious demand on the discipline of the troops cannot be dismissed without further ado.

Document D-419

[Internal Situation In The Warthegau [Western Poland Incorporated Into The Reich]], Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 867-868.

In almost all large towns, public shootings have been carried out by the organizations mentioned in this, the selection varied enormously and was often incomprehensible, the way it was carried out, frequently unworthy.

In some districts all the Polish estate owners were arrested and interned with their families. Arrests were almost always accompanied by looting.

In the towns, evacuations were carried out, during which blocks of houses were cleared at random, the inhabitants loaded onto lorries at night, then taken to concentration camps. Here also looting was a constant accompanying phenomenon. The quartering and feeding in the camps was such that the Corps Chief Medical Officer feared the outbreak of epidemics and thus endangering of the troops. As a result of my protests, relief is being given.

In several towns actions against the Jews were carried out which turned into the most serious excesses. In Turok three SS cars under the leadership of a higher SS leader drove through the streets, on the 30.10.39 while the people in the streets were hit on the heads at random with horse whips and long whips. Amongst the victims were also people of German blood. Finally a number of Jews were driven into the synagogue, there had to crawl in between the benches whilst singing, during which time they were continuously whipped by the SS men. They were then forced to take down their trousers in order to be hit on the bare behind. A Jew who out of fright had dirtied his trousers was forced to smear the excrement into the faces of the other Jews.

In Lodz it has become known confidentially that SS Oberfuehrer Molhorm has issued the following orders:

(1) From the 9.11., no unemployment relief may any longer be paid to Poles and Jews, only forced labor is paid for. (This measure has already been confirmed.)

(2) From 9.11., Jews and Poles will be excluded from the distribution of ration foodstuffs and coal.

(3) Unrest and incidents are to be created by provocation in order to facilitate the carrying out of the racial political work.

(4) The fire service is to be reinforced immediately in order to prevent undesirable spreading to other objects in case of chance fires in Jewish and Polish residential quarters and factories.

(The measures under (2) and (4) have not been confirmed yet).

Whilst the achievements of the Armed Forces are always placed in the foreground by the Reichs governor in speeches and demonstrations, the above mentioned circles, on the other hand, are unmistakably showing a tendency to diminish and denigrate these achievements. A specially crass case in this direction reported to me from Ostrowo from a victory celebration on 11/5/1939 Reichs speaker Bachmann spoke there. He never mentioned the Wehrmacht at all, when speaking about the Polish campaign. He only mentioned the Wehrmacht in one sentence, which concerned the war against England.

When speaking about the number of deaths, only the murdered racial Germans were mentioned, but not one word was spoken in memory of the soldiers who fell.

Only the racial Germans were acknowledged, so that the listeners were bound to get the impression that the Wehrmacht had actually not been concerned at all in the liberation.

This impression was strengthened when the speaker said that it had not been a war against Poland, but the Fuehrer had only ordered that the Poles should have the weapons taken away from them which were delivered by England and France and which they would not know how to use anyhow.

One got the impression that it was the speaker's aim not to allow any respect for the army to arise the German population.

The impression that this speech, that the guard of honor which had been provided, listened to, made on the soldiers was of a corresponding nature.

As the military commander of Posen has already reported to the High Command of the army, the men feel very strongly about the disproportion between their pay and the many times higher daily rate of pay of other formations.

The above mentioned facts lie in fields which for the most part escape direct intervention of the Reich governor. The removal of this grievance can only be obtained through higher quarters. I believe I am not wrong in assuming that the very welcome support would thereby be given to the Reich governor in his task of reconstruction which he has embarked upon systematically, energetically and tactfully.

[signed] Detzel General of Artillery

Certified correct copy: [signature illegible] Lieutenant-Colonel in the General Staff.

Title: "Document D-421 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 869-870.

Memorandum:

The Chief of the Army Judiciary announces by telephone:

The Field Court Martial of the Kempf Armored Division has sentenced an SS man of the SS Artillery Regt. to three years imprisonment and a military police sergeant major to 9 years penal servitude for manslaughter.

After about 50 Jews, who had been used during the day to repair a bridge, had finished their work in the evening, these two men drove them all into a synagogue and shot them all without any reason.

The sentence is submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army for confirmation.

The proposal of the representative of the prosecution is capital punishment for murder. Sentence on the day after the act.

[Marginal Note] Gen. Halder requests information on the decision of the C in C of the 3rd Army.

[Purple pencil notes] To the Adj. of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Gr III Grunther. (Initials) 13/5

[Lead pencil notes:] Both were SS. 14.9.39. Chief of Gen. St. of the Army

[signed] Ruttsgabe H 14/9. with a request to the Adj. of the C in C of the Army. By Order (signature) Radke.

Teleprint Message. plus plus HDIH 403 14.9.39.1905

To the Court Martial Chief Counsellor with the Quartermaster General in Berlin. W.35. Tirpitzufer 72-76.

Reference ---Az. 480 Quartermaster General Roem three Staff of the Army No. 1204/39.

Extenuating circumstances were allowed in the case of Stormtrooper ERNST, who was induced to participate in the shooting by an N.C.O. who handed him a rifle. His nerves were strained because of the many atrocities of the Poles against the Germans. Being an SS man, the sight of the Jews brought out in him very strongly his resentment of the anti-German attitude of Jewry: thus he acted with youthful recklessness and quite spontaneously. Good soldier-clean record.

Court Martial Chief Counsellor. Certified correct. Lipski Court Martial Counsellor.

[Pencil note] To the Adjutant, Supreme Commander of the Army Quartermaster General (III) 15/9

[Pencil note] Telephone message from Court Martial Chief Counsellor Dr. Jaffmann, that as far as is known, the Chief of the Army High Command will not confirm the two sentences.

[Pencil note] Conclusion: Sentences have come under Amnesty. Sentences were pronounced prior to Amnesty. 9 years penal servitude for the military police sergeant commuted to 3 years imprisonment. 3 years imprisonment for SS Trooper-no change. Confirmed by the Army High Command.

Document D-524

[German-French Trade], Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 870-873.

[Document consists of a booklet of diagrams, with explanatory texts on left-hand pages--even numbered.]

Preface Page 3, 1. Review of French contributions Page 4, 2. Employment of French labor Page 6, 3. Foreign labor the German Reich according to nationalities Page 8, 4. The contribution of French agriculture Page 10, 5. Production and obtainment of important agricultural products Page 12, 6. France's contribution to Germany's supply of cereals for bread Page 14, 7. The contribution of the French forestry industry Page 16, 8. The contribution of French industrial economy Page 18, 9. Supply of important ores and metals Page 20, 10. Supply of semi-manufactured and finished goods Page 22, 11. Supply of selected consumers goods Page 24, 12. Contributions of French transport Page 26, 13. France's share in German foreign trade Page 28, 14. France's place in the German foreign trade 1935/38 and 1942 Page 30, 15. France's place in the German foreign trade 1942 according to groups of goods Page 32

In the following diagrams an attempt is made to illustrate roughly the contribution towards the war economy by the military government so far achieved from the French area (namely from occupied Northern France as well as from Southern France). How big the contributions of the French territory are is unknown to the outsider, but it is also for the most part little known to the members of the Military Government. This pamphlet is to provide information here and to combine the available material into a general picture.

The diagrams are mainly based on the figures received by the military government in France as well as on date of the official German Reich statistics which, however, often had to be supplemented by estimates. Owing to the multitude of practical tasks to be solved, and owing to the inadequacy of the French statistics which were found, the aims of the military government had to be directed primarily towards acquiring the statistical figures necessary for the daily tasks. Even if this material does not permit of a full elucidation of the whole of French economy, it yet suffices to illustrate the great contribution of the French area to many branches of war economy.

The chief of the Military Government Ministerial Director Dr. Michel Paris, 4/1944.

1. Review of the French contribution

The total French contribution is composed of balanced and additional contributions.

The payments from the occupation costs account and from the French clearing credit account give a complete picture of the former. It reached the sum of about 30, 5 milliard Reichsmarks at the end of 1943. It comprises particularly also the other purchases which are easy to get hold of, but are not insignificant, made by the individual German soldiers who defray them, from their Army pay or from money sent from home.

The increase of the contributions expressed in money values is greater than the increase in the quantities supplied, owing to the increased prices since 1940. Purchases on the black market are the most decisive factor in the excessive increase in values.

The additional contributions which are not balanced comprise above all booty goods and provision of billets. Also the contribution made by the PWs and civilian workers working in Germany appears only to the extent of the permitted transfer of wages in a balance based on values. The amount of additional contributions is considerable.

Balanced French contributions in millions of RM.

Period: 1940 3rd quarter Payments from the Occupation costs account: 249 Increase of the French clearing credit account: [none] Total: 249; 1940 4th quarter 1510 43 1553; Year 1940 1759 43 1802; 1941 1st quarter 1208 76 1284; 1941 2nd quarter 1295 146 1441; 1941 3rd quarter 1331 262 1593; 1941 4th quarter 1253 327 1580; Year 1941 5087 811 5898 1942 1st quarter 1657 409 2066 1942 2nd quarter 1812 336 2148; 1942 3rd quarter 2209 480 2689; 1942 4th quarter 2194 555 2749; Year 1942 7872 1780 9652; 1943 1st quarter .2645 769 3414; 1943 2nd quarter 2240 908 3148; 1943 3rd quarter 2418 845 3263; 1943 4th quarter 2495 793 3288; Year 1943 9798 8815 18113; 1940-43 24516 5949 30465

2. Employment of French Labor

There are no current employment statistics covering all branches of economy and all groups of employed. The total figure of the existing manpower therefore had to be worked out roughly from old data. This computation was limited to men between 1850 years of age, because this age group comes primarily into consideration for turning over to Germany. (It does not comprise the departments Nord and Pas de Calais.)

Of the number of French men, there were employed:

For Germany: Directly In Germany and France together: 2 578 000 equals 37% In France only 1 378 000 equals 24% Indirectly 1 387 000 equals 20% 1 387 000 equals 24% Total 3 965 000 equals 57% 2 765 000 equals 487% For France: .3 008 000 equals 43% 3 008 000 equals 52% Grand Total: 6 973 000 equals 100% 5 773 000 equals 100%

The number of workers employed directly for Germany is known only as far as some of the specified groups are concerned.

Document D-524

[German-French Trade], Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 873-876.

As far as the other groups go, estimates had to be made which are in general based on the ratio of the total output to what is used for German purposes. The number of workers employed indirectly for Germany could be estimated only roughly as a minimum figure, because the indirect efforts of an order are extraordinarily ramified and impossible to show in statistics.

It would in principle have to comprise all labor working for the maintenance of the living conditions (namely for feeding, clothing, heating, lighting, etc.) of the persons who work for German interests. Thus, for example, not only the feeding of the workers who are working directly for Germany but also the feeding of all those who are working indirectly for Germany has here to be regarded as an indirect contribution of agriculture. The number of the indirectly employed persons depends further on the quantity of goods which are considered necessary for the maintenance of the living conditions and working fitness of the persons who are working for Germany.

In order not to go too high, the estimate was limited to the first branches of the ramification, since to follow all the ramifications, with all their repercussions on other branches of economy, can easily lead to an increase in the number of persons employed indirectly, which it would be hard to keep a check on and which would be like a snow ball. On principle, however it was assumed that in living conditions is included also the maintenance of the workers family.

3 Foreign Labor in the German Reich according to nationalities

The Frenchmen employed within the Reich represented more than a quarter of all foreign male labor working in Germany in the autumn of 1943 They are thus the biggest group, more numerous than the Eastern workers and the Soviet Prisoners of War and larger than the Polish group.

Amongst the foreign female workers, the French women form the third largest group. Their number is however considerably smaller than those of Eastern and Polish women workers.

The employment of foreign Labor in German Economy Autumn 1943 Numbers in thousands

From: France: Men [Including the prisoners of war turned into civilian workers, unemployed and persons of uncertain whereabouts.] Civilians: 605 Prisoners of war: 736 Total number: 1341 Percentage: 26.3 Women [Including the prisoners of war turned into civilian workers, unemployed and persons of uncertain whereabouts] number: 44 Percentage: 2.6 Soviet Union: 817 496 1313 23.8 899 52.4 Poland: 1094 29 1123 22.0 527 30.7 Belgium: 195 53 248 4.9 33 1.9 Protectorate: 244 [none] 244 4.8 42 2.5 Holland: 236 [none] 236 4.6 20 1.2 Serbia: 34 94 128 2.5 11 0 7 Italy: 103 [none] 103 2.0 14 0.8 Other countries: 303 54 357 7.1 124 7.2 Total: 3631 1462 5093 100.0 1714 100.0

4. The contribution of French agriculture

Among the manifold agricultural products that France is producing for German consumption, the following were the principal ones in 1942/43 according to their value in Reichsmarks.

Value in millions of Reichsmarks

Meat 285 Butter 56 Wine 30 Cereals for bread 134 Alcohol 49 Potatoes 25 Cereals for fodder 100 Seeds 33 Vegetables 24 Horses 70 Fruit 32 Hay 18

Calculating the foodstuffs in terms of the value of cereals shows the great importance of the deliveries of cereals and meat. The French contribution to the German supplies of cereals for bread is illustrated in greater detail in illustration 6

Apart from the direct obtainment for German purposes, further considerable qualities of agricultural products serve as food for the French people working directly or indirectly in the interests of Germany.

6 France's contribution to Germany's supply of cereals for bread

Before the war, French consumption had at its disposal, in addition to its own harvest, an import surplus.

Today France delivers for German purposes approximately 17% of the quantities available for consumption (Harvest excluding seeds and wastage) out of a harvest which is lower because of the war. The quantity remaining for supplying the French with cereals for bread amounted in the harvest year of 1942/43 to approximately two thirds of the quantity available in 1935/38 on an average or approximately half of that in 1938.

The quantity of cereals for bread-delivered to Germany out of what was raised in France, comprised 46% of German imports. France is therefore by far Germany's most important supplier of cereals for bread.

Reckoned in terms of the normal consumer's bread ration, The total quantity of cereals for bread raised by France represented in 1942/43 62 million yearly rations. The quantities delivered to the Reich 4.1 million yearly rations.

7 The contribution of the French forestry industry

The felling of timber of all kinds in France reached approximately 24 million sq. metres, in the last years, i.e. approximating the same quantity of timber as was cut down in the Reich proper before the war. The fellings for the Black market and for private use in the country, for which statistics are not available, are not included in these figures. To this must be added the amount cut down for military purposes by units of the German Armed Forces and German authorities, which may be estimated for 1943 at between 300000-400000 sq. metres.

The French forest industry supplies approximately 80% of its production excluding firewood to the German war economy, directly and indirectly.

The main types delivered direct to Germany in quantities increasing year by year:

Cut Timber 1942 in 1000: 2741; 1943: 3549 Charcoal 734 1113 Beams for building 407 511 Wood for wood burning cars 94 308 Sleepers 129 252 Parquet and planks 175 224 Masts and poles 41 163 In addition Firewood 272 333

The demands for direct German war requirements were fulfilled 100%, at the expense of French requirements which had to be satisfied with ever decreasing allocation quotas.

Document D-524

[German-French Trade], Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 876-878.

An extraordinarily high proportion of the quotas for French stove-timber requirements benefits the German War economy indirectly. The pit props, the sleepers allotted to the French railways and the solid fuel allotted to French transport are utilized to a very great extent in the German interests. In addition large quantities of cut timber and planks have been utilized for barrack building and for other German orders; also a large part of the packing-case wood, and the wood for paper and for tanning are used for German purposes.

8. The contribution of French Industrial economy

It is a particularly difficult problem to give statistically a conception of the contributions of French industry to German purposes. Estimates based on the industrial reports instituted on the German model-which actually do not extend to the production of the building industry, the food and luxury food industry, the aircraft industry and a part of the iron producing industry-reach the conclusion that direct deliveries to Germany are continuously increasing.

The increase in production expressed in value, is actually greater than the increase in the quantities delivered, owing to the increase in prices which has taken place since 1940.

As the French Central Orders Office's statistics about deliveries to Germany show, the building industry provides nearly half the production for the German account and the aircraft industry about 5% in spite of everything. If one adds to the figures in the Industrial reports an estimate of the missing branches of industry, the result shows that in the second half of 1943, the German share of French industrial production amounted to approximately 50%.

12. Contributions of French Transport

The available stock of steam locomotives in France fell in 1943 to about half of the prewar number owing to the handing over to Germany of about 4300 locomotives, to scrapping, destruction and falling out of commission.

The wagon park also contained in 1943 only a little more than half (58%) the prewar number.

Transportation in the German interests (Wehrmacht transportation and program goods "priority A") made greater and greater demands on the total transport supplied. The German share amounted to

12/1941 66% 12/1942 83% 1/1944 85%

Inland Water Transport.

It was possible to increase the transportation provided by French inland shipping constantly. In 1943 about half of all transport was used in the German interests, namely:

In 1000 ton loads

Building materials (Todt Organization, Air force etc.) 5000 Coal 4,800 Ores 650 Sugar-beet 600 Wheat 150 Oats 120 Limestone 100 Other goods (Straw, Chalk, Bauxite, Wood, Liquid fuel, etc.) 240 Total in the German interests 11,660 equals 49% Total in the French interests 11,995 equals 51% Grand total 23,655 equals 100%

Weekly transport performance according to groups requiring services. (Figures in 1000 ton loads)

Groups: Armed forces: Dec. 41 Figure: 320 percentage: 16 July 460 Figure percentage: 21 Dec. 42 Figure: 510 percentage: 25 July 43 Figure: 590 percentage: 29 Jan. 44 Figure: 560 percentage: 33 Programme goods 1,040 60 1,080 49 1,160 58 780 39 880 52 Chiefly German in the interests 1,360 66 1,540 70 1,670 83 1,370 68 1,440 85 Service goods 150 7 160 7 160 8 150 7 170 10 Priority goods 320 15 270 12 120 6 260 13 70 4 Other goods 240 12 250 11 50 3 240 12 10 Chiefly in the French interests 710 34 680 30 330 17 650 32 250 15 Total 2,070 100 2,220 100 2,000 100 2,020 100 1,690 100

In the months of 2-4/1944 the weekly transport performance dropped to an extraordinarily great extent, but at the same time the proportion of goods carried in the German interests rose at the cost of the French share.

13. France's Share in German Foreign Trade

France's contributions to the German economy are steadily on the increase if seasonal fluctuations are disregarded. In the first quarter of 1943 about 19% of German imports came from France.

German deliveries to France in exchange which are often necessary for carrying out the orders transferred to France, are also increasing. France's share of German exports amounted in the third quarter of 1943 to about 6%.

German economy thus received from France considerably more than Germany herself delivered to France. German foreign trade statistics do not include her deliveries to German Wehrmacht and other authorities which must be estimated as additional imports from France.

France's Share in German Foreign Trade

IMPORTS: 1941 1st Quarter Total in mill. RM: 1,469 from France mill. RM: 124 percentage: 8.4 EXPORTS: Total in mill. RM: 1,566 from France mill. RM: 36 percentage: 2.3 Excess of imports from France mill. RM: 88 1941 2nd Quarter 1,827 186 10.2 1,767 66 3.7 120 1941 3rd Quarter 1,796 204 11.4 1,714 89 5.2 115 1941 4th Quarter 1,839 238 12.9 1,795 124 6.9 114 1942 1st Quarter 1,461 204 14.0 1,382 97 7.0 107 1942 2nd Quarter 2,122 32515.3 1,953 150 7.7 175 1942 3rd Quarter 2,267 382 16.9 2,100 157 7.5 225 1942 4th Quarter 2,842 493 17.3 2,125 142 6.7 351 1943 1st Quarter 2,180 365 16.7 2,080 159 7.6 206 1943 2nd Quarter 2,505 390 15.6 2,496 152 6.1 248 1943 3rd Quarter 1,772 330 18.6 2,019 127 6.3 203

Document D-524

[German-French Trade], Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 878-881.

14. France's Place in German Foreign Trade, 1935/38 and 1942

When deliveries and return deliveries in foreign trade with different countries are compared with one another, the importance of individual countries for German imports and exports has changed almost completely since prewar times. In 1942 France was far in the lead of the countries from which Germany received more than she sent to. The Southeastern European countries, which were before the war the chief exporters to Germany, have dropped considerably behind. The drop in deliveries is indeed partly to be attributed to the unfavorable harvests in these countries.

15. France's Place in German Foreign Trade in 1942 according to groups of goods

As a source of supply of food and luxury food items for German food economy, France occupied in 1942 the second place after Italy and has since undoubtedly become Germany's most important supplier of foodstuffs. The most important commodities imported from France are the following:

Food industry total-352.4 Mill. R.M. of this Wines 118.7 Mill. R.M. Wheat 70.9 Mill. R.M. Cattle, alive 44.7 Mill. R.M. Meat 23.8 Mill. R.M. Fruit 20.8 Mill. R.M. Vegetable oils 19.2 Mill. R.M.

As a supplier of raw materials too, France occupied in 1942 by far the leading place. The following goods were chiefly supplied:

Raw materials, total-171.0 Mill. R.M. of these iron ore 46.0 Mill. R.M. Furs and Hides 42.9 Mill. R.M. Wool and animal hair 15.1 Mill. R.M. Resins 10.2 Mill. R.M. Textile waste 7.7 Mill. R.M. Building and stove timber 6.7 Mill. R.M. Bauxite 3.6 Mill. R.M.

In foreign trade in semimanufactured goods, France was in 1942 also one of the countries from which Germany received more on balance than she delivered to. She occupies the fourth place in the order. The chief goods delivered were the following:

Semimanufactured goods total 182.9 Mill. R.M. of these Wool yarns 24.7 Mill. R.M. Linen, Hemp and Jute Yarns 20.5 Mill. R.M. Coke 22.0 Mill. R.M. Copper 20.0 Mill. R.M. Semimanufactured Chemicals 14.7 Mill. R.M. Tin 11.0 Mill. R.M. Scrap iron 9.7 Mill. R.M. Aluminum 9.5 Mill. R.M.

France was furthermore the chief supplier in 1942 of finished goods of all 35 kinds. The following goods were delivered chiefly:

Fully manufactured goods, total 694.8 Mill. R.M. of these Woolen fabrics 56.2 Mill. R.M. Cotton fabrics 47.9 Mill. R.M. Linen, Hemp and Jute fabrics 39.7 Mill. R.M. Knitted woolen goods 34.1 Mill. R.M. Knitted cotton goods 24.8 Mill. R.M. Ready made cotton clothes 13.7 Mill. R.M. Electro-techn. products 45.0 Mill. R.M. Non goods 37.0 Mill. R.M. Leather footwear 36.8 Mill. R.M.Leather 31.7 Mill. R.M.Chemical preparatory products 28.8 Mill. R.M. Machinery of all kinds 37.0 Mill. R.M. Motor vehicles 13.4 Mill. R.M. Steam Locomotives 10.2 Mill. R.M. Wooden goods 15.7 Mill. R.M. Cosmetics 21.1 Mill. R.M. Fur goods 16.9 Mill. R.M.

Document D-547

[Jewish Question in Denmark], Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 882-883.

Army TELEPRINT Network

Command Matter! By officer only!

Received from HXKO on the 9/20/1943 at 1800 hrs. by Schueler.

[in blue pencil] Chief, Wehrmacht Ops. Staff. Urgent.

[in blue pencil] Chief OKW [Initialed] "K" [in Keitel's purple pencil] GWNOL Capt. Schueler calling Lieut. Bischoff calling.

[stamp]: OKW/Wehrmacht Ops. Staff courier office 9/20/1943, 1800 hrs. 662322/43 top secret command matter.

SSDH.X.K.O. No. 01608

To the OKW/Wehrmacht Operational Staff. Top Secret. By Officer only.

The Fuehrer has agreed in principle with Dr. Best's telegram that the Jewish question in Denmark be solved very soon by deportation.

According to Best's proposal, the execution of this measure should take place while the state of martial law still exists. It is not certain yet if sufficient police forces can be provided for the arrest of the Jews and their familiesabout 6000 persons, of whom most live in Copenhagen. The army would be heavily burdened by carrying out this measure, and will not be able to act forcefully and efficiently, since Copenhagen and on Fuenen young recruits have to be used mainly.

I believe that the results of the deportation will be serious.

It will no longer be possible to expect the cooperation of the Danish authorities and police machinery for the future. Supplies of foodstuffs will be made very problematic. The willingness of the armament industry to make deliveries will be prejudiced. Considerable disturbances, which will demand the utilization of the army, will have to be reckoned with.

Commander, Denmark. Ic (Intelligence) 350/43 Top Secret.

[Pencil note in Jodl's handwriting:] P.T.O.

[On back of teleprint, in Jodl's handwriting:]

Chief O.K.W. (1) I know nothing of this. If a political measure is to be carried out by the Commander, Denmark, the OKW must be notified by the Foreign Office.

[Marginal note in Keitel's purple pencil.] Neither do I! K.

[in purple pencil:] Correct!

[sidelining in purple pencil.] (2) The Foreign Office must state if it has instigated this measure. [signed]: Jodl 20/9.

[in Keitel's purple pencil:] (3) If the Foreign Office has issued this instruction it should also be clear about what means are to be used to carry it out. [initialed] K. 21/9.

[in purple pencil:] Deputy Chief Armed Forces Operational Staff.

[in brown pencil:] Qu 2 (N) (Admin) D.21/9.

Document D-547

[Jewish Question in Denmark], Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 883-884.

Captain Schueler calling.

2/Lt. Sintzenich calling. Lt. Reinhard HOKW calling.

Command matter by officer only

[pencil note] collects from OKW HR Hauptsturmfuehrer. Reuner.

G W N O L 010589.22/9 1920 hrs.

Commander of German troops in Denmark.

For action: Commander of German troops Denmark,

For information: Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police, SS Command Staff Hochwald.

For information: Foreign Office for the attention of Ambassador Ritter.

For information: Chief of Army armaments Dept. and Commander of the Reserve Army.

Top Secret command matter officer only.

The Fuehrer has ordered:

(1) The Reichsfuehrer SS has permission to recruit among the former members of the Danish armed forces who are about to be released, and to send to SS camps in the Reich up to 4000 men of the younger classes.

(2) The deportation of Jews will be carried out by the Reichsfuehrer SS who is transferring two Police Battalions to Denmark for this purpose.

(3) The state of martial law will remain in force at least until the end of the actions as under pars. (1) and (2). A special order will be issued about its suspension.

(4) The Reich plenipotentiary has been instructed via the Foreign Office in the same sense.

By order, signed Jodl OKW/Wehrmacht Ops. Staff/Qu. 2 (N) No. 66233 in red pencil 3/43 Top Secret Command Matter H X K O 19.50 hrs. received a top secret command matter message K R G W N O L 010589 Sintzenich 2nd Lt.

By order signed Jodl. OKW/Wehrmacht Ops. Staff/Qu. 2 (N)-No. 662333/43 top secret command matter TM 2 20.10 hrs. received Lieut Reinhard HOKW.

[pencil note] Tm 3 tel: Lieut. Reinhard 2045 hrs.

Sending and transmitting tapes destroyed.

[initialed] 22.9.43.

Document D-547

[Jewish Question in Denmark], Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 884-886.

Copy.

[in red pencil:] Denmark [in green pencil:] Chief OKW. [initialed] "J" [Jodl] 26/9

KR teleprint

9/25/1943. 23.15 hrs.

Top Secret 1 copy.

[in pencil] to 662369/43 top secret, command matter

To OKW/Wehrmacht Ops. Staff Command Matter!

For information: Head of Army Armaments Dept.

By Officer only!

Dept. and C in C Reserve army.

Obersturmbannfuehrer Riedweg visited the Plenipotentiary and Commander on orders from Obergruppenfuehrer Berger for a discussion on the subject of volunteers from the Danish army being taken over into the SS. As against the directive sent us by the OKW [underlined in black pencil; marginal note in Jodl's handwriting: "Has this happened?" Marginal note in Keitel's purple pencil: "Yes! only for the older professional soldiers"] to undertake the recruiting of volunteers for the SS in the present internment camps in Denmark, Riedweg reported that it was not intended to carry out this kind of recruiting as it was totally pointless. [Underlined in green pencil.] The Reichsfuehrer SS had ordered that 4000 men [underlined in black pencil] of the youngest age groups should be transported to Germany in a body to training camps to be established there. [Last sentence sidelined in green and commented "Yes! K" in Keitel's purple pencil.] The recruitment of volunteers was only to begin after a few weeks of training. The total figure of interned members of the Danish army is 5057. [Underlined in Keitel's purple pencil.] It was intended to form a railway police from this interned army on a voluntary basis-the Danish State railways doing the recruiting and appointing. The purpose of this railway protection was to be, to protect and guard the railway's installations, particularly against sabotage. According to the considerations to date, about 800 men will be required for this. [Underlined in green pencil.]. There thus remain, in round figures-should the withdrawal of these 800 men be agreed to by youonly 4275 soldiers [underlining in green pencil] i. e., strictly speaking, the whole Danish Army, with the exception of the 800 railway policemen, will have to be transported to Germany. In our opinion the question of the liberation of the regular soldiers-612 officers and 692 War Office officials-does not arise as a result of the deportation of the soldiers. [Underlining in black pencil.] The officers would, under these circumstances, constitute a constant source of unrest and would presumably form the chief contingent of enemy provocateurs. [Sidelining in green beside the two last sentences.]. Since the SS cannot recruit any volunteers from amongst prisoners of war, it is proposed to transfer Danish soldiers to Germany for a limited period for employment and for training in the anti-Bolshevist sense. [Underlining and marginal note: "Yes! K" in Keitel's purple pencil.] [Pencil bracket opened.] Since the Danish Officers' Corps has-in its general behavior-taken up a completely antagonistic attitude towards the German armed forces and it can be proved that propaganda was consciously conducted-particularly by the higher ranks-against our conduct of the war and since, in addition, arms and equipment as well as clothing were found in quantities far in excess of what was permitted, and thus the Danish Army Command intentionally broke the agreements [Pencil bracket closed]I propose that the regular soldiers (officers and War Office officials) be transported to Germany as prisoners of war. [Underlining in green pencil. Marginal note in black pencil in Jodl's handwriting: "And the 4275 soldiers". Marginal note in Keitel's purple pencil: "See above. K." Purple arrows to Keitel's previous marginal note opposite previous lot of underlining.] As soon as the proposals of the Admiral, Denmark, regarding the discharge of the Danish Navy are available, they will follow immediately-with opinion appended by return.

I draw attention to the fact that, by a decision of the OKW jointly with the Foreign Office, it has been stated with regard to the war material of the Danish Army that this is not to be regarded as war booty, but is only to be made use of. In our opinion, the treatment of the war booty and the intended treatment of the interned Danish soldiers contradict one another. [Underlined in green pencil. Last sentence sidelined and crossed out also in green pencil.]

Obersturmbannfuehrer Riedweg expressed the opinion of the individual departments here in a telegram to Obergruppenfuehrer Berger, the contents of which were approximately as follows:

Transportation of Danish soldiers to Germany would after all probably cause serious political and economic harm; in view of the peculiarities of the Danes, it is furthermore questionable whether the recruitment, even after detailed training, will be crowned with success. R. therefore suggests foregoing the action planned. [Last two sentences sidelined in green pencil.]

This view can, as I have already repeatedly stated, only be supported. The reasons given by me above for transferring the Danish Army to Germany and taking the officers prisoner are only far-fetched reasons to make it possible to support the measures politically in Denmark.

Commander, Denmark. No. 27/43 Top Secret Command matter. F. v. K. [Signature]

Document D-547

[Jewish Question in Denmark], Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 886-888.

[in red pencil:] Denmark [in red pencil:] Chief of the Wehrmacht Ops. Staff [in green pencil:] Chief O.K.W.

Army teleprint network Command matter only by officer.

Received from HXKO 1.10. 1320 by Brockdorff

[Stamp] O.K.W./Wehrmacht Ops. Staff. courier office 10/1/1943 No. 662405/43

KRHXKO 01803 1/10 1230

Lieut. Bischoff calling Lieut. v. Brockdorff calling.

O.K.W./Operational Staff of the Armed Forces-

Top secret command matter. Only by officer.

The Reich plenipotentiary in Denmark has given the following report to the Reich minister for Foreign affairs:

1. The arrest of the Jews to be evacuated will take place in the night of 1st/2nd/10/43, transportation from Seeland will be carried out by ship (from Copenhagen), from Fuenen and Jutland by rail (special train).

2. Should I receive no contrary instructions, I do not intend allowing the Jewish action to be mentioned, either on the radio or in the press.

3. Should I receive no contrary instructions, I intend leaving the possessions of the evacuated Jews undisturbed, in order that the seizure of these possession can not be imputed to be the reason or one of the reasons for the action.

4. The disadvantageous effects of the Jewish action on the attitude of the local population could be decisively countered if tomorrow-2.10.43-the notification could be made on the radio and in the press that the interned Danish soldiers would gradually be released within the next few days. It would thus be made clear that the sons of Danish peasants are notas has been affirmed here in the last few daysto be pt on a par with the Jews by the Germans and be deported likewise, but that the Jews are to be made primarily responsible for the difficulties which have arisen in Denmark, and treated accordingly. I therefore request, in agreement with the Commander of the German troops in Denmark, authority to publish tomorrow the 2.10.43, on the radio and in the press, that the release of the interned Danish soldiers (it is not necessary to make any mention of the officers for the time being) will begin in the next few days.

[in blue pencil] Does the Reichsfuehrer SS know?

[in black pencil] The Reichsfuehrer SS knows and in agreement. D. 3/10

Dr. Best's statements on point 4 are fully approved by me.

Commander, Denmark, Chief of Staff 30/43 top secret. (Special registry book) command matter.

[signed] v. Hanneken.

[Pencil note in Jodl's handwriting] The Fuehrer agrees J [Jodl]

[pencil note] By telephone to Hanneken.

Document D-547

[Jewish Question in Denmark], Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 888-889.

Top Secret

[in red pencil] Denmark

Wehrmacht Operational Staff/Operations

Fuehrer's H.Q. the 10/2/1943. 3 copies 3rd copy

Command Matter! By officer only! Copy.

Teleprint 01810 2.10.,13.20

Received 2.10.,14.00 hours (No. 662417/43 Top Secret command matter)

To the O.K.W./Wehrmacht Operational Staff.

Jewish action carried out in the night of the 1st/2nd October by the German police without incidents.

As the Fuehrer has given permission for the release of the Danish Armed Forces, the further maintenance of the state of martial law does not seem to be necessary and suitable.

Even if at present the Danes are not submitting proposals for the formation of a new government, the plenipotentiary can govern for the present in cooperation with the heads of departments, according to the agreement of the plenipotentiary with the Commanderassented to by the O.K.W. and the Foreign Office.

In agreement with the plenipotentiary, I therefore request approval for suspending of the state of martial law on the 6th October.

Commander, Denmark Chief of Staff No. 31/43 Top Secret, Command Matter. Certified correct copy: [signature illegible]. Captain.

Distribution: Chief O.K.W. 1st copy Operations Army 2nd copy. Qu. 3rd copy.

Teleprint office OWNOL 011065 [in red pencil] Denmark. Rec'd on: 3.10. at 2240 hrs. from: H.X.K.O. Via: Knipping

[in blue pencil :] Chief of the Wehrmacht Ops. Staff [initial]. 4752.

[Stamp:] OKW/Wehrmacht Ops. Staff Telepr. No. 15201 10/3/1943 22.55 hours.

Top Secret [in pencil] 22.55. H.X.K.O. 01818 3.10. 2050==

To the O.K.W./Wehrmacht Ops. Staff

With reference to Lt. Colonel I. C. Poleck's inquiry the following is reported:

According the statement of the Reich plenipotentiary the Reichsfuehrer SS has ordered that the Reichsfuehrer SS alone as the person ordering the Jewish Action is to receive the exact figures arrest. The plenipotentiary has therefore given no figures to the Commander of the German troops in Denmark. 232 (two hundred and thirty two) Jews have been handed in by the police troops via the gathering points set up by the Watch Battalion, Copenhagen.

Commander Denmark, Chief of Staff/Qu,No.355/73. [Note in green pencil in Jodl's handwriting] top secret.

Is a matter of complete indifference to us too.

[initialed] J [Jodl]

Document D-578

Activities Of The SS Units In The Area Of Popovaca [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 889-891.

Copy

St. Qu. the 9/26/1943. to 974/43 Secret.

1st Mountain Brigade Op. No. 1577/Secret. Kutina the 9/17/1943.

Ref: Day's report Op. No. 1534/Secret of the 9/16/43.

187th Reserve Division.

On the 9/16/1943, an SS unit of 80 men marched from Popovaca to Osekovo for the compulsory purchase of cattle. I was not notified by anybody about the arrival of this unit in the technical operational area of the 1st Mountain Brigade and about the activity of this unit in the area, for which I alone am responsible.

A short time after their arrival in Osekovo this unit was attacked by partisans. Under the pressure of the numerically superior partisans, this unit had to retreat in the direction of the railway station, which they succeeded in doing, but they had four men seriously and several lightly wounded, among them the unit commander. One man was missing and they also lost an armored car. The unit commander then reported from Popovaca by telephone that, when he had to retreat, he had killed all persons who were in the open because he had no chance to distinguish between the loyal population and the partisans. He himself said that he killed about 100 persons in this incident.

On the occasion of my inspection of Popovaca on the 16.9.43, the officials of the railway station of Popovaca reported to me that they were tortured by the members of this SS unit and pulled about by the arms; they called them all saboteurs and did not allow them to go on to the platform so that it was impossible for them to do their work. At the same time, the officials told me that they could not put up with this and that they would be forced to leave their jobs if an end were not put to this soon, because under such circumstances they are not able to carry out the job entrusted to them, for which-they are responsible to the authorities.

In the above mentioned day's report, it is announced that the raid on this SS unit is due mainly to the fact that I received no notification of the arrival of this unit in my operational area. If I had been notified of this, I could have organized the whole task in such a manner that a surprise attack by the bands would have been impossible.

The behavior of this unit towards the railway officials and the killing of the population in the area of Osekovo without distinction is in any case making a very unfavorable impression on the population.

In order to keep respect for the members of the German guarding forces at the desired level, and so that proof is given of the complete cooperation between the allied German and Croatian armed forces, I request that on the occasion of this incident an investigation be begun with all urgency and that the guilty ones be made to answer for it. At the same time I request that steps be taken to notify me in good time of the entry of all units and I request that all service offices be instructed to cooperate with me if they enter my operational area.

Brigade Commander, Pericic Colonel.

Certified Copy. [Signature Illegible] Captain.

Document D-606

Denunciation Of Agreements Based On International Law, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 894-896.

Operational Staff of the Armed Forces. Foreign branch No. 313/45. Top Secret. International Bureaux.

Berlin 2/20/1945.

3 Copies, 1st Copy.

A. The agreements in question are mainly the following:

I. Regarding the general conduct of war: (1) The Hague Convention of the 10/18/1907 concerning the laws and usages of war on land. (2) Convention of 27.7.1927 concerning the treatment of P.W. (3) The Geneva Convention of 27.7.1929 for improving the lot of the wounded and sick. (4) The Geneva Protocol of 17.6.1925 concerning the prohibition of chemical warfare.

II. Regarding the conduct of war at sea: (1) The XIII Hague Convention of 18.10.1907 concerning war at sea. (2) The Submarine Convention of 1925.

III. Regarding the conduct of war in the air, no international regulations have so far been laid down.

B. Concerning the consequences of a possible denunciation of agreements based on International Law:

(1) Strictly formally, a denunciation of the agreements is not possible. The conventions concerning P.W. and wounded provide for no denunciation, the Hague Convention admits a denunciation only if one year's notice is given.

(2) On the basis of the practice of states in the wars of the last centuries, there exists the "International Law of usage" which can not be done away with unilaterally. It comprises the latest principles of a humane conduct of war; it is not laid down in writing. To respect it is however considered a prerequisite for membership of the community of states. (Prohibition on misusing the flag of truce, killing of defenseless women and children etc.)

Consequently Germany will by no means free herself from this essential obligation of the laws of war by a denunciation of the conventions on the laws of war.

C. The effects on:

(a) the conduct of war:

(1) The denunciation gives the enemy the pretext to declare the employment of any means of warfare on his part to be admissible. The consequence: the combatting of new means of warfare (gas, germs) is not possible for us with the same success as the combatting of the means so far admissible (e.g. the Panzerfaust [a kind of A/T rifle] tanks, mortars etc.). The unrestricted use of means of warfare has-according to experience-a much greater effect in a limited space than on an attacker who, thanks to the extent of his space, can more easily escape the effects of such warfare.

(2) Favorable repercussions on the German deserter problem can not be expected from the denunciation, because, according to the practice to date, a corresponding enemy counter propaganda starts immediately (assurances of good treatment).

(3) When occupying German territory, the enemy is no longer bound by the regulations of the Hague laws of land warfare. The German civil population is therefore not only practically but also legally put in considerably greater danger than before, owing to the cessation of the clear protective regulations of the Hague Convention. Germany thereby herself gives up the possibility of branding corresponding conduct by the enemy by propaganda.

(4) All kinds of militia (Volksturm and military auxiliaries provided with yellow armlets) are legalized only by the Hague Convention (Article 1). Its denunciation would make a partisan of the Volksturm man and of the fighter marked with the yellow armlet.

(b) in the sphere of the convention concerning wounded:

(1) After the denunciation, there is no longer a legal possibility of a counter-propaganda against the bombing of field hospitals, hospitals, hospital trains, hospital ships, and ambulances, carried out by the enemy to date.

(2) Medical personnel who fall into enemy hands will no longer enjoy the protection of the convention concerning wounded. The current and future possibilities of exchange will cease.

(3) Medical personnel on the field of battle will not enjoy the protection of the convention concerning wounded. The possibility of collecting wounded on the field of battle cannot take place under the protection of the Red Cross.

Document D-606

Denunciation Of Agreements Based On International Law, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 896-897.

(c) P.W. questions:

No protecting power with all the corresponding consequences, particularly for our conduct of the war. Our P.W.-including officers-can be used for any kind of work. Thereby a strengthening of the enemy's fighting power. Apart from that, the possibility of employing German P.W. for the purposes of the enemy's conduct of the war.

Consequences

(1) For us small advantage, because enemy P.W. here are working any way and are in practice also being used for all fortification tasks.

(2) Probability that unrest in P.W. camps will increase. Considering the present inadequate guarding, possibility of uprisings with corresponding effect on the civil population.

(3) Decreased willingness to work among the enemy P.W.

(4) Possibility of increased number of acts of sabotage. Effectiveness of threats of punishment considerably weakened because the P.W. believe anyway that they have no rights and that they are at the mercy of arbitrariness.

Decreased encouragement to behave decently.

(5) By cancellation of the protecting power, Germany loses the most important possibility of checking up on the treatment of her own soldiers who have fallen into enemy hands.

(d) The civil population:

(1) There is no certainty that a denunciation of the conventions will be understood by the civil population in the way it is meant; to this extent there exists the danger that the denunciation will at first have a very disturbing effect.

(2) People will immediately reckon with gas attacks.

(3) Owing to the enemy's present air superiority, there is the danger that the German civil population will begin to believe in still severer terror measures by the enemy, namely after the enemy's will to destroy Germany completely was expressed in the Yalta decisions.

(4) Similarly to enemy P.W., foreign workers can also become restless after having the feeling of being deprived of all legal basis for their treatment.

(e) Enemies and Neutrals:

The denunciation of the conventions will without doubt be used to the highest degree in an anti-German sense abroad.

This applies in particular to the convention concerning wounded, in the conclusion of which strong sentimental tendencies played their part.

The advantage of stimulating still more the anger of the German civil population will have to be weighed against the above.

Document D-606

Denunciation Of Agreements Based On International Law, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 897-899.

Operational Staff of the Armed Forces/Op.(M). No. 00 1859/45 Top Secret

Fuehrer's HQ, 2/21/1945.

3 Copies, 3rd Copy. Top Secret.

Re: Geneva Convention.

With reference to Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu 2/1 No. 674

001825/45 top secret, the attitude of the Supreme Commander of the Navy on the question of withdrawing from the Geneva Convention is presented:

"By withdrawing from the Geneva Convention, the Navy would be essentially affected in 3 points: (1) Treatment of prisoners of war. (2) Saving of the shipwrecked. (3) Protection of hospital ships.

Re. (1) The fear that good treatment of prisoners of war may serve as a stimulus for preferring captivity to fighting does not apply to sea warfare, since the prospects of being taken prisoner of war on board on giving up fighting are extremely remote and do not depend on the will of the individual. Added to this is the fact that the members of the Navy are trained in such a way that, with captivity, the war does not cease for them, but that there too they try by all means at their disposal to create difficulties for their enemies and thus continue to act both morally and actually, along the lines of their own prosecution of the war.

Re. (2) To cease saving the shipwreckeda thing which is in any case possible only on rare occasions-would, in the present situation, hit us harder than the enemy, since our U-boats, left to rely upon themselves, move exclusively in enemy waters, where there is no question of taking our own measures for life saving. It would only lead to the loss of German lives without corresponding compensation.

Re. (3) A withdrawal from the Geneva Convention would result in the immediate loss of our hospital ships. We could indeed proceed against enemy hospital ships too by U-boat attacks. But this we can do also without withdrawing from the Geneva Convention. The other consequences connected with withdrawing from the Geneva Convention (protocol against gas warfare, the Hague Convention on shelling by naval forces and the London regulations on U-boat warfare) are in part of little importance for naval warfare and in part no longer play any part in the present stage of the war. It results that, from the military point of view, to withdraw from the Hague Convention brings more disadvantages than advantages to the Navy. Over and above this, it appears in general too to be more correct to apply measures which are considered necessary for military or other reasons and which are in contradiction to the Geneva Convention, according to the situation of the moment, without previously announcing them by a withdrawal. One thus succeeds in maintaining outward appearances without the measures necessary in the interests of the conduct of the war suffering thereby.

The C in C of the Navy File No Admz bV 516/45 Top Secret.

Distribution: Chief OKW via Chief, Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht 1st Copy Deputy Chief/War Diary 2nd Copy. Qu 3rd Copy.

L. Burkner Viceadmiral.

24/2, OU, 23.2,1945. [initialled] J [Jodl]

Sir Colonel General,

On the 20.2., the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces raised the question to the Chief of the Foreign Branch of the Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces, of a possible repudiation by Germany of certain treaties on international law.

In itself this is essentially a political concern; since, however, it falls within the section of your official sphere of competence which iS directed by me, the following observations-over and above the opinion given officially to the Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces can perhaps be briefly added to this:

(1) If such a repudiation were to be announced, it appears expedient to refer to the atrocities of only one enemy party, namely the Soviet Union or the Anglo-Americans-preferably the latter.

This would at once carry the momentum of the breach between the Allies to the expected storm.

(2) Perhaps it would also be better not to come forth at once with the full weight of a plain repudiation, but just to ask the Anglo-Americans at first, through the protecting powers, the question whether it is henceforth their intention to place in the fore. ground of their "warfare" attacks on women and children (Dresden).

(3) May I, in conclusion, only repeat: International law is not a juridical affair, but a collection of the experiences of soldiers in numerous wars.

Heil Hitler, Sir Colonel General Yours Obediently. [sgd] L. Burkner.

The affair will presumably blow over. [initialled] J [Jodl] 25/2.

Document D-606

Denunciation Of Agreements Based On International Law, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 900-902.

Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht QU. 2.(1) No.001825/45 Top Secret.

2/20/1945. Top Secret. 6 Copies. 6th Copy.

Ref: Present value and lack of value of international obligations, such as the Geneva Convention, the Hague land warfare regulations etc.

The daily terror attacks on the German civil population, which in their extent put in the shade all the atrocities of history, force one to wonder whether there is any sense whatever in Germany maintaining the limitations of international law regarding the conduct of war, and whether the people can be burdened with it.

The following statements intentionally leave out considerations based purely on theoretical law. They are intended clearly and soberly to compare the advantages and disadvantages of withdrawing at the present time from the international laws of war. The considerations refer mainly to the Western Powers, as the Soviet Union in any case does not keep to the usages and treaties of international law.

The international laws of war are supposed to "mitigate the sufferings of war in so far as military interests permit" in addition to rules which are recognized tacitly (customary law), the following agreements come mainly under consideration:

(1) The Hague land warfare regulations, dated 18.10.1907;

(2) The agreement on the prohibition of chemical warfare (gas warfare agreement) dated 17.6.1925;

(3) The Geneva convention for the amelioration of the lot of the wounded and sick of the army in the field, dated 27.7.1929. (Red Cross agreement).

(4) The agreement regarding the treatment of Prisoners of War, dated 27.7.1929.

(5) The agreement regarding sea warfare (of enclosed opinion of the OKM/1st naval operational staff).

Aerial warfare has not yet been regulated by international agreements.

I. Advantages and disadvantages of a withdrawal from the obligations of international law regarding the conduct of war.

(a) Gas and bacteriological warfare.

The surprise introduction of gas and bacillae for fighting the enemy can, in the present emergency lead, owing to the surprise and shock effect, to considerable initial successes.

As against this there are the following disadvantages. The enemy has air superiority. The German population which is at present crowded into a narrow area-with anything up to a six fold overcrowding of the remaining houses-would, in a very short time, be subjected to counter blows. In this connection one must take into consideration, that the refugees particularly have no means of gas protection at their disposal. As the war is being fought out at present on German soil both in the East and in the West, the German population in the enemy occupied territory would also be affected by our own gas warfare. Finally German gas warfare could not reach either Russia's wide spaces or, above all, the United States of America.

Conclusion. The introduction of gas and bacillae as a war measure must work out to our disadvantage.

(b) Red Cross agreement.

The Anglo-Americans have undoubtedly repeatedly not respected the Red Cross in this war, have sunk hospital ships and have also fired upon clearly marked ambulances, and have not spared hospitals in their terror attacks. Nevertheless it is to be noted that on the whole they still respect the Geneva convention as was again confirmed not so long ago by the report of the army doctor concerning observations in the zone of the H.Q. of the 6th Panzer army in the West. Owing to enemy air superiority it would be absolutely impossible to carry out any kind of orderly care of the wounded any longer, should the protection of the Red Cross be entirely withdrawn. We must also not fail to recognize that, on the German side too, the Red Cross has often been misused for other purposes (Transport of munitions and fuel, transport of personnel to the front) as the report of the Army Doctor confirms once more. Should the Red Cross Convention be dropped entirely it would be easy for the Anglo-Americans to smash all hospitals and transport for the wounded. Owing to the lack of our own air superiority, there are no effective counter-measures -available. The continuation of the Geneva convention is therefore an advantage for us.

(c) Prisoner of war agreement.

There are 230000 Anglo-American prisoners of war in German hands (168000 British, 62000 USA soldiers), against whom there are 441000 German soldiers in Anglo-American hands, of whom 307000 are in the hands of the USA and 134000 in the hands of the British. Reprisal measures against them therefore work out to our disadvantage. We have indeed also in our hands people from the Western auxiliary countries: 920000 French prisoners of war and, in addition, 64000 Belgians and 10000 Dutchmen; whereas against these there are only an estimated 80000 German prisoners of war in the hands of de Gaulle's France. But it is probably quite indifferent to the Anglo-Americans (apart from propaganda exploitation) what we do with the French, Belgians or Dutch; whether France, especially, is further weakened by reprisals or not will in no way influence them in their measures against us.

To this must be added the following war experience: Bad treatment of prisoners of war mainly strengthens the opponent's will to resist. The problem of our own deserters would presumably not be eliminated by bad treatment of prisoners, as our opponent would make all sorts of promises to further deserters so that actually only those German soldiers whom he captured in honorable combat would be badly treated.

Only one advantage can be reckoned in breaking away from the agreement regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, this being that the prisoners of war (including officers) can then be forced to do all important war work. Naturally however, this would again require more guard personnel.

Document D-606

Denunciation Of Agreements Based On International Law, Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 902-904.

(d) Provisioning of the islands in the Aegean and the Channel Islands.

Experiences in Crete, Rhodes and the Channel Islands have shown that the German garrisons there can only be maintained if the civil population which, especially in the Channel Islands, has been obtained to work for the troops, has the minimum necessary for keeping alive. The provisioning of this civil population only takes place, however, through agreements with the enemy based on international law. If the agreements regarding the provisioning of the island population go, then, in the end, not only the civilians would starve, but also the German occupation forces, if the enemy so wishes.

II. Effects of the repudiation of all obligations based on international law.

(a) On our own troops:

Experiences in this war show that the troops in the West and South maintain their positions in spite of pattern bombing and the very great weight of enemy material, whereas in the East, if they believe themselves to be outflanked, they do not always stand firm in a crisis. This certainly rests partly on the soldier's deliberations that, after an honorable fight against the Anglo-Americans, he would only become a prisoner of war, whereas in the East he does not remain steadfast, out of fear of Bolshevik cruelty. It is to be feared that, by repudiating all international obligations, the same thing would occur on the Western and Southern fronts as has happened on the Eastern front. The partial failure to hold out of strongpoints in the West, is to be attributed less to the soldiers expectation that it will not be so bad in Anglo-American captivity than to the fact that it is mainly a question of personnel who, owing to 4 years of garrison life in France, had no fighting value. Moreover, the behavior of St. Malo and of the Atlantic fortresses stands out against this failure.

The repudiation of all obligations of international law brings therefore the advantage of very strong resistance in the case of encircled troops, who have no longer a way out, whilst it can be prejudicial to the holding of positions. Accordingly an overwhelming advantage is not to be found here either.

(b) Effect on our own population.

The repudiation of all obligations of international law will be welcomed by the population which is tormented by terror bombing to the extent that they will be able to deal with the terror airmen personally. Part of the population is however already going in for this settlement of accounts and it is not necessary to renounce international agreements for this. It should also be mentioned in this connection that now already the Anglo-American airmen are all equipped with firearms. If they know exactly what their fate will be in German hands, they will be still better equipped in future so as to fight their way through to the nearest front. Volksturm, Landwacht and other organs who wish to capture airmen, must reckon on suffering losses themselves. In spite of this, the population must not be prevented from taking measures of self-help.

It appears doubtful whether the people's will to resist will be encouraged by the repudiation of the still existing agreements regarding the conduct of the war. A great part of the population will be considerably disturbed about the fate of their relations in enemy hands. Even the stoppage of the prisoners of war mail without anything actually happening to our prisoners, would represent a further considerable burden on wide circles of the people.

Further, that part of the people who are in Anglo-American occupied territory will be particularly anxious. For the enemy is then no longer bound to the principles regarding the treatment of the civil population of an occupied territory.

Since, as explained, terror airmen can be rendered harmless without repudiating international obligations, there is no advantage to be found here either in breaking with international law.

(c) Utilization for propaganda:

If Germany repudiates all obligations of international law, this cannot but prove useful for the enemy propaganda. Our justification that enemy terror bombing has caused us to do this will be countered by the claim that we ourselves made use of aerial warfare against the civil population. Whilst, we do not need to fear the lying enemy outcry, it would still tend to have on the not inconsiderable portions of the population in the camp of our Western enemy, who, in view of the advance of Bolshevism, perhaps begin to suspect the senselessness of the war with the Reich, the effect of turning them from these considerations once more. Our propaganda for a united Europe under German leadership would also probably be nullified thereby.

The Western enemy news, after the opening of the Russian offensive repeatedly played with the idea and even with the covert incitement, that Germany would now probably begin gas warfare against the Bolsheviks.

There is a suspicion that our opponents, by their terror attacks and also by such utterances in the press, actually want to provoke us into repudiating the obligations of international law, so as to be able then to carry out all the more brutally and openly, before the eyes of the more critical part of their peoples and of the so-called neutrals too, their real intentions of destroying the German people.

Document D-606

Denunciation Of Agreements Based On International Law, Part 06 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 904-905.

III. The attitude and suggestion of the deputy chief of the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces:

At the present moment the disadvantages of a repudiation of the obligations still kept up to the present in any case by far outweigh the advantages. Just as we were wrong in 1914 when we solemnly declared war on all the States which had for a long time already wanted to go to war with us, and thus to outward appearances took the whole responsibility for the war upon ourselves; just as it was wrong to acknowledge as our own guilt the necessary march through Belgium in 1914, so it would be wrong to repudiate now publicly all the obligations of international law which we have entered into, and thus again appeal to the outside world as the guilty party.

The adherence to the obligations entered into in no way involves our having to enforce on ourselves any limitations prejudicial to the conduct of the war. Should the British, for instance, sink a hospital ship, this must be used as before for propaganda purposes, this does not prevent us in any way from sinking a British Hospital Ship at once as a reprisal and then expressing our regret, in the same way as the British, that it happened owing to an oversight.

We must learn to. utilise international law as a weapon particularly a propaganda weapon, in the same way as the enemy has done successfully since the first world war.

Distribution

Chief of the OKW via the Chief of the Ops.Staff of the Wehrmacht/Deputy Chief of the Ops.Staff of the Wehrmacht.

Op. (Army) from the 21.2-copy. Op. (Navy) from the 21.3-copy.Op. (Airforce) from the 21/2 4-copy. Qu Foreign Dept. via Intelligence from the 21/2 5-copy. (Draft) from the 21/2 6-copy.

4 Enclosures:

Enclosure 1. Opinion of the Staff of the Armed Forces/Agent abroad.

Enclosure 2. Opinion Navy High Command /Skl.

Enclosure 3. Opinion Airforce High Command /Lw.Fu. Staff IC. (with reservation of the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force).

Enclosure 4. Extract from a report of the Fuehrer of the Administrative Dept. of the 20.2.1945. on the state of preparations for chemical warfare on the part of enemy powers.

Document D-637

On Adolf Hitler's Meeting With Papen [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 905-906.

Extract from "Voelkischer Beobachter" Edition A, Munich Edition, No. 7/8 Vol. 46th Saturday/Sunday 1/7-8/1933.

The Berlin press has made sensational news of Herr von Papen's meeting with Adolf Hitler.

The "Tagliche Rundschau" already feels able to relate that the purpose of the discussion was "to try once more to make Hitler Chancellor." If one is supposed to deduce from this that the overtures for the meeting came from Hitler, we can affirm, on the information at our disposal, that this was not so.

The other papers which are spreading this assertion, some in a very definite form, are likewise making completely false deductions.

It is much more probable that? on the contrary, Herr von Papen felt the need of informing the leader of the biggest German party of certain interesting details about the events which led up to the fall of his government in the November of last year.

If one thinks, in this connection, of the peculiar events which, after the formal resignation of the Papen government directly preceded Herr von Schleicher's being entrusted with the formation of a government, one can understand that the former Reich Chancellor thinks it valuable to throw some light on things, and on the methods by which one can become Chancellor nowadays.

The "Tagliche Rundschau" has no reason at all to be surprised that "Hitler could have any common dealings whatever with Herr von Papen." That the contrary is true, if overstresses the "common dealings." Hitler demonstrated on the 8/31/1932, which would, as is well known, have been the best opportunity for it. The leader of the German Liberation movement certainly has no intention of having "common dealings" with the representatives of a policy which he has recognised to be false in its contents. But the Fuehrer also ha,s not the slightest reason for accounting to the Berlin Press for his choice of persons from whom to find out personally how rotten that system is, internally too, with which he does not wish to have "common dealings."

Against deductions

Adolph Hitler and Herr von Papen publish the following combined declaration:

"Against false deductions which are in many cases being circulated in the press regarding Adolph Hitler's meeting with the former Reich Chancellor von Papen, the undersigned declare that the conversation dealt exclusively with the possibility of creating a great national political United Front, and that in particular the opinions of both parties on the Reich Cabinet at present in power were not touched on at all within the framework of this general discussion" [the signatures follow].

Title: "Document D-664 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 907.

Voelkischer Beobachter 1/21/1942

Kattowice 20 January-

Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach spoke Tuesday afternoon at a major convention of party leaders of the Gau Upper Silesia in the City theatre of Kattowice to the corps of leaders from party, administration and commerce on duties of the German Youth in the East, which will be the deciding factor in the destiny of the German people.

The German in the East, the Reichsleiter began, has a definite sense for reality. Here the German has either to fight or to stand guard. On top of it he has to carry out very hard work. Peace in the established sense was never known to him. Continuously he believed in the greater Germany and has always shown himself in his devotion as a true soldier and National Socialist.

Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach then dealt with the tasks of German youth in the East. The Hitler youth had carried out political schooling along the lines of the Fuehrer's Eastern policy. We are grateful to the Fuehrer for having turned the face of the German people towards the East, because the East is the destiny of our people. After having shown up the mistakes in past Eastern policy, the Reichsleiter continued:

Service in the East is honorable service to the German people. The young Germans must live for the ideas for which the German soldiers have died, and the young generation of our people must regard it as their highest duty to work in those regions where their German comrades in uniform have shed their blood.

It is the duty of every youth leader to regard the fight of his fallen comrades as a symbol for his future tasks. He must be prepared at all times to spend even his whole life in the East under the most difficult conditions. There can be no greater honor than to consolidate with the ploughfor the future and simultaneously for the sons and grandsons of our fallen comradesthose regions whose soil has been drenched with the blood of German soldiers.

Document D-679

Nazi Proposal for Absorption of Hungary, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 908-910.

[Typewritten draft for a memorandum. It is undated, but one page is written on the back of an unfinished letter dated 3/11/1944]

(Handwritten corrections made to the original typewritten script by Krallert, Weneck, Kaltenbrunner, Flotte and Urban, are given in brackets with their initials, viz., Kr., W., K., F., & U., the crossed out phrase being underlined [italics].)

From the point of view of the Reich, an incorporation of the Hungarian area as a fundamental part of the old Habsburg sphere of power is in the long run inadmissible.

This aim can be achieved by force (by intervention-K.) or as the result of an evolutionary process.

In spite of the extraordinary geopolitical and economic importance of Hungary for the Reich, German foreign policy has made no serious attempt during recent years to gain an influence on developments in Hungary and to make use of this to attain the goal by means of evolutionary methods (apart, perhaps, from direct personal endeavors by the Fuehrer to win Horthy over to the dismissal of Kallay and the elimination of the Bethlen influence.-K.)

Those Hungarians who look back, in the field of foreign policy, to a centuries-old tradition as a great power, incline fundamentally towards a conspiratorial policy. The complete lack of German attempts at influence has inevitably trained them to follow that policy of playing off one power against another which has now attained an intolerable character as the "proofs" have clearly revealed. (Underlining by W.)

Instead of recognizing therein the necessity of seeking, in the numerous positive forces, bases for a solution which will both secure the total utilization of Hungarian potentialities for the prosecution of the war at the moment, and create for the future the prerequisites for the final aim striven for an attempt at a military solution by force now threatens. This will by no means lead (underlining by U.) to the complete fulfillment of the military and economic demands of the Reich in this area, and will, on the contrary, obstruct forever the road to an evolutionary development (the whole paragraph is crossed out and the following substituted: I fear that the road to a future evolutionary development might be blocked by immediate military operations, without achieving for the present the seizure of the military and economic potentialities.-K.).

On the Hungarian side there stands against all this the fear of falling a victim to Bolshevism on the defeat of Germany, which is taken for granted. It is believed that the only way to exercise this danger is by an early adherence to the Anglo-American side. To this is added the deep dislike of the leading upper class towards us as the bearers of a social revolution which will, in the long run, make impossible the continuation of the feudal system of life in Hungary the beneficiary of which is this very upper class.

The consideration that a possible English intervention would have to be met in good time was one of the main reasons for the origination of the plan for a solution by force. (Indecipherable alterations have been made by K. and the whole paragraph has been struck out.)

Against this, I consider-for reasons arising from the geographical situation alone, the probability of an attempt at an invasion to be very slight. (Firstly, because of the geographical situation and then because an undertaking so unpredictable does not tempt the English who are not minded to take risks.-K.) I believe, on the other hand, that the approach of Bolshevism will in itself soon make even those of the upper class forces which are inimical to us, ready to negotiate, out of despair of the possibility of English aid and out of fear of the even greater Bolshevist danger.

The vitally essential demands of the Reich in this area are now as follows:

(1) Complete exhaustion of all economic and especially agricultural resources in order to safeguard the basis of Germany's and Europe's food supply, in view of the loss of the Ukrainian areas. (2) Employment of all reserves of manpower for carrying on the war and (3) Complete relaxation of tension, in order to set free the Rumanian troops also, for use on the Eastern front.

The military action will create the following state of affairs, especially in the event of participation by the Rumanians and Slovaks:

(1) A united defense front, such as has never been seen before-from the Communists to the Arrow and Cross party (Pfeilkreuzler) .

(2) The impossibility of forming any government; at the most some mercenary persons would be found.

(3) Horthy's immediate resignation.

(4) Military, political, and economic chaos.

The country-one center of resistance, partisan activity on the greatest possible scale.

(5) And this point carries particularly great weight when the present German military situation is taken into consideration-numerous German divisions will be tied down for an unlimited period.

Document D-679

Nazi Proposal for Absorption of Hungary, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 910-912.

The desired aims will therefore not be attained. The carrying out of the military action at the time of the cultivation of the land in the spring, in itself decisively damages the prospects for the harvest. Ownership of large estates and the activity of Jewish middlemen, neither of which can be eliminated at short notice, will further lessen results. The partisan activity that can be expected for certain, finally destroys any hope of an increase in productivity.

The Hungarians have for centuries had experience in the organization of national resistance. Even the efforts of the old monarchy, which went on for twenty years, from 1848 to 1867, making use of all means of power, resulted in total failure. On the contrary, they decisively contribute to the creation and intensification of Hungarian national chauvinism. A recruitment of the Hungarian reserves of manpower for the German war effort is out of the question under these circumstances. On the other hand, continuous partisan warfare will ensue in the area occupied by us. As a result of the clash of the two opponents, warfare on a large scale would ensue in Transylvania and would presumably last a long time.

Even assuming the more advantageous case of a final Rumanian victory, the losses the Rumanians would have suffered and the necessity of suppressing northern Transylvania would make the employment of Rumanian troops in the East impossible for some months at least, if not permanently. We would, therefore, not see our present hopes fulfilled, would probably close the road to a later appeasement and final solution and would also evoke far reaching reactions in the fields of strategy and of foreign politics. The zones of unrest created behind our enemies, with an operational intention, would be closed to form a belt reaching from the Adriatic to the Baltic Sea, if a mutinous Hungary and a Transylvania in a state of war were added to them. Simultaneously, we thereby cut those supply routes, the safe functioning of which is vitally necessary to the southern wing of the Eastern front. If the Soviet intention of cutting, one after another, the supply routes that run parallel to and outside the Carpathians until the last railway line is cut, succeeds, then the supply lines through the Carpathian basin will alone be the basis for further resistance. But, also, those supply lines into the Balkans which are today the only safe ones and which would be vitally necessary in view of the possibility of a war against Turkey or a (of a-K.) landing in the Balkans (there-K.) would be endangered.

Almost equally important are presumably the political effects abroad. The German attitude on the Transylvanian question, once again executing a volte face, would entail such a loss of prestige even in friendly foreign countries that no one could have faith in (doubts would arise as to-K.) our ability and our will for a New Order in Europe. The effects must be disastrous (will be oppressive-K.) even in friendly nations such as Bulgaria, where it would be feared that a possible German agreement with the Serbs or Greeks might one day result again in the loss of Macedonia or Thrace. Thus we would drive the Bulgarians too into the arms of the Anglo-Americans in the end endeavor (who will endeavor-K.) to make it possible to retain (to obtain a guarantee from them for (Sewoff)-K.) the territories they have gained, by changing sides in time.

The effects to be expected in Finland, the Baltic States, etc., would be quite similar.

I am therefore convinced that the intended military coercive measures (intervention-K.) will not only not (will not necessarily-K.) attain any of the (the-K.) aims set, will create new and unforeseeable difficulties (situations that are difficult to get a bird's eye view of-K.) in the fields of strategy and of foreign politics. A successful attempt at a new order on an evolutionary basis on the other hand (however-K.), would mean:

(1) An internally consolidated Hungary, friendly to Germany,

(2) Horthy's remaining in his position as a "historical" personality, who would continue to guarantee the functioning of the national institutions.

(3) The Honved and the security units would remain entirely in step and would thus be at the disposal of the Reich's military requirements.

(4) The total economic draining of the Hungarian area is fully guaranteed.

(5) The elimination of all arguments on Rumania's part that she needs troops in Transylvania, makes these troops available for the East, and can postpone the present Transylvanian problem to a later date by clever promises.

(6) Therefore, not only will Hungarian and Rumanian troops be gained, but numerous German divisions will be spared.

(7) A distribution of German troops throughout Hungary, which might become necessary for the purpose of security and against a British invasion, can be carried out unhindered, by means of troops in training, in the same way as has been done in Rumania.

These far reaching results can be attained by comparatively simple means.

The point of departure would have to be a personal message from the Fuehrer to Horthy who, as is known, is (has been-K.) always most strongly (strongly-K.) impressed by the personality of the Fuehrer. The go-between for this message could be a diplomat such as von Papen who is not only known as an honest broker, but who enjoys moreover the personal confidence of Horthy. This message would have to refer to the debit balance of the government (Kallay's-K.) which had been hostile to Germany and express the thought that the full employment of Hungary's potentialities for Germany's and Europe's aims could alone assure Hungary's future existence. The condition and the guarantee for the carrying out of these demands would have to be created by a complete change of regime (in any case with German occupation-K.). Following on this, the Regent will legalize a new government on the broadest (a broad-Kr.) basis from the right wing of the Government throughout the Party for Hungarian Renewal and the Hungarian National Socialist Party to the Arrow and Cross Party (Underlining by V.)

Document D-679

Nazi Proposal for Absorption of Hungary, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 912-913.

The Putsch-like carrying out of this change of government must be organized in such a manner that the entire public remains unaware of the actual connections, as a result of the authoritative decision of the Regent and that antagonistic forces do not get a chance to act. The putting into effect of this plan is guaranteed by the existence of plenty of suitable personalities with whom we have close connections through my collaborators (underlining by W).

(x) The most important of these men, who could take up leading posts in a new government, are:

Lieutenant-Fieldmarshal of the Reserve Ratz, a respected general who enjoys the confidence of the entire right wing opposition, and who seems certain to be acceptable to the Regent as Prime Minister.

Lieutenant-Fieldmarshal Ruszkay, a highly qualified soldier of pure German descent, who enjoys the very highest respect of the officer class, and who, on taking over the Honved Ministry, would be a certain guarantee that Hungary's military forces would stand unconditionally at the side of the Reich.

The former Prime Minister Imredy, a man of great qualities as an economic leader and financial expert, who meets with very great approval, particularly among the Hungarian intelligentsia.

Major General of the Reserve Baky (deputy-Kr), one of the organizers of the Hungarian gendarmerie, who are generally and quite rightly looked upon as being the surest instrument for peace and order, and who have, at the same time, always been entirely sympathetic to Germany.

A number of popular party leaders of the right wing, as well as acknowledged experts, would also immediately be at our disposal (passage from (x) sidelined by F.).

I dare say that such an attempt could, through my collaboration, bring about a government consisting of the above-named people within 3 days. The military undertaking (transports to the Eastern front) will make its own contribution towards this. The Trojan method remains assured, but so does our good reputation as well.

The discussions taken down on the 13.3 did not even become a "D-day."

It rests with the (?) and the "proofs"! (-K.).

Title: "Document D-683 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 913-914.

Confidential!

Vienna, 1/31/1935

The Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

I return once more to the further technical treatment of the Tschirschky case.

During our talk at the beginning of December, you very kindly offered to finish the Tschirschky business in a special way. I asked you on 13 December to let the matter follow the course of an ordinary trial. The idea behind this request was that Herr von Tschirschky should not reap advantages of any kind from his position with me; just as little could I wish, of course, that he should suffer any disadvantages because of his position with me.

I have heard in the meantime that you have entrusted Herr Heydrich with a special commission which relates to the very field in question. He is thus also concerned with the Tschirschky case, at least in the present stage of the proceedings of investigation.

Herr von Tschirschky, whom, incidentally, I have for the time being relieved of his duties, has now learned from several sources which he-and I also, unfortunately-regard as authentic, that some persons belonging to the Gestapo have for a considerable time been planning to neutralize him.

In view of his own experiences in the summer of last year, he fears that, on the occasion of his now anticipated interrogation, he will be eliminated by certain lower organs of the Gestapo in one way or another, either on his way there or at a later date.

I consider it my duty to draw your attention in good time to the possible complications which may ensue from this state of affairs.

Should Herr von Tschirschky find it desirable, because of his above-mentioned apprehensions, not to appear on the date fixed by the Gestapo-these rumors have as mentioned above, unfortunately also spread to Austrian circles, owing to Berlin indiscretions-and if I had to dismiss him immediately for that reason, which I would have to do as a matter of course, the comments in the foreign press, which could be expected without doubt, would make my task here very difficult.

In the event, however, of Herr von Tschirschky going along on the appointed date and-a thing I hardly dare think of, much less say outright-in the event of his apprehensions being justified in one way or another, owing to an unfortunate chain of circumstances, it can be expected that not only my position in Vienna would be untenable, but that, furthermore, the Reich and your name would suffer great damage.

In view of this importance of the case in the field of foreign politics, I would remind you of your erstwhile promise to let the matter take the "normal course of justice", and I would ask you to take the case in question-by means of a special order-out of the sphere of the mission entrusted to Herr Heydrich in order that the competent Public Prosecutor may take over the proceedings with his usual auxiliary organs.

I hope that I shall then not have to continue troubling you the whole time with this sorry business, especially as Herr von Tschirschky leaves my service on the termination of the trial.

I would be particularly grateful for an immediate communication of your action in this connection, as the telegram received today fixed the new date as February 5th. Should I not have received a reply from you by the 4.2. I shall communicate to the Gestapo telegraphically that I have contacted you direct on this matter.

[signed] Papen

To the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. Berlin.

Document D-684

The Tschirschky Case [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 915-916.

Vienna, 2/5/1935

The Envoy Extraordinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mission.

As already reported yesterday by telegraph, I have conveyed to Herr von Tschirschky the order of the 2nd of this month repeating the demand that he appear on the date fixed by the Gestapo-5th February.

He then announced to me officially that he would not comply with this order, as he was convinced that he would be killed in one way or another. He will marshall the reasons for this refusal in a report which I will submit as soon as I receive it.

I yesterday finally relieved Herr von Tschirschky, whom I had already suspended for the course of the proceedings, of his post. It goes without saying that I shall break off all connections of an official nature, as soon as the handing over of files, etc., has taken place tomorrow.

I telegraphed to Herr von Neurath today, saying that Tschirschky has been dismissed from the service of the Embassy. His diplomatic pass and other official identity papers will be sent back by to-day's courier.

With reference to reporting his dismissal to the Austrian government, I am afraid that if I report it abruptly tomorrow, the matter will attract public discussion. I believe that this scandal should be avoided and have therefore given Herr von Tschirschky sick leave for the time being, for the benefit of the public, and shall report his dismissal later.

I shall return to the Tschirschky affair and its connections with other current Gestapo questions in Vienna later in a detailed report.

After I had repeatedly asked that Herr von Tschirschky should be given a chance to clear himself before a regular judge of the charges laid against him, I am naturally exceedingly sorry that the affair is now ending thus. I left nothing undone to induce Herr von Tschirschky to take the course designated to him of letting himself be examined by the Gestapo. But if he remains firm in his resolve to avoid this examination, even though he knows that this means the ruin of his social and material position for himself and his family and if he has declared to me that, L while an emigre he will do nothing which would be harmful to the Fuehrer and the country, I have nothing to add but the wish that everything should be avoided that could make this affair an open scandal.

[Signed] Papen

To the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. Berlin. By courier.

Title: "Document D-685, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 916-918.

Vienna, 2/5/1935

F. G. Tschirschky and Boegendorff. Your Excellency, Mr. Minister,

In an order dated 2/4/1935 expressed in writing that you, Mr. Minister, are relieving me of my official duties, quoting an extract from a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs which brings to your notice the Fuehrer's orders and you give me instructions to place myself at the disposal of the Gestapo on the 5th Feb., fixed date.

Although I am fully aware of the seriousness of the decision, I am unfortunately compelled, Mr. Minister, to declare that, in the interests of the Fatherland, the carrying out the mission in Austria intrusted to you by the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor and last but not least, in the interests of my family, I am not in a position to comply with the Gestapo demand to report to Berlin for interrogation.

The reason for this decision which is based on the attached special report shows that it has not been influenced only the human understandable desire to live which I hope you, Mr. Minister, as well as for the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor will realize from this report, but owing to my sense of responsibility to the Fatherland, the leadership of the 3rd Reich and towards you yourself I cannot act otherwise. The seriousness of the meaning of my decision is apparent since I have made it, although I am aware that I have already caused you considerable inconvenience.

Allow me to express once again in writing the assurance that I will never act disloyally either to the Fatherland, to the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor or to you personally. I am whole-heartedly devoted to my beloved Fatherland and all my actions and efforts have in the past only served for its well being and ascendancy. Nothing will alter this in the future. As soon as I am convinced that no further harm can befall the Fatherland, I will return to the Reich in order to place myself before the proper Judge in the Sommer affair. As I have a clear conscience, I hope I shall carry the blemish which will apparently be put upon me for a short time only.

As a person who knows that honor is the highest possession a man can lose, I will, as soon as I see the possibility, call to account each one who has assailed or is assailing my honor.

Always your devotedly, [Signed] Fritz Gunther v. Tschirschky.

To the Ambassador Extra-ordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister, Herr von Papen, Vienna.

F. G. von Tschirschky and Boegendorff.

Annexed to the letter dated 2/5/1935 addressed to the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister, Herr von Papen, Vienna

Information has reached me, not only from one but from many sources both from home and abroad, that in Gestapo circles a large number of persons exist who consider me to be a reactionary and outspoken enemy of the National Socialist party. It is therefore necessary to make me harmless. In addition to that I am supposed to know too much. It is all the same whether through my disappearance from the Reich, damage or advantage results.

The first information which came to my knowledge found its first confirmation in the events of 30th June and my personal experiences in those days. I give only the following facts as proof of my conception of my experiences on 30 June:

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION. (Up to and including 30 June 35)

I was arrested on 30.6 by two different groups which shows that the action against the Vice Chancellor originated from two official sources, who were working against each other. The incident was as follows:

When I returned to the Ministry in Vosstr. 1 with Herr von Papen from the short visit to Minister President Göring, the building was completely occupied by SS people. After I had entered my office, a short reddish haired man appeared, who asked me whether I was Mr. von Tschirschky. Having replied in the affirmative he told me in a short and harsh manner that "You are under arrest, come along with me." As I had been informed by Herr von Papen on our way from Minister President Göring's palace in Voss Strasse that we would be arrested on account of t the events of the 30th June, I did not ask the person who was arresting me for his credentials but answered him "I just came with Herr von Papen from Minister President Göring and am informed about everything, especially, that I am to be taken into protective custody. I am at your disposal." As a result of my explanation, the man started, looked at me in great surprise and muttered under his breath "How is that possible?" I did not ponder at first over these words and repeated, although I was rather taken aback at his rude manner, "I am at your disposal immediately. I only want to take leave from my chief." Whereupon the man explained curtly and decidedly "No, that is not allowed, you are not to speak to anyone any more, but must comply with my orders." Thereupon he got hold of a paper and read out both names, von Savigny and Baron Pereira, asking "Where are these gentlemen?" I thereupon said "Herr von Savigny should be in this house, a Baron Pereira does not exist here, and has never worked here, I do not know him either, but I do remember that a few days ago there arrived an obituary notice. I am firmly convinced that the person you are looking for is dead. If you wish I can get the obituary notice for you from the files." He listened to all I had to say, but did not believe my words and insisted upon making a further search himself. He then handed me over to another SS man posted at the door, with a machine pistol at the ready. About five minutes later, together with the gentlemen von Savigny and Hummelsheim, I was ordered by this man to accompany him under the escort of three SS men armed with machine pistols, in order to be taken away.

Arriving at the lower gate entrance I saw a motor car come up, out of which two men jumped hurriedly and entered the main hall of the Vossstrasse 1 building. One of the two men I recognized immediately as an official from the Criminal Police Department, with whom I had sat about twenty minutes previously in the waiting room of Minister President Göring's Palace. He immediately came up to me, took hold of my arm and said "I am ordered (or I have the order) to take you into protective custody." Whereupon I replied in astonishment "Excuse me, I have already been arrested by this man," who was now standing half behind me.

Title: "Document D-685, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 918-921.

A sharp interchange of words between these two men now took place. They showed each other their criminal police identity card, so far as I remember, the one belonging to the first man was a metal disc, and that of the second man was a red card. In the course of this exchange of words I exclaimed to the man, with reddish hair, who had first of all arrested me, that if a muddle already existed, I would prefer to be taken into protective custody by the man who came from the Minister President, as I had already seen him and his order appeared to be more trustworthy. This man repeatedly told me that I should go with him. The reddish haired man thereupon became very strict and exclaimed, "If you offer any further resistance I shall have to resort to arms." I replied that I was offering no resistance, but that he must understand that I was startled as I at least knew the other man by sight, whereas I did not know him at all. Whereupon the second broke in and said "There you are, you see that my orders are correct" and pushed me towards his car. The small reddish haired man, who was very excited about the incident, dragged me back from the car and ordered the SS escort to get ready to shoot. I then addressed the second man, who had no armed guard whatsoever, and said, "It is senseless to cause a bloodbath here in front of the building on account of an apparent misunderstanding. I think it would be better if I went in the other car. But follow on in your own car and ascertain where I am being taken." This was finally done and the journey took us to the Gestapo building in the Prince Albertstrasse, through a courtyard to a back entrance. There another exchange of words took place between the two groups of Criminal Police officials. I again joined in this debate and suggested as a way of clearing up the misunderstanding that a man from each group should see someone in the building of higher authority, and let him decide what should be done. To guard myself, and the other two gentlemen, there were still three Criminal Police officials and four SS men available. This way out was accepted. The men eventually came back and explained that the misunderstanding was now cleared up, we could now be taken away. Whereupon we were taken by three SS men, not accompanied by the Criminal Police officials, on a longish trip through the building into the basement. There we were handed over without any comment and received the order from the SS men, on duty .r there, to go over and sit on a bench against the wall, in the passage. We were then forbidden to talk to each other and so we spent a few hours sitting on the bench. It would go too far to give further details about the events which took place during this time. I will therefore only limit myself to the case of the shooting of a well known person, publicly stated to have committed suicide.

The person was brought in and taken past us into a cell running parallel to our corridor, escorted by three SS men, the leader of the detachment was a SS Sturm-Hauptfuehrer, short, dark and with an Army pistol in his hand. I heard the command "Guard the door." The door from our corridor to the other was shut, five shots were fired and immediately after the shots, the Sturm-Hauptfuehrer came out of the door with the still smoking pistol in his hand, saying under his breath, "That swine is finished." Feverish excitement reigned round about, one heard frightened calls and shreaks from the cells. One of the SS men on duty, a comparative youngster, was so excited, that he apparently forgot the situation as a whole and informed me-illustrating with his fingers-that the person concerned had been liquidated through three shots in the temple and two in the back of the head.

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION. (For the time after June 30th)

(a) In Silesia, the former Gauleiter and Oberpraesident Brueckner had openly declared to the various personalities "It is preposterous that Herr von Papen and Tschirschky have not been murdered in Berlin. Had they been in Silesia, they would no longer be alive. Besides myself, the bloodhound Woyrsch would certainly have seen to it. This neglect must yet be rectified." In Tannenberg I spoke shortly after this to State Councillor Udo von Woyrsch who is known to me and whom I met accidentally, and after greeting him told him that such an utterance from a State official was monstrous. I take it that this matter would interest him as his name was also mentioned. As this conversation took place shortly before the departure of our train, it had to be broken off very quickly. Woyrsch informed me that he was very much interested and that I must again tell him a few more details about it all. Unfortunately I have had no further opportunity, so far, to speak to Woyrsch about that matter.

(b) The utterances of a Gestapo man, whose name is known, and who himself acknowledges having taken part in the action in the Vice Chancellery, show that he and a circle of his friends very much regret that Herr von Papen and I did not lose our lives on 30.6. Had not someone else interfered in time during the incidents in the Vice Chancellery, Papen and Tschrschky would also have been liquidated.

(c) Members of Hitler's bodyguard, whose names unfortunately cannot be mentioned, as they are themselves in danger of their lives, have expressed similar opinions among themselves and also to third parties. These utterances and discussions took place in the period between September and up to the middle of December. In connection with these discussions, these same men with the help of other SS men in the service of the Gestapo have discussed the matter as to what steps should be taken to rectify the neglect. Groups were formed, of which some, in spite of any objections that might arise with regard to foreign politics on account of my belonging to a diplomatic mission and of the repercussions resulting therefrom, were of the opinion that in any case I had to be murdered. The others declared, that the way was too dangerous as I was someone who knew a great deal and had also surely put away a lot for safe keeping abroad which would be brought to light. If one is already of the opinion that I must be murdered, then one must spread beforehand all sorts of tales about me in order to defame me.

(d) Towards the end of October I was informed that the Gestapo circles were very happy at last, in their opinion, to possess some real solid evidence against me in connection with a case. Sommer who had been apprehended for contravention of Article 17 and who is said to have had relations with me. But first of all, these matters should be utilized at a time suitable to the Gestapo, not to proceed immediately, but to gather first of all some further evidence.

(e) Already shortly after my arrival in Vienna with Herr von Papen, in the middle of August, persons from various Austrian and Reich German sources approached me with the question, which was incomprehensible at the time, whether I was not pleased to be further away from malevolent circles in the Reich. When I told them of my intention to go to the Reich in order to accompany Herr von Papen, I was given guardedly to understand, that I had better remain here. During the months of October and November these rumors increased considerably, and I followed up these matters energetically.

Up to then I had always thought that one still had the impression here, based on the press notices dating back to 30.6. that people in many Reich circles were opposed to me and that the Austrian emigrants had reported adversely about me.

As a large circle of real National Socialists recognized my undoubted loyalty, the trust of these persons in me increased and they now reported to me direct, from which sources these reports directed against me originated and what was being said.

Title: "Document D-685, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 921-922.

Emissaries of the Gestapo who had been sent to Austria spread various reports about me such as, for instance, "Beware of Tschirschky, he is an enemy of all National Socialists and in the end will only betray you to the Austrian Government." Another Gestapo man appeared in Vienna, approximately during the period between the 5th and 20th -12 and stated, "Tschirschky will very shortly be liquidated, as soon as he crosses the frontier he will be murdered." Again another one declared, "At last, proceedings can be taken against Tschirschky. He is also a homo-sexual person and when he enters the Reich, he will be liquidated." The same man spread reports here that Dr. Megerle would be transferred to the Embassy in Vienna. Very shortly afterwards the question Megerle was also raised in the Bund chancellery department, which gave me definite proof of the correctness regarding the reports spread about me.

I could still give a whole series of other matters, but they would make the report too lengthy.

In conclusion, the reason why I do not feel obliged either to appear before the Gestapo or to return to the Reich at all, in spite of the extraordinary protection promised me by the Fuehrer and Chancellor, I make the following declaration:

Already during my activities in Berlin, information has often reached me that there existed in the Reich a Terror organization which has sworn the oath of mutual allegiance until death. The men who are or who may be accepted in this brotherhood are expressly warned and given the obligation that they belong to the FEME and that they are in duty bound when carrying out their tasks to feel that they belong in a far greater degree to the brotherhood and are only bound to Adolf Hitler in a smaller degree. I could not have believed this monstrous thing, had the information not been given me about 6 months previously, by a man in the Reich-I wish to emphasize this explicitly, who is not opposed to the 3rd Reich, but quite the opposite, a man who in his innermost convictions believes in Adolf Hitler's mission, a Reich German National Socialist of many years standing, who himself at one time was to be won over into this brotherhood but who was able to withdraw from it cleverly. This man has assured me of his willingness to expose publicly the names mentioned to me of the members of this brotherhood, or to swear an affidavit to this effect in case these people should already be dead. He must only be assured that this Terrorist brotherhood can no longer be effective, especially as there are persons belonging to this brotherhood who are among the people who count as being the most trusted of the Fuehrer and the Reichschancellor.

I am naturally firmly convinced that the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor is not aware of the fact that these persons belong to the conspiracy. The logical consequences of this build up and the actions of this brotherhood prevent any one person from leaving it without falling himself a victim to the FEME.

I have had to give the last explanations so guardedly as I have not dared to give any names, even to my immediate superior Herr von Papen, so as not to incriminate you in case this report should fall into the wrong hands.

Vienna, 2/5/1935.

[sgd] Fritz Guenther von Tschirschky

Title: "Document D-687 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 923-925.

Vienna, 4/4/1935

The Envoy Extra-ordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on a Special Mission.

 

1. I have first to report on the development of the local NSDAP:

On 23rd March, a complete agreement was reached in Krems between Captain Leopold (retd) and Generaldirektor Neubacher. In accordance therewith, Neubacher subordinated himself to Leopold in every way and recognized him as Fuehrer for Austria. As soon as Schattenfroh is released from the concentration camp, he is to become deputy Fuehrer, while Neubacher, as the closest confidant of Leopold, will be consulted on all important questions. Furthermore, Leopold has nominated Werkowitsch to be head of the SA and Larsen to be his deputy. Major General Klupp (retd) will be taken into consultation in strict confidence. Furthermore Leopold expressed the desire that at long last, the continuous intrigues against him on the part of emigrees living in the Reich-of the type of Frauenfeld and his ilk-be stopped.

As has been reported to me the arrested Gau Leadership of Upper Austria which was betrayed by Klaushofer and gaoled has been reorganized in most districts.

The agreement reached on the question of Austrian Leadership can only be considered very pleasing.

2. On the internal political developments I report today in particular. They are brought into sharp relief by two original letters which came into my hands and which I would not like to withhold from you, my Fuehrer.

a. The Chief of Staff of the Tyrolese Heimwehr, Abel, writes:

"… I have long enough played the part of Cassandra to my superior, and have always been right. But when I see and feel that all these warnings have been given in vain, ,that the gentlemen in authority can work out their policy themselves-if one can still call it that-but they must also answer for it to our Heimwehr men, who are brave beyond all praise. My conscience will not let me participate in the present political trend any longer. Our mutual friend in Trieste (Steidle) is of the same opinion. Either our high and mighty gentlemen are smart enough to find at the last moment that North-South line which corresponds fundamentally to the old Tripartite Pact or Austria will be a thing of the past, and will inescapably fall victim to partition in the coming clashes.

The announcement of general conscription in the imperialistic--now no longer National Socialistic (?)-Reich has been a bombshell among the Tyrolese Heimwehr. Every Heimwehr man speaks of the brave decision with the greatest respect. How poorly does the cackling of a Mr. Schmitz compare with this! And our Federal Prince is out boar hunting. … In the meantime, the national government is happily making rapid progress in the markedly Catholic section. But our government seems to be asleep. …"

b. Baron Gudemus, the closest confidant of the Archduke Otto in Steenockerzeel, writes to me of my acquaintances on the 30.3:

"… I took many a cheerful impression back with me from Austria about the progress of our movement, but I cannot deny, that in some respects, the policy of our government worries me greatly. Of what use is it that the ringleaders of 2-4/1934-in as far as they get caught-are being sentenced while the government is too weak, too "slovenly", or intentionally too tolerant, to prevent brown and red propaganda being carried on in the cinema, in the press, and on the radio, and mainly by state officials or organs of the FATHERLAND FRONT-supported and paid by the financial and other means which are pouring in in plenty from Germany. What is that learned idealist Schuschnigg actually doing? Does he not notice that Papen and the other brown agents in his own country continually spit into the hand he so consistently offers them? He must not imagine that he can thus maintain and save Austria, while Hitler rules in a Germany which is painted brown on the inside and the outside. The methods over there haveit is truebecome more clever and more careful, but this makes them all the more dangerous ! Terrible are also the continuous differences between Schuschnigg and Starhemberg and also the competition of their `guards' and the remaining underground republican influence of the still existing Christian Social Clique, which has been rid of its decent members, a band of suspicious intrigers and corruptionists, who are now secretly guiding the FATHERLAND FRONT …

The difficulties of the internal Austrian situation could hardly be described more clearly than in this letter.

3. The film "the Old and the Young King" was shown here for the first time a few days ago in the presence of Mr. Jannings. It provoked enthusiastic demonstrations. Particularly the scene where the king stresses the fact that "French Trash and Roman books do not mean any.thing to Prussia", led to vociferous demonstrations. The police wanted to resort to a ban. Together with Mr. Jannings, we explained to them that, should this film be prohibited, we would resort to the complete exclusion of the whole Austrian film production from Germany. This worked. The film-except for the above mentioned part which was expunged-is being shown now and will be shown on the screen at Klagenfurt and Graz within the next few days. Yesterday I received Jannings together with a number of actors from the Burg Theater as my guests. He said he was very satisfied with his success, and we discussed in detail the plan of a film of Bismarck for the production of which I recommended Bemelburg to him as the writer of the script.

Yours respectfully, as ever, Papen

Document D-689

Inspection of the Consulates of Linz and Salzburg [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 925-927.

Vienna, 8/12/1935

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on Special Mission.

No. A 1892. Opening of the Grossglockner road.

(Three copies for the Foreign Office).

I returned today from a fortnight's tour, the purpose of which was to inspect the consulates and visit the provinces of Upper Austria, Salzburg, and Styria. This journey has given me a new and valuable insight into spiritual and economic conditions in these areas.

On the impressions I received from my visit to Linz and Salzburg I have already reported personally on the 1st of August. My conversation with the provincial Hauptmann, Dr. Gleisner, who, by the way, is a Bavarian by birth and is the first of the generation to live in Austria, dealt with the whole German-Austrian problem. The provincial Hauptmann gave me the impression of being of above average intelligence, and I quite believe that the surmise that he will yet be seen in other decisive State positions will prove right. On my question as to how far his own opinion concerning the possible restoration of normal relations coincides with that of the Austrian government, he answered very frankly, pointing out that the Federal government cannot bridge the present very sad gulf between the German Reich and Austria as long as they are of the opinion that the position of Catholicism seems to be threatened by the National Socialist doctrine. Despite my various objections regarding the present position in Germany, which was brought about at least in part by political Catholicism, which shows a strong similarity to the activity of Austrian political Catholicism, Dr. Gleisner stuck to his opinion. He concluded his exposition with the words: "Mr. Ambassador, I declare to you quite openly that the Austrian government has only one problem, which is to maintain our course until the cultural position in Germany is clarified."

Count Revertera, the Director of Security, spoke in a very conciliatory manner. He said he is trying to secure for the national opposition the possibility to exist, even though it is banned. (Action Reinthaler, Hueber) He said that it was necessary for the national opposition to become an Austrian affair and to break away clearly from the German party. I also had an opportunity to speak about some cases of particularly severe punishment, on which Count Revertera gave hopes of a benevolent revision.

In the evening I had assembled the representatives of the Reich German colony around me on the Postling berg. As soon as my arrival in Linz became known, people assembled to greet me in the most friendly manner. The consul told me that my visit has given a new incentive to national circles.

In Salzburg, the Reich German colony had assembled in considerable numbers-about 800 persons-and an excellent atmosphere prevailed among all the participants, who sent their greeting to the Fuehrer. As a result of the readiness of the security directorate to assist, flags and music were allowed and only the Horst Wessel song was forbidden. My visit to the provincial Hauptmann, Dr. Rehrl, left me with the impression that I was dealing with a sensible, politically moderate man, who is working earnestly for reconciliation with Germany. Dr. Rehrl repeatedly expressed to me his special thanks that the Fuehrer had, at the last moment, allowed some German cars to participate in the inauguration of the Grossglockner road. The promises of the Austrian government to exhibit both the German national emblems at the inauguration ceremonies on the Grossglockner were kept. The arrival of the Munich cars, driving in close column, with their Swastika pennant, was greeted everywhere with great joy by the population.

The ceremony of inaugurating the road has been reported elsewhere. The members of the Government avoided making any provocative remarks concerning the German relationship, so harmony was not disturbed. The Plenipotentiary General for German motor roads, Dr. TODT, whom I met next day at the Grossglockner, will report on the road itself. The nonarrival of the German car racers who had been announced was commented upon by the population with particular regret. How much it had been wished that a German car should win is proved by the demonstrative and roaring applause which went on for minutes on end, when, at the distribution of prizes, the Munich driver, Kohlrausch, was handed the third prize. As this applause could not be denied in the radio broadcast too, it has already given rise to disagreeable comments in a few newspapers.

The building of this road is without doubt a first class work of culture in which Reich German constructional firms took the main and decisive part. The Chief engineer of the Reich German firm which built the tunnel at the highest point offered to inform me of the position of the explosives chambers in this tunnel. I b sent him to the military attache.

In all places and among all persons to whom I talked, I found the greatest interest in developments in Germany. In Salzburg my presence gave rise to spontaneous demonstration in favor of the Reich. In Kammer on the Attersee, which I made my last halting place, 500 National Socialists assembled in the evening with music to greet me. It was only with the greatest difficulty that it was possible to explain to these people that any demonstration would involve imprisonment or even severer punishments for them. In spite of the fact that the crowd preserved marvelous discipline and only shouted "Heil" or sang folk songs, some guests in the hotel felt induced to telegraph to the Federal Chancellory: "the German Ambassador has caused a great Nazi demonstration to take place".

All told, I got the impression that morale in the Alpine provinces through which I travelled is excellent in spite of all sacrifices and oppression and that hopes for the rise of the Third Reich and a common destiny are unbroken. The lack of information about the actual state of affairs in Germany is noticeable everywhere. Something can be done about this only if the attempt to come to an arrangement with the Austrian government along the lines I am following succeeds, an arrangement according to which part of the German press and of German literature will be permitted to enter the country.

To the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, Berlin.

By Courier.

Document D-692

Austrian Governmental Reshuffle [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 928-929.

Vienna, 10/18/1935

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on Special Mission.

(Three copies for the Foreign Office.)

Yesterday's cabinet reshuffle resembles a bloodless insurrection by Prince Starhemberg and the Heimwehr. It becomes clear that Minister Fey heard early of his intended dismissal and that already yesterday afternoon he had the public buildings in Vienna occupied by the Viennese Heimwehr, which is loyal to him. The government countered this measure by simultaneously reinforcing the occupation by police. While the garrison of Vienna was kept in readiness, a number of transports of the Heimwehr from Lower Austria, which is loyal to Starhemberg, were on their way to Vienna since the early morning already. This being known, the Viennese Heimwehr was finally prevented from intervening with arms, after Fey had issued the well known order late in the evening to accept the situation. This evening a big demonstrative parade by approximately 10000 Heimwehr men from Lower Austria took place, which was used to pay homage to the Federal Chancellor and Starhemberg. It can be assumed that no further incidents will occur. The background for the government reshuffle, explained in my telegram yesterday, is being confirmed to me by the local diplomats and by many foreign journalists. Prince Starhemberg had tried to counter the sharp criticism which was being expressed openly everywhere of the line in foreign politics recently taken in Geneva by dropping all dissenting ministers and secretaries of State. Even in high bureaucratic circles whose guiding principle is only preoccupation for their own posts, people were talking during the last ten days with increasing excitement of the cul-de-sac into which they had been maneuvered by staking the fate of Austria solely on Mussolini's victory. English voices which speak very angrily of Austria's ingratitude and the impossibility of helping her in future have made a deep impression here, where the people have looked to England for a long time. To this was added the rumor which is being spread these days that Mussolini had informed Laval that he could not guarantee the Brenner Frontier by himself and that France would at last have to express herself about the effective military help to be rendered.

In this connection the communique issued in Bucharest yesterday is causing a particular stir. As is known, the Rumanian government stated in Titulescu's absence that there had never been, nor would there be, any negotiations about the passage of Russian troops. In this statement, one can see a victory of the British government against spasmodic attempts to reinforce the French-Czech-Russian front by the accession of Rumania. How far Italian pressure has constituted to making Starhemberg reshuffle the governments can not be discovered with certainty. But I understand from a reliable source that Mussolini had urgently requested the strengthening of the Austrian government's authority and that Starhemberg is personally firmly convinced of Mussolini's final victory in the Italo-British controversy.

In spite of the Vice-Chancellor's clear victory and of the diligent efforts of the Austrian press to make it appear plausible that the cabinet reshuffle was carried out for reasons of internal consolidation, the feeling of moving towards completely uncertain developments prevails among the Austrian public, including the Heimwehr circles.

From our point of view the change of affairs is only too welcome. Every new weakening of the system is of advantage even if it at first seems in fact to be directed against us. The fronts are starting to move and it will have to be our task to keep them moving. The continuation of negotiations for compensation, which I had renounced since the Geneva Declaration, seems to be entirely superfluous for the time being. It will be a good thing to strengthen the increasingly excited public feeling against the Italian trend by clever and tactful handling via the press without, however, giving the government justifiable cause for having recourse to the desperate measure of starting a new propaganda campaign against us. I would be very grateful if the Reich Minister for Propaganda were to put a few experienced journalists onto this work.

For the rest, we can confidently leave further developments to sort themselves out in the near future. I am convinced that the shifting of powers on the European Chess Board will permit us in the not too distant future to take up actively the question of influencing the southeastern areas.

[signed] PAPEN

P. S. It has been announced tonight that some of the ministers dropped have been reemployed in new posts. Neustaedter-Stuermer is to go as Minister to Budapest. Secretary of State Karwinsky will also transfer to the diplomatic service. Reither the minister for Agriculture, will again become provisional "Hauptman" of Lower Austria.

Document D-694

[Austria] The Development Of The Internal Political Situation, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 930-932.

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on a Special Mission.

(Three copies for Foreign Office.)

After the change in the Austrian government, the outlines of the new distribution of forces are showing up a little more clearly in recent days. Many things point to the fact that, while this change has strengthened the position of Prince Starhemberg, his influence is far from sufficient for reshaping Austria along his lines. In particular, it appears that the young people who have been newly taken into the cabinet, such as the Minister for Agriculture, Strobl, the Social Minister, Prof. Dobetsberger, and his Secretary of State, Znidaric, cannot be considered without further ado as members of the Starhemberg clique, and that, on the contrary, they wish to go their own way.

Within the cabinet as well as outside it, the violent difference of opinion continues as to Austria's attitude with regard to the question of sanctions. As I learn from various Ministers, the statement of Baron Pfhigl in Geneva, which was inspired by the Foreign Minister, has met with severe criticism even in the cabinet. People are rather horrified at the cooling off of relations with England and at the failure of the attempt to settle the question of the life claims of the Credit Bank, and they would prefer to get rid of Foreign Minister Berger today rather than tomorrow. As I reported, it is also true that the Ambassador in London, Baron Franckenstein, was asked to succeed Berger. He has meanwhile categorically declined to do so. Prince Starhemberg does not want to drop the Foreign Minister, who is devoted to him, without obtaining a practical reciprocal performance on the other side. He wants to take over the War Ministry so as to be able to control the entire executive as well as the Heimwehr police and security department. Only if he was allowed to do this would he agree to the Federal Chancellor getting the Foreign Office as well, as is his wish. Otherwise, so people here aver, he wants to put up his diplomatic adviser, legation counsellor, von Alexich, for this post.

As is known, Counsellor of State Funder, with whom I had a long discussion recently, made a strong attack on the Foreign Minister already at the last budget discussion. He declared to me the day before yesterday that his dismissal had already been decided upon, but was difficult to put into effect at present, as they did not want to displease Rome. Moreover Christian Social circles. too, did not agree very much with the antagonistic attitude which the Foreign Minister was continuously adopting towards Germany.

The opinions of Counsellor of State Funder, the chief editor of the "Reichspost", may be taken to be typical of the political views of a large section of the Christian Socialists and of their very influential wing of officials. In this connection, the two articles that were published last week on the question of the trials re foreign currency and on the discussion of German-French relations are also worth noting. I have reported in detail about the first of these articles, and have stressed the tone which, in spite of all criticism, is conciliatory-in which a collaboration of Catholicism with National Socialism against mutual Bolshevist enemy is demanded. Regarding the Fuehrer's conversations with the French Ambassador, the view is held here that Austria is very much hoping for an improvement in German-French relations, in Germany's as well as her own interest. Counsellor of State Funder also discussed the possibilities of a German-Austrian understanding very frankly with me. He thought that the atmosphere had fortunately diminished extraordinarily in tension during the last few months, thanks to the press agreement, and that one must take advantage of this progress in order to reach an agreement which in future would give Germany's and Austria's foreign policy a common denominator. It was in his opinion much more difficult successfully to clear up the problems lying on the surface, such as the press, refugee questions, etc., because too many forces both inside and outside Austria were interested in sabotaging such an agreement. But it should be possible to reach secret agreements which would make possible a mutual consultation in future on all questions of foreign policy that are of mutual interest.

Even though this idea of Herr Funder's does not appear to me Z to be realizable at present, it nevertheless proves to me how much his circles are occupying themselves with the problem of improving German-Austrian relations.

Yesterday Minister Buresch paid me a visit. The point of his elaborations was to make clear to me that, now that he was a Minister without Portfolio and no longer burdened by the difficult department of Finance, he would have much more time to devote to the decisive problem of the German-Austrian question. He too stated that one could put great hope in the young minister who had newly joined the cabinet. He obviously has notions of forming a strong party of malcontents here, under the influence of the Christian Socialists, against the Starhemberg clique.

The latter actually still seems to think that Mussolini will complete his Abyssinian adventure without loss of prestige. The Polish Ambassador Gavronski, who a few days ago had a long discussion with Herr Maudel, the director of the Hirtenberg arms factory and the most intimate friend of Starhemberg, told me that Maudel exercises a really uncanny influence on Starhemberg. With all his Jewish resentment, directed against everything that is going on in Germany, he strengthens the Prince in his Italian policy. After the manufacture of munitions for Italy had to be stopped in Hirtenberg because of Italian protests, he, Maudel, had loaded the entire factory on to the railway in order to continue work in Italy (incidentally an interesting situation for Austria's supply of munitions!) . I have today, as I have so often done previously, protested against Starhemberg's latest escapade, the usual Sunday speech in Linz. The Secretary General replied with a sigh that unfortunately the Prince had an uncontrollable temperament!

The government's efforts to make conquests among the socialist laborer wings are being continued at high pressure. Not only does Starhemberg make resounding speeches to the working class population every Sunday but Dobretsberger and Znidaric are also very active in that direction. Meanwhile, well informed circles assure me that these efforts completely fail with the social-democratic labor masses. At the opening ceremony of the new, state-owned tobacco factory in Linz, a banqueting table had also been put up for "Fatherland workers". Significantly it remained completely empty!

The League of Nations delegate, Herr Rost Van Tonningln, in an interesting lecture last night praised Austria's financial reconstruction in many directions. Nevertheless it is no secret that this year's budget is anything but balanced. On the orders of the budget consultant, a deficit of 360 million schillings was wiped out within 15 minutes by decreasing expenditure and increasing income. Naturally all this is a swindle on paper. No means are available for the program to create work in the New Year, and a new appeal to the capital market is not possible this year, I am told by the President of the National Bank, Kienbock. In this difficult financial situation the refusal of the British to help in the matter of the Credit Bank is of course particularly painful.

Document D-694

[Austria] The Development Of The Internal Political Situation, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 932-934.

The instability of both the internal and the external situation has led, as I have previously reported, to renewed activity by the friends of a restoration. In spite of the difficulties which this question presents in the fields of foreign and home policy, one must in no way underestimate its importance for future developments. It is certain that Prince Starhemberg is only taking up the Habsburg question in order to have his "finger in the pie". Apart from the fact that he himself cherishes great ambitions for i the position of Regent, legitimist friends within the Heimwehr exist in Lower and Upper Austria only; in the Alpine provinces, on the other hand, the Habsburg question is mostly the domain of Christian-Socialist and clerical circles. Reliable sources have informed me of an exchange of opinions which has taken place on this question between the Federal Chancellor, the local Nuncio, and the Holy See. The Federal Chancellor had let the Nuncio know that the mediation of the Vatican between Austria and the governments of the Little Entante was very much desired. The Austrian Government for its part was willing solemnly to renounce any territorial revisionism, Otto von Habsberg would be prepared to make a similar declaration.

The reply from the Secretary of State of the Holy See to the Nuncio in Vienna dated the 16.11 is said to have stated that, under the present conditions, the Vatican is not in a position to institute an official action of mediation, as at the present moment it must avoid anything that might be looked upon by Germany as being a clear exposition of the Vatican for a solution of the Austrian question. It was obvious that the Holy See had to void everything that might make the position of the German Catholics still more difficult. In detail it is stated in this letter: Italy is now as always to be had for a legitimistic solution of the Austrian question, but could not be brought in under present circumstances. The British Government had recently rather taken up the point of view of the Little Entente and was seeking to draw Yugoslavia into her sphere of influence. Britain could not tolerate any act which meant a strengthening of Italy's position in Central Europe. Even though the position of the Little Entente was doubtful, it yet appeared that Yugoslavia saw a casus belli in the , question of a restoration. For the same reasons France too did not want to touch this problem at present. The Vatican therefore recommends that the Government here should abstain from bringing the question up at the moment, but should continue the tactics of strengthening the Austrian legitimist movement which had ; been successful to date, and in particular secure it a prominent position within the "Fatherland Front".

I learn from the Yugoslav Ambassador that the ambassadors of the Little Entente here met and that they once again recommended to their governments that they should protest against the activity of the legitimists.

I hear from our friends in Linz that the director of security, Count Resertera, is continuing his efforts to bring about a reconciliation with the national opposition. Besides certain facilities for the imprisoned National Socialists, he is said to have made a proposal for an extensive amnesty. People are hoping that it will be realized at Christmas.

On the occasion of the session of the Diet on the 28.11., the Foreign Minister is going to give an extensive expose, and, as the Secretary General told me today, he will also touch upon the German-Austrian question.

As my exposition shows, the position on the whole is pretty confused. A further clearing up can probably only be expected when the political consequences of the Anglo-Italian conflict show up more clearly.

[signed] Papen

To the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, Berlin. By Courier.

Document D-706

[Extract from von Papen report of 8/21/1936 to Hitler] [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 934.

"It has unfortunately to be noted that the wild National Socialist excesses of July 29 of this year have not had the result we expected. Austria's reapproachment to the Third Reich in the field of foreign politics is making further progress, as well as the process of the cultural collaboration of the two sister nations. One can also assume from your most recent reports that the Trojan Horse of National Socialism is bringing over greater confusion into the ranks of the Fatherland Front and particularly into the ranks of the Heimatsschutz [Home Guard]. Opposition to the normalizing of German-Austrian relations which is extremely dangerous to Austrian independence, appears nevertheless to be relatively very great; it obviously only lacks good organization."

"It appears hopeless and also impractical to us to strive to influence Austrian legitimism or the Heimwehr movement. There are, on the one hand, comparatively strong elements in Austrian Catholicism who could, with certain reservations, be called democratic. These elements, which are gradually grouping themselves round the Freiheitsbund [Freedom Union] and which are inclined basically to work for an agreement with the Social Democrats, represent, in our opinion, that group which would under certain circumstances, be inclined to bring about a revolution in internal politics in Austria."

Title: "Document D-714 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 934-936.

Berlin, 1 Vossstrasse, W. 9. 7/4/1934. Tel. A2 Flora 6941.

The Reich Chancellor's Deputy.

Dear Reich Chancellor,

Yesterday at 10 a.m. I had the honor of informing you verbally, of my attitude towards the events of the last days, after my stretch in police custody had been suspended on the 2.7 at 2100 hrs. At this time I pointed out to you that I could not possibly take my seat in the Cabinet until my honor and that of my officials had been restored.

On the 30.6. five of my coworkers were arrested, one of them was shot. My files have been confiscated, my office sealed, and my private secretary also arrested. This is still the position at the moment.

A procedure of this kind against the second highest official of the state could only be justified if he and his officials were guilty of complicity in the plot against Fuehrer and state.

It is in the interests not only of protecting my personal honor, but even more so of protecting the authority and cleanliness of the state, that either the guilt should be proved at once or honor be restored.

The events have become known abroad, partly in a distorted form. For this reason alone it is in the state's and my own interests that not a single hour more be lost in settling this matter.

Your soldierly sense of honor, Herr Chancellor, will tell you that the Vice Chancellor, who it is true was repeatedly ensured by Prime Minister Göring that no accusation was being made ,against him, cannot possibly do otherwise than to protect the honor of his officials.

The following seems to be the only possible way:

(1) The case against my officials, including the shot Herr von Bose, to be put into the hands of the Prosecutor-General immediately, on your instructions or

(2) A communique to be published, stating that the investigation had provided no evidence of any complicity in the plot, my honor and that of my officials being thus restored.

If you do not wish to embark upon the latter path, my remaining in the cabinet any longer would be an impossibility. I had placed my position at your disposal already on the 18th and 19th of June. I can ask for my dismissal with an even lighter heart today, since it appears that the work mutually commenced Dy us on the 30.1.1933 now appears to be secured against further revolts. At the same time I request to be relieved of my position as Commissioner for the Saar.

I take it that you will make your decision regarding the restoration of my honor within the next few hours.

I remain loyally devoted to you and to your work for our Germany.

Title: "Document D-715 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 936-937.

Berlin, W 9, Lennestrasse. 9. 7/10/1934.

Dear Reich Chancellor,

Our agreement of the 4th July to the effect that I was to retain my position as Vice-Chancellor until September, and was then to be employed in the foreign service, was based between us on the following condition: The immediate and complete restoration of my authority and honor, so as to enable me to remain in the service of the Reich in whatever capacity.

To this end I submitted to you on the 5th July my proposals for an official statement, explaining why the arrest of several officials of my staff had taken place and how von Bose had lost his life and averring the nonparticipation of all the members of my staff in the SA revolt. This statement requested by me was only partially passed by you and published, in as much as the release and innocence of von Tschirschky, von Savigny, and of my private secretary, Miss Stotzingen, were announced. I wish to state that my own authority is by no means restored as a result of this published announcement for since the 30th June the press of the entire world has been discussing my arrest, the events in my office, the shooting of von Bose, etc., in ever changing versions. The "Times," for instance, says on the 7th July: "After the cabinet's vacation, von Papen will not return as Vice-Chancellor. The sudden evacuation of the Vice-Chancellory was ordered merely to enable a safe to be got at which it had been impossible to open on that Saturday on which the members of the staff were arrested and Herr von Bose shot." The "Times" also prints the official statement that was published about the release of the 3 above named persons, but adds: "The statement does not mention Herr von Bose who was shot in the office while these men were being arrested." Similar statements appear in a number of the big foreign newspapers, it also being claimed from time to time that Ministerial Director Klausener had also been a member of my office.

On Saturday, the 7th July, I discussed my position with Prime Minister Göring, who ordered the Gestapo also to release immediately Hummelsheim, a member of my office staff and to return my still confiscated private files. This order has not been complied with as yet. Herr Göring agreed with my opinion that, unless my authority is restored at once, my remaining in the cabinet even temporarily is an impossibility. I told him I wanted to go to Neudeck to ask the Reich President to relieve me of my post immediately. The Prime Minister not only agreed with me, but encouraged me to go as soon as possible. To my immediate telephonic request to Secretary of State Meissner to make an appointment for me in Neudeck, the latter replied to me that the Reich President was very much in need of rest and that I should wait a few more days for my visit. In the meantime I got an acquaintance to enquire whether the Field Marshal's health is really too bad for him to receive me for a farewell audience.

Dear Reich Chancellor, the position in which I am is quite intolerable. Even if people in Germany generally do not yet know what treatment I and my officials received, obviously in connection with the crushing of the SA Revolt, very many people do nevertheless know about it and in particular it is known everywhere abroad, because of the fact thatof all the peoplea large number of press representatives were present in my office during the event. It is quite impossible for me to go on pretending to the public that nothing happened as I have done up to now. Besides, no foreign government would like to have a representative of the German Reich accredited to it, of whom it knows that-with or without the knowledge of the Reich Chancellorhe has received the above mentioned treatment.

I therefore ask you to give your guarantee to the Reich President's accepting my resignation immediately. And if you think it in the interests of Germany and your work, and perhaps too, in the interests of regaining the Saar, that I should be employed in the foreign service (I should have to discuss the conditions with you verbally), then the psychological prerequisites therefore would first have to be created.

Asking for a decision as soon as possible, I remain with the assurance of unaltered devotion to you.

Yours obediently,

P.S. I am writing this letter because the Reich Chancellory informs me that you will be able to receive me today. P.

Title: "Document D-716 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 938-939.

Berlin W. Lennestr. 9. 7/12/1934.

Dear Reich Chancellor,

I thought for a long time over our conversation of yesterday's date, and the statements made to me-and in particular what you told me about your intentions regarding your Reichstag speech-have occupied me constantly in view of the enormous importance of the speech and its special effect on Germany's position in the sphere of foreign politics also. I therefore feel the urge-in fact I feel it to be my duty to let you know my opinion, as I have frequently done formerly on other occasions.

You explained to me yesterday that you intend to publicly accept responsibility for everything that happened, including what happened outside the crushing of the SA revolt. Allow me to say how manly and humanly great of you I think this is. The crushing of the revolt and your courageous and firm intervention have met with nothing but recognition throughout the entire world.

What are, however, at the moment a burden on Germany are solely those events that took place outside your own initiative and without any immediate connection with the revolt, such as the examples you yourself gave me. This has been given expression particularly in the British and American press.

You, as head of the state, wish to accept responsibility even for these acts which, at a time of great mental excitement and antagonism, took place without your knowledge. However, in the interest of lessening the tension in the atmosphere, particularly abroad, it seems to me to be advisable for you not to identify yourself with individual acts-even if you do throw your authority as leader into the scales.

In this connection I once again come to the Bose case, which is naturally the one which made the greatest impression on me and which you declined, during our discussion, to clarify publicly.

You assured me yesterday that you intended to give an account in the Reichstag of the events on the 30.6. concerning me and the Vice-Chancellorship, which would not only fully restore my own authority and honor, but also that of my officials, as this is the condition for my continuing to serve you and the country. It seemed to you yesterday that, in pursuance of these aims, I am stressing my own personal interests too much, although it is actually a question of the good of Germany as a whole.

Allow me to assure you once again that my person or my position--except for the restoration of my personal honor--not matter at all, and are only at issue insofar as the events in the Vice-Chancellery on the 30th of June are being regarded by the public as being the consequence of a breach between you and me. As I have, to date, been unable and unwilling to make any personal statements to the press without possibly forestalling your wishes. many rumors are explained that have circulated in the world for almost a fortnight, and which are intolerable to the authority o your government as well as to me. If therefore during these last few days I repeatedly asked for the clearing up of the Vice-Chancellory "affair," it was mainly in the interests of the state generally. You will understand that no official would be willing to work under me any longer, unless the Bose case is fully cleared up. I have already told you verbally the other day that the honor of my officials is my honor too. I also told you that I am convinced that Herr von Bose was in no way guilty of any treason or treachery, and I shall continue to be so until the contrary is proved to me. I know that particularly you, Herr Chancellor, will appreciate this attitude of mine, for you have always stood by your comrades, in fact have even placed yourself before your comrades.

That the Bose affair is arousing great interest arises from the fact that Herr von Bose was known to most journalists, and in particular to foreign journalists, as a result of his former work in the Reich Press Office and as head of the Prussian Press Office quite apart from the fact that during the events in the Vice-Chancellery a large number of visitors were present, who were also bound to note my strict imprisonment which lasted until Monday. I therefore asked you at least to state that Herr von Bose had no part in the treasonable efforts of the SA revolt. I therefore ask you once again to clarify the Bose affair by a public investigation.

The world is waiting your tomorrow's speech with great excitement. The only desire of these remarks is that the success of your explanation should aid the fulfillment of your efforts to bring about the rebirth of Germany.

With unchanged admiration and loyalty

Yours PAPEN.

Title: "Document D-717 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 939-940.

Berlin W. 9, Lennestr 9. 7/13/1934.

Very Esteemed Reich Chancellor,

I hope you have received my letter of yesterday's date, and that you received it in the spirit in which it was intended.

Today I ask you, for personal reasons, to excuse me from participating in the session of the Reichstag. Yesterday you were indeed of the opinion that my staying away might create the impression that there was disagreement between us. But this impression can surely not exist, if, during your speech, you refer to the case of the Vice-Chancellery in the form in which you promised me you would.

During all these days I have behaved with the greatest possible reserve towards the outside and have shown myself as little as possible, and you will surely understand my not wanting to appear in public again until every shadow has been removed from me.

I have also asked the chairman of the Party representative in the Reichstag to excuse my staying away.

Yours Very Obediently,

Title: "Document D-718 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 940-941.

Berlin W 9, Lennestrasse. 9. 7/14/1934.

Dear Chancellor,

After you, last night, gave the nation and the world your great account of the internal developments which led up to the 30th of June, I feel the need to shake your hand as I did on 1/30/1933, and to thank you for all you have given anew to the German nation by crushing the intended second revolution and by announcing irrevocable and statesmanly principles.

Painful and tragic circumstances have prevented me, for the first time since the 30th January, from appearing at your side. You yourself excused me and showed understanding for the fact that a Vice-Chancellor cannot take his seat on the ministerial bench as long as he finds himself subjected to special treatment. (My confiscated files have still not been returned to me, in spite of Göring's and your own orders.)

Your statements have clearly shown that any suspicion of a connection between my person and the treasonable goings-on was an intentional libel and calumniation. I thank you for stating this.

But I am still helpless against other people continuing to make out that there is an antagonism between us and against people considering and explaining every expression of sympathy towards me as being directed against the person of the Fuehrer. I am also defenseless against again being suspected of new conspiracies if I am seen in the company of old Conservative friends, however unobjectionable their attitude may be towards you and the new Germany.

The attempts to make my position impossible are being continued. I enclose an English letter from an obviously anonymous criminal, who is already attempting to represent me as being in league with attempts to murder Göring or Goebbels. Please pass this letter on to the Gestapo.

I should therefore be grateful if you could on some occasion point out positively that, up to today, I have loyally stood by and fought for yourself, your leadership and your work for Germany.

I request you to agree to my commencing a holiday immediately to last until I am recalled from my post. Before this, however, I must already today discuss with you the settling of the Saar problem and therefore request a short interview.

In unaltered loyalty,

Yours, Papen.

Title: "Document D-722, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 941-944.

Walter, Georg, Erich Giese.

Luedenscheid, Frankenstrasse 26. 2/19/1946.

The Story of My Life

I was born in Stettin on 11/24/1900 as the son of the foreman bricklayer, Ernest Giese. My father belonged to a trade-union, and voted for the Social Democratic party at elections.

I attended elementary school from my 6th to 14th year. Afterwards I served my commercial apprenticeship with the carrier's firm of Richard Wild, Stettin.

I was called up for the Armed Forces at the age of 17.5 years in 6/1918 (Grenadier Regiment No. 9 Stargard, Pomerania). I never got to the front, as the revolution had broken out in the meantime. I was discharged in 1/1919 and then worked in the telegraph office at Stettin. I joined the Navy as a volunteer on 9/1/1920, was taken on as a clerk, and served as a clerk throughout my whole service career. My units were briefly as follows:

9/1/1920-1/8/1923 in Cuxhaven with coastal defense.

9.1.23-16.3.25 in Wilhelmshaven with the HQ of the Naval Station.

17.3.25-21.7.27 on board the exploration and survey ship "Meteor." Took part in the German Atlantic expedition into South Atlantic waters.

22.7.27-27.9.29 in Berlin with the Naval Command (office work).

28.9.29-16.8.31 with the fleet command on board the battleship "Schleswig-Holstein" (Naval registrar).

17.8.31-30.1.32 in the Naval Academy at Kiel (Manager of the whole office).

I retired from active service on 1/30/1932, at the end of my 12 year term of service. My last service rank was Petty Officer Clerk.

I remained in my last post with the Naval Academy as administrative employee until 1/1934. I was then transferred as administrative employee to the Adjutancy of the Supreme Commander of the Navy in Berlin. I should like to summarize briefly my work in this position:

I sat in the anteroom of the Supreme Commander as assistant to the adjutant. I received all the Supreme Commander's visitors, accepted all applications for interviews and drew up the daily list of callers for the Supreme Commander. I did not take part in any conferences, or talks with callers. The Register of all the aforesaid discussions of visitors with the Supreme Commander was kept by the Adjutant. I received the Register from the Adjutant at midday after the callers had departed, to lock it up in the joint armor plated safe. I thus had access to this Register at any time and, therefore knew about all conversations with callers, or conferences which took place in the Supreme Commander's room. In addition, all top secret matters intended for the Supreme Commander passed through a mail registry book in my charge, so that I thus gained an insight into the complete correspondence of the Supreme Commander. In my position, I was also in charge of the Motor Transport Service.

In this position, I was promoted to Regierungsinspektor [Note: corresponds to a Lieutenant in the army] on 1.11.193, after passing the requisite officials' examinations. As a result of the extraordinary extension of the administrative section of the Navy, I was promoted, during the course of the following years, to Regierungsoberinspektor [captain], Verwaltungsamtmann [captain] and, on 5/1/1940, to Amstrat [major]. My sphere of activity was not changed by these promotions. As, however, I had, during the course of my long naval service, gathered a certain amount of experience, I came to know the Supreme Commander, Grand Admiral Raeder, fairly well from what I saw, read and heard every day. I did not have much contact with the Supreme Commander personallythis consisted rather in my submitting to, or fetching from, him top secret correspondence. This duty also was performed afterwards by the Adjutant.

As I saw the Register every day, I learned of all measures which came from the Reich Chancellery regarding extension or future political policies. In this way, I learned of the naval negotiations with England. Raeder pressed strongly for a conclusion, primarily in order to launch, as soon as possible, the U-Boats which were already under construction. The ratio of 1:3 for the naval forces resulted from the fact that the dockyard capacity which had been calculated for the following years up to 1943/44 would not permit any further large constructions. As far as U-Boats were concerned, it was possible to build more, and the ratio in this class of ships was increased for that reason. The construction of the first U-Boats had, as is now known, been secretly prepared at the German docks in Kiel to such an extent that the launching took place shortly after the signing of the naval treaty.

I realized from the discussions and conferences which the Supreme Commander had with Hitlerand from the later talks with the Naval Operational Staffthat they were counting on a war in the year 1943/44, with the same roles as when it broke out in 1939.

All measures, the occupation of the Rhineland, the reintroduction of sovereignty in the field of armaments, the occupation of Austria, Czechoslovakia and the Memel Area, were known to me through the operational measures. I also learned, at an early date, of the preparations for the attack on Poland, as the.visit of the battleship, "Schleswig-Holstein", to Danzig, had been planned accordingly. The date for the attack on Poland had been fixed for a week earlier, but was postponed owing to Mussolini's intervention.

I always learned from the Register of the discussions which the Supreme Commander had with Hitler. In this way, I noticed, among other things, that Hitler personally pressed very strongly for an increase in the Navy. Above all, he wanted still bigger ships and also very strong armament. Hitler was very well informed about the above-mentioned types of ships, and building programs of the other powers. For example, he laid particular value on strong rearmament; the then Chief of the Naval Arsenal, Admiral Witzell, often had to call on Hitler about that point.

When the war was then set going as result of the events in Poland, I learned, through the daily visits of the Naval Operational Staff to the Supreme Commander, of all current events which concerned the war at sea and also the conduct of the war on land. When the war was prolonged by the events in Russia, great pressure was exerted on Japan. The Japanese Naval Attache was also worked on accordingly.

As far as the prosecution of U-Boat warfare was concerned, their ruthless employment was backed by Hitler and also Raeder from the very first day, and was carried out accordingly by Doenitzthe Chief of the U-Boats. The number of U-Boats which served at the front was very small at first--at times there were only three to five U-Boats at the front.

I can state the following about the preparations which led up to the action against Denmark and Norway: An appointment with the Supreme Commander was frequently made for a Mr. Hagelin and another gentleman (whose name I cannot recall at present) through a party official of Rosenberg's Foreign Political Bureau; as a rule they were received immediately. I also received instructions accordingly that, in the event of a Mr. Hagelin announcing himself personally, I should always take him to the Supreme Commander at once. I then learned after a short time, that he was a Norwegian agent. The gentleman from the Foreign Political Office who frequently accompanied him and whose name I cannot recall either any more, also conversed with me and trusted me, so that I learned about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and about the preparations for the Norway campaign (Weseruebung). According to all I heard, I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler's joyous agreement. The whole enterprise was disguised by the pretense of an enterprise against Holland and England. One day Quisling too was announced at the Supreme Commander's through Hagelin and was received immediately. Another part in all these negotiations was played by Lieut. Commander Schreiber of the naval reserve, who was later Naval Attache in Oslo and knew the conditions in Norway very well. He worked with the Quisling party and its agents in Oslo.

Title: "Document D-722, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 944-947.

I learned the date of the attack on Russia (21st June) (Enterprise Barbarossa) already in 1/1941, after Molotov's visit to Berlin. In addition I should like to mention that, in 8/1940, after the rapid victory over France, all preparations were made for the attack against England. This order of Hitler's was ruthlessly carried out ( confiscation of all motor barges on all rivers and the corresponding holding in readiness of personnel). The attack was intended to take place during the month of September with a suitable tide. The sudden cancellation of this enterprise came from Hitler. The Fuehrer's naval adjutant made the remark that Hitler wanted to clear up the Russian question first, a campaign of three months being expected. Then the undertaking against England was to start. An undertaking against Gibraltar, which was to start in Spain, and the occupation of the Canaries were also operationally being prepared. German Intelligence officers were already in these islands and were preparing a strengthening of the coastal artillery by making German guns available for this purpose. For the undertaking against Russia, the thing was primarily to occupy the Ukraine rapidly and later do the same to the Caucasus area because of the oil wells. I learned from Rosenberg's assistant that the staffs required for the large scale exploitation of the oil fields had already been formed.

I should also like to add that the torpedoing of the "Athenia" caused great excitement in the High Command. Raeder personally ordered the strictest secrecy. The composition of the notices for the press regarding the handling of this case was done by the press officer on the staff of the Supreme Commander, Lt. Cdr. Alfred Wolf. Lt. Cdr. Wolf worked fundamentally on Raeder's instructions and then issued to the Propaganda Ministry the notices that had been prepared in accordance therewith.

Raeder's attitude to Hitler was very caustic, and he by no means recognized Himmler as a leader, and particularly not as a military leader. During the period when Heydrich was still Chief of the Gestapo, Raeder received reports on many current problems, mainly concerning disagreements in the church, naval questions, Pastor Niemoller, etc. Raeder had no sympathy for Göring either, as he hated him as a spendthrift, boastful, and gluttonous individual.

I have written down the above statements from memory; as I have knowledge of the entire inward and outward correspondence in the Supreme Commander's office on the strength of the records and other documents, I have merely selected these few items. Naturally I could at all times give particulars of any questions that were discussed in the Supreme Commander's Office, insofar as they relate to the period previous to my dismissal on 4/21/1942.

My dismissal from my position as an official of the Armed Forces resulted from the following two reasons:

(a) I was on several occasions strongly advised (by the Naval Administrative Department) to join the Party as soon as possible, as any further promotion to Regierungsrat [senior major] would depend on this. I refused to do so on principle. I must point out that in my parent's home I had been brought up in the spirit of the Social Democratic Party, and I have always remained loyal to this conviction. As a soldier and later as an official of the Armed Forces I always stuck to this conviction and frequently expressed this.

(b) My marriage having been unhappy for many years led to my entering upon relations with another woman, whom I intended to marry, which fact became known officially. Being a uniformed official of the Armed Forces equivalent in rank to an officer, these relations with another woman were held to be a breach of the code of honor.

Because of my irreproachable official qualifications I was granted a 50% pension.

I then took an industrial position, and from 7/1/1942-2/28/1944 I worked as office manager at the Differdinger steelworks at Differdinger, Luxemburg. Here I had many quarrels with the Kreisleiter in Esch, as I had stood up for Luxembergers on several occasions and had several times shown people collating for the Party the door. On the basis of an order of the Kreisleiter, every Reich German had to have some kind of function in the party, otherwise he would be expelled from Luxemburg. I remained passive, and, in spite of being 42 was appointed by the Kreisleiter an Oberscharfuehrer [sergeant major] in the Hitler Youth. As I did not take any interest, and the Hitler Youth of Differdinger was opposed to anything German, I was relieved of my post again after three months without having performed any duties. On the occasion of a large meeting, the Kreisleiter referred to me as a "mutineer" and this settled the matter for me.

As I expected further difficulties from the Kreisleiter, I kept on looking for another job, and on the 28th February left my position and took over a similar job with the "Gustloff" works in Hirtenberg, Lower Austria. I remained in this position until 4/2/1945 when this area became a Russian war zone.

Until 10/15/1945 I was in Pondorf, Upper Austria, as a refugee, and got to Lindenscheid via Dortmund in a refugee transport. I had selected this destination so as to seek here, in the British Zone, for the possibility of finding work in industry or in connection with the Navy. When, during this time, I followed the progress of the Nurnberg trials, I said to myself that my statements might possibly be of some use, and on 1/10/1946 I called on the Military Government. The writing down of my career results from this call, and I have written it voluntarily.

I swear and confirm on oath that the above mentioned career corresponds to the truth, and that it was drawn up to the best of my knowledge.

[Signed] Walter Giese.

Witnessed by: J. F. Collins, Rank: Capt.

Witnessed by: [Signature Illegible]. Rank: Lt. Cdr. RNVR.

Title: "Document D-739 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 947-948.

CZ/29.

The Reich Protector in BOHEMIA and MORAVIA.

PRAGUE, 10/5/1940.

The representative of the Foreign Office.

Secret Reich Matter.

12.065/D.pol.2 Secret.

The Fuehrer's decision in connection with report of 9/27/1940-No. 11. 663/D, Pol. 2 Secret.

Regarding the reception of the Reich Protector and Secretary of State Frank by the Fuehrer, I have learned the following from authentic sources:

To begin with, the Minister of Justice, Guertner, gave a report on the Czech resistance movement, during the course of which he maintained that the first trial of the four chief ring leaders would shortly take place before the People's Court.

The Fuehrer objected to this procedure and declared that execution squads were good enough for Czech insurgents and rebels. It was a mistake to create martyrs through legal sentences, as was proved in the case of Andreas Hofer and Schlageter. The Czechs would regard any sentence as an injustice. As this matter had already entered the path of legal procedure it was to be continued within this form. The trials were to be postponed until after the war, and then amidst the din of the victory celebrations the proceeding would pass unnoticed. Only death sentences could be pronounced, but would be commuted later on to life imprisonment or deportation.

Regarding the question of the future of the Protectorate, the Fuehrer touched on the following three possibilities:

1. Continuation of Czech autonomy, in which the German would live in the Protectorate as co-citizens with equal rights. This possibility was however, out of the question, as one had always to reckon with Czech intrigues.

2. The deportation of the Czechs and the Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by German settlers. This possibility was out of the question too, as its execution would take a hundred years.

3. The Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by germanizing the Czechs, i.e., by their assimilation. The latter would be possible with the greater part of the Czech people. Those Czechs against whom there were racial objections or who were anti-German were to be excepted from this assimilation. This category was to be weeded out.

The Fuehrer decided in favor of the third possibility; he gave orders via Reich Minister Lammers, to put a stop to the multitude of plans regarding partition of the Protectorate. The Fuehrer further decided that, in the interests of a uniformed policy with regard to the Czechs, a central Reich authority for the whole of the Bohemian and Moravian area should remain at Prague.

The present status of the-Protectorate thus continues.

The Fuehrer's decision followed the lines of the memoranda submitted by the Protector and Secretary of State Frank.

[Signed] Dr. ZIEMKE.

To the Foreign Office in Berlin.

F 17 031 and F 17 02

Document D-747

Affidavit of Max Pauly [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 948-949.

AFFIDAVIT OF MAX PAULY, born on 6/1/1907 at WESSELBUREN at present at ALTONA.

1. At the time at which I took up my appointment as Commandant of the Concentration camp NEUENGAMME in 11/1942, all personnel were Waffen SS. Later, in summer 1944, single men and small units came from the Army and Airforce, who were taken over by the Waffen SS. They were issued with new paybooks and clothed by the Waffen SS.

In summer 1944 the camp also got SS auxiliaries and female warders [Aufseherinnen], who did not belong to the SS.

2. In cases where camp inmates worked for the Navy, the guards were provided by the Navy, if they worked on the removal of debris in the City of Hamburg, the guards were provided by the police. Likewise the Airforce provided guards for the outposts at Porta, Helmsted and Hanover which worked for the SS Sonderinspektion I.

3. The total strength of the SS in NEUENGAMME amounted to approximately 500-600 men in 11/1942. In summer 1944 this figure had increased to approximately 2500 and at the time of the capitulation the number of SS troops employed in NEUENGAMME and its outposts [Aussenkommandos] may have been 2500-3000.

4. Replacements for NEUENGAMME came from all units of the Waffen SS, from 1944 onwards a great number were Volksdeutsche from Slovakia, the Banat, Danzig-West-Prussia, etc. Personnel were posted from all Trainings and Holding units of the Waffen SS; to name any specific unit is, therefore, impossible.

5. Due to the increasing demands of the field units of the Waffen SS an exchange of personnel took place, younger age groups were replaced by older ones. The replacement affected approximately 500-1000 men. During my term of duty from 11/1942-4/1945 approximately 4000 SS men have served at one time or another at NEUENGAMME and its outposts.

6. There was no difference in the employment of personnel, be it in the camp or as guard. A man could be transferred from the Camp staff to guard battalion at any time and vice versa, which occurred continuously.

[sgd.] Max Pauly.

Sworn before me 3/15/1946 at the Mil. Gov. Prison at ALTONA.

[sgd.] A. R. Frisby, Major, RCASC, SO II, Fin/Int, HQ Mil. Gov., Hansestadt Hamburg.

Title: "Document D-788 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 949.

Der Stuermer No. 8, 2/24/1944.

[Extract from an article signed by Streicher.]

Whoever does what a Jew does is a scoundrel, a criminal. And he who repeats and wishes to copy him deserves the same fate, annihilation, death.

Title: "Document D-794 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 951.

Berlin, 4/2/1933.

The Reich Foreign Secretary, [Initialled] `L' [Lammers] `Tho' [Thomsen]

[In handwriting] Submitted to the Reich Chancellor

Dear Reich Chancellor,

The Italian Ambassador telephoned me last night and informed me that Mussolini had declared himself prepared to deny, through the Italian delegations abroad, all news about the persecution of the Jews in Germany that had been distorted by propaganda, if we should consider this course useful. I thanked Herr Cerrati, also on your behalf, and told him that we should be glad to accept his offer.

I regard this friendly gesture of Mussolini's as important enough to bring it to your notice.

As I am unfortunately so hoarse, that I can only make myself understood with difficulty on the telephone, I am having to recourse to this written channel.

With best greetings I remain, dear Reich Chancellor,

Yours faithfully, [Signed] NEURATH

To the Reich Chancellor, Herr Adolf Hitler, Reich Chancellery.

Title: "Document D-802 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 952.

Der Sturmer No. 12, 3/1938.

Greater Germany. The Jewish domination is broken!

Our God makes sure that the power of the Jews does not grow up to heaven itself. What was only a dream up to a few days ago, has now become reality. The sister nation of Austria has returned home to the Reich. The world Jew has lost yet another battle. He still lives in the Reich in the midst of Germans and he still lives in the midst of the German and Austrian people. The power he had has, however, been taken from him-his domination is broken. We are approaching wonderful timesa Greater Germany without Jews.

Julius Streicher.

Document D-804

[Extract from Skl.File: Fall Athenia] [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 952-953.

1st Naval Operational Staff.

Berlin, the 9/16/1939.

1. To M. Naval Attache.

The Foreign Office has had a report o the meeting between the Commander in Chief of the German Navy and the American Naval Attache on the 9/13/1939 passed on to it by telephone; it is worded as follows:

"On the 16.9 at about 1300 hours, the Commander in Chief of the Navy received the American Naval Attache on the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister, and told him more or less the following: He had intended for some days already-as he knew-to write him to visit him, in order to tell him clearly his opinion about the sinking of the "Athenia", in view of the continued baiting about it. However he had waited for the return of these of the submarines that had been employed in waging war against merchant ships, at the time in question which might possibly be concerned, in order to receive reports about their activity personally. He repeated most emphatically that the sinking of the "Athenia" was not caused by a German submarine. The ship nearest to the place of the incident was at the time actually situated about 170 sea miles away from the place of the sinking. Besides this, the instructions according to which the commanders had to wage war against merchant shipping had after all been published. Up to date, in no case had these instructions been even slightly disregarded. On the contrary, an American captain reported a short time before about the particularly courteous and chivalrous behavior of the submarine commanders.

He authorized him to make official use of his statements through his embassy. It is left to the Naval Attache to report this to the Naval Attache in Washington.

Signed: Neubauer. 16.9.39.

1st Naval Operational Staff. II to sto.I Iu

 

III. Ica z.d.A.

sgd: Neubauer. Ic. [Initials].

Berlin the 20.9 39.

To: 3rd Dept.Naval Operational Staff. 1st Dept.Naval Operational Staff.

American Naval Attache Berlin to Washington:

Grand Admiral Raeder told me today the 16.9 that he had now received the reports from all submarines, as a result of which it has definitely been ascertained that the steamer "Athenia" was not sunk by a German submarine. He emphatically stressed the marvellous discipline of his submarine commanders; he had nevertheless delayed notifying me until the reports of all submarines which could possibly have been involved in the "Athenia" incident had been received. Grand Admiral Raeder added that the chivalrous conduct over and above.the demands of the laws concerning prizes which is so much praised by the neutrals will be difficult to carry out, in view of the arming of merchant ships by the British.

3rd Dept. Naval Operational Staff B. (B-Command)

Distribution: Ic 1st Naval Operational Staff, Ia, Iu. Naval Operational Staff 7244 secret.

Title: "Document D-806 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 954.

[Extract from Anlagen Skl Ib]

Immediate By special messenger.

Berlin 11/11/1936.

1. Subject: U-Boat Construction Program.

On 10/27/1936 I made my decision on how to make use of the U-boat tonnage that was for the time being still at our disposal in accordance with the London Naval Treaty of 1935, and on orders to be placed for the immediate construction of the new U-boats U 41 to U 51.

The military and political situation urgently demands that the extension of our U-boat fleet should be taken in hand immediately and completed with the greatest energy and dispatch, as it is a particularly valuable part of our armament at sea and possesses special striking powers.

I therefore impose the obligation on all naval departments concerned to do everything to make sure that the U-boat fleet is entirely completed, taken into commission and prepared for action in the shortest possible space of time, and to remove all obstacles and difficulties in the way of this aim by the strongest pressure on the armament industries participating in the construction and by the employment of all other suitable measures.

I order in particular that the requirements of the extension of the U-boat fleet are in every case to be given absolute priority over export orders.

[Pencil note]: It is to be reported to me after renewed negotiations with the firms and after exerting the strongest pressure when the seven 500 ton boats and the eight 740 ton boats will be completed.

C in C of the Navy.

2. Send copy of 1 to:

A (4 copies), B (4 copies), M Wa (4 copies), M P A, C, K (3 copies), E, Engineer, Fleet., Chief of the U-boats, Stat O., Stat. N., T.J., A.J., S.M.J., Z.J., Dockyard, Naval Adjutant at War Office, Arsenal, E.A. U-boats.

Document D-807

Sinking of S/S Deptford, Thomas Walton, and Garoufalia, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 955-956.

[Extract from I Skl I:]

Berlin, 1/31/1940.

Naval Ops. Staff. 1st Naval Ops.Staff a 4307/40 secret referring to 4306 and 4305

I. Previous Ref:-R.S. 205, 294 and 295.

It is proposed in replying to Norwegian notes, to admit only the sinking by a German U-boat of the S/S "Deptford", but to deny the sinking of the two other steamers. According to the data attached to the notes presented by the Norwegian Government, the grounds for suspecting a torpedo to have been the cause of the sinkings do in fact appear to be equally strong in all three cases. According to the Norwegian Foreign Minister's speech of the 19th January, the suspicion in Norway of torpedoing by a German U-boat appears, however, to be strongest in the case of the S/S "Deptford", whereas in the other two cases it is at least pretended that the possibility of striking mines has to be taken into account; this is considered improbable in the case of the S/S "Deptford" anyhow because other vessels had passed the same spot.

The assumption that the S/S "Thomas Walton" struck a mine may be supported, since the torpedoing occurred towards evening and nothing was observed and since furthermore several explosions took place in the same area owing to misses by torpedoes.

In the case of the S/S "Garoufalia" a denial appears expedient, if only because a neutral steamer is concerned, which was attacked without warning. Since it was attacked by means of an electric torpedo (Eto), no torpedo wake could be observed.

II. To the Foreign Office. Berlin W. 8.

Previous Reference R.S. 205. 294 and 295

Subject: Sinking of the Steamships "Deptford", "Thomas Walton" and "Garoufalia".

It is suggested that the Norwegian notes regarding the sinking of the Steamships "Deptford", "Thomas Walton" and "Garoufalia" be answered somewhat in the following manner:

As a result of the communication from the Norwegian Government, the matter of the sinking of the steamships "Deptford", `Thomas Walton" and "Garoufalia" has been thoroughly investigated. The following facts have thus been ascertained:

The steamer "Deptford" was sunk by a German U-boat on the 13th December, as it was recognized as an armed enemy ship. According to the report of the U-boat Commander, the sinking did not take place within territorial waters, but immediately outside. The German Naval Forces have strict instructions not to undertake any military operations within neutral territorial waters. Should the U-boat Commander have miscalculated his position, as appears to be borne out by the findings of the Norwegian Authorities, and should Norwegian territorial waters have been violated in consequence, the German Government regrets this most sincerely.

As a result of this incident, the German Naval Forces have once again been instructed unconditionally to respect neutral territorial waters. If a violation of Norwegian territorial waters has indeed occurred, there will be no repetition of it. As far as the sinking of the steamships "Thomas Walton" and "Garoufalia" is concerned, this cannot be traced to operations by German U-boats, as none of them were in the naval area indicated at the time of the sinkings.

III. Copy of II to OKW Foreign Dept.

IV. Carry forward I ia

1st Naval Operational Staff Ia Iu Ic I i. I ia.

Document D-807

Sinking of S/S Deptford, Thomas Walton, and Garoufalia, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 956-957.

Berlin, 1/8/1940.

Naval Operation Staff 1st Naval Operational Staff I i 2569/39 secret.

1. To the Foreign Office. O.K.W. Foreign Dept. (for information)

Previous reference R.S. 1105 of 12/26/1939.

Subject: Sinking of the Greek steamship "Garoufalia."

It is suggested that a reply be sent to the Greek note to the effect that nothing is known to the German authorities about the sinking of the steamship "Garoufalia" by a German U-Boat.

If, either through communications made to the Norwegian Government as a result of the letter 1st Naval Operational Staff 23808/39 secret of 12/21/39 or through the testimony of witness, the presence of a German U-Boat in the area in which the "Garoufalia" was sunk has already become known, it is suggested to answer the Greek note to the effect that a blacked-out ship bearing no illuminated neutrality markings was sighted by the U-Boat in the area concerned and was therefore not regarded as a neutral ship. It may therefore be possible that the steamship was mistaken for an enemy auxiliary warship.

II. Copy of I to Military Attache 3rd Naval Operational Staff.

III. Copy of II to 1st Naval Operational Staff. Io, Iu. Iu Ic Ii for I ia.

Title: "Document D-832 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 963.

Der Sturmer No.52, p.2. 25 December 41

[Leading Article by Streicher]

If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the Jewish blood is to finally come to its end, then there is only one way: the extermination of that people whose father is the devil.

Document D-841

Deposition of Walter Kurt Dietmann, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 963-964.

Deposition on oath of WALTER KURT DIETMANN, male, of Nauen, Berlin, Graf Arco-Str 19, sworn before me, Frederick Michael Warner, Captain, Gen. List, of War Crimes Investigation Unit, at Kiel, on 5/3/1946.

I was Naval-Administration-Inspector (Mar.-Verw.Inspector) and O i/c of the Naval Quartermaster Stores in Libau in Latvia.

I held this position from beginning of 8/1941 to the end of 3/1942.

The Jewish population of Libau at that time was supposed to be about 7000 people.

Up to the end of 3/1942 many thousands of those had already been "evacuated" by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police.

Evacuated was the local expression for the annihilation of these people.

All Jews were registered. When a new lot was evacuated it happened in the following way:

The Latvian Police fetched the Jews out of their houses, put them on lorries and drove them to the Naval Port about 6-7klm. outside the town. Later on these people had to march and were not taken anymore in lorries to that place.

In the Naval Port these people were then shot with machineguns. This was done by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. The people of course got their orders from the German Gestapo.

I personally didn't witness these incidents but comrades told me all about them.

Some of the Jews before they were shot worked for the Navy.

About 80,100 people worked in the Quartermaster Stores every day.

About 100,150 people worked in the Town Major's Office every day.

About 50 people worked at the Local Naval Building Office every day.

Through these contacts and through personal visits of Jews in their houses I heard a lot regarding these terrible happenings in Libau during these months.

I personally went to my superior, Festungs-Intendant Dr. Lancelle, and before that I also went to another superior, the O i/c of the Hospital Administration (Lazarett-Verwaltungs-Vorsteher) Nuetler, both were Naval Administration officials. I pointed out to them these already mentioned awful happenings.

The answer I got was that they couldn't do anything and that things like that were best overlooked.

Document D-841

Deposition of Walter Kurt Dietmann, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 964-965.

The Assistant Naval Administration Officer (Marine-Verwaltungs-Assistant) Kurt Traunecker accompanied a transport of clothing from Kiel to Libau. He stayed a few weeks in Libau and he definitely disapproved of the conditions there regarding the annihilation of the Jews.

He then went back to Kiel to the Local Quartermaster Stores.

There again he showed his disapproval of what he had seen and thereupon was ordered to appear at the Naval Administration H.Q. (Marine-Intendantur). Whom he saw there, I don't know, but it was made clear to him that these occurrences were not true and therefore he should not talk about them anymore, otherwise he would get into serious trouble.

My personal opinion is that the higher formations of the Navy in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of these terrible conditions.

In my opinion directly responsible for the incidents in Libau were-

The Oi/c of the Police, Obersturmbannfuehrer of the SS Dr. Dietrich.

Police-Lieutenant and Adjutant Graf.

Police-Lieutenant Seiffert.

Untersturmfuehrer of the SS and leader of the Department Kuegler.

Gestapo-Official and SS Oberscharfuehrer Handke.

Witnesses for these occurrences are the following:

Naval-Administration-Inspector (Mar.Verw.Insp) Paul Roepstorf.

Naval-Administration-Assistant (Mar.Verw.Asst) Josef Glaser.

Naval-Administration-Assistant (Mar.Verw.Asst) Max Gohr.

Naval-Administration-Secretary (Mar.Verw.Sekr) Kurt Traunecker.

I can give you further details, addresses, etc., concerning the witnesses, further witnesses and the accused, after I had access to my luggage, which at the moment is in Nuemauenster.

[signed] Kurt Dietmann.

Sworn by the said Deponent WALTER KURT DIETMANN, voluntarily at Kiel, on 5/3/1946, before me Frederick Michael Warner, Captain, detailed by C.inC. British Army of the Rhine. [signed] F. M. Warner, Capt. Investigating Officer.

Title: "Document D-843 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 965-966.

Telegram (Secret Code V) Oslo, 3/28/1940, 24.00 hours. Arrived: 3/29/1940, 5.45 hours. No.410 of 28th March.

Most urgent!

For the Reich Minister and Secretary of State, with reference to Telegram No. 406 of 28th March.

1. When I charged Foreign Minister Koht, in today's discussion about submarine "U 21", with last week's operations of British warships in Norwegian territorial waters, he declared that the Norwegian navy had in every case succeeded in preventing the carrying out and conclusions of warlike actions even if one could assume that an attempt was made in that direction. He also believed that the Norwegian navy would in future succeed in protecting and maintaining shipping in Norwegian territorial waters. He added, in confidence, that the British behaviour seemed to him to be intended [Marginal Note: Group Missing] and to provoke Germany into starting warlike operations herself, which would give the British a free hand in Norwegian waters. The British apparently did not want to take upon themselves the responsibility for openly violating Norwegian territory and Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for carrying out warlike operations in them.

2. The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees things quite right. It definitely appears, however, as I have frequently pointed out, that the British have no intentions of landing, but that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian territorial waters, perhaps, as Koht thinks, in order to provoke Germany. Of course, it is also possible that the British behaviour last week, which I have pointed out as well, will grow into more or less regular and increasing interference in territorial waters in order to strike a blow at our iron ore shipments along the Norwegian coasts.

3. The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and to insure that Norway's neutrality rules are respected can be accepted as a fact. The internment of the submarine "U 21" can be traced back to these fearful endeavours to prevent any doubts arising as to this intention of Norway's; this does not of course affect all our criticism of Norway's attitude.

To this belongs also the order to fire given to Norwegian antiaircraft units and the navy, of which the English were notified too, on the occasion of the Norwegian protest against the British trespass on Norwegian territorial waters.

4. As seen from here, the attempt to fortify Norway further in her desire to keep neutral and thus prejudice her gradually more and more against England would seem worth while. While doing this, we might state that any deviation from this, harmful to our interests, or the inability to maintain this line, would confront us with serious decisions.

Title: "Document D-844 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 966-967.

TELEGRAM (Secret Code V)

Stockholm, 4/4/1940. Received,4/5/1940 No. 383 of the 4/4/1940

taken down by telephone

TO BE KEPT SECRET. Foreign Minister Gunther today asked me to call on him in order to discuss the political situation. He started by saying that lately much had been written and said about threatened action against Scandinavia by the Western powers. On the other hand, the Swedish government had information that in Northern Germany, particularly in Stettin and other Baltic ports, large numbers of troops were concentrated. He attached value to the German government receiving complete clarity about the real situation which the Swedish government considers to exist, and had caused the Swedish ambassador in Berlin to make an explanation to this effect to Secretary of State Weizsacker. The Swedish government had no reason at all to believe in an impending action by the Western powers against Scandinavia. On the contrary, on the strength of all official reports and other information, it considered the situation lately to be much calmer. In particular, Gunther did not at all believe in the possibility of the carrying out of a British coup against the Swedish ore area via Narvik. Sweden had at this moment a very strong armed force in the north which could frustrate any such attempt, and Sweden was determined, now as ever, to repel by force of arms any violation of her territory. Without being a prophet, Gunther did not believe in a British act of violence against Norway either, though of course he could not speak of this with as much certainty as with regard to Sweden; at any rate, however, the Norwegian government, with which he was in close contact, was of the same opinion. Ore transports from Narvik were too small in relation to Sweden's total deliveries of ore to Germany, which would soon be possible again in the Baltic also, to counterbalance the great risk for Britain. In this respect Gunther thought the threatening elaborations in the allied press were more likely an attempt to provoke Germany.

Where Russia was concerned, also, the Swedish government had no fears. Gunther mentioned in this connection that the project of a Nordic defense pact was not a subject for speedy development and any threatening attitude towards Russia was out of the question. Moreover the Finnish government's matter regarding the project which it had put forward during the closing stage of the peace negotiations was not even known in detail to the Swedish government.

In conclusion, Gunther requested me to report his statements to my government, and repeated that the Swedish government attached the greatest value to the German government not erroneously getting the impression of the existence of circumstances which might evoke the possibility-he would not use the word necessity at all-of special measures by Germany with regard to Scandinavia.

Gunther's carefulness in expressing himself gave me the impression that he was filled with a certain anxiety about a possibly impending German move in a northerly direction. Possibly, today's announcement of the "Aftonbladet" on the report by the journalist Steer to the "Daily Telegraph" played a part in this (I refer you to today's D.N.B. [German News Bureau] report Stockholm). A remark by the cabinet secretary Boheman points to this, who jokingly asked me before I entered the minister's room whether I had read the terrible news in "Aftonbladet" too.

Title: "Document D-845 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 968.

Telegram (Secret Code V)

Stockholm 4/5/1940 14.40 hours

Received: 4/5/1940 18.35 hours No. 386 dated 5. 4.

Most urgent!

Info for O.K.H.

Serious anxiety exists in Swedish military and government circles regarding possible German military preventive measures in Scandinavia against the announced intensification of war measures by the Western Powers. Swedish and Norwegian military government authorities consider it unlikely that military measures will be taken against Scandinavia by the Western Powers. Press reports on this subject by the Western Powers are attempting to provoke Germany. Military Attache.

Produced in 5 copies, of which have been delivered: No. 1 to Pol. I g with 3 copies. No. 2 to Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs. No. 3 to St. S. No. 4 to B.R.A.M. No. 5 to U.St.Pol. This is No. 5

Title: "Document D-846 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 968-969.

Telegram (Secret Code V) Copenhagen, 9/26/1939 19,36 hrs Received: 9/26/1939 20,45 hrs

No. 168 of the 26.9.

With reference to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's telephonic directive of the 21st Sept. and to the telegraphic report of the 25th Sept. No. 167.

Sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarines have caused great worry here owing to Danish food transports to England. If Government circles here only make reports containing reservations, this reserve by no means represents the real feeling, but rests on directives from the governments dictated by repercussion in foreign politics. The Foreign Minister expressed serious disquiet to me. In accordance with orders I again pointed out that we must reserve the right to use such measures at all times against imports to England as the British for their part use with regard to our imports from neutral countries. But I think that our interests would, at least at the present stage, suffer political damages here which it will be difficult to repair if normal Danish transports were in fact to be sunk by German naval units.

RENTHE FINK.

Prepared in 13 copies of which-No. 1 has gone to W (working staff) No. 2 has gone to the Reich Foreign Minister No. 3 has gone to St.S. No. 4 has gone to Head of the Organization abroad (AD) No. 5 has gone to B.R.A.M. No. 6 has gone to Dir Pass No. 7 has gone to Dir.Pol. No. 8 has gone to Dg. Pg. No. 9 has gone to Dir. W. No. 10 has gone to Dir. Legal. No. 11 has gone to Dir. Press. No. 12 has gone to Dir. [?] No. 13 has gone to Personal staff (Hewel)

Title: "Document D-847 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 969-970.

Telegram (Secret Code V)

Copenhagen 3/26/1940 9.00 hours

Received 3/26/1940 11.35 hours

No. 216 dated 25-3

The King of Denmark to-day summoned me to his presence in order to tell me what a deep impression the sinking of six Danish ships 1st week, apparently without warning, had made on him and on the whole country. Sorrow at material losses could always be got over finally, but the heaviest burden was the loss of life of so many Danish seamen, who were only sailing in the service of their country. He asked me whether it was not possible to arrange for sufficient time for the saving of lives if of nothing else. I replied that the reason why the ship sank had not yet been elucidated. In any case, our naval units always kept strictly to the Prize regulations, but vessels sailing in enemy convoy or in the vicinity of the same took upon themselves all the risks of war; insofar as any sinkings had been carried out without warning, it seemed that they could be traced back to the German notifications made to date. At the same time I pointed out the dangers of the waters around the British coast, where neutral shipping is inevitably involved in compromising situations on account of measures taken by the British. The King assured me emphatically that none of the Danish ships were sailing in convoy, but it would probably never be possible subsequently to clear up without possibility of doubt the incidents which had led to the sinking.

It was now a question of finding a way to reduce as much as possible future loss of lives. Although I expressed my scepticism as to whether, in view of the situation created by England, the dangers to which the crews of Danish ships were exposed during journeys to and from England could be diminished, and expressed my conviction that insecurity in British waters would increase as time went on, the King continued to maintain that something had to be done immediately to avoid any further losses. The stopping of shipping to England would be a catastrophe for Denmark. In order that no time should be lost, he had chosen the path of speaking with me personally and requested me to bring the contents of this conversation to the Fuehrer's knowledge.

The conversation was carried on by the King without bitterness or reproaches, his statements were filled only with deep concern for Denmark and the feeling of great responsibility towards the fate of Danish seamen. Actually the King did not expressly mention the conversation proposed last week in Berlin by the Danish Government regarding greater safety for Danish shipping, but without doubt he had in mind to accelerate these negotiations.

RENTHE-FINK.

[Marginal note:] Produced in (?) copies

copies for distribution, Nos. 1 to 13. 1. R.S 2. R.A.M. 3. SS 4. Chef. A.O. 5. B.R.A.M. 6. US Pol.

[remainder mainly illegible]

Copy No. 6.

Title: "Document D-849 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 970-971.

Berlin, 4/12/1941.

Secretary of State No. 250

Telegram to the Reich Foreign Secretary

Grand Admiral Raeder who this morning could not get into telephonic communication with the Reich Foreign Secretary, therefore approached me with the urgent request to bring about a final decision on the following two problems:

(1) Consent to German Naval Forces in the western part of the Atlantic Ocean being allowed to operate freely as far as the internationally customary three mile boundary.

(2) The cancellation of the preferential treatment which American merchant vessels have been enjoying so far in our warfare at sea.

The Grand Admiral motivated the urgency of his request as to (1) with the necessity for now issuing the necessary orders to the U-boats concerned or for employing them in another theatre of war, as to (2) with the expectation that American merchant vessels would now also appear in the Red Sea with war material.

[signed] Weizsaecker.

Copies to: Under Secretary of State Political Branch Dg. Pol. Ambassador Ritter.

Title: "Document D-850 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 971.

4 Copies, this is No. 3

Ambassador Ritter.

General Jodl informs me that at the recent interview which Grand-Admiral Raeder had with Hitler, the more extensive orders issued to the naval forces, as they were discussed in connection with the Raeder interview, have been postponed until further notice.

Also, permission to attack US merchant vessels within the framework of the prize laws has not been granted.

The Fuehrer wishes to avoid anything which could lead to incidents with the United States.

[signed] RITTER

Salzburg, 6/9/1941

To Ambassador Eisenlohr Ambassador Leitner

Title: "Document D-851 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 971-972.

Submitted respectfully to the Secretary of State with the enclosed memorandum.

The Chief of the Operational Dept. of the Naval Command, Captain Fricke, informed me by telephone that the Fuehrer was already dealing with this matter. The impression had, however, arisen here that the political connections had again to be gone into and brought to the Fuehrer's notice anew. Captain Fricke had therefore sent-Lieutenant-Commander Neubauer to the Foreign Office in order to discuss the matter further.

Berlin, 9/3/1939.

[signed] Albrecht.

The question of an unlimited U-boat war against England is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the Naval High Command.

The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England which can be achieved with the forces available can only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated in the enclosed map.

The Navy does not fail to realize that-

(a) Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement of 1936 regarding the prosecution of economic warfare.

(b) A military operation of this kind could not be justified on the basis of the hitherto generally accepted principles of international law.

(c) This operation will cause great damage to the neutrals who are important to us politically and economically, that it will aggravate their attitude towards us and that it will undermine their will for neutrality, their resistance to British pressure and their readiness to trade with us.

The High Command does not assert that England can be beaten by unrestricted U-boat warfare. The cessation of traffic with the world trade center of England spells serious disruptions of their national economy for the neutrals, for which we can offer them no compensation.

Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using the military method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England gives us a justification, by her method of waging war, to order this form of warfare as a reprisal.

It appears necessary, in view of the great importance in the field of foreign politics of the decision to be taken, that it should be arrived at not only as a result of military consideration but taking into full account the needs of foreign politics.

Document D-852

Memorandum On Conference With Secretary Of State Von Weizsaecker On The 25th September, P.M. On Question Of Naval Warfare [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 973-974.

Copy Wg 2022

Present among others:

From the Foreign Office: Under Secretary of State Pol., Dir. W., Dg. Law, Pol. I W XII.

From OKM: Rear Admiral Schniewind, Captain Fricke, Commander Wagner, Lt. Com. Nebauer, Ministerial Counsellor Dr. Eckhardt, the Reich Commisar at the Supreme Prize Court Admiral Gladisch and his deputy Vice Admiral von Gagern:

From the Reich Ministry of Economics: Under Secretary of State von Jagwitz;

From OKW; war economic staff: Colonel Becker,

From the Plenipotentiary for economy: Ministerial Counsellor von Maass.

The following points from the conference must be stressed:

(1) As from yesterday, the naval war is being waged against France also in the same way as against Britain, the British Dominions, and Egypt.

(2) Regarding foodstuffs on neutral ships, a special directive has not up to now been sent to the naval forces, not even regarding the listing of conditional contraband goods. According to the documents submitted by W, which are to be put at the disposal of the Navy and of the Commisar at the Prize Court in the original English text if possible, it is considered probable by the legal department also that, regarding the most important types of food under consideration, evidence of national management can be brought in such a way that even a private receiver's address in enemy territory will justify confiscation. The actual clearing up of the question as to how far confiscations by Britain of food destined for Germany on neutral ships have taken place is to be further worked on by the Foreign Office. The order to treat foodstuffs as contraband without regard to the receiving address is at any rate to be deferred for a few more days.

(3) The OKM will submit to the Foreign Office a proposal, as a basis for a communication to the neutral powers, in which those intensifications of naval warfare will be communicated, the ordering of which has already taken place or is impending in the near future. This includes particularly a warning not to use wireless on being stopped, not to sail in convoy, and not to black out and if necessary also clarification regarding the list of contraband goods. (The question of the treatment of wood is to be specially discussed tomorrow.)

(4) Before permitting attacks without warning against enemy merchant ships, attacks which are called for and justified because of the fact that they are being armed as a general practice and which in practice come into consideration for the area around the British Isles, material-if possible photographs also-is to be published showing the arming. Two cases of attacks by armed enemy merchant ships on German U-boats were mentioned.

(5) The OKM was further requested by Secretary of State von Weizsaecker and Under Secretary of State Woermann that, before any further intensification, the intended orders should be submitted to the Foreign Office in order to obtain the Reich Foreign Minister's opinion.

(6) Ministerialdirektor Wiehl pointed out that at present there was no reason to have special regard for individual-for example Nordic-countries, but the situation might soon change. Admiral Schniewind states that the situation in the Baltic and the North Sea might be expected in the near future to permit refraining from sinking neutral ships, and analogous to the British procedure in this matter, taking the ships into German ports and have them unloaded. Colonel Becker pointed out, in this connection, that our most important means of exerting pressure, the German supplies of coal, will only be felt effectively once the supplies of coal from Britain have been actually cut off by our Naval warfare.

A conference with Italy was intended on the subject of how and to what extent imports and exports for Germany could be conducted through Italian ports without the danger of confiscation by the enemy. It would depend on this as to how much consideration could be shown to any possible Italian transports to the enemy countries, particularly food from South America.

(7) Concerning the question of German exports, it was established that, according to the legal position, notwithstanding the treatment of the Italian coal transports and also because of the British regulations about certificates of origin, there was hardly any doubt that Britain would confiscate such transports.

Berlin, 9/25/1939.

Title: "Document D-853 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 975-976.

9 Copies, this is copy No. 8.

Berlin, 9/27/1939.

IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET

I. Today, as ordered, I discussed with Admiral SCHNIEWIND the questions of sea warfare expounded by the Naval Operational Staff in their letter of the 26th September. Admiral SCHNIEWIND had called in Captain Fricke, Captain Neubauer, Senior Naval Judge Advocate Eckhardt, and Captain [?].

The Naval Ops Staff will draft a memorandum on the discussion.

Agreement was reached on the following points:

(1) Enemy and neutral merchant vessels which, on being stopped, transmit; those signalling and those blacked out, may be sunk without warning.

All neutral states will receive notification to this effect. The text will be prepared at the Foreign Office and, after agreement with the Naval Ops Staff (Eckhardt), will be dispatched by telegraph to all our missions, not later than today.

This notification should not forecast torpedoing, but should only be a warning that ships will expose themselves to danger by behaving in these ways.

I did not discuss the question of limiting the use of these measures to certain zones, as is provided for in one case in inclosure (1) to the letter from the Naval Ops Staff. It appears desirable to include such a limitation so that the Americans cannot say we were doing such things off their shores. This could be considered when the notification is formulated.

(2) As from a certain date, still to be determined, British and French merchant vessels may be torpedoed without warning, as it can be taken for granted that they will be armed. No notice will be given. First one should start with an intensive propaganda campaign about the arming of enemy merchant ships, lasting approximately four days. Before publishing final orders, the Naval Ops Staff will once more come to an agreement with the Foreign Office.

Both the Naval Ops Staff and the Foreign Office will immediately examine the question whether, in view of the present legal situation in the USA, American citizens travelling on enemy vessels may do so only at their own risk or whether it is forbidden altogether. Should such laws not exist, I have put forward the wish of the Foreign Office to hold up these measures until the conclusion of American legislation; however I made no condition of this wish.

(3) It has been agreed not to torpedo neutral merchant vessels in the Baltic Ocean or in the eastern part of the North Sea whenever possible.

Admiral Schniewind said that, in view of the employment of U-boats, no absolutely binding assurance could be given in this respect.

(4) It has been agreed that food stuffs with the exception of fruits and vegetables are to be treated in practice as absolute contraband goods. This is done in the-expectation that, before the decisions of the Prize Court are reached, more obvious details about the corresponding British and French attitude will have come to hand.

(5) The question of Italian, Japanese, Spanish, and Russian merchant vessels was not raised. The notification in par. (1) is in any case to be sent also to the governments of these countries. shall make certain, furthermore that, as has already been foreshadowed, further discussion shall take place with regard to this question.

II. The Naval Operational Staff indicated anew that the Fuehrer will probably order ruthless U-Boat warfare in the restricted area in the very near future. The previous participation of the Foreign Office remains guaranteed. In this connection I made special reference to the United States of America and demanded that this measure should not be put into effect until corresponding legislation by the United States had been assured.

The following points were mentioned during the discussion of this question. In the course of Monday's discussion, Ministerialdirektor Wiehl reserved the right to make further exceptions for the Prosecution of economic warfare at sea in case of negotiated agreements, especially with the Northern Countries. Captain Neubauer pointed outAdmiral Schniewind agreeingthat these agreements could not be allowed to exercise a limiting effect on ruthless U-Boat warfare should the latter be introduced, so that it might perhaps be better not to make any agreements which would subsequently have to be broken.

III. With reference to the intended belt of 30-500 sea miles surrounding the American States, it was agreed to await first more detailed news of the American intention.

[signed] Woermann

Secretary of State Office of Reich Foreign Secretary. Dg.Pol. Dir.W. Director of Law Pol. I.M.

Document D-854

U-Boat Construction 1920-1935 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 977-979.

Details given below regarding German participation in U-Boat building between 1920-1935 have been extracted from a series of Essays on "The Operational and Tactical considerations of the German Navy and the consequent measures taken for its expansion between 1919-1939" contained among the files of Viceadmirals ASSMANN and GLADISCH, who were in the Historical Section of the German Admiralty.

… But although, as was stated, in nearly all spheres of armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit, or at least its violation was prepared, a long time before 3/16/1935, this probably took place in no other sphere on the one hand so early and on the other hand under such difficult circumstances as in the construction of a new submarine arm. The Treaty of Versailles had only been in force a few months (since 1/10/1920), when it was already violated in this point.

Already in the year 1920, the Germania shipyards and the Vulkan shipyards with the permission of the Naval Command sold plans of the German U-cruiser (U 142) and the mine U-cruiser (U 117) to Japan, which used these plans as a basis for the construction of their own U-cruisers under the supervision of German U-boat builders, partly under the personal direction of the former Chief builder of the Germania shipyard. In 1925-28 a former naval officer took part, with the permission of the Naval command in testing these submarines which were the first to be built after the war according to German plans (abroad) and was thus able to preserve and improve the valuable experience he had gained as a member of the former commission for taking over U-boats.

In 1922 three German shipbuilding yards founded a German U-boat Construction Bureau in Holland under a Dutch covering name with about 30 engineers and builders. In 1925 a Dutch shipbuilding yard built two 500-ton U-boats for Turkey on the plans of this bureau which enjoyed the financial and personal support of the Naval Command. In the solution of this question too Captain Lohmann was concerned decisively. There followed the construction of three 500-ton and one 100-ton submarines for Finland which had a German naval adviser, according to plans of the "Dutch" bureau in Finnish shipyards. The trial cruises of these ships under German direction could be utilized for the first time for the practical training of a small number of active German naval and engineer officers in the submarine services. Three submarines for Sweden followed … finally the especially valuable and important relations to Spain. In Spain in 1927/28 the Navy made possible with the King and Primo de Rivera the construction of the first prototype ship of a submarine plan, corresponding entirely to the demands of the German Navy, of about 750 tons in the shipyard of Eche Varietta in Cadiz. Already in the autumn of 1927 the naval construction department was commissioned to carry out the construction in Spain by the Chief of the Naval Command, Admiral Zenker, who accepted the responsibility despite all the difficulties in the field of home politics. The working out of the project and the drawing up of the construction plans took place in the Dutch Bureau. After completion in 1931, the ship carried out trial runs and diving exercises from Cadiz and Cartagena, under German direction, and with German personnel consisting of officers, engineers, naval construction students, and foremen. The intended purchase by the Spanish Navy was thwarted by the political revolution in Spain. Only in 1934 did it become possible to move the ship from Spain to Turkey whose Navy purchased it. This boat, which is now the Turkish submarine "Guer" became the prototype for the "U 26" and "U 26".

It had, in the meantime, been possible in 1930 to lay the basis in Finland also for the construction of a submarine of 250 tons which was to correspond to the military demands of the German Navy. The fundamental intention in this connection was to create a type of submarine which would permit the inconspicuous preparation of the greatest possible number of components that could be assembled at shortest imaginable notice … The Finnish U-boat was the first U-boat plan to be worked out in Germany and to be executed; only for the working out of details was the Dutch bureau still called upon.

The Finnish 250 ton vessel became the prototype for "U.1" to "U.24"; to be sure "U.7" to "U.24" were lengthened and improved in order to double the radius of action.

The building and the thorough trial of the prototype vessel made it possible to obtain the parts for "U.1" to "U.24" in 1933/35 long before the order for assembling the vessels, to make preparations for this assembly to the extent possible while maintaining secrecy.

Engines, gear, and accessories for 12 vessels were stored in Kiel and it was made possible to build 6 U-boats simultaneously.

The individual parts for both the 712 ton vessels "U 25" and "U 26" were secretly built and stored before the order to assemble was issued. As a result the assembly of those largish vessels took only 9 to 10 months. …

At the beginning of 1935 there were probably 6 250 ton boats ready for assembly and 6 275 ton and 2 750 ton boats on which preparatory work was being done; about four months were needed for assembling the small ships and about 10 for the big ones, dating from the 1.2.35, but everything else was still quite uncertain …

It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty. Considering the quantity of U-boats which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to 1938. In reality 118 were ready or ordered. The preparations for the new U-boat arm were made so early, so thoroughly, and so secretly that already 11 days after the conclusion of the German-British Naval Treaty, which permitted the construction of U-boats, the first German U-boat could be commissioned on 6/29/1935.

Document D-855

Information Relating To German Preparations For U-Boat Construction And Infringement Of Clauses Of The Versailles Treaty, Prior To 1935 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 979-980.

Lecture by THIELE

The following information is taken from a lecture on "The Development of the Naval Budget 19301939" by Secretary (Flottenintendant) THIELE, OKM (E) (Budget Department of the German Admiralty) at the German Naval Training Center for Administrative Officers in Prague, 7/12/1944.

Ship Construction Plan

The era of the very large development of the Navy had therefore come of the moment of the seizure of power. Already in the first year after this, in 3/1935, the construction of battle cruisers with a displacement of 27000 tons was proceeded to. Such a vessel was ordered to be constructed. Thus one of the classes of the Treaty of Versailles which were the most important for us was at once violated in the naval sphere in a manner which in a short time could no longer be camouflaged. Similarly the second important clause, forbidding the construction of U-boats, was violated. Orders were placed during that year for 2 large and 6 small U-boats, also for the light cruiser "Nurnberg". 8 minesweepers, and 7 E-boats. The U-boats were completed in separate parts, as their construction was under no circumstances to be apparent to the outside, these parts were stored in sheds for the time being and only needed to be assembled after the declaration of freedom to re-arm. The third one also of those clauses of the Treaty of Versailles that were the most disadvantageous for us, the limitation of personnel to 15000 men, was immediately ignored after the seizure of power. The total personnel of the Navy was already 25000 in 1934, and in 1935, the year of the London Naval Agreement, 34000 men.

The year 1934 saw the placing of the order for the second battle cruiser, also of 2 heavy cruisers, 16 destroyers, 4 minesweepers, 2 E-boats, 10 medium and 18 small U-boats.

Title: "Document D-857 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 981.

Serial 51. St. S. Nr. 807

 

Berlin, 10/14/1939

The Reichsaussenminister

According to my information the decision on unrestricted U-boat warfare against England is imminent. This is at least as much a political decision as it is a technicality of war.

A short while ago I submitted my personal view that unrestricted U-boat warfare could bring new enemies upon us at a time when we still lack the necessary U-boats to defeat England. On the other hand the Navy's attitude of insisting on the opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare is backed by every convincing reason.

I therefore think it necessary to ask the High Command of the Armed Forces for a military appreciation [translator's note: free for "fachmaennische Unterlage"] before making the final decision. In my opinion the following questions ought to be asked:

(a) When would the navy like to start unrestricted U-boat warfare ?

(b) Which prohibited zones does it suggest ? (Notification of the neutrals is necessary.)

(c) What are the figures of sinking per month up to now and what can one expect them to be in future?

(d) Does the navy wish to make exceptions in the sinkings as regards passenger ships

as regards certain neutrals (i. e. Russian trade to England, Danish foodships, etc.)

and how does the Navy envisage sparing those ships?

I beg to be given authority to make inquiries of this nature with the High Command of the Armed Forces at once.

[signed] WEIZSAECKER

Title: "Document D-863 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 982.

Notes on the Conversations of the C-in-C of the Navy and the C/SKL in the Fuehrer's HQ 28-29/843 Signed Meisel Participants: Grand Admiral Doenitz Vice Admiral Meisel, Chief of Staff of the SKL Capt. Rehm, etc.

TIME TABLE 28 August

0845 Take off from Staaken

1015 Arrival Rastenburg.

1030 Arrival Fuehrer's H.Q.

1130 Conversation C-in-C Navy, C-in-C Luftwaffe.

1300 Situation conference (Lagesbesprechung) with the Fuehrer, closing with a further conversation between the C-in-C Navy and the C-in-C Luftwaffe.

1600 Departure C-in-C Navy

1700 Conversation C/SKL and Ambassador Ritter.

1900 Conversation C/SKL General Jodl.

2200 Evening situation conference (Abendlage) with the Fuehrer.

2400 Conversation C/SKL Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler.

1300 Midday situation conference with the Fuehrer.

1530 Conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.

1800 Take off C/SKL.

2000 Arrival BerlinStaaken.

Document D-864

[Sworn Statement of Gerhard Flesch] [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 982-983.

I, GERHARD FLESCH, have been sworn under oath and say as follows:

I, Gerhard Flesch, was born on 10/8/1909 in Posen, and before the war I lived in Berlin-Schoeneberg. In 4/1940 I came to Norway, and from this time until 10/1941 I stayed in Bergen where I was the Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei and the SD, and from 10/1941-5/1945 I stayed in Trondheim as the Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei and the SD. My address before the war was Berlin-Schoeneberg, but I was at the same time in charge of the Staatspolizeistelle in Erfurt.

I received the order to transfer Evans from Trondheim Missionshotel to the BdS, Olso, this order I received by telegram or telephone from the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei and the SD, Oslo. I can not tell who signed the telegram or the telephone call from Oslo. I can not say for certain to whom I passed the order, but I think it was to Hauptsturmfuehrer Hollack. I know, that the Commander in Chief Navy of the Norwegian Northern Coast, had interrogated Evans himself. I have been told by one of my comrades that General-oberst Falkenhorst got in touch with the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei and the SD in Oslo, in order, personally to get a close impression of the material at hand.

Concerning the clothes of Evans:

(a) It is not known to me that Evans wore a uniform. As far as I remember, he wore a blue mechanic suit, and was therefore not properly attired, the clothes not being warm enough for the season.

(b) I was asked by one of my colleagues, it may have been Hstf. Hollack or Ostuf. Nielson, I do not know for certain, if clothes could be obtained from the requisition stores and given to Evans. I had eventually to decide on the matter, as the Abteilungsleiter had no authority whatsoever as for the disposal of the articles requisitioned. As far as I remember I gave permission to get the articles in question from the requisition stores.

I have given this statement quite voluntarily, I have read it through, and swear that it is the truth.

[signed] FLESCH.

SWORN by the above named Gerhard FLESCH before me at AKERSHUS PRISON, 11/14/1945.

[signed] JOHN HUMPHRIES, Major.

Witnessed and interpreted: [signed] ARTHUR LINCKERT.

Title: "Document D-868 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 989-991.

Berlin, 5/31/1934

[Pencil note] Habicht is coming today L 6/6

The Reich Chancellor has been informed 6/6.

From the Reich Chancellor on 6th June.

The Austrian lawyer Baron Waechter visited me today in order to bring me greetings from the members of our Embassy as he remarked at the beginning, and to introduce himself to me in person as the leader of the department dealing with Austrian affairs. Herr v. Waechter of fresh, youthful appearance, gives the impression of an energetic personality steadily pursuing his aims. His statements were obviously made in full consciousness of.serious responsibility. His estimation of the affairs and personalities that came under review was clear and definite.

Herr v. Waechter drew up for me too a picture of the situation in Austria which was in some of its colors, even darker and more serious than it had appeared to us here up till now. The extremist tendencies of the National Socialists in Austria were constantly on the increase. Terrorist acts were multiplying. Irrespective of who actually undertook the demolitions and other terrorist acts in individual cases, each such act provoked a new wave of extremism and also of desperate acts. As Herr v. Waechter repeatedly and sadly stressed, uniformity of leadership was lacking. The SA did what it wanted and what it, for its part, considered necessary. The political leadership at the same time introduced measures which sometimes meant the exact opposite. Thus, the great terrorist action as the result of which the railway lines leading to Vienna were blown up was by no means committed by Marxists, but by the Austrian SA, and indeed against the wishes of the political leadership which, as he believed, did not participate in any way either in the act or in its preparations. Such is the picture as a whole. In detail, in individual provinces and districts, the confusion was, if possible, even greater. One main seat of unrest and therefore a particular source of danger for sudden outbursts of mob passions was and still remained Carinthia, the country where the mismanagement and want under the Dollfuss regime were most felt and where National Socialism was, therefore, most successful. Herr v. Waechter thought that here improvements must be introduced most speedily, and namely by means of centralization of all forces active in the interests of National Socialism both in Austria itself and outside Austria. Personal questions should play no part here. The decisive word in this connection could of course be given only by the Fuehrer himself. He, Waechter, was in full agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters. As far as he knew, Herr Habicht had already succeeded in having a brief conversation with the Reich Chancellor today. Baron Waechter himself had, on the contrary, so far been unable during his present visit to put forward his views and suggestions, which were at the same time those of the authoritative party leaders in Austria. For a while peace and order reigned within the party in Austria, when after the February events the Reich Chancellor prohibited any propaganda activities and issued an order for a truce to be observed along the whole line. This was naturally obeyed by all departments. But everyone supposed that a solution was being prepared and that, by his basic orders, the Fuehrer desired to create the necessary peaceful and favorable atmosphere for forthcoming negotiations. But when nothing followed in the meantime, and on the other hand the counter measures of the Austrian administration grew more and more brutal and incisive from day to day, the radical elements moved afresh and came forward with the statement that the Chancellor had issued his order only for tactical reasons, but was inwardly in agreement with every manly act of opposition and had in view, as the true political aim, merely the weakening of Dollfuss' hateful system, though in a way which was as unobtrusive as possible. They were now working on this principle. In the course of the discussions, this idea, which goes on secretly smouldering, was met with again and again. A change must soon be made and a uniform leadership … [illegible] otherwise Herr v. Waechter concluded his impressive description, any day a disaster might occur which would have the worst consequences from the point of view of foreign policy, not for Austria alone, but above all for Germany.

During the conversation, the visitor was called to the telephone on urgent business. Herr v. Waechter received a telephone warning from Munich not to return to Vienna, because he would be faced with arrest on the frontier already. An impressive illustration of what he has just told me about the intensification of Austrian police measures.

To my question as to what he intended to do now, Herr v. Waechter shrugged his shoulders and confined himself to remarking that he would first have to discuss it with his party friends

I told Herr v. Waechter that in view of the importance of his report and the dangers which arose from it, I would make a suitable report to the Reich Minister and to the State Secretary. Herr v. Waechter asked me to do so.

[sgd] Koepke

Document D-872

Extracts from the War Diary of the German Naval Attache in Tokyo [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 991-992.

(PG/32145)

1800. The Naval Attache extended an invitation to several officers of the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires from the conversation that the negotiations in Washington must be deemed to have broken down completely and that, quite obviously, speedy military action to the South by the Japanese armed forces is to be counted on.

Conversation with Commander Shiba

The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the following signal:

Naval Attache 1251 Top Secret.

1. Last week, America proposed a nonaggression pact between the United States, Britain, Russia, and Japan. In view of the Tripartite Pact and the high compensatory demands, Japan rejected this offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken down.

2. The Japanese Armed Forces foresaw this development and consented to Kurusu's being sent only to impress the people with the fact that no stone had been left unturned.

3. The Japanese Armed Forces have already decided (three weeks ago) that war is inevitable, even if the United States, at the last minute, should make still greater concessions. Corresponding measures are under way.

4. Oshima is authorized to conduct negotiations in Berlin in accordance with Naval Attache's 214/15 paragraph 5.

5. Addition. Naval Attache: No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the commencement of the Southern Offensive. All the evidence, however, indicates that it may be expected to start within three weeks and simultaneously attacks on Siam, the Philippines, and Borneo will be launched.

6. The ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents

7. The contents of paragraph six will be abbreviated in future to the codeword `Switch-off" ["Ausschaltung"]. In which case, please do not pass to Foreign Office.

Shiba said that the outbreak of hostilities was definitely to be expected this year. He could not, however, give me an exact zero hour in view of the necessity for surprise. A state of war with Britain and America would certainly be established by Christmas. From this I got the impression: in three weeks.

Document D-873

Extract from War Diary of U 71 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 993.

6/21/1941.

Date and Time: 12.15

Details of place, wind, weather, sea, light visibility, moon, etc.: Square AL 1973, SW 4/5 Showery, rising sea, medium swell, visibility good.

Events: Etmal: 234 sm Lighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker John P. Pedersen drifting under sail. Three survivors were lying exhausted under a tarpaulin and only appeared when the U-boat was moving away again. They stated that their ship had been torpedoed 28 days before. I turned down their request to be taken aboard, provisioned the boat with food and water, and gave them the course and distance to the Icelandic coast. Boat and crew were in a state that, in view of the prevailing weather, offered hardly any prospects of rescue.

[signed] Flaeksenberg.

Document D-878

The Strength of the SS on the 6/30/1944 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1014-1015.

[Cover page]

The Reichsfuehrer SS Statistic-scientific Institute

10 copies, 6th copy.

[in pencil:] 81

Total strength of the SS on 6/30/1944

Allgemeine SS excluding members of the SS who are at present serving as reservists in the Waffen SS. Not called up: 64614 Called up into the Wehrmacht: 115908 Called up into R.A.D. (labor service):722 Called up for other employment: 19254 Total: 200498 Waffen SS (serving with the colors and reservists): 594443 Total: 794941

Total strength of the Waffen SS

Field units: 368654 New formations and reinforcements: 21365 Training and reserve units: 127643 Training schools: 10822 Other units and offices directly subordinate to the Operational HQ of the SS High Command: 26544 Waffen SS personnel at the Head Offices: 39415 Total: 594443

Members of the Waffen SS in the Head Offices

(Excluding the Operational HQ of the SS High Command)

SS Head Office: 9349 Racial and Settlement Head Office of the SS: 2689 SS Economic and Administrative Head Office (WVHA): 24091 Personal Staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS: 673 SS Personnel Head Office: 170 Head Office, SS Court of Justice: 599 Bureau of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Heissmeyer: 553 Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of German Folkdom (Staff Head Office): 304 Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of German Folkdom (Head Office of the Volksdeutche Mittelstelle (Central Office for persons of German race)): 987 Total: 39415

Document D-879

Extracts from Admiral Assmans Headline Diary [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 1015.

10/10/1939.

[Sheet 10] E The Fuehrer agrees that for the time being the 2 battleships, which are at present the only ones, are not to be employed fullyRussia has offered bases at Murmansk (of sheet 23)question of blockading England. The Fuehrer and the C n C Navy agree that all objections by neutrals have to be rejected even in case of a danger of the USA entering the war, which seems certain if the war continues. "The more brutally the war is waged the earlier the effect, the shorter the war."

[Sheet 12] UK N R (Ob.d.M.) Capacity for big U-boat building programme-for political reasons Fuehrer rejects proposal to build or buy in Russia-C in C Navy states that the conquest of the Belgian coast brings no advantage for the U-boat war; points out the value of acquiring Norwegian bases, (Drontheim) with the help of Russian pressure. Fuehrer wishes to weigh the question.

[Sheet 14] UK Memorandum: prerequisites in the field of war economy for a great U-boat building programme-draft of a Fuehrer order for them to be put into effect.

Document D-881

Extracts from Admiral Assman's Headline Diary [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1016-1018.

2/23/1940.

[Sheet 93] R E U.K L USA Baltic: Alteration of the 20 line of demarcation towards Russia desired. North Sea: favorable situation for battleship thrusts; loss of two destroyers probably through our own planes-U-boat successes are on the increase; attacks on passenger ships; aerial mine attacks on the English East Coast (footnote: difference of opinion between the C. in C. Navy and C. in C. Air Force regarding time of action; resolved by the Fuehrer in favor of the C. in C. Air Force (putting off the action) (War Dairy A, Vol. 6, sheet 205).). Fuehrer rejects employment of U-boats off Halifax, owing to psychological effect on the USA. (cf. appendix, sheet 99), as well as the employment of U-boats in the Mediterranean without the previous consent of the Duce (but see sheet 107u) C. in C. Navy considers that both refusals represent a considerable limitation of U-boat warfare.

[Sheet 96] N R Fuehrer's question regarding the maintenance of ore imports from Narvik after the occupation of Norway is answered by the C. in C. Navy to the effect that Norway's neutrality is most favorable for ore imports. On the other hand, if England occupied Norway, we would probably lose the whole of Swedish ore imports,-There follow details for carrying out the occupation of Norway by Germany. Purchase of Esthonian U-boats only possible via Russian mediation-German-Russian treaty (38 cm. and 28 cm. towers).

[Sheet 99] A USA Appendix: considerations re employment of U-boats off Halifax.

[Sheet 102] N R C. in C. Navy reports on "Weser-Ubung" believes it will succeed if surprise is ensured, although the enterprise breaks all the laws of naval warfare as taught. The hardest part is the way back, for which all modern naval forces must be concentrated: C. in C. Navy recommends that, when Norway is occupied, the Russians should be told, as a concession, that we are not occupying Tromso. The Fuehrer considers that we must occupy Tromso too.

[Sheet 105] N The occupation of Norway by the British was imminent when the peace was concluded between Russia and Finland. Fuehrer's question as to whether a British landing in Norway was acute at the moment is answered in the negative by the C. in C. Navy. The C. in C. Navy suggests an action by us for the next new moon (7 April). Fuehrer agrees.

[Sheet 107] L Aerial mine warfare: C. in C. Navy demands immediate commencement; difference of opinion with C. in C. Air Force who does not consider the stock of mines sufficient yet (cf. appendix, sheet 109). Fuehrer agrees.

[Sheet 109] Appendix: Use of aerial mines.

Document D-884

Employment of Foreign Nationals, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1018-1020.

Nationalsocialist German Workers Party Gauleitung Baden/Alsace

The Gaustabsamtleiter No. 79/44

Strassburg, 3/28/1944

With reference to the discussion which took place on the above matter in the Gau Staff Office on the 3/3/1944, I bring to your attention the following letter from the Higher SS and Police Chief, Stuttgart, to the Gauleiter:

"The uncertainty existing within the competent offices regarding the treatment of-

I. Foreign workers from the East and South-East, as well as POW's of various nationalities, in respect of illegal sexual intercourse,

as well as the treatment of

II. Pregnant foreign workers (female workers from the East and from Poland) and of children of foreign female workers born in the Reich give cause to give a summary once again of the more important sections of the orders and directives on this subject that have so far been issued for my sphere of authority, and to recommend strict compliance with them. The situation appears to call particularly for influencing the works managers via the offices of the DAF (German Labor Front) and of the Reich food authorities, for making them familiar with the orders to the extent that these can be applied to the public, and for pointing out to them their duties of educating the foreign workers. In particular, these offices must be expected to remain in constant close touch with the works managers, so that detected cases of pregnancy in foreign workers can immediately be suitably recorded.

I The following orders are in existence regarding the illegal sexual intercourse of foreign workers.

Any serious violations, such as rape or crimes against morality 2nd sexual intercourse with German women and girls are to be reported to the SD (Security Police) at once; on principle, the legal authorities will not be concerned with this to begin with. As a rule, both parties will be arrested. After checking nationality, the foreign partner will be subjected to an examination as to race by the competent SS chief for Matters of Race and Settlement; the possibility of Germanization will be checked.

Upon a case of sexual intercourse becoming known, an official medical officer has to ascertain immediately whether the German woman concerned has become pregnant. It is to be stated what stage the pregnancy has already reached and whether another person-and what person-apart from the foreigner concerned, comes into consideration as sire of the child to be expected (this will be established by the Youth Office [Jugendamt] ). If the foreigner is capable of being Germanized, and if both single persons are judged to be racially sound, marriage is possible under certain circumstances (see under a, b, and c); however, for the time being, marriages between workers from Serbia or workers from the East and German girls are not permitted (see under d and e).

The following principles exist with regard to sexual intercourse between German men and female foreign workers:

Should the foreign female worker have been induced to sexual intercourse by the German man (for instance by taking advantage of a condition of dependency), she will be taken temporarily into protective custody and then sent to another place of work. In other cases, the foreign female worker will be sent to a concentration camp for women. Pregnant women are to be sent to a concentration camp only after delivery of the child and the period of nursing. The treatment of the German man concerned is also the subject of special directives; if he has seriously violated his supervisory or educational duties, female foreign workers will be taken away from him and no more sent to him in the future. Further measures depending on the circumstances of the case will be taken by the State Police.

The principles enumerated up to now apply particularly to the following groups of persons:

a. Workers of Polish race.

b. Foreign workers from the Government General and the incorporated Eastern territories who are not of Polish race (Ukrainian, White Ruthenians, Russians, Goralians).

c. Workers from Lithuania.

d. Workers from former Soviet territory (Eastern workers).

e. Workers from the territory of the military commander Serbia.

Document D-884

Employment of Foreign Nationals, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1020-1021.

II Regarding the Treatment of Pregnant Foreign Workers and Children Given Birth to by the Same in the Reich

Particular attention is drawn to the directives for the treatment of such children in circular No. 186/43 and 10/44 of the NSDAP Reichsleitung Head Welfare Office (with enclosed extract from the decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police-S-IVD-377/42 of 7/27/1943). The procedure for an application for abortion is once more explained below:

1. The factories report all cases of pregnancy to the competent Labor Office.

2. The Labor Office reports the case to the Youth Office [Jugendamt] in order to establish paternity. If the sire is a German or of related (Germanic) race, the Youth Office reports the case to the Health Office [Gesundheitsamt].

3. The Health Office carries out an examination to determine health and hereditary health and submits a report (with photo). The Health Office passes the matter on to the "Commissioner of the Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of German Race."

4. The latter makes his findings according to the directives of the Reichsfuehrer SS. The Race and Settlement chief deals with the racial investigations.

5. If the investigations show that the progency will be racially satisfactory and hereditarily healthy, they will, after birth, go to homes for foreign children, to be looked after by the National Socialist Welfare Organization (NSV), or will be looked after by families.

6. In negative cases, the children will be lodged in Foreign Children's Nurseries.

7. The Commissioner of the Commissar will inform the following authorities of the decisions: The competent Youth Office, The Gau NSV Office, The Labor Bureau

I request the Kreisleiters to record immediately through the usual channels, in conjunction with the Kreisobmann of the German Labor Front and the Kreis peasant leader, all cases of pregnancy which have already occurred and all children already born. An examination, in accordance with the new directives, of all children of foreign female workers who were taken under the care of the NSV before the issue of the new instructions is also necessary

Time limit: 5/1/1944.

Heil Hitler [Signed] SCHUPPEL Hauptbereichsleiter of the NSDAP

[Rubber stamp]

Certified correct copy [signature illegible] Gauhauptstellenleiter

Distribution:

Gauobmann of the German Labor Front. Gau propaganda chief. Gau press office chief. Gauamtsleiter of the Bureau for Racial Policy. Gauamtsleiter of the Bureau for National Health. Gauamtsleiter of the Bureau for the Peasantry. Gauamtsleiter of the Bureau for National Welfare. Gauamtsleiter of the Bureau for Questions of Race. Gau Women's Leadership. Gau Labor Office, Baden/Alsace. Kreisleiters, Baden/Alsace. Kreisobmaenner of the German Labor Front. Kreis Peasant Leaders. Commander of the Security Police and SD, Strassbourg. Head of the Office of the Commissioner of the Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of German Race, Strassbourg.

Document D-884

Employment of Foreign Nationals, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1021-1023.

SECRET

District: Bruchsal Births: 1 Abortions: 9 Pregnancies: 1 Agriculture: 1 Industry and Professions: 10; Buchen 33 [none] 18 [none] [none]; Buehl [none] [none] 9 1; Donaueschingen 48 15 27 61 29; Emmendingen 46 9 30 33 52 Freiburg [none] [none] [none] [none] [none]; Heidelberg 46 [none] 8 28 18; Karlsruhe 73 [none] 41 [none] [none]; Kehl 9 [none] 3 [none] [none]; Konstanz 45 [none] 45 [none] [none]; Lahr 3 [none] 4 [none] [none]; Loerrach 2 [none] [none] [none] [none]; Mannheim [none] [none] [none] [none] [none]; Mosbach 34 [none] 2 17 17; Muellheim 1 2 [none] 1 2; Neustadt 26 [none] 1 [none] [none]; Offenburg [none] [none] 16 [none] [none]; Pforzheim 10 [none] [none] 10 [none]; Rastatt 26 v[none] 10 [none]; Saeckingen 13 [none] [none] 4 9; Sinsheim 78 [none] 46 [none] [none]; Stockach 43 [none] [none] [none] [none]; Ueberlingen 36 [none] 25 [none] [none]; Villingen 21 4 [none] [none] [none]; Waldshut Nil return Wertheim 25 3 8 [none] [none]; Wolfach [none] [none] [none] [none] [none]; Altkirch 2 [none] [none] [none] [none]; Gebweiler Nil return Hagenau Nil return Kolmar 2 [none] [none] [none] 2; Molsheim Nil return Muelhausen 20 [none] 15 [none] [none]; Rappoltsweiler Nil return Schlettstadt 4 [none] 5 1 7; Strassburg 11 [none] 9 [none] [none] Tann Nil return Weissenburg Nil return Zabern 5 [none] 1 [none] [none]

Villigen, 21.5.1944

Gau Baden, Kreis Leadership Villingen, The Kreisleiter

To the NSDAP Gauleitung Baden The leader of the Gau Staff Office Strassburg.

Re: Employment of Foreigners. Circular letter No. 79/44 secret

An exact statement on the cases of pregnancy that have already occurred is no longer possible, as these cases have not been registered at any office. As far as I could find out up to now, there have been about 21 pregnancies, of these 4 abortions are said to have been carried out, during which 2 of the women died. Of the remaining 17 births, 5 were stillborn. Welfare by the NSV has not taken place anywhere.

Heil Hitler! The leader of the Kreis of Villingen (Signed) Arnold Haller District leader of the NSDAP

[Rubber stamp]

NSDAP Gau BADEN Kreisleiter E./Gi.

Donaueschingen, 5/13/1944

To the Gau Staff Office Strassburg

Subject: Employment of foreign labor.

I send below the report due on 5/1/1944 of the pregnancies of foreign female workers which have occurred up to now in the district area.

A. Industry and handicrafts 1. Pregnancies: 13 2. Abortions: 12 3. Children: 4

B. In agriculture 1. Pregnancies: 14 2. Abortions: 3 3. Children: 44

Gauleadership Baden of the NSDAP Staff office received 5/19/1944 HEIL HITLER [signed] Eger

[Stamp] Of Kreisleiter

Title: "Document D-885 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1023-1024.

Berlin, 10/281939.

My dear Police President:

For your enthusiastic letter of September 22, I thank you heartily. I was quite particularly pleased about it. This wonderful campaign in Poland was a grand opening for this hard and decisive struggle and has brought about for us an unusually favorable point of departure politically as well as militarily. The most difficult part for the people as well as the Army is naturally still ahead. But the Fuehrer and his associates are full of the greatest confidence; for the sanctimonious British will not succeed in throttling our economy, and militarily we are without worry. Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of. This time we will show that we have the better nerves and the greater unity. That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share to keeping the Czechs at it and to not letting them perk up, of this I am convinced.

I was very pleased about the high recognition granted the troops of the Ostmark (Austria) for their courageous behavior. The youngest of the fourteen officers who were awarded the Ritterkreuz personally today by the Fuehrer was also an Austrian, a Lieutenant Scholz.

Thanking you once more heartily for your words of appreciation which exceed by far my modest contribution in the shadow of the powerful personality of our Fuehrer.

I am with Heil Hitler your always devoted A. Jodl.

Enveloped addressed to: Police President Dr. Karl Schwabe Bruenn (Moravia) Police Presidency.

Document D-892

Extract from Admiral Assmann's Headline Diary 5/12-14/1943 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1024-1025.

[Sheet 318]

Report to the Fuehrer in person. The Fuehrer does not share the Duce's opinion that Sicily is the enemy's next objective. (Anglo-Saxon order which has been found indicating Sardinia and the Peloponnesus).

C. in C. Navy does not believe that the Italian supreme commanders (Duce, Supreme Command, Naval Command) have fully understood the Idea "stress on supplies" including increasing the capacity of the ports for unloading. He underlines the fact that the Italian Naval Command's demand for air attacks on the African supply ports is right, but that the stress lay on protecting supply, using small vessels as well and even the tiniest harbors. He says that the Sea Transport Chief, Italy (Engelhardt) had already done good preparatory work in this direction. There follows a report by the Sea Transport Chief Italy, about transport requirements-200000 tons per month for Sicily, 80000 tons per month for Sardinia-and how they are to be covered, particularly by small vessels. C. in C. Navy stresses, and the Fuehrer agrees, that the Sea Transport Chief must be independent in the employment of shipping space and that intervention by the home staff Overseas, OKW, is harmful. The Fuehrer asks whether C. in C. Navy has the impression that the Duce is determined to hold out. The C. in C. Navy replies that he "assumes this to be certain but naturally does not know." The Italian's main weakness, he says is lack of initiative.

UK C. in C. Navy points out that "owing to the Mediterranean now being free the Anglo-Saxons are gaining 2 million gross registered tons of shipping space." The Fuehrer interrupts: "which the brave U-boats must sink again now." C. in C. Navy. And we are at present in the biggest crisis of the U-boat war because the enemy has for the first time made fighting impossible by new means of determining position and is inflicting heavy losses on us (15-17 U-boats per month). Fuehrer: "The losses are too high, we can't go on like that!"

C. in C. Navy goes on to say that the Bay of Biscay is also our only narrow exit, to get through which is extremely difficult and already takes 10 days. C. in C. Navy sees the best strategic solution in the occupation of Spain and Gibraltar. To this the Fuehrer says that this was still possible in 1940, carrying Spain along with us, but that our forces are not sufficient for this purpose now and against Spain's will: the question of supplies is therefore to be embarked upon as proposed by the Sea Transport Chief.

Document D-894

[Polish Workers in kali Mining Area] [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1025-1026.

Report of 9/23/1944.

Kreis leadership making the report: TANN of the NSDAP or office

Subject: Foreigners

Polish youth in the Kali mining area, which has always shown an endeavor to stick particularly closely together, is being watched with especial care.

The Ortsgruppenleiter Wittelsheim reports that he noticed 13 young Poles who had left Buggingen without permission and who were in possession of medical certificates. He had 11 of these Poles arrested and taken to the Gestapo at Muelhausen for reexamination.

The Kreisleiter of the Kreis Tann [rubber stamp] Heckmann Communal leader of the NSDAP

Title: "Document D-897, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1026-1027.

[(4a) (1)]

Erfurt, 4/4/1938.

Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS. Branch Office Erfurt.

Special Order

Top Secret. I/38.

Strictly Confidential

To all Heads of Sections (Referent) and Stuetzpunkleiter.

Stuetzpunkleiters are to report not later than 1800 hours on 4/7/1938 all persons in their district about whom it is safe to assume (with 100% probability) that they will vote "No" at the impending plebiscite. (Don't forget the International Jehovah's witnesses!).

Heads of Sections are to support the Stuetzpunkleiters locally as much as possible in this matter.

This matter is also to be carried out in closest collaboration with the Ortsgruppenleiters of the Party. The Ortsgruppenleiters will be instructed by the Aussenstellenleiter [Head of the Branch Office] personally after 1800 hours on the 5.4.1938.

The list of persons must contain the following details: Name, christian name, exact address, and a short explanation why the person concerned is expected to vote "No" and which members of these person's families who are entitled to a vote, share the same views.

The tremendous responsibility which the Stuetzpunkleiters have-in particular with regard to this report-is stressed once more the Stuetzpunkleiters must clearly understand the potential consequences for the persons contained in their report. It must be particularly strongly considered whether the persons who impart such information to the Stuetzpunkleiters and from whom the Stuetzpunkleiters make their inquiries, are not motivated by personal reasons; even political leaders are not excepted from this.

The confidential nature of this Order is again emphasized.

The order is to be minutely memorized and thereafter destroyed immediately. (Every Stuetzpunkleiter is personally responsible to me for the complete destruction of this Order!).

The Aussenstellenleiter (Head of the Branch Office) [signed] HELFER. SS. Oberscharfuehrer.

Elections on 10.4.1938.

Increased attention is to be devoted to participation in and the results of the plebiscite on 10.4.1938, particularly in small towns and villages. It must, above all, be ascertained, whether the opponents are to be sought in Marxist ideological or opposition circles.

One must count on the possibility of Marxist circles organizing excursions in groups to smaller localities on the day of the plebiscite and voting there with voting forms. It is thereby intended to exercise a check as to whether the No-votes deposited in these places actually appear on the plebiscite result.

If any observations of this nature are made, they should be reported immediately.

Title: "Document D-897, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1027-1028.

B. Catholicism:

The attitude of the clergy deserves special attention.

1. What effects did the declaration of the German-Austrian bishops have on the clergy and the believers?

2. Was any attitude expressed during church services and similar meetings?

3. Have any official ecclesiastical declarations with regard to plebiscite or to the Austrian "Anschluss" and the declaration of the German-Austrian bishops become known? (Exact text is to be submitted).

4. Has any attitude been expressed towards the papal counter-declaration which was broadcast by the Vatican radio and which rejected both the declaration of the Austrian bishops and the attitude of the "Schwarzen Korps"?

C. Protestantism.

Special attitude of the clergy is to be observed.

1. What official ecclesiastical declarations became known with regard to the Austrian Anschluss?

2. Was any attitude expressed about the Anschluss or the plebiscite during services?

3. What comment did the Church press make?

4. Has the "Bildblatt" der deutschen evangelischen Kirche zur Volkabstimmung am 10.4.1938 ("Feuilleton" of the German Protestant Church for the Plebiscite on 10.4.1938) (16 pages long) been distributed?

5. Were the bells of all religious communities rung on the evening of 9.4.1938, following the Fuehrer's speech in Vienna?

6. Were any confirmations celebrated on 10.4.1938?

D. Freemasons.

1. What was the opinion about the Austrian Anschluss in the various Freemason circles?

2. Have any contacts of German Freemasons with Austria or journeys to Austria become known?

What is the attitude of Jewish circles towards the completed Austrian Anschluss and the impending plebiscite?

Special reports are to be submitted as soon as possible about points A-E.

It is suggested that the election officials are contacted in a suitable manner where necessary. The exertion of any kind of pressure must, however, be desisted from.

Furthermore, all observations which are made in various fields on the occasion of the plebiscite on 10.4.38 are to be reported in the form of special messages.

Title: "Document D-897, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1028-1030.

[(4a) (3)]

Gispersleben, 25.4.1938

Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS. Sub Sector Thuringia/Erfurt. Branch Office Weissensee

To the Branch Office, Erfurt.

Subject: "No"-voters in Weissensee. Election on 10.4.1938.

Previous correspondence: See preceding report.

Enclosed are the data forms relating to the 7 "No"-voters. The following procedure was employed for finding them out:

Prior to the election, Party Member Paul Fritsche of Jakobstrasse, Weissensee, Thuringia completed a register of all persons suspected of voting "No". On the election day every person included on this list received from a specially selected official a voting paper which was marked with a number imprinted by means of a colorless typewriter. The number of this voting paper was entered by the official in the above-mentioned register after the voter's name. After the conclusion of the election the voting papers were sorted and all slips with an imprinted number taken out. With the help of the register, the action of the watched persons could be examined accurately.

The names of the "No" voters have been reported to the local collaborator by the above-mentioned Party member Fritsche.

[signed] R. WEINGART.

Gispersleben, 4.5.1938.

Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS. Sub Sector Thuringia/Erfurt. Branch Office Weissensee.

To the Branch Office Erfurt.

Subject: Plebiscite on 10.4.1938

No previous correspondence.

The following incident occurred at Soemmerda on election day:

The tax-consultant Otto Zobel of No. 6 Raemenstrasse, Soemmerda entered the voting center. He received a voting paper and envelope there and-contrary to the behavior of the other voters-took them into the voting booth. As Zobel is known as a fanatic Center Party adherent and as a man who is unfavorably inclined towards National Socialism, the election official, Albert Schumann of Dreyseplatz, Soemmerda, did not throw the envelope into the voting box immediately but tried to push it under the paper end which is situated on the voting box to cover the slit so as to be able to open the envelope later at an opportune moment. Zobel observed this procedure and drew the official's attention to the fact that the envelope had not been placed in the voting box at all. To avoid raising any suspicion the official Schumann then apologized saying that the envelope had got under the paper cover by mistake, and he then placed it unopened into the voting box.

Zobel's behavior indicates that he did not wish the nature of his vote to become known. This fact, together with the above-mentioned political attitude gives rise to the well-founded suspicion that Zobel voted "No."

The above-named man has a tax-consulting office in Soemmerda. His personal data are as follows:

Name: Zobel, Otto Place of residence: Soemmerda Address: Raemenstrasse, No. 6 Date of birth: 25th May 1898 Place of birth: Soemmerda Single or Married: Single. Religion: Catholic. Relation to the Party: Not a member of the NSDAP

Moved to Soemmerda the last time on 11/1/1933 from Fulda.

[signed]: R. WEINGART.

Title: "Document D-897, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1030-1031.

[(4a) (5)]

Erfurt, 4/9/1938

Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS. Sub Sector Thuringia/Erfurt. Branch Office Erfurt.

To all Ortsgruppenleiters of the NSDAP of the Kreis of Erfurt-Weissensee.

On their appearance in your Ortsgruppen area for the purpose of carrying out their voting duty, the under-mentioned persons are to be specially watched and the Kreisleitung of Erfurt (Election Office SD.) is to be notified immediately: Kaufman, Karl; Kaufman, Hedwig; Paessler, Wilhelm; Paessler, Margarete; Stange, Otto; Stange, Else; Langhammer, Emil; Fulle, Hildegard; Ehmer, Jacob; Pfotenhauer, Paul; Wettwer, Elisabeth; Hense, Karl; Sonren, Josefine; von Natusius, Walter; Chrestensen, Karl,=; Mueller, Heinrich; Mueller, Else; Schmidt-Henrici, Gerhard; Kletschke, Gustav; Ziegler, Karl; Ziegler, Kaethe; Buchmann, Karl; Graf, Helene; Grunewald, Berta; Deckers, Maria; Hense, Charlotte; Grohmann, Paul; von Nathusius, Erika

By order of the Kreisleiter, this matter is to be treated as strictly confidential.

The Aussenstellenleiter [Head of the Branch Office] [Signed]: HELFER SS. Oberscharfuehrer.

Gispersleben, 13.4.1938.

Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS. Sub Sector Thuringia, Erfurt. Branch Office Weissensee.

To the Branch Office Erfurt.

Subject: Jehovah's Witness-Rob. Siering, Guenstedt.

No previous correspondence.

This is to notify you that the Jehovah's witnesses Robert Siering and his wife appeared in the voting center in Guenstedt on Sunday morning and deposited their vote, after both had been advised of their duty to vote by the police in Griefstedt and had been threatened with the removal of their child in case of nonparticipation.

It has been ascertained beyond doubt, however, that they only handed in the empty envelope; it must be added though, that their names had already been struck off the voter's list, as they had left on Friday.

[Signed: R. WEINGART.

Document D-901

[Confessional Front], Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1031-1033.

1. Ortsgruppe Darmstadt-Schlossgarten 2/20/1939

Point 9, Ecclesiastical questions

As the caretaker of the communal building of the St. Martin's community, Blockleiter and party member Keil informs me that meetings of the Confessional Front are again taking place at the St. Martin's institute, Mellerstrasse (Ortsgruppe Gutenberg), the public being excluded. Only the possessors of a red pass are admitted. Even the sexton who has to check these admission tickets can no longer attend these meetings since he left the Confessional Front. That these evenings do not serve ecclesiastical or rather "Christian edification" can already be seen from the fact that only a very limited circle are admitted. If the Confessional Front holds meetings behind tightly locked doors, then the contents of the "Bible classes"or whatever other name is used as a pretense are pretty obvious. Otherwise they need not be afraid of the light of publicity or hold secret sessions. Certainly the Gestapo is entitled to supervise the meetings, but they also can only gain admission there by showing their official passes, and the evening would then certainly take a very harmless course. These "secret sessions" ought to be forbidden.

[signed] Wimmer Ortsgruppenleiter

2. Ortsgruppe Pfungstadt 2/17/1939

To the 42 point report as to 33c-ecclesiastical questions

"Whoever leaves the church has different taxes imposed on him," so our already much discussed confessional pastor Strack said once again on the occasion of a mother's evening. This gentleman should really be rapped on the knuckles seriously for once.

It would also be urgently indicated that some authority should look after those children whose parents have left the church. Every sect looks after its children, only the "gottglaeubigen" [translator's note: Nazi term for people who have retained their belief in God, but have left the official churches] find no one to look after them. The result is that they first attend the usual religious classes for three or four years and have to be reconverted later, which might not be successful in all cases. Here is a gap that the party ought definitely to close.

The Ortsgruppenleiter Frick [?]

3. Ortsgruppe Darmstadt-Gervinius 2/17/1939

Re: 42 point report

Point 9: Ecclesiastical questions

The attached inclosure gives an insight into the activities of the Confessional Front. The poem "Thine is the choice" was pushed into the hands of three senior pupils by a woman in the Kirchstrasse. The Catholic priest Degen holds meetings with young male and female students with beer and cigarettes. Dance evenings are also held. Parts of the Bible are read out in which work is praised.

The school run by the English misses was transferred to the house of the Catholic priest Degen in the Annastrasse after it had been dissolved. No propriety and discipline; the girls smoke and come and go when they feel like it. Where is the school supervising authority ?

Heil Hitler Ortsgruppenleiter 1032

1 inclosure.

"Thine is the choice"

(A poem of 4 verses about the choice between a life of pleasure and emptiness, and spiritual life and eternal happiness)

Document D-901

[Confessional Front], Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1033-1035.

4. Ortsgruppe Hahn 2/19/1939

Re: Political situation report for 2/1939

9e Church and Youth

The church has no influence here on the male youth; it comes into touch with them only in as far as the parents send the boys to confirmation classes. As the priest has no authority whatsoever, wild scenes take place there.

It is a different matter where the girls aged 10-14, i. e., the age of the Junior Hitler Girls, are concerned. As has been previously repeatedly reported, an "Evangelical Youth Club" still exists, and the majority of the Junior Hitler Girls go there. An occasional discussion with the sub-Gau of the German Girl's League (female Hitler Youth) brought no change either. The participation of children under 10 years of age has been stopped by the school; it cannot prevent the participation of the older ones. The "Youth Club" is headed by the evangelical parish welfare nurse and meets in the rooms of the Evangelical infants' school. Without the active cooperation of the parish and the Hitler Youth we shall apparently not be able to get rid of this Youth Club.

Heil Hitler [signed] Freitag Ortsgruppenleiter

The comments made by the Kreisleiter run as follows:

Kreisleitung Darmstadt Month of 2/1939.

To point 9. Subject: Church questions

Increased activity on the part of the confessional priests has been reported to me from various places. I am not yet in a position to judge finally whether this zeal is the result of special directions or whether the priests are having their say on heir own initiative. Going into details, I request you to take the following inclosure into consideration:

1. The report of Ortsgruppenleiter Wimmer (St. Martin's parish). (The SD, Gestapo, and the competent Ortsgruppenleiter will be instructed by me.)

2. I shall request Ortsgruppenleiter Frick, who reports from Pfungstadt, to go to the Kreisleiter tomorrow and shall get him to name his witnesses. These will be notified to you and to the Gestapo (to the latter with a report of the case). The priest Strack is sufficiently well known and ripe for the concentration camp or the Special Court. His reported statement before fellow Germans constitutes an infringement of the Law against Malice. In any case, the chap must disappear from the territory of the Kreis or Gau.

3. The attached edifying poem was distributed in the Ortsgruppe Gervinius. It appears to me that it could only make an impression on such fellow citizens as have a bee in their bonnet anyhow.

4. The statement of Ortsgruppenleiter Freitag from Hahn is interesting. In connection with the second paragraph of this letter, I wish to inform you that the Bannfuehrer (Hitler Youth Colonel) and the head of the Hitler Girls have received instructions to get into touch with the Ortsgruppenleiter.

With reference to case 4, Ortsgruppe Hahn, the following report, dated 7/9/1939, indicates the measures taken in this matter.

Ortsgruppe Hahn 7/9/1939

Subject: Church and Youth

Reference: My 42 point report dated February 1939. Your letter of 6/12/1939 and my reply of 6/18/1939.

The questions discussed in the above correspondence have been happily solved during this week. The head of the Elizabeth Institute has recalled the parish welfare nurse with effect from 6/30/1939 and transferred her to Erbes-Buedesheim. On Wednesday, in place of the confessional kindergarten, a NSV (National Socialist Welfare) Kindergarten was opened here. The start was a good one; out of the former pupils ¾ turned up on the first day already; it can therefore be reckoned with that the NSV Kindergarten will soon have as many children as the former Evangelical children's school, or perhaps even more. On Friday the nursery work was again started by a National Socialist nurse. In addition the following has been achieved:

1. The Evangelical Youth Club no longer has a head mistress or a home. We will see to it that it will not be resurrected.

2. The Evangelical Women's Assistance no longer has a home. It has lost one out of two heads (the other is the wife of a Party member).

3. The pastor no longer has refuge in the house and must for better or for worse take the trouble of going to the Church for his Bible classes.

4. The Confessional Front thereby lost its most zealous protagonist who, in this connection, was far more efficient than Pastor Kempf of Eschellbruecken, who is after all responsible for Hahn.

Heil Hitler [signed] Freitag Ortsgruppenleiter

JPD/15.6.45.

Title: "Document D-901-A [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1035-1037.

Cologne, 1/31/1941.

NSDAP Gau Cologne-Aachen Gau Organization Department. Copy Circular No. O. 1/39

2. Instructions to all Kreis and Ortsgruppen organisationsleiters regarding installing and keeping card indexes of households.

Since my instruction of 5/1/1938, Circular No. O. 51/38 is in some respects out of date, I hereby withdraw it, and it thus loses its validity. So that the keeping of card indices of households should be uniform in all Ortsgruppen, including those newly formed in 1938, the following directives should be strictly adhered to:

1. The sense and purpose of card indexing households.

The card index of households serves to contain a card index all Germans united in the same household. It must give a clear picture of every individual living in the household. The precise personal data, entries regarding joining the Party, its organizations, affiliated bodies, etc., serve as a basis for statistical inquiries and combined with the entries on the back of the card index of households, for the political judgment of the members of a household. An all-embracing judgment going into all details, such as family circumstances, financial position, former and present, political and ideological views, as well as attitude on the occasion of the "Eintopf" [Translator's note: "Eintopf"-a one dish meal which had to be laid down for every household at intervals, the difference in the cost of this and a full meal being contributed by the household to the National Socialist Welfare Organization-the NSV.] and other collections of the NSV, must enable the Ortsgruppenleiter to give at any moment a judgment of the household member concerned which is sufficient in all respects. If correctly kept, the household card index provides the most important data for the Ortsgruppenleiter and Organisationsleiter. …

3. Confidential treatment of the household card index

The household card index must be kept in the Ortsgruppe office in a cupboard or chest which can be locked.

4. Entries in the Index

Only the Ortsgruppen-Organisationsleiter, or his representative, makes entries on the index cards. It is forbidden to get other persons to make entries.

5. Lists for the Blockleiters.

The Blockleiters must be in possession of lists which contain the same printed text as the household card index and which are to be provided with the necessary entries by the Blockleiters (family status, Party membership, membership of an organization, affiliated body, etc.) Nothing is to be mentioned in these lists about a political judgment. …

6. Reports on alterations of the organizations and affiliated bodies.

7. Reich order for reporting

According to the Reich order for reporting, see the Gaumitteilungsblatt of 8/1938, page 5, reports of any changes in residence, marriages, births and deaths are "sent to the Ortsgruppen by the bureaux for the registration of inhabitants or the Registry Offices as they come in; immediately on receipt of this information it must be used to amend the household card indexes …"

8. Change of residence within the Gau of Cologne-Aachen

In the case of people who have moved from the zone of the Ortsgruppe, the cards of the index are to be sent immediately fully entered up to the Kreisorganisationsleiter dealing with the old place of residence …

9. Change of residence to another Gau area

In the case of persons who have moved to another Gau area, the household cards are to be delivered to the former Ortsgrupper in alphabetical order marked "moved" …

10. Filling in the index cards

Index cards must be filled in uniformly either in typewriting or neatly in ink. Data concerning political judgment is to be entered in pencil, so that any necessary alterations (such as church connections; conduct at the "Eintopf" and other collections, etc.) can be carried out. In case of membership of the Party, an organization, an affiliated body etc., the exact date of joining, according to the membership card, is to be entered. A brief remark "Yes" is not permitted. Furthermore, the membership number and rank are to be entered under all circumstances, as well as the appropriate Sturm and Standart number in the case of members of the SA, SS, etc. The entry "Children" is to be used only for children up to the 18th year (completed 17th year).

The most precise information is to be obtained on military position and corresponding entries are to be made. It is here very important to state on the household index card whether the head of the household possesses a military identity card and when he performed his training in the new Wehrmacht. All other entries are to be made with similar care. It is thus to be recorded since when the "Voelkischer Beobachter" was subscribed to, whether the family already possessed a swastika flag before the 1935 flag law, and what wireless apparatus is available in the household, i. e. "Mende 3 valve, one resonance circuit". It is easy to obtain this data from conversation by Blockleiters with the German concerned.

12. Political judgment

In the lower part of the back of the card, detailed entries are to be made about the social and economic circumstances of every household member or sub-tenant, about their reputation, their former and present political reliability, etc. … The political judgment of every German is to be carried out by the Ortsgruppen Organisationsleiter in cooperation with the competent Block and Zellenleiter as well as in agreement with the Ortsgruppenleiter …

Title: "Document D-902, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1037-1038.

Erfurt, 4/7/1938

To the Erfurt Branch Office of the Security Service (SD) of the Reichsfuehrer SS.

Confidential

After thorough and most careful examination in the area of the Ortsgruppe of Melchendorf and in the closest cooperation with the Ortsgruppenleiter, we have come to the following conclusion:

The following persons will with 100% probability vote "No" at the forthcoming plebiscite on 4/10/1938:

1. Wilhelm Messing, plumber, Trift 49 h, Melchendorf, and his wife. 2. Walter Messing, carpenter, Trift 49 h, Melchendorf, and his wife. 3. Fritz Kranhold, lorry drier, No. 75 k, Melchendorf, and his wife.

Explanation:

(1) Wilhelm Messing (taken into protective custody in 1933 because of illegal activity for the Communist Party and printing illegal inciting pamphlets, and later given a long term of penal servitude.)

(2) Walter Messing (also taken into protective custody in 1933 for slandering the SA).

The wives of both Messings are greatly influenced by their husbands.

(3) Fritz Kranhold (taken into protective custody in 1933 and given a long term of penal servitude for distributing illegal propaganda pamphlets). The wife has been greatly influenced by K.

The farmer and house owner Hermann Leidel, living at No. 95 Hohenwindenstr, has already twice been fined several thousand Reichsmarks for insulting the late Reich President Hindenburg and for slighting the government of the Third Reich. Imprisonment could not be awarded as L. suffers from diabetes. He only rarely replies to the Heil Hitler salute, and then only if forced to do so. According to his remarks, he is not at all satisfied with the institutions of the Third Reich. For these reasons it may be assumed almost with certainty that Leidel will either vote "No" or hand in a blank paper.

Supervision therefore seems to be called for. Erfurt, 5.4.38.

Note: His wife has the same attitude.

Guenther Hartung, 113 Johanesstrasse, Wallstrasse entrance, must be reported as being an enemy of the State and opposed to the plebiscite.

Hartung must be described as a morally totally degenerate man and it is necessary to lock the same up in spite of his age (70 years).

Among other things, he referred to the German troops on their entry into Austria as loafers. Sufficient witnesses as to Hartung are available.

Erfurt, 8.4.38.

Heil Hitler [signed]

Title: "Document D-902, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1039-1041.

Subject: Secret Order

46228 reports the following unreliable fellows: Kurt Roediger 2 Hospitalplatz, Erfurt, born 16.12.1912 Ida Hartung 38a Kraempferstr., Erfurt, born 23.11.1872 Maria Kilian 16 I Hospitalplatz, Erfurt, born 17.10.1862 Erich Kaul 16 I Hospitalplatz, Erfurt, born 16. 8.1899 (18 names follow)

Erfurt, 11.4.1938

Report in Connection with the Plebiscite of 4/10/1938

The supervision of the voting that took place after previous discussion was technically impossible to carry out. The returning officer acting in election district No. 40 is so intimately known in this district that the voters put their envelopes with their voting slips into his hand without further ado. Any kind of secret marking of the voting envelopes was therefore hardly possible. A general passing on of the information regarding the measures that had been taken to the entire polling council could by no means take place. Nevertheless, it was possible to keep an eye on some of our fellow Germans who are not well disposed towards us. However, regarding this also, an exact statement cannot be made for reasons of justice. For example, the voting envelopes of the family of the former Master Freemason, senior post office employee Hertel, 40 Steigerstr. were marked. As, however, only one of the voters in question recorded a "No" vote, it cannot be stated whether this vote was recorded by Hertel himself or by his wife. According to the experience I have gained during my 5 years of political activity in the Steiger quarter, the "No" vote recorded can only be that of Hertel himself. As several voting slips were handed in with neither "No" nor "Yes", I consider it to be -urgently necessary to have the following fellow Germans visited by an unknown agent, calling with National Socialist pamphlets and also cleverly going into the present political situation.

l. Teacher Korsch 8 Steigerstr. Erfurt 2. Merchant Procopp 1 Steigerstr. Erfurt 3. Party Member Ernst Freise and wife 35 Steigerstr. Erfurt 4. Merchant Zimmass 17 Steigerstr. Erfurt 5. Robert Kluge 24 Steigerstr. Erfurt 6. Family Marpuart 25 Steigerstr. Erfurt 7. Merchant Fischer 4 Steigerstr. Erfurt 8. Professor Issel 25a Herderstr. Erfurt 9. Paul Topf 23a Steigerstr Erfurt

In any case, it is remarkable that the originals of the voting registers were in a state of disgusting disorder. More than 6 electors were not struck off although their names had been specially passed on to the election office at 6 Predigerstrasse for striking off. Two fellow Germans, "Trefz, Steigerstr, 2 and Jenny Thaeumer, 17 Steigerstrasse, ground floor" were not entered in spite of being passed on and a personal report. In another case, the following three 100% Jews were entered on the election register:

1. Felix Meyer, 1 Pfoertchenstr, Erfurt 2. Wife Meyer, 1 Pfoertchenstr, Erfurt 3. Erna Schenker, nee Sachs, Milchinselstr, 20.

The wife of the 100% Jew Bielschowski, 8 Augustapark (nee Wolff-Malzwolff) who was dragged along just before closing time of the plebiscite, voted "No" as can be proved.

That "No" votes were recorded in the Steiger quarter was obvious in view of the general attitude of the people listed on sheet 1, but that, after our Fuehrer has been more than 5 years in government, 100% Jews are today still on the voting register is clearly due to the fact that it is not the conscientious National Socialist workers who sit in the responsible positions in the municipal administration. A change in the occupants of these positions is in the interests of National Socialism and has nothing at all to do with official positions, which is the general attitude. The time has now come for doing something here particularly and for personal appointments on filling these important offices at the statistical department and its branch offices to be looked upon only in accordance with real performances at last. At the office of registration of the population, changes might also be very necessary.

[signed] Sonne [?]

Gispersleben, 21.4.1938

SD of the Reichsfuehrer SS Subsector Erfurt, Thuringia, Weisensee branch office

To the Erfurt branch office

Subject- Plebiscite of the 10.4.1938.

No previous reference.

On the 10th April of this year the inhabitants of Dielsdorf went to the plebiscite and only the farmer Georg Hoenig, 39 Herrenstr, Dielsdorf, did not. He was asked to come to the plebiscite but he remarked: "If I had wanted to vote I should have been there long ago."

On Good Friday, the 15th of this month, the anger and ill-humor of the inhabitants of Dielsdorf showed itself in the form of two placards on every lamp post.

The original of one follows; a copy of the other is inclosed.

Hoenig was a member of the Party until 1934.

2 inclosures.

[signed] WEINGART

(A poem is inclosed referring to his graft, corruption, profiteering from the State, and now turning against the State as its enemy.)

Title: "Document D-902, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1041-1042.

Witterda, 4/12/1938

Subject: Unfavorable remark by a farmer in Witterda.

On the 4/6/1938 propaganda material was distributed here by Party members. At one farm the dealer in textile fabrics Hirschfeld, from Bleicherode, happened to be there on business. The farmer took the propaganda material and said to the dealer: "I'll put this straight where it belongs," and took it to the lavatory. The dealer has told of this but not named the farmer, as it concerns a good customer of his.

In view of the recorded "No" votes-I assume that it is the farmer who recorded the "No" vote--I request the SD to take the matter in hand immediately, and to see to it that the dealer Hirschfeld is interrogated and forced to name the farmer.

To the Gispersleben branch office. [signed] MASSINO [?]

Gebesee, 4/22/1938

SD of the Reichsfuehrer SS Subsector Erfurt, Thuringia, Weissensee branch office

The married woman Lydia Gresser, nee Kraft, living at 28 Horst Wessel Strasse, Gebesee, states:

I have been buying petrol for our car from the motor car workshop of Bender and Weissenhorn, 31 Erfurtstrasse, Gebesee.

On Easter Monday I paid for the petrol that had been supplied during the preceding week. Weissenhorn expressed his surprise at the small quantity. I told him that it would get less still, we would now have to buy petrol somewhere else as well. When he continued to ask me why it was that he should no longer supply all the petrol, I said to him that I, and my husband also, had had our attention drawn by various persons to the fact that we should no longer buy anything from him, as he had voted "No" at the plebiscite. Here in Gebesee it is common knowledge that Weissenhorn is said to have voted "No."

I can swear in court to the statement made by me. Read, approved and signed Lydia Gresser

Completed Hausmann

Gispersleben, 25.4.1938

SD of the Reichsfuehrer SS Subsector Erfurt, Thuringia, Weissensee branch office

To the Erfurt branch office

Subject: "No" voters in Weissensee. Plebiscite on the 10.4.38.

Reference: See previous report

Inclosed you will find the personalia cards of the 7 "No" voters. They were detected as follows:

Before the elections, Party member Paul Fritsche of Jakobstr, Weissensee, Thuringia, compiled a list of all persons suspected of being likely to vote "No." On the day of the election everyone listed was handed by a specially selected election official a voting slip that had been marked by embossing a number with a ribbonless typewriter. The number of this voting slip was entered by the election official after the voter's name on the above mentioned list. When the voting had finished, the voting slips were gone through and all slips with embossed numbers were sorted out. By comparison with the list, the attitude of the person under surveillance could then be checked precisely.

The names of the "No" voters were reported to the competent collaborator by the above mentioned Party member Fritsch.

[signed] Weingart

Title: "Document D-902, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1042-1044.

Gispersleben, 4/25/1938 SD of the Reichsfuehrer SS Subsector Erfurt, Thuringia, Weissensee Branch Office

To the Erfurt Branch Office

Subject: Reichstag election and plebiscite on the 4/10/1938.

No previous reference

The factory worker Kirschner of Vippachedelhausen was dismissed by the Rheinmetall-Borsig Company in Soemmerda on the 20th of this month at the instigation of the Weimar sub-prefect, because, at the above mentioned Reichstag elections, he was the only inhabitant of the village of Vippachedelhausen to vote "No."

[signed] Weingart

Gispersleben, 4/28/38

SD of the Reichsfuehrer SS Subsector Erfurt, Thuringia, Weissensee branch office

To the Erfurt Branch Office

Subject: Election and plebiscite on the 4/10/38

No previous reference

Inclosed you will receive some statements from Soemmerda for your information and further utilization.

Subject: Plebiscite on 4/10/1938. No previous reference.

The laborer Otto Wiegand of 17 Erfurter Strasse, Soemmerda, had to be requested four times to record his vote on the day of the election and finally only voted under force. The above was a member of the former international association of Jehovah's Witnesses. His personalia are as follows:

Name: Wiegand, Otto Home: Soemmerda Address: 17, Erfurterstrasse Occupation: Laborer Date of birth: 10/7/1900 Place of birth: Soemmerda Religion: Dissident (left the church on 2/6/1937) Status: Married (to Ida nee Raenke, born 8/22/1904 in Soemmerda) Number of children: Two Moved to Soemmerda on 11/22/1922 from Kulitz.

Subject: Plebiscite on 4/10/1938. No previous reference.

The married woman Frieda Schreiner, nee Troester, of Soemmerda (Salzmannstrasse 5) did not vote in spite of repeatedly being invited to do so. The above is a fanatic member of the former international association of Jehovah's Witnesses.

The husband, who has the same opinions and who was recently involved in criminal proceedings because of them, recorded his vote. To be sure this was probably exclusively for fear of renewed arrest.

The wife's personalia are as follows:

Name: Schreiner nee Troester, Frieda Home: Soemmerda Address: 5 Salzmannstrasse Date of birth: 3/2/1897 Place of birth: Oldisleben Religion: Christian free Status: Married (to the master bricklayer, Paul Schreiner, born 9/21/1895 in Leubingen) Children: Two Moved to Soemmerda on 6/5/1930 from Leubingen, district of Eckartsberga)

Extract from the "Thuringer Allgemeine Zeitung" 4/11/1938

Erfurt The avowal before the world: The united German Yes: 99.08% 99.750% in Austria! The Fuehrer's thanks: "It is the proudest hour of my life." Gauleiter Sauckel: "Never before has any people thus demonstrated its unity."

99.29% Yes in Erfurt

List of voters: 102428 Voting cards: 5252 Total of people entitled to vote: 107678 Votes recorded: 107593 Yes votes: 106713 No votes: 756 Void votes: 120

Document D-903

Examination of Witnesses Provincial Court for Criminal of Vienna VIII Landesgerichtstrasse II, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1044-1047.

On 6/7/1946 Judge present: [illegible] Court Reporter [illegible].

Criminal Proceedings

The witness is warned to speak the pure truth to the best of his knowledge and conscience in answer to the question put to him, to hide nothing and to give his testimony in such a way that he can, if necessary, confirm it on oath.

He states regarding his personal data: 1. Christian and Surname: Dr 3. Place of birth: Vienna. 4. Religion: Roman Catholic. 5. Married or single. 6. Occupation: Cathedral chapter, Archbishop's secretary. 7. Address: 2 Rotenturmstrasse, Vienna I. 8. Relation to the accused or to other persons concerned in this examination.

On 10/8/1938 a serious attack by young demonstrators took place on the Archbishop's Palace in Vienna. I was present during it and can therefore describe it from my own experience. At about 20.15 hours I was sitting with my colleague Zeremoniar Dr. Franz Jaclyn in my room which has windows overlooking the courtyard. Suddenly we heard through the windows excited cries and slogans shouted in unison coming down from the Stefansplatz, and in the very next moment already the smashing of window panes. Immediately afterwards his Eminence rang me on the telephone: A crowd of young people are assembled in the Stefansplatz, they are breaking our window panes. Call the police! I used the police emergency call A-i-22 and received the answer we are coming. I then went to his Eminence's room. On my way across the courtyard I heard shouting simultaneously, I heard heavy blows on the Stefansplatz. I found the Cardinal in his study together with the nuns who were employed in the household. The blows on the gate which were being made with a ladder and iron bars resounded heavily. I made another emergency call from his Eminence's room and received the answer: The commissariat have been informed. The answer could not satisfy me, as on an emergency call being received the special police force turned out immediately. I telephoned once again and said: The gate is being stormed, we do not know how long it will withstand. Once again the same reply. I listened out of the window and heard shouts of heave ho, then smashing and splintering cries of triumph; they had got in. After approximately a quarter of an hour the gate gave way. The demonstrators stormed into the courtyard shouting and smashing everything they came across. We conducted the nuns to the attic and instructed them to hide there. We took the Cardinal to safety in the personalia archive and locked the iron door behind him, then we two priests who saw ourselves opposed to a crowd of invaders took up post at the door of the Cardinal's house chapel, in order to prevent any destruction there at least. Shortly after we had reached the chapel, the first invaders stormed into the Cardinal's rooms which the chapel adjoins. Right at the door we warded them off; pieces of wood were flung into the chapel. I received a push that caused me to fall but we managed to prevent any entry into the chapel. The demonstrators were youths aged from 14-25 about a 100 of them. After we had warded off the first troop we opened up the tabernacle and … the consecrated wafers so as to protect the most holy from being desecrated. But new invaders stormed up already, whom we warded off. In the meantime in the remaining rooms an orgy of destruction that cannot be described took place against all the fittings. With the brass rods that held the carpet in place on the staircase the youths destroyed tables and chairs, candelabras and valuable paintings, particularly all crucifixes. The chapel's slate glass doors, the large decorative mirrors, the glass panes of the book case everything was smashed to pieces.

While we were still engaged in hand to hand fighting, my colleague thought he heard the shout: Cardinal discovered. He attempted to battle through, but did not get through the rooms; he received a blow on the head with a bronze candlestick and could only with difficulty escape to a room where he again used the emergency call. I was dragged from the chapel by about 6 people and dragged across the ante-room to the window which overlooks the Rotenturmstrasse. "We'll throw the dog out of the window!" However, applying my utmost strength I was able to prevent myself being thrown out. I managed to free myself and rushed back to the chapel where I ejected one youth who was just getting ready to busy himself around the altar. Then suddenly the shout went up "Back, the police are coming." The invaders rushed away. One policeman arrived, then another, but the demonstrators were able to leave the Palace unhindered. From the time of the first emergency call to the arrival of the police, at least 40 minutes had gone by.

We then fetched his Eminence out of his hiding place and brought him to his destroyed quarters which presented a picture of dreadful devastation. Then there came a police Lt. Colonel and apologized; then there appeared a representative of the Gestapo and expressed his regret, stating, however, that the police had not had much desire to intervene.

In the meantime, other demonstrators had attacked the cathedral rector's house in 3, Stefansplatz, and there threw the cathedral curate Krawatik out of the window into the yard; this priest lay in hospital till February with a fracture of both thighs. From there too the police and other officials had been repeatedly telephoned but with no success.

At 11:30 the destroyed quarters were sealed by the State Police. On the following morning — it was Sunday — all the residents had to remain indoors until the police examination was over. The cardinal protested against this kind of treatment, and it was then permitted to go to the Cathedral for Holy Mass. A written undertaking was demanded from all the other residents that they would not say anything about the events. During the course of the forenoon his Eminence then betook himself to a meeting of the Cathedral chapter, where means were discussed of informing the Holy Father as soon as possible of the events. During the course of the day all the people in the house were interrogated by the police. In the afternoon the Cardinal visited the Nuncio who happened to have come to Vienna. Following this, the Nuncio paid a visit to the Palace but was not admitted into the destroyed quarters in spite of his diplomatic passport, with the explanation that the damage was such that a commission must come from Berlin. Actually however, the quarters were thrown open in the evening already. The Gestapo had in the meantime put things roughly in order so as to eliminate the worst signs.

On the 9th of October the Cardinal sent a message to the Fuehrer's chancellery through the Nuncio, but no reply to it was ever received. Neither did the State or Urban authorities ever give compensation in any way. The damage amounted to about 20000 marks. Over 1000 window panes were broken on all sides of the house and inside it. The Cardinal's wardrobe was plundered, a valuable cross and two rings were stolen. Although Gauleiter Globocnik stated in a speech on the 12th October that he had had the Cardinal's windows replaced at his own expense, this does not correspond to the facts.

That the demonstration was not the result of youthful wantonness or the embitterment, but a well thought-out plan known to official quarters is obvious from the speech of Gauleiter Buerckel who, on the 13th October in the Heldenplatz, represented the Cardinal as the guilty one in the nearest possible manner.

I enclose the copy of the record of an examination taken down on 10/10/1938 with his Eminence.

Vienna, 6/7/1946.

[Signed] Dr. J. Weinbacher.

[counter signed by the Judge and court reporter]

Document D-903

Examination of Witnesses Provincial Court for Criminal of Vienna VIII Landesgerichtstrasse II, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1047-1049.

Record

Taken down on 10/10/1938 at 18.00 hours in the building of the Archbishop's palace in Vienna with his Eminence the Cardinal-Archbishop of Vienna, Dr. Theodor Innitzer who, on being informed of the subject of the examination states:

At about 20.10 hours on Saturday the 8th October, I heard about a mass of people who had gathered in front of the Archbishop's Palace in the Stefansplatz. I confirmed this fact for myself and heard how the crowd assembled in front of the Archbishop's Palace were singing the Deutschland and Horst Wessel songs and uttering threats against my person. I thereupon went away from the window and immediately gave orders that the Emergency Detachment of the regular police (Ai22) should be phoned, and this actually took place. In the meantime, or shortly afterwards stones and other articles were thrown at my windows, breaking window panes. In addition, people from the crowd assembled before the Palace attempted to force the Palace gates, which they succeeded in doing after about a quarter of an hour. The crowd, which consisted mainly of youths between 15 and 20 years of age, then stormed into the house through the courtyard towards the main-steps, whereupon I vacated my official rooms. I then heard how the persons who had-penetrated into my official rooms smashed the windows; I heard clashing and rumbling as well as whistles and cat-calls. In my opinion, the persons who had forced their way into my official rooms, remained there for at least 20 minutes. Suddenly I heard a whistle, and then all was quiet. I then returned to my official rooms with police officials who had arrived in the meantime and had been looking for me together with my secretary, and found the rooms in a dreadful state of destruction. I was able to ascertain immediately that the following articles were missing from my property:

1 One Prelate's gown 2 Two morning coats 3 Two great coats 4 One ulster 5 One pair of red buckled shoes 6 One bishop's hat 7 One stiff hat 8 Three red Birettas 9 Three red skull-caps 10 One violet stole 11 One Pectoral with gold chain 12 Two bishop's rings, one of them being one presented by His Holiness to the Cardinal upon his promotion; the Pope's coat of arms was on this one. 13 One gold fountain pen 14 Two horse-shoe purses- with total contents of about 10 marks 15 A few boxes of cigars and cigarettes 16 One key ring with four keys

For the rest, the damage and devastation which has been established by the police commission was caused to my rooms. Particularly the damage to religious paintings and crosses, and here I point out specially that the ivory crosses, which are besides of great artistic value, were almost all smashed. In addition a chalice consecrated by me on 10/8/1938 which had been packed up was torn out of its packing, damaged and thrown into the courtyard.

I wish further to add to my statements that a new green table cover valued at 260 marks has also vanished from the Council Chamber.

I am unable at the moment to give the amount of the damage caused by the mob which broke into the Archbishop's palace.

As at the time of the mob's incursion into my palace I was not in my official rooms, I did not notice any particular person and in case of a confrontation would not be able to recognize anyone either.

Perused, sealed and completed.

Title: "Document D-906, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1049-1051.

1. Gaustabsamtleiter (Franconia) Sellmer handwritten note. 1.10.40.

Justice: Visit from party member Blankenberg, Berlin. Action begins in the near future. So far hardly any mishaps have occurred. 30000 dispatched. Further 100000-120000 are waiting. The circle of those who are initiated is to be kept very small. If necessary the Kreisleiter is to be notified in good time. Initiate Dr. [? HUMMEL], when possible supply a statement from the Gau.

(1) Institutions. (2) Doctors' attitude. (3) Where is the institution situated? (4) Who is the Kreisleiter?

The Fuehrer gave the order. The decree is ready. At present only clear cases, that is 100 ones, are being settled. Later an expansion will take place. From now on notification will be given in a [?cleverer] form. Informed are:

1.10.40 (sgd) SELLMER.

Party member Dr. [?Hummel] is informed while on leave. 2.10.40. S. the supplies [illegible word] material regarding all institutions in the Gau. KreisleiterSellmer … [name] … [name] … [lord Mayor] must be informed.

2. Martin BORMANN 24.9.1940.

National Socialist German Workers Party. (NSDAP) at present in Berlin, 24.9.40. Bo-An.

The Fuehrer's deputy Chief of Staff

To the Gauleitung Franconia for the attention of Kreisleiter Zimmermann Nurnberg Gauleitung of the NSDAP.

Copy to [? Ben]

Your letter of the 13.9.1940 was given to me by Party member Hoffmann. The Commission which was working at Neuendettelsaus is under the control of Reichsleiter Bouhler or is acting on his orders.

The text of the notifications of relatives is being variously worded, as I was once more assured yesterday; it can, however, naturally happen sometimes that two families living close to each other receive similarly worded letters.

It is natural that the representatives of Christian ideology speak against the Commission's measures; it must be equally natural that all Party Offices should, as far as necessary, support the work of the Commission.

Heil Hitler! [Sgd.] M. Bormann.

3. Situation Report by the Kreisleitung of Erlangen 26.11.40.

(2) Elimination of mental patients: On orders from the Ministry of the Interior, signed Schulz or Schultze, a commission consisting, among others, of a North German doctor and a number of students appeared some time ago at the local sanatorium and nursing home. It examined the documents of the patients lodged in the institution. Some time later the director of the institution was informed that a certain number of patients were to be transferred to another institution on orders from the Reich Defence Commissar, that a Berlin Transport Company was to carry out the transfer and the head of the institution was to follow the directives of this company, which was in possession of the list of names. In this way 3 transports with a total number of 370 patients were in the meantime transferred to Sonnenstein near Pirna in Sa. and to the Linz district. A further transport is to leave in January of next year. The head of the institution did not at first know at all where the transports went and at present too he does not know officially. He received no information on the subject from anybody. He merely had instructions to reply to the patients' relatives' enquiries that the new Institution would get in touch with them and inform them of their admission. Strangely enough various relatives received notification after the transportation that their patients had died. In some cases pneumonia and in others an infectious disease were given as the cause of death. At the same time the relatives were further informed that it had been necessary to cremate the body and that, if they were interested, they could have the clothing of the deceased sent to them. The registry office of Erlangen was also informed by the institution of the various cases of death, and again either pneumonia or an infectious disease was given as the cause of deathillnesses which had no connection with the previous medical history, so that it is to be assumed that it is here a case of false statements. The population is terribly disturbed about the transfer of patients, because they connect it with the cases of death which are becoming known in rapid succession. They are speaking, partly openly, partly secretly, about an elimination of patients for which there is no legal foundation. In these war times such unrest among the population has a doubly unfavorable effect. Moreover, the events described above give the church and religious circles cause to revive their attitude against National Socialism.

[Handwritten addition]: original extract from the situation report of the Kreisleitung of Erlangen of the 26.11.40. A copy was not made …

4. Situation Report of the Kreisleitung of Ansbach, 12/1940:

Sanatorium and Nursing Home: The removal of patients of sanatoria and nursing homes to other districts could not naturally remain-hidden from the public. It also appears that the commissions which were established work in too great haste, are not always lucky, and that many mistakes occurred. Nor can one prevent individual cases becoming known and spoken about. The following cases should naturally not have occurred.

(1) Through an oversight one family received two urns.

(2) One notification of death indicated appendicitis as the cause of death. But the appendix had already been removed ten years previously.

(3) Another cause of death quoted was a disease of the spinal cord. Relatives of the family had visited the patient physically perfectly healthy only eight days before.

Title: "Document D-906, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1052-1053.

One family received a notification of death, although the woman still lives in the institution to-day and enjoys perfect bodily health.

Some time ago, an obituary notice was inserted in the local Frankische Zeitung by the relatives: "… has been taken away from us by a tragic fate".

With these highly delicate measures, it is difficult to make suggestions as to how to counter a further spreading of the facts or rumors arising from them or invented rumors. At least it would be necessary for the Kreisleiters to receive confidential information about the measures themselves.

In addition, the competent Kreisleiter should also be advised at the same time as the relatives are notified, in order that he can observe the effects on the relatives and watch their behavior and, if necessary, intervene in a suitable manner.

Heil Hitler [signature illegible]

5. Kreisleiter Walz, Fraenkische Alb, 30.12.40.

Lauf (Pegnitz) 30.12.40.

To the Gaustabsamtsleiter. Party member, Sellmer Nurnberg.

Further to my last report on morale, I report the following:

Dr. Loeffler of Hersbruck, the district doctor, informs me that in Schupf near Kainsbach (formerly district of Hersbruck), a young peasant named Koch was sent to an institution for sterilization, on account of epilepsy.

He wrote to his mother a few weeks ago that all was well with him and that she should send him some tobacco for him to smoke. The mother replied that he should come back soon as his work in the farmyard was very much missed. It is to be noted that the young Koch was a very great help to his mother, the farmer's widow Koch, as he carried out all the agricultural work practically by himself.

The widow was informed one week later that her son had died suddenly and that she should collect the urn with his ashes.

As the young Koch was also well known in the surrounding district too on account of his diligence, this case of "violent death" has naturally caused great indignation.

When I proposed to district Doctor Loeffler that he should send a master masar from Osternohe to the institution at Ansbach for a few weeks in order to observe his mental state, he declared that he could not be responsible for this, as he did not know whether this person would come back alive. The doctor also informed me that it was well known that the Commission consisted of one SS Doctor and several subordinate doctors and that the "patients" were not even examined and that they only pronounced their verdict in accordance with the medical history noted down. As far as he knew, families were refusing to send their sick to institutions, as they did not know whether they would get them back alive.

The district doctor in Nurnberg had informed him that in the city of Nurnberg 2 accusations of murder had been institute(! by the relatives of such sick persons.

The Party has up to now received neither complaints nor accusations of this sort.

Heil Hitler [signed] E. Walz. Kreisleiter.

[on original sheet]

Note. After the penultimate paragraph there are the following handwritten remarks: "the District Doctor" is underlined, "investigate. (and a name)" … There is no case of this. The Authorities are instructed how they have to behave. S. 7.1.41.

Incident at the Ottilienheim

Title: "Document D-906, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1053-1055.

3/5/1941.

6. Gaustabsamtsleiter Sellmer. 3/5/1941. Gaustabsamt. Sel/Pf.

To the Kreisleiter Party member Michael Gerstner Weissenburg in Bavaria.

Ref: your letter of 2/24/1941 unrest of the population of Absberg.

The Reichsoffice Berlin informs me that the removal of the patients from the Ottilienheim was not carried out by Berlin but by Munich. I have therefore now communicated with Munich on this matter. In the meantime I have heard from the District President that he has also raised an objection to the way in which the patients were treated. I hope therefore that such gross mistakes will not occur in future.

Heil Hitler [signed] S. [Sellmer] Gaustabsamtsleiter.

N.B. The competent person for Bavaria is Regierungsrat Gaum, at the Bavarian Ministry of State, Munich. We should as far as possible get in touch with him. Regierungsrat Gaum will issue instructions for the institutions to be evacuated as soon as possible.

File note: Subject: Ottilienheim, Absberg.

Dr. Hefelmann, Berlin, informed me by telephone to-day that the removal of the patients from Ottilienheim did not take place on orders from Berlin but on orders from Regierungsrat Gaum of the Bavarian Ministry of State.

Furthermore, he told me that the NSDAP functionary could not be brought in, as the regulation does not provide for this. Nurnberg. 5.3.1941.

(signed) Sellmer.

7. Gaustabsamtsleiter Sellmer to SD. Nurnberg 1.3.1941.

Copy for information to the Fuehrer's Chancellery, Party member Dr. Hefelmann, Berlin.

 

Gaustabsamt Sel/Pf.

To the Security Service SSSturmbannfuehrer Friedrich. Nurnberg.

Subject: Unrest of the population of Absberg owing to the conspicuous evacuation of the inmates of the Ottilienheim.

As I have already informed you by telephone, the evacuation of further inmates of the Ottilienheim has caused much unpleasantness. I enclose herewith for your information the comprehensive report of the Kreisleiter, party member Gertsner, and will in due course inform you of the further inquiries that take place.

"I have just received a telephone message from the Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP in Absberg. Party member Kirchhof-who is employed as a foreman in the Muna Langlan and also lives there-about an incident which has disturbed the population in Absberg to an exceptional degree. In Absberg, which is part of the area of the former Kreisleitung of Gunzenhausen, the Abbey of Ottilienheim is situated in the middle of the market place. In this Ottilienheim were housed some hundreds of mentally defective persons who, as far as they were fit for any work, were employed on the farm of the Ottilienheim. These mentally defective persons were originally sent there by the various Country Welfare Organizations. Already last year 25 inmates were removed in the course of the well known scheme; of these 24 died, while one inmate was again brought back to the Ottilienheim. It was allegedly then a case of inmates for whom the Country Welfare Organization of Swabia had to provide.

Last Friday the inmates of the Ottilienheim for whose cost the Country Welfare Organization of Upper Franconia and Middle Franconia had taken over the responsibility were taken away in two large cars. The removal was carried out by the personnel of the Sanatorium and Nursing Home of Erlangen under the direction of a professor from this Institution. These people were taken away in the most conspicuous manner imaginable. Instead of the buses entering the courtyard to pick up the inmates who were to be removed, the vehicles were stationed outside the Ottilienheim in the middle of the market place. The inmates of the Ottilienheim who were to be removed and were accordingly excited had to be taken to the vehicles singly and by force. The whole population of Absberg, which is strongly Catholic, had congregated and watched the incident crying loudly. That certain circles made suitable psychological use of this incident cannot be regarded as surprising. Party Member Kirchhof reported that there were even party members among these weeping onlookers and that, in the general excitement of the people, certain remarks were passed which must be regarded as irresponsible. It goes without saying that the pastor of the Ottilienheim himself helped to create the appropriate atmosphere by having the people who were to be removed brought to the Abbey church for confession and communion in the morning, and having them practically carried to the altar with the help of the nuns.

I shall now make detailed inquiries about the incident through the sub-prefect. I consider it necessary, however, to advise the authorities responsible to use somewhat more tact in the removal of these persons who are to be eliminated as a Reich Defense measure, as it is not necessary to create unnecessary difficulties and play into the hands of our opponents. As soon as I receive the report, I shall pass it on to the Gaustabsamt (Gau Staff Office) .

Heil Hitler! [signed] S. [Sellmer] Gaustabsamtsleiter [Chief of the Gau Staff Office]

Title: "Document D-906, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1056-1058.

8. Ortsgruppenleiter Kirchhof, Absberg. 25.2.1941. Kreisleitung Weissenburg in Bavaria Ortsgruppe Absberg

Langlan, 2/25/1941.

Subject: Incidents on the occasion of the latest removal of mentally defective persons from the Ottilienheim in Absberg.

Reference: Telephone conversation Party member Gerstner and Party member Kirchhof on 24.2.41.

Enclosure: 1 report.

To the Kreisleitung of the NSDAP, Weissenburg.

With reference to the telephone conversation mentioned above, the desired report about the recent incidents in Absberg a few days ago is enclosed herewith for your cognizance.

We would request you not to pass on the original of this report to the Gendarmerie Officer Pfister in Absberg for possible examination of the participating spectators, as the Ortsgruppe fears that Pfister-as he is judged and regarded as strongly Catholic by us-may not take effective steps against his own fellow believers in this matter.

The local Ortsgruppe itself, however, is of the opinion that the Ottilienheim will serve a much more useful purpose if it is cleared of its present inmates and placed at the disposal of the State as a military hospital or some other institution of military use.

Heil Hitler! [signed] Kirchhof Ortsgruppenleiter.

Confidential.

Owing to the course of last Friday, 21.2.1941, a bus from Erlangen took 57 inmates of the Ottilienheim, Absberg, away in two parties, allegedly for an examination at the clinic at Erlangen. In the bus itself there were a doctor and three nurses who loaded these people on to the bus and supervised each transport.

A great number of spectators congregated each time these people were put on the bus, as it is reported that the loading did not take place in the courtyard but in front of the gate. The wildest scenes imaginable are reported to have taken place then, as some of these people did not board the bus voluntarily and were therefore forced to by the accompanying personnel.

These were people who were mad or mentally defective and were said to have other epileptic illnesses as well-and whose upkeep the state and other Public Bodies have so far had to provide for either completely, or at least for the greater part.

I was able to learn in this connection that the Country Organization of Swabia fetched eight such persons back last autumn, and that seven of these were said to have died very shortly afterwards of influenza and low blood pressure which set in. Only one person returned to the Ottilienheim in Absberg.

This matter gradually became known to Absberg, and as a result a great crowd gathered also on the occasion of the last action, who, I have heard, allowed themselves to pass remarks against the National Socialist State. I was unfortunately unable to find out the names of the spectators concerned, as all spectators who had taken part showed great reticence towards me about this matter during my investigation.

These incidents during this action-which is after all necessary-are to be condemned all the more because even Party members themselves did not shrink from joining in the lamentations of the other weeping spectators. The fact that a certain group of spectators concerned gave expression to their former convictions and did not refrain from minimizing and criticizing the great necessity of the measures taken and introduced in the course of Reich defense was only to be expected from these people.

It is said that a section of these people even went so far as to formulate and disseminate more or less the following assertion: "The State must be in a bad way now, or it could not happen that these poor people should simply be sent to their death solely in order that the means which until now have been used for the upkeep of these people may be made available for the prosecution of the War". This view originates predominantly from the Catholic population of Absberg.

It is even said that these poor victims-as they are regarded by the clergy and the religious inhabitants of Absberg-were taken to the Catholic church for confession and communion shortly before their departure. It seems absolutely ridiculous to want to take away by an oral confession the possible sins of people, some of whom completely lack all mental powers.

Although of the 57 people that were fetched away there were some that had been employed by the Ottilienheim in the kitchen and in agriculture and, as it happens, could only carry out these tasks under supervision, the measures taken can, for that reason too, not be understood by the population. As this measure is gradually becoming known now, yesterday already 7 such people were fetched back by relatives into their households, so that they allegedly could no longer be included in the action. Added to this comes the fact that about 14. days ago strangers thoroughly inspected the Ottilienheim and made notes as to the size of the rooms, etc. Because of all of these reasons the population of Absberg now fears that the Ottilienheim may possibly be vacated and made available for other purposes.

Langlan, 2/24/1941 [signed] Kirchhof.

Title: "Document D-906, Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1058-1060.

Absberg, 2/24/1941.

9. Chief Gendarme Pfister, 2/24/1941. Gendarmerie post Absberg, Rural district of Gunzenhausen, county of upper and central Franconia.

To the Gunzenhausen Sub-Prefect. Subject: Removal of asylum inmates.

Further to your telephonic orders on the 24th inst. I beg to report the following:

On the 21st inst. at about 10 hours a large bus drove through Absberg into the Ottilienheim. The bus did not drive into the courtyard of the asylum through the open gateway but through the gateway which is provided with gates. The gates were immediately closed again. About an hour later the bus left the asylum full and drove off in the direction of Geiselsberg. As during the whole year such a large bus never comes to Absberg, it was conspicuous to the population, and they presumed that inmates of the asylum were being removed. During the bus's first departure there was no one in front of the asylum. At about 1500 hours the bus came once again, drove into the asylum courtyard through the same gates, which were again closed immediately, and left again after about one hour full of asylum inmates.

As at the time of the bus's arrival the school had just closed, about 20 to 25 schoolchildren and 4 or 5 adults stood in front of the Ottilienheim and waited until the bus had departed. Some of the women standing there, who felt sorry for the women and girls, wept.

During the departure through Absberg many people stood before their houses and waved to the girls and women. But that it go as far as riotous scenes or insults is not the case. It is, however, not impossible that one person or another was not in agreement with the removal of the asylum inmates. But remarks about this were not made.

The population of Absberg, of both religions, are good Christians, and individuals may have found fault, among themselves, with the removal of the girls and women, but otherwise they obey official orders and do not allow themselves to be carried away to excesses.

I had not previously informed you of the removal of the asylum inmates as I was of the opinion that this was known to you and because there were no incidents. If I had in the least noticed such, or if unpleasant remarks had been made, I should not have omitted making a report to you.

As I have ascertained, all the asylum inmates attended communion on Friday the 21st inst. but not only those that have left but all of them. As the mother superior, Willibald Guggenberg, is a sick person and she found it too difficult to inform the people concerned that they would be leaving that day, she asked the local priest, Joseph Zottmann, to tell them.

Shortly before the arrival of the bus, the mother superior had the people concerned called into a hall, where Zottmann then told them. The mother superior had known for some time that in the near future so and so many asylum inmates would be fetched, but she told neither the priest nor her fellow sisters about it. She had also been forbidden to inform the relatives about the removal.

Neither I nor the local population knew that people from the asylum were to be removed.

[signed] Pfister, G.M.

10. Kreisleiter Gerstner, 6/3/1941.

Kreisleitung Weissenburg, Bavaria

The Kreisleiter Ge/Kr.

To the NSDAP Gauleitung Franconia, Gau Staff Office, Nurnberg.

Subject: Disturbing the population of Absberg by conspicuous removal of inmates of the Ottilienheim.

Further to my report of the 2/24/1941 which I made on the strength of a previous telephone report from the Ortsgruppenleiter, party member Kirchhof, I submit the requested written report of the Ortsgruppenleiter (N.B. No.8) and also the requested report of the competent Gendarmerie post (N.B. No.9). The report of Ortsgruppenleiter party member Kirchhof is of no importance, inasmuch as it does not include any real facts but merely relates the events as told by third persons.

The fact is that the bus in which the inmates of the asylum were removed was parked not in the market square but in the courtyard of the Ottilienheim. It was perhaps psychologically wrong to,make two bus trips on one day.

It is correct that all asylum inmates attended communion on the previous day. If a causal connection between this action and ,he removal of a section of the inmates of the asylum is denied, hen such a description does not do justice to the facts. With regard to the events, I held a meeting of members in Absberg on Saturday the 1st of March, and during the course of my statements also inquired into the happenings. Here also I could not ascertain that any party members wept or misbehaved in any other way during the removal of asylum inmates. In any case, it was shown that much ado has been made about nothing here.

In this connection it might be worth remarking that repeatedly the endeavor can be noted to take asylum inmates who must be regarded as individual payers home now. Now and again it is attempted to explain this intention with the fact that the labor of the person concerned is required. This is of course only an excuse. It is desired to prevent a development being carried through that every sensible person can but welcome.

Heil Hitler. [signed] Gerstner Kreisleiter.

2 enclosures.

Title: "Document D-906, Part 06 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1060-1062.

11. Kreisleitung Ansbach. 3/6/1941. Kreisleiter.

Ansbach, 3/6/1941.

To the NSDAP Gauleitung Franconia Gau Staff office, Nurnberg. re: Removal of inmates of the Bruckberg institution.

The Ortsgruppenleiter of the Bruckberg Ortsgruppe, Party member Reuschel, gives the following report:

"The news of the removal of some of the inmates of the Bruckberg Institution has caused the greatest unrest among the population of Bruckberg, which was further increased by the fact which I heard for the first time to-day, that some of the inmates to be removed came into nearly every house to say good-bye. ( Those concerned were those who, in the opinion of the inhabitants "are still sane"). One might almost believe that it is a question here of a "farewell carried out on orders", but I am informed from reliable sources that the inmates felt of their accord that it was their duty to say goodbye, and that probably one recognizes clearly in this case how far the simple German is receptive to the solution of this question of hereditary disease, I was asked my own opinion for weeks before from all sides and what attitude the Party takes up in this matter."

Ortsgruppenleiter Reuschel is furthermore of the opinion that he should speak about the removal of the inmates, if possible at the next meeting of members, in order to give the facts and above all to squash the rumors that have arisen that the inmates would very soon be put out of the way, done away with or poisoned.

I, however, am of the opinion that it continues to be better not to talk about this matter at all and I would ask you to notify me accordingly if you hold different views.

As I judge the situation, a certain amount of unrest will naturally continue to arise which will be specially fostered by the Churches. The more reserve the Party shows towards such attacks, the sooner will calm be restored here too.

Heil Hitler [signature illegible] The Kreisleiter

[Handwritten note in Sellmer's writing]

Party member-Wolf was informed by telephone on 7.3. Nothing is to be announced officially. The Org.Rt. [i.e. Organizationsleiter] is to be informed. [S. 7. III.]

(The case of Marie Kehr and her sisters)

Nurnberg, 27.11.40. Schweppermannstr.44.

12. To the Provincial Mental Home. Sonnenstein/near Pirna/Elbe.

Marie Kehr. [Stamped]: Kreisleiter advised

I have received your letter of 22.11.40 and have taken cognizance of the death of my sister Christine Ortmann. My brother-in-law, Herr Hans Lindemann, whose wife, Ottilie Lindemann, nee Ortmann-who has also died there-is also a sister of mine, will communicate with you about the dispatch of the urn with the mortal remains.

I request that the personal affairs of the deceased be placed at the disposal of the NSV [National Socialist Welfare Organization].

The unexpected deaths of both my sisters within a period of two days appear most improbable to me. Their illnesses were fundamentally different, the difference in their ages amounted to nine years.

You must realize that one is bound to draw certain conclusions if one receives news of the death of both one's sisters on the very same day, and nobody in the world can persuade me that that is just a coincidence. I should regain my peace of mind only if I knew for certain that a law of the Reich makes it possible to release people from their incurable maladies. This is obviously a blessing both to the sick persons themselves and to their relatives, and a great relief for our Reich and people.

I should be very grateful to you for the transmission of this order which gives the authority for the release of these sick people.

I myself and my family stand solidly behind the 3rd Reich and would certainly not oppose this decree, as I have had to watch the misery for a great many years myself, and on innumerable occasions my sole wish was that both my sisters might soon be released from their great suffering. I cannot believe, however, that this secret wish of mine should have come true within a period of two days …

Document D-908

[Jewish Problem in Hungary] [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1062-1063.

Extracts from an article in "DIE LAGE" of 8/23/1944 entitled The Jewish Problem in Hungary

It was a matter of course that the German offices in Hungary did everything possible after March 19th to eliminate the Jewish element as rapidly and as completely as was at all possible. In view of the proximity of the Russian front, they commenced with the cleaning up of the northeastern area (North Transylvania and the Carpathian province) where the Jewish element was the strongest numerically. Then the Jews were collected in the remaining Hungarian provinces and transported to Germany or German controlled territories. 100000 Jews remained in the hands of the Hungarians to be employed in labor battalions. By the appointed day, the 9th July, the Hungarian provinces were without any Jews. Here remarkable consistency and severity were used in the shortest possible time. An important prerequisite for the success of this action was the fact that the measures against the Jews met with the full consent of a majority of the Hungarian people. It must, it is true, be stated in limitation that numerous Jews were not affected by the measures because of the Hungarian Jewish laws being used as the basis for the qualification of "Jew." Thus, for example, all Jews are exempted who are married to non-Jewesses or who received high decorations during the Great War. Up to the 9th July, approximately 430000 Jews from the Hungarian provinces had been handed over to the German authorities. The handing over takes place on the Hungarian national frontier, up to which the carrying out of the measures against the Jews, and with it also the responsibility for it, is a matter for the Hungarians.

Difficulties over the Deportation of Jews from Budapest

As the last stage of the measures against the Jews, the Jews from Budapest were to be deported. It is a question of approximately 260000. But in the meantime pressure from enemy and neutral countries (Hull, the King of Sweden, Switzerland, the Pope) had become so strong that those circles in Hungary that are friendly to the Jews attempted to influence the Hungarian government to prevent any further measures against the Jews and particularly their being handed over to German authorities. The Hungarian gendarmes who had been ordered to Budapest for the purpose of deporting the Jews were withdrawn again. …

Document D-922

[Special Regulations for Dachau Concentration Camp], Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1097-1098.

[Enclosure to a letter dated Munich, 5/29/1933, from Wintersberger of the County Court, Munich, to the Ministry of State for Justice concerning concentration camp Dachau.]

Document No. 3.

The following SPECIAL REGULATIONS are decreed for the persons lodged in the collecting camp of Dachau:

 

Martial law is imposed on the collecting camp of Dachau and the following regulations come into force with immediate effect:

In cases of attempted flight by the prisoners, the guard or escort personnel are authorised to use their weapons without prior warning.

B. Regulations regarding Punishment

The following punishment may be imposed on the prisoners:

2. Transfer, for disciplinary reasons, within the existing classes of prisoners.

3. Death penalty.

Cells may be mild, medium, or severe. The maximum term of the first two kinds is 8 weeks, and 3 months for the severe arrest. The execution of this kind of punishment is generally in solitary confinement. In the case of medium cells, the person undergoing punishment receives a hard bed and only bread and water for food. Severe cells takes the same form as the medium, but in a completely dark cell.

The prisoners must show respect and obedience to every member of the Camp Commandants staff and of the guard personnel, and must obey their orders promptly. They must obey the instructions of persons charged with security and escort duties in the same manner.

Punishment by cells or transfer for disciplinary reasons will be imposed on the following:

1. Persons contravening para. 4. in any way.

2. Persons knowingly telling untruths to members of the camp staff or the guard personnel.

3. Persons not carrying out a given order, or carrying it out incorrectly.

4. Persons contravening hut or camp regulations.

5. Persons insulting or slandering a member of the Camp Commandant's staff or guard personnel.

Document D-922

[Special Regulations for Dachau Concentration Camp], Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1098-1100.

6. Persons making or attempting to make a complaint which is based on untrue assertions or which deviates from the prescribed official channels for presenting a complaint.

7. Persons criticising camp installations, the instructions and orders of the Camp Commandant's staff or its subordinated authorities, or participating in discussions serving this purpose.

8. Persons collecting signatures for a joint complaint.

9. Persons refusing to work.

10. Persons in any way being in, or seeking, contact with persons outside the camp without permission.

11. Persons carrying out sabotage of any kind. Para.6.

An attempt to commit one of the punishable actions listed in Para.5. will be punished in the same way as the actual deed.

Punishable actions committed under aggravating circumstances are to be punished with severe cells.

An action carries heavier punishment if it was carried out while on duty, in the presence of other prisoners, or if it caused considerable harm. If an insult or slander took place by the distribution of written or spoken statements, and if it was of such a nature as to imperil the maintenance of quiet and order in the camp.

Punishment by death is to be imposed on the following:

1. Persons actively opposing, or attempting to oppose, a member of the Camp Commandant's Staff or of the guard personnel.

2. Persons inciting, or attempting to incite, another prisoner to refuse obedience to a member of the Camp Commandant's staff or of the guard personnel.

3. Persons instigating, or attempting to instigate, actions listed under Figures 1 and 2.

4. Persons participating in a joint refusal of obedience, or in a joint active attack of a nature designated under Figure 1.

A person who has knowledge of a planned joint refusal of obedience or of a planned active attack against a member of the Camp Commandant's staff or of the guard personnel and reports it in such good time that the execution of the deed does not materialise, remains free of punishment provided he was not an instigator.

C. Division of the prisoners

The prisoners are divided into 3 classes. Para.11.

The prisoners must perform work in all three classes, the length and extent of which is determined by the Camp Commandant.

All prisoners are allocated to Class II at first, unless any instructions to the contrary are laid down below.

Document D-922

[Special Regulations for Dachau Concentration Camp], Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 1100.

Para.13.

Prisoners in Class II receive ordinary billets and suitable food.

Prisoners in Class II who conduct themselves well and show willingness to work may be transferred to Class I. Prisoners in this class receive good billets and sufficient food. Further favourable treatment may be accorded in this class for continued good conduct; in particular, the training and capabilities of the prisoner can be taken into account in the distribution of work.

Prisoners who conduct themselves badly are transferred to Class III. The prisoners in this class receive hard beds and warm meals as food to the extent of ¾ of the normal food ration.

Prisoners who have conducted themselves well during their stay in the camp, but whose previous activity demands specially sharp supervision in the interests of quiet and order in the camp, may also be transferred to Class III.

Prisoners of all classes who conduct themselves well but do not wish to work, may, on application, be excused from work, but receive during that time a hard bed and only ¾ of the food ration of the class to which the prisoner belongs.

D. Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction within the camp and regarding the prisoners is exercised solely by the Camp Commandant, except in cases of a violation under para. 8. All cases which fall under para. 8 are decided by a Camp Court which consists of the Camp Commandant, one or two officers to be nominated by the Camp Commandant, and an SS man belonging to the guard personnel. The prosecution is also to be undertaken by an SS man belonging to the Camp Commandant's office, who is to be nominated by the Camp Commandant. In case of an even vote, the President of the Camp Court has the casting vote. The President is the current Camp Commandant. Where reference is made to the Commandant in the above, he will be represented by his deputy during his absence.

Document D-923

Beating to Death of Pflaumer by SA, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1101-1104.

[Doc. 1-5 (recapitulated in 6)]

1. Report of Public Prosecution Provincial Court, Nurnberg-Fuerth, to Bavarian State Ministry of Justice (dated 8/21/1933).

2. Post mortem report on Pflaumer.

3. Public Prosecution Provincial Court Nurnberg-Fuerth o Provincial Court Public Prosecutor, Nurnberg (3/26/1933), stating that police refuse to give evidence on above case as this might endanger the well-being of the Reich. The investigating magistrate asked the police President, Nurnberg to relieve them of their duty to maintain official secrecy, but has had no reply yet.

4. Court of Appeal Public Prosecutor to Bavarian State Ministry of Justice (8/26/1933). The Police Directorate Nurnberg-Fuerth refuse permission to police officials to break official secrecy. The writer thinks it is in the interests of the State to have the trial. The public can be excluded.

5. Public prosecution Prov. Court, Nurnberg-Fuerth to Court of Appeal Public Prosecutor Nurnberg (28/26/1933). Police directorate refuse permission to police officials to break official secrecy for the trial. They also need both accused to guarantee the security of the Party Rally.

[Document No. 6]

No. II 46422a.: To the Minister of State for the Interior.

Subject: Criminal Proceedings against members of the SA and SS

On 8/17/1933 the 29 year old married mechanic, Oskar Konrad Pflaumer of Nurnberg was interrogated by the members of the SA Eugene Korn and Hans Stark at the SA guardhouse at 4, Hallplatz, Nurnberg, on the suspicion of communist intrigues and was mishandled physically by blows with rubber truncheons. Korn and Stark allege that Pflaumer tried to attack them and had for this reason been beaten with a rubber truncheon by them. After the beating, Pflaumer was brought in a motorcar to the main police station in Nurnberg. The police report on the subject states:

"Pflaumer was again brought to the main police station by two SA men on the 8/17/1933 at 5 o'clock. He was then taken by the prison warder Vogel to the prison cell, Pflaumer complaining of severe pains in the stomach. Prison warder Vogel saw Pflaumer about half an hour later in the prison cell, apparently unconscious. Dr. Gutemann, the deputy district doctor, who was called at once, established that death had already occurred. The cause of death could not be established."

The juridical autopsy carried out on 8/18/1933 showed that the skin on the seat of the corpse and on the upper part of the thighs in the form of the seat of a pair of riding breeches was of a deep bluish red colour. The skin on the soles of the feet was swollen owing to the mass of blood gathered there, so that after the blood was drained off after incision pockets nearly the size of a fist were formed. It was impossible to establish any injury or morbid changes in the stomach. It is to be assumed that Pflaumer was bent over and maltreated in the oriental way of the "Bastinado." The Provincial Court doctor also reported that, according to his findings, Pflaumer was beaten to death in a most cruel and torturing way with blunt objects.

From the type of the numerous wounds, particularly from the state of the soles of the feet which were in a bad state as a result of the bastinado, the conclusion had to be drawn that the perpetrators did not cause the injuries to the illtreated man in self-defence. The Public Prosecutor therefore applied for the institution of preliminary judicial investigations against Korn and Stark because of the suspicion of a crime of inflicting physical injuries resulting in death. The investigating judge refrained from issuing an order for arrest, since there was no danger of escape and since detention because of the danger of hushing up would no longer promise any results, a preliminary arrest was not made by the police and moreover it was doubtful whether Korn and Stark were the chief perpetrators.

On 8/21/1933 the Police Directorate, Nurnberg-Fuerth communicated to the Provincial Court Public Prosecutor by telephone through the assessor Dr. Kiesel a wish that the case should be left in abeyance until after a consultation with Regierungsrat Dr. Martin, who was sick at the time. The Gauleadership were also interested in the case, it was said. The Provincial Court Public Prosecutor declined this request, referring to his legal obligations and the announcement of the State Ministry of Justice of 8/4/1933 (St. Ans. No. 185).

The Police officials coming into question as witnesses declined to give evidence to the investigating judge, whereupon he requested the Police Directorate on 8/23/1933 to relieve the officials of their obligations of official secrecy. Government Counsellor Dr. Martin, head of the Political Branch of Police Directorate, Nurnberg-Fuerth, informed the investigating judge by telephone on 8/26/1933 that the Police Directorate would not relieve the police officials coming into question as witnesses of their duty of official secrecy because of the danger to the state, nor could he spare the two accused before the Reich Party rally, since he could not otherwise undertake any responsibility for the security of the Party Rally.

The Provincial Court Public Prosecutor requested, in agreement with the State Ministry of the Interior and the Supreme SA Leadership that the preconditions should be provided for the unhindered conduct of the criminal proceedings.

On 8/28/1933 at 8.30 p.m. in Hoerstein, in the district of Alzenau three Hoerstein Jews, the 19-year-old student Siegfried Rothschild, the 20-year-old merchant Arthur Hecht and the 57-year-old married butcher Moritz Loebenthal were taken by a number of members of the SS from Hoerstein and Aschaffenburg in a car belonging to the Aschaffenburg gas works into the open and badly mishandled by blows with rubber cudgels and fists. Loebenthal had his chin smashed according to the report of the Dettingen on Main Gendarmerie, so that he had to be taken to Aschaffenburg Hospital. The case became generally known in the Aschaffenburg district and caused great excitement amongst the population. The Local Party authorities endeavoured, in common with the Gendarmerie, to clear up the circumstances of the case.

The SS man Konrad Vogt of Hoerstein, who took part in the act, was remanded in custody on the Alzenau Police Court's orders. It was ascertained that the SS men Georg Volk, Karl Steiniger, Emil Freppon and N. Walch were further participants in the act. The examination and temporary arrest of the guilty persons living in Aschaffenburg could however not be carried out as the SS men of Aschaffenburg took the standpoint that the Police had nothing to say to the SS and in particular could not arrest any SS man. Their attitude was confirmed by Sturmbannfuehrer Jehl of Aschaffenburg, who attempted to obtain Vogt's release from the rural police (gendarmerie) and stated to the rural police official, Mueller, from Dettingen that should Vogt not be released severe consequences would be brought about.

Finally the Alzenau district court suspended the order of arrest against Vogt after it had been informed by the Alzenau district office that the Bavarian political police in Munich had ordered the release of the arrested SS man. The release of Vogt and the behaviour of the SS people to Aschaffenburg, especially that of Sturmbannfuehrer Jehl resulted in the cessation of the inquiry proceedings.

The events described under I and II give me cause for great apprehension. They show that the repeated departmental party orders and decrees of the bearers of State authority, by which, after the victorious conclusion of the German revolution any illegal infringements of the legal rights of private individuals and individual acts based on self-granted authority are most strictly forbidden on pain of disciplinary measures are not yet receiving the general attention which is absolutely necessary, and that members of the SA and the SS still allow themselves to indulge in the inadmissible ill-treatment of opponents, which is unworthy of national socialism, without taking into consideration that, through this, the good name of the SA and SS and, not least, of the National Socialist State is gravely endangered.

The events show further that unfortunately attempts are still being made to interfere with the legal course of justice. A line has been drawn under the events of the first revolutionary months by the decree dated 8/2/1933 (GVBl. p.211) regarding the granting of an amnesty. In my announcement of 8/4/1933 (Stans. 185) published in execution of this decree, I announced it as the common will of the Bavarian provincial government and of all authoritative offices that in future every disturber of the legal order, without regard to his person and the reasons for his action, will immediately and relentlessly be dealt with in accordance with the existing laws, and I have imposed upon the public prosecutors and official attorneys, the duty of imposing this will of the Bavarian provincial government in all their measures. It would be irreconcilable with this solemn announcement if both these criminal cases mentioned were not to be carried through with all resoluteness. However, the prerequisite for this is that the offices called upon to cooperate in the clarification of the punishable acts should support the public prosecution and the law courts to the best of their ability, and that all obstructions which hamper a complete clearing up of these serious excesses and prompt punishment should be eliminated.

Document D-923

Beating to Death of Pflaumer by SA, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1104-1106.

Especially in the case of Pflaumer, I consider it an urgent necessity, in the interest of safeguarding the authority of the State and the good name of justice and the police, to avoid even the slightest appearance that the police are shielding this crime. A danger to the Reich arising from the examination of the police officials who are under consideration as witnesses would at the most have to be taken care of if it is carried out in public session. The misgivings of the chief of the Political department of the Nurnberg-Fuerth police directorate can, however, be taken into consideration by the' exclusion of the public during the trial. The carrying out of a trial can further hardly be prevented by the refusal to allow testimony. For, in view of the confession of the accused Korn and Stark to date, together with the results of the judicial autopsy, the trial will have to be instituted against them and carried out under any circumstances.

In case II (excesses in Hoerstein), by the release of the accused Vogt and the cessation of the police enquiry, and hushing up of the circumstances made possible thereby, the results of the enquiry are endangered. The public prosecution has as in duty bound, ordered the police authorities to take up the matter again, and to take steps to arrest the participants provisionally, owing to the existing danger of hushing up. I take it that the gendarmerie and police officials will proceed with the required decisiveness, and will not again let themselves be prevented from carrying out their duty by intimidation. I should otherwise be compelled to order the public prosecution to withdraw the enquiry from the hands of the gendarmerie and police and to have the case cleared up by means of interrogations by the public prosecution and the law courts. I would therefore request that the necessary measures be taken to ensure the immediate carrying out of the proceedings.

Owing to the fundamental importance which I attach to the events mentioned, and to the whole question of carrying out criminal proceedings against members of the SA and SS, I have requested the Prime Minister to bring this matter up for discussion at the next meeting of the council of Ministers and to invite to it the Chief of Staff Roehm and the Police Commander Himmler too.

II. To the Prime Minister.

Reference: as above with 2 copies.

With reference to the attached copy of my letter to the State Minister of the Interior, I would request that the point:

"Criminal proceedings against members of the SA and SS" be -placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the council of Ministers and that the Chief of Staff Roehm and Police Commander Himmler be also invited to it. The other attached copy, I would request you to forward to the Reich Governor for information.

Munich 9/6/1933. [signed] HANS FRANK.

III. Add to II 2 copies of I IV. Submit again in Department 11. B Order of the Minister.

[Document No. 7]

National Socialist German Workers' Party.

Munich, Briennerstrasse 45. Tel.No. 34901 & 58344. Munich 9/26/1933

The Deputy of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff B/N.

to Minister of Justice Dr. Frank. Munich Bavarian Ministry of Justice

Dear Dr. Frank,

The Fuehrer's Deputy has requested me to ask you how far the inquiry in the matter of Pflaumer, Nurnberg has now got.

I would be grateful if you would inform me.

Heil. [Signed] M. BORMANN.

Document D-923

Beating to Death of Pflaumer by SA, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1106-1108.

[Document No. 8.]

No. II 46422 L.

Subject: Pflaumer caseNurnberg.

I. Letter to Chief of Staff M. Bormann Munich, Briennerstr. 45.

With reference to letter of 9/26/191943 [1933?]

Dear Party member,

In the matter Pflaumer-Nurnberg, the preliminary judicial inquiry is still proceeding. I have advised the OSCA [Provincial Court public prosecutor] to submit the files to me immediately after the conclusion of the inquiry.

Heil Hitler Munich 10/6/1943 [1933?] [signed] HANS FRANK

[Document No. 9.]

The investigating magistrate reports to the president of the provincial court, Nurnberg (9/28/1933) that, when he interrogated an inmate of Dachau in connection with the Pflaumer case, a criminal police official insisted on being present, although this is a breach of the code criminal procedure.

[Document No. 10.]

Political Police Commander of Bavaria to Bavarian State Minister of Justice (Hans Frank) (11/23/1933.). Heydrich reports that steps have been taken to ensure that judicial investigations can be carried out in Dachau without the presence of police.

[Document No. 11.]

Public Prosecution, Prov. Court, Nurnberg-Fuerth to Court of Appeal Public Prosecutor, Nurnberg (11.12.33.). Report on results of the preliminary investigation to date. Stark has recanted his statement that he and Korn struck Pflaumer in self defense. He said that he and Korn were only trying to shield their friends by saying this. The attempt to discover which SA people were in the guardhouse concerned on the night in question has been unsuccessful. Attempts are being made to find out through the SA leadership. Korn is at present in Munich on the staff of the Supreme SA leadership.

[Document No. 12 (resumed in 14).]

Note of 20.1.34. (Court of Appeal Public Prosecutor, Nurnberg, to Bavarian Minister of Justice) on the result of the preliminary investigation to date (resume of 8 and 11). Also states that two other communists were beaten and maltreated in the same guardhouse. These have been interrogated by the investigating magistrate.

[Document No. 13.]

Public Prosecution Provincial Court Nurnberg-Fuerth report to Court of Appeal Public Prosecutor, Nurnberg that the preliminary investigation ended on the 3/19/1934. The police directorate, Nurnberg-Fuerth, intended to apply for the quashing of the criminal proceedings. (This report was passed on to the Bavarian Minister of Justice).

[Document No. 14.]

Nurnberg, 4/28/1934.

Public Prosecution at the Provincial Court, Nurnberg-Fuerth. Nurnberg 32.

To: The Court of Appeal public prosecutor, at the Court of Appeal Nurnberg

Subject: Korn Eugen, merchant in Nurnberg and Stark Hans, merchant in Nurnberg. Because of bodily injuries which resulted in death.

Here: Petition of the police directorate Nurnberg-Fuerth to quash the criminal proceedings.

Enclosures: 1 file of criminal proceedings, petition of the Nurnberg-Fuerth police directorate of 4/17/1934.

Document D-923

Beating to Death of Pflaumer by SA, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1108-1112.

Shortly before the party rally of 1933, the (K.P.D. (communist party)) developed a specially strong disintegrating activity and planned among other things to create violent disturbances at the party rally.

Therefore, the Kriminalobersekretaer Otto Ottomar of the political department of the Police Directorate Nurnberg-Fuerth was commissioned by this department to carry out a large-scale action against the dangerous Communists work of agitation. As the police forces available were far from sufficient, the "SA-Sturm for special use", which was stationed in Nurnberg in the old Samariter Wache at the Hallplatz No. 4, was appointed to assist the police in these tasks. In this guardhouse the necessary confrontations and questionings of arrested Communists took place. The leader of this Sturm [SA Unit] was the then Sturmbannfuehrer [SA Major] Korn, Eugen, 25 years old, unmarried, commercial employee in Nurnberg. His deputy was Stark, Hans, 34-year-old divorced merchant in Nurnberg. S. A. Scharfuehrer [corporal]

In the course of this large-scale action, among others, the mechanic Oskar Konrad Pflaumer of Nurnberg, 29 years old and married, who was extraordinarily active as a Communist, was arrested on 8/16/1933 and imprisoned in the main police station. During the same evening at about 23.00 hours, Pflaumer was taken by several SA men to the above mentioned guardhouse, on the instructions of Otto on the direct orders of Sturmbannfuehrer Korn, for confrontation with other Communists and for questioning. In this night Pflaumer was grievously illtreated by a number of SA men there, so that he died as a result of these illtreatments early in the morning at about 05.30 hours on 8/17/1933. According to the juridica-medical certificate, it can be assumed by reason of the finding of the autopsy that Pflaumer, an athletically built man, had been "bent over" and that he was also bastinadoed and that the grievous sub-cutance hemorrhage caused by this caused the death of Pflaumer in the sense of action similar to shock. In their police questioning by the police directorate Nurnberg-Fuerth, Korn and Stark stated at first that they had both struck Pflaumer in self-defense; they had wanted to question Pflaumer, the two of them alone. Suddenly he had attacked them and then he even went for them with a carbine hanging there, which he succeeded in snatching.

On 8/21/1933 preliminary investigations were started against Korn and Stark, accused in common of causing bodily injury resulting in death. The preliminary examinations were concluded on 3/19/1934.

The result of the preliminary investigations is mainly this:

In spite of exhaustive inquiries, no solid clues which can be followed up any further have been found to prove what persons were individually concerned, during the night in question, in the questioning and illtreatment of Pflaumer. It could also not be found which SA men took Pflaumer to and from the SA guardhouse. Only the separate events which took place in the main police station before Pflaumer was taken to the SA guardhouse and after his return could be ascertained.

Also no sufficient actual proofs of direct participation in the illtreatment of Pflaumer could be found against the two accused Korn and Stark. Their statements made to the police, which they at first maintained when questioned by the examining magistrate and which, as such, were unworthy of belief in view of the circumstances, were recanted by the accused with the declaration that they only wanted to shield their subordinate SA men by their former statements, and that they did not take any part at all in the illtreatment of Pflaumer, and that they knew nothing about the illtreatments from their own knowledge. This subsequent statement is in any case not refutable, inasmuch as it cannot be definitely inferred from the former statements of the accused that they played a direct personal part in the matter.

No further actual evidence of punishable complicity in this crime could be proved against Stark. In his case, a release from criminal proceedings should therefore be applied for.

In the case against Korn no further actual proofs have been found of personal participation in the illtreatment of Pflaumer at least. But, against that, it can be accepted for sure, by reason of the investigation that Korn had known about the illtreatment of Pflaumer in the night in question, as in the case of the other Communists who were questioned there and that he tolerated Pflaumer's illtreatment counter to his duty and thus furthered it intentionally. Korn should therefore be accused at least of complicity in the crime of bodily injury resulting in death.

The police directorate Nurnberg-Fuerth is now submitting a petition to quash the proceedings.

II. Certificate of Opinion

On mature consideration, I assent to the suggestion of the police directorate.

Firstly it should be considered whether the proceedings could not be brought to an end by the release of the accused from criminal proceedings. According to the result of the Preliminary investigation alone Korn ought to be accused in any case according to what is mentioned above, while only the accused Stark could be released from criminal proceedings. But furthermore an investigation or an extension of the investigation against the persons who took part in this matter (accomplices, possible instigators and helpers) and finally also against those who favoured the culprits would, according to para. 152/II ST.P.O. be occasioned.

But if the proceedings were to be carried out in this manner, it would be unavoidable even if the public is excluded from the actual trialthat the public would get to know about the events. But this would seriously harm and shake the reputation of the SA, the party, the police and even the National-Socialist State.

Even greater would be the damage to the German Reich which would be caused by the fact thatas can be taken for granted foreign countries would receive information about the happenings. I fully agree with the statements of the police directorate in this direction.

Besides these reasons, which stand out predominantly, the following is also of special importance:

The well being of the Reich and the party absolutely demanded that the extensive and dangerous agitation of the Communists, which just at that time put in an appearance, should be exposed and destroyed. And this goal had to be-especially with a view to the security of the imminent party rally-attained in the shortest possible space of time. Therefore quick and decisive action was necessary. Because of the shortage of forces of its own, the police was forced to use auxiliary forces from the SA The usual method of action, as laid down by the Code of Penal Procedure, did not suffice to expose the secret plans of the Communists rapidly, because of the well known method of the Communists of denying everything or making things out to be harmless. If now the revolutionary fighting spirit of the SA helped to expose and destroy the criminal plans of the Communists and to render the Communists themselves innocuous, it is understandable that, in order to achieve this high objective, in overgreat zeal and under the influence of the revolution which at that time was actually not yet finished methods were after all also used which no longer agreed with the law. Only in this way can the illtreatment of Pflaumer, with its bad consequences, probably be explained; for, from the whole state of affairs it can be assumed that the illtreatment of Pflaumer only took place in order to get valuable statements about the Communist activities from his knowledge, which could not be obtained without force.

Also the personality of Pflaumer himself is to be considered when dealing with the question whether the proceedings should be continued or not.

According to the just portrayal in the petition of the police directorate, Pflaumer was a Communist traitor, dangerous to the State, and a public menace, whose sentiments and conduct do not justify that for his sake the reputation of the German people and its government should suffer as a result of a sensational and painful criminal trial.

Lastly it may also be pointed out that this deed was committed relatively shortly after the coming into force of the amnesty decree of 8/2/1933 (G.V.B.L. page 221). If it had been committed before 7/26/1933, i.e. only 3 weeks earlier, it would have been amnestied, like a number of other political excesses. As the deed did not originate in an ignoble motive, but rather served the achievement of an exceedingly patriotic aim and the advance of the National-Socialist State, the quashing of the proceedingsalso in view of the above-mentioned relation of the time of the deed to the above-mentioned amnesty does not seem incompatible with the orderly administration of criminal justice.

For all these reasons it is suggested, in connection with the petition of the police directorate, that the proceedings on account of the bodily injuries resulting in the death of the mechanic Oscar Pflaumer, as well as on account of the actions of criminal participation and acts of favouring, immediately connected with this, should be quashed, with the further result that also fresh criminal proceedings may therefore not be instituted on this account.

[signed]: HERGENROEDER.

Document D-923

Beating to Death of Pflaumer by SA, Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1112-1113.

Nr. 7183

Submitted with one further copy, one application of the police directorate Nurnberg-Fuerth of 4/17/1934 and the files on the trial to the State Minister of Justice in Munich, further to my report of 4/9/1934 No. 6098.

I agree with the point of view of the prosecution.

Nurnberg, 4/28/1934. The Public Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal, [signed]: LEUKS.

[Document No. 15.]

Munich, 5/23/1934.

No. II 19619 a. Free State of Bavaria State Ministry of Justice

To the Prime Minister

Subject: The quashing of the criminal proceedings against Eugen Korn and Hans Stark of Nurnberg. With one report, one petition, one report of the Provincial Court Public Prosecutor at the Provincial Court, Nurnberg-Fuerth, and one volume of documents.

I have the honour of enclosing the petition of the police directorate Nurnberg-Fuerth of 4/17/1934 for the quashing of the criminal proceedings pending against Eugen Korn and Hans Stark of Nurnberg.

I request this to be forwarded to the Reich Governor in Bavaria.

[signed] HANS FRANK.

Respectfully submitted with three letters and one document to the Reich Governor in Bavaria for your kind decision.

Munich; 6/1/1934 The Bavarian Prime Minister [signed] Dr. SIEBERT.

Document D-923

Beating to Death of Pflaumer by SA, Part 06 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 1113.

[Document No. 16]

The Reich Governor in Bavaria.

Munich, 6/27/1934.

Exercising the powers deputed to me by the President of the Reich, I hereby quash the criminal proceedings on account of the bodily injuries which resulted in the death of the mechanic Oskar Pflaumer, of Nurnberg, as well as those on account of the actions of criminal participation and acts of favouring immediately connected with it.

[signed]: FRANZ v. EPP.

[Document No. 17.]

To the Court of Appeal Public Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal, Nurnberg.

Subject: The quashing of the criminal proceedings against Eugen Korn and Hans Stark of Nurnberg

With reference to the report of 4/28/1934 No. 7183.

The Reich Governor in Bavaria has used his powers of quashing by his resolution of 6/27/1934 No. Pv.7/24.5 and has quashed the criminal proceedings on account of the bodily injuries which resulted in the death of the mechanic Oskar Pflaumer of Nurnberg as well as on account of the actions of criminal participation and acts of favouring, immediately connected with it.

This is to be known to the police directorate Nurnberg-Fuerth and to the accused Korn and Stark.

Munich 7/2/1934. [signed]: HANS FRANK.

Document D-925

List Of Contents Of The Handbook Of The SA

Published With Permission Of The Supreme Command Of The SA (Main Office For Education), Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1116-1118.

CONTENTS

Preface A. Introduction B. The Storm Detachments

Organisation of the SA

SA Units Special Units a) Naval SA b) Mounted SA c) SAMessenger System d) Pioneer SA e) SAMedical Corps; The SA Standarte "Feldherrnhalle"

SA Retraining Camp; Service grade rank distinction; Flags for SA staffs-Standards for motor vehicles; Composition of badges and colours of the highest SAleadership and groups

Flags and "Banners"

Significance; Retaining of Storm flags and "banners"; Fetching and diverting of flags and "banners"; Moral of the flag-Storm; Method of bearing flags and banners

The development of an SAman

Transfer of H-J members to the SA; Compulsory labour duty and military service; Transfers within the SA; Transfers to the NSSK and SS; Leave of absence from SA duty; Withdrawal from the SA

Leadership and Selection

1. The Leadership Corps of the SA.; The SALeader; The development of the SA leader; The development of the SA admin.leader; The development of the SA medical leader; The Youth leader; Principals for promotion in the SA; Putting regular soldiers into leading positions

2. Education and training of the SA leader; At the front; In school; Special training

C. Principles re aim and means of training

D. Thorough carrying out of individual branches of service

I. The cosmopolitan basis of the SA service

II. Care of the SA man The penalty Complaints Leave Social care

III. The Health Service

IV. The inner Storm-Service

1. Place of Service; Office, Assistance, hours of duty; The orderly book; The Leave Roster; Personal Papers; Exhibition of service products; Notification of strength (of unit); The Admin.Service in the "Sturm" Branch

2. Official behaviour; Official behaviour (verbal); Correspondence; Outer Form of Correspondence; Contents of Correspondence; Official Channels; Letter File and number; Reports; Standing Time Reports; Official descriptions and abbreviations for correspondence

VI. Parade duty Primary training; "Storm" Branch

Document D-925

List Of Contents Of The Handbook Of The SA

Published With Permission Of The Supreme Command Of The SA (Main Office For Education), Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1118-1121.

VII. Physical training.

1. Elementary; Tips and clues for practical training in sport.; Building up of sports exercises; Index of sport pamphlets of the highest SA; Leadership

2. Competitions and Mil. Exercises; Carrying out; The fighting arena.

3. The SA Fighting Sports Associations

4. The SA Sports Badge; Foundation certificate for SA Sports Badge; The road to the SA Sports badge

VIII. Musquetry 1. Instructions 2. Practical appliance 3. Individual training in musquetry The Shooting range 4. Musquetry for attack

IX. Training in Terrain 1. Purpose 2. Material and timely planning 3. The building up of terrain training 4. Incorporation of Groups I and II of the SA Sports badge into terrain service 5. Details for the recruit 6. Tips and clues for training in terrain; Map reading and orientation; Quickening of perception; Exercises in observation; Observation of terrain; Description of terrain; Judgment of terrain; Judgment of distances Camouflage 7. Movement and behaviour in terrain; Lying down and getting up; Crawling; Leopard crawl; Making use of natural cover; Messages; Sketches; Reconnaissance training

X. The Special Task Service

1. Conceptions re Special Task Service; The Political Service; Service for People and State Pre-mil. service as supplement to weapon service

2. Tips and Clues for Training; The Propaganda march; The parade-the proclamation; The Reich's Party Day Cordoning of and Security; Honourable service; Relief work

3. Exercises in the Special Task Service; The Technique of giving orders; The Position; The Judgment; The Decision; The Order; Technique of Special Task Service; The Sequence of the Special Tasks; Cordoning off and Security; The arrangement of all kinds of Special Task exercises

4. Plan for Alarm and Training

5. Training men to march; Transport; What has the Medical Officer to say to consistent march-training ?

6. Accommodation, bivouac and camp; Possibilities for accommodation; Local accommodation; The Bivouac; The camp; Measures of the health service

E. Formation of the Service during attack.

1. Bearer of the Service; The troupe; The Squad; The attack

2. Duty-days-Duration of Service; Training plan for the SA Sport-badge association

3. Appliance of training during actual attack (full day service); Epilogue

F. Supplement

I. Decree by the Deputy Fuehrer of the 3/29/1936 over the carrying out of Party parades

II. Expedients for training in terrain; Map indicator; Compass

III. Additional training; What does the SA man have to know of war materials and gas mask? Gas mask 30; The People's Gas mask (1937 (G.M.37)); First aid for accidents

IV. Details for social welfare; Reference chart for the welfare officer; Details and regulations for conditions in the SA

V. Summary for the location of important decrees, published in the "Verordnungsblatt" of the highest SA leadership

Document D-926

Deaths Of Prisoners In Protective Custody At The Concentration Camp Of Dachau, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1121-1123.

[1.] Public Prosecution at the Provincial Court Munich II.

Munich, 6/2/1933.

To the State Ministry of Justice.

In accordance with my instructions, I had a lengthy discussion on 6/1/1933 with the Police Commander Himmler in his office at the Police H.Q. Munich about the incident at the concentration camp Dachau, which I have already reported to the Ministry of Justice separately; in particular, I told him briefly, with the aid of the photographs from the investigation files, about the Schloss, Hausmann, Strauss and Nefzger cases of which he appeared to have been advised already. I pointed out that particularly the four above-mentioned cases-in view of the result of the findings to date-offer good reason for cogent suspicion of serious punishable actions on the part of individual members of the camp guard and of camp officials, and that both the Public Prosecution and the Police authorities to whose knowledge these incidents have come are under the obligation, under the threat of heavy punishment, to carry out the criminal investigation of the above-mentioned incidents without consideration for any persons whatsoever; I requested the Police Commander Himmler to assist me in this task as much as possible. I stated that I was arranging for a preliminary legal investigation to be proposed and carried out with regard to the four cases mentioned, and that I would apply for a legal warrant of arrest-because of the danger of things being hushed up-against the persons who were cogently suspected of punishable participation in these cases. I declared further that I would employ the only officials suitable for the further necessary investigations, namely, those of the Criminal Department of the Police H.Q. Munich.

At my request the Police Commander Himmler agreed to issue an order to the effect that no difficulties were to be put in the path of myself and the examining magistrate during the investigation in the camp of Dachau, and that all requested information was to be given; he also stated that he had naturally no objections to my other intentions regarding the investigation of the individual cases.

The Oberstaatsanwelt [Provincial Court Public Prosecutor] [Signed] Wintersberger.

[2.] Public Prosecution at the Provincial Court Munich II. Munich, 8/11/1933.

To the State Ministry of Justice, Munich.

Subject: Deaths at the concentration camp of Dachau.

Pursuant to telephone instructions, four dossiers of the Public Prosecution, Munich II, regarding the deaths at the concentration camp of Dachau of the prisoners Schloss, Hausmann, Dr. Strauss and Nefzgar, who were in protective custody, (G 851, 924, ff 33, G 866/33, G 927/33, G 928 ff/33) were sent to the State Ministry of Justice on 6/2/1933. Should the dossiers not be required at present, I would request the return of these files for the purpose of examining whether the decree of 8/2/1933 regarding the granting of immunity from punishment has to be applied.

For the Oberstaatsanwalt [Provincial Court Public Prosecutor] Dr. Wintrich.

3. [In handwriting]

By order of the Ministry of the Interior A.C.

For the attention of Ministerialdirektor Gareis or his representative.

Sent on 8/23/1933.

Subject: Application of the decree of 8/2/1933, regarding the granting of immunity from punishment.

The four dossiers were handed to the Minister of the Interior for decision on 6/21/1933. I request their return in the near future for the purpose of applying the decree granting immunity from punishment.

By order Spangenberg.

I. Dr. Wendler of the Political Police, in whose possession the dossiers are, promised immediate return of the dossiers today on the occasion of a personal discussion on another matter.

M. 23.9.33. Doebig By order, Widmann Signed, Lechner.

II Spoke personally with Oberfuehrer Heydrich on 9.10.1933. He will endeavour to procure the dossiers.

Document D-926

Deaths Of Prisoners In Protective Custody At The Concentration Camp Of Dachau, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1123-1125.

[4.] State Ministry of the Interior The Commander of the Political Police. 1 enclosure.

Munich, 10/6/1933.

To the State Ministry of Justice, Munich.

No receipt of the four dossiers is recorded here. In spite of thorough investigation, nothing could be found out about the location of the dossiers. I shall, however, continue the inquiries and communicate immediately if the occasion arises.

By order [Signed] Heydrich ,

[Handwritten notes] Dossiers reported on various occasions with the Political Police Offices, who have promised that they will be received by the Ministry of the Interior.

26.5.34. Stepp

1. Reported the matter to the Minister. Submit again in two months.

25.9.34. Doebig

Landesgerichtsrat Dr. Stepp has been requested to arrange for inquiries to continue, and to report about their result.

20.1.1935. Doebig

The matter was discussed with the OSTW [Provincial Court Public Prosecutor] at the Provincial Court Munich II. He will endeavour to procure the return of the missing dossiers with the help of Landesgerichtsrat Dr. Stepp who has been appointed Chief of the Bavarian Political Police in the meantime.

Munich, 1/18/1935. Doebig.

[Docs. 5-8 Two letters from the Public Prosecutor, Provincial Court, Munich II and two affidavits re the death of Hugo Handschuch, a prisoner in protective custody, at Dachau camp. (recapitulation in Doc. 10).]

[9.] Gestapo-Regional State Police H.Q. Duesseldorf. Received: 5/17/1943

Berlin Nue 89 911 17.5.43 11,45 Tess-

To the Regional Commanders of the Security Police and of the S.D. Oslo, the Hague, Paris and

the Commissioner of the Security Police and of the SD Brussels.

the Regional and Subregional State Police H.Q.s Kiel, Schwerin, Stettin, Koeslin, Schneidemuehl, Frankfurt/Oder, Berlin, Potsdam, Dresden, Leipzig, Weimar, Magdeburg, Halle, Brunswick, Kassel, Frankfurt/Main, Cologne, Duesseldorf, Dortmund, Muenster, Hannover, Wilhelmshaven and Bremen, Hamburg.-

Subject: Dispatch of prisoners in protective custody to the concentration camp Neuengamme.

Previous correspondence: none.

In order to prevent unnecessary transport detours, I request that in future only the concentration camp of Neuengamme be given as the destination of transports of prisoners in protective custody who are to be sent to the concentration camp of Neuengamme, and not the Regional State Police H.Q. Hamburg and such like, and that the form accompanying the transport be filled in accordingly. The passing of these transports through the Police prisons of the Subregional HQ. Hamburg is not practicable owing to the continuous crowding of these police prisons and in view of the tense, air situation and only produces a considerable amount of extra work.

I request therefore that this practice be desisted from in future.

Additional note for the Subregional H.Q, Hamburg. Your letter of 28.4.1943 II D 33/43 is thus dealt with.

R S H A Berlin IV C 2 General No. 43 133 By order: [sgd.]: Dr. Berndorff SS.-Obersturmbannfuehrer

Document D-926

Deaths Of Prisoners In Protective Custody At The Concentration Camp Of Dachau, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1125-1128.

II L--D 10/1 Diary No. 216/43

Duesseldorf, 5/18/1943

1.) It is not necessary to pass this order to the subordinate offices, as the sending of transports is the responsibility of the local protective custody office.

2.) II D in this building sent for information and observance.

3.) File under II ID 10/1

[signature illegible]

URGENT AND SECRET.

To be dispatched by special messenger, under double cover.

I. To the Prime Minister.

Subject: Quashing of Criminal Proceedings.

A merchant's wife, Sophie Handschuch, of Munich, in a written statement received by the Public Prosecution at the Provincial Court, Munich II, on 9/18/1933, stated that her son, Hugo Handschuch, taken into protective custody on 8/23/1923, died of heart failure in Dachau camp on 9/2/1933. In the inquest certificate, heart failure following on the concussion of the brain was given as the cause of death. The body was not shown to the relatives and was handed over only after great difficulties and on condition that the coffin would not be reopened. The coffin was so firmly nailed down that it was impossible to reopen it. The writer asked that the coffin be opened and a judicial post mortem held, as she wanted the body identified and the cause of death established.

In order to clear up the state of affairs, the Provincial Court Public Prosecutor at the Provincial Court, Munich II, at first personally questioned the plaintiff, Sophie Handschuch, and the fiancee of the deceased, Thea Kink. From their evidence, the assumption seemed justified that already on the day of his arrest Handschuch was badly physically maltreated in the Braunhaus in Munich, and in connection with the further established fact that the relatives of the dead man were expressly refused permission to view the body, sufficient grounds were given for the suspicion that Handschuch did not die a natural death. In order to establish the cause of death without any doubts, the body was exhumed in Dachau on 9/23/1933, and a judicial autopsy carried out on the orders of the Provincial Court Public Prosecutor. It showed that death was caused by injury to the brain as a result of hemorrhage of the soft membrane of the brain and that these hemorrhages originated from blows with a blunt object which hit the skull particularly in the region of the left temple and that of the back of the head. In addition, extensive bleeding was established in the region of the left cheek, the right shoulder and the left upper arm of the corpse, in the regions of the seat, the thigh, and on the lower part of the left thigh, as a result of blows with a blunt instrument on the body of the deceased while still alive. The findings of the judicial autopsy gave grounds for assuming outside responsibility.

The Public Prosecution has requested that the Bavarian Political Police undertake the necessary enquiries.

In the forenoon of the 19th October, the Public Prosecution at the Provincial Court, Munich II, was informed by telephone by the Bavarian Political Police that in the afternoon of 10/17/1933, Wilhelm Franz, of Munich, a prisoner in protective custody, born on 6/5/1909, and, on the night of 10/17-18/1933, Dr. Delvin Katz, of Nurnberg, a prisoner in protective custody, born on the 3rd August 1887, hanged themselves in their military confinement cells in Dachau concentration camp. The Public Prosecution ordered the same morning a legal examination to be held in the camp, followed by a post mortem. The corpses were in a locked camp shed lying on stretchers, and with the exception of the feet were totally undressed. In Franz's cell, fresh blood spots and splashes were observed on the wooden plank bed. It was established in Katz's cell that the chain mechanism for opening the window was broken off in part and replaced by a cord. In consequence of the examination and the post-mortem, a judicial autopsy was carried out on both corpses on 10/20/1933. With the consent of the officiating judge, the autopsy was witnessed by the camp doctor, Dr. Meixner, and the camp adjutant, Dr. Scheingraber.

The autopsy gave grounds suspecting, in both corpses, force by an outside hand. According to preliminary opinion of both law court doctors provincial Court doctor Dr. Flamm and Court doctor Dr. Niedenthal, death by suffocation as a result of strangulation and throttling was established in both cases. The strangulation marks found on the neck do not correspond to observations in the case of persons hanged. In respect of Franz's body, it is also stated in the preliminary opinion that fat embolism is not prima-facie to be excluded as a contributing cause of death. Fresh weals on the head covered with hair as well as particularly numerous ones on the body and on the arms, with extensive bleeding and destruction of the fatty tissues were established on this corpse. Apart from injuries on the neck, also Katz's body showed various signs of drying up and rubbing off of the skin off the head and one separation of the skin.

At the time of the examination already, the Public Prosecution had demanded the production of both belts with which Franz and Katz had allegedly hanged themselves; they could not be handed over at once. The Dachau lower Court had ordered the confiscation of the belts in accordance with the application. Up till now the objects confiscated had not yet been received by the Public Prosecution.

In each case I informed the Prime Minister and, through him the Reich Governor in Bavaria, as well as the State Minister of the Interior of the Public Prosecution's reports on the cases quoted in I and II.

In a letter of 11/29/1933 addressed to me, the State Minister of the Interior proposed that, for State political reasOns, the inquiry pending at the Public Prosecution of the Provincial Court, Munich II, into the death of Hugo Handschuch, Wilhelm Franz and Dr. Delvin Katz prisoners in protective custody should be quashed. As a reason it is pointed out that the conducting of investigations would ca,use great harm to the prestige of the National Socialist State, since these proceedings would be directed against members of the SA and SS and thus the SA and SS as the chief protagonists of the National Socialist State would be immediately affected.

I permit myself to state on the legal side of the proposal that according to Para. I sub-para. 1, No. 5 of the law re Reich governors of 4/7/1933 in the version of the laws of 4/2/-5/26/1933 (RGBl. I, p. 225, 293) the Reich governor has the right of pardoning. The right of pardoning in the sense of the law re Reich governors embraces the right both of remitting an individual penalty and of quashing individual proceedings, pending so far as the right of pardoning is an administrative act according to the constitution of the province and not a legislative act. I therefore beg to refer to the enclosed copy of a letter from the Reich Minister of the Interior of the 4th September No. IB 1-15/11.8. The constitutional deed of the Free State of Bavaria of 4/14/1919 forbade the quashing of criminal investigations. The law re the quashing of criminal investigations of 8/2/1933 (GVBl. p. 211) removed the ban on quashing. According to the Bavarian provincial law at present valid, the legal possibility therefore exists of quashing individual criminal proceedings by means of an administrative act in the form of a pardon. According to the law re Reich governors this right is vested exclusively in the Reich governor in Bavaria.

In view of this legal position, I beg you to submit the proposal of the State Minister of the Interior to the Council of Ministers and to place it on the agenda of the next meeting of the Council of Ministers; I presume that the State Minister of the Interior will himself present the proposal in the Council of Ministers.

I beg you to forward the enclosed copy to the Reich Governor in Bavaria. The State Ministers and State secretaries have received copies.

Document D-926

Deaths Of Prisoners In Protective Custody At The Concentration Camp Of Dachau, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1128-1131.

II To the State Minister of the Interior with reference to letter of 11/29/1933.

I have the honour of sending you as an enclosure a copy of my letter to the Prime Minister for your notice.

Munich, 12/2/1933. [sgd] Dr. H. Franck.

III A copy of I together with one copy of the letter of the Reich Minister of the Interior of 9/4/1933 is to be forwarded to the other State Ministers and State secretaries for their notice.

IV To be resubmitted in Ref 11.

[Sgd] Spangenberger Degen Doebig.

[11. Proposal made by the Minister of the Interior to quash the inquiry into the deaths of the protective custody prisoners Handschuch, Franz and Katz]

Munich, 11/29/1933

The Bavarian State Minister of the Interior

To the State Minister of Justice, Munich

Dear Party comrade and State Minister, Dr. Frank,

The Commander of the Political Police in the Ministry of the Interior presented to you on 11/18/1933 a proposal according to which the inquiry into the cases of the prisoners in protective custody, Hugo Handschuch, Wilhelm Franz and Delvin Katz should be quashed for state political reasons. In connection with this case, you sent to me the liaison man of the State Ministry of Justice with the Bavarian Political Police, Public Prosecutor Dr. Stepp. Meanwhile, in a discussion with the commander of the Political Police Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, I have ascertained once more that to carry out this inquiry would cause considerable damage to the reputation of the National Socialist State, because this inquiry would be directed against members of the SA and SS and thus the SA and the SS, as the main props of the National Socialist State would be directly affected. For these reasons I support the proposal for quashing the inquiry presented to you on 11/18/1933 by the Commander of the Political Police in the State Ministry of the Interior.

According to what the Commander of the Political Police, Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, tells me, he also had a long talk with you concerning this case. The Council of Ministers has already discussed the matter. The outcome was that the Ministry of Justice sent a representative to the Political Police. I hope firmly that these are the last cases which will force the Governor and the Council of Ministers to intervene in the interests of the State. I made a clear statement to the organs of the Political Police to the effect that in future I could no longer express my willingness to make a proposal for quashing inquiries in similar cases. On the other hand, I do not deny the absolute necessity for giving the supervisory organs in the concentration camp the authority which would enable them, in cases either of actual attacks or of opposition or serious breaches of concentration camp discipline, to intervene by the immediate use of firearms or by shooting according to martial law. This is the only possible way to maintain absolute order in the concentration camp which, as is well known contains almost exclusively criminal types.

I would be very grateful, dear Minister of Justice, if you would express your opinion.

Heil Hitler [signed]: Adolf Wagner.

Copy to: 1) The Prime Minister. 2) The commander of the Bavarian Political Police.

[12. Concerning DACHAU concentration camp.]

The proposal of the State Minister of the Interior that the inquiry pending at the public prosecution at the Provincial Court Munich II, into the death of the prisoners Handschuch, Franz and Katz who were in protective custody be quashed was the subject of a debate during the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 12/5/1933. As a result, the State Minister of Justice communicated the following to the undersigned official:

The criminal proceedings regarding the happenings in the Dachau concentration camp are to be continued with all determination. The facts are to be cleared up with the utmost speed. If necessary the provincial police are to be brought in to help. Any attempts to hush up the case must be opposed by the means laid down.

The Provincial Court public prosecutor at the Provincial Court, Munich II, was instructed, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers, to continue the proceedings immediately and with all energy and to bring about the clearing up of the incidents as soon as possible. He will apply for Court investigations and see to their being completed rapidly, in the case of Franz and Katz immediately, and in the case of Handschuch after the arrival of the files from the political police, who have been requested to return them. He (the public prosecutor) has been instructed to keep the State Ministry of Justice informed about the course Or the proceedings and to produce the files with an attached report about the result of the investigation and with the intended further action in the case, after the completion of the investigation. The public prosecutor at the Court of Appeal in Munich has been notified and instructed that he also for his part, is to pay particular attention to the proceedings. The preliminary investigations will probably be conducted by Provincial Court Counsellor Kissner, the district of Dachau being his sphere of competence.

The liaison man with the Political Police, 1st public prosecutor Stepp, was instructed, according to orders, to communicate the decision of the Council of Ministers to the commander of the Political Police Himmler and to the chief of the Bavarian Political Police.

[signed] M.

Document D-926

Deaths Of Prisoners In Protective Custody At The Concentration Camp Of Dachau, Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1131-1133.

II. Presented to the State Ministers: with the request that he take note. The note of the 1st public prosecutor, Dr. Stepp, regarding the carrying out of his instructions is attached with the request that note be taken.

Munich, 12/6/1933 Doebig.

By order of Ministerial Counsellor Doebig, I communicated to the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, the decision taken yesterday by the Council of Ministers concerning the cases of Handschuch etc. The Reichsfuehrer SS told me that the matter greatly concerned the chief of staff of the SA, Reich Minister Roehm. He (Himmler) had to discuss the matter with the latter first. He asked me to drive with him to the office of the Reich Governor to hear his views after a discussion with the Chief of Staff. I waited in the anteroom of the Chief of Staff until Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler asked me to go with him to the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff Roehm asked me then to communicate on his behalf his reply to the State Minister of Justice, which at the request of Ministerial Counsellor Doebig, I am writing down from memory:

The Dachau camp is a camp for prisoners who are in protective custody and who were imprisoned on political grounds. The incidents concerned are of a political nature and under all circumstances the political authorities must decide first about them. To my mind they are not suited to be dealt with by the legal authorities. This is my opinion as Chief of Staff and also as a Reich Minister who is interested in the Reich not suffering politically because of the proceedings in question.

I shall get the Reichsfuehrer SS to issue an order that no investigating authorities may enter the camp for the time being and that people in the camp may also not be interrogated for the time being. Tomorrow I shall discuss the matter with the Fuehrer and ask him for his decision.

Munich, 12/6/1933 [signed] Dr. Walther Stepp.

[Handwritten note]

1. The Court of Appeal Public Prosecution Munich, was instructed by a directive from the Minister to refrain for the time being from making an application for the opening of preliminary investigations.

Munich, 12/7/1933 [sgd]: Doebig.

[13.] The Public Prosecution at the Provineial Court, Munich II.

Munich, 7/30/1934

To the Court of Appeal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal. Munich.

Subject: Death of the prisoners in protective custody Wilhelm Franz and Dr Katz in the Dachau camp.

With regard to the above mentioned matter, I have as instructed, requested the Bavarian Political Police by letter of 7/12/1934 to clear up the matter further in conjunction with the Commandant's office of the concentration camp of Dachau, and to endeavour to find out the persons who are suspected of having been the culprits. In this request I mentioned also that I have not yet received the legally confiscated instruments of suicide (belt and braces) of the dead men.

The Political Police have apparently transmitted the files without any written directions to the Political Department of the Concentration camp of Dachau the latter has returned the files to the Political Police accompanied by a letter of 7/25/1934. the first paragraph of this letter reads:

"The latest application for production of evidence from the Public Prosecution Munich II shows what far-fetched means are employed in order to saddle the concentration camp of Dachau with allegedly perpetrated crimes."

In the second paragraph of the letter regret is expressed that the two dead men were able by their suicide to escape impending punishment for smuggling letters. The third paragraph refers to the confiscation and reads:

"After the two corpses had been dissected according to law and had been released, the commandant's staff had no further interest in the preservation of the instruments with which they had hanged themselves. The commandant's staff do not belong to those objectionable Kulturmenscher [cultural people] who preserve such articles as souvenirs, as was done in America recently in the Dillinger case."

The letter is signed on behalf of the camp commandant by SS. Obersturmbannfuehrer Leppert.

The Bavarian Political Police sent me the dossiers on 27. 7.1934 together with this letter from camp commandant's office without further comment. Neither the Political Police nor the camp commandant's staff appear inclined to carry out further suitable investigations in the matter in question as requested by me. I therefore regard it as necessary that the required instructions be issued to the Bavarian Political Police and to the camp commandant's office by a higher authority, if it is intended to carry out further investigations on the matter, as these authorities are not likely to carry out any requests from the Public Prosecutor, Munich.

Apart from this, I regard it also as urgently necessary in the interests of the administration of justicein view of the most recent decree of the Reich Chancellor and Reich Minister of Justice that the required action be taken by a higher authority regarding the outrageous allegations against the Public Prosecution, Munich II, which were made in the letter of the camp commandant's office. Personally I do not wish to apply for proceedings for insult.

The Oberstaatsamwalt [signed] Wintersberger.

Submitted to the State Ministry of Justice together with 5 more copies and files.

With regard to the allegations of the Deputy camp commandant, Obersturmbannfuehrer Lippert, in his letter of 7/25/1934, I beg to draw attention to the enclosed file G2138/33 of the Public Prosecution at the Provincial Court, Munich II which shows that the request of the Oberstaatsamwalt-sheet 19 of the file-arose from the impartial observance of his official duty.

Munich, 7/31/1934 The Generalstaatsamwalt at the Court of Appeal [Court of Appeal Public Prosecutor] [signed] Lotrer.

Document D-926

Deaths Of Prisoners In Protective Custody At The Concentration Camp Of Dachau, Part 06 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1133-1134.

[Handwritten note] 1. The matter was reported to the Minister. The letter in question was withdrawn by the camp of Dachau. 2. To Ministerrat (Ministerial Counsellor) Doebig Munich 9/7/1934. Stepp.

[14.] Public Prosecution at the Provincial Court Munich II

Munich 9/27/1934

To the Generalstaatsumwalt (Court of Appeal Public Prosecutor) at the Court of Appeal Munich.

Subject: Death of the prisoners in protective custody Wilhelm Franz and Dr. Katz in the concentration camp of Dachau.

I have stopped the proceedings, as the investigations have not produced sufficient grounds for the assumption of outside guilt in the deaths of the two prisoners in protective custody.

The Oberstaatsumwalt Dr. Barnickel.

Document D-930

[Dr. Wilhelm Hoegner, Bavarian Prime Minister: Hitler And Kahr The Bavarian Would-Be Napoleons Of 1923, A Scandal Of Justice, Exposed In The Committee Of Inquiry Of The Bavarian Provincial Diet] [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1134-1137.

I, Dr. Wilhelm Hoegner, Bavarian Prime Minister, Munich, 7 Prinzregenten Strasse, hereby declare the following under oath for the purpose of submitting this declaration to the International Military Tribunal in Nurnberg:

The two pamphlets-Part I and Part II-submitted to me

"Hitler And Kahr The Bavarian Would-Be Napoleons Of 1923, A Scandal Of Justice, Exposed In The Committee Of Inquiry Of The Bavarian Provincial Diet" were written by me.

At that time I was assistant reporter of the committee of inquiry of the Bavarian Provincial Diet on the Hitler Putsch of 1923. All the facts mentioned in these pamphlets originate from court documents through which I worked personally and from which I made extracts. That also applies especially to the military orders and instructions, partly quoted literally in the pamphlets.

My activity in the writing of the pamphlets mainly consisted in collecting, sifting and grouping the material and in establishing the necessary connection between the individual parts.

The SA has been known to me since their first appearance here in Munich and Bavaria, i.e. since about the year 1921: As a politician, I followed their activities very closely. Originally the SA was a body to protect the meetings of the NSDAP. Already in this capacity they were provided with steel whips, leather whips and some of them also with firearms. They ruthlessly terrorised people present at the meetings if they made themselves noticeable, by interruption. Already in 1922-I believe it was the so-called "German day of Coburg"-the SA with its armed gangs ruled the streets, made unexpected attacks on the peaceful populationespecially on persons of different political opinions-and drove in lorries to all events arranged by the National Socialist movement. Already in the year 1922 there were conflicts with the government in the Bavarian Diet because of the scenes in Coburg. During the succeeding period the government proved itself to be pretty powerless against the doings of the SA. At a consecration of the colours of the SA, which I believe took place in 1923, the government had to proclaim a sort of state of emergency to keep these bands in order to some extent. Also during the succeeding period the Bavarian government was continuously under pressure from Hitler's armed bands and his military accomplices among whom Göring stood out particularly by issuing threats of violence. The actions of the SA were all the more dangerous as it was trained by the Reichswehr (German Armed Forces before 1933) as a kind of auxiliary force and in part had its own secret arsenals, in part had access to the secret arsenals of the Reichswehr. This military arming and training was without doubt a bad breach of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The extent and the type of the military training of the SA permits the deduction that it was intended as an auxiliary force in case of military conflicts with foreign countries. Every SA man could and indeed had to assume, and also knew from the talks and the mobilizations that preparations for an emergency were concerned. The SA also burned to settle accounts with their political opponents, i.e. to render them harmless in a "night of the long knives" and to help Hitler to get into power by force, and they acted that way too. In the best known attempt to achieve this, 11/8-9/1923, the SA played a distinguished part. At the same opportunity Ludendorff was after all also earmarked to loose the national war against France. Nobody who joined the SA at that time could have the slightest doubts about the final goal of this force.

The SA did not change their behaviour later on either. Especially after 1930 it distinguished itself in the conflicts with its political opponents by its violence and ruthlessness. After the coming into power of the National Socialists, the SA broke into the houses of political opponents as a heavily armed horde, illtreated and arrested them. It is known to me that the SA also played an evil part in the persecutions of the Jews in 4/1933. The same was the case in the occupation of the Trade's Union building on 5/2/1933. Already before that, the chairman of the Munich Trade's Unions, Gustav Schiefer had actually been attacked by members of the SA in the Trade's Union building and so seriously illtreated that he had to spend a long time in the hospital.

Immediately after the coming into power the SA had already committed serious excesses against other political parties also. I, myself was an eyewitness when, on the evening of 3/9/1933, the SA occupied the building of the Social Democratic newspaper the "Munchener Post" in Munich, threw typewriters, tables, chairs, documents, newspapers and the domestic furniture of the publishing director Muerriger out of the windows into the street and set fire to it. All these excesses were, according to my observation, not only not condemned, but they were even welcomed and approved by the members of the SA. What I saw myself here in Munich, occurred in a similar way, according to reliable reports, in other places too. The SS appeared here in Munich at first as Hitler's bodyguard. At the time of the seizure of power in Munich alreadyon 3/9/1933it played an important part. It occupied, namely, the Political Police, and established itself there as such under Himmler's and Heydrich's supreme command. I myself witnessed how they transported men arrested for their opposition to National Socialism, to the concentration camp of Dachau in lorries. There very serious illtreatment took place. I myself, my wife and my Party friends saw the back of one of my political friends, the present Burgomaster of Erlangen, Poeschke, who was released on 4/28-29/1933 as an elected deputy for the sessions of the Diet. His back from the neck down was cut up by bloody weals; numerous streams of blood were visible. Poeschke could hardly move and had to enter a hospital. He told dreadful things about the illtreatment there.

Before my departure from Germany the former communist Diet Deputies Dressel and Schlaffer were murdered in the concentration camp of Dachauprobably in 5/1933. Whether by SS or the SA, I do not remember for certain. I knew the incident very well because I complained about it to the Reich Minister of Justice Dr. Guertner in Berlin. One day in 4/1933 the SS, as political police, making use of the service motorcar of the Police Directorate in Munich, went across the Austrian border near Kufstein and murdered in an inn in Durchholzen near Walchsee a certain Dr. Bell who was said to have disclosed NSDAP secrets to political opponents of this movement.

The gross excesses of the SA and SS in the service of the NSDAP were accomplished so publicly that the whole population knew of them. Everyone who entered these organisations as a member knew about such excesses.

The above statements are true according to the best of my knowledge and I am prepared to swear to them.

Dr. Wilhelm Hoegner Bavarian Prime Minister.

Title: "Document D-936 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1137-1138.

Copy. B 745-753/33.

The proceedings against the nine accused fall under the decree of the Cabinet of the Bavarian Free State regarding the granting of amnesty, dated the 2.8.1933 and are therefore to be suspended.

All the persons suspected of the deeds are without doubt members of the SA. It is known that the injured man, Dr. Schloegl, was a bitter opponent of the NSDAP, at any rate, before the National Socialist revolution. This is clear also from the newspaper "Der Niederbayerische Bauer" [The Lower Bavarian Peasant] which has been attached to the file by the legal adviser of the SA and was formerly run by Dr. Schloegl, and which fought the NSDAP with the most serious insults. It appears from the examination of the witness Rampf, which took place on 28.6.33, that Dr. Schloegl was seen with former leading personalities of the Bavarian People's Party shortly before the attacks, from which it was assumed that meetings of a political nature had been held.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the deeds were committed for political reasons. They were committed also to ensure the success of the National Socialist State. It may be that the destruction of the furniture was intended to serve the purpose of a house search, in which previously imbibed alcohol may have played a harmful part in the manner of carrying out that decision; it may be that, by the destruction of the furniture-certainly, however, by the illtreatmentit was intended to restrain Dr. Schloegl from further political activity; no other motive for the deeds can be found. The Supreme SA leadership have also examined these questions. In their letter of 14.9.33 they announce that the SA men in question were bound to see, and did see, in the possibility of Dr. Schloegl forcing his way into the National Socialist movement, a danger for the movement and thus for the nation itself. Nor were the deeds committed for the purpose of personal profit or other low motives. The Supreme SA leadership state on this point: "The deed and intention of the SA men were only aimed at the wellbeing of the National Socialist movement. The political reason and the purity of the intention is thus beyond doubt."

The manner of execution must remain immaterial. Nobody will probably be able to approve of it in itself. According to the decree of amnesty, the purpose pursued by the perpetrators is alone decisive. (cf, in this connection the Decision of the Court of Appeal of 5.9.33 in DRZ 1933, page 688). Nor can one differentiate between the deeds committed against Dr. Schloegl and those committed against Frl. Neudecker and Frau Kulzer. With the purpose of settling accounts with Dr. Schloegl in the way they had selected, these perpetrators had come across these women. They had perforce to break Frau Kulzer's domestic peace in order to reach Dr. Schloegl at all. It was similarly fully in pursuance of their purpose that they wished to prevent escape, or even any assumed opposition, by the Neudecker woman, even if here too the deeds exceeded what was absolutely necessary. The application of the decree of amnesty has therefore been rightly approved by the Prosecution in its order of suspension of the 9/19/1933. Since the High Court agrees to this decision and the injured persons and the Public Prosecutor have applied for a decision of the Court, in accordance with Para.2, sub-para.2 of the Decree of 8/2/1933, one had to be reached, as has now been done.

Landshut, 12/4/1933. [sgd] Kuffer Amtsgerichtsrat.

Title: "Document D-939 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1138-1139.

Protocol of the evidence of a witness taken by the Public Prosecutor and member of the Central Committee for the Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, Dr. Stanislaw Piotrowski, in Nurnberg on 7/29/1946.

By virtue of the regulations of Polish Law, the witness was informed of the responsibility for false testimony and the oath was administered.

Name and first name: Eizenberg, Israel.

Place of birth: Warsaw

Occupation: electro-mechanic.

Religion: Jewish

Address: Stuttgart W. Reinsburgstr. 203

Relationship to the Parties: --

The witness declared the following: I lived in Lublin and from there I was sent to Maidanek in the beginning of 1942. However, as a prisoner I continued to work for the Germans, who employed me as an expert for electro-mechanical jobs on the various SS houses and SS offices in Lublin. I worked as an electro-mechanic in the palace building of the SS and Police Chief Globocnik and in the headquarters of the SS in Lublin, Warschauer street 21. The Waffen SS were also there. On the outer wall the notice "SS-Waffen" could be seen and on the pass which I received at the entrance, the words "SS-Waffen" were also marked. l knew all the officers, for instance Oberscharfuehrer Riedel, Rottenfuehrer Mohrwinkel, Unterscharfuehrer Schrammek. I know that the leaders of the SS Waffen as well as the regiment of the SS Waffen whose seat was in the same building where I worked, participated directly in all the expulsions of the Jews from the district of Lublin. In these expulsions thousands of persons were killed on the spot and the rest sent away for extermination. I myself saw how in the winter of 1941 the "SS-Waffen" of 21, Warschauer Street participated in the deportation of some hundred Jews to Maidanek, when several persons were killed on the spot. At that time my father was also deported because of his long beard, as this action mainly concerned Jews with beards. I know that Rottenfuehrer Mohrwinkel directed this action and was promoted to the rank of Untersturmfuehrer for it. I worked for the "Waffen SS" till 11/1942, i.e. until I was transported to Radom. The same persons participated the whole time in all the crimes of the SS in Lublin and district. I wish to point out that these SS men kept their horses in the stables on the aerodrome, where there was a notice: "Mounted Regiment SS Waffen" (Reiter Regiment SS-Waffen). I myself worked on the illumination of this notice. These SS men were also easily recognized during the actions by the spurs on their boots.

[Signature illegible]

The protocol has been read out to me.

Title: "Document D-944 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1142-1143.

[EXTRACT]

Yugoslav War Crimes Commission BAOR HQ

Re: Statements about War Criminals.

To the State Commission for Ascertaining War Crimes.

On the occasion of the interrogation of a few racial Germans-former members of the SS-who are at present interned at Oeselheide Camp Near Paderborn, we obtained the following statements:

HOLTZER Leander declares:

In 8/1943, the 23rd Company set fire to a village on the railway line Jablabnica-Prozor by order of the battalion commander, Obersturmbannfuehrer Wagner, under the command of the Company Commander, Untersturmbannfuehrer Schuh; the inhabitants of the village were shot in the meantime.

In 8/1943, on the orders of the same persons, the 23rd Company set fire to a village on the railway line Niksic-Avtovac, and the inhabitants of the village were shot. The order for the shooting came from Jablabnica and the villages were burned down already in the morning. The shootings in Pancevo were carried out by the police agent Gross, former master-dyer, Brunn from the SS Division "Prinz Eugen" from Pancevo, a former master-miller. He received a reward of 20,000 Dinars for the hangings at the cemetery.

Brunn was in the past employed at the master-miller Hiber's, Zimska Ulica. The sum of 20000 Dinars was found on the hanged innkeeper's wife, whom Brunn executed with his own hands; the money was given to him as a fee. …

We deliver the above report for further possible proceedings against the accused.

Death to Fascism-liberty for the people.

Yugoslav Commission for Ascertaining War Crimes BAOR. HQ. (Sgd) Lieutenant GROZDIC.

No. 383/G 10/27/1945

Title: "Document D-945 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1143-1144.

[Extract]

Report No. 5 of the Jugoslav State Commission for Ascertaining the Crimes of the Occupiers and their Accomplices.

… We submit here the wording of "Report No. 3" (No. 49/944 of 9/30/1944) of the Croatian Commission for Ascertaining the Crimes of the Occupiers and their Accomplices, in which this Commission, among other things reports this crime, also on the basis of the original report of the Domobran Lieutenant-Colonel Potocnik, garrison commandant of Linj, that miserable accomplice of the same 118th German Division, who reported about this crime to Pavelic's Ministry for War in the following terms:

"In accordance with the order of the commander of the 118th German division, an SS battalion of the "Prinz Eugen" division and a battalion of the Teufels-Division (Devils Division) under the command of the German Lieut. Col. Dietsche, carried out on 3/27/1944 and on the following days a purge action from Sinj in the direction of the villages of Otok-Ruda-Udovicic-Krivodol-Vostane-Grab.

On the 28 March this SS battalion overran the villages of Otok Cornji, Ruda and Dolac Dolnji one after the other and carried out horrible massacres, destructions by fire and looting. These beasts murdered on a single day in the three above named Dalmatian villages 834 people-a part from grown-up men, also women and children-set on fire 500 houses and looted everything there was to be looted. They removed rings, watches and other valuables from the dead bodies. The mass slaughter was carried out in all the villages in the same horrible manner. The German soldiers gathered women, children and men in one place and then opened fire on the crowd with machineguns, threw bombs at them, looted their property and set them on fire. In the House Milanovic-Trapo 45 burned bodies were found. In another house in the same village of Otok 22 unburned corpses were found in a pile. In the village of Ruda they collected all the people in one place and killed all of them. Those who happened not to be collected were killed where they were found. Not even the smallest babies at their mothers' breasts were spared. In some places the victims were soaked in petrol and set on fire. They also killed those who offered them hospitality out of fear. They also killed those people who were forced to follow them to carry their ammunition and other things. According to the evidence of reliable witnesses, the massacres were prepared beforehand, and this all the more so as the above mentioned villages gave no reason whatsoever previous to the purge action for any kind of reprisals. Neither then nor ever previously was a single shot fired at German soldiers, nor was any hostile action undertaken against the same in the area of these villages …"

Secretary: Dr. Ivan Grgic

President of the State Commission Dr. Dusan Nedeljkovic University professor.

Title: "Document D-951 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1144-1145.

The Supreme SA Leader b 312/34

Munich, 3/6/1934

Subject: Letter from the Reichswehr Minister [Note: Title of Minister for War till 1935] to the Fuehrer.

1 Enclosure:

Distributed according to distribution I.

I enclose for your confidential information a letter of the Reichswehr Minister or of General Reichenau to the Fuehrer.

I remark to this that the question of staff guards was not mentioned either in my discussion with the French ambassador, Francois Pancet, or with the German ambassador in Paris, Koester.

I refer, also to my disposition of 8.1.34, cypher No. 34 and to my conversation in Berlin after the termination of the last session of the Reichstag. On this occasion I forbade the appearance of armed staff guards in public.

The chief of staff: [Sgn.] Roehm

Certified copy. v. Rausser [?] Obergruppenfuehrer.

The Reichswehr Minister.

Berlin, 2.3.1934

Copy! Confidential

To the Reich Chancellor.

I feel it my duty to draw attention once more to the significance of the staff guards of the SA. According to the order of the chief of staff, every Corps and Division (Obergruppe and Gruppe) is to form an armed staff guard with a heavy machinegun company. This formation is at present taking place. According to the report of the VI Military District H.Q., the SA Brigadenfuehrers are also said to be considering forming such a staff guard already, and to be engaging SA men for 1 to 1½ year's service for this purpose. Selection and training have to take place with the aim of appearing in public. Numerically this would amount to 6 to 8 thousand SA men permanently armed with rifles and machineguns in the area of the VI Military District H.Q. alone. A particularly awkward factor is that the creation of these staff guards relies on so-called SA auxiliary camps (Hilfswerklager), which are mostly situated in the big towns. Today have received the report that in Hoechst on the Main-i.e. in the neutral zone-the creation of such an armed staff guard is taking place. Such behaviour renders all the Wehrmacht's care and that of the Krueger depots within the neutral zone which are influenced by it, illusory.

As the chief of staff is away from Berlin, I am sending this report direct to the Chancellor.

[Sgd.] v. Blomberg.

Certified copy. [Sgd.] v. Pausser [?] Obergruppenfuehrer

[In pencil]: Counter-intelligence 8/3 R.

Title: "Document D-960 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 1165.

3/24/1943

Waffen SS Natzweiler Concentration Camp Commandant's office 3.43/Kr/Jg.

8000151, VIII/ 64 C 16 Concentration Camp Natzweiler Bill

To the Security Police and SD, Strassburg.

For the 20 prisoners executed and cremated in this concentration camp, costs amounting to RM 127,05 arose.

The commandant's office of the Natzweiler concentration camp requests the early despatch of the above mentioned sum.

[Initialled] SS Hauptsturmfuehrer and Commandant.

Document D-964

Affidavit of Szloma Gol [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1165-1167.

I, SZLOMA GOL, declare as follows:

1. I am a Jew and lived in Vilna, Lithuania. During the German occupation I was in Vilna ghetto.

2. The administration of Vilna ghetto was managed by the SA. The Town Commissioner of Vilna (Stadtkommissar) was an SA officer called Hinkst. The Landkommissar for Vilna was an SA officer called Wolf. The Advisor on Jewish questions was an SA officer called Muerer.

3. In 12/1943, 80 Jews from the ghetto including 4 women and myself and my friend Josef Belic were ordered by an SA Sturmfuehrer, whose name I forget, to live in a large pit some distance from the town. This pit had originally been dug for an underground petrol tank. It was circular, 60 meters in diameter and 4 meters deep. When we lived in it the top was partially covered with boarding, and there were two wooden rooms partitioned off, also a kitchen and lavatory. We lived there 6 months altogether before we escaped. The pit was guarded by SA guards about whom I give details below.

4. One morning the Sturmfuehrer standing on the edge of the pit accompanied by 14 or 15 SA men said to us "Your brothers and sisters and friends are all near here. Treat them properly and if you complete your work we will send you to Germany, where each man can practice his own vocation". We did not know what this meant.

5. Thereupon the SA men threw chains into the pit, and the Sturmfuehrer ordered the Jewish foreman (for we were a working party) to fasten the chains on us. The chains were fastened round both ankles and round the waist. They weighed 2 kilos each, and we could only take small steps when wearing them. We wore them permanently for 6 months. The SA said that if any man removed the chains he would be hanged. The 4 women (who worked in the kitchen) were not chained.

6. After that we were taken out to work. We walked in chains 5 to 6 meters.

7. Our work consisted in digging up mass graves and piling the bodies onto funeral pyres and burning them. I was engaged in digging up the bodies. My friend Belic was engaged in sawing up and arranging the wood.

8. We dug up altogether 68000 graves. I know this because two of the Jews in the pit with us were ordered by the Germans to keep count of the bodiesthat was their sole job. The bodies were mixed, Jews, Polish priests, Russian Prisoners of War. Among those that I dug up I found my own brother. I found his identification papers on him. He had been dead two years when I dug him up, because I know that he was in a batch of 10000 Jews from Vilna ghetto who were shot in 9/1941.

9. The procedure for burning the bodies was absolutely methodical. Parallel ditches 7 meters long were dug. Over these a square platform of boards was laid. A layer of bodies was put on top, the bodies had oil poured on them and then branches were put on top and over the branches logs of wood. Altogether 14 such layers of bodies and fuel were put on each pyre. Each pyre was shaped like a pyramid with a wooden funnel sticking up through the top. Petrol and oil were poured down the funnel, and incendiary bombs put round the edge of the pyre. All this work was done by us Jews. When the pyre was ready the Sturmfuehrer himself or his assistant Legel (also in the SA) personally lit the pyre with a burning rag on the end of a pole.

10. The work of digging up the graves and building the pyres was supervised and guarded by about 80 guards. Of these over 50 were SA men, in brown uniform, armed with pistols and daggers and automatic guns (the guns being always cocked and pointed at us). The other 30 guards consisted partly of Lithuanians and partly of SD and SS. In the course of the work the Lithuanian guards themselves were shot presumably so that they should not say what had been done. The Commander of the whole place was the SA officer Muerer (the expert on Jewish questions) but he only inspected the work from time to time. The SA officer Legel actually commanded on the spot. At night our pit was guarded by 10 or 12 of these guards.

11. The guards (principally the SA guards) hit us and stabbed us. I still have scars on both legs and on my neck. I was once knocked senseless onto the pile of bodies, and could not get up, but my companions took me off the pile. Then I went sick. We were allowed to go sick for 2 days, the third day we were taken out of the pit "to hospital"-this meant to be shot.

12. Of 76 men in the pit 11 were shot at work. Forty-three of us eventually dug a tunnel from the pit with our bare hands, and broke our chains and escaped into the woods. We had been warned by a Czech SS man who said "they are going to shoot you soon, and they are going to shoot me too, and put us all on the pile. Get out if you can, but not while I am on guard".

I declare the above to be correct.

[signed] Szloma Gol

8/9/1946.

Document D-968

Affidavit of Khaim Kagan [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1167-1169.

I, KHAIM KAGAN, declare as follows:

1. I am a Jew and lived in the Ghetto of Kaunas (Lithuania) during the German occupation. I was on the Jewish Council of the Ghetto dealing with statistics and supplies. As representative of the Jews for rations, etc., I had to deal directly with the Town Governor's Office (Hauptsturmfuehrer SA Jordan's section). The Town Governor's Office was exclusively staffed by SA: even the girls in the office wore brown SA uniform.

2. The German Town Governor (Stadtkommissar) was called KRAMER, and he was a Brigadefuehrer SA. Jordan was the Advisor on Jewish Affairs to Kramer. I know their ranks and that they were in the SA, because they signed the orders which were posted in the Ghetto.

3. About 9/10-15/1941 a plundering operation was conducted throughout the Ghetto. It was done exclusively by SA men, Jordan was with them. They all wore brown uniform. They took gold, silver, valuables, furniture, etc. In order to scare people and to induce them to give up their property more easily they shot people indiscriminately in different parts of the Ghetto: they shot twenty-seven in all.

4. After the plundering was over Jews were employed to sort the plunder and pack it into parcels to send to private addresses in Germany.

5. On 9/13/1941 Jordan and Sturmfuehrer SA KEPEN (with Brigadefuehrer LENZEN, who was Commissioner for the Rural District (Landkommissar) of Kaunas, standing by) shot three men in my presence. One of these men they first pulled out of bed.

6. On 9/21-22/1941 I was in a labor detachment. I saw about thirty SA men in uniform conducting a group of some 300 Russian prisoners of war. The Russians were quite exhausted, they could barely walk. Two collapsed and the SA shot them. The SA were beating them all the time. My labor detachment had to bury these Russians.

7. In 10/1941 300 Jews including myself were taken by the SA from the Ghetto and forced to carry two chairs each, on their shoulders, for a distance of 5 kilometres and then back again, for no object whatsoever. Those who could not carry on were shot. Jordan was following the procession in his car. There were about 100 SA men guarding us: they were armed with automatic pistols.

8. On 10/28/1941 there was a big "action" on in which 10500 people from the Ghetto were shot. The Ghetto population was first divided into two groups, those for execution and those who were allowed to stay. The sorting was supervised in the morning by a man called RAUKA (who was I think in the Gestapo or the SD) and later in the day three prominent SA men, Jordan, Kepen and Poeschl came to help him. All these SA men were in uniform. I know the number of those who were shot because my job on the Jewish Council included the rationing for which we had taken a census of the Jews. A new census was taken after these executions.

9. On 8/15/1941 the SA shut the Ghetto gates. A number of people had gone out of the Ghetto on the 11th August to try to get food. On the 15th after the gates had been shut Jordan came to me and said: "Go and get 20 bodies which I have just shot as a warning to you all not to have dealings with the outside population."

10. On the same day (15th August) Jordan announced that he wanted 530 intellectuals to work on archives. He was told there were not that number available. Thereupon the SA (assisted by others in German uniform which I cannot identify for certain but I think it was SD) seized 530 people at random. The SA personnel present included Jordan, Poeschl and Lenzen.

I declare the above to be correct:

[signed]: KHAIM KAGAN

8/10/1946.

Document D-969

Affidavit of Leib Kibart [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1169-1170.

I, LEIB KIBART, declare as follows:

1. I am a Jew and lived during the German occupation in the Ghetto of Schaulen, about 130 kilometres of Riga. I am a leather worker by trade.

2. I was arrested in the street and forced to work for the Germans for three years making-mostly women's handbags. I lived in the Ghetto but I was taken daily by SA men to the Courtyard of the District Commissioner where I and other Jews worked on various jobs.

3. While at work we were often cursed and beaten by the SA. Sturmfuehrer SA Bub one day ordered a lady's handbag from me, to be ready by the same evening. I said that was impossible, so he gave me many strokes with a whip. In the evening he thrashed me again because the bag was not ready.

4. The SA came to Schaulen soon after the occupation by the Germans in the summer of 1941 and they took over the administration of the Ghetto. The first SA Chief was SCHROEPFER, a Sturmfuehrer SA. He was either from Bromberg or Bamberg but I cannot remember which. I know it was one or the other because Jews were employed to make trunks for SA officers and I remember his name and address being painted on one. His successor was Sturmfuehrer Bub.

5. It is hard to judge, but I estimate that there must have been 700-800 SA men there at the beginning, but they decreased in numbers later. I knew them as SA because they wore brown uniform with Swastika armlets. Later on they often used other Germans in the locality as auxiliaries.

6. There were 4500 Jews in the Ghetto, which was very overcrowded. In 8/1941 the SA therefore surrounded the whole Ghetto, and numbers of them went into the houses and took out women, children and old men, and put them into lorries and drove them away. I saw all this myself. It was done exclusively by SA. I saw them take children by the hair and throw them into the lorries. I did not see what happened to them but a Lithuanian told me afterwards that they had been driven 23 kilometres away and shot: he said he had seen the SA make them undress and then shoot them with automatic pistols.

7. In 1943 working parties were sent out from the Ghetto into the country and they sometimes brought back food such as potatoes. `I he A searched them and if they found food on them they beat them in the streets. In 6/1943 a man called MAZAWETZKI, a master baker, was caught by Bub with four or five cigarettes and some sausage.

He was beaten and brought to the District Commissioner's office. I was working in the Courtyard with other Jews and Bub said to the working party that the man must be hanged because he wanted to show that he too could hang Jews. Next Sunday we were all kept in the Courtyard and Bub had Mazawetzki hanged in front of us by Jews.

8. The District Commissioner in whose Courtyard I worked was called GEWECKE. I saw him every day. He was in the SA.

9. The SS took over from the SA in 9/1943, and the Ghetto then became a working commando.

I declare the above to be true. [signed]: LEIB KIBART

8/10/1946

Title: "Document D-971 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1172-1173.

SA UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT COLOGNE

1. In 5/1934 all German students of the age group due to take their leaving certificates in 1933 will be regimented by the SA University Department in order to be physically and mentally trained in a uniform manner in the spirit of the National-Socialist revolution in accordance with the Fuehrer's decree of 9/9/1933.

2. All students of the 1933 leaving certificate age group will be regimented it being a matter of indifference whether they are SA men or candidates for the SA and such as worked in some job for some reason between matriculation and studying and are only now in their second or third term although they belong to an earlier age group.

3. According to the decree of 7.2.34 [in green pencil: not available in Cologne SA service is compulsory for all German students.

In accordance with the decree of the Supreme SA Leadership F 6914 of the 27.3.34 [in pencil: attached] the ban on taking on newly matriculated students is raised in the period 25.45.5.34. Every student is thereby offered the possibility of joining the SA

4. The continuation of their studies depends for German students, as from their 5th term (this comes into force for the first time at Easter 1935) on the possession of a duly certified statement as to their year of service at the SA University Department.

The SA University Department lays down the following times, in agreement with the Rector, for reporting for service in the SA University Department:

From 4/23/-5/10/1934 daily from 10:00 to 12:00 o'clock in the Sociological lecture room.

University, Room 135 (entrance through room 132)

Cologne, 4/14/1934.

The head of the SA University Department, Cologne. [signed] Deputy, Truppfuehrer.

Document D-972

Extract From Schulthess's Calender Of European Historie Events [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 1173.

[Published by Ulrich Thuerauf. New Series. 50th year of publication. Volume 75 of the whole series. 1934.

Publishers and Booksellers C. H. Beck Munich 1935. Page 557.] 20-22 February

Eden's conversation with the German Government in Berlin.

The British Government publishes in its White Book the following statement made on the occasion of Mr. Eden's visit to Berlin regarding the point of view taken up by the German Government with reference to the United Kingdom Memorandum:

… The German Government would be prepared to con; cur on the basis of the reciprocity of the laying down of further regulations aimed at securing the non-military character of the SA and SS, suggested to Mr. Eden by the Reich Chancellor on the 21st February, under which this character would be supervised by a system of controls. These regulations would state that the SA and SS (1) will possess no arms, (2) will receive no instruction with arms, (3) will not be gathered or trained in military camps, (4) will not be trained either directly or indirectly by officers of the regular army, (5) may not undertake any field manoeuvres or take part in such.

Document D-975

Affidavit Of Szloma Gol [Supplement to Document D-964.] [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1176-1177.

I, SZLOMA GOL declare as follows:

As the corpses were taken from the mass graves, and before they were placed on the pyre, two persons were charged with extracting the gold from the teeth of the bodies with prongs, and two or three other persons simultaneously washed the gold in benzine. The washing of the gold thus extracted was done by three Jewish boys aged 12-13 who were among the 80 persons in the pit. The gold was packed in boxes each weighing 8 kilograms. During the period of my stay in the pit 7-8 such boxes were filled with dental gold. LEGEL ordered the boxes to be neatly packed because they were to be sent to Berlin. MURER personally took the boxes with him.

I declare the above to be correct.

[signed]: SZLOMA GOL

9/10/1946.

Document EC-255

Plenipotentiary General for War Economy [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1178-1179.

Berlin W.35. 29.11.37 Tirpitzufer 72/76 Tel. B 1 Kurfuerst 8191

The Reich War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces:

WA, No. 1961/37 Most Secret L IV a (When replying, please quote above reference and give date and contents in brief ) .

[Stamp] Most Secret.

To the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Ministerpraesident General Göring, Berlin

Dear General Göring:

As provided in Section 6 of the Reich Defense Law, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, when declaring the state of defense, provided for the appointment of a "Plenipotentiary General for War Economy G.B." for the direction of the war economy as a whole. By virtue of a decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21.5.1935 he has already taken up his duties in peacetime.

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, by a special decree, had appointed the President of the Reichsbank directorate, Dr. Schacht, as Plenipotentiary General, and he was at the same time charged with the direction of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics.

Because I deem it necessary that the position of Plenipotentiary General should continue to be combined with that of the Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics, I intend to suggest to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor that he should appoint the Reich and Prussian Minister for Economics, Funk, as Plenipotentiary General, effective immediately, and strengthen his operational staff as regards constitutional law, through the appointment of a Secretary of State.

The urgency of unified further work on all preparations for the conduct of the war does not admit of this office being paralyzed until 15.1.1938.

May I have your opinion on this matter?

Heil Hitler! signed v. BLOMBERG 1.12.37 [Illegible Initials]

No. 1961/37 Most Secret. IV A.

To War Economy Staff.

The above copy is transmitted with the request that it be noted.

[Stamp] [signature illegible] War Economy Staff, War Economy Ia. 12/2/1937. No. 3333/37/Secret Encl.

Document EC-270

Attitude of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) toward the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1179-1181.

DRAFT [rubber stamp]

9 April Berlin, 4/27/1938

War Economic Staff File No. 11 b W Wi Ia No. 923/38 Top Secret 2 copies 2nd copy

Ref: 610/38 Top Secret L IV a of 4/9/1938.

TOP SECRET [rubber stamp]

To L, through Lt. Col. Hinnemann on 27 April. Registered 24/21/1938 Bl.

The interpretation, which the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy has given the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of 2/4/1938 in his letter "GB No. 649/38 top secret of 3/31/1938" toward the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, does not in any way correspond to the necessities of total warfare.

The demands which warfare has to make of economy are decisive for the mobilization preparations. The achievements of the economy, however, reach their full importance only then when these mobilization preparations are being directed along similar lines. These lines must be in accordance with the requirements of national defense. They form one of the most important provisions for the supply of the armed forces and therewith for the fighting ability of the units.

It must therefore be requested that you agree with the opinion in the planned conversation with General Field Marshal Göring that the Plenipotentiary General be dependent on the directives issued in the general name of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) in all questions of minor importance in this field the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) has the right to make decisions in case of arguments, without having the point of the argument brought before the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor for his decision. The working side by side of the branches of the armed forces dealing with the preparations for the economic mobilization and the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy prevents almost in all fields a clear picture about the potential de guerre.

In order to justify the necessity of the right of directive the following details are pointed out:

1. The dependence of the armament sector on the remaining sector of economy, and thereby the whole mobilization preparation require, that directives about the extent and speed of the mobilization preparations be issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

2. The armament industry adjusts its size to the requirements of the Armed Forces. Therefore, in the interests of national defense it must remain the right of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to decide to what extent industries will be declared armament industries. After the past experiences however, the debtors [Aussenstellen] of the Reich Economic Ministry often oppose such a declaration of armament industries.

3. The Armed Economic Order [Wehrwirtschaftsordnung], which is to regulate the cooperation between the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the Plenipotentiary General on the basis of the national defense law, has been completed in draught form by the Armed Forces as far as this is possible without the cooperation of the Plenipotentiary General. The Plenipotentiary General in his part has refused his cooperation in this fundamental plan for the time being. Although a clear determination of the authority of the civilian and military authorities in the war economic field urgently needs to be settled, the further continuation of working on the plan has become impossible through the attitude of the Plenipotentiary General at present.

4. The distribution of the total population (requirements of the Armed Forces and mobilization of labor) must be decided from the standpoint of warfare. Only the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces can determine if the operational situation requires an increased use of men at the front or in the war economy. The use of human labor, in wartime must therefore be placed under the control of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in peacetime already.

5. The food economy is also decisive for the fighting ability of the units and occasionally of decisive importance for military operations.

An exact knowledge of the food situation and cooperation in measures in the food economy on the part of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces are therefore required already in peacetime.

Previously it has not been possible to receive a report on the war food situation from the Plenipotentiary General or even only reasonably dependable reports on the necessary food requirements of the civilian population in wartime. As long as no right of directive exists it will be impossible to receive these reports.

6. The use of raw materials decisively influences the supply situation of the Armed Forces in wartime.

7. The usual equipment is only to be secured by the order of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, because the equipment of the units and thereby their fighting preparedness depends on this. For this the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) must be able to assemble the installations for industrial economy to the extent it appears necessary to the interest of the country's defense.

8. In the field of transport facilities, uniformity is essential. During one of the transport actions carried out recently, the individual officers of the Plenipotentiary General discussed this from completely various viewpoints and from a different one than was taken during the usual war economic-inspection procedure, so that the result is hardly of use. The directory law of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) could have avoided this:

Document EC-270

Attitude of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) toward the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1181-1182.

9. In the court of a mobilization at the present time in the Reich, there is a shortage of approximately 40000 trucks. With the mobilization, the Armed Forces will therefore either not receive the necessary trucks, or parts of the war economy will collapse, since the necessary transports cannot be driven. In the interest of her supplies, the Armed forces must therefore request that the management make possible the procurement of the trucks lacking through tax reductions and release of raw material.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) must use its influence to expedite the procurement of the trucks lacking.

The war economy which is subordinated to the Plenipotentiary General represents the war economic stage of the armaments industry. If this stage fails, the striking power of the Armed Forces becomes questionable.

The undertaking Otto has brought numerous proofs that the lack of uniformity in the direction of economy will lead to severe disturbances.

The greatest part of all points of friction and difficulties can be eliminated, as soon as it has been clearly decided that the Plenipotentiary General in all questions of provisions for the Armed Forces must conform to the orders of the OKW.

CHIEF AUTHORITIES

For the files II b

A 26/4 [illegible initial] 26/4 [illegible initial] 26/4 [illegible initial] 26/4

Title: "Document EC-271, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1182-1183.

COPY

75.) 9.4. 4/27 Berlin, 4/61938 4/27

The Minister of the Reich and Head of the Reichschancellery R.K. 153 B g Rs vol. 94-4

Top Secret [Geheime Kommandosache] E 271

To the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW)

General of Artillery Keitel or to his Official Deputy.

Dear General:

The enclosed copies, concerning the Plenipotentiary for War Economy and the decree concerning the command of the armed forces, dated 2/4/1938, are respectfully submitted, with request to take notice.

Heil Hitler! Very sincerely yours [signed] Dr. Lammers

2 enclosures [Rubber stamp] WSTb. W Wi I a 11 April Tb a II II/4 1938 I Az Nr. 923138 gk. Anl.

(Very Urgent!)

Nr. 610/38 g. Kdos. IV a

To W Stb. Above copy transmitted with request to take notice.

I.A. [signed] Mueller. 1 a Spitzengliederung 11 b

[Pencil note] 2.I.U.C.

Title: "Document EC-271, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1183-1184.

COPY

Berlin 31.3.1938

Copy to Rk. 153 B.G.Rs. The Plenipotentiary for War Economy. G.B. 649/38 g. Rs.

To the Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery Dr. Lammers Berlin.

Dear Dr. Lammers:

In connection with a trip to Austria I have among other matters talked to General Fieldmarshal Göring also about the position of the Plenipotentiary for War Economy. I have pointed out that-contrary to the attitude of the OKW of which I was informed the decree of 2/4/1938 concerning the leadership of the Wehrmacht did not change the position of the Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Aside from the fact that this decree, according to its heading, applies exclusively to the "command of the armed forces", the tasks of the OKW, as mentioned especially in the last paragraph in question, are dependent upon instructions of the Fuehrer. Moreover, to the instructions of the Fuehrer, belongs also the decision of the Reich Government of 5/21/1935, according to which the Plenipotentiary for War Economy, in his sphere of duty as Supreme Reich authority, is immediately subordinated to the Fuehrer.

General Fieldmarshal Göring assured me that my interpretation, as mentioned above, was correct in every respect and also corresponds with the Fuehrer's opinion. I asked him to give me a brief written confirmation. General Fieldmarshal Göring promised to grant this request.

I am transmitting these facts to you for your information, so that you may make use of them, should the occasion arise.

Heil Hitler! Yours [signed] WALTER FUNK.

Berlin, 4/6/1938

Copy to Rk. 153 B.g. Rs.

The Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery Rk. 153 B. g. Rs.

Re: Letter from the Plenipotentiary for War-Economy

G.B. 649/38 g. Rs. regarding decree concerning command of Armed Forces, dated 2/4/1938.

Top Secret [Geheime Kommandosache]

To the Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics Walter Funk or official deputy.

Dear Mr. Funk!

When reporting to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor the draft of the decree concerning the command of the Armed Forces, dated 2/4/1938, I extended my report also to the Plenipotentiary for War Economy. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor expressed himself in a definite manner, to the effect that his previous instructions with regard to the Plenipotentiary for War Economy, were in no way affected by this decree. The wording in the last paragraph of the decree was formulated in its present manner, for the precise purpose of corresponding with the conception of the Fuehrer. In consequence the position and the sphere of duty of the Plenipotentiary for War Economy have not been altered by the mentioned decree.

Both, General Fieldmarshal Göring and the Commander of the OKW have received one copy each, of your letter of 3.3.1938, as well as of this letter.

Heil Hitler!

Very sincerely yours [signed] Dr. Lammers

Title: "Document EC-318 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1184-1187.

Conference of Presidents under the chairmanship of the Plenipotentiary General for the Commitment of Labor (Arbeitseinsatz), Gauleiter SAUCKEL, held on 4/15/1942

The Reich Minister of Labor, who arrived accompanied by the "Staatssekretaere" Dr. SYRUP and Dr. ENGEL and who remained here throughout the meeting, has welcomed Gauleiter SAUCKEL, assured him of the close cooperation of the departments that were made available to him, and emphasized that differences which still remained would be settled in the most friendly manner in the course of a discussion between him and SAUCKEL.

Gauleiter SAUCKEL thanked him for the friendly welcome and asked that he should not be considered an intruder. He had been surprised by the mandate given to him, and he considered it a temporary mandate. He was wholeheartedly a Gauleiter and had no intention of becoming a Minister of State. He considered the mandate as having been entrusted to him for the duration of the war only. Besides, the question was not which person would carry out the Fuehrer's difficult mandate to regulate the commitment (Einsatz), but that the regulating work would be carried out. To him the difficulty of the task appeared to be the fact that it was not only an organizational and mechanical problem but that it was work involving the Germans. All his co-workers would have to remain conscious of the fact that they were regulating and committing people of German blood, with a German soul, and that fact invested their work with serious responsibility. That was also why he considered it necessary to work in closest cooperation with the Party, which was charged with leading the human element in Germany; that was why he had appointed the Gauleiters as his deputies. That did not mean that the Presidents of the State Labor Offices [Landesarbeitsaemter] would be subordinated to the Gauleiters, but merely that they should cooperate with the Gauleiters in comradely fashion, so that the latter could facilitate their difficult tasks. He requested that the President and Trustees who were present should immediately call on the Gauleiters. He, on his part, would take care of the correct briefing of the Gauleiters, and would also see to it that no interference with departmental work would occur.

SAUCKEL estimated manpower requirements at one million, to which number another 600,000 workers would be added in the course of time. Replacements would have to be procured for 370,000 skilled workers drafted into the Armed Forces. The drafting of these 370,000 skilled workers meant a serious handicap for the armament industry; it would have to be made up by raising the idealism and work morale of the remaining workers, by spurring key workers on to maximum effort; and that would also lead to extensive integration of the Party and of the German Labor Front.

He had discussed his task with the Fuehrer in a conversation that had lasted for several hours, and immediately after that he had discussed it with the Reich Marshal for more than eight hours. The most important solution envisaged by the Fuehrer, the Reich Marshal and himself was in exploiting the manpower of the East; all previous directives were cancelled, and all previous misgivings had been put aside. One million Russians would have to be brought into the Reich as rapidly as possible; with such speed that the output of some of these Russians would become available even prior to the offensive. Prisoners of war presently on hand would have to be utilized as rapidly as possible. The principal effort would be devoted to the recruiting of Russian civilians.

The prerequisite for his acceptance of his mandate had been the assurance that Russians would be fed approximately the same ration allowance that was in force for the German civilian population. He had been in a position to accept his mandate only after he had been assured of that by the Fuehrer, by Reich Marshal GÖRING, by Reich Minister DARRE and by State Secretary BACKE. In order to maintain the productive strength of the Russians it was necessary to feed them at the level of the ration allowances now in force for the German civilian population. He has based his opinion on the experience of a Russian of German ancestry who had worked in Russian exile for many years and who had gathered his experiences in the Russian Deportation Camps. He convincingly stated that the food supply for deported Russians in the work camps had been at least as ample as food supply allotted by the current German rationing. Furthermore, the food supply should be adapted to Russian national habits. The better they would be fed, the greater the output that could be squeezed out of them. The goal towards which he was working was the establishment of plants employing solely Frenchmen, Belgians and Dutchmen.

But he would not only have ensured their food supply; he had also taken into consideration the emotional reaction of Russians brought here for work. Therefore his second demand had been that the barbed wire would have to go. He had succeeded in that also, in the course of negotiations with the Reichsfuehrer SS. The Russians would be billeted in compact camps, which would be guarded; they could be taken out by guards, and they would be trained and taken care of by the Party. They would have to be handled so roughly by the German administration in the East that they should come to feel that they would prefer to go to Germany for work. Thirdly, he had termed the prevailing wage rates decreed by the Reich Marshal as intolerable, and had persuaded the Reich Marshal that Russians should have the possibility to earn up to one half of the wages of German workers. What they could not use in the camps would be credited to them in a savings account, and they would receive a Savings-book listing their savings. It would be explained to them that after their return to Russia, they could acquire land with their accumulated savings and establish themselves there (contrast to Communism).

To recapitulate the Russian problem, one would have to state that the spiritual prerequisites for the Russians had to be created in Germany in order to make it possible to demand output from them. Once these spiritual prerequisites had been created, the necessary output would have to be demanded most energetically also, and it would be self-understood that their treatment would be tough and just.

Document EC-366-1

Report on activities as Liaison Officer of the OKW with the Sudeten German Freikorps (Free Corps), Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1187-1190.

Berlin, 11.10.38

Koechling, Lt. Colonel and Special Delegate of the OKW to the Youth Leader of the German Reich 6 copies 4th Copy Br. B. No. 6/38 Top Secret

Army General Staff Dept. 2, No. 2285 Top Secret Received 12.10.38 Group III.

1. On the 17.9 I received the following instructions from the Fuehrer at the Obersalzberg for the Sudeten German Freikorps.

Continuous harassing along the active front by the Freikorps. To be carried out in the form of small undertakings against Czech posts, guardhouses, etc., appearing as groups of terrorists; formations of the Freikorps to be made according to the home districts of the members, so that they operate from opposite their particular home districts.

On the 18.9 a detailed discussion took place between Konrad Henlein and myself concerning the tasks and the organization of the Freikorps, which was in the process of being formed. There were an estimated 10000-15000 men in the reception camps and villages along the active front, only a very small part of them being armed.

The chain of command was fixed to the effect that one Group (I) in Breslau, one Group (II) in Dresden, one Group (III) Bavarian Austria in Bayreuth, one Group (IV) in Vienna (since the 28.9 six groups corresponding to the army sectors) were formed by the Command Staff of the Sudeten-German Freikorps (Donndorf near Bayreuth).

These groups in their turn formed battalions, the number of which varied from 3 to 18. From the battalions approximately 4 to 8 companies had been formed. The formation of the leadership corps and that of the staffs presented the greatest difficulties.

Supplies had been organized by the SA in conjunction with the NSV (Nat. Soc. Welfare Organization) and went smoothly from the very beginning.

The very small amount of arms consisted of Austrian carbines that had been supplied by the Austrian SA.

It is only thanks to the almost summerlike weather that there was no great falling off in numbers for reasons of the totally inadequate civilian clothing (for the greater part was without coats and headdress).

With magnificent camaraderie and unselfishness, the Supreme SA leadership had looked after the Freikorps materially. The NSKK had also given a hand by supplying lorries, cars and motorcycles.

The formation of the 4 group staffs was ordered: they were for the time being to form the available masses into battalions and to subdivide them again into companies. In this it was laid down that the maximum strength of a battalion should be 1000 men, that of a company 200 men. As regards weapons, the army helped with available Austrian stocks. The dispatch of rifles, hand grenades, ammunition as well as some machine pistols and light machineguns was arranged. Equipping and feeding remained in the care of the NSV and of the SA. The financial expenditures for feeding and for pay was accepted by the Wehrmacht.

The groups were ordered to carry out actions, which the Fuehrer had demanded should be numerous and intensive, for the time being in the form of 10 undertakings during each night. The carrying out of such shock troop undertakings was explained to the leaders of the group who were present.

The organization of the signals service created the greatest difficulties. Only through the support of the NSKK was a dispatch system made possible on the group fronts which were up to 250 km. in extent. Here again the SA helped in part with available signals apparatus. In spite of the reporting centers installed behind each sector of the front, the conveying of orders took up to 12 hours to begin with.

The leaders of the groups reached their areas by the afternoon of the 18.9, so that the first undertakings took place already during the night from the 18th to the 19th.

The building up of the groups and staff in the manner ordered was only possible owing to the effective support of the liaison officers provided to each group by the OKH, with whose help it was possible to reorganize the Freikorps so thoroughly by the 25.9 that supply, a regular formation and fighting could take place with a certain amount of prospects of success. In this the liaison officers were particularly well supported by the German SA leaders from the Reich who had been put into the Freikorps battalions by the SA; without their camaraderie and their readiness to do their duty the Freikorps could not have carried out its task.

The supreme leaders appointed to the Freikorps by the supreme SA leadership also contributed essentially to the building up of the Freikorps and to its successes. Their cooperation with me was exemplary. The leaders seconded from the SS leadership were present as observers in the staff or the Freikorps without participating in the building up.

3. There were several clashes with the Reinforced Frontier Patrol Service (VGAD) as the liaison between the two bodies did not work perfectly. This friction increased with the mounting of the Frontier Protection Service (Grenschutz)-in some cases in an unpleasant way. After the Command Staff and the liaison officers had continually worked in this direction on the groups, better cooperation came about in course of time.

With reference to the units of Organization K employed on the Silesian front who were under the command of the Wehrmacht (Counter-Intelligence) a sharp order issued by Konrad Henlein was necessary to overcome the lust for power of the group commander in charge there.

4. At the end of the first week (25.9) a certain consolidation and more successful working-both with regard to inner organization and to the execution of fighting actions-was recognizable, thanks to the tireless work of all units. The bringing up of arms and ammunition repeatedly caused the greatest difficulties. Yet here, too, owing to the continual willingness to help of Admiral Canaris of Dept. 2 of the General Staff and of the SA, it was possible to increase stocks of these to such an extent that on the 1.10 50-60% of the front line fighters were armed. The lack of hand grenades and equipment continued. (See App. 2.) The OKW's decree regarding the Freikorps' welfare and supply was accepted with particular thanks.

The fact that the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Central Office for persons of German race) was brought in, and wanted in part to claim powers of command over the Freikorps, had the effect of making the powers of command and the supply of material more difficult. The sudden supplying of the Freikorps through the Gau headquarters had an equally stultifying effect. Owing to lack of any stocks, these headquarters had, in their turn, to have recourse to the SA. This led to a delay in supplying the troops. Then, a few days later, the SA again completely took over supply as the result of an agreement.

Title: "Document EC-366-1: Report on activities as Liaison Officer of the OKW with the Sudeten German Freikorps (Free Corps), Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1190-1192.

5. The 1.10 brought about a fundamental change in the position, in as much as the Freikorps was subordinated to the Supreme SS leadership. The OKW continued to take care of feeding and payment until the 5.10.

At the same time the Obergruppenfuehrers who were working on the orders of the Supreme SA leadership intended to stop supplies by the SA. The Command Staff of the Freikorps was unable to call upon the SS leadership, which had now become responsible for the Freikorps, to take over the task of continuing to supply the Freikorps.

6. Among the leaders of the lower Freikorps units, too, there arose from this day on a certain agitation which threatened to endanger the inner structure of the corps which had been attained after much effort, in as far as it was justifiably feared that the SA leaders who had proved their worth in battle and in the task of building up would be replaced by leaders from the SS.

A letter to this effect from me to the Fuehrer's adjutant had as its effect that the Fuehrer devised unconditionally that the buildup of the Freikorps as regards personnel should remain as heretofore.

Under pressure of events and out of a feeling of comradeship, the SA drew upon its last stocks without reserve in order to give the troops striking power, although it was no longer bound to do so after the new subordination of the Freikorps.

On the 2nd October police general Daluege had a conference with the chief of staff of the Corps in order to regulate the activities of the Freikorps. The leaders of the Freikorps now believed that they would receive supplies and the necessary orders for further tasks through the police. They were, however, disappointed in this respect, in that nothing happened to this effect. On the 3rd October general of the police Muelverstedt arrived and issued only local and temporary instructions and left the urgent question of financial and material supplies unsolved. This lack of clarity in the position was passed on to the troops who, in spite of strict orders, began to lose their unity (frequent, illegal absences, in particular among the peasant and artisan elements). On top of that came the fact that the SS who had so far done nothing for the development of the Freikorps-began recruiting leaders and the elite of the troops in the Freikorps. Because of that there began an understandable exasperation on the part of the SA leaders. These things went so far that a Gruppenfuehrer of the Freikorps went to Berlin without leave. There he was promoted to SS-Oberfuehrer and reappeared only several days later in the Fuehrer's SS retinue. In order to win over the senior leaders of the Freikorps, the deputy of the Sudeten German leader and the chief of staff were offered high posts in the SS. But they did not accept them.

The fact that under such circumstances the inner structure of the force was bound to suffer was comprehensible, particularly as the fighting could no longer remain a link after the advance of the Armed Forces. The idea of disbanding the Freikorps after the conclusion of the military action, which I proposed to Konrad Henlein and his deputy in the early days already, gradually gained the upper hand, even though some leading persons were against it-not so much for logical reasons as for reasons of power. Since the "placing at the disposal" or since the placing under the orders of the SS for police duties I have interfered only in as far as the interests of the Armed Forces were directly affected. (Arbitrary headstrong advancing of ambitious junior commanders.) It was shocking to witness how two components of the State (leaders of the SA and SS) stood in more or less latent antagonism to each other, the effects of which were detrimental to the direction and unity of the troops.

Here lies the reason for the presence in Berlin since the 28th.9. of Konrad Henlein, who intended to deflect the local political currents into a direction favorable to the Freikorps. The actual leadership of the Korps was in the hands of the very active and methodical Chief of Staff (formerly a senator in the Czech Parliament and one time officer on the Royal and Imperial (Austrian) General Staff).

I left the Freikorps in this condition on the 4.10.

The experiences arising from this improvisation have shown that it was possible to employ a troop usefully in defensive tasks and in the task demanded by the Fuehrer even when it was only badly and un-uniformly trained and equipped-if it was moved by limitless patriotism and selfless readiness to serve, and animated by the will to fight. To have carried out military actions with this force in a large body and on a wider frontwhich the leaders were persuaded out of at the very beginning owing to its being misguidedwould only have led to bloody reverses. The spirit of the force was fundamentally magnificent, in spite of those who wanted to go home. It varied according to the locality from which the troops were drawn (Egerland was first-rate).

The force carried out more than 200 minor undertakings, in which they lost nearly 100 dead and more than 50 wounded, and captured more than 2000 prisoners and a great deal of booty of all kinds (see Appendix 1), so that the task which the Fuehrer had demanded as a foundation for his foreign political negotiations may be considered as having been completed.

[signed] Kuechling

Distribution: OKW Chief 1 L. 1 Foreign Dept/Counter Intelligence Chief 1 Dept. 2, General Staff of the Army 1 Lt. Col. Kuechling 1 Reserve 1 Total 6

Title: "Document EC-366-1: Report on activities as Liaison Officer of the OKW with the Sudeten German Freikorps (Free Corps), Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1192-1193.

APPENDIX I to: Lt. Colonel Kuechling, Special OKW delegate to the Youth Leader of the German Reich No. 6/38-Top Secret

Command of the Sudeten German Freikorps Records and Reinforcements Dept.

Number 015 Report I--VI/9

Total review of all actions of Groups I to VI Date 10/1/1938 Report 1900 hours

Description: I. Accomplished Actions To Date: 144; I: 0; II: 4; III: 15; IV: 0; V: 0; VI: 1; Total: 164; II Successful Actions 70; 0; 1; 3; 0; 0; 1; 75; III Enemy Losses Dead 96; 0; 0; 11; 0; 0; 3; 110; Wounded 50, 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 50; Taken prisoner 2027; 0; 0; 2; 0; 0; 0; 2029; IV Own Losses Dead 50; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 52; Wounded 57; 0; 3; 4; 0; 0; 1; 65; Missing 16; 0; 0; 3; 0; 0; 0; 19; V Captured Arms and Valuable Objects Various arms 49; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 49; Light machineguns 22; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 22; Heavy machineguns 2; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 2; Rifles 340; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 341; Revolvers 61; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 61 Ammunition 32000; 0; 0; 1000; 0; 0; 0; 33000; Hand Grenades 532; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 532; Lorries 3; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 4; Motorcycles 2; 0; 0; 2; 0; 0; 0; 4; Bicycles 2; 0; 0; 2; 0; 0; 0; 4; Ambulances 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; Carbines 4; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 4; Cars 3; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 3; Locomotives 4; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 4

APPENDIX II to: Lt. Colonel Kuechling Special OKW Delegate to the Youth Leader of the German Reich No. 6/38 Top Secret

No. 015 Report No. 9 Day 1-10-1938 Time of notification 1900 hours

Command of the Sudeten German Freikorps Records and Reinforcement Dept.

A. Establishment and new repartition of the Corps

Group I (Vienna) Battalions 6; Companies formed 32; No. of men on the strength 5365; Group II (Linz) 5; 20; 4748; Group III (Bayreuth) 5; 28; 4753; Group IV (Dresden) 2 sub- 15; 2454; 9 sections 27; 10200; Group V (Hirschberg) 3; 12; 1260; Group VI (Breslau) 7; 28; 3574; 1 Reserve Battalion 4; 1600; Total 38; 166; 33954

B. Equipment State for all Groups (in accordance with reports received to date)

1. Heavy MG's 62 2. Light MG's 27 3. Rifles 13545 4. Rifle ammunition 847190 5. Revolvers 1274 6. Revolver ammo. 62691 7. Hand grenades 996 8. Carbines 210 9. MG ammo. 10. Side arms 425 11. Lorrie 2 12. Motor boats 3 13. Aircraft 1 14. Automatic pistols 14 15. Steel helmets 15

Document EC-488

Employment of Prisoners of War, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1205-1206.

The Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy

Berlin, W.8. Behrenstrasse 6. 1/28/1939

GBW 7/437/39 g

Replies to be addressed to: The Leading Staff GBW Attention Ministerial Director Sarnow, or Deputy in the Office.

Express Letter SECRET

To the High Command of the Armed Forces Department of the Interior

Attention: Major Breyer or Deputy in the Office. Berlin.

With reference to the meeting of our mutual special workers in the case, I would like to inform you of the following:

I According to the Reich Defense Law of 9/4/1938, I have the direction for the economic preparations for the Reich Defense (except the armament industry). The Offices under my jurisdiction (Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs, Reich Ministry for Nutrition and Agriculture, Reich Labor Ministry, Reich Forest Master and Reich Commissioner for Price Control) are bound to follow my directives.

For the preparations concerning the utilization of labor during the war, the measures planned by you for the housing and the utilization of prisoners of war are of great importance. In the case of mobilization there would be an important deficit of laborers which might be catastrophic in some parts of the economy. I can refer to the statements of Col. General Keitel, Secretary of State Dr. Posse, and Secretary of State Dr. Syrup in the meeting of the sub-committee (R.V.) on 1/17/1939, concerning balance sheets for figures [Zahlenbilanz]. The deficit in labor has to be made up by the employment of eventual prisoners of war as far as possible and practical. The preparations, therefore, have to be made in close cooperation of OKW and GBW. The offices under my jurisdiction will be informed.

I therefore beg you to inform me of the preliminary studies prepared so far and to have negotiations of a principal nature in future with myself. I would be grateful for a copy of the drafts so far prepared.

In the drafting of the directives I want to emphasize the following principles:

1) Location of Camps:

For the choice of transit camps only military and technical transport exigencies will be prevailing.

As far as the permanent camps are concerned the exigencies of labor utilization will have to be taken into consideration. It will be expedient to locate them in districts which presumably will have the greatest and most urgent need for workers. The preliminary studies of the President of the Reich Institution for employment and unemployment insurance concerning employment during war in the agriculture could serve as a basis.

I therefore beg you before the final decision about the location of the six contemplated permanent camps to give me an opportunity to offer my advice. This could be done within a very short time.

2) Dimension of the Camps:

According to present directives, the permanent camps shall take in 10000 men and the working commands should return daily to the camp even if longer distances are involved. This regulation renders more difficult a practical employment. Therefore, a more flexible arrangement of the camps should be sought, as far as military reasons do not interfere and self-contained working commands should be provided.

Document EC-488

Employment of Prisoners of War, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1206-1207.

3) Execution of the Utilization of Labor:

a) The utilization of the prisoners of war will take place only in the permanent camps; in the transit camps a separation of working commands will not take place. If the High Command of the Armed Forces should think a different regulation necessary, then a participation of the district labor offices for the transit camps would have to be ordered, which, so far, is only contemplated for the permanent camps.

b) The utilization of the prisoners of war must be accomplished in close cooperation with the authorities for labor utilization, because only they have knowledge about the most urgent demands for labor. The Reich Labor Minister will declare competent one district labor office (respective labor office) for each permanent camp, which takes care of the practical utilization of the prisoners and which will advise the Commandant of the camp on all labor questions.

c) All requests for working commands will have to be directed to the District Labor Office. Insofar as the utilization of prisoners of war is not regulated centrally by OKW, GBW and RAM, the District Labor Office will advise about the urgency of the request. The utilization itself will take place in close cooperation between the District Labor Office and the permanent camps.

4) The Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs will make suggestions about the regulations for labor conditions, etc.

[Unsigned] Berlin, 1/28/1939

To the High Command of the Armed Forces Attention: a) Col. Warlimont (Department L) or Deputy in the Office. b) Major General Thomas (War Economy Staff) or Deputy in the Office. Berlin.

I am forwarding herewith the foregoing copy for your information, with a request to keep my office informed of all negotiations.

By order, [sgd] SARNOW

[Stamp] Certified: [Signature illegible]

Document M-130

[translation] in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 1209.

Der Strumer No. 51. 12/17/1942.

An Eye for an Eye, A Tooth for a Tooth.

The London newspaper, The Times, of 9/16/1942 published a resolution which had been unanimously passed by the Board of Deputies of British Jews. This resolution expresses the grief and horror of the "Anglo-Jewish community" at the "unspeakable atrocities" committed by Germany and her allies and vassals against the Jews of Europe, atrocities which had only one aim: to exterminate the whole Jewish population of Europe in cold blood.

Strange how the Jews of the "Anglo-Jewish community" suddenly begin to hear clearly ! When the second World War began, the Fuehrer of the German nation warned the Jewish war-mongers against plunging the world into a blood bath again. And since then the German Fuehrer has warned and prophesied again and again that the second World War, instigated by World Jewry, must necessarily lead to the destruction of Jewry. In his last speech, too, the Fuehrer again referred to his prophecies.

And yet an "Anglo-Jewish community" now dares to express publicly its "grief and horror"!!-the same community which is responsible for the mass murders of past centuries and of our present times, and which frequently proclaimed that a coming world enemy must bring about the extermination of the German people.

The Book says "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."

And so said the Fuehrer, too.

[Initialled] "Str." [Streicher]

Document M-136

[partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1210-1211.

Extracts from Der Sturmer No. 5. 1/28/1943

But the ghetto, too, which has today been re-established in nearly all European countries, is only an interim solution. For humanity, once awakened, will not merely solve the ghetto question, but the Jewish question in its totality. A time will come when the present demands of the Jews will be fulfilled: The ghetto will have disappeared. And with it Jewry!

[Signed] Ernst Hiemer

When, with the outbreak of the second World War, world Jewry again began to manifest themselves as warmongers, Adolf Hitler announced to the world, from the platform of the German Reichstag, that the World War conjured up by world Jewry would result in the self-destruction of Jewry. This prophecy was the first big warning. It was met with derision by the Jews, as were also the subsequent warnings. But now, in the fourth year of this war, world Jewry is beginning, in its retrospective reflections, to understand that the destiny of Jewry is finding its fulfillment at the hands of German National Socialism. That which the Fuehrer of the German people announced to the world as a prophecy, at the beginning of this second World War, is now being fulfilled with unrelenting inevitability. World Jewry which wanted to make big international business out of the blood of the warring nations, is rushing with gigantic steps towards its extirpation!

When Adolf Hitler stepped before the German people 20 years ago to submit to them the National Socialist demands which pointed into the future, he also made the promise which was to have the greatest effects in its results-that of freeing the world from its Jewish tormentor. How wonderful it is to know that this great man and leader is making action follow this promise also! It will be the greatest ever to take place amongst mankind. As yet we are too close to the events of the present time to be able to applaud in pious devotion the action that has been commenced. But the day will come when the whole of humanity will enjoy an international peace such as it has longed for for thousands of years.

[Signed] Julius Streicher

Document M-150

[translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 1216.

Der Sturmer No. 1. 1/6/1944

After the National Socialist uprising in Germany, a development began in Europe, too from which one can expect that it will free this continent, once and for all, of the Jewish disintegrator of nations and exploiter, andover and above thisthat the German example willafter a victorious termination of the second World Warbring about the destruction of the Jewish world tormentor in the other continents as well.

[Signed] Julius Streicher

Document M-151

[translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1216-1218.

Copy.

L. Schlaich, Stetten i.R., Supervisor of the Sanatorium for mental patients and epileptics.

Stettin i.R., 6.9.1940.

To the Reich Minister of Justice Dr. Frank [sic]. Berlin.

Dear Herr Reich Minister!

The measures which are at present being applied to mental patients of all kinds have led to the rise of a feeling of absolute legal insecurity among wide circles of the population. Such patients are transferred from the institutions, without obtaining the consent of their relations or guardians, to other institutions from which after a short time the notification follows that the persons concerned have died of some kind of disease. In view of the multitude of death notifications, the people are convinced that these patients are done away with. Since on the 10.9 and the 13.9, 75 of the patients entrusted to me were transferred on each of these days from the institution under my charge to such an institution, I take the liberty of asking this question: is it possible that such a measure can be carried out without a law referring to this being published? Is it not the duty of every citizen to oppose under all circumstances all acts not covered by the laws-in fact acts prohibited by the law--even if they are carried out by state organs?

Because of the absolute secrecy and impenetrability in which these measures are carried out, not only the wildest rumours arise among the people (for instance, that people who cannot work because of old age or wounds received in the Great War, have been done away with or are also to be done away with), but also they get the impression that the selection of the persons affected by this measure is done in a completely arbitrary manner.

If the State really wants to carry out the extermination of these patients or certain kinds of mental diseases, should not a clear law-openly accounted for to the people-be published, a law which would give every single person the guarantee of a careful examination of his liability to die or right to live, and would also : give relatives the chance to be heard, as in the case of the law for the prevention of the transmission of hereditary diseases?

With regard to the other patients entrusted to our institutions, I urgently beg you to do all you can to get the execution of these measures suspended, at least until a clear legal position has been created.

Heil Hitler! [signed] Schlaich.

I have sent a copy of this letter to the Head of the Reich Chancellery, Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, by the same post.

To Reich Minister of Justice

Berlin, 10.9.1940.

Dear Mr. Schlaich,

Your letter of the 6th of this month concerning the affair of the "transfer of inmates of institutions to another institution" reached me yesterday. For reasons of competence I sent it on to the Reich Minister of the Interior.

Heil Hitler! Yours truly, [signed] Dr. Guertner.

To: The Supervisor of the Sanatorium for Mental patients and epileptics. Mr. L. Schlaich Stetten i.R.

[letter passed on to Frick] Copy The Reich Minister of Justice

Berlin, the 10.9.1940.

My dear Colleague!

Enclosed I take the liberty of sending you a letter from the supervisor of the sanatorium in Stetten i.R., which I received last night, as I am not the competent person to deal with the directive asked for by the supervisor.

I have notified the sender of the passing on of his letter.

Heil Hitler! Yours truly, The Reich Minister Dr. Frick Reich Ministry of the Interior.

Document M-152

Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1218-1222.

COPY

Wuerttemberg Evangelical Provincial Church The Provincial Bishop.

To the Reich Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick. Berlin NW. Koenigsplatz 6.

Dear Reich Minister,

For some months past, insane, feeble-minded and epileptic patients of state and private medical establishments have been transferred to another institution on the orders of the Reich Defence Council. Their relatives, even when the patient was kept at their cost, are not informed of the transfer until after it had taken place. Mostly they are informed a few weeks later that the patient concerned had died of an illness, and that, owing to the danger of infection, the body had had to be cremated. On a superficial estimate several hundred patients from institutions in Wuerttemberg alone must have met their death in this way, among them war-wounded of the Great War.

Owing to numerous inquiries from town and country and from the most variegated circles, I consider it my duty to point out to the Reich Government that this affair is causing a particular stir in our small province. Firstly because one of the institutions concerned, Grafeneck castle, to which the patients are delivered and where a crematorium and registrar's office have been set up, is in Wuerttemberg. Grafeneck is the property of an institution of the "Inner Mission," the Samaritan Foundation, which for years has been taking in and looking after persons who are physically or mentally maimed. On the outbreak of war, it was transferred to the convent of Reutte in Upper Swabia on the order of the Wuerttemberg Ministry of the Interior; Grafeneck was intended for the reception of patients brought from other institutions. The castle lies on a height of the Swabian Alb in a sparsely populated forest district. With all the more attention does the population of the surrounding area follow the events that take place there. The transports of sick persons who are unloaded at the small railway station of Marbach a.L., the buses with opaque windows which bring sick persons from more distant railway stations or directly from the institutions, the smoke which rises from the crematorium and which can be noticed even from a considerable distanceall this gives all the more rise to speculation as no one is allowed into the castle.

The second reason why grave importance is attached to these things in Wuerttemberg is the fact that symptoms of degeneration are not rare even in mentally and morally high-ranking families in our small province. It is partly the consequences of marriages between relations, connected with the long seclusion of the province, that are noticeable here. A comparatively large number of families from the cultured class also is thus affected by the measures directed towards annihilation which are being taken against patients of institutions.

The manner of action is already sharply criticised in these circles; there is much talk, in particular, of deceptions which occur in this connection. Everybody is convinced that the causes of deaths which are published officially are selected at random. When, to crown everything, regret is expressed in the obituary notice that all endeavors to preserve the patient's life were in vain, this is felt as a mockery. But it is, above all, the air of mystery which gives rise to the thought that something is happening that is contrary to justice and ethics and cannot therefore be defended by the Government with full publicity like other necessary and severe war measures. This point is continually stressed by simple people as wellin the numerous written and oral statements which come to us. It also appears that very little care was taken, at first at any rate, in the selection of the patients destined for annihilation. They did not limit themselves to insane persons, but included also persons capable of work, especially among the epileptics.

The most important thing seems to me, however, that the Reich Government should appreciate the fundamental objections which have been raised among our people from humane and religious motives against this action, and should not consider the present ill-humour as a disregard of national and political necessities. I would therefore request permission to deal in greater detail with the problem of annihilation: I myself formerly had, as a subsidiary duty, the care of souls at a state sanatorium and nursing home and am therefore not unacquainted with the conditions and problems which arise in this connection.

Naturally, everybody who sees such pitiful men, thinks over and over again "Would it not be better to put an end to such an existence? It has no value for itself and means a heavy burden on the relatives." When the consequences of the blockade made themselves felt during the Great War and many patients died of tuberculosis and other illnesses fostered by malnutritionthe number of funerals which I had to hold amounted normally to about 20, but increased to 50 in 1917-everybody accepted this as a natural consequence of the war and as a divine ordinance, and one could be thankful in many cases that the end had come. It is, however, quite a different matter to take steps to bring about this end through human intervention. Many patients are conscious of their existence and position to a much greater extent than healthy people assume; in many cases, when one believes that they have not heard or have not understood, words addressed to them, it transpires afterwards that they have in fact done so, but were not able to react as a healthy person would have reacted. Many are distinctly sensitive as to whether they are treated lovingly or roughly by their doctor and nurse. Now put yourself into the mental position of a patient who draws the conclusion from all sorts of signs that something is to happen to him, who, maybe, is even subjected to force in order to make him board the transportand you will be convinced that this is wrong, as God's will is interfered with and human dignity violated thereby. The decision as to when the life of a human sufferer should be terminated rests with Almighty God, according to whose inscrutable decision a completely healthy and valuable man is taken away before his time in one case, and an incapacitated man languishes on for decades in another. I can well understand that, in view of these and of many other facts which cannot be explained rationally, many people reject belief in God and adopt a creed of blind fate in its place; but I cannot understand that a party which implicitly rejects atheism and which has selected and introduced the term "believers in God" for those outside the Christian faith, should approve of and carry out a violation of God's sovereign right, as is the case in the treatment of the patients of the institutions. The Fuehrer has only recently called for prayer for the fighting troops and for humble thanksgiving for the glorious victory over France; can we not also entrust the lives of our suffering compatriots to this God, and is it not his will that we look after them while he lets them live?

Here I come to the second reason why the sensibilities of our people take offence at these measures. Pre-Christian Antiquity already laid down the principle: res sacra miser, the unfortunate person is a holy thing. Christianity has always made it its duty to look after the sick and suffering, because of Him, of whom it is said: He bore our sickness and took our pains upon Himself. As opposed to the roughness of primitive paganism, man was treated as a human being and not as an animal. The progresses in the field of medicine were utilised for mental patients as well in the institutions of the Christian labour of love. And it is actually specialists in institutions of the Inner Mission and in state institutions who have made considerable progress. I have often admired the conscientiousness and patience of institution psychiatrists who, while showing a much smaller percentage of successful cures as compared to other doctors, nevertheless treat every patient as something of value entrusted to them. How hard it must be for these men to allow and to defend measures contrary to the whole tradition of their profession, that are directed towards the opposite of the humane attitude which, in addition to scientific accuracy, forms the honour and dignity of the medical profession!

Perhaps, however, I shall receive the reply: the hundreds of thousands of physically and mentally incapacitated persons are too heavy a burden economically and financially for the German people who have now undertaken such big tasks; the relatives must make their sacrifices, as the families of those killed at the front have made much heavier sacrifices ! Against this one must say that a people fights for its existence, and that no one is too good to risk his life in this battle for existencethat we may accept as God's will and commandment, that, however, the weak and defenseless should be destroyed, not because they represent a danger to us, but because we are tired of feeding them and caring for themthat is contrary to God's commandment. Do we not praise our soldiers because, when they have done their duty against the armed enemy, they mercifully look after the unarmed, especially women, children, wounded and sick, and do not consider them burdens which they thus impose on themselves and the nation. It would indeed be possible to entertain the thought: we have no reason to spare an inimical nation which has done us as much harm as the French. But this thought would be worthy of a Clemenceau, not of a German.

It is no doubt very painful for the parents if among their children there is one who is mentally deficient; but they will let this child feel their whole love as long as God allows it to live; contrary treatment, which of course does occur also, is condemned by public sentiment. Why? Because our people are guided by the Christian way of thought in all these questions. And as the Party stands implicitly on the basis of a "positive Christianity" and as, again, it implicitly and especially wishes the ethical attitude of the Christian, above all the love of one's neighbor, to be understood under this "positive Christianity," it really cannot approve the measures directed to destroy life. We therefore find it quite understandable that those circles of the Party whose voices can be heard chiefly on the "Schwarze Korps" wish to do away not only with church Christianity but with all Christianity because it represents an obstacle to such measures. They thus confirm the old and frequent experience that a break with the Christian faith also carries with it a break with Christian ethics. But anyhow, the Fuehrer and the Party have so far stood on the platform of positive Christianity which regards charity towards suffering compatriots and their humane treatment as a matter of course. If, however, a serious matter like the care of hundreds of thousands of suffering compatriots in need of care is dealt with solely from the point of view of momentary advantage and if a brutal extermination of these compatriots is decided on, then the final stroke is added to a fateful development and Christianity is given its final conge as a vital power determining the individual and communal life of the German people. But paragraph 24 of the Party program is then also untenable. The claim that only confessional Christianity, not Christianity in itself, is being fought against, is inoperative here; for all confessions are agreed that man and nation have to bear as a burden imposed by God the burden imposed on them by the presence of people who are in need of care and may not eliminate these people by killing them.

Document M-152

Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1222-1224.

It is only with honour that I can think that things will continue as they have begun. The possible advantage of these measures will be more and more outweighed, the longer they go on, by the damage they will cause. What conclusion will the young generation draw for private life, when it realizes that human life is no longer sacred to the State? Cannot every outrage be excused on the grounds that the elimination of another was of advantage to the person concerned? There can be no stopping once one starts down this slope. God does not permit people to mock Him; he can turn what we believe we have gained on one side to harm and a curse on the other. Either the National Socialist State also must recognise the limits which God has laid down for it, or it will favour a moral decline which will also carry with it the decline of the State.

I can imagine, Mr. Minister, that this protest will be regarded as embarrassing. Hardly dare I express the hope, either, that my voice will be heard. If, nevertheless, I have made this declaration, I have done so primarily because the relations of the compatriots affected expect such action from the leaders of a church I am also, however, moved by the thought that this action may perhaps give rise to a serious examination and to the abandonment of this path. Dixi et salvari animam meam!

Heil Hitler! Yours faithfully, [Signed] Dr. WURM.

Wuerttemberg Evangelical Provincial Church. The Provincial Bishop.

Stuttgart, 8/23/1940.

To Reich Minister of Justice, Gr. Guertner, BERLIN.

Dear Reich Minister of Justice,

Much comment has been aroused by the measures-directed at the elimination of lives of no value to the community-which are being carried out at the moment on a large scale in certain state institutions, especially in Wuerttemberg, in Castle Grafeneck village of Dapfen, Muensingen district. I have therefore directed the letter of which I enclose a copy to the Reich Minister of the Interior. I request you, Mr. Reich Minister of Justice, to interest yourself, from your sphere of work, in this matter, which, if continued in the present manner contrary to the legal measures for the protection of the eugenic health of the German people, must shatter the people's confidence in justice as much as their trust in the doctor as a helper of men.

Heil Hitler! Yours sincerely, [signed] D. Wurm.

Stuttgart, the town of the Germans abroad 9/5/1940

Wuerttemberg Evangelical Provincial Church The Provincial Bishop

To the Reich Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick BERLIN.

Dear Reich Minister,

On the 19th July I sent you a letter about the systematic extermination of lunatics, feeble-minded and epileptic persons. Since then this practice has reached tremendous proportions: recently the inmates of old-age homes have also been included. The basis for this practice seems to be the opinion that in an efficient nation there should be no room for weak and frail people. It is evident from the many reports which we are receiving that the people's feelings are being badly hurt by the measures ordered and that a feeling of legal insecurity is spreading which is regrettable from the point of view of national and state interests. If the leadership of the state is convinced that it is a question of an inevitable war measure, why does it not issue a decree with legal force, which would at least have this good point that official quarters would not have to seek refuge in lies ? But ifas can be assumed with certaintyGermany is in a position to feed these members of the nation as well, why then these rigorous steps? Is it necessary that the German nation should be the first civilised nation to return, in the treatment of weak people, to the habits of primitive races? Does the Fuehrer know about this matter? Has he approved it? I beg you not to leave me without a reply in this tremendously serious matter.

Heil Hitler Yours faithfully [signed] Dr. Wurm

Document M-152

Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1224-1225.

Wuerttemberg Evangelical Provincial Church The Provincial Bishop.

Stuttgart, the town of the Germans abroad, 9/6/1940.

To the Reich Minister of Justice Dr. Guertner BERLIN W Wilhelmstr. 65

Dear Reich Minister,

Permit me to inform you of a second letter which I have sent to the Reich Minister of the Interior about the systematic extermination of lunatics, weak and frail compatriots. This matter is reaching the proportions of a great danger and a scandal. Dear Reich Minister, I would be very grateful if you would give me the opportunity to give you a more detailed account and to show you documents concerning this matter, next Wednesday the 11th September. Please inform Dean Keppler, Berlin, N.W.87, Holsteiner Ufer 16, Tel. 392950, if and when the reception is possible.

Heil Hitler Yours faithfully, [signed] Dr. Wurm

Most obediently To the Minister [Guertner]

According to order, I informed Dean Keppler by telephone on the 10th September that hospitals and nursing homes come under the Reich Minister of the Interior and that it is therefore recommended that the Provincial Bishop present his wishes first to the Minister of the Interior.

Dean Keppler promised to inform the Provincial Bishop accordingly.

BERLIN, 9/11/1940 [signed] Sommer

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1243-1244.

File [Cover]

"Correspondence re complaint about Major Meinel and the Commander of the Prisoners of War in Defense Area (Wehrkreis) VII of the Armed Forces."

[Document A]

Munich, 9/12/1941

1) Introductory Notice

Re: Russian Prisoners of War

According to oral information by the Commandant of the Prisoner of War Camp in Defense Area VII there are within that district about 5000 Russian prisoners of war. For the purpose of distribution they are held in Stalag Moosburg. Here the Russian prisoners of war are guarded in a separate division of the camp. A considerable part of the Russian prisoners of war have already been distributed for labor in the Higher Administrative Areas of Schwaben and Oberbayern. They are used only in groups and in such a way that they will not be able to get in touch either with the civil population or with other prisoners of war. The individual labor detachments are housed in enclosed areas or huts. The foremen of the labor detachments are usually auxiliary police officials. Every precaution is being taken, and the guard force instructed accordingly so that disturbances cannot occur. Moreover, the guards are allowed to make use of their firearms.

An examination of the Russian prisoners of war who are held in the Moosburg Camp is no longer made since the prisoners of war do not arrive there immediately from the East, but are transferred from Defense Area IV (Dresden) to Moosburg for labor. Presumably they were in Defense Area IV, which also contains a screening camp.

Regarding the staffing of the Special Detachments in the Hammelburg and Langwasser Camps (Nurnberg) I refer to the enclosure. (GRS). [Note: Not in this dossier.] Regarding the distribution of Russian prisoners of war in District XIII the inquiries have not yet been completed. Report will follow when the statements are complete.

2) To be submitted to SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Isselhorst.

[signed] Wuerstle SS-Hauptscharfuehrer

[Marginal note in pencil] The Russians are not screened in Defense Area IV. [signed] Sch.

[Document B]

Secret State Police Secret Police High Authority Munich Nr. secr. Reichm. 66/41

Munich, 23.9.41

I. Teletype! Urgent! To be submitted at once.

a) To the Gestapo directing office in Dresden.

b) To the Gestapo office in Halle (Saale).

Re: Screening of Russian prisoners of war.

Your Ref: Decree of Chief of Security Police (Sipo) and Security Service (SD) of 12.9.41.

Ref. Nr. 21 B/41 top secret (6 Rs.) IV A 1 c.

From the following Stalags situated in Defense Area IV. 1. Army Training Ground Zeithein. 2. Stalag Muehlberg (Elbe).

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1244-1245.

So far 5328 Russian prisoners of war have been transferred to Stalag VII in Moosburg near Freising, which is situated within the jurisdiction of this Gestapo. The greater part has been distributed from there into labor detachments. Since these prisoners did not arrive immediately from the East, but from the transit camps mentioned above, they were supposedly screened in these camps by employment detachments [Einsatzkommands].

Please inform me by urgent teletype whether these Russian prisoners of war were screened by you according to the Rules of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service of 7/17/1941. Encl. 2.

II. File in Dossier: Russian P of Ws, II a.

[Handwritten note] Re-submit at once.

By order: [signed] Schermer Kriminalkommissar [corresponding to: CID-Superintendent.]

[Document C]

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office Munich Teletype office

Nr. 18193 From: Dresden Nr. 9284 9/25/1941 1310-MI

To: Munich Office-Secret:

Re: Screening of Russian prisoners of war.

Your Ref: TP Nr. 18117 of 23.9.41-II A.

Since every organizational facility is lacking we have hitherto been unable to start screening Stalag Zeithain. Zeithain is reception camp for Defense Area IV, from there the Russians are transferred to the Muehlberg Transit Camp; there they are screened within a few days according to their labor suitability and subsequently distributed between a number of other Stalags. The 5,328 prisoners of war transferred to your area therefore have not been screened here.

Gestapo Directing Office, Dresden I D-22/41g By order [signed] Uhlenhaut, KK. ["Kriminalkommissar"]

[Document D]

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office-Munich Teletype Communications Office.

Nr. 18149 Halle Nr. 1849 24.9.41 1505-Schl.

To: Gestapo Directing Office, Munich.

Secret-Urgent-To be submitted at once.

Re: Screening of Russian prisoners of war.

Your Ref. Decr. Chief Security Police and Security Service of 12.9.41 Ref. Nr. 21/B/41 secr. Reichm. IV A. 1 c and your letter TP Nr. 18117 of 23.9.41 II A1.

Hitherto no screening has been done by us in the two transit camps mentioned.

Gestapo-Off. Halle II A 1-215. Top secret /41, by order: [signed] Gold, KK

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1246-1248.

[Document E]

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich

Teletype Communication

From: Berlin "NUE" 183 48313.11.41 1555-WE 1-

To: Gestapo Directing Office, attention of Obersturmbannf Regierungsrat Dr. Isselhorst-or deputy Munich

Re: Screening of Soviet-Russian prisoners of war.

Your Ref: Nr. Nil.

Armed Forces High Command informed us that the screening of Soviet Prisoners of war in the camps and detachments is allegedly done superficially; thus in one case for instance out of 4,800 prisoners 380 are said to have been sorted out. Will you please charge the leaders of the labor detachments to observe the rules given in Enclosure 2 of Employment [Einsatz] Order No. 8. Moreover I recommend that you get in touch with the Commanding Officer of Prisoners of War in Defense Area VII personally and settle this matter. Please report to me as soon as possible on the facts and the result of your negotiation so that I can communicate with the High Command.

The Chief of Security Police and Security Service-B Nr. 2024 B/rlg IV A 1 c.

By order [signed] VogtSS-Obersturmbannfuehrer.

[Document F]

Munich, 15.11.41

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich II A/Sche

Re: Screening of Russian prisoners of war in District VII.

The Munich employment detachment during last week screened a total of 662 Russian prisoners of war in 6 labor camps. Of those 63 Russians were definitely found to be suspect and impossible to tolerate. .So far the following camps have been screened:

1. Stalag VII A at Moosburg Screened: 550 Intolerable: 89 2. Aerodrome Lechfeld: 330 34 3. Farm Management Lechfeld: 130 10 4. Aerodrome Landsberg (Lech): 60 14 5. Aerodrome Altenstadts near Schongau: 500 72 6. Hohenpeissenberg, Messrs. Lunz & Co.: 10 [none] 7. Liechtenay and Maxlried: 80 6 8. Aerodrome Memmingen: 214 28 9. Aerodrome Neuburg/Danube: 442 7910. Railway-Traffic-Office Memminen: 55 25 11. Marbleworks Eichstaett: 30 5 12. Pfraudnrof near Kipfenberg: 25 5 13. Grossmehring n. Ingolstadt: 27 4 14. Geissenfeld/Winden: 40 2 15. Pfaffenhofen on Jacht: 50 [none] 16. Fahlenbach n. Wolnzach: 95 9 17. Wolnzach Station: 100 11 18. Schleissheim Aerodrome 350 37 [Total]: 3088 410

2 The 410 Russians who were sorted out belong to the following categories:

1. Officials and Officers 3 2. Jews 25 3. Members of Intelligentsia 69 4. Fanatical Communists 146 5. Agitators, Ringleaders, Thieves 85 6. Runaways 35 7. Incurably sick 47 [Total] 410

The employment detachment will still have to screen the following labor camps in Defense Area VII:

1. Dorfen on Isen 40 Russians 2. Moosen n. Dorfen 40 Russians 3. Mettenheim n. Muehldorf on Jagst 150 Russians 4. Tatzelwurm n. Oberaudorf 50 Russians 5. Oberegg n. Krumbach, Messrs. Pohl 20 Russians 6. Oberegg n. Krumbach, Messrs. Bisle 55 Russians 7. Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Loc. Auth) 110 Russians 8. Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Army Building Office 40 Russians [Total] 555 Russians

In Defense Area XIII the employment detachment has screened 2 labor camps in Schwaben as follows:

1. Deiningen n. Noerdlingen (Air F. Build. Off.) [Screened] 90 Intolerable 8 2. Heuberg n. Oettingen (Air F. Build. Off.) [Screened] 120 Intolerable 20 [Total] [Screened] 210 Intolerable 28

Of 410 Russians who were sorted out, the following were executed in the Concentration Camp at Dachau to date:

1. On 15.10.41 27 Russians 2. On 22.10.41 40 Russians 3. On 8.11.41 99 Russians 4. On 12.11.41 135 Russians [Total] 301 Russians

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1248-1250.

As ordered by the Chief of Security Police and Security Service, every Russian was personally interrogated by the employment detachment and heard as to his political opinions. The enclosed form was used if a Russian was sorted out. It had been possible to appoint for each Labor camp several Soviet-Russians as confidential agents, who in the main were of Ukrainian, Armenian, Baltic, Polish or Rumanian race. The special point was made that every unfavorable report by a confidential agent had to be borne out by the report of another agent. In this way the danger was avoided from the very beginning that one of the agents might accuse a Russian prisoner of war of having been an active agitator in the Soviet Union, animated solely by spite, personal enmity, or other personal reasons.

I repeatedly instructed the members of the employment detachment when we discussed our daily experience, or when we had special conference, that they had to screen the Russians strictly according to the rules issued by the Chief of Security Police and Security Service. Since two interpreters were at my disposal, I divided the employment detachment into two groups, and I satisfied myself in person that they performed the screening correctly. I was present at almost every interrogation, and supervised the two groups in turn.

Up to date, 410 Russians out of a total of 3088 Russians were screened out as intolerable, which corresponds to an average percentage of 13%. The Gestapo offices, Nurnberg-Fuerth, and Regensburg screened out an average of 15-17%.

I wish to refute most emphatically the complaint of the High Command of the Armed Forces that the screening of the Russians had been carried out in a superficial manner.

Many camp officers and guards in many cases proposed to screen out individual Russians because they had been guilty of small offenses in the camp or of contravening camp discipline. In some cases, on the other hand, they wanted to keep German-speaking Jews in the camp, although they had been screened out, in order to continue using them as interpreters. In either case the members of the employment detachment were not influenced by those wishes, but decided accurately on the basis on their guiding principles.

I assume that the report which the OKW in Berlin received was made by the Counter-Intelligence Officer of Stalag VII A at Moosburg via the C. O. of Prisoners of War in the Defense Area VII. When I was present in Moosburg, I noted that this counterintelligence officer, Captain Hoerrmann was from the start prejudiced against the work of the employment detachment and also had influenced the Army interpreters. I was informed from a very reliable source that Captain Hoerrmann was very little liked by camp officers and guards, because he favored the French prisoners of war in every way and moreover preferred Jewish prisoners of war as confidential agents. I am going to receive more material about Hoerrmann from one of my agents in the camp next week; I shall then make a detailed report.

The Chief of Counter-Intelligence Office VII, Prisoner of War Department, Capt. Woelzl, gave me a hint about a fortnight ago when we had a conference that Hoerrmann will soon be relieved from his post as Counter-Intelligence Officer of Stalag VII A at Moosburg, since other authorities there already disapproved his attitude.

II. Submitted to the Deputy-Chief.

By order [signed] Schermer

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich

Personnel Form

Identity Number: Stalag Family Name: First Name: Born: At: Profession: Whether single, married, widowed, divorced: Domicile: Last military rank: Unit: Result of Inquiries:

[Document G]

Munich, 11/24/1941

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich II A/Sche

Re: Screening of Russian Prisoners of War in-Defense Area VII of the Force

On Saturday, 11/22/1941, I visited the Counter-Intelligence Officer of the Deputy Army Corps Command VII-Dep. I c-Int. Off./III P.o W., Capt. Dr. Woelzl, Munich, Theresienstr. 4/room 183, and exchanged information with him.

Dr. Woelzl informed me that in the near future 20000 Russians would arrive in Defense Area VII for allocation as labor. He requested me to assist the Counter-Intelligence Officer of Stalag VII A at Moosburg in the future examination of the Russians; technicians, fitters, locksmiths and engineers to be screened out since these craftsmen would be needed in the near future for restarting the Russian armaments enterprises in the occupied countries.

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1250-1254.

The OKW have instructed that escaping prisoners should no longer be screened out after one attempt only, and that the OKW had decided to grant them a probation period. He asked me to propose screening only in cases where larceny or violence against persons could be proved.

When I asked him whether Counter-Intelligence Department VII ever had received a complaint from anybody that the employment detachment of the Chief of Security Police and Security Service screened out Russian prisoners of war in a superficial way, he denied this decidedly. He expressed the belief that such a complaint could have been made only by the Commanding Officer for Prisoners of War at Munich. During the conference I received the impression that Dr. Woelzl also was not able to collaborate closely enough with the officers of Stalag VII A at Moosburg and with the C.O. of P.o.W.s and his advisors because in many cases they went over his head. Dr. Woelzl mentioned that other officers had already received a hint to be careful in their relations with him because he was an old Nazi.

He suspected that Major Karl Meinel, born 25.11.77 at Neuburg/Danube, had made a complaint to the High Command of the Armed Forces that the Russians had been superficially screened out. He had found out that Major Meinel, in his capacity as Rural Police Lieutenant Colonel at the headquarters of the Rural Police Department for Upper Bavaria, before the assumption of power had intimately collaborated with the late police president of Munich, Koch, and the late Minister of the Interior, Stuetzel. After the assumption of power, Major Meinel had been pensioned off; the reasons were unknown to him. If I could discover the reasons he would be obliged if I could inform him. In the enclosed Personnel Files of Major Meinel is a report of the Security Service, Directing Section, Munich which says:

[Follows a note from these Gestapo files, in which Meinel is reproached with having shown after the accession of power not only indifference, but "to some extent even aversion" against the National Socialist creed, thus he had e.g. mentioned God, but not the Fuehrer in an Order of the Day, etc.]

When I assumed my office in the beginning of 10/1941 I repeatedly asked Major Meinel by telephone whether I could see him or the C.O. of the PoWs, Major-General von Saur, Munich, Friedrichstr. 11. He answered that in his opinion there was no need for screening the Russians kept in Defense Area VII, since they had already been screened in the different transit camps and Stalags where they had been before. Thereupon I communicated at once by teletype with the Gestapo offices in Dresden and Halle and was informed that the Russians, transferred from the camps Zeithain and Muehlberg to Stalag VII at Moosburg, had not yet been screened by any office. When I informed Major Meinel and later his deputy, Major Mueller, of this fact, they left it to me whether I wished to communicate immediately with the Commander of Stalag VII at Moosburg. Again neither of them recommended a personal interview with the C.O. for PoWs, Major General von Saur, or with his subordinates, Majors Meinel or Mueller. From this attitude I received the impression that Gestapo officials are not welcome there. Now it has been clearly established by the above report from the Security Service Directing Office in Munich, that Major Meinel is prejudiced against the NSDAP and its organizations. The officers of Stalag VII at Moosburg also showed no spirit of collaboration when I carried out my special duty there. Dr. Woelzl informed me that the Commander of Stalag VII A at Moosburg, Colonel Nepf, is an ossified old officer who resents any interference in his routine by other authorities. His only aim is to satisfy the C.O. of PoWs in order to end his career, if possible, as a Major-General. In the same manner the Intelligence Officer in Stalag VII A, Captain Hoerrmann does everything to please Colonel Nepf, in order to attain some benefit for himself.

Dr. Woelzl does not think Captain Hoerrmann suitable for his post as Counter-Intelligence officer, since he does not receive important information unless directly from other sources.

Captain Dr. Woelzl asked me time and again in our several interviews not to be influenced by the attitude of those officers, and to proceed with screening the Russians precisely according to the prescribed rules. The officers of Stalag VII A displayed the attitude that the Russians ought to be improved by clemency; sick Russians ought to be coddled back to health; in this way they tried to gain for themselves the reputation of being humane men. Experience, however, has shown that the Russians can be compelled to work only by the utmost severity and the use of corporal punishment.

I have certainly not been helped in my task, but I worked strictly in accordance with the instructions.

Dr. Woelzl advised me to ask the Counter-Intelligence Department of Defense Area VII to give an opinion whether or not I carried out my special duty with conscientiousness.

II. To be submitted to the Deputy Director

By order [signed] Schermer SS-Obersturmfuehrer and Criminal Commissioner Director of Employment Detachment

[Document H]

Munich, 11/24/1941

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich-The Chief of Office-

Secret! [stamp] Dispatched 11/25/1941 Dispatching Office

g 9074/41 II A

I. Write: (Written. [initials Ma.])

To the Main Reich Security Office-Dep. IV-att. of SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Vogt-or deputy Berlin SW 11 Prince Albrecht-Str. 8

Re: Screening of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War.

Your Ref: Your TP of 13.11.41 Ref. Nr. 2024 B/41 g IV A 1 c.

According to your directive, I approached the Commanding Officer of Prisoners of War in Defense Area VII, Major-General von Saur and asked for an interview about this matter. Major General von Saur was unable to grant me an interview, owing to urgent duties and lack of time, and referred me to the officer in charge, Major Meinel.

To the latter I replied with regard to the complaint of the High Command, that the Russian prisoners of war had been screened by our Employment Detachment in complete accordance with the instructions contained in enclosure II to Allocation (Einsatz) Order Nr. 8.

[Follows some figures etc. taken from Schermer's report of 15.11.41.]

[Next page, line 8]

Major Meinel gave a hint that it was he who had made the complaint in question, and that' he considered the manner intolerable in which the Soviet-Russian prisoners of war were treated here. He was an old soldier, and such proceedings could not be approved from a soldierly point of view. If a soldier of the enemy had been captured, then he was a prisoner and must not be shot at anybody's whim. The second reason for his objection to this procedure was that the labor supply for Defense Area VII was catastrophically bad so that every man was urgently needed for labor. On the other hand, it was well known that the Russians were, in general, good workers, and he could not understand why he executed these able workers, especially as these Russians had already been screened in the Eastern transit camps. Furthermore, Meinel remarked that he also objected to the procedure followed for the reason that news of it gradually leaked out to the outer world, which involved the danger that Soviet Russian authorities would also learn about it. In that case we had certainly to reckon with the fact that the Soviets would treat German prisoners of war in exactly the same manner as we treated theirs. To the latter point I replied that the Soviets as far as could be judged from the experiences hitherto had and from what I had been able to find out, would probably take no German prisoners at all, and that probably no German soldier would ever return alive from Russian captivity. Furthermore, I pointed out to Major Meinel that the work of the Gestapo employment detachments was done with the consent of the High Command of the Armed Forces, and according to rules which had been drafted in collaboration with the High Command, Department Prisoners of War. To which Meinel replied that the entire procedure was, in his opinion, wrong, and that he was going to report to that effect to Berlin. He was of the opinion that first some firsthand information should have been gathered with regard to the Russian prisoners, and that appropriate measures should have been taken after, not before, such information had been collected. Besides, he believed it would be desirable to allow the Russian prisoners of war, especially the intelligensia among them, to get acquainted with life in Germany, so that they could enlighten their comrades. I notified Major Meinel that this opinion of his was not binding upon me, and that the employment detachment of the Gestapo Directing office in Munich would proceed in its work until either the screening of Russian prisoners of war was completed or we had received an order from the Main Reich Security Office to terminate the screening activity in this district. For the rest, I announced to Major Meinel my intention to report to my superior authority.

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 06 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1254-1255.

[Follow denunciations against Major Meinel, taken verbally from Schermer's report of 24.11.41.]

[The letter ends:]

The activity of the employment detachment is completed for the time being. But in the near future the arrival of 20,000 more Russian PoWs in the Defense Area VII is to be expected, according to information by Captain Dr. Woelzl.

II. One copy to Inspector of Security Police and Security Service. III. One copy to the Leader of the Higher SS and Police. IV. To submit to Regierungs-Assessor Marmon for his information. V. To be filed.

The deputy [signature] Schimmel

[Document I]

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich The Chief of Office Secr. 9074/41 II A

Secret! [stamp] Dispatched 12/15/1941 Dispatching Office.

I. Report: (typed G.W.) To the Main Reich Security Office-Dept. IV Att. of SS-Gruppenfuehrer Mueller. Berlin

Re: Screening of Russian Prisoners of War

Your Ref: Your teletype of 13.11.41 B.Nr. 2024/41 B secr. IV A 1 c., my report of 24.11.41 B.Nr. secr. 9074/41 IIA.

The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Freiherr von Eberstein recently asked me to inform the Main Reich Security Office that it would be desirable if you would enter into negotiations with the High Command in order to urge the relief or transfer of Major Meinel, a subordinate of the Commanding Officer of PoWs in this district; this is the officer with whose objectionable attitude I dealt at length in my report mentioned above. SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Freiherr von Eberstein thinks it intolerable that Meinel should continue to have his appointment here, since it must be expected that his attitude might lead to disagreeable discussions with the District Command of this place, which would endanger our mutual cooperation.

I request you take note of this for your information and possible further action.

II. To be filed.

As deputy [signature] Schimmel

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 07 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1255-1256.

[Document J]

[Note: This letter is a copy]

Munich, 1/13/1942.

The Officer Commanding the Prisoners of War in Defense Area VII-Ref. Nr. IIa Nr. 19/42 secr.

The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police Freiherr von Eberstein. Munich

Dear Baron Eberstein,

In reply to your letter of 12/24/1941 I beg to enclose copy of a report which Major Meinel made to me by request; it gives a different picture of the facts. Major Meinel did not make the activity of the employment detachment more difficult.

The objections of Major Meinel to the manner in which the screening was carried out originated from reports of the Camp Commander which left me with the same impression. I voiced these objections towards the High Command since I thought the results of the project were too uncertain to risk the injury to the camp discipline and to the labor supply which necessarily must result from it. The reason for the objections thus far was of a merely practical and procedural nature and did not include a criticism of the measure itself.

I may be allowed to expect that this explanation is sufficient to remove the friction prevailing now and am

With Heil Hitler Yours sincerely [signed] v. Saur Major-General

[Enclosure to the letter of 13.1.1942, von Saur to Eberstein]

To: The O.C. the PoWs in Defense Area VII

Re: Interview with Regierungsrat Schimmel.

The interview with Regierungsrat Schimmel only concerned facts. I did not make any objections. I only informed him of the first-hand information acquired while carrying out the instructions and asked whether the proper authorities might not draw conclusions from this information.

When I mentioned that weighed heavily on the officers' conscience to hand over the prisoners, Regierungsrat Schimmel replied that the hearts of some of the SS men who were charged with executing prisoners were all but breaking.

[signed] Meinel

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 08 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1256-1257.

[Document K]

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich II A/Sche

Munich, 1/16/1942 Secret!

Re: Screening of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War

I. Comment to Major Meinel's report of 1/13/1942. [The first two pages of this document contain nothing but repetition.]

In the meantime I found out that of the 474 Russian PoWs who had been screened out, only 301 Russians were transferred to the Dachau Concentration Camp. By order of Major Meinel the remaining number were not delivered to the Dachau Concentration Camp. The 173 Russians thus retained in Stalag VII A at Moosburg are seditious, fanatical Communists who are not suitable for work, as has been ascertained in the conscientious examination by the employment detachment. I make a special point of requesting that these 173 Russians should be transferred at once to the Dachau Concentration Camp as has been expressly ordered by the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service, Berlin. On 1/9/1943 I requested the Gestapo Office in Regensburg to report on their experiences. The Chief of the employment detachment there, SS Obersturmfuehrer & Kriminalkommissar Kuhn, saw me today at 14.30 hours in my office and reported in person that he had similar difficulties. Of the 244 Russians screened out by the Gestapo Office in Regensburg (Lower Bavaria) only 30 Russians have been transferred up to date to the Dachau Concentration Camp. Thus there also Q14 Russians are still retained without justification. Mr. Kuhn finally went to see the Commanding Officer of Prisoners of War, Munich, Friedrichstr. 11, where he is going to try to have the 214 Russians delivered. He is going to report the result of his interview at once to the Main Security Office, Berlin, and he will provide us with a copy.

II. With one file folder and two enclosures submitted through the -Chief of Dept. II to the Chief.

By order [signed] Schermer

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 09 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1257-1259.

[Document L]

Munich, 1/21/1941

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich The Chief of Office Nr. Secr. 9074/41 II A

[stamp] Dispatched 1/22/1941 Dispatch Office

I. Report-(Typed: Ma) The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police Freiherr von Eberstein Munich

Re: Screening of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War.

Your Ref: My report of 11/24/1941. Encl. 3

Enclosed I return the letter from the Commanding Officer of PoWs in Defense Area VII to the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in the Defense Areas VII and XIII, and the report made by Major Meinel on 1/13/1942 re the interview with me. To these documents I report as follows:

I have nothing to add to the facts reported by me on 24.11.41.

It is true, and I do not deny it, that I mentioned the fact that executing the prisoners weighed heavily on the consciences of the SS men charged with this duty.

II. To be filed.

The deputy: [IllegibleProbably Schimmel]

[Document M]

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich

Munich, 1/23/1942

[Pencil] Delivered by me in person on 1/24/1942 [Initial]

The Chief of Office Ref. Nr. secr. 9074/41 II A

I. Report (Typed: Ma) The Deputy Inspector of Security Police and Security Service SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer and Oberregierungsrat. Schmitz-Voigt Munich

Re: Screening of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War.

Major Meimel as well as his deputy, Major Mueller have not in any way assisted in the work of the special detachment of this office, but only hampered its work. The strange attitude of Major Meimel can also be seen in the fact that he refused to deliver 173 Russian prisoners of war who had been screened out as intolerable by the employment detachment. His reason for retaining them is as follows, in his letter of 1/14/1942 of which the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer received a copy:

"The 173 Soviet PoWs whom I am asked to deliver were screened out in the period between 9/22-11/22/1941 by the employment detachment of the Chief of Security Police and Security Service. In the meantime the Fuehrer ordered the Soviet PoWs to be used for work to an increased extent. This order was communicated by the High Command-Ref. Nr. 2 f 24.12a AWA PoW I b Nr. 8648/41 of the 18.12.41 to the Reichfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police and to all interested Reich Ministries. Within the territory of Defense Area VII the labor supply situation is extremely critical and every worker is urgently needed. For this reason I request that the 173 Soviet PoWs who have been screened out be examined again, in order to retain for the labor supply as many as appear still tolerable. I request you to inform me of the result."

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 10 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1259-1261.

The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer thereupon replied to the Commanding Officer of PoWs in Defense Area VII, Major General von Saur, by letter of 1/23/1942 as follows:

I received copy of a letter addressed to the Gestapo Directing Office in Munich and submitted it to the Reich Commissioner for Defense for his decision. The Reich Commissioner for Defense is of the opinion that the Gestapo officials carried out the examinations with all due conscientiousness, according to the importance of the decisions to be taken. He therefore sees no reason for ordering a second examination, especially as such order would appear undesirable owing to the time involved and the scarcity of personnel. The Reich Commissioner for Defense is furthermore convinced that the measures which were started, should be completed in the interest of German internal security.

"I should be glad if you would accept this communication at the same time as the reply of the Gestapo Directing Office, Munich to the application of 14.1.42."

Referring to the statements made by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in his report of today, I should be glad if you would urge the Main Reich Security Office, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Mueller, to bring about the speedy recall of Major Meinel by the High Command.

In conclusion, I beg to report the number of Russians examined and screened out by my employment detachment and that of the Gestapo office in Regensburg:

By the employment detachment of the Regensburg Gestapo within the territory of Defense Area XIII 2,344, of whom 330 were screened out as intolerable.

Within the territory of Defense Area VII, 1,254, of whom 278 were screened out as unsuitable for use.

By the employment detachment of the Gestapo Directing Office, Munich, within the territory of Defense Area VII, 3,78, of whom 456 were screened out as unsuitable.

Within the territory of Defense area XIII, 210, of whom 18 were screened out as unsuitable.

The number of prisoners of war examined and screened out by the Gestapo office, Nurnberg, has not yet been ascertained.

II. To be filed.

As deputy [signed] [illegible-Schimmel?]

[Document N]

Munich, 26.11.1941

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich II A/Sche

Re: Screening of Russian prisoners of war in Defense Area VII.

I. Report on Activity:

The employment detachment in the period from 29.9.41 to 22.11.41 screened the Russian prisoners of war distributed by Stalag VII A at Moosburg into labor detachments within the territory of the Gestapo Directing Office, Munich (Upper Bavaria and Schwaben) from a political point of view.

[A detailed account follows ending with the following figures]

Screened: 3,578 Intolerable: 456

Moreover the Munich employment detachment screened two labor detachments of Defense Area XIII, Nurnberg, with the following result: [Follow figures for two camps which are added to above total, resulting in a new total of]

Screened: 3,788 Intolerable: 484

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 11 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1261-1262.

The 484 Russians who were screened out fall under the following categories:

1. Officials and Officers: 4 2. Jews: 31 3. Members of Intelligentsia: 81 4. Fanatical Communists: 174 5. Agitators and Ringleaders: 94 6. Runaways: 38 7. Incurably sick: 62 Total: 484

The Munich employment detachment therefore has screened all labor detachments stationed in Upper Bavaria and Schwaben. Its work was terminated for the time being. Its members were put at the disposal of their offices, beginning 11/26/1941.

The commander of Stalag II A at Moosburg reported that within the next 10-14 days the arrival of 20000 more Russians may be expected. In this case the employment detachment will resume its duties at once. I reported at the end of each week to the Chief of the Gestapo Directing Office in Munich on special events occurring during my work.

II. Through the Deputy Chief II. Submitted to the Deputy Chief of Office.

[Initials] By order [signed] Schermer

[Document O]

Regensburg, 1/17/1942.

Secret State Police Gestapo Office Regensburg

Ref. Nr. 144/42 secr.

To Secret State Police Gestapo Higher Directing Office Munich, att. of KK Schermer

Re: Soviet Russian PoWs

Your Ref: Your letter of 1/9/1942 secr. Nr. 9074/41 II A/Sche

One list enclosed.

Enclosed I submit the desired account of the activity of my employment detachment in the Russian camps and a list containing the figures of Russians examined, and of those screened out and transferred into the Flossenburg and Dachau concentration camps.

By order: [Illegible]

[The enclosed list ends with the following figures]:

Intolerable 344278

Defense Area XIII Screened 2344 Intolerable 344 Defense Area VII Screened 1254 Intolerable 278

[Following is end of letter]:

In Defense Area XIII the best relations prevail between the employment detachments of the security police in the Russian PoW camps and the Army authorities. Here the Russian PoWs who are screened out are delivered without difficulties and in the shortest time to the Flossenburg concentration camp.

Regensburg, 1/17/1942 Secret State Police Gestapo Office Regensburg By order [sig. illegible]

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 12 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1262-1264.

[Document P]

Regensburg, 1/19/1942.

Secret State Police Gestapo Office Regensburg Tel. 5145 Ref. Nr. 114J42/II secr.

To the Main Reich Security Office IV Berlin

Re: Guiding principles for the Detachments of the Chief of Security Police and Security Service which are sent to the Enlisted Men's Camps.

Your Ref: Decree of 8/14/1941 B.Nr. 21/8/41 secr. Rs IV A 1 c

In the period from 10/21/1941 to 11/3/1941, 13 labor detachments consisting of a total of 1125 Soviet Russians were screened, by whom 244 were declared intolerable. This decision was confirmed--by the Main Reich Security Office with teletype Decree of 11/10/1941 Nr. 989/41 sub Nr. 2007/41 IV A 1 c; the decree at the same time ordered the execution of the PoWs who had been screened out. Stalag VII A at Moosburg was asked by our letter of 11/11/1941-Nr. 3295/II secr. to deliver the 244 prisoners to the Dachau Concentration camp. It was not until recently that we were informed by the Dachau Concentration Camp, following our inquiry, that the 244 prisoners were not delivered there.

On this matter the leader of the employment detachment, SS-Obersturmfuehrer Kriminalkommissar Kuhn, reported the following:

"On 1/16/1942 I proceeded to Stalag VII A at Moosburg in order to inquire why the 244 prisoners were not delivered to the Dachau Commanding Officer. The A.D.C. ` informed me that the Commanding Officer of PoW Camps in Defense Area VII at Munich had given the order that the prisoners were not to be i delivered. Thereupon I proceeded to the officer charged with this matter on the staff of the Commanding Officer of PoW Camps in Defense Area VII, Major Meinel. In my ensuing interview Major Dr. Meuller was also present. Major Meinel declared he was in possession of a directive from the High Command which ordered the delivery of the prisoners to be stopped. When I replied that I had not been informed of such an order and that in Defense Area XIII the prisoners had been delivered without any objection, he said General Schimmel in Nurnberg could do what he pleased, he on his part had been ordered by telephone to stop delivery. When he had a second telephone talk with the High Command on 1/14/1942, he had been instructed that the Russians whose delivery was requested by the Gestapo had to be handed over as a rule, but in every such case it had to be ascertained whether the prisoners were objected to because they were bad characters, lazy, or unfit for work, or whether the objection was based on other grounds. In the latter case negotiations had to be opened with the Gestapo, in which he had to point out that the Russians | were urgently needed for work. Moreover, there were the decrees of the High Command of 12/18/1941 Nr. 8648/41 and of the Chief of the High Command of 12/24/1941 Nr. 8770/41 which had been transmitted to the Reich Fuehrer SS also, which showed an alteration in the original intention. He pointed out that every Russian taken away was equivalent to losing a man who could work 10 hours a day. When I replied that I understood his point, but was under orders to screen the prisoners from the political viewpoint and to screen out those who were unbearable, he gave the answer, the situation now was such that we could no longer afford this attitude, we had now reached the point where we had to use prisoner labor in armament industries and that therefore, we must handle them with kid gloves. In this connection he added the question, in what way did I want to ascertain their political unreliability, whereupon I replied that this was the Gestapo's business.

He then returned the list containing the names of the prisoners to be handed over to the Regensburg Gestapo Office with the request to screen the prisoners once more on the lines mentioned above; at the same time the Camp Commander was going to make more detailed inquiries on his part.

During the interview with Major Meinel I did not receive the impression that he was exclusively interested in maintaining the labor supply, but rather that he only wanted to defy the measures of the Gestapo. This I concluded from his statement, that the Russians were still under the command of the Wehrmacht, as long as they had not yet been handed over to the Gestapo, and that the Gestapo could not do with them as they liked until they were delivered to them.

I ascertained from a personal visit to the Gestapo Directing Office in Munich that he made the same difficulties to that authority. This authority already reported on this matter to the Main Reich Security Office, Berlin, mentioning on this occasion particulars concerning Major Meinel.

I submit this rePort for your information and to ask for further orders. Owing to the prevailing scarcity of personnel I am not in a position to order a second screening of the Russian Camps in the farthest corners of my area. The Commanding Officer of PoW Camps in Defense Area XIII hitherto made no objections. There the Russians are delivered in the shortest time after request.

[signed] Popp

Gestapo Directing Office, Munich Submitted to Chief By order: Schermer

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 13 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1264-1266.

[Document Q]

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich secr. 9116/41 II A/Sche

Munich, 1/28/1942.

1264 R-l 78 i I. Fast teletype

To the Main Reich Security Office.

I. Fast Teletype To the Main Reich Security Office Attention of SS-Gruppenfuehrer and Lt. Gen. of Police, Mueller, Berlin.

Re: Soviet-Russian Prisoners of War in Defense Area VII. Your Ref. My report of 1/26/1942 Nr. secr. 9116/41 II A.

I reported on 1/26/1942 that the Commanding Officer of PoWs in Defense Area VII handed over only 335 out of 734 Russians who had been screened out, whereas he retains the remainder of 399 Russians without justification. Presently I discovered that the Russians who had been screened out, though they were relieved from their former detachments, were distributed again on 1/7/1942 for newly formed labor-detachments. Using these segregated, fanatical Bolshevists in work outside of the camp is equivalent to a considerable danger for the security of the nation and the State. I should be glad if you would induce the High Command, Dept. PoWs, General Reinecke, Berlin, to order at once that these Russians be withdrawn from outside work.

II. To be filed.

As deputy [signed] Schimmel, Regierungsrat

A true copy Schermer

[Document R]

Commander of Prisoners of War in Defense Area VII

Munich, 2/12/1942.

I b Ref. Nr. B.XI/12 Nr. 57 secr.

To the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in Defense Areas VII and XIII

Copies to the Reich Defense Commissioner for the Defense Areas VII and XIII; Secret State Police, Gestapo directing Office, Munich; Secret State Police, Gestapo Directing Office, Regensburg ,

Re: Soviet Russian Prisoners of War

The OKW has ordered with decree Ref. Nr. 2 f 24.11n Chief PoWs (Ia) Nr. 284/42 secr. of 2/4/1942 the following:

"The prisoners held in Stalag VII A, but screened out by the Security Police or the Security Service, are to be handed over to the Gestapo. Those Soviet PoWs who have been screened out in their place of work are to be taken back to the Stalag and there screened once more by the Security Police. The screening will be done in the presence and with the participation of the leaders of the labor detachments to which the prisoners in question belong. Defense Area Command will communicate this decision to the police authorities and take further action in agreement with them." In order to assemble at the right time the PoWs who are now working but were previously screened out in their place of work, I should be glad to be informed at what time the new examination will take place in the camp of Moosburg.

[signed] von Saur

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 14 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1266-1267.

[Document S]

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing office, Munich Teletype Office From BLN. Nue. 2717514.2.42 1835 Wel.-

A) To Directing Office, Munich, att of Oberregierungsrat Schimmel, or dep.

B) To State Police, Regensburg, att Police Director Popp, or deputy.

Re: Treatment of Prisoner of War Matters in Defense Area VII

Your Ref: My teletype of 2/9/1942

Obergruppenfuehrer Freiherr von Eberstein reported to Deputy Chief IV the facts by telephone; thereupon we requested the High Command to hand over the PoWs without further confirmation. High Command will answer by letter on Monday. I shall inform you at once.

Regarding Meinel sharp protest is being lodged with High Command.

Added for High Authority Munich: Will you please inform von Eberstein at once.

Main Reich Security Office-signed Panzinger, Oberregierungsrat.

[Document T]

Teletype: Berlin Nr. 27 766 2/17/1942 1905 BE

Re: Treatment of Prisoner of War Matters in Defense Area VII

Your Ref: Known

The prisoners of war who have been screened out will be transferred to the Buchenwald concentration camp as the High Command has decided in conference today. Will you please inform the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer today about this and also that Meinel is getting a different assignment.

Main Reich Security Office IV A.

By order [signed] Panzinger, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer.

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 15 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1267-1268.

[Document U] DRAFT!

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich II A 9116/41 secr. II A

 

Write: (Typed)

[stamp] Dispatched 2/26/1942 Dispatch Office

The Commander of Stalag VII A Moosburg

Re: Soviet Russian Prisoners of War

Your Ref: Nil

Enclosed: 1 List

The advisor [Referent] to the Commander of Prisoners of War in Defense Area VII-Major Dr. Mueller, informed us by telephone on 2/24/1942 that owing to a new order by the High Command the Russian prisoners of war who have been screened out are to be delivered to the Buchenwald Concentration Camp near Weimar.

The employment detachment in Munich screened in the area of the Gestapo Directing Office, Munich (upper-Bavaria and Schwaben) altogether 3578 Russian Prisoners of War.

Of these were screened out: 455 PoWs Already delivered to the Dachau Concentration 267 PoWs Consequently there are to be delivered to the Buchenwald Concentration Camp 188 PoWs

For checking purposes I enclose a list of the prisoners of war screened out by us, arranged according to identity discs and would be glad if you would let me have the number and identity marks of the delivered prisoners of war after the transport's departure.

II. To be filed. Submit to II A at once.

[Document V]

Of the Russian Prisoners of War in Defense Area VII screened out by the employment detachment of the Chief of Security Police and Security Service. (Gestapo Directing Office Munich.)

No.: Stalag Identity No: Surname: First Name:

sent to Dachau Concentration Camp on:

[There follow 455 names]

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 16 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1268-1269.

[Document W]

 

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office, Munich II A No. Secret 9074/41 II A/ Sche

I. Letter: gef. Au

To: The Commander of Stalag VII A Moosburg

Re: Russian Prisoners of War

Your Ref: High Command of 9/8/1941 ref. no. 2f 24.11 AWA/P/W(I) No. 3058/41 Secret

Encl: 1 letter to Commander of Dachau Concentration Camp.

The employment detachment of the Chief Security Police and Security Service has screened out 3 more Russians in Stalag VII A at Moosburg, viz:

1. F 304-10188 Ygnatziak Iwan, 10/12/1913. 2. IV B-117772 Dawanow Michayl, 5/15/1919 3. IV B-119827 Schtscherbakow Andrey, 9/17/1914

By order of the Chief of Security Police and Security Service I request that these three Russians be handed over and delivered to the Dachau Concentration Camp.

Please order the transport commander to deliver the enclosed letter to the Commander of the Dachau Concentration Camp in person.

II. To be filed: Russian Prisoners of War in II A. W. V. II A alsl.

By order: [signed] Schermer

[Stamp] Secret State Police Munich

Document R-178

Russian Prisoners of War, Part 17 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 1269.

[Document X]

 

Secret State Police Gestapo Directing Office Munich F No. Secret 9074/41 II A/Sche

I. Letter: gef. AU

The Commander of the Dachau Concentration Camp

Re: Russian Prisoners of War

Your Ref: Decree of Chief of Security Police and Security Service of 10/11/1941. No. 639 B-41 Secret IV A 1 c.

By order of the Chief of Security Police and Security Service the following three Russians who have definitely been found suspect and intolerable by the employment detachment are to be executed at once in Dachau Concentration Camp.

1. F 304-10118 Ignatziak Iwan, 10/12/1913. 2. IV B-117772 Dawanow Michayl, 5/15/1919. 3. IV B 119827 Schtscherbakow Andrey, 9/17/1914.

II. To be filed: Russian Prisoners of War

By order: [Signed] Schermer

[Stamp] Secret State Police Munich

Title: "Document 007 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 1270.

The Reichfuehrer SS Field Command Post, 9/7/1943. Diary No. 1741/43 top secret RF/Bn

To the Higher SS and Police Chief Ukraine Kiev.

7 copies. 7th copy.

Dear Pruetzmann,

Infantry general Staff has special orders with regard to the Donetz area. Get in touch with him immediately. I order you to cooperate as much as you can. The aim to be achieved is that when areas in the Ukraine are evacuated, not a human being, not a single head of cattle, not a hundredweight of cereals and not a railway line remain behind; that not a house remains standing, not a mine is available which is not destroyed for years to come, that there is not a well which is not poisoned. The enemy must really find completely burned and destroyed land. Discuss these things with Stampf straight away and do your absolute best.

Heil Hitler, Yours [sgd] Himmler.

SS Obergruppenf. Berger has received the copy with the request that the Reich Minister for the East be informed.

2.) Chief of the Regular Police 3.) Chief of the Security Police and SS 4.) SS Obergruppenfuehrer Berger 5.) Chief of the Partisan-combatting units.

Copies sent with a request that they be noted.

By order [initial] SS Obersturmbannfuehrer.

Title: "Document 008 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1270-1272.

Institute for Practical Scientific Research for Military Purposes. G.R.Z. I A.H. No. 41

Waischenfeld/Upper-Franconia, 5/19/1944, No. 135 Tel. No. 2

[Institut fuer wehrwissenschaftliche Zweckforschung]

4 copies 2nd copy To

To SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS Pohl, Chief of the SS Economic Administrative Head office (WVHA), Berlin-Lichterfelde-West Unter den Eichen 126-135.

Subject: Production of a new kind of spotted fever serum.

Reference: Your letter of 10/25/1943 /D III / Ref. No. 87/10.43 Lg/W

Secret Diary No. 51/43.

Dear Obergruppenfuehrer,

Following our application of 9/30/43, you gave your authorization on the 10/25/1943 for the carrying out of experiments with a view to producing a new kind of spotted fever serum and transferred 100 suitable prisoners to Natzweiler for this purpose. It has been possible to carry out the experiments very satisfactorily so far with the help of the Chief of Department D III, SS Standartenfuehrer Dr. Dolling commissioned by you. It appeared from the results of the report before us that it is possible not only to achieve an anti-toxical, but-what should be of special practical importance also-a decided anti-infectional immunity with the help of this serum. Inoculation, however, still produces a lengthy fever reaction, so that its introduction for the protective inoculation in its present form cannot be recommended as yet. Further research is being carried out now with a view to changing the serum in such a way as to produce only so weak a reaction that no considerable effect on the general well-being takes place, while retaining its full effectiveness. It is to be examined whether this can be achieved by decreasing the doses of the serum and by longer storage of the serum. The new serum is already in preparation so that further experiments could be embarked upon as soon as further persons suitable for the experiments are available. I therefore request you to detail persons to Natzweiler again for the purpose of inoculation. In order to obtain results which are as accurate as possible and can also be utilised for statistical purposes, 200 persons should be placed at our disposal for inoculation this time; it is also again necessary that they be as far as possible in the same physical condition as is met with amongst members of the Armed Forces. If imperative reasons should demand that 200 persons should not be transferred to Natzweiler for the experiments, the experiments could be carried out in a different concentration camp, although it would entail great difficulties. The overcoming of these difficulties would, if necessary have to be accepted by the scientists employed-although the latter are at the same time very much tied down to the University of Strassburg owing to their lecturing activities — as the results which will certainly be achieved are of the most far reaching importance for maintaining the health.

As I have informed you, the direction for carrying out the experiments is in the hands of the Director of the Hygienic Institute of the Reich University of Strassburg, Prof. Dr. Haagen, Major in the Medical Corps and consulting hygienist to an air fleet, who was commissioned with this task by the Reich Marshal. the President of the Reich Research Council. In accordance with his instructions, Dr. Haagen has to report about his work to the chief of the Luftwaffe Medical Services; in doing this he has to mention with whose support the work is carried out; that is firstly the Reich Research Council and secondly the SS. I request your decision as to which of the following is to be mentioned as the supporting authority of the SS:

a) the Reichsfuehrer SS or b) the SS Economic Administrative Head Office (WVHA) or c) the Institute for practical scientific research for military purposes of the Waffen SS.

Heil Hitler! [signature illegible] SS Standartenfuehrer

To SS-Standartenfuehrer Dr. Brandt for cognisance

Title: "Document 009 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1272-1273.

The Reichfuehrer SS, Personal Staff. Diary No. 1934/44 top secret Bra/H.

Field Command Post. 6/6/1944.

Subject: Production of a new kind of serum against spotted fever.

Ref: Your letter of 5/19/1944. to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl file ref. G.R.Z.I A.H. No. 41.

To SS Standartenfuehrer Sievers Waischenfeld/Upper Franconia

Dear Comrade Sievers,

Thanks very much for sending the copy of your letter of 5/19/1944 to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl. I have informed the Reichsfuehrer SS, as the matter seemed to me to be sufficiently important. In answer to the question as to who is to be designated as the supporting authority of the SS, the Reichfuehrer SS said that both the SS Economic Administrative Office (WVHA) and the institute for scientific research of military value [Institute fuerwehrwissenschaftliche zweckforschung] should be mentioned. In addition, there is no objection to saying straight out that the Reichfuehrer SS has also personally supported the experiments.

Heil Hitler! Yours, [initials] SS Standartenfuehrer.

Title: "Document 010: Investigation Into The Cause Of Contagious Jaundice (Hepatitis Epidemica) [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1273-1274.

6/1/1943. Berlin W. 15,

The Reichfuehrer SS Reich doctor SS and Police ef. No. 420/IV/43 Diary No. 6/43/ Top Secret.

To the Reichsfuehrer SS, H. Himmler, Berlin.

Top Secret Dear Reichsfuehrer,

The Fuehrer's Commissioner-General, SS Brigadefuehrer Professor Dr. Brandt called on me with the request that I should assist him by placing prisoners at his disposal for research work into the cause of contagious jaundice (Hepatitis epidemica) which he was furthering considerably.

The work has been carried out up to now by a medical captain, Dr. Dohmen, within the framework of the research place of the army medical inspectorate, with the participation of the Robert Koch institute. It has up to now led to the result, in agreement with the results of other German research workers, that contagious jaundice is not carried by bacteria but by a virus. In order to increase our knowledge, which is based up to now only on vaccination experiments from men to animals, the reverse way is now necessary, namely the vaccination of the cultivated virus germ into humans. One must reckon on cases of death.

The therapeutic and above all the prophylactic results are naturally largely dependent on this last experimental step. Eight prisoners condemned to death would be required, if possible of fairly young age, within the prisoners hospital of Sachsenhausen concentration camp. I respectfully ask for a decision, Reichsfuehrer, as to:

1. Whether I may start the experiments in the prescribed form, 2. Whether the experiments may be carried out in the Sachsenhausen prisoners' hospital by medical captain Dr. Dohmen himself.

Although Herr Dohmen does not belong to the SS (he is an SA leader and a Party member), I would recommend this as an exception in the interests of the continuity of the series of experiments and thus of the accuracy of the results.

The practical importance of the question raised for our own troops, especially in Southern Russia, is shown by the fact that this illness has been very widespread in the past years, both amongst us in the Waffen-SS and the police and in the Army, so that companies have been reduced by 60% for periods of up to 6 weeks.

The illness has, on the other hand, a relatively favourable prognosis on the whole, when quick and practical treatment is begun. The possibility of a prophylaxis by means of infection would gain considerable tactical importance.

Signed Graum [?]

Title: "Document 015 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 1275.

The Reichsfuehrer-SS Personal Staff Department "A"

Waischenfeld 4/11/1944.

Top Secret Z 1 A 31/No 36 Secret Diary p. 19 No 170 2 copies 1st copy

To: SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. Brandt Berlin

Subject: Fuehrer's order of the 3/1/1944.

Ref: Your letter of the 3/10/1944 diary No 1888/44 Top Secret.

Dear Comrade Brandt,

In accordance with orders, I got in touch with SS Brigadefuehrer Professor Dr. Brandt and informed him in Beelitz on the 31st March about the research work conducted by SS Haupsturmfuehrer Professor Dr. Hirt. On this occasion I handed to him the plan for the treatment of L.Damage worked out by Professor Hirt, a copy of which I enclose for you for presentation to the Reichsfuehrer SS if the occasion should arise.

Professor Brandt tells me that he will be in Strassburg in the first week in April and that he intends to discuss details with . Professor Hirt then, after which he will contact me again.

I will keep you informed continually.

With best wishes, Heil Hitler. Yours [signature illegible].

Title: "Document 034: Prison Camps Within The Area Of The Higher SS And Police Chiefs, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1276-1278.

[In pencil] IIc/5 Oranienburg, 2/21/1940.

The Reichsfuehrer SS The Inspector of the Concentration Camps File Ref. 14a 12/L/Ot.

To be Registered [initialled] HH [Himmler].

Ref: RF SS, Personal Staff, diary No. Top Secret/694/40 Wa/Kp. of 2/1/1940.

Enclosures: -3-

To the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police Berlin S.W.11

Copies to: 1) SS Gruppenfuehrer Pohl (with 9 enclosures) 2) SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich (no enclosures)

In the above mentioned decree, the Reichsfuehrer SS ordered that the following prison camps be inspected to determine their suitability as concentration camps:

1. Police prison in Welzheim. 2. Transit camp (Dulag) in Kislau (both in the area of the Higher SS and Police Chief South West) 3. Frauenberg (nr. Admont) amp (in the area of the Higher SS and Police Chief Alperland)

4. Sosnowitz (East Upper Silesia) camp. 5. Auschwitz (Upper Silesia) Camp (Both in the area of the Higher SS and Police Chief South East)

The inspection has been carried out. The result was as follows:

(1) Welzheim. Welzheim is not a concentration camp but has since 1934 been a house prison of the Gestapo in Stuttgart, which it comes under. The designation "Concentration Camp" must have been given to it by mistake.

It is unsuitable for use as a concentration camp.

(2) Kislau. Kislau is a prison camp of the Reich administrator-of justice, supervised by the judiciary and directed by a prison director. It can take 600 prisoners. Up to the beginning of the present war, foreign legionnaires were also sent to the camp by the Karlsruhe Gestapo (against reimbursement of costs); at the moment there are still 7 legionnaires at Kislau. As a concentration camp existed near Kislau in 1933/34, the present judicial prison camp is still erroneously described as a "concentration camp."

Kislau, a former hunting lodge, is unsuitable for use as a concentration camp.

(3) Frauenberg (nr Admont). Frauenberg is a labour camp set up by the provincial welfare union of Styria for shirkers and drunkards. It consists of five wooden huts and can take 300 prisoners.

The labour prisoners are exclusively Styrians who are paid for their work by the Provincial Welfare Union of Styria during their time in the camp (27-57 pfennig an hour, less food).

The SA (about 20 men) do the guarding. The labour prisoners are employed in two quarries and on building roads. Not far from the camp there is a stretch of moor of about 25-30 square kilometres (it is said to be up to 25 metres deep). The whole place is now state property: formerly it belonged to the Admont foundation.

In its present form and without big additions, Frauenberg is unsuited for use as a concentration camp.

(4) Sosnowitz in Upper Silesia. Sosnowitz has only been set up provisionally as a temporary transit camp for emigrating Jews; at present it contains 300 Jews. The religious community of Sosnowitz sees to the feeding of these Jewish emigrants. The factory room, the floor of which has been covered with straw for this purpose, has no fittings of any sort, no water and no cooking facilities and can be used neither as a concentration camp nor as a quarantine camp.

(5) Auschwitz in Upper Silesia. Auschwitz, a former Polish artillery barracks (stone and wooden buildings) is suitable as a quarantine camp after some sanitary and constructional shortcomings have been eliminated. A detailed report has been submitted to the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, Gruppenfuehrer Pohl, Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich and the Reich doctor SS. The constructional and hygienic investigations which are still necessary in Auschwitz are being carried out at the moment. When the negotiations begun by the Chief of the Security Police aimed at getting the Wehrmacht to hand the camp over (as has already been reported, there is still a construction company in the camp) are terminated, I shall immediately get it going as a quarantine camp. I have already made the necessary preparations for this.

(6) Stutthof. A detailed report has been submitted to the Reichsfuehrer SS regarding the taking over of the camp of Stutthof near Danzig as a State Concentration Camp. SS Gruppenfuehrer Pohl and SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich have recommended that it be taken over.

I have submitted the data regarding the camps in the area of the Higher SS and Police Chiefs Warthe and Rhine, which I am not to inspect, to SS Gruppenfuehrer Pohl, with the request for his opinion as to whether he is interested in these camps. After looking through the reports, it seems to me that these camps do not come into question as concentration camps.

[Signed] Gluecks SS Oberfuehrer.

[Rubber stamp] Personal Staff, RFSS Enclosures Received: 2/22/1940 Diary No. 732 top secret (initials) To: Reichsfuehrer

Title: "Document 035 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1279-1280.

To the Reich Plenipotentiary for the Consolidation of German Folkdom, SS Himmler, Chief of the Police, Berlin.

[Initialled] H.H. [H. Himmler]

I beg you to give your attention to the following statements. I have asked Professor Hoehm to hand this letter to you and have thus selected the direct path to you in order to avoid the slower official channels and to eliminate the possibility of an indiscretion, bearing in mind the enormous importance, under certain circumstances, of the idea submitted.

Prompted by the thought that the enemy must not only be conquered but exterminated, I feel obliged to submit the following to you as the Reich Plenipotentiary for the Consolidation of German Folkdom:

Dr. Madous is publishing the results of his research into sterilization by medicaments (I enclose both works). In reading this article, I was struck by the enormous importance of this medicament in the present struggle of our people. Should it be possible to produce as soon as possible, as a result of this research, a medicament which, after a comparativel brief period, would cause an unnoticed sterilization in individuals, we would have at our disposal a new and very effective weapon. The thought alone that the 3 million Bolsheviks now in German captivity could be sterilized, so that they would be available for work but precluded from propagation, opens up the most far-reaching perspectives.

Madous discovered that the juice of the plant Caladium Seguinum, taken orally or injected, produces after a certain time, particularly in the males of animals but also in the females, a lasting sterility. The illustrations which accompany the scientific work are convincing.

Provided that the idea expressed by me meets with your approval, the following path could be followed:

(1) Dr. Madous should not publish any more works of this kind (the enemy is listening too!).

(2) Propagation of the plant (easily raised in greenhouses!).

(3) Immediate experiments on humans (criminals!) in order to ascertain the dose and the duration of treatment.

(4) The quickest possible discovery of the formula of the composition of the effective chemical body in order to,

(5) produce the same,synthetically if possible.

I myself, as a German doctor and a retired lieutenant of the reserve in the medical corps of the German Armed Forces, undertake complete silence on the use to which the subject raised by me in this letter is to be put.

Heil Hitler! [Sgd.] Dr. Pokorny Specialist on skin and venereal diseases, University Dr. of Medicine. Ad. Pokorny, Komotau, Graben 33.

Komotau, 10/1941

Title: "Document 065: Affidavit Of Oswald Pohl: Medical Experiments General [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1280-1283.

The Medical experiments were undertaken by order of Himmler. Representatives of the medical profession knowing how to describe to him a medical problem as one of the highest significance for science r having good friends who acted as intermediaries, could convince him easily. And that in spite of the fact that Himmler himself did not possess any more knowledge of medical science than the average educated layman. But he had enough opportunity to discuss such questions with the doctors of his staff and entourage and he probably did so (Grawitz, Gebbhardt, Brandt, Conti, US)

Whenever he was interested in a matter he put all the help at his command to the disposal of the physicians, and always kept in personal contact with the project. He even informed himself personally of its progress. Whenever prisoner were put at disposal for an experiment, the orders usually went to the Inspektion. However, later on, they were sent also to me. But I do not believe it impossible that orders also were given directly to the camp commanders; otherwise, I should have had knowledge about more experiments as the ones described below.

When I intervened in 1944 against the transfer of prisoners for these purposes, with the explanation that they would be a loss to the work details, Himmler appointed Grawitz as his deputy in charge of operations of the experiments. From then on, he was in charge of the supervision and the reporting on all experiments which were ordered by Himmler. But Himmler's personal participation (Teilnahame) did not decrease.

During the period of 4/1942 to the end of 1944, when the Inspektion was a part of the W.V.H.A., I gained knowledge of the following experiments:

1. Schilling. These tasks are probably sufficiently known through the trial of Schilling. Schilling, whom did not know previously, conducted me through his installations in Dachau during a visit and told me a few things about malaria and malarial mosquitos. I believe this was the biggest experiment. This also has caused my protest to Himmler, because Schilling always asked for prisoners. How many were finally transferred to him, I do not know.

2. Rascher. My attention was called to these experiments by Himmler's written orders to me. The prisoners were transferred to Dachau. There, the experiments also took place. Himmler, during a stay in Munich, took me along for a visit. We saw a cockpit [Flugzeugkanzel] in which a prisoner was seated. After this the cockpit was put under pressure. Rascher observed through a glass window. After that, the person on whom the experiment was performed was brought into Rascher's study where he asked him questions. At first these questions were answered in a dazed manner; until, after a certain period of time, full consciousness returned.

I did not see any other of Rascher's experiments. Neither did I select the prostitutes for his cooling experiments [Unterkeuhlversuche]. The prostitutes probably came from Ravensrueck.

3. Klauberg (or Glauberg). I made his acquaintance during supper at the Fuehrerheim Auschwitz. He was introduced to me and I did not talk with him about his experiments. I was not present at the planning of the experiments, but I had already heard, through Gluecks, that Klauberg was interested in sterilization. I declined Klauberg's invitation to watch this experiment.

4. Sievers (Ahnenerbe). I heard about this for the first time subsequent to Sievers' visit to me in Berlin when the experiments, apparently, were concluded already, because he came to me in order to find out about a production possibility (equipment for manufacturing). I gave him the name of Deutsche Heilmittel GMBH in Prague, which belonged to the Deutschen Wirtschaftsbetrieben under the administration of Oberfuehrer Baier of my staff. I referred Sievers to him. The compound was subsequently produced in Schlachters (Schwarzweld).

Sievers told me the following: "The `Ahnenerbe,' which was managed by Sievers, had developed, by order of Himmler, a compound which causes the blood to coagulate quickly. This wa3 tremendously important for our combat troops, since it prevented fast bleeding. The experiments in Dachau, during which a prisoner was shot, had proved that. A prisoner at Dachau, who was an expert in this matter, had an important part in the discovery of the compound."

5. Heissmeyer. The Chief physician assigned to the hospitals at Hohenlychen received Himmler's permission to conduct experiments in the field of tuberculosis. I referred him to Gluecks, who put the necessary individuals for these experiments at his disposal. This concerns about ten-orphans who probably came from Auschwitz. The experiments took place in Neuengamme. Later on, I saw a report for Himmler on these experiments, but its language was so scientific that I didn't understand it.

6. Madaus. Worked in Radebeul on a compound for sterilization for which he needed coladium [schweigrohr]. Since this plant grows predominantly in North America, I was ordered by Himmler to take care of its cultivation in Germany. Himmler probably then thought of the Division for Pharmaceutical herbs of the botanical garden in Dachau, which was under my jurisdiction. The contact with Madaus was initiated through the physician assigned to the Inspektion Lolling. Since Madaus, who was represented by Dr. Koch, believed Dachau unsuitable, he invited us to visit Radebeul and to begin the cultivation there. During the visit we were shown the site and we saw experiments performed on animals in the laboratory. I am not sure if these experiments were undertaken with coladium [schweigrohr], but I presume that. Since a hothouse was necessary for the cultivation of the plant, Dr. Koch asked for assistance in the procurement. I promised him to take this matter up with Himmler, who okayed it. Since all details were taken care of by Lolling from then on, I do not know to what extent the cultivation of the plant was successful, and if mass production of the compound was ever accomplished, and if experiments were ever undertaken on human beings.

7. Lost. I do not remember if these experiments were ever conducted at all, because other agencies were also utilized for such experiments; but, naturally, it is possible. I do not know if the I.G. Farben Plant at Dyrrenfurt, near Breslau, filled the bombs, which I have seen there, with a gas manufactured in Lost. Dr. Ambros had invited me to inspect this plant.

To the best of my ability I tried to depict what has remained in my memory. I did not have any direct knowledge of most of the experiments. The prisoners who were used for them appeared in Lolling's monthly report with one number and were distributed among 40 experiments. I had that determined in 1944 by Lolling; if I am not wrong, about 350 to 400 prisoners were detailed at that time. I also tried to decrease that number, mainly, I confess, in order to make the prisoners available for work details, and this caused Himmler's intervention as for instance, in the case of Schilling who then ordered the detail impersonally.

My personal sentiment concerning medical experiments on living human beings is the same as that of each civilized person. But, as a layman, I have not understood the extent and degree of danger of these experiments. Deep inside of me I resented Himmler's methods.

/s/ OSWALD POHL Oswald Pohl

Sworn to and signed before me 6/23/1946 in Nurnberg, Germany.

/s/ WALTER H. RAPP Walter H. Rapp US Civ. D-416387

Title: "Document 085 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1283-1285.

The Ahnenerbe The Reich-Secretary.

Berlin 2/9/1942. GR/2 page 1.

To: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Brandt Berlin SW 11 Prinz Albrecht-Str. 8.

[in ink] Secret

Dear Comrade Brandt:

"Prof. Dr. HIRT's report, which you requested in your letter of 29/12/41Journal No. AR/493/37, is submitted in the enclosure. I was not able to send it to you before because Prof. HIRT took ill some time later. He was stricken by bleedings of the lung (diagnosis: "Cyst-lung")at least it is not TB. In addition he wa afflicted by a weakening of the systemic circulation. At the present time he is still in the hospital but hopes that the doctor will release him in the near future so that he will be able to resume his work, at least to a small extent. Because of this Prof. HIRT was merely able to write a preliminary report which, however, I should like to submit to you. The report concerns

(1) his research in the field of the Intravtalmikroskopie (microscoping living organs), the discovery of a new method of examination, and the construction of a new research microscope.

(2) his proposal for securing skulls of Jewish-Bolshevik Commissars."

Some special copies were enclosed as a supplement to the report (1) among which the two articles in the Zeiss-Nachriten No 10 (second series) and No 1-5 (third series) make possible the quickest orientation whereas the other publications are complicated individual scientific work.

Yours sincerely Heil Hitler! Yours [signature illegible]

"SUBJECT: Securing skulls of Jewish-Bolshevik Commissars for the purpose of scientific research at the Reichsuniversitaet Strassburg.

We have a nearly complete collection of skulls of all races and peoples at our disposal. Of the Jewish race, however, only very few specimens of skulls are available with the result that it is impossible to arrive at precise conclusions from examining them. The war in the East now presents us with the opportunity to overcome this deficiency. By procuring the skulls of the Jewish-Bolshevik Commissars, who represent the prototype of the repulsive, but characteristic subhuman, we have the chance now to obtain a palpable, scientific document.

The best, practical method for obtaining and collecting this skull material could be handled by directing the Wehrmacht to turn over alive all captured Jewish-Bolshevik Commissars to the Feldpolizei (Field M.P.). The Feldpolizei in turn is to be given special directives to inform a certain office at regular intervals of the number and place of detention of these captured Jews and to give them special close attention and care until a special delegate arrives. This special delegate, who will be in charge of securing the material (a junior physician of the Wehrmacht or even the Feldpolizei or a student of medicine equipped with a motor car and driver), has the job of taking a series of previously established photographs, anthropological measurements, and in addition has to determine, so far as is possible, the background, date of birth, and other personal data of the prisoner. Following the subsequently induced death of the Jew, whose head should not be damaged, the delegate will separate the head from the body and will forward it to its proper point of destination in a hermetically sealed tin can, especially produced for this purpose and filled with a conserving fluid. Having arrived at the laboratory, the comparison tests and anatomical research on the skull, as well as determination of the race membership of pathological features of the skull form, the form and size of the brain, etc., can proceed. The basis of these studies will be the photos, measurements, and other data supplied on the head and finally the tests of the skull itself."