The Holocaust Historiography Project

Translation of document 345-PS


Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories

Berlin, 20 July 1944

Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery-Dr. LAMMERS Fuehrer Headquarters.

1. In accordance with an agreement between the Reich Marshal as Supreme Commander of the Air Force, the Reichfuehrer SS, the Youth Fuehrer of the German Reich and the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the recruiting of youthful Russians, Ukrainians, White Russians, Lithuanians, and Tartars, between the ages of 15 to 20 will take place on a volunteer basis for Kriegseinsatz in the Reich. This is to be fulfilled by the Kriegseinsatz commands which were set up in offices which are under my command.

The youths will first of all be placed at the disposal of the Air Force. Thereby, general service men of the Air Force will be freed for employment in other branches of the Wehrmacht. Later, the youths will be used as SS helpers.

2. A similar agreement was made between the offices mentioned regarding the recruiting of feminine forces of the same age and of the same nationality as Air Force helpers.

3. On the basis of a suggestion by military offices, the seizing and turning over of youths between the ages of 10-14 into the Reich territories will take place [Heu-Action] in a part of the operational territory, since the youths in the operational territory present a not insignificant burden. The aim of the action is a further disposal of the youths by placing them in the Reich Youth Movement and the training of apprentices for the German economy in a form similar to that which has been done in agreement with the General Plenipotentiary for Arbeitseinsatz [GBA] with White Russian youths, which already shows results. A political direction of this action on the part of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories is indispensable, since these youths are to be used later in the occupied eastern territories as especially reliable construction forces.

4. In compliance with an agreement with the Supreme Commander of the Air Force, I have ordered that youths in the general provinces of Estonia and Lithuania will be called for employment in the Air Force, which corresponds to the employment of German Air Force helpers.

The Actions under points 1 and 3 are known to the Fuehrer. He has given his express approval. Regarding the execution of the SS helper action, the Fuehrer has set a short time limit. Except for point 3 of the action, all measures are of pure military nature and therefore lie outside the jurisdiction of the General Plenipotentiary for Arbeitseinsatz [GBA]. A special verification of the division of jurisdiction is therefore requested in my correspondence of the 10 July—II 1 d 931/44g, because the GBA has taken the viewpoint that all fugitives are to be taken to the Arbeitseinsatz in the Reich. Therefore he has closed the collection camps for incoming fugitives to the Kriegseinsatz commands.

I ask, in view of the fact that my dealings with the GBA have failed, that a decision of the Fuehrer on this be secured that the measures for 1-4 are prescribed for fugitives and also for the camps of the GBA. I have learned that Gauleiter SAUCKEL will be at the Fuehrer’s Headquarters on 21 July 1944. I ask that this be taken up with him there and then a report made to the Fuehrer.

[signed] Rosenberg Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories II 1 d 971/44g]

2. Telegram [each separately]

To Reich Marshal Supreme Commander of the Air Force Supreme Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force

Reischsfuehrer SS Field Command Post

Reich Youth Fuehrer Berlin (Reich Youth Command)

Reich Minister of Interior Berlin

Subject: Activity of the Kreigseinsatz Command (SS-helpers, Air Force women helpers, Heu and Air Force helper Action)

I have just now directed the following telegram to Dr. LAMMERS, Fuehrer Headquarters:

“Insert 1st telegram from `[` to `]'”

I ask (you) to acknowledge. Immediate presentation to the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery is desired.

[signed:] ROSENBERG
Reich Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories II 1 d 971/44g

Chief of the Fuehrungsstab Politik Ref P 772a/44g

Berlin 22 July 44

Ministry Bureau Gauleiter Bureau Chief of Fuehrungsstab Politik Leader of Main Section II Chief Government Counsellor Dr. Lab. Ministry Director Dr Brautigam Brig. Gen (HJ) Nickel

each separately with the request for acknowledgment.

initialled: Str Straube

Directives 287 Fuehrer’s Headquarters 16 September 41

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Armed Forces Command Staff/Dept L(N/Qu)
No. 002060/41 Top Secret

40 Copies
25th copy

1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, communist insurrections have broken out in all the areas occupied by Germany. The forms of procedure are increasing from propaganda measures and assaults on individual members of the Armed Forces to open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare.

It can be ascertained that we are dealing with a mass movement, uniformly controlled by Moscow, which is also responsible for the seemingly unimportant sporadic incidents, in otherwise quiet areas.

In view of the considerable political and economic tensions in the occupied areas, it also has to be taken into account that nationalistic and other circles take advantage of this opportunity to cause difficulties for the German occupation forces, by joining the communist uprising.

In this way, an increasing danger to the German conduct of the war is developing, which appears at first in the form of general insecurity for the occupation force, and has already led to a shift of forces toward the main centers of unrest.

2. The measures taken so far, to meet the general communistic mutiny-movement, have proved to be insufficient.

The Fuehrer has given orders now to strike everywhere with the strongest means, in order to suppress the movement in shortest time.

Only with this method, which in the history of power-extension of great nations has always been used with success, will it be possible to restore peace.

3. The following rules will apply:

(a) Every case of rebellion against the German occupation forces, regardless of circumstances, must be concluded to be of communistic origin.

(b) In order to suppress those machinations from the beginning, right on the first occasion, the strongest means have to be employed to ensure the authority of the occupation forces and to prevent further spreading. Here also has to be considered that a human life, in those countries affected, often doesn’t mean anything, and a deterrent effect can only be achieved by extraordinary strength. As atonement for the life of one German soldier a death-penalty for 50-100 communists must be generally considered as proper. The manner of execution of the death penalty must be such so that it will have a deterrent effect. The reverse method, to proceed first with relatively mild punishment and threaten with stronger measures, is in this case not warranted, and will therefore not be applied.

c) The political relations between Germany and the country concerned are not decisive for the attitude of the military occupational government. Rather it has to be thought about and presented through propaganda, that strict measures free the native population from those communistic criminals, and therefore they will profit by them.

A clever campaign of propaganda of this sort will not have as a result unforeseen reactions on the liberal [gutgesinnt] portions of the populace due to the harsh measures employed against the communists.

(d) Forces indigenous to the areas will in general be opposed to the execution of such violent measures. Their augmentation brings as a consequence increased danger for the various troops with them, and consequently must be discontinued.

On the contrary, by the utilization of a system of premiums and rewards for the populace, their assistance can be secured in a suitable form.

(e) In so far as exceptional court-martial procedures should have to be introduced in connection with the communist insurrection or with other offenses against the German Occupational Force, the severest penalties are requested.

A practicable means of intimidation in this matter can be only the death penalty. In particular acts of espionage, sabotage, and attempts to join the forces of hostile powers must of necessity be punishable by death. For illegal possession of weapons the death penalty in general is to be decreed.

4. The Commanders in the Occupied Territories are to be responsible for the immediate dissemination of these policies to all military units concerned with the treatment of communistic acts of rebellion.

[Signed:] KEITEL.

Distribution: Armed forces commander southeast through communication section: 1st copy Military commander Serbia: 2d copy Military commander Salonika-Aegean: 3d copy Military commander southern Greece: 4th copy Military commandant Crete: 5th copy Armed forces commander Norway: 6th copy Armed forces commander Netherlands: 7th copy Armed forces commander Ostland: 8th copy Armed forces commander Ukraine: 9th copy Armed forces deputy with the Reichs protector in Bohemia and Moravia: 10th copy Army High Command (Operations division): 11th copy Army High Command (Quartermaster Section IV) 12th copy General quartermaster through Communications section for: 13th copy Military commander France: 14th copy Military commander Belgium and Northern France: 15th copy Military commander General Government: 16th copy Chief of Armament and commander of Reserve Army through communications section for: 17th copy Commander of German Forces in Denmark: 18th copy Chief of the Luftwaffe (Gen Staff of the Air): 19th copy Supreme command of the Navy (SK1) (Seekommando 1): 20th copy Armed forces staff K. Wiesbaden: 21st copy Foreign office for Mr. BOTSCH. RITTER: 22d copy Special purpose staff Frankfurt on the Oder (over LII): 23d copy Special purpose staff Breslau (over LII): 24th copy Supreme Command of the Armed Forces: [stamped: 291] Armed forces command staff: 25th copy Section L: 26th to 32d copies W. Pr: 33d copy Foreign office/intelligence: 34th copy Section foreign countries: 35th copy Intelligence III: 36th copy Economical mobilization office: 37th copy A W A: 38th copy W R: 39th copy Liaison officer with the general government in Cracow: 40th copy

Translation of document 488-PS

Foundation for the study of Heredity [Ahnenerbe-Stiftung], Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 342-343.

The Reichsfuehrer-SS
8 Prinz Albrecht-Strasse
Berlin SW 11
1 April 1940

I, the undersigned Reichsfuehrer of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, herewith confirm that,

(1) The Institute for Research and Study of Heredity [Forschungs-und Lehrgemeinschaft “Das Ahnenerbe"], 16 Puecklerstrasse, Berlin-Dahlem, and

(2) The “Foundation for the study of Heredity” ["Ahnenerbe-Stiftung"], 28 Wilhelmstrasse, Berlin, SW 68, are components of my Personal Staff and, as such, departments of the SS.

[signed] H. HIMMLER

By-Laws of the Institute for Research and Study of Heredity

(1) Name and Task

The Institute for Research and Study of Heredity has the task to do research on the area, spirit, and heritage of the Indo-Germanic race which is a Northern race. Part of this task is to mould the results of its research work in an attractive manner and to teach them to the people. This task must be carried out by applying scientific methods. Its realization will be achieved through:

1. The establishment of institutes for research and study.

2. The commission of research projects and carrying out of research trips.

3. The promulgation of scientific publications.

4. The promotion of scientific work.

5. The arrangement of scientific conventions.

The Institute for Research and Study of Heredity shall promote and support all like or similar endeavors, also in the field of collaboration between peoples. The Institute for Research and Study of Heredity is an organization in the public interest in the meaning of legal regulations.

(2) Research Projects

To carry out its tasks, the Institute for Research and Study of Heredity may also commission non-member scientists with research projects. The research results will be exploited by the scientific divisions of the Institute for Research and Study of Heredity.

(3) Headquarters, Management

The headquarters of the Institute is located in Berlin. The Institute will be registered in the Register of Associations [Vereinsregister] of the Lower Court [Amtsgericht] of Berlin. The business year begins on 1 April of each year.

(4) Organization

The Institute for Research and Study of Heredity comprises:

1. The Senate

2. The Research Council

3. Corresponding Members

4. The Circle of Founders

5. Active and Participating Members.

(5) Management

The management of the Institute for Research and Study consists of:

1. The President who is also the chairman and legal representative of the registered association in the meaning of Section 26 of the Civil Code [Buergerliches Gesetzbuch].

2. The Curator.

3. The Reich Manager

The Reichsfuehrer of the SS is President.

(6) President

The President is at the helm of the Institute for Research and Study. His duties are:

1. The Management of the Institute for Research and Study. He assigns the work to the various divisions and determines the individual tasks;

2. He appoints and recalls the Curator and the Reich Manager;

3. He appoints the members and recalls them;

4. He approves the budget;

5. He has the exclusive authority to change the By-Laws and dissolve the society insofar as this is permissible according to the legal provisions then in force.

The scientific management of the Institute is under the Curator within the framework of the directives issued to him by the President.

(8) Reich Manager

The Reich Manager conducts the business of the Institute; it is his duty to handle the business aspect and the administration. He is responsible for drafting the budget and for handling of the treasury.

The Institute has:

(a) Active Members

(b) Participating Members

(c) Corresponding Members. Associations and legal entities may also be members. Admission and recall of members will be handled by the Reich Manager as representative of the President insofar as the latter does not reserve the decision. In case of serious infractions by a member, his separation from the Institute may be brought about by expulsion instead of by a recall. Reasons must be given for the expulsion. No reasons need be given for the recall but the recall is considered notice of termination of membership effective immediately or at the later date stipulated in the recall. Each member may also at any time give notice, in writing, of termination of his membership. This notice will be effective as of the end of the current business year.

(10) Membership Dues

Membership dues will be collected only from the Participating Members. The President determines the appropriate amount of

the dues. In special cases the President or the Reich Manager may reduce or dispense with the dues.

(11) Participating Members

Participating Members have all the rights which the members of the association have according to these By-Laws in connection with the legal regulations. They are, furthermore, entitled to participate in all meetings whatsoever of the Institute.

(12) Active Members

The Active Members are the scientific co-workers. They will be proposed to the President by the Curator. Nature and form of their collaboration will be determined by the Curator through general guiding rules as well as through an agreement in each individual case. Insofar as such an agreement creates monetary obligations or essential organizational measures for the Institute, it requires the approval of the Reich Manager.

(13) Corresponding Members

Scientists and other promoters in this country or in foreign countries may be Corresponding Members. They are entitled to participate both in the meetings of the Institute and in the collaboration without, however, being obligated to pay dues or to collaborate. They will likewise be appointed by the President upon the nomination by the Curator or Reich Manager.

(14) Circle of Founders

The Circle of Founders consists of promoters of the Institute for Research and Study of Heredity who make available to the Foundation for the Study of Heredity funds for promoting the Institute. The President admits persons to the Circle of Founders upon the proposal by the Chairman [Vorstand] of the Foundation for the Study of Heredity and the Reich Manager. The founders have all the rights of the Participating Members with the exception of the right to vote.

(15) Research Council

It is the task of the Research Council to advise the President and the Curator in matters concerning special scientific projects. The President appoints the members of the Research Council. The President determines the organization and the working methods of the Research Council.

(15) Senate

The members of the Senate are appointed by the President. They are men from among the leaders of the Party and State who are especially close to the aims of the Institute and who have declared, to the President, their willingness to become members.

The members of the Senate have no legal obligations whatsoever but they will be called in by the President to attend meet-

ings of the Institute where they will be received in an especially befitting manner; they will be informed about the cultural work of the Institute and will be supported by the President of the Institute both concerning their suggestions made to the President and regarding their own endeavors in the research fields of the Institute.

(17) Membership Meeting

The membership meeting will be convened according to the provisions of Section 36 of the Civil Code [Buergerliches Gesetzbuch]. The Reich Manager is obligated to convene a membership meeting if more than two-fifths of the participating members request that the meeting be called provided they state the reasons for their request. A written invitation or the copy of an invitation in the periodical “Germanien” is sufficient to convene the meeting.

(18) Dissolution

In case of dissolution of the Institute the President will determine the utilization of the property in the public interest.

[signed] H. HIMMLER

1 January 1939

Institute for Research and Study of Heredity
Reich Central Office, 16 Puecklerstrasse, Berlin-Dahlem

Translation of document 535-PS


Berlin SW 11, 23 January 1945
Prinz Albrecht Str. 8

Chief of the Security Police and of the SD
IV A 2 a — Ltr. No. 502/42gRs
58960 45

To: The High Command of the Armed Forces
Armed Forces Planning Staff
Attention of Col. i.G. Polleck, o.V.i.A.,

Berlin W 35
Tirpitzufer 72/76

Subject: Commando Operations.
Reference: Your letter of 28 September 1944-WFSt./Qu.2 (Verw. 1) No. 0011754.44 g.K.

I cannot agree with the view supported in the cited letter as well as in the letter, transmitted as an enclosure by the Commander in Chief of Southeast dated 13 September 1944, that members of commando operations now fall under the Fuehrer order of 18 August 1944 and/or 30 July 1944 (OKW/WFSt/Qu. 2/Verw. 1 No. 009169/WR I/1 No. 79/44g Kdos.) This Fuehrer order speaks expressly only of non-German civilians while the members of commando operations in question generally appear in enemy uniform and consequently must be treated according to the Fuehrer order of 18 October 1942—003830/42g Kdos/OKW WFSt. Only members of commando operations in civilian clothing can be treated, from the very beginning, as agents according to exclusive Security Police viewpoints, since according to the Geneva Convention they cannot claim any favors for PWs.

I request that you inform the other recipients of your letter of 28 Sept. 1944 in the above sense and to notify me of the action taken.

E. Kaltenbrunner

Translation of document 580-PS

Recruiting Of Civilian Workers From The Occupied Eastern Territories, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 347-349.

The Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories
III Economic Labor Policy and Social Administration
File number 5782-460/42

Berlin W 35, 6 March 1942
Kurfuerstenstrasse 134

(a) To the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland Riga
(b) To the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine Rowno

For information to the Commissioners
General with copies to the District
Commissioners Labor Division.

Re: Recruiting of civilian workers from the occupied Eastern territories.

1. The Deputy for the Four-Year-Plan, Department Manpower, requested by decree of 24 February 1942—V a 5780 28/60 the procurement of 380,000 agricultural workers and 247,000 industrial workers from the occupied Eastern territories. The employment of these workers in the Reich is particularly urgent and cannot be delayed because of the coming spring cultivation and because of the requirements of the armament industry.

2. As shown in the attached statements, the Deputy for the Four-Year-Plan in agreement with me has divided the total requirements as indicated by the above figures between the territories of the Reich Commissioners and the Commissioners General. In carrying out this decree it should be kept in mind that ;n any case the requirements of the Reich have priority over the local requirements for workers. Exceptions to this rule may be made if the tasks in question are urgentIy necessary for the interest of the war, as for instance construction jobs of the Organization Todt, supply of troops, requirements of agriculture, transportation of coal, reconstruction of electrical plants, etc.

3. The Labor Policy and Social Administration departments and their subordinate labor offices and social agencies with the support of and in agreement with the departments politics, press and propaganda, food and agriculture and the local district offlces or their leaders respectively will be in charge of this task. Furthermore, the Deputy for the Four-Year-Plan will augment his recruiting commissions, or add new ones.

4. The Labor Policy and Social Administration departments, as well as their subordinate labor offices and social agencies have to take steps that all available manpower be registered. First, all the manpower has to be registered which is still available in large cities and which in the last years has migrated from the farms into the cities and were employed in industrial plants. Then workers who have migrated from the cities to the country, and who for reasons of food have taken refuge on the Sowchos and former Kolches, and who are dispensable. The district leaders have to take active part in the recruiting and making available of these workers.

5. Furthermore, the district offlces have to supply food and, if the occasion arises, horses required for the transportation of the workers. If possible, a car with food is to be attached to every train leaving for the Reich to furnish an initial food supply for the workers, e.g., millet among other things.

6. The workers are to be recruited. Forced enlistment should be avoided, instead for political reasons the enlistment should be kept on a voluntary basis. In case the enlistment should not bring the required results and there should be a surplus of workers available use may be made, in extreme cases and in agreement with the General Commissioner, of the decree dated 19 December 1941 concerning the introduction of compulsory labor in the occupied Eastern territories. Promises which cannot be kept may not be given either in writing or verbally. Therefore, the proclamations (posters) and appeals in the press and over the radio may not contain any untrue information in order to avoid disappointment among the workers employed in the Reich and thus reactions against future recruiting in the occupied Eastern territories. Recruiting appeals are to be published only in agreement with the Labor Policy and Social Administration departments and press and propaganda.

7. The drafted workers are to be brought to designated collecting points (to district commissioners). In case of a shortage of transportation, which is to be anticipated, the workers should be marched to their destination, their necessary baggage loaded on vehicles supplied by the respective towns or plants where the workers came from. Authorized assembly camps should be set up according to necessity.

8. The OKW-Chief of Transportation-promised to furnish every week a certain number of railroad trains for the transportaton of workers into the Reich. Time tables will be issued soon.

9. Food rations must be furnished to the workers for the march to the collecting point and the following trip; as far as possible warm meals are to be provided by the Labor Administration at the collecting point and at the stopping points.

10. Delousing of workers and their baggage is to be carried out in installations provided for that purpose, and if necessary, additional delousing facilities should be set up or drawn from the Armed Forces.

Please transmit directives to your subordinate offices without delay and report to me urgently (by teletype) regarding the arrangements made. On account of the urgency of the matter the Commissioners General received their copies directly.

For the Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter [signed] Alfred Meyer

[Stamp of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories]

Certified: [signature illegible] Reg. official

Document 580-PS

Recruiting Of Civilian Workers From The Occupied Eastern Territories, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 349-350.


Enclosure 2 to Va 5780. 28/60

Recruiting of Industrial Workers

Recruiting district [Oblast]

Territories: Charkow Workers: 20000 Saporoshje: 15000 Taganrog: 10000 Molitopol: 10000 Druczkowka: 6000 Kramatoskaja: 20000 Slawjansk: 4000 Konstantinowka: 50000 Stalino: 50000 Kiew: 30000 Nikolaijew: 5700 Kriwoj-Rog: 7000 Schostka: 8000 Powno: 1000 Prosskurow: 10000 Dniepropetrowsk: 6200 Reval: 4000 Riga: 2000 Kauen: 2000 Wilna: 2000 Odessa: 25000 Total: 247900

Enclosure 1 to Va 5780. 28/60

Recruiting of Farm Labor

Recruiting district (quota)

1. Economic District North (mainly Russian refugees)

2. General Commissariat of White Ruthenia and district of Minsk including Economic District Center

3. Reichs Commissariat Ukraine

Quota Kiew North-Soth: 90000 Quota Kamenez-Podolsk: 60000 Quota Shitomir: 50000 Quota Rowno: 30000 Quota Luzk: 30000 Quota Brest: 30000 Total: 380000 [?]

Document 884-PS

Treatment Of Political And Military Russian Officials [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 352-353.

TOP SECRET Dept. National Defense (IV/Qu.)

Fuehrer H. Q. 5/12/1941 Affair for Chief! By commissioned officer only!

Report notice

I. Army High Command presents a statement of the instructionfrom 3/31/1941, concerning “Directives regarding treatment of political representatives, etc., for uniforrn execution of this mission,” enclosed as Annex 1.

This draft provides:

1. Political representatives and commissars are to be eliminated.

2. Insofar as they are apprehended by the troops, decision rests with an officer of disciplinary power whether that person is to be eliminated. Identification as political functionary is sufficient proof.

3. Political commissars of the Army are not recognized as Prisoners of War and are to be liquidated at the latest in the transient prisoner of war camps. No deportation to the rear areas.

4. Professional directors (commissars) of economic and technical institbtions are to be apprehended only if resisting the German Armed Forces.

5. The execution of the operations must not be interrupted by this measure. Coordinated search parties and razzias are not to take place.

6. In the rear army areas political functionaries and commissars, with the exception of political military commissars, are to be handed over to the commitment Kdos. of the political security police.

II. In opposition to this, Memorandum 3 of The Reichsleiter Rosenberg, suggests that only very high and topmost functionaries be liquidated as the state, communal, and economic functionaries are indispensable for the administration of the occupied territories.

III. Therefore a decision of the Fuehrer is required which principles shall be valid.

Proposal L. for case II:

(1) Functionaries revolting against the army, a thing to be expected from the radical element, come under the decree of rules for military tribunals of the territory Barbarossa. “They are to be liquidated as partisans. The same provision is accepted in Directives for conduct of armed forces in Russia.”

(2) Functionaries, committing no hostile act, are to be left in peace for the time being. The armed forces can hardly be expected to segregate the different grades of authority in the separate sectors, only after more complete penetration of the territory will it be possible to decide, if the remaining functionaries may stave at their present location, or will be handed over to the special commandos, insofar as commands themselves are not in a position to conduct the scrutiny.

(3) Military functionaries [commissars] are to be dealt with according to proposal OK. They are not recognized as prisoners of war and are to be liquidated at the latest in the transient P of W camps and under no cirsumstances to be removed to the rear areas.

W. [initial of Warlimont]

Distribution: Chief of W.F.St. Chief L. L IV. Ktb. News: W.R.

Document 1031-PS

Notes of Meeting with Reichsminister Funk: Establishing Of Currency For The Countries To Be Occupied [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 354.

Top Secret Berlin 5/28/1941.

Present: (1) Reichsleiter: Rosenberg (2) Reichsstatthalter: Meyer (3) Stabsleiter: Schickedanz (4) Staatssekretar: Landfried (5) Reichsbankdirektor: Wilhelm (6) Ministerialdirektor: Schlotterer (7) Oberbuergermeister: Winkler (8) Oberbereichsleiter: Malletke.

[page 4] [Par. 2]

In the Ukraine and in the Caucasus however it would become necessary to maintain the present currency the Rubel; at least until a Ukrainian and or Caucasian National Bank has been formed. Plans would have to be made to provide sufficient Rubel bills by printing new ones in Germany, as well as by manufacturing printing dies to be used also over there, these Rubels to be used for purchases as well as for troops.

Reichsbankdirektor Wilhelm asks that the Reich Bank not appear in the new printing of Rubel bills under any circumstances. The Reich Bank should not be accused in any case that it has counterfeited bills. For this purpose a special organization must be created.

Title: “Document 1137-PS, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 356-359.

Chief of the Political Operational Staff, Pers. Ref.

MICHENDORF, 10/27/1944

[pencilled] P 1051a/44 secret [stamp] SECRET

(1) To: Ministerial Bureau Att: Standartenfuehrer Dr. MARQUART

Inter-office Memorandum [pencilled] 31 Oct. [illegible marking.]

Inclosed I transmit to you report by Hauptbannfuehrer [=Brig. Gen. Hitler youth] NICKEL concerning the activity of the Bureau, with the request that it be shown to the Reich Minister and then be returned after due note has been taken. 1 Inclosure 2) To: Operational Groups P 1, P 2, P 3 for attention and kind return.


Berlin, 10/19/1944 [stamp] SECRET!

The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Office of Hauptbannfuehrer NICKEL Berlin C 2, Klosterstr. 79 [in ink] No. 717/44 secret.

To: The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories MICHENDORF

Subject: Report on the activity of the office of the Hauptbannfuehrer NICKEL in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

On 3/5/1944 I received the order to open Office for the recruitment of youths 15-20 years of age from the population of the Occupied Eastern Territories for war employment in the Reich. The settlement of political and labour questions, the compilation and instruction of the staff as well as the erection of procurement camps, the preparation of clothing and equipment, the establishment of offices, the planning and procurement of the first propaganda-materials and the setting up of special field units were completed by 5/27/1944. The clearing up of political questions required the longest time, which led to constant differences between the subordinate offices of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, particularly in Riga and Kauen.

The Office was able to commence practical work: (a) on 5/27/1944 in the middle sector of the Eastern front of that time; (b) on 6/4/1944 in the southern sector of the Eastern front; (c) on 6/15/1944 in Lithuania (d) on 6/15/1944 in Estonia (e) on 7/18/1944 in Lettland.

From then on to 9/20/1944, i. e., in barely four months there were procured for employment 1. 18,917 youths 2. 2,500 girls Total: 21,417

Re. 1: The youths employed are classified as follows: (a) 1383 Russian SS Auxiliaries (b) 5953 Ukrainian SS Auxiliaries (c) 2354 White Ruthenian SS Auxiliaries (d) 1012 Lithuanian SS Auxiliaries (e) 3000 Estonian Air Force Auxiliaries (f) 3614 Latvian Air Force Auxiliaries

All those in the (a) to (f) group are employed in the Air Corps, to wit: 1000 in Air Communications 1000 in motorised ARP 265 in dockyards the remainder in anti-aircraft artillery.

(g) 302 Russian SS auxiliaries could not be brought back and were handed over to the Army High Command [AOK] 9 in BOBRUISK, employed in the troops and were mostly killed, in action. (h) 346 Estonian Air Force auxiliaries were transferred to the Navy as assistants. (i) 250 selected Ukrainian SS auxiliaries had 8 weeks training in a WE camp and were then transferred to the Galician Infantry Division as future noncommissioned officers. (k) 96 youths over 20 years of age were received by the SS Main Office to be exchanged against Germanic volunteers from the armaments industry. (1) 81 youths less than 1.40 m. in height went to the Air Force Signal Repairs Workship 8/III at HOHENFRIED, East Prussia, for apprentice-training. (m) 99 unfit youths were sent to the Construction Office of the HITLER youth Movement as builders of concentration camps. (n) 427 men over 45 years of age were sent to the Air Force. 41 youths fell so far in line of duty, 2 youths received the Iron Cross, Second Class.

Re. 2.: 500 Ukrainian and Russian girls were transferred into the Air Corps as searchlight personnel.

200 girls are now employed in building of emplacements on the Baltic Sea, under guidance of BDM leaders, and will then go to the Air Force. All posts are satisfied with the youthful workers received. The youths are enthusiastic about their enrollment, on one hand and unassuming, on the other. With the right education, anything can be done with them. My office carries on the training in the Air Force, on basis of the given general plan. In addition to these workers, others ha,d already been channeled into the German armaments industry, to wit: (1) 3500 youths and 500 girls to the Junkers Works; (2) 2000 youths and 700 girls to the Todt Organization [Labor Corps]. Total: 6700

From the Occupied Eastern Territories the following workers have thus been allotted by the office functioning under the Hitler youth Movement: 18917 youths to the Air Force 5500 youths to the armaments industry 2500 girls to the Air Force 1200 girls to the armaments industry Total: 28117

The process comprises: enlistment, transportation, here also decontamination — examination — clothing — first preparatory service — selection of personnel — transportation to the Reich and to the main camp — preparatory education in languages until they completely possess a knowledge of the German military words of command — close order drill, up to moving in a column on the march -preparatory rifle course — physical exercises (basic) — indoor duties — conduct in service and off duty — conduct towards superiors.

Educational and welfare care on the lines laid down. Postal censorship and postal traffic.

The office conducts this preparatory work with its own staff, without having to follow up the first requisitions by later ones. The first youths (2000) were transferred to the troops on 7/8/1944. Ukrainian, Russian, White Ruthenian and Lithuanian SS auxiliaries were employed in the Reich, from the very beginning, while Estonian and Lettish Air Force auxiliaries were attached to German Air Force units in their own countries.

The Estonian and Lettish Air Force auxiliaries have temporarily been withdrawn into the Reich, half of them being brought back by the troops themselves, whereas in the case of the other half the troop units had become completely dispersed. The greater part of the youths thus lost has in the meanwhile been again collected by special teams from my office and brought into the Reich; from the main camps there they will be re-distributed to the 1 troops.

Title: “Document 1137-PS, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 359-361.

The order to enroll girls also was only received by the office on 7/1/1944.

The office carried out the command by the following organizational arrangement: In the Occupied Eastern Territories themselves there were--corresponding to the three main army groups-(a) the Northern HITLER Youth Operational Command. (b) the General HITLER Youth Operational Command. (c) the Southern HITLER Youth Operational Command.

Over that stood the Berlin office as Unit Field Postal Number 14298. Each one of the commands was headed by a Hitler Youth Leader. The office disposed over 16 concentration camps in the Occupied Eastern Territories, in addition to the four main camps at EGER, KREMS, PUETNITZ and LOBBE within the Reich. Furthermore: 68 armored vehicles, 14 trucks and arms and ammunition for all members of the Command. Arms consisted of pistols, carbines, light machine guns, heavy machine guns and grenade launchers.

Personnel was composed of- 1. Members of the Hitler Youth: 5 leaders; 3 BDM leaders; 71 German youth leaders as translators and assistant instructors. 2. Members of the SS: 26 SS leaders; 234 noncommissioned -officers and troops; drivers, and translators. 3. Air Force personnel: 37 officers; 221 noncommissioned officers and privates, in particular specialist N.C.O.’s for clothing, administration, rations, and transportation units. 4. 5 office personnel.

Of this staff there were released up to 10/1/1944-1. 12 SS leaders; 134 noncommissioned officers and troops. 2. 15 air force officers; 134 N.C.O.’s and troop. 3. 1 Hitler youth leader.

The unit lost in action 5 killed and 7 wounded. 7 motor vehicles became useless or were lost. The entire equipment, with a few exceptions, as well as uniforms and items of equipment, could be brought back.

Since in the beginning, the entire personnel has been considered as being to the Command (office) only, they are now considered as having been transferred assignment as of 10/1/1944 on.

The Office now has its own Table of Organization. One staff officer from the Air Force and one SS Leader in the office each have full powers of a regimental commander. The largest number of staff is required for personnel affairs: 1. Procurement of personnel 2. Escorts for transports 3. Administration 4. Clothing 5. Supply and kitchens.

On 8/1/1944 the offlce received the order to extend its activities to the emigrating Eastern population in the Reich and the Occupied Territories. The order came too late as regards the Occupied Territories. A report on this mass operation can be presented at a later date only. In addition, from that date on, the office has received orders of the most varied kinds and in numerous countries, which can only achieve partial results, or which come too late, especially in France, Belgium, Serbia and Greece. At the present time the office is functioning, after reforming the commands [units] and changing over of the whole work, in cooperation with: (a) the Netherlands Hitler Youth Operational Command (b) the Adria Hitler Youth Operational Command (c) the Southern Hitler Youth Operational Command in Slovakia and Hungary; (d) the Lt. NAGEL special Command in refugee camps within the Reich (e) the field-offices in Vienna, Posen-Litzmannstadt, Prague and Berlin for emigration of the Eastern populace; (f) with disbanded Operational Commands for repatriation of German populace from the South-East.

Comprised in this list is the Hitler Youth Operational Command in Poland, one Command in course of preparation for Northern Italy and the Protectorate.

Particular efforts are required at the present time for stepping up political education and welfare of those who are attached to troops in the Reich. The main camps in the Reich are at present occupied by about 1600 youths and barely 1000 girls, who are constantly being released to the troops.

The office has furthermore undertaken to supply 4000 laborers released for labor purposes to the Construction-office of the Reich Youth Leadership by the Plenipotentiary General for the German nationals released for recruitment. Preparatory measures have 1 been taken here.

Heil Hitler! The Chief of the office /s/ NICKEL /t/ (NICKEL) Brigadier General [Hauptbannfuehrer]

Document 1263-PS

Fight Against Enemy Sabotage Troops, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 362-363.


WFSt/Qu. [Administration]. [In Handwriting]: Reexamine Distribution (WR and Abw.) Warlimont, Oct 15

Following the radio announcement of 10/7/1942, WFSt has requested proposals from Foreign Office/Abw. and from WR for an executive order.

The proposal of the Foreign Office Abw will be submitted as Appendix 1.

Opinion of WFSt:

The proposal is not in accordance with the above mentioned radio announcement and is too strongly influenced by considerations of the own interests of the Foreign Office/Abw. and particularly Abw. II, sections.

The Chief of WR has made a statement to the effect that the order was to be drawn up in such a way that it will take into account the own interests while considering the future conduct of the war. In this way he wanted to avoid repercussions which would counteract our further intentions. Sabotage is an essential part of conducting war at a time of total warfare; we ourselves have strongly developed this method of fighting.

[Handwritten remark: “But the English are much more in need of it.” Jodl]

However, to draw up such an order it is necessary to clarify preliminary questions which he could bring up in oral discussions only; if possible, in the presence of the Chief of the Foreign Office/Abw. at WFSt. A telephonic discussion would be out of question because of the necessary treatment of future intentions.

Only then could a statement be issued to the troops as to which sabotage troops should be regarded as bandits.

Opinion of WFSt:

The intention to dispose in the future of all terroristic and sabotage troops which behave like bandits has been already made public over the radio.

The task of the WFSt therefore consist only of giving such directives for execution as to how the units should deal with terroristic and sabotage units.

The question of the promulgation of this order, as it was brought up by the WR, needs not be followed further, since the announcement of the basic principle in the Wehrmacht report of Oct 7 should already be sufficient for purpose of intimidation.

WFSt therefore suggests the order appearing under Appendix 2.


Document 1263-PS

Fight Against Enemy Sabotage Troops, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 363-365.

Appendix 1

Copy by way of Extract

From Teletype KR GWOKA 02822 To WFSt

10/10/1942, 14.30 o'clock arr.: 10 Oct, 16.25

Re: Treatment of British terroristic and sabotage units.

A. Members of terroristic and sabotage troops of the British Army who are found, contrarily to the rules of warfare, without uniform or in German uniform will be treated as bandits. During fight and when fleeing, they are to be shot without mercy. If military necessities will call for their temporary arrest or if they fall into German hands outside of military actions, they are to be led at once before an officer for interrogation. Thereafter they are to be court-martialed. [Jodl’s handwritten remark: “No".]

B. Members of terroristic and sabotage units of the British Army who, in uniform, are, in the opinion of the unit guilty of dishonorable activities or of activities contrary to international law, are to be put under military confinement after their capture. WFSt has to be immediately notified about their actions. Directives about their treatment will be issued by WFSt in accordance with WR and the Foreign Office/Abw. [Handwritten remark: “That doesn’t go either. Jodl".]

OKW Foreign Office/Abw.

No. 00381/42 Top Secret Copy 1 G 1 b(5).

Appendix 2 Fuehrer Hq, the 10/1942

Chief of the High Command of the Army. No. 00 /42 top secret WFSt/Qu. (Adm.)

Copies .Copy

1. In the x- appendix to the -x Wehrmacht report of Oct 7, 42 it has /already/ been announced that in the future all terroristic and sabotage units of the British and of their associates who do not act like soldiers but like bandits will be mercilessly exterminated in fight.

2. The behavior x- of terroristic and sabotage units -x has to be x- always -x assumed to be contrary to the rules of warfare when /attacks of/ single x- aggressors as -x saboteurs /take place who, contrarily to the basic rules of warfare, while killing single persons or annihilating property of high value/ or agents, regardless whether as soldiers and irrespective of the kind of uniform, commit attacks of acts of violence which, in the judgment of the unit, differ from the basic rules of warfare and thus place themselves outside of the rules of warfare.

3. In these cases the aggressors are to be annihilated to the last man x- while fighting or fleeing -x without mercy.

4. x- If military necessities call for a temporary arrest of single participants, then, after their military questioning, they are to be handed over to the SD in principle -x. Confinement in PW camps is prohibited x- even temporarily -x.

5. This order is not to go beyond army level; from there on to lower echelons is to be announced verbally. The order has to be destroyed after acknowledgement.

[Note: x- -x indicate additions in pencil. / / indicate word or words crossed out in pencil].


Document 1263-PS

Fight Against Enemy Sabotage Troops, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 365-366.

WFSt / Qu. (Adm.)

Re: Fight against enemy sabotage troops.

Following an order, a draft for an order is herewith submitted about the fight against terroristic and sabotage units. A draft about the counterproposal of the Foreign Office/Abw is contained in the teletype of Oct 10 with handwritten corrections according to the teletype of Oct 13.

In agreement with the Chief of the WR it is pointed out that attached order can have repercussions which can counteract our interest as to the future conduct of the war.

Sabotage has become an essential part of warfare in the age of total war. In this respect it is sufficient to point out our own attitude. Proof can be gathered by the enemy from reports of our own propaganda companies.

Therefore, in agreement with the Chief of the WR, the motion is made to hold a discussion at the WFSt, at which the Chief of the Foreign Office/Abw., the representatives of W.Pr. and WR should take part in order to ascertain in a statement to what extent can the goal be reached to fight efficiently against the sabotage warfare of the enemy without considerably impairing our own effort. In the meeting the points should be discussed which appear in the appendix. Telephonic discussion is not feasible because the answers to the questions under discussion would permit conclusions to the further intentions about the conduct of the war. The Chief of the WR does not expect any progress from a preliminary discussion with the Foreign Office/Abw.

With this view in mind to prevent the enemy’s fighting the war by using sabotage troops, following questions have to be clarified before formulating an order:

(1) Do we ourselves have the intention to commit sabotage units in the zone of rear echelons of the enemy only, or also far back in the zone of interior?

(2) Who will commit more sabotage troops, the enemy or we?

(3) Can we establish the principle: Sabotage units do not conduct legal war; they are to be exterminated in the fighting without mercy?

(4) Do we attach importance to arrest first the single members of this group for interrogation by counterintelligence and not kill them immediately?

Document 1263-PS

Fight Against Enemy Sabotage Troops, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 366-367.

Top Secret

WFSt / Qu. (Adm.)

Re: Fighting against enemy sabotage units.

Following the radio announcement of 10/7/1942, WFSt made proposals for an executive order of Foreign Office/Abw. and of WR.

The proposal of the Foreign Office/Abw. will be submitted as Appendix 1.

x- Opinion of WFSt: The proposal -x is not in accordance with the above mentioned radio announcement and is strongly influenced by the.own interests of the Foreign Office/Abw., particularly Abw. II.

The Chief of WR has expressed the opinion that /from the standpoint of the aim to prevent the enemy warfare by use of sabotage troops/ he would /issue/ draft an order in such a way that it should /extensively/ take into account our own interests with regard to the future conduct of the war. In this way he wants to avoid repercussions which could counteract our further aims. Sabotage is an essential part of the conduct of war in the time of total war; we ourselves have strongly developed this method of warfare. Only then could /he/ one give an explanation to the troops what sabotage units should be regarded as bandits.

Opinion of WFSt:

The intention to annihilate all terrorists and sabotage units in the future which behave like bandits, has been already made public over the radio. /The deserving effect would be this basically achieved/. Therefore the task of the WFSt would be only to issue directives as to how the troops are to act against terrorists and sabotage units.

The question about the publication of this order which was raised by WR needs no further discussion since the publication of the principle x- published in the Wehrmacht report of Oct. 7. As far as the intimidating effect goes -x should already be sufficient.

WFSt therefore proposes the order as submitted in the appendix. (Appendix 2.).

W. [Warlimont]

Note: x- -x indicate additions in pencil. / / indicate word or words crossed out in pencil.

Document 1265-PS

Treatment of PWs, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 367-368.


Communication Office GWEHL

13 Oct. 42 14:15 hours

KR WOKA 02901 13 Oct. 1253

TO: Armed Forces Operational Staff/QM/Administration (WFSt) Armed Forces Operational Staff/QM/PW Affairs (K)

To the discussions and measures which were announced by the High Command of the Armed Forces, 10/7/1942, the following collective stand was taken.

( 1 ) Shackling: Shackling is permitted within the realm of military necessities, and is therefore neither dishonorable nor inhuman.

(2) Treatment of sabotage units: sabotage units in uniform are soldiers and have the right to be treated as PWs. However, sabotage units, dressed in civilian clothes or in the uniform of the German soldier, have no right to be treated as PWs (armed insurgents) .

(3) Reprisals on PWs: Reprisals on PWs, according to the PW agreement ratified in 1934 are absolutely not permitted. The English counter measures, for that reason, are also contrary to international law. The Foreign Office is in agreement with this opinion.

(4) Offers for adjustment by the International Red Cross or by the Swiss Government should be accepted according to the opinion of the Department.

(5) Announced report on the British treatment of PWs.

It is requested that during the drafting of the report that these opinions already mentioned in paragraphs I-3 form the basis, since they are in our own interest.

(6) To avoid difficulties before the release of such important basic information, the prompt participation of the Department of Foreign Affairs with the Counter Intelligence service is requested.

(7) Referring to telegram Nr. 00381/42 TOP SECRET AUSL, Roman numeral I B 5, dated 10 Oct. 42 and the telephone conversation with Major Kipp concerning numbers 1, 3, 4 as well as the proposal to number 4 and that was mentioned over the telephone.

! (WR and AWTA/PW Department to receive message) Supreme Army Commander/ Office of Foreign Intelligence AUSL Nr. 1531/42 TOP SECRET AUSL Roman Numeral I (B5) (signed) CANARIS

Document 1265-PS

Treatment of PWs, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 368-369.


WR 133/42 TOP SECRET (III/10a)

TO: Armed Forces Operational Staff WFSt (previous telephone conversation)

For the information of: the Foreign Intelligence Office

SUBJECT: Treatment of PWs

REFERENCE: OKW/Amt Ausl/Abw.Ag.Ausl.Nr.1531/42 TOP SECRET Ausl.I (B5) v.10/13/1942

In reference to (1): To be inserted: “As an exceptional measure in an emergency”

In reference to (2): It is fundamentally agreed. Perhaps in special cases the following ideas may be represented:

Battle methods as they are today and as they should be combatted, came into being long after organization of the HLKO, especially thru aerial warfare; it is especially necessary to note the large usage of Paratroopers for sabotage purposes. Whoever performs acts of sabotage as a soldier with the idea in mind to surrender without a fight after the act is successfully completed does not conduct himself as an honorable warrior. He misuses the rights of article 23c HLKO since such methods of warfare had not been thought of at the time this article was formulated.

The misuse lies in the speculation of surrendering without a fight after a successful sabotage mission: The concept of inadmissibility of these sabotage units is one of unrestrained advocacy, unless we prevent it ourselves.

(3): WR does not agree completely to this.

Reprisals on PWs must be permitted after very serious infractions on the part of the enemy in their treatment of PWs. If the enemy would shoot for example 10000 German prisoners of war, the untenableness of the theory governing the prohibition of reprisals would not be doubted. One can not deliver oneself for better or for worse to the enemy by the renunciation, based on principle, of reprisals. The sentence on the mutual obligations in case of a treaty is too obvious in that it could be simply eliminated by the Article 2, par. 3 of the agreement on PWs. In case it became necessary, the best thing to do would be to declare this without bothering to submit reasons.

(signed) LEHMANN

Document 1266-PS

Treatment of Prisoners of War, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 369-370.

Top Secret.

Recd from: GWOKA. day :13/10. time 14.15 by [signature] [plus] KR Woka 02901. 13/10 1253.

To Ops Staff of the Wehrmacht/QU/Administration-Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht/QU/K. 2 Addresses.

Regarding the notice dated 7-10-42. issued by the O K W-The following attitude in abbreviated form is taken regarding the discussions and measures which have been commenced.

1. Chaining: Chaining is admissible within the framework of military necessity, as then it is neither dishonourable nor inhuman.

2. Treatment of Sabotage units: Sabotage units in uniform are soldiers and have the right to be treated as prisoners of war. Sabotage units in civilian clothes or German uniform have no claim to treatment as prisoners of war (francs tireurs).

3. Reprisals against; prisoners of war: Reprisals against prisoners of war are absolutely inadmissible according to the prisoner of war agreement ratified in 1934. The British counter measures are therefore also contrary to international law. This conception is shared by the Foreign Office.

4. Officers of mediation by the International Red Cross or by the Swiss Government should, in the opinion of this department, be accepted.

5. The memorandum announced regarding the treatment of British prisoners of war:

It is requested, when drawing up the memorandum, to base it on the concepts laid down in pars. (1)-(3), as these lie in our own interests.

6. In order to avoid difficulties it is requested that, before publishing such important and fundamental announcements, the Foreign Dept Counter Intelligence be consulted in good time.

7. We refer to teleprint No. 00381/42 Top Secret, Foreign Dept. I B5 of the 10.10.1942 and the telephone conversations with Major Kipp about pars. (1), (3) and (4), as well as the proposal with regard to par. (4), passed on by telephone. (Wehrmacht Legal Department and Foreign Office--P.W. Dept have O K W Foreign Department Counter Intelligence AG. Foreign Dept No. 1531/42 Top Secret Foreign Dept. I (B5)

Signed: CANARIS.

Document 1266-PS

Treatment of Prisoners of War, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 370-371.

WR [Legal Department of the Armed Forces 133/42 Top Secret (III/lOa) 993/42 Secret

10/15/1942 Wer Wolf.

To: Operational Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu. Admin/(in confirmation of telephone conversation)

[Pencil note:] On 10/15/1919 [sic] “Written note of telephonic communication to Chief of Operational Staff of the Armed Forces through G IV

[signature illegible] 18.10 Fuehrer has issued the decree. [initialed by same as above]

For information to: Foreign Dept/Counter Intelligence.

Subject: Treatment of prisoners of war.

Ref: Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Foreign Dept/ Counter Intelligence. Ag. Foreign Dept. No. 1531/42 Top Secret Foreign Dept. I (B 5) of 10/13/1942.

As regards (1) “As an extraordinary measure in case of emergency” is to be inserted.

As regards (2) Agreed in principle. But the following train of thoughts can perhaps be put forward for special cases:

The methods of waging war which are now available and which are to be prevented, only came up long after the Hague regulations governing land warfare were created, in particular as a result of aerial warfare. The large scale employment of parachutists for purposes of sabotage must here be pointed out in particular. Now, whoever commits acts of sabotage as a soldier, with the intention of surrendering without a fight afterwards, does not behave like an honest fighter. He misuses the right of article 230 of the Hague land warfare regulations during the drawing up of which such methods of warfare were not had in mind. This misuse lies in the speculation of surrendering without a fight after successfully carrying out sabotage.

The conception regarding the inadmissibility of sabotage detachments can be supported without qualification if we make it apply to ourselves also.

As regards (3) The Wehrmacht Legal Dept. does not agree without limitations.

Reprisals against POWs must be admissible in the case of very serious violations by the enemy in the treatment of POWs. If, for instance, the enemy was to have 10000 German POWs shot, then the untenableness of the thesis of the ban without exception on reprisals could hardly be doubted.

[Marginal note in Jodl’s handwriting: “Quite right."]

One cannot surrender to the enemy for better or for worse by renouncing reprisals on principle. The statute regarding the mutual obligation to keep a treaty is so obvious that it cannot be simply eliminated by article 2, paragraph 3 of the POW agreement. If necessary, it would be best to state this without offering any reasons for it.

[signed] LEHMANN.

Title: “Document 1296-PS, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp.

The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan. The Plenipotentiary General for Manpower.

Berlin W 8, 7/29/1942. Mohrenstr. 65.

To the Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery, Party member Lammers, Berlin W 8.

Dear Reich Minister,

I am taking the liberty of sending you the enclosed copy of a report to the Fuehrer and to the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich for your information.

Heil Hitler. Yours faithfully, [Signed] Fritz Sauckel.

The Plenipotentiary General for Manpower.

Berlin, 7/27/1942

Strictly confidential.

G.Z Va 5780/1644

Employment of Foreign Labour in Germany POSITION AS AT 7/27/1942

I was commissioned as Plenipotentiary General for Manpower on the 3/21/1942. I immediately drew up the program for carrying out this commission. As, in the negotiations with all the authorities concerned, the necessity for putting to work some 1.6 million workers to cover the urgent requirements of the armament and food industries was shown, I made the putting to work of this number of labourers within the shortest possible time my target, as being an essential point of my program. On the 7/24/1942, this figure of 1.6 million, which was demanded of me at the commencement of my task, was exceeded. I therefore give below a short review of the numerical development of this putting to work process and the difficulties overcome in the course of it.

I. Numerical review of the putting to work of foreign labourers. since 1.4.1942.

Since I received my special commission, a total of 1,639,794 foreign workers have been obtained for employment in the armaments and food industries in the Reich. These numbers are made up as follows:

(a) From the newly occupied Eastern Territories:

Eastern Workers: April: 110149 May: 273128 June: 324066 July: 264489 Total: 971832 Labourers from the Galician District: April: 20525 May: 17496 June: 9013 July: 61118 Total: 108152 Soviet Russian Ps.W: April: 43074 May: 53600 June: 38335 July: 86000 Total: 221009 Total: April: 173748 May: 344224 June: 371414 July: 411607 Total: 1.3 million.

The figure for July contains approximately 147000 workers who have already been despatched to the Reich and are currently being put to work.

(b) Other foreign workers.

Protectorate: April: 6000 May: 4000 June: 4900 July: 8800 Total: 23700 Gouvernment General: April: 27402 May: 20265 June: 8907 July: 7596 Total: 64170 Wartheland: April: 12305 May: 11195 June: 7558 July: 1107 Total: 32165 Belgium: April: 8000 May: 8000 June: 6200 July: 7900 Total: 30100 France: April: 7000 May: 7000 June: 5500 July: 11800 Total: 31300 Italy: April: 14250 May: 28534 June: 8842 July: 4100 Total: 55726 Holland: April: 5905 May: 12895 June: 8100 July: 4400 Total: 31300 Serbia: April: 3769 May: 1724 June: 929 July: 1008 Total: 7430 Croatia: April: 1057 May: 2045 June: 4093 July: 4400 Total: 11595 Slovakia: April: 13324 May: 335 June: 1406 July: 200 Total: 15265 Other Territories: April: 13409 May: 7084 June: 9000 July: 6557 Total: 36050 Total: April: 112421 May: 103070 June: 65435 July: 57868 Total: 338801

Total of (a) 1.3 million (b) 338801 Grand Total 1639794

II. Difficulties of recruitment and putting to work.

The large scale putting to work of such enormous numbers of workers necessarily taking place within the shortest possible time, was only possible after overcoming countless difficulties. These could only be mastered thanks to the support of all party, military and civil authorities concerned. The result was achieved mainly through the increased employment of Eastern workers, and it was therefore particularly in connection with them that all difficulties had to be mastered.

The transportation of several hundred thousand Eastern workers per month was only possible after I had ordered that the transport to be provided was to be tripled and after the transport chief and the Reich Minister of Communications had made the corresponding transport space available. This space was made use of for the transportation both of civilian workers and of Ps.W. The question of feeding and guarding these transports had to be settled with the authorities concerned in the shortest possible time.

The danger of infection, particularly through spotted fever gave rise to particular difficulties. Far reaching sanitary preventive measures had therefore to be taken. Thus I ordered a threefold disinfection-in the recruiting area, on crossing the frontier in the Government General and in the collecting camps of the provincial labour offices. For this purpose hundreds of installations-collecting camps, disinfection installations, examination offices etc-had to be prepared or newly constructed with great speed. In this particularly the Wehrmacht with its installations and medical officers readily supported me.

Title: “Document 1296-PS, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 378-380.

The problem of billeting the labourers in the factories also had to be solved very quickly. The construction of approximately 300000 new dwellings is in full swing. For the transitional period, I have ordered the procurement of emergency billets through the labour offices, in sheds, factories and halls with the assistance of the Reich Minister for Ordnance, the Reich Labour leader, the Reich Minister of the Interior and the German Labour Front. The assuring of food supplies (storage of winter supplies), clothing and the fitting out of the camps, the procuring of fuel, etc., have been begun.

The conditions for the employment of Eastern Workers have been examined and, on the basis of experience, in the decree of the council of Ministers of the 30.6.1942, have been improved. In this, apart from an improvement in wages, with special regard to the principle of performance, arrangements for savings books and savings stamps for the Eastern Workers have been made.

As for regulating food, I started from the assumption that this must be sufficient for ensuring a useful output of work. In negotiations with party member Backe, an improvement in rationing scale has already been achieved.

The general principles with regard to police and counter-intelligence treatment and welfare have been created on a practical basis in negotiations with the Party Chancellery, the Reichsfuehrer SS, the OKW, the Propaganda Ministry, the Ministry for the East and the German Labour Front.

Extensive measures have also been taken as regards propaganda. Apart from a proclamation to the Eastern workers which is being distributed to the extent of more than 2 million copies as leaflets and posters, the memorandum No. 1. for factory managers is to begin with being distributed in 200000 copies to all factory managers, and 2 million copies of the memorandum No. 1 for Eastern Workers to all Eastern Workers. Further, three newspapers for Eastern Workers (Ukrainian, Russian and White Ruthenian) are being distributed in all camps, and wireless and films are also being brought in according to a plan.

Particular difficulties were caused by the seizure and recruiting at short notice of hundreds of thousands of such workers in the former Soviet territories. Not only spotted fever, difficulties resulting from frost and the cold and from the period of mud and the defective state of communications made the recruitment extremely difficult, but also the difficulties arising from the passive and open resistance, the mistrust of the population, contaminated by communism, and the counter-propaganda which was carried out according to a plan. The difficulties were particularly increased by the ever growing guerrilla activity. Finally many difficulties had to be overcome which resulted from the fact that, in the occupied Eastern territories the local needs for tasks of importance to the war had to be increasingly safeguarded, apart from the recruitment for the Reich.

Last but not least, let me mention the extraordinary performance which had to be done by all the offices of the administration for the employment of labour up to the labour offices, in cooperation with the offices concerned, especially also with the party offices, to ensure that the result of the recruiting was carried out. I have also sent special recruiting commissions to the East from the personnel of the Reich German Labour Offices. These 700 men or so have done their duty fearlessly and tirelessly in cooperation with the local offices, especially with the labour authorities in the East, in spite of all difficulties and often under enemy fire. In this connection it must be particularly stressed that the people concerned were skilled workers, who, because of the calling up of the younger classes to the armed forces, were in the majority of an advanced age, most of them being already over 50.

Experiences in the employment of Eastern Workers have, on the whole, been satisfactory, both as regards their behavior and their output. As, owing to the economic structure of the Eastern area, there is a preponderance of workers from the country, I have introduced planned measures for training them for work in armament factories.

The recruitment of Eastern workers will be further continued by me in so far as it is at all possible. The recruitment of domestic servants for lightening the burden especially of large families, will also be commenced now.

III. The employment of Soviet-Russian Ps.W.

Apart from the employment of civilian workers, I have increased the employment of Soviet Russian Ps.W. in conjunction with the OKW department for Ps.W., as planned. In this, I have particularly worked for sufficient food and a speeding up of transportation. The transports coming from the front are examined in the Ps.W. base camps of the Government General by my special commissioners to determine their professions and are then sent on to the Reich for Employment. Amongst the Ps.W. captured this year there are relatively many skilled workers and workers suitable for employment in the mining industry.

I therefore attach particular importance to the further increased and speeded up transport of the largest possible numbers of Ps.W. from the front to employment in the Reich.

IV. Employment of other foreign workers.

Although the centre of gravity of my activity lay in the field of the employment of Eastern workers, the endeavours to obtain workers from other recruiting areas (Warthegau, Government General. Protectorate, occupied areas and friendly and neutral countries) were continued with emphasis. Through increasing the recruiting, 338,801 foreign workers were enlisted since the 1.4.1942 apart from the Eastern workers, and were conveyed into Reich territory.

V. Total review of the foreign workers and Ps.W. employed in Germany at the present moment.

In conclusion, I give the following total review of the foreign workers and Ps.W. at present put to work in the Reich.

(a) Newly occupied Eastern territories: 1.148 million (b) Other recruiting areas: 2.4 million (c) Ps.W. 1.576 million altogether: 5.124 million

[signed] Fritz Sauckel.

Document 1342-PS

Memorandum Concerning The Second Sauckel Action, Meeting At The Military Commandant’s In Presence Of Gauleiter Sauckel, 1/11/1943, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 381-383.


Paris, 1/13/1943.

DBA II/1 Hg/Bt. Br. B.N: 28/43 g) Nr. 3) [in pencil]

Present among others:

Military Administrative Bureau Chief [KVCh] Dr. Michel, Superior Military Administrative Councillor [OKVR] Dr. Kohl from the Military Commandant’s Office, Gauleiter Sauckel, President Ritter, Dr. List, from the Office of the Commissioner-General for Labor Commitment, Major General [Lt. Gen.] Barckhausen, Lt. Col. Dr. Becker, Dr. Boesebeck, from the office of the Chief of the Armament Staff, Major General [Lt. Gen.] Weigand, Colonel Gerhard, Lt. Col. Dr. Doescher, from the armament industry, Major Ahlborn, Major Henning, from the DBA.

Colonel Keller, Central Armament Command and gentlemen from the Armament Commands East and West.

Military Administrative Bureau Chief [KVCh] Dr. Michel welcomes the persons who are present and states that the first Sauckel project has been fulfilled in its essential parts; not at the set time, though, but by the end of 1942. He promises active cooperation for 1943, too.

Gauleiter Sauckel: He, too, thanks everybody for the successful carrying out of the first project. He states that he has to announce further serious measures already now, right after the beginning of the new year. There is a new, large need for more men both for the “front” and for the armament industry in the Reich. Several sectors on the Eastern front would have to be replaced by German divisions or would have to be bolted off; their Allies did not lack bravery, but were not sufficiently well armed and helpless against the Russian heavy tanks. The new divisions would have to be armed first, and that with more and more strong tank-penetrating weapons. For that reason, in addition to the labor conscription of all childless women and eventually possibly all women with one child, it had been considered to draft all 15-year-old boys and 17-year-old girls for the signal corps and antiaircraft units. The situation on the fronts requires the calling to the colors of 700000 soldiers fit for front-line service; for this purpose, the armament industry would have to drop 200000 key workers by the middle of March. He declared to be in possession of the Fuehrer’s order to get for this purpose 200000 good foreign skilled workers as replacements by that time and would need 150000 French specialists for that while the remaining 50000 would be extracted from Holland, Belgium, and other occupied territories. In addition he had to request another 100000 unskilled French workers for the Reich. By the middle. of March the second French project would have to transfer 150000 skilled workers and 100000 unskilled workers and women from all of France to Germany. He said he had the Fuehrer’s order and the agreement of Reich Minister Speer for it.

[Remark at the end of page 1, written in pencil]: BDC-GOTHA-Enclosure No. 2 to the war diary of the DBA-first quarter of the year 1943.

Both Sauckel and Speer have admitted that the armament production in the Reich would decrease somewhat for a short time by the calling in of the essential workers and that, as a consequence of the removal of skilled workers, one has to be prepared for the same thing in France, too. But, as according to his estimate there are another 450000 skilled metal workers left, the removal of 150000 should be possible without closing down any production really important for the war. The Commissioner-General for Labor Commitment will see to it that the plants will have put two unskilled workers for training at their disposal for each removed French skilled worker.

Principle of propaganda towards the French: “The only life insurance for European men and women of nations not fighting on the front, is working for German armament".

The “relive” in the proportion of 1:3 would continue. Furthermore, the Fuehrer intends to grant easier conditions to 250000 French prisoners of war in Germany, if the second Sauckel action would be carried out in the time set; he also intends to give them the permission to receive visits by their wives or relatives, for two weeks yearly for each prisoner. The total number of 1.2 million prisoners of war could not be relinquished, because the Fuehrer needs them as Hostages [Faustpfand]: a general leave of absence is not feasible either.

For the carrying-out of the project Screening Commissions [Auskaemm-kommissionen] are to be formed, consisting of representatives of the Commissioner-General for Labor Commitment and of the armament offices.

Military Administrative Bureau Chief [KVCh] Dr. Michel hopes that the negotiations agreed upon with Laval for the following day will lead to support of the project by the French government. In any case, all plants of Industrial economy will have to be combed out very much, in so far as they are not armament or V-plants.

Major General [Lt. Gen.] Barckhausen: The armament offices would have to take cognizance of the situation pictured by the Gauleiter and accept the task; they would have to cooperate that the removal of skilled workers would be carried out with minimum damage to the armament potential and that a crucial industrial [Schwerpunktfertigungen] production would be spared as much as possible. That is why he asks the Commissioner-General for Labor Commitment to exhaust all other sources fully, which means:

(1) The extensive exploitation of the newly occupied territory; after all, it must be possible to get a considerable number of workers out of it in two months.

(2) Strong shift [Umlage] to plants without armament production.

(3) Radical shut down of inefficient or not absolutely vital plants.

(4) Utilization of discharged French soldiers.

(5) Catching of fugitives from the first project.

Furthermore, he doubts the accuracy of the figure of 450000 skilled workers allegedly still left.

Major General [Lt. Gen.] Weigand states to that point that there are only 180000 skilled draftable workers at hand at the present time.

Gauleiter Sauckel: Of course, the armament production working for Germany must be protected as much as possible. But the denting of the armament production in the Reich is caused precisely by drafting of the 200000 key workers, after all. And under no circumstances could more consideration be granted in France than in the Reich. Besides, the plants would be filled up again, anyhow, by replacing 1 skilled worker with 2 trainees.

It is regrettable that the whole process of change-over has not been carried out earlier. The French government consists of procrastinating artists. As the negotiations with the French government were started already last spring, the first 20000 workers could have arrived in Germany in the set time, namely by fall. In that case, it might have been possible to draft the essential workers in the Reich earlier and to set up new divisions and so the cutting off at Stalingrad might not have happened. In any case, the Fuehrer is now ready for anything, perhaps even to govern France without a French government.

Document 1342-PS

Memorandum Concerning The Second Sauckel Action, Meeting At The Military Commandant’s In Presence Of Gauleiter Sauckel, 1/11/1943, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 383-386.

Major General [Lt. Gen.] Barckhausen again recommends to carry out the action energetically especially in Southern France; there the local industry is not being utilized as much for German armament than in the originally-occupied territory.

Gauleiter Sauckel agrees to that, but states that the originally occupied territory must also again be combed out, in order to carry out the whole project. Due to the shortage of coal, electricity, and raw material, full use is not made of the local workers. He had been told, that after the removals of the first Sauckel action only 5000 trainees have been requested by the plants as replacements for the time being. Major General [Lt. Gen.] Barckhausen corrects this mistake. Requests for 25000 workers have already been processed; these requests are from one-sixth of the armament plants. Furthermore, the plants were requested to exhaust all possibilities within their own limits first. Partly, the plants helped themselves by recruiting relatives and friends of workers.

Gauleiter Sauckel: That would speak in favor of the removal of the French skilled workers. There is no more possibility of replacements within the Reich, while here it will still be possible to replace 1 skilled worker with 2 trainees.

A discussion about the training measures follows. Major General [Lt. Gen.] Barckhausen requests an injunction imposed on plants in order to carry out the training. Mr. De la Roche declares that the question of an allowance by the French Minister of Finance has already been settled. General Weigand asks, who is going to pay the second substitute worker. Major Ahlborn declares that the plant should be in a position to include him in the payroll calculation. Gauleiter Sauckel emphasizes that unanimity would of course have to prevail in the Screening Commissions between the representatives of the Commissioner-General for Labor Commitment and the Armament Offices, also in regard to the rejection of the objections made by the central agencies. In any case, Speer had told him: “Get me the men as fast as possible; every objection will be overruled!”

Major General [Lt. Gen.] Weigand emphasizes that it is only natural that German armament production in France will decline considerably. Major Ahlborn, like Major General [Lt. Gen.] Weigand, estimates the decline in production at about 33% up to now.

Military Administrative Bureau Chief [KVCh] Dr. Michel brings up the question how far compulsory labor service is intended for entire younger age groups and how far it would be politically tolerable; up to now the removal was carried out mainly from the plants alone.

Gauleiter Sauckel says that the 100000 unskilled workers and, if possible, also the 300000 trainees, should be called in according to annual age groups.

Military Administrative Bureau Chief [KVCh] Dr. Michel confirms, that the legal basis exists in the Compulsory Labor Service law.

Major General [Lt. Gen.] Barckhausen requests to exempt the armament and V-plants from the drafting of young age groups, and to refrain from instituting a system of draft deferments because of essential positions in the war effort, a system that could not be handled by the Armament Offices, due to a shortage of personnel.

The Chairman of the Armament Commission in Thuringia is asked for his opinion by Gauleiter Sauckel. He describes the great difficulties which were caused in the Reich by the drafting of the relatively small number of key workers in January. The reason for that is that the essential workers are either foremen for groups of foreigners or otherwise almost indispensable. The change-over and training measures were carried out in the Reich with energy; however, plants existed there also which did not show too much willingness to cooperate and, in any case, wanted to train unskilled workers for their requirements.

Gauleiter Sauckel describes the immense enthusiasm of the German armament workers who worked almost day and night on Christmas, in order to rebuild captured 7.5 cm guns into anti-tank guns.

Major General [Lt. Gen.] Barckhausen says, that there it is a question of patriots but here Frenchmen are concerned whose ideals are not on our side.

Military Administrative Bureau Chief [KVCh] Dr. Michel: General von Stulpnagel wishes to carry out the project as much as possible in cooperation with the French government. Up to now an outspoken passive resistance could be avoided, and it will have to be avoided under all circumstances in the future too.

At the end, Gauleiter Sauckel, Military Administrative Bureau Chief, [KVCh] Dr. Michel, and Major General [Lt. Gen.] Barckhausen again agree on the immediate meeting of a committee which is to issue regulations for the Screening Commissions.

[signed in pencil] Henning

Armament Inspection France of the Reich Minister for Armament and Munition B 2, Nr. B 39/43

Paris, 1/16/1943

To: Distribution:

Subject: Sauckel Project 1-3/1943 Screening Commissions

150000 skilled workers and 100000 auxiliary workers are to be recruited until 3/15/1943 from the entire French occupied territory (including newly-occupied territory, Pas de Calais and North). The results of the Sauckel Project of 1/1943 (that means 37000 skilled metal workers) will be deducted from the total request. All trades employing draftable workers will be counted in towards the total, but the main interest is for metal workers, like heretofore. About 15-20 of other trades will be admitted. Women are counted in but like heretofore, they can be recruited on a voluntary basis only. Dockyards remain exempted as before. The order about armament in France B 2 Nr. B 19/43 g of 1/6/1943 (priorities of the programs) remains a determining factor for the removal. Another production program which is to be treated with consideration should be added, namely the Atlantic wall.

The further raising of manpower will not be done in the manner employed heretofore, namely by a shiftover to the armament sector like the first Sauckel Project or by a regional shiftover like in the Sauckel Project of 1/1943. Rather, all plants (armament, V- and other plants) are to be checked once more by Screening Commissions. The French territory not occupied heretofore is to be used in this project to the largest possible extent.

Screening Commissions will be formed:

(1) One each in the district of each regional prefecture.

(2) Ten within the jurisdiction of the Commandant of Greater Paris, with 6 of them in the district of the Armament Command Central Paris, and 4 in the district of the Armament Command Paris-East. Regulations (decree number B 33/43 of 1/14/1943) already have been issued about the setting up of district boundaries and taking over of the position by members of the Paris Armament Command.

Document 1342-PS

Memorandum Concerning The Second Sauckel Action, Meeting At The Military Commandant’s In Presence Of Gauleiter Sauckel, 1/11/1943, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 386-388.

(3) Eight in the territory not occupied heretofore, with six of them in the 6 regions of the unoccupied territory, with one additional commission each in Marseille and Lyon.

In addition to these Screening Commissions, the working staffs which were formed in the individual Armament Command districts remain in existence and serve for the preparation and support of the activity of the Screening Commissions.

The Screening Commissions are organized in the following way:

(1) As chiefs one higher official of the Labor Commitment Administration who will be deputized here from the Reich for this purpose.

(2) One representative of the armament command concerned. For this the most qualified men (officer or official) are to be committed, if possible, from the Procurement Group. Knowledge of the French language is desired. To assist him and depending on the product in the plant he is supposed to check, he is joined by an expert from the jurisdiction of the Commissioner-General for Labor Commitment in France (procurement officer).

(3) Depending on requirements, one member of the Military Administration Headquarters [Feldkommandantur] concerned, provided that V- and other plants are to be checked by the Commission.

(4) A member of the French Work Commitment Administration, who, in cooperation with the Recruiting Office concerned has to take care of the designation and removal of the workers to be transferred.

For the Screening Commissions in the French territory heretofore unoccupied, experts will be taken from the armament command for a short time (about 2-3 weeks); if possible, they should come from the Procurement Group. These men will be used for the support of the Armament Control Commissions not yet experienced in the labor commitment questions of the occupied Western territories.

Besides skilled workers, the provided unskilled workers are to be procured by the commissions at the same time.

Directives for the work of the commissions are being set up rapidly by the Commissioner-General for Labor Commitment, France.

Some Screening Commissions are being created right away by the Commissioner-General for Labor Commitment, France, and will start their activity immediately, insofar as chiefs are at their disposal for that purpose.

The members of the Screening Commissions are being called to Paris for a conference on January 23 [*]. Further instructions for it will follow.

Signed as Draft Copy Weigand

Certified (signed) [signature]

A certified true copy Major

[illegible pencil mark]

[(asterisk) “by the Commissioner-General for Labor Commitment, France", has been crossed out here.]

Title: “Document 1452-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 388.

Vol. 172 [handwritten]

SPEER [handwritten] 3/24/1942

K T B Wi Rue Office/Staff

Conference of the Chiefs with the Chief of the Department

Report of the Chief of the Department on the conference on 23 March with MILCH, WITZELL, LEEB, in Minister SPEER’s Office.

The Fuehrer looks upon SPEER as his principal mouthpiece, his trusted adviser in all economic spheres.

SPEER is the only one who to-day can say anything. He can interfere in any Department. He already disregards all other Departments.

SPEER wishes that all questions of Armament shall be settled solely by Rue-In, [Armament Inspectorate] which is subordinate to him and that all other tasks shall be eliminated. This will be further discussed later on.

The Head of the Department emphasizes that we must join the SPEER organisation and pull together, otherwise SPEER will g his own way. In general SPEER’s point of view is purely technical.

Technical consultation with SPEER. He will not initiate any scheme which cannot be carried through to the end.

Document 1507-PS

Occurrences in Freising on 2/18/1935, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 389-391.



B.No 17311135 I and B

Munich, 3/27/1935 Briennenstrasse 50.

To the: Government of Upper Bavaria Ministry of the Interior, attention of the High Councillor to the government [Oberregierungsrat] Dittman.

Attachments: (1) file/folder with contents 2 copies of interrogation

With reference to the discussion with the High Councillor to the government [Oberregierungsrat] Dittman, the following information has received all the above mentioned matters:

Inquiries were made in Freising by an official of the Political Police of Bavaria, from 3/11-16/1935, to clear up the facts relative to incidents occurred there on 2/18/1935. In total 12 witnesses were interrogated and some of their statements vary greatly: It was not possible to determine which party had attempted to put Cardinal Faulhaber’s sermon on records: Further, there was no proof whether the recording of the sermon was successful. Regens Westermayr, as well as the witnesses indicated by him, were unable, to give name or description of any of the participants. There seems little doubt that these culprits were people from out of town, as most people know each other in Freising. It was impossible to determine whether the church window was shattered for the purpose of conducting the wire into the inside of the church, as this action was not watched by anybody. In any event, it is true that one window on the further side of the church has in its left lower corner a hole the size of a hand. It is further true that a clod of glazier’s putty, which showed clearly the marks of a wire, was found near this window.

As far as the occurrences in the church are concerned; according to the evidences given by all witness, there can be no talk of a general disturbance of the service and even less of a threatening of the Cardinal. When he was interrogated, Praefect H. Johann Wiesneth declared that he had talked to Cardinal Faulhaber and the latter had mentioned he had not noticed any disturbance. He knows nothing about a threatening of the Cardinal. It is true that about 100 men of the Storm Troops of Freising in civilian clothes were present, together with the Nazi Party’s Women’s Organization, to listen to the sermon of Cardinal Faulhaber. Mayer Lechner, also, at the some time, is local commander of the Storm Troops of Freising, had issued definite orders to all members Nazi Party organizations not to disturb the service, not even if Cardinal Faulhaber should in his sermon contradict National Socialism. Mayer and SA Leader [Sturmbannfuehrer] Lechner indicated that he himself was present at the service on February 18, he was standing in the nave [Mittleschiff] of the Dom. Only the following day did he learn about the disturbance caused presumably by the installing of a cable. He further declared, that if he would have noticed any disturbances, he would have interfered immediately. Also he was not asked for protection from any party, although Regus Westermayr as well as the other clergyman knew that he was in the Dom.

It was difficult to make the necessary inquiries, since Police inspector Heinrich Wagner, also until a short time ago, was chief of the Police in Freising, is at present at a forced furlough, and his place of residence is unknown.

Wagner declared in his written report, dated February 2,1935, that he was not in the Dom during the service, while several persons stated to the contrary. As Regens Westermayr had to admit in his interrogation on March 16,1935, the statements, given in his written report, concerning his fears and anticipation are highly exaggerated and cannot be proved in details and also cannot be verified.

As far as the request made to Major Hoffmeister, Freising, regarding the employment of armed forces is concerned, considerable contradictions are noticed, for instance, in his interrogation of March 16,1935 Regens Westermayr denies having asked Major Hoffmeister for military protection. He indicated further, that the main reason for his visit was to learn from Hoffmeister whether armed forces were really on the alert the evening of 2/18/1935; further he denies having said that the police in Freising are completely dependent upon the local Storm Troops and the city counsel also will not grant him the necessary protection. It is a fact, however, that Regens Westermayr has never asked the city police, nor the Mayor, nor the city commissioners [Oberramtmann] Heidenrich for protection. To the new evidence given by Regus Westermayr, Major Hoffmeister states that what he reported to the regiment on 2/22/1935 still stands. Major Hoffmeister declared unmistakably, that the request of Regens Westermayr, was quite clearly and obviously aimed at the employment of the armed forces for the protection of the Dom [Domberg]. Westermayr did not come to inquire if it was true that the garrison will be alerted on 2/18/1935, but solely to get assurance of employment of armed forces for the protection of the Dom [Domberg]. The fact that Regens Westermayr now denies several important parts of the report made by the major, shows clearly how embarrassed the clergyman is today about his original exaggerated report on the occurrences. Major Hoffmeister is willing any time to take an oath on his written report of February 22,1935.

As far as the incident with glazier Hans Hiedle is concerned, it has been found that he was at no time unable to write, and that he is not interested in opening case.

On the whole it can be said that the facts about the occurrences in Freising have been very much exaggerated by-the Catholic clergy in order to expose the National-Socialistic city counsel.

Besides, the church has opened a case on this matter with the district court Munich II, denouncing wilfull destruction and disturbance of the service, and therefore the incidents will be investigated legally.

Reference is made to the attached copies of the protocol interrogation of Regens Westermayr and Hans Lechner.

signed [signature]

Document 1507-PS

Occurrences in Freising on 2/18/1935, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 391-394.

Report was given by glazier Hans Hiedl, Freising, regarding the mistreatments which were inflicted upon him during the night of 2/18-19/1935. On Monday February 18, I went to the Dom to listen to the sermon of the Cardinal. When I ascended the stairs next to the Seminary, the bells rang for the people to come. I entered the church through the northern entrance and found myself a place from where I could hear the sermon and see the Cardinal. So I came to the epistle side of the altar of St. Mary. I could not advance further, as people were crowded closely around the altar. An advancing to-the side of the gospels would have been hardly possible.

The reading from the testament was just over, when a noise coming from the church window on-the epistle side of the altar of St. Mary became audible. A clergyman in a stall, who was on duty to keep order among the church goers in the Dom, and also, at that time, was on the gospel side of the altar, became aware of the noise, as well as many of the other faithfuls in the church, and he looked for the cause of the noise. I pointed out to him with my finger that the noise was coming from the window at the epistle side. At the same time I noticed that a cord was pulled in through the shattered church window; the lowest small square at the far east was shattered and so I added “oh, a cord"; both remarks were made in such a low voice, that the clergyman, because of the people standing in between could not hear them. At that moment a gentleman said to me if I am not quiet immediately I will be brought to Dachau. After that I kept completely quiet. Some women also had noticed the incident and had become agitated, were threatened in the same manner. It was only then that I noticed that an official action was on its way; up to then I had only suspected some kind of disturbance caused by students on the outside.

In the meantime the clergyman had succeeded in getting through the closely crowded people and had come over to the epistle side. But here he was immediately stopped.

During the sermon a gentleman asked me what my name was and I gave it to him. It was the same gentleman, also before that had attached the plug which had been pulled through the window to the left front of a gentleman standing behind me. The gentleman who had the plug attached to his front asked me to remain there after the sermon was over. However, I wanted to go home, since I had given him my name. But they kept me there telling me that I would have to go with them to the police station.

After the service three gentlemen in civilian clothes went with me to the police. They took my personal datas and then released me. I went home immediately.

At 12:30 night the housebell rang loudly, I went through the hall to the hall entrance and listened as I sometimes was notified in this manner if there was a fire alarm. As there seemed to be a fire alarm, I returned to my room to get my slippers and then I went, dressed only in trousers, shirt and slippers to the front-door and then to the gate to open and see who was there. Three men were standing on the lower door and as they advanced towards me one of them said:

“Mr. Hiedl, we need your son; AH", he added as he recognized me, “It is you yourself. You must come with us.”

They lifted up my hands and felt in my trousers pocket for arms. I then wanted to return to the house to get my clothes. But they did not let me go alone: one gentleman went ahead and handed me my father’s water-proof topcoat which was hanging in the hall. They did not let me have my own clothes and I had to go on my way only scantily dressed. I thought we did not have far to go and therefore did not object.

On the way they asked me:

“What did you think was the matter when the bell rang?”

“I thought that it was either the fire-brigade or the police.”

“This time you do not have to go to the police station.”

I knew the leader of these three men as sargeant of brigade 86; of the local Hilfswerklager (Auxiliary working camps?). He inquired further: “You must have good connections with gentlemen in the white coat up there", he meant the clergyman in the stall on duty in the Dom. He also asked what I had said to the gentleman up there. He presumed that after giving my personal datas to the police I had gone to the seminary to report about the incidents, which, however, was not the case. I declared most decidedly that had no connections with the clergymen and that I did not report on the incident at the seminary. The leader also expressed the untrue suspicion that the fact that I was in the Dom so early seemed proved to him that I was a spy in the service of the church (Domberg). This is the reason for my declaring at the beginning of this report that I ascended the stairs of the seminary when the bells were ringing for people to come. We passed the Inn “zum Hirschen” where I had presumed the office of the Political Police was located; he went on in the direction of the RR depot then, however, along the road to Munich [Muenchenstrasse]; we crossed the railroad tracks. The idea came to me that I might be brought to Munich and I remarked to the gentlemen that in my pocket was the key for the shop and if I should not be home by morning my father would be unable to get into the shop. I was told that I would return home soon.

In the meantime we went along the street and had passed the uses on the left side of the street on the other side of the railroad tracks crossing. We then passed the last, newly built house on the left side of the street. Along on the left side of the street is a hedge, we went through that hedge in an opening and proceeded further about 15 steps inside of the hedge. The leader took a kerchief from his pocket and tied it over my mouth, he then pressed me to the ground and held me while the two others started beating me. They gave me about 15 to 20 heavy blows, from the seat down to the ankle of the left foot. The gag became loose and I screamed loudly. They then let go of me and helped me up. I was given strict instruction not to tell anybody about this incident, if I wanted to keep my business. Then he gave me a kick with his foot and told me:

“Now run home in a trot, you black brother". I was almost unable to stand up, however, I tried to advance with the good right leg while the others yelled behind me “Double time, double time.”

The next morning I went to the doctors to get bandaged as I could make almost no use of my left foot.

Many sympathetic people asked me for the cause of the pain in my leg, which made me limp strongly. This is how the news of this incident got around.

This report was given to me by the Regens.


Document 1507-PS

Occurrences in Freising on 2/18/1935, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 394-397.

Statement made by Mr. Rupert Mattes, custodian of the Dom at Freising, regarding his arrest on the evening of 2/18/1935.

The sermon of the Cardinal had already begun when I was asked by one of the churchgoers to go and see what kind of work was done by several men outside of the Dom at its northern side. Only after a candidate of the seminary made the same request, did I leave the church and go to the North side. I found there five or six men in civilian clothes, who seemed to be installing a transmission line. I saw the men unroll what seemed to be a conduction wire. When I asked the men what they were doing, I was immediately seized by some of them and held. I asked to see a warrant of arrest but this was refused. Without further ado one of the. men took me to the police station. There I had to wait for the arrival of one gentleman; there was no interrogation but I was told not to meddle into anything which has been decided upon by the Munich Police. It also was forbidden to me to mention anything concerning the arrest. Upon my question, as to what should I tell my superior when they inquire about my long absence, I was told to answer them to the effect that I had to wait that long at the police station. Also I was forbidden to enter the Dom until the service was over.

Afterwards Commissioner Wagner accompanied by two gentlemen in civilian clothes, drove me to the Dom [Domberg]. When I got out of the car he said I was released and free to go wherever I wanted to. Whereupon I went immediately to the Dom.

Freising, 2/20/1935

Rupert Mattes Custodian of the Dom

This report was handed to me by the Regens.

Commander 111/1.R. Munich

Freising, 2/22/1935. Secret

Regiment Munich

On 2/21/1935, at about 12.30, Regens [?] Westermayr, head of the Catholic Church in Freising called on me, of course I received him immediately. He reported to me about the occurrence in the Dom in Freising, as detailed in attached statement.He declared that, on dates indicated in the report particularly on Monday, 2/18/1935, due to the attitude of the SA in the Dom, he was seriously worried about the keeping of the peace and order in the church, and even for the person of Cardinal Faulhaber. He asked me if in a case of serious disturbance of the peace in the church, or in case of an assault upon Cardinal Faulhaber, he could count on military protection, which he considers necessary as the police was completely depending upon the SA and the city counsel who will not grant him protection from the military officials.

I have answered the Regens [?] on his questions that it is the duty of the Armed Forces to defend the German borders against outside enemies, in case of internal fights the armed forces will only go into action in cases of emergency and danger.

The request for (stopping), of similar incidents must therefore in my opinion, be made by the Regens [?] to the Bezirksoberamtmann (district government) or the Cardinal must apply for it with Government Authorities. I as garrison commander, am not competent for questions of this kind.

Regus Westermayr took notice of this and admitted that, at present, there is no danger, and he explained that his inquiry was made mainly, to find out how I would react to a similar request in case of repetition.

I replied that generally the armed forces can only be put into action upon orders of Major General Adams, commandant of military area VII [Wehrpreis]. I do not believe, however, that the commandant will be able to put in troops for the protection of the Dom, or the Cardinal, as the police is competent for this matter, and I referred him again to the representative of the government, the district government [Bezirksoberamtmann].

With reference to this matter I had the following report from the paymaster-official [Statezahlmeister] Grueber (garrison administration) [Standartverwaltung] Freising, who is himself a member of the party and whose wife is a member of the Nazi Party Women’s Organization, [US frauenbund] in Freising.

On Monday February 18, there came to the house of paymaster official Grueber the Kreisleiderin [leader of the district] of the Nazi Party Womens Organization Mrs. Dr. Kreis and asked the wife of paymaster official Grueber to come immediately with her to the Dom to listen to the sermon of Cardinal Faulhaber, imply ing that this was Mrs. Grueber’s duty as member of the party and the Nazi Party Womens Organization. Mrs. Grueber’s objection that she was a Protestant was rejected as unimportant, instead it was ordered that every member of the Nazi Womens Party organization has o attach herself to a Storm Trooper in civilian clothes, in which way they would be considered as audience and not as sent out party members. There is no doubt that this measure shows the intention of disturbance of the service and the bringing about of violent scenes.

That Mrs. Grueber also did not know what it was all about until she was in the Dom, and could not leave, confirms the facts mentioned in the Regens Report.

I have been told confidentially from another source-that the order to take records of the sermon, was given by the office of the regional leader of NSDAP in Munich.

As I am of the opinion that participation on demonstrative undertakings of this kind for members of the Armed Forces is not possible if they want to have the respect of the population, I have ordered the officers and officials of the garrison and the battalions to postpone until further notice the Nazi Womens organization long strived for joining of our ladies. I have ordered the paymaster official Grueber to request an obligatory declaration from the Nazi Womens Organization, to the effect that his wife, as wife of an army official, will never again be called upon for similar matters. If they should refuse to give this declaration, she has to submit hr resignation. May I add that paymaster official Grueber and his wife fully agree with my opinion.

I talked about the matter both with the Lord Mayor and Kreisleiter [district leader] Lederer and he declared that officially he knew nothing about the matter, however, considers a serious disturbance of peace or a threatening of the Cardinal as impossible.

During a discussion today with the Oberamtmann [district government] he declared that he was only informed about these occurrences through the Regens, also following my advice, contacted him. In his opinion the police of Freising has completely failed. To date he was not able to obtain any proof from the police and he shall report to his superior bureau accordingly. He mentioned he was highly indignant about these occurrences, to the effect that the whole matter should be settled through the police and government and that from the part of the armed forces there was no reason to interfere.

signed [signature].

Document 1507-PS

Occurrences in Freising on 2/18/1935, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 397-399.

Art Fuehrer VII

This report was submitted in absence of the Regimental Commander without comment. Due to the importance of this matter, it seems not possible to await the return of the Regimental Commander. Report will be made to the Regimental Commander after his return.

Munich February 22,1935 V.d.a.B Secret

signature Captain Regimental adjutant.

Division Artillery Commander VII Received 2.22.25 No. 349135 Attachments 3 Ref Ia

To Military Area Headquarters.

The garrison commander has acted properly. Conditions in Freising should be called to the attention of the responsible civilian bureau.

signed: [Signature]

Division Artillery Commander VII received: 2-23-35 No. 767 Secret 3 Attachments

To the Reich Governor of Bavaria Major General retired Ritter von Epp. Munich

please note The Commander signed: Adam.

Ref. G 383/35 District Attorney’s Office District Court Munich II

Munich 3/5/1935. (Post Office 35)

To the Public Prosecutor, Court of Appeal Munich

Subject: Disturbances during the Sermon of Cardinal Faulhaber at the Dom-Church Freising.

According to a denunciation made by the Regentie [?] of the clergy seminary Freising disturbances were supposed to have occurred during the sermon of Cardinal Faulhaber in the Dom Church at Freising on 2/18/1935. With the knowledge and consent of the police inspector Wagner, Freising, a cable was laid from the teachers seminary over the north side of the Dom through a window, which was shattered for this purpose, into the interior of the Dom. Close to the Altar of St. Mary, where the end of the cable was, there were seen among others the 2nd Mayor Lechner, deputy Kreisleiter (district leader) Weidinger, city councillor Anneser, Storm Troop leader Steigenberger, 2-3 plain clothes police men and police inspector Wagner. From this direction were supposed to have come during the sermon heavy sounds of clearing of throats and coughing. One student of the seminary who was on duty to keep order, tried to find the cause of the disturbance, was called a “Bazi” [Bavarian expression for “no good"] and was held by a younger man, in such a way as to make it impossible for him to look right or left, till the end of the sermon.

The Dom custodian, also was trying to locate the cable on the outside at the Northern part, was supposed to have been attacked, held and taken to police station, and he was released only upon return of the police inspector.

Also the stairway to the north entrance of the church was supposed to have been blocked at times by Storm Troopers.

On their way home some Students were supposed to have been mistreated without evident reason.

The Regentie [?] of the clerical seminary sees in above mentioned offence heavy damage of property, disturbance of domestic peace and security, deprivation of liberty and disturbance of religious services within the church. The ordinariat [?] of the Archbishoprics Munich and Freising have joined the Regentie in preferring these charges.

I shall report further after the official inquiries have been carried through.

The Chief Public-Prosecutor.

About the happenings in the Dom at Freising on 2/18-19/1935

It was on the morning when the Cardinal Faulhaber bestowed the last minor sacraments and the diaconate sacrament in the presence of many relatives of the 111 sacrament candidates and other worshippers. In the entrance hall candidates of the seminary were selling printed copies (5pf. apiece) of the pope-sermon which the Cardinal had delivered on Pope-Sunday (Feb. 11) in Munich. There can be no doubt about the right to sell copies of his sermon as the sermon was never forbidden or sequestrated and it was sold within the church. Police inspector Wagner had some people (it was reported to the signer of this report that some of them had already looked for it on Saturday at the first sacraments, but the sermon was not sold on this day) confiscate the numerous copies at hand, take the candidates away and put into the police station, and all that was reported to the signer, with a certainly authorized reference to the Munich Police authorities. In fact with them by one of the Munich canons, who was called by telephone, brought the result that the service was released immediately, under the condition-no doubt caused by Mr. Wagner-however, that it must not be distributed in the entrance hall of the Dom. Mr. Wagner phoned the undersigned at noon and made this announcement. The undersigned protested against this restriction declaring that the entrance hall with these two altars which are being used is just as much part of the church as the nave, and requiring the return of the confiscated copies by 2 o'clock for the afternoon service. Mr. Wagner replied that he will not accept from the undersigned and hung up. A candidate went to get the confiscated copies of the sermon at the Police station. The unjustified confiscation of the Cardinal service, in his own church, at the hour when he was bestowing sacraments not only hurt the religious feeling of the numerous present worshippers but also has grossly violated the elementary behaviour against a high dignitary of the church and the sense of justice.

Document 1507-PS

Occurrences in Freising on 2/18/1935, Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 399-400.

February 19

On the occasion of the bible course held for the local theologians a sermon by the cardinal and solemn services were planned in the Dom for 7:15 in the evening and this was announced in the paper. During supper about 6:15 the undersigned was called from the dining room and was advised that the worshippers in the Dom were very excited because the 86th brigade in uniform has entered the Dom in close formation and members of the Storm Troop 11 civilian clothes, as well as the members of the Nazi Party’s Women’s Organization were called up for this service. Threats against the Cardinal and the worshippers have been heard which would indicate that the worst may be expected. As the Cardinal in his sermon did not give reason for his hostile demonstrations even to the malevolent attendants, the service passed without noticeable disturbance for the congregation.

However the following is certain: a cable was laid from the outside over the large stairway to the Dom, next to the so called “Hennerhaus” and through the shattered pane of the church window at the north side of the nave. An eye-witness reports as follows. “At the end of the sermon stood on the bench under the window and pushed an electric cord, if I am not mistaken, out of the window. In any event there was a string on a card". Theologian, who, upon the rumor of the installing of wire leading into the Dom, went to check up on it, found the left window next to the altar of St. Mary shattered in from the outside, the splinters laying inside. Outside of the church they found a clod of glazier’s putty, in which there still could be detected the mark of a conducting wire. Also the wall still showed signs of somebody having scaled it. It also seems strange that, as quite a few visitors told us, the stairway to the north entrance was blocked by storm troops before and during the sermon. One witness recognized them in the left inner transept among others Mr. Wagner, Storm Troop leader Steingenberger, 2-3 plain clothes police-men, city counsellor Annesen, mayor Lechner, deputy district leader [Kreisleiter] Weidinger. It was also reported to the undersigned that members of the Hitler Youth and German Girls league were entrusted with the blocking of the space in the Dom where the wire was installed.

I do not have to report in detail about the very offensive songs, deeply hurting the religious feeling, which were sung by the Storm Troops on their march back (from a catholic religious service), about the mistreatments inflicted upon for instance a plainclothes policeman and Mr. Hiedl, Jr. also was lured from his house, in the night of February 19, and as a “Black” (Schwarzer-Roman Catholic) was beaten up, as all these incidents have happened outside of the church. Accidentally the undersigned has learned from very reliable source that Storm Troop unit 11 has been ordered by their troop leader to sing: “Put the Black (Schwarzen Catholics) against the wall", instead of singing “Put the `Bruzen' (Bigwigs) against the wall.”

Freising, February 22,1935

Dr. F. Westermayr Regens

Document 1776-PS

The Continuation of the War Against England, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 404-405.

Chief of the Wehrmacht; General Staff 6/30/1940.

If political means will be without results England’s will to resist will have to be broken by force.

(a) By making war against the English mother country.

(b) By extending the war to the periphery.

Regarding point (a), there are three possibilities:

(1) “Siege” This includes war on the high sea and from the air against all shipments to and from England, the first against the English Airforce and all economic resources important to her war effort.

(2) Terror Attacks against English centers of population.

(3) A Landing of troops with the objective of occupying England.

Germany’s final victory also over England is only a question of time. Hostile operational attacks of great strength are no longer possible. Germany, therefore, can choose a form of warfare which husbands her own strength and avoids risks.

The fight against the English Airforce must have top priority in order to lessen the destruction of bases essential to our war effort such finally to prevent it altogether. In order to achieve this the English Airforce must be brought down within the effective operational zone of our fighter planes or at least forced to retreat to its basis in Central England. Attempt to force it down in that region will hardly be successful.

With such actions, nevertheless a prerequisite is created for destroying all of Southern England with its armament factories and for lessening the effectiveness of English bombers against Western Germany. If we succeed in eliminating the aviation factories concentrated around London and Birmingham the English Airforce can no longer replace its losses. In such a case England would have reached the limit of its capabilities of action against Germany, since the blockade by the English fleet is of no decisive importance to us.

The first and most important objective in-our war against England is to be supplemented by a concurrent Attack against English storage facilities and shipping on the high sea and in ports.

Together with propaganda and temporary terror attackssaid to be reprisal actionsthis increasing weakening of English food supply will paralyze the will of her people to resist and finally break and thus force its government to capitulate.

A landing in England can only be contemplated after Germany has gained control of the air.

A landing in England, therefore, should not have as its objective the military conquest of the island an objective which can be obtained by the Luftwaffe and the German Navy. Its sole purpose should be to provide the coup de grace, if it should still be necessary, to a country whose war economy is already paralyzed and whose air force is no longer capable of action.

This situation will not occur before the end of August or the beginning of September.

We must count with an opposition of about 20 English divisions so that at least 30 German divisions will have to be embarked.

The invasion nevertheless must be prepared in all details as a last resort.

An operational plan for it and the necessary preparations therefore are to be presented separately.

Document 1776-PS

The Continuation of the War Against England, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 405-406.

Addition to (b).

The war against the British Empire can only be carried out through or by other countries which are interested in its falling apart and hope for a substantial part of the spoils. These countries are primarily Italy, Spain, Russia and Japan. To activate these countries is a question of state craft. The military support of Italy and Spain is possible in a limited way (e.g. to mine the Suez Canal or the conquest of Gibraltar).

Besides the Arabic countries can be assisted by offering them “Defensive Means".

An Italian operation against the Suez Canal in conjunction with the conquest of Gibraltar thus sealing off the Mediterranean Sea, would be most effective.

In case Italy should intend to participate in the war against the British isles it can do so by employing its submarines based on the French coast or putting into action some of its fighter formations to be attached to the Luftwaffe. Elements of the Ground Forces are, from a purely military point of view, neither essential nor useful. The employment could only be a political gesture.

It is difficult-to predict the time required for such operation.

Since England can no longer fight for victory but only for the preservation of its possessions and its world prestige, she should according to all predictions, be inclined to make peace when she learns that she can still get it now at relatively little cost. Against a complete destruction England would fight to the bitter end.

[signed:] Jodl

Document 1849-PS

Memorandum on Reich Defense [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 406.

Strictly Secret!

Filing note.

(I) The tasks of the SA, as regards their part in the country’s defense, are laid down as follows by the Reich Minister of Defense.

(a) Pre-military training following on youth fitness training.

(b) Training of those capable of bearing arms who are not included in the Armed Forces.

(c) The maintenance of the fitness for action of former soldiers, and of those who have been trained in SA Sports but have not yet served.

(II) The tasks of Youth are briefly as follows:

Youth fitness training lasts until the end of the 17th year, thus--

(a) Youth Sports (6-14).

(b) Cross-country sports (15-17).

Youth fitness training comes to an end with a performance test in cross-country sports. The Reich Youth Leader and the Reich Sports Commissar are responsible for running the cross country sports in accordance with the general directions of the Reich Minister of Defence-the training must be carried out unarmed.

(III) The aims of pre-military training.

Pre-military training (SA sports) is given between the years of 18 and 20, thus-

(a) Training in SA formations.

(b) Training in SA sports camps.

Training is to be carried out with the 98 rifle.

Completion of pre-military training (with award of SA-Sports badge) should be the precondition of entry into the Armed Forces.

As for the rest, however, men capable of bearing arms, of age groups 21 to 26, should be instructed in SA-Sports, where this has not already been done, or where they have not been included in military service.

Berlin, 2/23/1934.

Ringen [?] C-002159

Document 1975-PS

Order Concerning The Introduction Of Compulsory Work In The Occupied Eastern Territories, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 408-410.

[P. 6.] III Ba 5 Wirtschaft Arbeitseinsatz Das Recht des besetzen Ostgebiete.

dated 12/19/1941 (Official Gazette, Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories p. 5) in terms of the revised Order dated 8/27/1942 (Official Gazette, Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern Territories p. 72).


As in the Reich, a development in the employment situation occurred in the occupied Eastern Territories, even in a comparatively short time, from widespread unemployment at first, to today’s high figures of employment. It is therefore possible to make the legal status similar to the legislation of the Reich with due regard to local conditions at the time.

In order that work in the war-industry of the Reich may not be impeded by a lack of labour, first, compulsory work itself was brought in by the Order set out below, which at the same time made a framework for further measures to be taken by the Reich commissars.

The order read as follows:

By virtue of section 8 of the Fuehrer Edict on the administration of the newly-occupied Eastern Territories dated 7/17/1941, I decree the following:

1. (1) All inhabitants of the occupied Eastern Territories are subject to the public liability for compulsory work, according to their capability for work.

(2) The Reich Commissars can increase or restrict the liability for compulsory work in regard to specific groups of the population.

(3) A special ruling is drawn up for Jews.

1. By the Order revising the Order concerning the introduction of compulsory work in the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 27.8.42, (Official Gazette, Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories p. 72) liability for compulsory work was extended to affect every inhabitant of the Occupied Eastern Territories. In the original terms of section 1, liability for compulsory work was restricted to persons between the ages of 18 and 45.

2. No special regulation on compulsory work for Jews has been made owing to the fact that all Jews capable of working are already in actual employment and also that the liability for compulsory work itself has been extended to include every inhabitant of the Occupied Eastern Territories, according to his capability for work.

2. Persons who can prove permanent employment in some kind of work useful to the community are to remain unaffected by the public liability for compulsory work.

3. ( 1 ) They will be paid according to rates which are considered just.

(2) As far as this may be possible, the welfare of the compulsory workers and of their families will be attended to.

4. (1) The Reich Commissars will issue the instructions required for the execution of this order.

(2) Contraventions of this order and of the instructions issued for its execution, will be punished by penal servitude or imprisonment. The special courts are competent to pass judgement.

c.f. 1st Order, issued by the Reich Commissar for the Eastern Territories (Ostland) for the execution of the order concerning the introduction of compulsory work in the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 25.1.43 (O. III Ba 51d. Slg.) and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Order issued by the Reich Commissar for the Ukraine for the execution of the Order concerning the introduction of compulsory work, dated 28.7.42 (U. III ba 11d. Slg.), 11.5.42 (U III Ba 12d. Slg.) and 16.11.42 (U III Ba 13d. Slg.)

Berlin 12/19/1941.

Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories (RR Dr. Schuenicke)

Document 1975-PS

Order Concerning The Introduction Of Compulsory Work In The Occupied Eastern Territories, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 410-411.

[P. 7.] Arbeitseinsatz. Wirtschaft III Ba 51

First Order for the execution of the Order concerning the introduction of compulsory work in the Occupied Eastern Territories dated 1/25/1943 (Official Gazette, Reich Commissariat of the Eastern Territories p. 3)

By virtue of section 4 of the Order issued by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories concerning the introduction of compulsory work in the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 12/19/1941 (Official Gazette, Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories 1942 p. 5) I decree:

1. (1) All work in the public interest comes under the heading of public compulsory work, especially work in the armament industry, in agriculture, in public building-work above and below ground and hydraulic construction work, erection and maintenance of public buildings, construction and maintenance of roads, waterways and railways, maintenance of drains and work on the development of the country [Landeskultur].

(2) Those liable for compulsory work must be reinstructed, undergo training or attend courses, when required to by the Area CommissarLabour department.

(3) Even work undertaken outside the Reich Commissariat of the Occupied Eastern Territories can be included as compulsory work.

The legal basis, justifying the conscription for native labor outside the Occupied Eastern Territories, is given in the Order concerning the conscription of labor for the areas outside the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 12.12.41 (O III Ba 4 d. Slg).

2. (1) Those liable for compulsory work are to be employed in work most suited to their knowledge and capabilities.

(2) Anyone capable of working is liable for compulsory work.

(3) Anyone not fully capable of working is subject to the liability for compulsory work to the extent of his capability.

3. (1) Those liable for compulsory work are directed into employment by the competent Area Commissar (Labour department) of the permanent or temporary place of residence.

(2) The Area Commissar (Labour department) can make district and municipal leaders responsible for seeing that compulsory workers take up compulsory employment.

(3) When the compulsory worker is directed to start work, he is to be given-a certificate of obligation by the competent Area Commissar (Labour department).

4. Those liable for compulsory work are paid according to the local pay regulations applicable to the conditions of work which are in force.

5. (1) The duration of liability for compulsory work will be determined by the Area Commissar (Labour department). It can be limited, from the start to a specific period. Liability for compulsory work of an indefinite period can cease only with the permission of the competent Area Commissar (Labour department) of the place of work.

(2) In so far as work is undertaken outside the Reich Commissariat of the Eastern Territories, the instructions applicable to that place of work, are valid.

Document 1975-PS

Order Concerning The Introduction Of Compulsory Work In The Occupied Eastern Territories, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 411-412.

With reference to the terms of employment and treatment within the Reich, however, differentiation must be made between subjects of the former three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and inhabitants of the General district of White Russia. So far as there are no special regulations for foreign workers, the terms of employment for comparable racial Germans apply also to the subjects of the foreign three Baltic states, as from 1/1/1943, after the discontinuation of the 15% pay levelling duty [Lohnausgleichabgabe]. There are no essential restrictions in accommodation and treatment.

On the other hand, the so-called Eastern workers including also the White Russians, have conditions of employment of a special kind to which the German regulations of employment rights and employment protection rights apply only in so far as this is specifically decreed. As payment for their labour, they receive according to their capability a graduated rate of pay in accordance with the Order concerning the conditions of employment for Eastern workers dated 30.6.42 (RGBl. I pp. 419/24). In addition the heads of factories must pay an Eastern worker’s tax according to a legally established table of rates; owing to this, however, the payment of income tax within the German Reich ceases. Accommodation and food is arranged for by the heads of the factories who also make the appropriate charges according to the established rates.

6. (1) The compulsory worker must comply with all measures necessary to the commencement of his work.

(2) When required to do so by the Area Commissar (Labour department) he must above all:

1. appear in person with all his personal papers and give all relevant information about himself.

2. to make use in his work of any effects in his possession which can be used in the course of his work (e.g. hand tools, working clothes ) .

7. No deputizing is allowed in complying with the liability for compulsory work.

8. (1) Anyone failing to comply with the terms of the Executive Order will be punishable under section 4 of the Order issued by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, concerning the introduction of compulsory work in the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 12/19/1941 (Official Gazette, Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories 1942 p. 5).

(2) Likewise, anyone undertaking to hinder others in the fulfilling of the obligations set out in this Executive Order, will be punished.

(3) Punishment can be inflicted only by order of the Area Commissar (Labour department).

In place of inflicting a penalty in the terms of section 8, the Area Commissar can decide on a punishment of 6 weeks in a Forced Labour Camp.

10. This Order comes into force on 2/1/1943.

Riga 1/25/1943

Reich Commissar for the Eastern Territories (RR Dr. Schuenicke)

Document 3546-PS

[Human Experimentation] [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 513-515.

Extract from “DAS AHNENERBE” (Diary 1944)

Page 7-6 January 1830 hours. 2. SS Hstuf. Dr. Rascher (c) Letter from RFSS to Ogruf. Pohl about assistance for scientific research work. (d) Rooms for carrying through of freezing experiments.

Page 24-23 January 1130 hours. Lecture to RFSS together with Ostubaf. Dr. Brandt: 1. We shall receive the reports of Prof. Schilling.

Page 30-28 January 0900 hoursRFR, SS Brif. Prof. Dr. Schwab: 2. Cooperation with Institute R, Dachau.

Page 32-29 January 1730 hoursWith SS Hstuf. Rascher and Dr. Pacholegg to Dahlem.

Page 37-2 February 13. CA-Workfirst picture of living cancer cells and the fight against them. Hirt succeeded in picturing living cancer cells and thereby proving the Tripaflavin penetrates into the heart of the cell as coloring matter detrimental to the cancer cells. 21. Protectional vaccination for spotted fever-by Prof. Haagen. The protectional vaccination for spotted fever in Natzweiler goes on with good results.

Page 53-22 February 1330-1500 hours. 2. Conference with Dr. Habil Ed. May: (b) Cooperation with Dr. Ploetner and Prof. Schilling.

Page 58-25 February 0900-1520 hours. 3. Report for RFR Prof. Blome (by phone): Order of the RFSS about his work in Dachau and cooperation with Rascher communicated.

Page 81-22 March 1830-2100 hours SS Hstuf. Dr. Rascher: Preparation of the freezing experiments for the winter half-year, 1944-45.

Page 103-14 April 1300-1515 hours Station Rascher: Situation of work, further work, orders for provisional carrying on-Hstuf. Ploetner introduced. 1515 hours Political Department about escape of Pacholegg. 1525 hours Ostubaf. Weiter about Station Rascher.

Page 142-23 May 1300-1330 hours Reichsarzt SS: Conference with Agruf. Grawitz, Staf. Poppendick, and Hstuf. Dr. Ploetner. Cooperation. Division as to the work of Dr. Schilling's. 1330-1530 hours. SS Hstuf. Dr. Ploetner Taking up of personal contact with SS Stubaf. Prof. Dr. Hirth.

Page 150-31 May 1745-2030 hours SS Hstuf. Dr. Ploetner 1. Order Reichsarzt SS reference cooperation with Prof. Schilling. 3. Use of inmates in accordance with order of RFSS, dated 25/5/44.

Page 179-27 June 1500-1900 Hours Conference with SS Staf. Dr. Brandt and SS Hstuf. Berg: .24. Creation of a scientific research station in a concentration camp. Information about conference with SS Ogruf. Pohl, dated 15/6/44.

Page 205-25 July 0730 Hours Together with Ostubaf. Klumm to Oranienburg: Conference with SS Staf. Maurer, Oranienburg, about use of inmates for scientific purposes.

Page 206-26 July 0830-1900 hours R F R SS H'Stuf. Dr. Fischer (by phone): Order in accordance with conference with SS Staf. Maurer, dated 25/7/44 to journey fastest through all concentration camps in order to fix finally the persons.

Page 279-21 October 1500-1545 hours 2. Proceeding or research of SS Stubaf. Prof. Dr. Hirt. Renewed release of Staff Surgeon Dr. Wimmer for duty, and setting aside of the Chemist, SS Ostuf. Martinek in accordance with letter of 6/10/44.

Page 281-23 October 1645-1655 hours. SS Staf. Dr. Poppendieck (by phone): Taking over of biological research by SS Staf. Dr. Ploetner in Dachau.

Title: “Document 3572-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 515-516.

Berlin, 4/25/1938.

G/14 POL I 260 g. Rs.

Appendix to the decree of 4/2/1937 Pol. I 1686/37 g. Rs./

Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization has made further progress within Germany in the Armed Forces and in all civil-administrations including the Foreign Office, it is necessary now that in the ease of government offices abroad corresponding measures also be taken in their area of jurisdiction without delay and that they be brought into line with the duties owed the mother-country. The commencement of a period of crisis or of the actual mobilization confronts the offices abroad in manifold fields with great and difficult tasks, the nature and extent of which will be very varied due to local and political conditions. Among others the following are mentioned: the increase of personnel, the making use of Germans for special duties (code and special W/T service, propaganda, etc.) the securing of archives and the destruction of secret matters, the safeguarding of the needed financial resources, the guaranteeing of the transmission of intelligence, the transport home of men liable for military service, the protection of German individuals and property, the cooperation in economic planning concerned with organization, which must necessarily include the economic possibilities abroad.

The detailed spheres of activities will be made known in further decrees on the part of the various departments of the Foreign Office. The work to be done then by the offices abroad is to be tackled before hand. The carrying out of all preparatory mobilization measures, which are of course to be treated as “Top Secret", comes under the personal supervision and is the responsibility of the head of the office. In times of peace these measures must be taken care of by the available personnel.

I request the heads of offices-without waiting for further instructions-to start considering now the measures to be taken into consideration in their sphere of activity in the case of a serious situation, and then at once to submit appropriate proposals. In the interest of absolute secrecy it must be observed strictly that the number of people informed remains as restricted as possible. If necessary the reports are to be written by hand by the head of the office himself.

I request that this decree, which is to be kept sealed and under lock and key by the head of the office, be acknowledged in writing with these words only, “I have received the decree Pol. I 260/38 g. Rs. of the 25th April.”



Buero R.M. Pers. F 20286

Title: “Document 3661-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 517-518.


Schaulen, 9/8/1941 Schr.-Hp

The Regional Commissar in Schaulen. To the Reich Commissar for the Eastland (Ostland) Riga

Re: SS Colonel (Standartenfuehrer) Jaeger

A Captain Stasys Senulis, residing in Schadow, Ponnewesch district, appeared today at the office of the Regional Commissariat in Schaulen, stating that he had been ordered by SS Colonel Jaeger to seize all silver and gold articles of Jewish ownership. He had been in Schadow and also in Radviliskis. Both mayors, acting on instructions from the Regional Commissar, had refused to deliver up these articles.

I strictly forbade Senulis to carry out the order of SS Colonel Jaeger, and I beg you to prohibit Jaeger from taking any independent arbitrary measures relating to the Jews.

The two certificates, copies of which are enclosed, were taken from Captain Senulis.

This fresh incident clearly demonstrates that Colonel Jaeger does not consider himself bound by the instructions issued by the Reich Commissar and by the Regional Commissar regarding the seizure of Jewish property and that he meddles in matters that do not concern him.

If the SS continues to overreach itself in this fashion, I, as Regional Commissar, must refuse to accept responsibility for the orderly confiscation (Erfassung) of Jewish property.

Furthermore, I shall take every opportunity to emphasize to the heads of districts and the mayors that they are not to take orders from offices other than those of the Reich Commissar the Commissar General, and the Regional Commissar.

Because of the importance of this matter, a letter of similar content is being sent to the Commissar General in Kauen.

[Signed] Gewecke

Document 3697-PS

[Extract From An Austrian Court Document In The Proceedings Against Dr. Rudolf Neumayer.], Part 01 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 518-521.


Vg 1 b Vr 445/45 Hv 187/45

Third day of Trial-1/30/1946

Commencement: 9 a. m.

Present: Tribunal, Defendant, Defence Counsel as on the first day of the trial.

Secretary: JAng. Trumler.

The Witness Wilhelm Miklas, personal particulars in File No. 29 adds: resident in Vienna I. Wildpretmarkt No. 1, not related to the accused.

The Defence states that it will waive the swearing in of this witness.

The Prosecuting Attorney also states that it will waive the swearing in of this witness.

The Witness: Warned to tell the truth and not sworn in after it was agreed upon to waive the oath.

The President: Since when have you known the defendant?

The Witness:.Actually only since his appointment as Finance Minister in 1936. I cannot remember the exact date now.

The President: That is to say since 11/1936. Do you perhaps know the reasons why the Chancellor fixed on the defendant at the time when the Finance Minister, Dr. Draxler, resigned from the Cabinet?

The Witness: I do not know the reason. For me the order of the Austrian Chancellor was alone decisive, who himself chose the members for his Cabinet. In this case I naturally raised no objection, particularly as I knew that this was done in agreement with the National Council. I also do not know the reasons why the Chancellor felt obliged to fix on the person of Dr. Neumayer. Obviously the Chancellor wished to have someone who was not a political outstanding expert in financial affairs. That was my impression.

The President: After Dr. Neumayer’s appointment as Finance Minister you must have come repeatedly into contact with him on the occasion of receptions and certain other State occasions. Did you become better acquainted with the defendant?

The Witness: I did not often come into contact with the defendant, even privately.

The President: Cannot you tell us something about the events of 2/12/1938-that is, about the Chancellor’s journey to Berchtesgaden and the results which followed-how the change of government, etc., came about?

The Witness: I only know one thing, that on 11/11/1938 a so-called “Patriotic Ball [Vaterlaendischer Ball"] took place in Vienna. The newspapers wrote at the time that this was the the first official State ball in Austria since the government of the “Patriotic Front [Vaterlaendische Front"]. In this connection I I remarked that I could look back on a period of 52 years' work as a State Official and that I was not a member of the “Patriotic Front". I always declined to become one, because of my position as President. I was convinced that the head of the State must be above all parties. One can imagine how difficult that was to carry through. I had a very difficult position. I did not attend this official State ball of the Patriotic Front, but went with my wife to Mariazell that day. There I received a telephone message from the then Secretary of State, Dr. Guido Schmidt, who t informed me that a meeting had been arranged in Berchtesgaden between the Chancellor and the Head of the German State, Hitler. I would point out in this connection that we had received terrible drubbings by Germany in the economic and political spheres in the years preceding 1938; I would point for instance to the 1000 Mark embargo, which considerably curtailed our tourist traffic in the Western Alps. I would point out that this telephone conversation took place perhaps as early as 10.11.38. In any case I was asked by Dr. Guido Schmidt what I thought of the Chancellors meeting with Hitler in Berchtesgaden. To this I said: “It is of course very difficult". It was intimated to me that the Chancellor desired this discussion, it was only a question of asking the President if he was in favor of it. I asked what was to be the aim of this discussion whereupon I was told that the object was to clear up the misunderstandings which had arisen in Austria in the execution of the Agreement of 7/1936. This Agreement of 1936 was drawn up by the Government alone and was exacted by Germany and accepted, and remained a “gentleman’s agreement.” It was thus no State Agreement but a pact between the two heads of the Austrian and German Governments. The President had naturally nothing to sign. It is thus that this “gentleman’s agreement” came about. It was also the same with the “Berchtesgaden Protocol.” Germany, through the 1000 Mark embargo, had, as already mentioned, taken our best tourist traffic in the Western Alps away from us, so that there was ill-feeling in the Western areas.

Replying to a question by the Prosecuting Attorney: The witness states: Is it indeed true that at that time (11/11/1938) the 1000 Mark embargo was no longer a matter of the moment.

The President: Did the invitation regarding the meeting between the Chancellor and Hitler in Berchtesgaden come from Austria or from Hitler, i.e., from Germany?

The Witness: This invitation came from Germany through Herr v. Papen. Consequently the Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, went to Berchtesgaden accompanied by Dr. Guido Schmidt. On their return from the Berchtesgaden journey they gave a short report on the manner in which the discussion had taken place. I have only heard one thing regarding the contents of the Berchtesgaden Protocol, that Dr. Guido Schmidt sat for hours in an adjoining room of the Berghof and tried, together with Hitler’s confidants, to alter this or that point of the Protocol in Austria’s favor, or to let it drop altogether. This was all done in Austria’s interest. Dr. Guido Schmidt has therefore rendered service to Austria in a certain sense. The protocol was handed over by Hitler in the form of an ultimatum. I was told all this by Dr. Guido Schmidt.

The President: What did the Chancellor report to you regarding the discussion at Berchtesgaden?

The Witness: The Chancellor informed me that certain points had been agreed upon regarding an interchange of officials, particularly with regard to officers of the Armed Forces. Thus the Chancellor gave information on matters which one can discuss among friends. These are the principal points which the Chancellor mentioned to me. The Chancellor reported further that, with regard to the remodelling of the Government, the entry of Seyss-Inquart into Dr. Schuschnigg’s Government and his appointment as Minister of the Interior was demanded. That was a direct command by Hitler. After much hesitation and under the influence of the reception at Berchtesgaden, as well as of military pressure behind the scenes-Hitler is said to have raved during this discussion--the Chancellor undertook the desired remodelling of his Cabinet. If this demand of Hitler was not fulfilled, there was the greatest danger of the outbreak of war. Hitler granted the Chancellor a short period of time in order that Dr. Schuschnigg could discuss this demand with his people.

Document 3697-PS

[Extract From An Austrian Court Document In The Proceedings Against Dr. Rudolf Neumayer.], Part 02 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 521-525.

I think the Chancellor was allowed a period up to 11/15/1938. The authoritative members of the Austrian Government declared at that time that we must endeavour to yield. There was the danger of the outbreak of a second war, which might have been a terrible danger for the whole of Europe.

This remodelling of Dr. Schuschnigg’s Cabinet, by the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior, took place during this period. Seyss-Inquart was thus made Minister of the Interior and immediately brought in the National-Socialists in the National-Socialist spirit [im nationalsozialistischen Sinne] to reinforce the police, as in a similar instance at the time of Dr. Dollfuss, and, as happened previously under the Social-Democratic government, when the “Republican Defensive Confederation” [Republikanisch Schutzbund] was formed. You can imagine what a difficult position I had between these parties, which had their own private military forces. In my position as President I was so to say the whipping boy of the government, the party for the moment in power.

The President: You now appointed Seyss-Inquart Minister of the Interior in accordance with the demand ? Were you acquainted with him before this, or did you only now make his acquaintance?

The Witness: I only made his acquaintance on his appointment as Minister of the Interior; before that I did not know him. I had only heard that he was doing quite well out in Doebling, in any case he was a man with whom one could talk things over. I was also told that Seyss-Inquart was a diligent church-goer. But I knew nothing more about Seyss-Inquart personally; I did not know him personally before his appointment as Minister.

The President: Was this appointment of Seyss-Inquart a difficult problem?

The Witness: It was not only a difficult problem, it was directly caused by the circumstances which prevailed at that time in the Chancellery on the Ballhausplatz. The President could not act otherwise, under the burden of saving Austria from the worst that could happen, namely the entry of the German troops which would be looked upon as enemies and preventing a total war. Vienna would have been “bombed to bits” by the Germans.

The Prosecuting Attorney: Had you not previously inquired of the Western Powers as to whether you should consent to the Berchtesgaden Agreement?

The Witness: The,Chancellor was continually in contact with the Ambassadors of the Western Powers, and continually drew their attention to Austria’s difficult position in face of the Hitler Reich threat to Austria; but he found little understanding of the matter. The leaders of the Western Powers only saw the difficulties of their own countries. At the eleventh hour Mussolini refused to be consulted. There was also no real interest on the part of England. We felt ourselves to be completely abandoned by Europe.

The President: Did the defendant, who was Finance Minister at that time, attend the Ministerial Council Meetings of Dr. Schuschnigg’s Cabinet?

The Witness: Yes.

The President: Do you know whether, and to what extent the individual Ministers were informed of the events at Berchtesgaden and of Hitler’s demands?

The Witness: I can make no statement about this, I do not know. In this connection I would remark that, in my position as President I could not take part in the meetings of the Ministerial Council. In any case I did not discuss the Berchtesgaden Agreement and its consequences with the defendant. I cannot say therefore if the Defendant was well informed on this point or not.

The President: What can you remember regarding the events of Friday, 11.3.1938. What took place then in the Chancellery, what were your own experiences at that time?

The Witness: I must admit that I was not kept informed by the Government of the events of that time relative to the difficult situation in which Austria had found herself at that time. I was not informed of all the events which took place in the sphere of Foreign policy. Of course I could have done nothing about it. The consequence of not having been informed about everything was that I was somewhat surprised at the terrible foreign situation, which threatened to become acute. As Schuschnigg was in contact with the Western Powers, as with Paris and London, I did not consider the matter to be so very threatening and tragic.

The President: What have you to say regarding the plebiscite?

The Witness: This plebiscite was suggested to the Chancellor by France. The Chancellor regarded this plebiscite as a good safeguard for Austria. It could then have been publicly referred to that Austria stands steadfast by reason of the people’s vote. Austria must then have remained a State. But this plebiscite was arranged too late. Had it been carried out-as I continually urged-perhaps in 1934-1935, things might have been different. Had it been carried out after the murder of Dr. Dollfuss, that would “probably” still have been the right time. But I even regard this “probably” as doubtful. For I was told that already at that time the situation in Austria was such that a plebiscite might possibly have led to armed conflict between the parties, i.e., to civil war. For Austria was at that time already severely infected with National Socialism. A plebiscite at that time would perhaps have been all the more likely to bring about the intervention of Hitler Germany.

Thus, at the beginning of the week to 3/11/1938, the problem of the plebiscite came up. At that time the Chancellor visited me with the Foreign Ministerother men also called on me in this connectionand was of the opinion that a plebiscite was necessary for the moral security of the State. I naturally agreed with pleasure, and would remark in this connection that this plebiscite must be formally held by the President.

The Chancellor therefore visited me with the Foreign Minister and I agreed to the plebiscite. The Chancellor then went to Innsbruck and there, in his party circle, in the “Patriotic Front” made the speech showing the Austrian point of view which is so well known to all.

He thereupon returned to Vienna and from this moment on began the counter-thrusts on the part of the National-Socialists who already felt themselves protected by the military might proclaimed by Hitler. Thus this prohibited National-Socialist Party had already made itself manifest to the outside world. Austria was already undermined by the Nazis. There was now much correspondence back and forth between the Chancellor and Hitler. Schuschnigg tried to find some kind of way out. Schuschnigg insisted in carrying out the plebiscite. In the meantime the events of 11.3.1938 took place. With regard to these events of 11.3.1938 I should like to say that I still- believed, “What can happen to us, at all events we are assured of the protection of the Great Powers and of Italy, Hitler will not dare to bring us to our knees by armed force.” But in the end the National-Socialist revolution within the country, strengthened by the consciousness that the Nazis were certain of military help from Germany, was not to be checked. This National-Socialist Revolution within the country grew and grew and resulted finally in Hitler’s military ultimatum.

On Friday 2.3.1938 about midday, I knew nothing about a military ultimatum, indeed of any ultimatum at all. About midday I drove home to my modest dinner. While at home I received a telephone message from the Foreign Minister that Germany had just sent an ultimatum to the Austrian Government which demanded the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, i.e., the formation of a new Government under the leadership of Seyss-Inquart. The ultimatum probably also demanded the abandoning of the plebiscite proposed for Sunday. The plebiscite was to take place under National-Socialist direction. This ultimatum had, I think, no time limit. This ultimatum was given to the Schuschnigg Government and not to the head of the State. Naturally Dr. Schuschnigg did not wish to bear the responsibility alone and I was therefore informed and asked to come to the Chancellery. I arrived at the Chancellery at 2 p. m. and was personally informed of this ultimatum. I said “that is quite impossible, we will not be coerced, we have `Protecting Powers', for example in Geneva, and we would like to know what they will say to it.” We immediately informed the Western Powers about the ultimatum. For this purpose Ambassador Ludwig communicated by telephone with Rome, Paris, and London. Teletype messages were sent. We wanted to discover the frame of mind of the government circles of the Western Powers. I said the ultimatum was to be refused. That appears to have been done by the Government in some form or other, whereupon the German Reich presented a military ultimatum. This military ultimatum contained the same demand as the first one. This ultimatum was addressed to the head of the State, i.e., to me.

The President: When was this military ultimatum presented?

The Witness: In the afternoon round about tea-time. This ultimatum I also refused. Then the Secretary of State, Dr. Keppler arrived and informed him that I was refusing the ultimatum. A second military ultimatum was then presented, that was at approximately 6:30 p.m. Major General Muff brought me this second ultimatum. The two military ultimatums had a time limit up to 7:30 p.m. After the expiration of this time limit the entry of German troops into Austria was threatenedthere were 200000 men on the Western border from Bregenz to Passau. We were threatened with the German troops obtaining the requirements of the ultimatum by force. I informed the two gentlemen, Dr. Keppler and Major General Muff (I was on good terms with the latter) that I refused the ultimatum. I condoled with Major General Muff that he was the one to have been chosen to hand me the ultimatum. I refused both ultimatums and told the two gentlemen that Austria alone determines who is to be the head of the State in Austria, as is also the case in Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and also in the Scandinavian countries, and why should we not be granted this right, and that I insist upon Austria herself and her functionaries alone determining the composition of the Government. That was noted by the two gentlemen. I naturally informed the Chancellor of this. There was continual contact between me and the Chancellor during the critical hours of 11.3.1938, in fact until the morning of 12.3.1938. There was also continual contact between us and Dr. Guido Schmidt. After Dr. Schuschnigg had delivered his well known farewell speech in. the evening, he was still busy with the carrying on of the Government until the formation of a new Government. Dr. Schuschnigg had already told me of his resignation before making this radio speech.

The President: Did you know this radio speech?

The Witness: I did not hear it, I was told about it later on.

Document 3697-PS

[Extract From An Austrian Court Document In The Proceedings Against Dr. Rudolf Neumayer.], Part 03 partial [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 525-528.

The President: The Chancellor spoke as follows in this speech: “The President has charged me to inform the Austrian people that we yield to force". Do you remember this passage?

The Witness: It is quite out of the question that I could have given such an order. I have never said anything regarding the contents of this speech. He may have drawn his conclusions from the consultation I had with the Chancellorhe did say that we must say that we must yield to force. I gave no instructions whatsoever as to this speech of the Chancellor. Only one thing occurred. Dr. Schuschnigg told me already in the afternoon that he intended to resign. This resignation was, I think, made known by radio. That must have been about 2 or 3 p.m. It is possible, however, that his resignation was not notified by radio, but that the countermanding of the plebiscite was made known. But in any case the Press was advised of the Chancellor’s resignation. I said at the time “things have not gone so far that we must capitulate".

The President: Did the Chancellor say to you the second time that he would make his resignation public?

The Witness: No. According to old custom the Press is advised. I would state that I did not know that the Chancellor himself would speak. Reverting to the Chancellor’s radio speech, in which he refers to an order given by me that we must yield to force, I would remark, as previously mentioned, that this is the conclusion drawn by him from the conversations with me and Dr. Guido Schmidt. He considered himself morally justified, as Europe had left us in the lurch. The conversations with Paris, London, and Rome continued in the meantime, but with no results. Mussolini could not be contacted. Paris said “we have trouble enough with the new Cabinet crisis home". It was just such a situation as would have led to a conflict over Austria with the outbreak of a second World War. This dreadful situation applied to the whole of Europe. Since I had no help whatsoever in either domestic or foreign policy there was only one solution possible, that a Chancellor be appointed who would be acceptable as negotiator by the opposite side, i. e., by the government of the Reich.

The President: Thus the position at that time was such that the Austrian State could be said to be in a state of emergency, on the brink of war?

The Witness: Yes, it certainly was.

The President: Were you personally, as head of the State, yourself in a state of peril on account of this emergency? Were you aware of the internal situation during these critical days? Did you know what was then happening in the streets of Vienna ?

The Witness: Yes, I was occasionally informed as to what was happening in the streets of Vienna. I also knew that the Chancellery had been closed by the Nazis. I even knew more than that. I knew that a deputation of Nazi rebels had been admitted to the Chancellery; but I only knew later on that they had been admitted to the Chancellery by Seyss-Inquart, who was Minister of the Interior and had been given executive powers. I knew what was happening in the streets from reports.

The President: Did you not, as head of the State, have the feeling of yourself being in a serious position?

The Witness: To be sure.

The President: Did you have the feeling that you were still free in your decisions and acts?

The Witness: In a serious situation one is no longer free. It is coercion. Thus I undertook this reforming of the government under pressure from inside and outside. This pressure went so far as to include my person, as head of the State. In any case my own situation, that I was a prisoner of the mob, was quite clear. That was no longer the will of the authorities, but a dictatorship. The military ultimatum expired at 7:30 p.m. After this time limit, if this ultimatum was rejected, the German Army was to march in. But my firm attitude and refusal to accept the ultimatum was so successful that the Armed Forces delayed their entry until the following morning; from a military point of view they could do this easily, as already in the evening of 11.3.1938 the Austrian Armed Forces, in obedience to an Army Order, had withdrawn somewhat from the Inn-frontier in order to take up a secure position.

The President: Has the question of whether resistance could ever be carried out by our Armed Forces ever been looked into?

The Witness: This question was looked into; the little State of Austria has some 20000 men in the Army, thus 10000-12000 men perhaps would be drawn up on the Western frontier; against them they had forces almost 20 times their strength, not forgetting the superiority of the German Air Force. I also invited the inspector of the Army, Infantry General Schilhawsky, to our discussions. Only with him did I discuss the question of whether we could offer resistance or not. He requested me to relieve him of the decision as to whether Austria could possibly be defended. In this connection he mentioned another General with whom I should discuss this matter. I should, however, prefer not to mention the name of this General.

The President: Was there ever any possibility of resisting?

The Witness: No. It was from the very beginning a lost cause. The question of resistance was considered. The Generals discussed it and it was realized to be hopeless from the beginning. As I therefore was completely abandoned both at home and abroad, I decided finally, in order to avoid useless shedding of blood and to save the existence and the life of the Austrian people in these critical hours, to appoint a National-Socialist as Austrian Chancellor. At midnight I therefore appointed Dr. Seyss-Inquart, the former Minister of the Interior, as Austrian Chancellor. By this means I saved the life of my soldiers and also the life and existence of my homeland. Political reasons (not alone military reasons) forced me to capitulate. There was no other way out. I was informed how terribly the German Armed Forces were acting in accordance with Hitler’s instructions. The discoveries made in Berlin show with what brutal words Hitler had given permission to his troops to invade the country. The lives of the civil population, above all of the working population of Vienna were in danger. Perhaps if I could have gained time and have entered into negotiations with the German Reich, perhaps I should then have succeeded in interesting the Western Powers in Austria’s cause.

The President: Did you speak to Seyss-Inquart before his appointment as Chancellor?

The Witness: No, he was only summoned then; he did not come himself. I did not negotiate with him. Neither did I negotiate with Minister Glaise-Horstenau. I sent for Seyss-Inquart, after I had come to the realization above described. I even thought of the appointment of another head of the Government. But that was impossible. I therefore sent for Seyss-Inquart. That the opposition knew only too well that I was the only resister is shown by the fact that the next day (12.3.1938) during the morning, Himmler had arrived in Vienna from Berlin by air. His first demand of the new Austrian Chancellery was the dismissal of the President. This clearly shows that I was the sole and last resister in Austria.

Document 3697-PS

[Extract From An Austrian Court Document In The Proceedings Against Dr. Rudolf Neumayer.], Part 04 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 528-531.

The President: When the new Chancellor was designated in the person of Seyss-Inquart, did he inform you which Ministers he (Seyss-Inquart) had in view?

The Witness: Seyss-Inquart handed me no list of Ministers then. He told me at the time that he would have to leave for a short time in order to talk to his Party comrades. He compiled his list of Ministers only some time after his appointment as head of the Austrian Government. Actually a list of Ministers was compiled from among the National-Socialists already admitted to the Chancellery. Thus a government revolution had already broken out before r had summoned the new head of the government. Names of Austrians, e. g., Prof. Menghin, etc., appeared on the list of Ministers. I said to myself that these men, who are Austrians, will yet endeavor by some means to place in some kind of favorable position and that Austria will perhaps remain a semi-independent State.

The President: When you summoned the Chancellor did he tell you what he intended to do? Did you ask him what steps he intended to take in the next few hours?

The Witness: No, I did not want to ask him, if I was compelled to appoint him head of the Austrian Government by force. I knew one thing, that the Nazis wanted an Anschluss with the German Reich in some form. Seyss-Inquart knew that I was opposed to and rejected this demand, so a mutual discussion of the matter was superfluous.

The President: When was the list of ministers presented to you ?

The Witness: About midnight, after the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as head of the Austrian Government. The following names appeared on the list-Dr. Neumayer, Prof. Menghin, Reinthaler, Jury, Wolff, Fischbock and Hueber. I then ordered that the swearing-in of the Seyss-Inquart Government should take place on Saturday, 3/12/1938. At this swearing-in I gave a very short address. The substance of this address was as follows: 1 said, “My Lord Chancellor and Ministers, you will not require me to speak to you about the events of the last few days and wish for an explanation. I demand of you one thing only: you have been appointed by virtue of the Austrian constitution and must fulfill all rights and obligations for Austria according to the Austrian constitution.” Seyss-Inquart has become the head of the Austrian State. The swearing-in of the newly formed Government was carried out according to the old Austrian form. All the ministers took an Austrian oath of allegiance that is to say to an Austrian Government. This swearing-in took place about 10 a.m. on 3/12/1938.

The President: Was it immediately after this swearing-in ceremony or a little later that the accused came to you?

The Witness: It was later and not directly after the swearing-in. But as far as I can remember only a little time lay between. The accused thanked me for his reappointment as Finance Minister, which was not a customary procedure. I pointed out to the accused that it was Seyss-Inquart who had appointed him as Finance Minister and told him, that Seyss-Inquart had designated him as his colleague. Furthermore, I explained to the accused that I was thoroughly in disagreement with the whole affair and also intimated that in this situation I could no longer remain President.

On being questioned by the President the witness declared: It is possible, that I passed the remark that I could no longer remain President at the point of the sword. I also plainly told the accused that he naturally was not to assume that I was in agreement with the events of the previous night. The accused was rather astonished that, so to speak, I should announce my resignation to him and not wish to collaborate with the new system. He had to be prepared, therefore, for me not to be in agreement.

The Prosecuting Attorney: You have said that it was clear to you, when you appointed Seyss-Inquart as Head of the Government, that the Anschluss with the Reich would follow and nevertheless you allowed the Ministers to take the oath. Were you acting under compulsion? Why did you undertake the swearing-in?

The Witness: The swearing-in of every Cabinet named by me is the duty of the President; Seyss-Inquart was appointed as Austrian minister. He was Hitler’s agent. There was always the possibility that, through him, Austria would remain a sovereign state or perhaps a semi-sovereign state like Bavaria. When Himmler was already in Vienna, Seyss-Inquart sent his State Secretary, Dr. Wimmer, to me and he explained to me how things stood. Germany had made the demand that I be deposed as President. Seyss-Inquart who also visited me on this subject, first talked round the matter by saying that it was extremely distasteful to him but that he was bound to comply with the order of the German Reich and he therefore urged it upon me to send in my resignation. My view of the resignation was as follows: Under Dollfuss, I repeatedly asked to be allowed to resignnaturally this was done in private without being announced publicly since I could not tolerate that the head of the State was so to speak publicly held responsible at home and abroad for the Government and/or for any regents. I had had enough of it. However, at the time the foreign enemy presented me with these demands, I now more than ever felt it my duty to remain in office. I did remain and then, on 3/13/1938, when the law of reunion [Wiedervereinigungsgesetz] was submitted to me for my signature-that was about 5 in the afternoon-I refused to sign it. Seyss-Inquart came to my official residence about the matter, accompanied by Menghin, who was then Austrian Minister. I refused to sign this law of reunion and I refused for political reasons. My refusal was due not only to my fundamentally opposed opinions, but I refused also because, according to the Austrian constitution, I would be obliged to institute a general plebiscite about the “law"-which sacrificed the sovereignty of Austriabefore it was signed, the signature merely having the significance of that of the State notary, that is to say, a certification that the law in question had come into existence formally and in accordance with the constitution. There was, however, no time left for such a plebiscite owing to Hitler’s impulsive and strong interventionindeed Hitler is alleged to have said: “I will have finished with the Austrian business in 3 days". Thereupon, the government cited Article 3 of the Federal constitution. Seyss-Inquart wanted to account for Himmler’s already described demand by means of article 3 of the 1934 constitution. He agreed, however, when I said I was quite prepared, in consideration of Austria’s position as it then was and under article 77, par. 1 of the constitution, to surrender to him the functions of President for as long as I was prevented from carrying them out myself, but without myself resigning. As a result of my refusal to sign the Anschluss law, there was no documentary authentication. For I saw that documentary authentication was not given. Naturally, the Anschluss law had then to be published by other means, signed by Seyss-Inquart and all the Ministers. At that time, I drew up in my official residence a letter to the Chancellor (Seyss-Inquart) saying as I have already stated above that, by virtue of article 77, pal. 1 of the constitution, I was surrendering to him the functions of President for as long as I was prevented from carrying them out myself. Minister Menghin was called in as a witness to this. The “Anschluss law” that was submitted to me was a draft. I did not have the original but was only given a copy. The ministerial council had previously decided that Seyss-Inquart must be the sole plenipotentiary.

Document 3697-PS

[Extract From An Austrian Court Document In The Proceedings Against Dr. Rudolf Neumayer.], Part 05 partial [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 531-533.

The Prosecuting Attorney: You have told us that you appointed Seyss-Inquart head of the government under political pressure from at home and abroad. You knew what course the Seyss-Inquart Cabinet would take. Why did you not resign on 3/12/1936 when it was suggested to you? What was there still to save?

The Witness: I considered resignation as cowardly flight. It would have been cowardly to abandon my fatherland in that hour of need and not to seek any possibility of negotiation.

The Prosecuting Attorney: But that was quite hopeless. Austria’s independence was buried by that time.

The Witness: That may be.

The Prosecuting Attorney: As head of the state, I would have resigned.

The Witness: No, I would have regarded that as cowardly.

The Prosecuting Attorney: In connection with the Berchtesgaden agreement, you stated that the Western powers showed themselves to be disinterested. What possibility of negotiation did you still have in mind on 12.3.1938?

The Witness: There were always possibilities. One had to have dealings with the German Reich to know what its demands actually were. And further, I wanted to gain time so that even the Western powers could realize what was happening; perhaps the Western Powers would then have intervened. It was more a question of gaining time, because I did not give up the hope that the Western Powers would perhaps still intervene.

The Prosecuting Attorney: Negotiations should have been made with the German Reich; instead of Dr. Schuschnigg, the National-Socialist Seyss-Inquart was the negotiating party on the Austrian side and you knew indeed what course Seyss-Inquart had set and in what direction Seyss-Inquart was heading. Seyss-Inquart, who was made head of the Austrian government by desire of the opposing side, could not follow a course which was against the wishes of Germany. In your place, I would have resigned. You should not have sworn in the National-Socialist Government.

The President: Were you of the opinion that there was a possibility of negotiating with the German party even after Seyss-Inquart succeeded Dr. Schuschnigg?

The Witness: I was of the opinion that there was a possibility of negotiation with Germany.

The President: Did you still have Austria’s independence in mind at that time?

The Witness: I thought that Austria might perhaps remain a semi-sovereign state. I also had good news from Bavaria. For there were opponents in the German Reich who were not in agreement with the tyrannical system of the National-Socialists. We had to bring up all these possibilities during the negotiations.

The Prosecuting Attorney: Little Austria?

The Witness: Yes, little Austria. Even Seyss-Inquart had to consult with his politicians at home; he couldn’t act entirely on his own initiative.

The Prosecuting Attorney: As President, you were acquainted with the programme of the National-Socialists?

The Witness: Yes.

The Defence Counsel: There were indeed Austrians among the ministers in the Seyss-Inquart government. Did you not also know Dr. Neumayer to be a responsible Austrian official?

The Witness: I knew him to be a very useful and able Finance Minister, and in this, the political bias of Dr. Neumayer was of no interest to me. The person of primary importance for me was the Chancellor who chose his own officials. I saw Seyss-Inquart as an Austrian who must have known that Austria must remain a country and a people.

The Defence Counsel: Did you consider Dr. Neumayer a good Austrian and not as a National-Socialist?

The Witness: I did not think Dr. Neumayer was one of the radical Nazis. I did not know that he had any connection with national or National-Socialist circles. I knew Dr. Neumayer as an Austrian official.

When, after the ministers had been sworn in, you spoke to the accused and told him that you would not remain President for long under the pressure to which you were subjected, you said that the accused was somewhat astonished. Did you have the least idea that this accused had committed treason, that he might be a traitor?

The Witness: No.

The Defence Counsel: Mr. President, did you state the following at your interrogation before the examining judge: “As is well-known, Schuschnigg had handed me his resignation already on the afternoon of 11.3.1938-it was announced at 7 o'clock in the evening-but I had naturally entrusted him at once with the task of continuing the conduct of government affairs with a view to forming a new government. He and Dr. Guido Schmidt, his Foreign Minister, remained at the Chancellor’s office throughout the evening and night of 11.3.1938 until after midnight, most of the time with me; they kept me continually informed about what was happening outside, also about the progress of the National-Socialist revolution in Vienna and in the provinces of the federation, [Bundeslandern] about the occupation of the most important nerve centres of public administration, about the hopeless answers to appeals for help made by the Austrian Foreign Office to Rome, Paris, London and other capitals. (Ludwig, the ambassador, had telephoned). Soon after, Vienna Radio was transmitting National-Socialist reports and, since 10 o'clock in the evening, the swastika flag had been flying from the roof of the Vienna office of Chief of Police on the Schottenring, while the crowd of National-Socialists assembled in front of the Chancellor’s office grew denser and about 40 of them, said to be a deputation, were admitted to the closed Chancellor’s office through the back door, and that by the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Seyss-Inquart. The guard detachment on watch must have looked on full of wrath; I learned of it only on the next day.” Were you of the opinion that, from the moment Dr. Schuschnigg resigned from the office of Chancellor, the Austrian government still possessed some power, or had the power already been transferred then de facto to the National-Socialists?

The Witness: My statements before the examining judge are correct. At that time, the Schuschnigg government had, de facto, no powers whatsoever.

Document 3697-PS

[Extract From An Austrian Court Document In The Proceedings Against Dr. Rudolf Neumayer.], Part 06 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 533-536.

The Defence Counsel: You know that the accused still remained in the Seyss-Inquart Cabinet later on. Have you personally ever held this against him?

The Witness: No, on the contrary, I was glad that there were Austrians of conviction in the Seyss-Inquart Government, who, in my opinion, had somehow taken office in Austria’s interests.

The President: Did you or any member of your family approach the accused with any personal request at any subsequent time? Because you stated before the examining judge: “In early summer 1939, when my eldest son, Finance commissar (retired), was discharged from state service, and was endeavouring to find another post, the family advised him to apply to Dr. Neumayer, his former Minister, who might perhaps find him a job in the Vienna City Insurance Concern, of which he had become the director in the meanwhile. My son was indeed received by Dr. Neumayer but his request came to naught. At any rate, Dr. Neumayer’s attitude was one of refusal.”

The Defence Counsel states in this connection: The statement that Dr. Neumayer’s attitude in this matter was one of refusal must have been based on incorrect records or on erroneous records.

The Witness states in this connection: In the year 1939, my oldest son, Dr. Wilhelm Miklas, who was in the Ministry of Finance, was dismissed from the state service by the Nazis. He then joined the army, spent 4 winters in the East and, at the beginning of the fifth winter, he was taken prisoner by the Russians and died of spotted fever in a prisoner-of-war camp North of Lemberg. That was the middle of October. He was the third victim of the war. Of his [or “my". Typing not clear] seven sons, who were all conscripted, three were killed, two are still prisoners and two returned home a few weeks ago.

I can no longer remember what I said before the examining judge with reference to my son. My eldest son made various attempts to gain a post but unfortunately in vain. As far as I know, he also applied to the accused. But this effort too was unsuccessful, he did not obtain the desired post.

The Witness Dr. Wolfgang Troll: Personal particulars in File No. 22 and adds: living in Vienna III., Neulinggasse 18, no relation of the defendant, after having been warned to tell the truth, and after formal taking of the oath, states: I have known the defendant since 1936. It must have been in November, at the time Dr. Neumayer entered the Schuschnigg Cabinet as Finance Minister.

The President: In what capacity did you make the acquaintance of the defendant?

The Witness: In my capacity as Recorder of the Cabinet Council. I was the Recorder at the Cabinet Council meetings. For ten or twelve years it was my task to make the arrangements for the Cabinet Council meetings and take the minutes. The President: Do you still remember when the Cabinet Council sat, following the journey of Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden. The journey to Berchtesgaden was on 12.II.1938. The Cabinet Council meeting which followed it took place then about a few days later.

The Witness: I remember that.

The President: What information on the discussion with Hitler did the Chancellor at that time give the Ministers, and also to the accused who was present?

The Witness Dr. Troll: The Cabinet Council meeting must have been held on the 16.II.1938. At this meeting Dr. Schuschnigg said quite briefly that he had been to Obersalzberg, that the matter had not worked out at all well; but he did not give further details at the Cabinet Council meeting regarding what had happened at Obersalzberg.

The President: We want to ascertain what the defendant knows or could have known from this Cabinet Council meeting. The Witness Dr. Troll: I also did not ascertain any further details. I was the Recorder. The Chancellor did not mention individual details. Dr. Schuschnigg did not state what demands Hitler made at Berchtesgaden at that time. I believe the Chancellor made no mention of this at the meeting.

The President: Do you remember whether the Chancellor said that Hitler had demanded that Seyss-Inquart should enter Dr. Schuschnigg’s Government as Minister of the Interior?

The Witness: I believe I remember that. I do believe that the Chancellor said that.

The President: The Chancellor said that he was put under great pressure.

The Witness Dr. Troll: One could have got that impression.

The President: The next Cabinet Council meeting was with the newly formed Cabinet: Dr. Pilz, Dr. Taucher had already left and in their place was the new Cabinet with Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior. That was on 21.II.1938. Could you tell us anything about this Cabinet Council meeting which took place between 21.II. and 11.III.1938?

The Witness Dr. Troll: On 11.III.1938 there was no Cabinet Council meeting. It must have been in the previous week, that is, in the period between 3/3-7/1938. So far as I know, at that time as well as on 2/21/1938 only technical matters were discussed at the meeting. What happened on the following day I no longer remember as the particulars regarding this were lost.

The President: Was it mentioned at these meetings how much freedom was to be given to the native National-Socialists with regard to whether the wearing of the swastika was to be permitted or whether that was to be permitted only within certain limits or whether the German greeting might be used, etc.?

The Witness Dr. Troll: I cannot remember having heard anything at all about such matters. It was not customary to discuss political matters at the meetings. Political events were discussed beforehand, outside the meetings so that the Cabinet Council had only to carry out the formal passing of resolutions regarding pertinent matters.

The President: Do you know whether the defendant was called in to these discussions outside the Cabinet Council?

The Witness Dr. Troll: I don’t know,-for those discussions usually took place at the Chancellor’s place; I do not know who was invited to them.

The President: What do you remember about the events of 11.III.1938?

The Witness Dr. Troll: A Cabinet Council meeting had been fixed for midday on 11.III.1938. However, he never came to it. The events of that time took place in rapid succession. In the course of the afternoon, the Secretary of State Dr. Kepler, appeared. He wore a uniform, and I noted that at that time I did not know the uniforms. Discussions then took place between the Chancellor and Minister Seyss-Inquart in the office of the Chancellor in the course of the afternoon, towards evening. I do not know the purport of these discussions, as I was not present at these discussions. The conclusion of the discussion was that the Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg came out of his office and then made his well-known farewell speech on the radio, which he delivered at the microphone in the ante-room. That was between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening. This was preceded by discussions between Dr. Schuschnigg and Minister Seyss-Inquart. I do not know whether Dr. Schuschnigg also had discussions with the President.

Document 3697-PS

[Extract From An Austrian Court Document In The Proceedings Against Dr. Rudolf Neumayer.], Part 07 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 536-539.

The President: Are you informed about the proceedings in the Office of the Chancellor after Dr. Schuschnigg’s farewell speech?

The Witness Dr. Troll: After the Chancellor’s farewell speech I still stayed on at the office until about 2 a.m. I can no longer remember whether at that time I saw the defendant. At that time the Government was being formed. I only saw the members of newly formed Cabinet again when they came out of the chambers of the President. I do not remember seeing Dr. Neumayer among the members of the Government, or seeing him at all at that time in the Chancellor’s Office. I had nothing to do with the swearing-in of the new Government. I was busy at the Cabinet Council Meeting on Sunday, 3/13/1938. This took place at about 10 a.m. I do not know if it took place during the afternoon, but it may have done. From my experience of the Cabinet Council I definitely felt that I no longer wanted to have anything to do with it. I was presiding, [Presidialist] in the Chancellor’s Office. I was a ministerial Councillor. I held the office of recorder. On 13.III.1938 this new Government held the first Cabinet meeting. I took the view that I no longer belonged to this Government. I just felt it. For me my activity also ended with the farewell speech of the Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg. In this connection it is true that I was still a Government official. Because I felt that way, however, I declined to act further as recorder at this meeting on 13.3.1938. I had the feeling that my place was no longer there, that another person belonged there. I also asked that someone else be entrusted with this position, but received instructions from Secretary of State Wimmer that I still t had to act as recorder and, therefore, complied with these instructions.

The President: What happened at this meeting?

The Witness Dr. Troll: I did not know what was the object of the Cabinet Meeting as it was an unprepared Cabinet Meeting. I did not at that time have to make any preparations. I then went into the Cabinet Council hall. The Government was assembled and I can still remember that the proceedings were rushed through. I hardly had the chance and the time to sit down. I had to take the minutes standing up. Seyss-Inquart said a few words at the beginning of the meeting which I can no longer remember. The whole matter must have lasted ten minutes at most. Seyss-Inquart read out the Anschluss Law, that Austria is a country of the German Reich and so on. To this no objection i was raised. There was absolutely no debate at all. I have forgotten all that Seyss-Inquart said.

The President: I put it to you that the accused in his statement said the following: “The Cabinet Meeting was very short, the Anschluss Law has been accepted without objection, Seyss-Inquart first stated that as a result of the resignation of the Austrian President Miklas, the functions of President were transferred to him, and secondly Seyss-Inquart stated that he had a meeting at Linz on Saturday, the 12.3.1938, with Adolf Hitler, who ordered him, `now, to-day, immediately' to pass the Anschluss Law which he was now reading.”

The Witness Dr. Troll states in this connection: I believe that must be right. I do not know whether the word “order” was used.

The President: Did Seyss-Inquart say that the functions of Austrian President had been transferred to him?

The Witness Dr. Troll: I do not exactly know but I consider it likely. Then the Anschluss Law was accepted without objection. The agenda was thereupon finished. After this meeting of the Cabinet Council all the members went away.

The President: What was the next step necessary? Was the law made public?

The Witness Dr. Troll: I gave the Anschluss Law documentary authentication and the law was then entered into the law gazette of the province [Land] of Austria, of that time, by the constitution service [Verfassungsdienst].

The President: Are you not aware that two men went to the residence of the former President for the purpose of getting the signature for this law?

The Witness Dr. Troll: I don’t know, I have not heard anything about it.

The President: You also cannot tell us at what time this meeting of the Cabinet Council took place on 3/13/1938?

The Witness Dr. Troll: No. This meeting could even have taken place in the afternoon.

The President: You made the acquaintance of the accused at the commencement of his period of office as Minister in 11/1936. You perhaps also learned, and in your capacity as recorder, for what reason or in what capacity the defendant was appointed Finance Minister in Dr. Schuschnigg’s Cabinet?

The Witness Dr. Troll: The retirement of the Finance Minister Dr. Draxler took place at that time. I do not know why Dr. Neumayer was then appointed as Finance Minister in the Schuschnigg Cabinet. I do not know whether political reasons were decisive here or purely technical reasons. It was certainly said that the accused supported the nationalist cause or had some such background.

The President: At the meetings of the Cabinet Council in 11/1936 until the end, did the defendant in any way take up a party attitude or did he see things strictly from the point of view of his department?

The Witness Dr. Troll: I cannot recall any instance when the defendant would have been prosecuted for his political views during the meetings of the Cabinet Council.

The President: Do you also know anything about this ultimatum which was handed over on 3/11/1938 in the office of the Chancellor?

The Witness Dr. Troll: I heard rumors of it.

The Prosecuting Attorney: The defendant has stated in his defense that Seyss-Inquart declared at the opening of the meeting of the Cabinet Council on 3/13/1938 that the Anschluss Law must be passed otherwise he would bring war on Austria. Can you recall any such words by Seyss-Inquart?

The Witness Dr. Troll: I recall that some kind of statements were made by the Chancellor Seyss-Inquart at the time, but I do not know any details.

The Defence Counsel: submits to the witness his statements before the Examining Judge.

The Witness Dr. Troll states in this connection: My statements before the Examining Judge in File No. 22 are correct. I still stand by these statements.

Document 3697-PS

[Extract From An Austrian Court Document In The Proceedings Against Dr. Rudolf Neumayer.], Part 08 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 539-540.

The Witness Otto Huber: Personal particulars in S 107, no relation to the defendant, after having been warned to tell the truth, and duly sworn, states:

The President: When did you get to know the defendant?

The Witness Huber: At the opening of the Vienna Fair which took place twice a year. I got to know him then in his capacity as Financial Advisor to the Vienna municipality. I was then in the company of the President. Later I got to know him in 11/1936 as Finance Minister in the Schuschnigg Cabinet.

The President: Was anything at all known about him personally, in what direction his views tended and so on?

The Witness Huber: It was known that the defendant was a nationalist. He was looked upon as a special Minister. The reasons for his appointment as Finance Minister are not known to me.

The President: Could you briefly describe to us the events of 3/11/1938 at the office of the Chancellor, as far as you can remember them?

The Witness Huber: Up to the afternoon the President had not heard anything from the “Right". At that time no ultimatum had yet been presented. At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon I drove home with President Miklas. At that time we still did not know anything about the events. At about 3:30 p.m. we returned to the Chancellor’s office. The Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg then announced to the President that he was going to resign. A long discussion then took place between President Miklas and Chancellor Schuschnigg at which I was not present. Then the ultimatum was presented-I have forgotten who by. There appeared I believe two youngish men from Salzburg, one of them must have been Dr. Rener; he said he had spoken to Göring on the telephone about the ultimatum and that Göring had told him that the ultimatum must be kept, nothing would happen to Austria if the ultimatum were kept. These people wanted to speak to President Miklas; I did not let them, but referred them to Minister Glaise-Horstenau.

The President: Why did you refer these people to Minister Glaise-Horstenau ?

The Witness Huber: The National-Socialists were then going in and out of the Chancellor’s office, and it was already evident that they were representatives of the opposition. Then Secretary of State Dr. Kepler handed over the ultimatum. I was not present, however, at the handing over of this ultimatum. President Miklas rejected the ultimatum. Discussion was then entered into as to whether a different Chancellor and not Seyss-Inquart could be installed in the Government. They had Dr. Ender in mind for this purpose. Dr. Ender, however, declined. Then there appeared Lieutenant General Muff. President Miklas told him, too, of the rejection of the ultimatum. In this connection I remarked that Lieutenant General Muff had spoken very strongly to Dr. Guido Schmidt who was present and had blamed him for being largely responsible in the whole matter. Upon this Guido Schmidt left.

At 12 noon Secretaries were changed.

The President: [illegible signature]

Secretary: Trumler e.h.

The above copy is a true extract from an Austrian court document in the proceedings against the defendant Dr. Rudolf Neumayer, containing the testimony of the witness Wilhelm Miklas.

People’s Court Vienna Vienna VIII (64) Landesgrichtsstr.11. Section V g 1 11.II.1946.

People’s Court Vienna in the building of the “Landes” Penal Court.

Document 3755-PS

Jahrbuch Der Hitler Jugend, 1938 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 541-543.

[Page 134]

The dead of the great war did not die in vain, if the youth of the new Germany will preserve the reverence for the sacrifice made by them, and if it remains imbued by the glowing desire to live readily, strongly and with faith in the future for that aim, for which those once died.

[Pages 148-150]


The work, “Education for War of the German Youth” by Obergebietsfuehrer Dr. Helmuth Stellrecht, contains a slogan of General Field Marshal von Blomberg's, in which the following passage is quoted: “The fighting spirit is the highest virtue of a soldier. It requires toughness and determination. This passage from `Duties of the Soldier' constitutes the direction and the aim of the education of the German youth.”

It is an old soldier’s experience that the number of troops and equipment, and their mastery of weapons do not solely guarantee success, but that the last decision depends on the spirit of the troops. Therefore it is a strong and unyielding demand, which the General Field Marshal already puts to the young body of men marching in the formations of the Hitler Youth, that they should conform to a soldierly spirit and educate themselves in toughness and determination. The fighting spirit is the highest virtue of a soldier. Preliminary conditions for courage are not only racial and spiritual, but also educational. In a recently published work on war psychology, it is stated that in the era of total war, spiritual power of resistance will not only come in next to courage but will perhaps replace it. Nevertheless, in the field of soldierly education, education to courageousness could and should be retained, only it has to be supplemented by education to spiritual power of resistance in and outside the troops. This in itself is a right perception; however, actually it means only something which has already been carried out through the direction of the education which was demanded by the General Field Marshal and through the fanatical faith of the German youth.

The General Marshal knew when he made his demands to the youth of Adolf Hitler, that this youth possesses the strongest powers of spiritual resistance in its fanatical belief in its leader and his ideology. But just because of this, he could demand from this youth that it should make the highest virtue of a soldier, namely courage, and those qualities upon which it is based, namely toughness towards one’s self and the determination to act, the aim of the education. And from age group to age group, a new German youth will fulfill these demands in an increasingly clear and concise manner.

When a year ago General Field Marshal von Blomberg, in the Berlin Sports Palast, consecrated the colors of the Wehrmacht Section of the German Labor Front and imposed his demands as a duty upon the workers and employees of the Wehrmacht, he declared, “He who demands should also give.” The man who as General Field Marshal of the Fuehrer demands a certain education from the youth has also to give something to it. As Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, General Field Marshal von Blomberg has given a unique, exemplary, soldierly body of men to the troops of the Army, Navy and Air Force under his command, to the German people and the German youth. Also during the years of the Weimar Republic he instilled the German youth with the desire to become soldiers. But it was difficult for them to understand the silent service and renunciation of a professional soldier of the Reichswehr. Yes, between the troops and youth there was an estrangement. However, as Minister of Defense and as present Minister of War, he was able to incorporate the Reichswehr into the new Reich as the sole and reliable bearer of arms; this was done in an exemplary manner living up to the sense of obligation, to the imperishable soldier of the World War and to the education for achievement, as well as to the Socialist spirit of the Reich of Adolf Hitler. Thus, an essential prerequisite was created in so far as the Fuehrer and the German people could have that confidence in the Reichswehr which was required for such an immense task, namely that of the creation of a people’s army by general compulsory conscription. This task could be accomplished only by a man who is a soldier in the best and largest sense of the word and who, furthermore, is a political soldier. Such was the exemplary path pursued by General Field Marshal von Blomberg in his soldierly career: at 13 years cadet, at 19 years lieutenant, at 50 years general colonel, and at 58 general field marshal. During the World War he was a soldier in the front lines in the best sense of the word-decorated for having been wounded and the distinction pour le merite which he is wearing as proof of that. Since the end of the World War he can be always found in the Army, when plans for a new beginning had to be shaped. At present General Field Marshal von Blomberg has always blazed the trail towards maximum military achievements which was and is his absolute aim, be it as Chief of Staff of the Brigade Doeberitz, the training school of the later Reichswehr of the Fifth Division in Stuttgart, to which post he was appointed by the General of the Infantry Walter Reinhard, who unfortunately died too soon; be it as Chief of the Training Section of the Reich Ministry of Defense and later as Chief of the Truppenamt, which is Chief of the General Staff. In 1933 when, on proposition of the Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, the Reich President von Hindenberg appointed General Lieutenant von Blomberg, who was at that time the Commander in Wehrkreis I, Koenigsburg, to the post of Reich Minister of Defense, Adolf Hitler’s confidence was thus expressed, which was justified to the last during the following four years of untiring efforts for the new Wehrmacht. It was a wonderful gesture, acclaimed by the whole people and the youth, when on 1/30/1937 the Fuehrer awarded the Golden Party Emblem to the Supreme Commander of the Army and the Navy, who was as well the First Assistant of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force. Thus, it is unequivocally expressed that the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht is not only the first soldier, but also the first political soldier of Adolf Hitler in the closest sense. The German youth looks with reverence, gratefulness and confidence to the First General Field Marshal of the Third Reich.

Document 3758-PS

Extract from Diary of Minister of Justice [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 543-544.

[Page 641. Para. 3.]

Secretary of State and Chief of the Reich Chancellery 25.5, submitting a copy of a reply dated 14.5. from the Youth Leader, in connection with the point of view expressed by the Finance Minister on 6.5. as regards the drafting of a Bill on the Youth of the Reich, Schirach estimates the following costs for the administration and nine Leadership Schools [Fuehrerschulen] which are to be established.

Staff of the Youth Leader: Million Reichsmarks: 1936: 0.62 1937: 0.83 1938: 0.97 1939: 1.05 1940: 1.12 1941: 1.12 25 Gau Youth Leaders: 1936: 1.49 1937: 3.64 1938: 4.53 1939: 5.00 1940: 5.34 1941: 5.34 1050 Kreis Youth Leaders: 1936: 2.46 1937: 8.13 1938: 11.55 1939: 14.79 1940: 18.04 1941: 17.89 9 Leadership Schools [Fuehrerschulen]: 1936: 1.76 1937: 2.08 1938: 2.11 1939: 2.12 1940: 2.12 1941: 2.12 Hutment and Tent Camps: 1938: 16.93 1939: 32.84 1940: 48.62 1941: 48.20 1938: 35 Camps 1939: 70 Camps 1940: 105 Camps Shooting instruction for the Youth of Reich: 1937: 0.44 1938: 0.86 1939: 1.27 1940: 1.30 1941: 1.30 Single Outlay for initial outfitting, clothing, etc., new buildings, reconversion and additional building: 1936: 1.98 1937: 22.15 1938: 19.23 1939: 18.95 1940: 0.02 [Total]: 1936: 8.31 1937: 37.27 1938: 56.18 1939: 76.02 1940: 76.56 1941: 75.97

According to this, the main outlay will be for the training of the Youth in hut and tent camps and not for administration. Finance Minister wishes to include in the account an expense allowance of 50 Reichsmarks per month per Zugfuehrer [Platoon Leader] for 70000 Zugfuehrers who are active in an honorary capacity. He thinks that a payment must also be made for this activity. Baldur von Schirach does not believe that overhead expenses will arise, but if they did they would be, at most 5 Reichsmarks per month, moreover not 70.000 but only 23.000 Zugfuehrer, and that payment for this activity was not necessary.

Document 3764-PS

[Extract from “Uns geht die Sonne nicht unter” Hitler Youth Songs.], Part 01 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 545-547.

[Page 5.]

Hans Otto Borgmann.

Forward, Forward

Verse 1. Forward, forward, the fanfares sound, Forward, forward, youth never sees any danger Germany you will shine, even if we go under. Forward, forward, the fanfares sound. Forward, forward, youth never sees any danger However high our goal, youth will attain it

Chorus. Our flag flies before us, we march into the future man for man, We march for Hitler through night and through want, With the flag of youth for freedom and bread. Our flag flies before us. Our flag is the new era. And the flag leads us into eternity. The flag is more than death.

Verse 2. Youth, youth, we are the future soldiers, Youth, youth, pillars of future deeds. Yes, everything which opposes us will fall before our fists, Youth, youth, pillars of future deeds, Youth, youth, we are the soldiers of the future, Fuehrer, we belong to you, we comrades to you.

Text Baldur von Schirach for the UFA motion picture “The Hitler Boy Quex.”

Can You See the Dawn in the East?

1. Can you see the dawn in the East? A sigh of freedom and sun. We will keep together, whether living or dead, come what may. Why do you still doubt, stop all this quarrelling, German blood still flows in our veins. People to Arms.

2. For many years the people was enslaved and misguided. Traitors and Jews had the upper hand, they demanded the sacrifice of legions. Born of our nation a Fuehrer arose, gave Germany faith and hope again. People to Arms.

3. Germans awake and get into line, we march towards victory. Labour shall be free, we will be free, and valiantly and defiantly daring. We clench our fists we will not be faint hearted, there is no going back, we will risk it. People to arms.

4. Young and old-man for man cluster round the Swastika banner. Whether a townsman, a farmer or a worker, they will wield the sword and hammer for Hitler, for Freedom, for work and bread. Germany awake, death to Jewry, People to arms.

Unfurl the Blood-Soaked Banners

Verse 1. Unfurl the blood-soaked banners, let the fire leap up to heaven, He is a coward who still thinks of himself, when the Homeland is Menaced all around by enemies. We will never give way before the enemy, we Hitler’s fifth company.

Verse 2. Where cowardice and treason prevail, our fighting songs ring out, we march forward to fresh endeavours, the last defenders of Germany’s freedom. We are ready to die at all times for Germany’s greatness.

Verse 3. And if at some future date the day of vengeance approaches, and the Fuehrer calls us to war, then we will carry the Swastika out of misery and disgrace from victory to victory. We march at dawn towards death for Hitler’s flag.

With kind permission of the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP Franz Eher Nachf., Munich.

Document 3764-PS

[Extract from “Uns geht die Sonne nicht unter” Hitler Youth Songs.], Part 02 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 547-548.

[Page 25.]

Drums Sound Throughout the Land

George Blumensaat.

Verse 1. Drums sound throughout the Land, the drums of the Hitler Youth, The flag waves in our hand, the flag is our Fatherland, Our enemies must go to the scaffold, the enemy must go to the scaffold.

Chorus: Hitler Youth marches, Hitler Youth marches.

Verse 2. We firmly believe in our destiny, Heil Adolf Hitler, And though we are given the death blow, We will nevertheless make Germany great, We comrades, we comrades. Chorus.

Verse 3. As Hitler Youth the best of the nation were killed, We are the last levy and carry blood red banners For Germany’s greatest son, for Germany’s greatest son.

Baldur von Schirach.

Copyright 1933 by Ufatons-Publishers, Berlin SW, with permission of the original publishers.

(Sung first of all in the Hitler Youth)

We March Through the Streets.

We march through the streets with firm and steadfast step, And above us the flag flutters, Tum, tum, tum, tiddly, um, tum, tum. In front of us the drummer boy, he beats his drum well, He knows nothing yet of love, he doesn’t know what separation does. Tum, tum, tum, tiddly, um, tum, tum. He drummed many a one into bloody battle and into his grave, And nevertheless everybody loves the happy drummer-boy. Tum, tum, tum, tiddly, um, tum, tum. Perhaps I am the one who tomorrow must die in a pool of blood The drummer-boy does not know what love and dying are. Tum, tum, tum, tiddly, um, tum, tum.

With kind permission of the publishers Ludwig Voggenreiter, Potsdam, taken from Hans Baumann “Our Little Drummer Boy.”

The Decaying Bones are Trembling

Words and music by Hans Baumann.

Verse 1. The decaying bones of the world are trembling, Because of the great war, We have rid ourselves of the terror, It was a great victory for us.

Chorus: We will march on, even if everything falls into ruins, For to-day Germany belongs to us, and to-morrow the whole world.

Verse 2. And if the whole world lies in ruins, What the devil has that to do with us, We will build it up again.

Verse 3. And what if the old-folks grumble, Then let them fume and scream, And if all the world opposes, We will nevertheless become the victor.

First in “Goetz": “We March Into the Distance,” Guenther Wolff. Publishers, Plauen i.V. 1931.

Document 3769-PS

Yearbook Of The Hitler Youth, 1939 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 550.

[Page 226]

Every Hitler youth a marksman. Shooting practice in the Hitler Youth.

Stellrecht: “To handle a rifle should be just as natural for everybody as to handle a pen.”

“In order that every group should have training armament, the Wehrmacht presented to the Hitler Jugend in 1937 10000 KK rifles.”

There is no shortage of shooting ranges. Since the beginning of organized shooting practice in autumn 1936, 10000 shooting ranges have acquired the green shooting certificate during weekend and special practice and every year this figure increases by some thousands.

Title: “Document 3843-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 588-590.

Business number Vg 3c Vr 1920/45

INTERROGATION OF WITNESS District Court for penal matters Vienna I sitting in Salzburg on 10/15/1945 beginning of session: 2:00 o'clock

PRESENT: Judge: L. G. R. Dr. Sucher Recorder:

CHARGE: against Dr. Guido Schmidt and others.

The witness is warned to tell the whole truth in answer to the questions put to him, to the best of his knowledge and conscientiously, to conceal nothing, and to give his testimony in such a way that he can if necessary confirm it under oath

He gives his personal data as follows:

1. Given name and surname: Karl Karwinsky

2. Age: 57 years

3. Place of birth: Innsbruck

4. Religion: Roman Catholic

5. Marital status: Married

6. Occupation: State Secretary, retired

7. Residence: Salzburg, Schallmoserhauptstrasse 1

8. Relationship to the accused or to other persons participating in the investigation: not related

I was State Secretary in the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg cabinets from 9/1933-10/15/1935. I was therefore not a member of the cabinet when Guido Schmidt was State Secretary or Minister.

I was therefore not able to follow closely his activity in directing for Foreign Ministry. It was known that Guido Schmidt had to pursue a policy toward the Reich which aimed at pacification. However, he had, of course, to pursue the same policy toward the [western powers?] and Italy, when it became clear that Austria urgently needed restraint on the part of these big powers toward Germany. In this connection I recall several occurrences. The treatment which he afforded the foreign representatives was often not at all of a kind to gain sympathy for Austria. I recall that the Italian Foreign Minister Ciano and his wife were annoyed at the way their visit to Vienna developed, since they did not receive enough attention. The worst impression was made by a performance in the Schoenbrunn Castle Theater, where a very mediocre cast rendered the performance, and there were noticeable gaps even in the first few rows of seats, a picture which, if one considers Ciano’s well-known vanity, should have been avoided by all means. On Neurath’s visit, at any rate, Schmidt had prepared an entirely different type of welcome. I know from repeated talks with the French Minister Puaux, whom I knew as one of Austria’s most reliable friends, that he was very much disturbed at Schmidt’s personal conduct toward him. Schmidt repeatedly kept Puaux waiting for an unsuitably long time, and, as Puaux thought, with demonstrative intention, when Puaux visited him, only to dismiss him with brief and noncommittal remarks. I also recall that England and Belgium had no corresponding information on the critical situation in Austria. While interned in Magdeburg, there came to my hands the reference book “Who’s Who", which contains the personalities prominent in the politics and economy of the Third Reich. The enumeration of the positions held by Guido Schmidt as director-general of the Hermann Göring Works and the numerous supervisory and administrative positions held by him at home and abroad took up much more space than with most of the others.

The deceased wife of the deceased mayor Schmitz, who was in a concentration camp to the end, once turned to Guido Schmidt in her need. First he kept her waiting for an hour, and then he told her that he did not understand why she was excited-there were so many others in Dachau.

At the end of 2/1938 I met the then Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau, in Herrengasse [name of street]. He was obviously very cheerful and greeted me with a lively: “How are you, how are you?” I could not share his cheerful mood in those critical days and replied with emphasis: “I am getting along just as an Austrian should in these days. The man out there [Hitler] has his program, and I am afraid that it will not he long before he carries it out.” Glaise-Horstenau answered, quite unconcerned: “Yes, of course, he has his program” whereupon I left this Austrian Minister of the Interior.

Shortly after Easter 1934 I received the news that the prisoners in the Kaiser-Steinbruch detention camp had gone on a hunger strike. Thereupon I went there myself, in order to inform myself about the situation. While comparative calm and discipline prevailed in most of the barracks, one barrack was very disorderly. I noticed that one tall man seemed to be the leader of the resistance. This was Kaltenbrunner, at that time a candidate for attorney-at-law, who was under arrest because of his illegal activity in Austria. While all the other barracks gave up their hunger strike after a talk which I held with representatives of the prisoners, the barracks under Kaltenbrunner persisted in the strike. I saw Kaltenbrunner again in the Mauthausen camp, when I was severely ill and lying on rotten straw with many hundred other seriously ill persons, many of them dying. The prisoners, suffering from hunger edema and from the most serious intestinal sicknesses, were lying in unheated barracks in the dead of winter. The most primitive sanitary arrangements were lacking. The toilets and the washrooms were unusable for months. The severely ill persons had to relieve themselves on little marmalade buckets. The soiled straw was not renewed for weeks, so that a stinking liquid was formed, in which worms and maggots crawled around. There was no medical attention or medicine. Conditions were such that 10 to 20 persons died every night. Kaltenbrunner walked through the barracks with a brilliant suite of high SS functionaries, saw everything, must have seen everything. We were under the illusion that these inhuman conditions would now be changed, but they apparently met with Kaltenbrunner’s approval, for nothing happened.

In connection with Guido Schmidt, I should like to mention that Dr. Froehlichstal, the secretary of the Chancellor, was often able to keep people from reaching the Chancellor. I had the impression at that time already, however, that Froehlichstal did not put up these difficulties on behalf of the Chancellor, but was waging his own politics.

Read, approved and signed by Karwinsky

I certify that the testimony of Karwinsky was taken before the Austrian court. The present document is a copy of the testimony.

Signed: Dr. Arnold Sucher Appellate Court Judge [Oberlandesgerichtsrat]

Title: “Document 3855-PS, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp.

The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service

Berlin 4/5/1944 110 Copies 53rd Copy

-IV A 2-B. Nr. 220/44 top secret

(a) To all Commanders and Inspectors of the Security Police and the Security Service (To be announced orally to the subordinate offices)

(b) To the Groups--IV A and IV B The departments IV A 1 IV A 3 IVA 4--IVA 6 IVB 1-IVB 4

(c) To the Agency V-Reich Criminal Police Office For information to: The Higher SS and Police Leaders The Chief of the Regular Police

(d) To the Chiefs of the Agencies I-III and VI of the Reich Main Security Office

Re: Treatment of enemy fliers who have bailed out. Reference: None.

A series of questions concerning the treatment of enemy fliers who have been shot down needs clarification:

I Enemy pilots who are picked up have to be bound on principle. This measure is necessary and is taken with the full approval of the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht-(a) To prevent the frequent escapes and (b) In view of the very tense personnel situation in those organizations which are to handle these cases.

II Enemy plane crews who-(a) Put up resistance when captured or (b) Are wearing civilian clothes under their uniforms are to be shot immediately upon being captured.

III Enemy pilots--particularly of the Anglo-American air force-mostly carry escape kits filled with daggers, various kinds of maps, food ration stamps, escape tools, etc. Escape kits absolutely have to be secured by the police, as they represent most important aids in tracing. It is necessary that they be transmitted to the Luftwaffe.

IV The order by the Reich Fuehrer of the SS dated 8/10/1943 will partly not be observed, as it was probably not orally transmitted down to the subordinate police offices according to orders. It is therefore repeated: “It is not the task of the police to intervene in altercations between Germans and landed English and American terror pilots who have bailed out.”

V An armband with the inscription: “German Wehrmacht” and a valid stamp was found with the body of an English pilot who had been shot down. This armband is worn only by combatants, and in the various territories of operations it gives the wearer access everywhere to military and strategically important points. Enemy agents who are landed will probably make use of this new means of camouflage.

VI Individual cases in the last few months have shown that the German population, although they do seize enemy pilots, do not keep the necessary distance toward them until they are handed over to the police or the Wehrmacht. Too strict measures on the part of the State Police against these Germans would prevent them from participating without reservation in the seizure of enemy pilots, the more so as these cases must not be confused with the crime of helping escaped enemy pilots.

The Reich Fuehrer of the SS has ordered the following measures to be taken against Germans who, with evil intent or for reasons of mistaken pity, behave in an undignified way toward captured enemy pilots:

(1) In particularly severe cases, internment in a concentration camp, announcement in the papers of the district.

(2) In less severe cases, protective custody, not less than 14 days, with the competent State Police agency. Employment for clearing up work in the damaged territories.

Title: “Document 3855-PS, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp.

In case there are no damaged territories suitable for employment of these people in the district of a State Police agency, the short-term protective custody is to be carried out in the neighboring State Police district. Since these are always less severe cases, there are no objections-in order to avoid unnecessary burdens on the agencies-to the person to be punished, upon request of the State Police, traveling at his own expense and without guard to the State Police agency indicated to him and reporting there to serve his term of protective custody.

The decision as to whether the case in question is severe or light is to be made by the head of the competent State Police agency after investigation and interrogation of the party, taking into consideration the total personality of the culprit. A short report (not teletype) giving personal data about the culprit and indicating whether it is a light or a severe case, to be sent to Reich Security Main Office.

The Reich Fuehrer of the SS has contacted Reichsleiter Bormann in this matter and has called his attention to the fact that it is the task of the Party functionaries to enlighten the population and to tell them to keep the absolutely necessary distance toward enemy pilots.

I leave it up to the commanders and inspectors of the Security Police and the Security Service to transmit paragraphs V and VI of above decree also in written form to the subordinate agencies.

Signed: Dr. Kaltenbrunner

certified: Rose, Office Clerk

This is to certify, that this photostatic copy is an exact and true copy of the document, consisting of 4 (four) pages, which has been found in the archives of the Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia, and which is deposited with the Czechoslovak Government.

Signed this day the fourth of April, nineteen hundred and forty six. Gen. Dr. B. Ecer.

Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary Gen. Dr. B. Ecer.

Czechoslovak Representative on the United Nations Commission for Investigation of War Crimes.

Nuernberg, 4/4/1946

Title: “Document 3857-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 594-596.

Prague, 11/25/1939

The Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia No. I Ia-Secret

1. Chancellery to prepare copy of the bracketed portion of the draft of 11/16/1939 from the dossier re oath of loyalty of employees of the Protectorate.

2. To be humbly submitted to the Under Secretary of State, again enclosing-

(a) The draft X 119/39 Secret.

(b) A copy of my file note submitted 11/16/1939, with the following opinion on (a):

The necessity for finding other employment for students who have become idle as a result of the closure of the Czech Universities in the Protectorate was already mentioned by me as can be seen from (b), when considerations regarding the closure of Universities were put forward and is recognized by me now as formerlythe more so as it is now certain that the number of persons affected is very much higher than one originally assumed.

This necessity arises especially from the fact that all the students have a more or less chauvinistic attitude and have to be prevented from infecting the population politically throughout the entire territory of the Protectorate after their departure from the Universities to their homes.

I immediately suggested the introduction of compulsory labor service as a radical method.

In the meantime, however, I was informed by competent offices during my recent stay in Berlin that unemployment is beginning to make itself felt within the Reich on a considerable scale, and in particular that important industrial plants to which large detachments of Czech workmen who had come into the Old Reich voluntarily were allocated were begging to be allowed to release these workers back into the Protectorate. This I countered with the statement that the release of large detachments into the territory of the Protectorate were out of the question, and that these detachments had rather to be put to work at places where foreigners were still employed in large numbers (Italians, Slovaks, Jugoslavs, etc.), as for instance at the Hermann Göring Works. I consider it politically far wiser to send the foreigners back home instead of releasing Czech workers who had gone of their own free will into the Reich back into the Protectorate, where they would spread rumors with the usual exaggerations-about the unemployment which is starting in the Reich and might give undesirable material to the whispering propaganda. At least as long as foreigners are still employed in organized groups in the Reich, the release of workers from the Protectorate should be avoided.

From that it is clear that in Reich territory the utilization of fresh groups of workers from the Protectorate has little chance of success. Then there is also the question, which has still not vet been settled, of the possibilities of transporting large groups into the Reich.

But there is above all the further point that, as against the workers from the Protectorate employed in the Reich hitherto, the students enrolled for compulsory labor are not taken to the Reich voluntarily but only by force on the basis of the decree for compulsory labor. As they must in any case be looked upon as sources of discontent on account of their political opinions, they will, owing to the closure of the Universities and compulsory labor, have to be regarded as politically specially dangerous elements; dangerous not only to the other workers in the Reich but also to their fellow Czech workers. For, in case of compulsion on the basis of the decree for compulsory labor, it will not only be the students who have become idle who will be enrolled but also members of all the other various professions and strata of society who belong to an age group due for calling-up.

In such a situation, it appears to me doubtful whether it is advisable to send into the Reich the students who are to be given other occupation via the Compulsory Labor Decree and the members of other professions due for calling-up simultaneously owing to their age groups. I would be far more in favor of employing them only on Protectorate territory to begin with, e. g. on the building of the Oder-Danube canal, the autobahn, etc. A profitable utilization within Reich territory, outside of the Protectorate, appears to be only possible once peacetime conditions are reestablished.

3. Please put this on file relating to “The Compulsory Labor Decree".

Document 3858-PS

Enrollment Of Students Affected By The Closure Of Czech Universities [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 596-598.

Prague, 11/21/1939

The Reich Protector, Bohemia and Moravia Head of Group X X/119/39 Secret

Report from: Oberregierungsrat Dr. Dennler.

According to the data at my disposal the number of students affected by the closure for 3 years of the Czech Universities is 18998.

According to the Press communications dated the 21st of this month only 1,200 persons were arrested in connection with the events of the 15th of this month. Even if it were only students who were affected by this-of which I am not aware-there nevertheless remains some 17800 people who are suddenly faced by a change in their whole way of living which affects them in every respect.

This fact calls for a rapid examination of the question as to what is to become of this mass of persons who have become unemployed.

What gives rise to this question is, on the one hand, the imminent expectation of a certain political danger and, on the other hand, the fact that the further idleness of such a considerable number of Protectorate subjects can not be tolerated.

The expectation of a political danger I deduce from the well-known tendency of :young Slav students to commit acts of terrorism. I need only refer to Favrilo Princip (28/6/1914), Lenin’s brother (attempt of the Czar’s life), Dora Brillant (famous Russian terrorist), etc. If the young Czech students have so far not had recourse to such means (such events are unknown to me in recent Czech history), this is probably because they had no direct cause to do so. But now the lives of a number of young undeveloped people have been interfered with by the closure of the Universities, we shall have to reckon, in my opinion, with reactions.

[Manuscript marginal note to this document reads: “In this connection it should be stressed that-contrary to the Old Reich-an extraordinarily high percentage of students come from the working classes. It will therefore, be easier for the expelled students here than in the Old Reich to act as bearers of ideas among the working classes during the time in which the Universities are closed."]

In order, on the one hand, to meet this danger and, on the other hand, to meet the impossible situation-for the other reasons set forth above-where thousands of people in the Protectorate are allowed to remain idle, I consider it necessary to conscript for labor such members of the above-named category as are suitable therefor.

But in my opinion only employment in the Old Reich can be considered, for which the government decree re general compulsory labor service dated 25/7/1939 would give the requisite legal authority. Their employment in the Protectorate is, in my opinion, not possible for political and security reasons, and is also out of the question owing to the lack of suitable accommodation near the Autobahns, which are probably the only places where one could consider employing them. On the other hand, their employment for a limited period on the Autobahns in the Old Reich could, according to my information, be carried out without further ado because there is sufficient barracks space available there.

Should the intention of using the people concerned for labor in Germany be followed up, it would be necessary to exchange views beforehand with Secretary of State, Dr. Syrup. There would, in addition, be the matter of transportation to be settled, about which I cannot give an opinion.

Via Chief of Division II, Ministerialrat Dr. Bertsch. To the Under Secretary of State von Burgsdorf.

(Dr. Dennler.)

[Pencil note:] I am for a quick clarification of these matters following Dennler’s suggestion.

II B 22/XI/39

Title: “Document 3859-PS, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 598-601.

Prague, 8/31/1940.

No. Rpr. 1391/40

Dear Herr Lammers,

Encl. 1. Enclosed I send you the memorandum, which I mentioned in advance in my letter of 7/13/1940, No. Rpr. 1197/40, about the question of the future organization of the Bohemian-Moravian country.

Encl. 2. I enclose another memorandum on the same question, which my Secretary of State K. H..Frank has drawn up independently of me and which, in its train of thoughts, leads to the same result and with which I fully agree. Please present both memoranda to the Fuehrer and arrange a date for a personal interview for myself and Secretary of State Frank. As I have heard from a private source that individual Party and other Offices intend to submit proposals to the Fuehrer for separating various parts of the Protectorate under my authority, without my knowing these projects in detail, I should be grateful to you if you would arrange the date for my interview early enough for me, as the competent Reich Protector and one who understands the Czech problem, to have an opportunity, together with my State Secretary, to place our opinions before the Fuehrer before all sorts of plans are suggested to him by other people.

Heil Hitler, yours, [Signed] Freiherr von Neurath.

To the Head of the Reich Chancellory, Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, Berlin, W.8. Vosstr. 6.

Memorandum concerning the question of the future organization of the Bohemian-Moravian territory.

I. Any considerations about the future organization of Bohemia and Moravia must be based on the goal which is to be laid down that that territory from a political and national-political point of view.

From a State-political standpoint there can be but one aim: total incorporation into the Greater German Reich; from a national-political standpoint to fill this territory with Germans.

II. A brief review of the present position from a State-political and national-political standpoint, as it can be seen from the observations and experiences since its incorporation into the Reich took place, will point the path which must be followed to attain the clear and unambiguous aim.

1. It is not as a result of warlike events that Bohemia and Moravia have become a component part of the Greater German Reich. After Slovakia had left the union of Czechoslovakia on 3/14/1939, the remainder of Czechoslovakia joined the Greater German Reich on 3/15/1939 in recognition of the real interests of their country, under the leadership of State President Hacha, and were received into the Greater German Reich in the form of a Protectorate, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the “Anschluss". This evolution differentiates that country fundamentally from other territories in the East, North and West, which have become or are still to become component parts of the Greater German Reich as a result of a victorious war.

2. In this land of Bohemia and Moravia there live some 7.2 million Czechs. The settlement area is almost a solid bloc, once the prevailingly German parts of the former Czechoslovakia had been separated on 10/1/1938. The small German-speaking oases can not alter this materially. The circumstances of a national nature in Moravia and the so often publicized thesis of the completely different national composition of this part of the country cannot be recognized as of fundamental importance for making final decisions.

These 7.2 million Czechs, of whom 3.4 millions live in towns and communities of over 2000 inhabitants and 3.8 millions in communities of under 2000 inhabitants and in the country, are led and influenced by an intelligentsia which is unduly puffed up in proportion to the size of the country. This part of the population also tried, after the alteration of the constitutional situation of this area, more or less openly to sabotage or at any rate postpone necessary measures which were intended to fit the circumstances of the country to the new state of affairs. The remainder of the population, i. e. small craftsmen, peasants and workmen, adapted themselves better to the new conditions. At any rate, trade and traffic did not come to a standstill. The peasants tilled their fields, whilst workers in all concerns including armament concerns, carried out their tasks satisfactorily. Assimilation to the wartime economy of the Old Reich, and an increase in agricultural production by intensive productive methods were achieved, whilst the specially arduous tasks set this country as regards armaments were completely fulfilled.

The machinery of the Protectorate government and of its officials has also functioned in spite of individual cases of resistance, although it is mostly controlled-at least in higher positions-by precisely those persons who belong to the above-mentioned intelligentsia.

Even if measured by the most rigorous standards it can therefore be said that this country haseven in wartime, which demanded of both government and people an unexpectedly rapid change-over-carried out its duties as part of the Greater German Reich, in the constitutional structure which has been given to it.

3. But it would be a fatal mistake to conclude from this that the government and population behaved in this correct manner because they had accepted inwardly the loss of their independent state and incorporation into Greater Germany. The Germans continue to be looked upon as unwelcome intruders and there is a widespread longing for a return to the old state of affairs, even if the people do not express it openly.

By and large, the population submits to the new conditions but they only do so because they either have the necessary rational insight or else because they fear the consequences of disobedience. They certainly do not do so from conviction. This will be the state of affairs for some time to come.

Title: “Document 3859-PS, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 601-604.

III. But as things are like that, a decision will have to be taken as to what is to be done with the Czech people in order to attain the objective of incorporating the country and filling it with Germans as quickly as possible and as thoroughly as possible.

1. The most radical and theoretically complete solution to the problem would be to evacuate all Czechs completely from this country and replace them by Germans. But this solution is not possible because there are not sufficient Germans to fill immediately all the vacant spaces which will in a measurably short time belong to Greater Germany. Even if the urgency of Germanising the Bohemian-Moravian country is recognized and even if it is admitted that it is easier to bring Germans to this area at any rate from the Old Reich and from Austria-than to Poland, it would probably be impossible to carry out the radical solution in a short while unless we were prepared to allow fields to remain fallow and towns to become deserted. But when we take the total position in the Reich into consideration, that is impossible. To carry out the most radical solution would also require decades.

2. But to attain the objective of filling this area with Germans, a total evacuation of Czechs is not necessary.

If one looks at the population of the present Protectorate area more closely, one is astonished at the large number of blonde people with intelligent faces and well built bodies, people who would hardly strike one unfavorably in Central Germany or Southern Germany, nor to speak of the region east of the Elbe. In view of the great amount of intermarriage with Teutons which as gone on during the past millennium, I consider it would be quite possible-for this reason if for none other-to leave a large part of the population in Bohemia and Moravia. In that respect the Czechs differ fundamentally from the Poles, and can therefore not be treated according to the same principles. It will, where the Czechs are concerned, rather be a case on the one hand, of keeping those Czechs who are suitable for Germanisation by individual selective breeding whilst on the other hand expelling those who are not useful from a racial standpoint or are enemies of the Reich (i. e., the intelligentsia which has developed in the last 20 years). If we use such a procedure, Germanisation can be carried out successfully.

IV. In my opinion, therefore, neither can the Czech people be quickly eliminated from this area nor is it proved that such elimination would be in the interests of the Greater German Reich. To decide the question as to what is to be done with each individual member of the Czech people, i. e. whether he is to be received into the German national community for assimilation or whether he is to be kept apart from it, will need many years.

V. There then arises the question: what constitutional form shall this country have during the transitional period, which I estimate at a minimum of two generations, and how is it to be administered.

In accordance with what I have explained above, we have to start from the fact that we must reckon with the presence of about 7 million Czechs who live almost in a solid bloc. For the constitutional form of the Protectorate for the Czech rump State, it was originally points of view based on foreign policy that counted above all. But this form has, after the experience we have gained in close on 1½ years, proved itself in the field of home politics and administration as well. There is therefore no essential reason to depart from it.

For the administration of the Bohemian-Moravian country by German officials alone we have not got the manpower. Every man who thinks in a statesmanlike and simultaneously practical way therefore has the idea that the simplest way is to let these Czechs administer themselves within the framework of the Greater German Reich and in accordance with its aims, i. e. to leave them an administrative organization of their own and to give them administrative autonomy within the limits just mentioned. And finally, it will be such an administration, in tune with the majority of the population that will best succeed in ensuring quiet and order, and consequently the smooth running of daily life in this area. A German administration modelled on the lines of the German Gaus could not but have a disquieting effect, because it would all too easily be tempted to use administrative methods employed in the Old Reich which would not be suitable here and because-in its whole being-it is much too intensive not to arouse resistance unnecessarily.

Equally, the German administration must continue in the transitional period to limit itself to supervising the actual administration of this country, to laying down guiding lines according to which the administration is to be carried out and to issuing orders to guarantee and further at all times the interests of the Greater German Reich. The activity of the German administration here is thus a governing activity. It is clearly eliminated in the decree of 3/16/1939. I must insistently warn you against abandoning this kind of German administration before this area has become Germanised. It is simple and clearcut and entails intervention only if the execution of the Fuehrer’s political directives is endangered.

But then it also becomes apparent from this that the Czech problem can only be handled homogeneously and by one central Reich bureau. Any dismemberment of Bohemia and Moravia is bound to endanger the clear, unified direction of the Czech administration and the Czech people. However clear the objective and the means may be, they are nevertheless bound to be variously interpreted by various administrations and then the methods used are also bound to differ. In view of the mentality of the Czechs and their great tactical skill, they will soon find ways and means of playing of the various administrations against one another. Their tactical political ability has been schooled through hundreds of years. A forced partition of the country would fan up political nationalism anew and only strengthen opposition. Therefore, direction must come from one central government authority, in the hands of one person only. The Czech problem cannot be solved at one fell swoop. For the Germanisation of this country, many separate means will have to be adopted in the most varying spheres, and because these means will require many years to become effective, a constant unified direction of Bohemia and Moravia will be necessary. In a struggle between races nothing is more harmful than a vacillating attitude and an unified line.

A Reich policy can be followed in the Protectorate only by central direction. But if we, for instance, ceded Moravia to the Niederdonau Gau [Lower Danubian district], not only would a differentiation between Bohemia and Moravia arise, but the accession of this district might even place Austria face to face with new difficulties in its relations to the Reich, which would above all also entail for the Greater German Reich itself dangers that should not be under-estimated.

The necessity of a unified direction of policy towards the Czechs is not affected by the fact that not all Czechs live in the Protectorate. The Czechs who live in neighboring districts, outside the Protectorate, are just “splinters” without any significance as compared to the mass living in the Protectorate. When they are being Germanised or removed, we can go at quite a different speed, and other methods can be used for handling such minorities. These differentiations need not disturb us. The real Czech problem only exists in the Protectorate. And that is why, in the long run, it can only be settled here.

Title: “Document 3859-PS, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 604-608.

VI. The incorporation of the Sudeten district into Bohemia/Moravia for historical reasons does not appear appropriate, even if one takes into account that this strengthens the number of Germans.

VII. If one considers the gigantic tasks facing the German nation after a victorious war, the necessity for a careful and rational utilization of Germans will be apparent to everyone. There are so many tasks that have to be tackled at once and simultaneously that a careful, well thought out utilization of the Germans who are suitable for carrying out these tasks is necessary. The Greater German Reich will have to make use of the help of foreigners on a large scale in all spheres and must confine itself to appointing Germans to the key positions and to taking over the reins of public administration where the interests of the Reich make it absolutely necessary (e. g. military and parts of the police).

In the Protectorate there is in existence a (Czech) Protectorate administration working along technical lines and organized according to the needs of a modern State, and this can do the greater part of the work that is done in the Reich itself by the German administration. It is even possible that when the war is over it may be given further tasks that are now performed by German authorities. It will suffice to incorporate comparatively few Germans into the key positions of the Protectorate’s administration and to have a German leadership in Bohemia and Moravia composed of a comparatively small number of German government authorities.

VIII. The past of Bohemia and Moravia, the history of the country which is of particular importance to the German nation and which is reflected in the history of the capital, Prague, and the particularly heavy tasks which-as far as the human mind can see-will devolve on that city in a racially foreign area, make it appear an absolute necessity not to weaken its position as the center.of Bohemia and Moravia in any way by breaking off parts of the territory. Any city that is to be a focal point requires sufficient space to keep such a position. Such a city must be the gravitation-point of a large area having a big population, in order to be able at the same time to radiate and fructify the area and population with the yields of its spiritual, cultural and industrial labors. In the case of Prague there is the additional point that it would be prevented from fulfilling its historical role of gaining influence further southeastwards as well if its old t hinterland of Bohemia and Moravia were cut into, precisely at a time when this age-old German city of Prague is at last once more placed in a position to exert this influence according to the ideas of and for the benefit of the Greater German Reich. Even if the broad political lines are laid down in Berlin for the South East countries too the individual threads, at least in the industrial and cultural spheres, will still emanate to a large extent from here, on account of the position of Prague and its past.

That is why this country deserves special attention and furtherance, in the interests of Greater Germany. We should beware of experiments, even of a purely administrative kind, which would only too easily make it difficult to attain the clear and unambiguous object of the gradual confounding of land and population with Greater Germany and the role that is due to this country on account of its geographical situation and history.

Copy certified correct: SS Obersturmbannfuehrer [Lieut. Col-signature illegible]



The Purpose of the Memorandum

The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was established under definite political conditions and the legal and political order it received at the time arose from these conditions. (14.3.1939). The question as to whether the Protectorate, with a Reich Protector at its head, is suitable for settling the Czech problem and should therefore be retained, or whether it should give place to some other form of government is being raised by various people and is the cause of this memorandum. It will briefly A. Indicate the nature of the Czech problem; B. Analyse the present way in which it is being dealt with; C. Examine the proposed alterations from the point of view of their suitability and finally D. Express an independent opinion on the whole question.

On a correct decision depends the solution of the Czech problem. We thus bear the responsibility for centuries to come.

A. The Nature of the Czech Problem

I. The nature of the Czech problem becomes evident from (1) A look at the geographical and ethnographic map, (2) the knowledge of racial conditions and (3) from the historic fate of the Czech people.

(1) The Czech people, which belongs to the western Slavs, lives not only within the German political Lebensraum but also within its ethnographic Lebensraum. Its territorial position prohibits political independence. The inability of the Czechs to organise themselves into a permanent state is a fate arising from their geographical position. The Greater German Reich must be able to dispose of this territory and its inhabitants politically. Out of this arises the question of the fate of the Czech people and of the constitutional form of its incorporation into the Reich.

(2) Originally there existed a strong racial difference between the Teutonic Germans and the Slav Czechs. But the fact that the Czechs belonged for a thousand years to the Old Reich or to States governed by Germans, determined not only the political and social but also the racial structure of the Czech people, i.e. it considerably altered it. From the very beginning a mixing of German and Czech blood took place here. Just as the Czech princes took their wives from amongst the German noble families, so also did the rest of the nobility and the citizens and peasants intermarry with Germans. Only towards the end of the 18th century did the ratio of Germans to Czechs of 5 to 3, which had existed till then,-in the flat country as well,-change to that of 3 to 5,-a fact which can be explained only by the quiet transformation of a corresponding number of Germans into Czechs, whose descendants, bearing Czech or German names, today live as Czechs. On the other hand, particularly in the course of the 19th century the Germanisation of numerous Czechs took place. The outcome of this thousand year long historical process is the far reaching racial levelling off of the two peoples in the Bohemian area, so that now only a minority has retained the original distinctive racial features in a pure state. This strong intake of Germanic blood also explains the ability of the Czech people to produce considerable achievements in the spheres of culture and civilisation--especially since the beginning of the 19th century-to a far greater degree than, for instance, the Slavonic Poles. The Germans from the Old Reich, who expected to find a “Polish Economy” [translator’s note: slang for “chaotic state of affairs"] in this country, are always astonished at the high cultural level in Bohemia and Moravia.

(3) History finally shows, that the practice of incorporating Bohemia into the Reich, at first as a tributary and then as a fief was an advantageous solution for both sides. The withdrawal of Bohemia in the 16th century is not an isolated process, but is one of the many cases of the breaking up of the Old Reich into separate territories. The break took place in connection with and was caused by the great religious confessional antagonisms which led to political cleavages not only between neighbour peoples but also within the individual peoples. From 1526-1918 Bohemia was then again made a part of a comprehensive and vast state structure, and lived in it in a kind of political autonomy. Only the Masaryk-Benes epoch produces an attempt at absolute opposition to Germanism.

If the territorial situation forces the inclusion of Bohemia and Moravia in the Reich, the racial picture provided by the Czechs permits a policy of assimilation or of changing nationality for a majority of the Czechs: the past finally demonstrates the protectorate-like form of the inclusion of Bohemia in the Old Reich as it proved itself during centuries.

II. At present the Czech people are in the midst of a real and extremely severe spiritual-political crisis. The collapse came suddenly and catastrophically. A tremendous number of new things have stormed in on the Czechs. They have not as yet found a way out of the collapse of the old values, concepts and orientations. The present mental-spiritual attitude of the Czech people is somewhat as follows:

(1) In the case of the one-time exploiters and of the majority of the intelligentsia, who are very numerous in proportion to the total population and who are very conceited: they hope that we will be defeated and that Czechoslovakia will subsequently be resurrected. This class is irreconcilable.

(2) Then-and that also in the circles of the elder intelligentsia-a class of Czechs who entertained doubts of the durability of the 1918 arrangement even in Czechoslovakia. Advocates of the former Austro-Slavism, older State officials, as well as officers and men faithful to Austria). These people are beginning to remember that they had lived well for centuries while they were part of a foreign State union.

(3) A factor comprising primarily the wide class of peasants, workers and petits bourgeois which until now we have hardly worked on at all in the way of political propaganda. Their national consciousness bears no strongly developed national-political, but a more patriotic, folk lore note. This circle may follow a clever German leadership, if it can continue in this manner for the time being and if it is no longer incited by the intellectuals.

Title: “Document 3859-PS, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 608-610.

B. Analysis of the present constitutional and political shape of Bohemia and Moravia.

The constitutional position of the Reich provinces of Bohemia and Moravia has not reached its final shape with the setting up of the Protectorate, and the Czech problem cannot yet be regarded as having been finally solved thereby. On the contrary, only the first stage of a process has thereby been entered on. The war has greatly influenced this course. The effect has been partly to speed it up, in as far as the Reich has attained a dominant position in Europe and the world within a short space of time, whereby a certain part of the external political considerations of 3/1939 have been eliminated; and partly obstructive, because the need for the contribution of the Protectorate to efforts vital for the war, (intensive agricultural production, production of arms and munitions, functioning of trade and traffic) forbids any attack on the Czech national spirit because of possible interruptions in the smooth-running of production on which might result for the duration of the war.

The setting up of a central Reich authority which s subordinated only to the Fuehrer has proved itself absolutely correct. Under the leadership of the Reich Protector, the Czechs have, by and large, rendered their contribution to the production demands of the Reich, during the war also, without any big acts of sabotage, partly out of conviction that only thus would they maintain their autonomy and secure their national existence and partly for fear of punishment. The Czech administration, controlled and directed by the Reich Protector, has functioned and works even in times of crisis without serious disturbances, owing to suitable German pressure.

Nevertheless, the Reich Protector is today forced to maintain an administrative activity based on the status quo. We cannot be satisfied with,this kind of stationary policy in the long run, but must emerge from this passive attitude one day and enter upon an attack against this area and against the Czech people within the framework of a plan embracing the whole Reich. This then necessitates a change of the constitutional structure of the Protectorate, since the further undisturbed functioning of the Reich Protector’s present administrative apparatus does not by itself bring about the assimilation or Germanisation of the Czechs.

C. Opinion on various Party and other Projects

Various Party and State authorities are at present concerning themselves intensively with the future shaping of the Bohemian-Moravian area and the solution of the Czech problem. The causes for these projects are:

(1) The plans of individual Gauleiters concerning the reforming and remodelling of their regions. (Sudetendistrict, Lower Danube, Upper Danube, Silesia etc.).

(2) Constitutional deliberations by some State authorities concerning Reich reforms and the New Order of the coming Reich. (Ministry of the Interior, Hess' Staff).

(3) Certain economic and financial interests of Berlin State departments (Ministries of economy, finance, food, postal services and transport).

Nearly all of these projects foresee as speedy a dissolution of the Protectorate as possible and with that of the office of Reich Protector, demand a splitting up into 3 or 4 Reich Gaus of the territory which is at present one whole and with this the earliest possible total incorporation into the Reich administration. From such a splitting up of the Czechs into several Reich Gaus, they expect-besides a simplification of the Administrationa speedy solution of the Czech nationality problem, i.e. Germanisation in a short time by means of the offensive power possessed by the Gaus.

The efforts of the Lower Danube Gau leadership aim at separating Moravia and joining it to the present Lower Danube Gau, with Brno as the Gau capital, and intend Bohemia as a kind of Czech “reserve". From the Lower Danube to Silesia a German corridor is to be created. In this connection the tribal differences of the “Moravian Slavs” are also specially speculated upon.

To this the following has to be pointed out:

(1) The decision about the solution of the Czech problem must not be made dependent on the special interests of individual Gauleiters, however justified such interests may seem at present. The New Order of the Reich is at stake, and with it the final solution of the Czech question, i.e. Reich interests and not Gau interests. The latter are to be subordinated to the former. The emphasis on the primary importance of Reich interests excludes neither the bringing in of the native forces in the adjoining frontier areas which have proved themselves in the racial struggle, nor consideration for the requirements of the industries belonging to these areas, industries which for ages had their natural marketing area in Bohemia and Moravia.

(2) The opinion that, by splitting up the national bloc living in one closed body and distributing it to several Reich Gaus the Czechs can be Germanised more rapidly-these projects too consider total evacuation impossible to carry out-is wrong for these reasons:

a. because the first reaction to partition would be an increase in political tension among the Czechs, the flaring up of resistance and a fresh growth of political consciousness among the Czechs, whereas what is desired is to make them unpolitical and disorganized;

b. because administrative frontiers can never destroy a united people and an administrative splitting up unfortunately does not end the existence of a Czech nationhood very conscious of unity. History has proved this in Poland, which was thrice incorporated by partition into three different states. It was then that the political regeneration of the Polish people really started in earnest;

c. because, against a Czech nationhood which in reality remains unified, there would standnot a unified Reich authority but a number of Gau offices or Reich Governorates working and experimenting along different lines, as we know from experience. The German strength would be split up, and the vital Czech people would find it easier to deal with these divided German forces;

d. because such an official “Czech partition” brings with it sharp reactions in the field of foreign politics and disturbs the Reich’s policy of wide spaces in the South East. To this must be added the fact that the Czechs were not incorporated as a result of war, but that they asked for protection, which might perhaps frighten other South Eastern peoples off doing this.

It should further be noted that the creation of a “Czech reserve” in Bohemia does not constitute a constructive solution, as this gives rise to new administrative problems and the “Czech reserve” is not Germanised-the problem thus remaining. In addition it is hardly possible to prevent these Czechs multiplying in the Reserve and they will shortly begin to emigrate once more into the neighboring frontier areas.

Title: “Document 3859-PS, Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp.

D. Own Opinion

The aim of Reich policy in Bohemia and Moravia must be the complete Germanisation of area and people. In order to attain this, there are two possibilities:

I. The total evacuation of the Czechs from Bohemia and Moravia to a territory outside the Reich and settling Germans in the freed territory, or

II. if one leaves the majority of the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, the simultaneous application of a great variety of methods working towards Germanisation, in accordance with a plan containing a target year.

Such a Germanisation provides for:

(1) The changing of the nationality of racially suitable Czechs;

(2) The expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and of the intelligentsia who are enemies of the Reich, or “special treatment” for these and all destructive elements:

(3) The recolonising of the territory thus freed with fresh German blood.

To I: I consider that the total expulsion of 7.2 million Czechs is impossible to carry out,

a. because there is no space available where they can be settled afresh;

b. because there are no Germans available who can immediately fill the vacated space;

c. because the core of Europe which is highly civilized and highly sensitive, economically and in the technical field of communications cannot stand being disturbed in its functions and cannot tolerate a vacuum;

d. because human beings represent Reich capital and we, in the new Reich, can not do without the working power of 7 million Czechs;

e. because probably the shock effects on other South Eastern peoples are undesirable.

To II: In my opinion, Germanisation can nevertheless be achieved by means of the three possibilities here mentioned. The successful attempts at assimilation in past centuries, the bringing of millions of Czechs to the German racial level which thereby took place, and which is described above and the power of attraction of the new Reich make it possible and probable that several million Czechs can be got really to transform themselves nationally. To separate this transformable part of the Czech population from those who are racially inferior is the task of special commissions of investigation, to be appointed for this purpose. (Perhaps within the framework of the public health services). is a systematically carried out political neutralization and depoliticalisation, one must first of all arrive at a political (spiritual) and then at a racial assimilation of the Czech people, in order finally to attain a real national transformation.

This process will have to continue both in the Protectorate area itself and also on a wide scale in Germany proper. Well planned methods sure of their goal are to be employed in all spheres of national life in an elastic manner and in a great variety of different ways. Only some of these methods can be pointed to here in their general lines:

Raising of the standard of living-participation in the social achievements of National Socialism (German Labor Front, Strength through Joy)-granting of obvious advantages on declaring in favor of Germanism (elimination of every defamation)-large scale exchange of places of work with the Reich proper-including transfer of families (at present 95000 Czech workers voluntarily work in the Reich proper after having been recruited)-a certain differential scale of wages between the Reich proper and the Protectorate to be maintained as an inducement-transfer of female domestic servants into the Reich proper-ditto waiters, menservants, musicians, etc.

Participation of Czech farmers in the advantages of the German agricultural policy favorable to farmers-good policy of markets and prices-inheritability of farms only for German peasants-German defensive farm settlements along the Eastern frontier.


Materially promote trade and commerce-offer social advantages to officials-open up personal prospects-promotions-award of honors.

Title: “Document 3859-PS, Part 06 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 612-614.


Fundamental change in education extermination of the Czech historical myth-education towards the Reich idea-no getting on without perfect knowledge of the German language-first doing away with the secondary schools, later also with the elementary schools-never again any Czech universities, only transitionally the “Collegium Bohemicus” at the German university in Prague 2 years compulsory labor service.

Large scale land policy, creation of German strongpoints and German bridges of land, in particular pushing forward of the German national soil from the north as far as the suburbs of Prague.

Campaign against the Czech language, which is to become merely a dialect as in the 17th and 18th centuries, and which is to disappear completely as an official language.

Marriage policy after previous racial examination.

In attempts at assimilation in the Reich proper, the frontier Gaus must be excluded.

Apart from continuous propaganda for Germanism and the granting of advantages as an inducement, severest police methods, with exile and “special treatment” for all saboteurs. Principle: “Pastry and whip"!

The employment of all these methods has a chance of success only if a single central Reich authority with one man at its head controls its planning, guiding, and carrying out. The direct subordination of the “master in Bohemia” to the Fuehrer clarifies the political character of the office and the task, and prevents the political problem from sinking down to an administrative problem. Only thus can the task be withheld from the departmental jealousies and.the multiplicity of the Ministries and other Reich and Party offices. The Czech is always impressed only by he direct use of Reich authority. With his political skill and his tactics, trained throughout centuries, he can easily deal with -three or four different provincialisms, particularly since for the time being “mother Prague” [pencil note: Head Office in Russia] will in any event remain the political brain of the Czech nation. Any division of the Protectorate area violates this principle.

Until suitable successes have been achieved in the intended process of national transformation, I therefore recommend the following:

(1) The maintenance of the territorial unity of the present Protectorate area. Frontier adjustments on a small scale in favor of the adjoining Gaus, or for technical reasons, are always possible. (Pilsen, Morava, Ostrava, Neuhaus, etc.).

(2) The maintenance of one central Reich authority in Prague, with one man at its head, who is directly subordinated to the Fuehrer and equipped with all the necessary powers for Germanizing.

(3) The step by step elimination of the autonomy of the Czechs, and the careful, gradual elimination of the Czech machinery of state connected therewith, commencing with the highest authorities, but retaining a body of Czech officials and employees.

I recommend paragraph (3) for the reason that-

(a) Owing to lack of officials we are not in a position to appoint German functionaries for the 7,950 urban and rural administration offices, the 92 county administration offices, and 2 Provincial authorities, and because, owing to the enormous tasks which will face us in the future Reich we have to make use of Czechs on a large scale.

(b) Because-thanks to the German hand which guided it-the Czech administrative machine did function on the whole--during the war too-will continue to work in the future too and-in its own interests-will maintain quiet and order on the Czech’s own responsibility.

(c) Because it is quite sufficient if we occupy all the important key positions in the higher administrative offices with a comparatively small but well trained body of German officials, and, instead of ourselves administrating every little detail, issue directives and lead, i.e. rule.

This memorandum takes for granted the intention of wishing to Germanize the area of population of the Protectorate. It therefore does not deal with the problem of an absolute “degradation” of the Czech people to a purely auxiliary race [Hilfsvolk] on racial grounds (Askari viewpoint!), a race to be outlawed socially and intermarriage with which would have to be forbidden. The practical carrying out of a complete degradation is rather considered as impracticable, and only an individual degradation is visualized as a special method of “special treatment” [Sonderbehandlung] in accordance with D II/2. And according to the explanations contained in this memorandum, this degradation does not seem to be necessary, because the solution of the Czech question, and with it the final pacification of the centuries-old Bohemian-Moravian center of unrest [Brandherd] in Europe, can be attained in the manner proposed.

At the end of a certain period of transition, during which the process of Germanization must be brought into full operation in a uniform manner, nothing any longer stands in the way of a partition of the present territory of the Protectorate and its allocation to the Reich, or of the creation of new Reich Gaus.

Prague, 8/28/1940. (Signed) Secretary of State K. H. FRANK.

Document 3862-PS

Handling of the German-Czech Problem [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 615-616.

Prague, 6/27/1941

The Reichs Protector for Bohemia and Moravia I 1 a-3943

[Stamp:] Office of the State Secretary Reichs Protectorate for Bohemia and Moravia. Recd. 16/7/1941


To: (a) The Office of the Reichs Protector (b) The Office of the State Secretary (c) The Office of the Under State Secretary (d) The Central Administration (e) Sections I to IV (f) All groups (g) The Office for Moravia at Bruenn (h) The Plenipotentiary of the Armed Forces (i) The District Labor Chief (j) The Commander of the Public Police (k) The Commander of the Security Police (l) The Representative of the Foreign Office (m) The Party Liaison Office (n) The Bohemian and Moravian Oberlandraete (o) The Curator, German Scientific High School, Prague (p) The Curator, German Technical High School, Bruenn (q) The higher Finance President (r) The Chief District Judge (s) The Attorney General (t) Head Office, German Reichspost.

For the motive stated, I order that in future, when arrangements and publications of any kind concerning the German-Czech problem are made, the views of the whole population are more than ever to be directed to the war and its requirements, while the duty of the Czech nation to carry out the war tasks imposed on it jointly with the Greater Reich is to be stressed.

Other questions concerning the German-Czech problem are not suitable subjects for public discussion at the present time. I wish to point out that, without detriment to my orders, administrative handling and treatment of all questions about the German-Czech problem are to be in no way alluded to.

What is decisive for my order is the necessity for seeing that quiet and order reign in the Protectorate during the war and that the working population, both in the country and in towns, especially in the armaments industry, are allowed to perform their tasks, so important to the war, without hindrance. Public explanations or expressions cannot be allowed to disturb the arrangements I have made for maintaining peace and order. Any disturbance of the public by untimely discussion of the German-Czech problem gives to enemy broadcasters, enemy agents, and opposition-circles the occasion for stirring up the Czech population.

Requisite public statements about the political questions of the Protectorate, and in particular those addressed to the Czech population, are my business and mine alone and will be published in due time.

[signed]: Freiherr von Neurath

Witnessed: [signature illegible] Registrar

Document 3876-PS

Report No. 9 Concerning The Activity Of The Einsatzgruppen Of The Security Police And The SD In The USSR, Part 01 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 616-617.

Berlin, 2/27/1942.

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD IV A 1-B. No. 24 B/41 gRs.

SECRET [rubber stamp].

I herewith enclose the ninth summary report concerning the activity of the “Einsatzgruppen” of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR. The reports will be sent out periodically in future.

Signed: Heydrich.

Filed 7 March [Office rubber stamp]

certified: Signed: Gotschlich Office clerk


To the Chiefs of the “Einsatzgruppen” A, B, C, and D (with extra copies for the “Einsatzkommandos” and commanders of the Security Police and the SD).

Commander of the Security Police and the SD SS-Oberfuehrer [Brig. Gen.] Dr. Schoengarth, Cracow.

Inspector of the border I-East-SS-Oberfuehrer RuKD Damzog, Posznan.

Higher SS and Police Chief SS-O'Gruf. [Maj. Gen.] Jeckeln, Riga

SS-O'Gruf. [Maj. Gen.] v. d. Bach Mogilew

SS-O'Gruf. [Maj. Gen.] Pruetzmann, Kriwoj-Rog

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Korsemann, Rowno

SS-O'Gruf. [Lieut. Gen.] Krueger, Cracow

SS-O'Gruf. [Lieut. Gen.] Heissmeyer, Berlin

SS-O'Gruf. [Lieut. Gen.] v. Woyrsch, Dresden

SS-O'Gruf. [Lieut. Gen.] Schmauser, Breslau

SS-Gruf. [Maj . Gen.] Mazuw, Stettin

Document 3876-PS

Report No. 9 Concerning The Activity Of The Einsatzgruppen Of The Security Police And The SD In The USSR, Part 02 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 617-618.

SS-Gruf. [Maj. Gen.] Dr. Kaltenbrunner, Vienna

SS-Gruf. [Maj. Gen.] Koppe, Posznan

SS-Gruf. [Maj. Gen.] Undersecretary of State Frank, Prague

SS and Police Chief SS-Brif [Brig. Gen.] Schroeder, Riga

SS--Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Wysocki, Kovno

SS-Oberf. [Brig. Gen.] Moeller, Reval

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Zenner, Minsk

SS-O'Stubaf. [Lieut. Col.] Hellwig, Shitomir

SS-Oberf. [Brig. Gen.] Scherner, Cracow

SS-Oberf. [Brig. Gen.] Wigand, Warsaw

SS-Oberf. [Brig. Gen.] Oberg, Radom

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Katzmann, Lwow

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Haltermann, Kiew

Reich Defense Commissioner for the “Wehrkreis” I c.o. Reg. Dir. Koehler, Koenigsberg, Prussia.

Reich Defense Commissioner for the “Wehrkreis” II c.o. Reg. Dir. Buchholz, Stettin.

Reich Defense Commissioner for the “Wehrkreis” VIII c.o. ORR. Dr. Frhr. v. Wrangel, Breslau.

Reich Defense Commissioner for the “Wehrkreis” XVII c.o. RR Dr. Fischer, Vienna.

Reich Defense Commissioner for the “Wehrkreis” XX c.o. ORR. Brien, Danzig.

Reich Defense Commissioner for the “Wehrkreis” XXI c.o. RR. Mittendorf, Posznan.

Reich Defense Commissioner for the occupied Polish Territories Gov. Gen. Reich Minister Dr. Frank. c.o. ORR. Dr. Schepers, Berlin.

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Harm, Stettin (SS-Oberabschnitt [section] Baltic Sea).

SECRET [rubber stamp] 100 copies 67th copy

Document 3876-PS

Report No. 9 Concerning The Activity Of The Einsatzgruppen Of The Security Police And The SD In The USSR, Part 03 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 618-620.

[page 20]

Report No. 9 of the activities of the “Einsatzgruppen” of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR (For the period from 1/1-31/1942)

I. Garrisons. II. Activities: A. Partisans. B. Fight against communists, functionaries, and criminal elements. C. Jews. D. Propaganda activity. III. Feeling and attitude of the population: A. Latvia B. Esthonia. C. White Ruthenia. IV. Polish Resistance Movements V. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)

[page 31/32]

Now as ever the attitude of the Jews is unequivocally anti-German and criminal. It is attempted to purge East Land [Ostland] as completely as possible of Jews. Executions by shooting are carried out everywhere in such a manner as not to attract public attention. The public and even the remaining Jews are mostly of the opinion that the Jews have only been transferred to a different domicile.

Esthonia is already free of Jews.

In Latvia the number of 29,500 Jews remaining in Riga was reduced to 2,500. Nine hundred sixty-two Jews still living in Dvinsk are urgently needed as workers.

In Lithuania the country and the smaller towns have been completely purged of Jews. Aside from basic considerations this was particularly urgent because Communist elements, especially terror groups and circles of the Polish resistance movement were establishing connections with the Jews. The Jews, on the other hand, often tried to arouse anti-German feeling among Lithuanian circles by themselves willing to participate in the reconstruction.

The Jews in Zagare were particularly active. There, 50 Jews escaped from the Ghetto but could be caught again and shot. During the shooting of all Jews in Zagare, organized as a result of the above mentioned incident, the Jews attacked the guards while shouting “Long live Stalin” and “Down with Hitler". Resistance was crushed immediately.

In Lithuania there are still 15000 Jews in Kaunas [Kovno] 4500 in Shavli, and an additional 15000 in Vilna who are also needed as workers. In White Ruthenia the purge of Jews is under way. The number of Jews in the part up to now handed over to the civil administration amounts to 139000. In the meantime, 33210 Jews were shot by the special unit [Einsatzgruppe] of the Security Police and the Security Service [SD].

Berlin, 4/23/1942

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD IV A 1-B. No. 24 B/41 gRs

SECRET [rubber stamp]

Re: Report No. 11 concerning the activity of the “Einsatzgruppen” of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR.

At the request of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD I herewith enclose the eleventh summary report concerning the activity of the “Einsatzgruppen” of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR.

signed: Heydrich.

Filed 5/4/1942 [Office rubber stamp]

Certified: Signed: Gotschlich Office clerk

Document 3876-PS

Report No. 9 Concerning The Activity Of The Einsatzgruppen Of The Security Police And The SD In The USSR, Part 04 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 620-621.


To the Chiefs of the “Einsatzgruppen” A, B, C and D (with extra copies for the “Einsatzkommandos” and commanders of the Security Police and the SD).

Commander of the Security Police and the SD in the Government General SS-Oberfuehrer [Brig. Gen.] Dr. Schoengarth, Cracow.

Inspector of the border I-East-SS-Oberf. [Brig. Gen.] RuKD. Damzog, Posen

Higher SS and Police Chief SS-O'Gruf. [Maj. Gen.] Jeckeln, Riga

SS-O'Gruf. [Maj. Gen.] v. d. Bach, Mogilew

SS-O'Gruf. [Lieut. Gen.] Pruetzmann, Kriwoj-Rog

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Korsemann, Rowno

SS-O'Gruf. [Lieut. Gen.] Krueger, Cracow

SS-O'Gruf. [Lieut. Gen.] Heissmeyer, Berlin

SS-O'Gruf. [Lieut. Gen.] v. Woyrsch, Dresden

SS-O'Gruf. [Lieut. Gen.] Schmauser, Breslau

SS-O'Gruf. [Lieut. Gen.] Mazuw, Stettin

SS-Gruf. [Maj. Gen.] Kaltenbrunner, Vienna

SS-Gruf. [Maj. Gen.] Koppe, Posznan

SS-Gruf. [Maj. Gen.] Undersecretary of State Frank, Prague

SS and Police Chief SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Schroeder, Riga

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Wysocki, Kovno

SS-Oberf. [Brig. Gen.] Moeller, Reval

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Zenner, Minsk

SS-O'Stubaf [Lieut. Col.] Hellwig, Shitomir

SS-Oberf. [Brig. Gen.] Scherner, Cracow

SS-Oberf. [Brig. Gen.] Wigand, Warsaw

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Oberg, Radom

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Katzmann, Lwow

Document 3876-PS

Report No. 9 Concerning The Activity Of The Einsatzgruppen Of The Security Police And The SD In The USSR, Part 05 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 621-623.

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Haltermann, Kiew

Reich Defense Commissioner for the “Wehrkreis” I c.o. RR. Witte oViA., Koenigsberg/Prussia

Reich Defense Commissioner for the “Wehrkreis” II c.o. RD. Buchholz oViA., Stettin

Reich Defense Commissioner for Lower Silesia in the “Wehrkreis” VIII c.o. ORR. Dreschhoff oViA., Breslau

Reich Defense Commissioner for Upper Silesia in the “Wehrkreis” VIII c.o. RR. Meyer-Tonndorf oViA., Kattowitz

Reich Defense Commissioner for the “Wehrkreis” XVII c.o. RR. Dr. Fischer oViA., Vienna

Reich Defense Commissioner for the “Wehrkreis” XX c.o. ORR. Brien oViA., Danzig

Reich Defense Commissioner for the “Wehrkreis” XXI c.o. RR. Mittendorf oViA., Posznan

Reich Defense Commissioner for the occupied Polish Territories Gov. Gen. Reich Minister Dr. Frank c.o. ORR. Dr. Schepers oViA., Berlin

SS-Brif. [Brig. Gen.] Harms, Stettin (SS-Oberabschnitt [section] Baltic Sea)

SECRET [rubber stamp] 100 copies 69th copy

Report No. 11 of the activities of the “Einsatzgruppen” of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR. (For the period from 3/1-31/1942)

I. Garrisons. II. Activities: A. Partisans B. Communists C. Jews III. Feeling and attitude of the population. IV. Movements for national independence.

…released from arrest, accusations against them were suppressed and false identification papers made out for them.

A few days later the former NKVD-Major Koschemijak and his wife were arrested. They had tried to form a new NKVD-organization in Kiev and to organize terror and sabotage groups for the purpose of blowing up larger buildings and bridges.

The checking of villages and the screening of the population led continually to the arrest of political activists. After they had been given a hearing, they were shot.

At Yalta in the Crimea a new unit of the communist youth organization, just starting up, was raided and the leading woman was shot.

The manner in which the Jewish question was solved differed very much at the various front sectors.

Since the largest part of the Eastern territory [Ostland] was free from Jews, and the few who remained and were needed for the most urgent labor projects, were located in ghettos, it was the main task of the security-police and SD to get hold of the Jews who were mostly hiding in the country. Several times Jews were seized who had left the ghetto without permission or who were not wearing the Jewish star.

Document 3876-PS

Report No. 9 Concerning The Activity Of The Einsatzgruppen Of The Security Police And The SD In The USSR, Part 06 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 623-624.

[Page 64]

At Riga, among others, three Jews from the Reich, who had been assigned to the ghetto and had made a breakaway, were seized and publicly hanged in the ghetto.

In the course of some larger actions against the Jews, 3412 of them were shot at Minsk, 302 at Vileyka, and 2007 at Baranovitchi.

The population welcomed these actions since upon inspection of the residences, they had found out that the Jews still had quite a supply of food, while the food situation of the population was extremely bad.

Especially in the sphere of the black-market the Jews reappeared time and again. In the Minsk community kitchen, which was set up to feed the people and was managed by the city administration, two Jews were involved in extensive embezzlements and briberies. The food stuff thus obtained was sold on the blackmarket.

Another Jew was arrested under strong suspicion of espionage. The man in question was a well known sculptor and painter who, because he had made portraits of numerous German officers, had access to almost all the German troop units garrisoned at Minsk.

In the remaining territories of the Eastern Front, the duty of the security police and SD consisted in general clean up activities of larger villages, along with actions against individual Jews who put in a political or criminal appearance.

Thus in Rakow alone 5000 Jews were shot and 1224 in Artenosk, so that these places are free from Jews.

In the Crimea 1000 Jews and Gypsies were executed.

Title: “Document 3877-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 624-625.

Reich Regent [Reichsstatthalter] in Vienna Head Office Teleprint Department 1/1 Ballhausplatz 2, U-24-5-20


Reichsstatthalter Vienna No. 1087, 5/28/1942, 20.35 hours.

To Reichsleiter Bormann. Berlin, Party Chancellery

Express-Urgent-Immediate attention

Dear Martin Bormann,

I request that the following be submitted to the Fuehrer:

Knowing the Czechoslovak population and its attitude in Vienna as well as in the Protectorate, I would draw your attention to the following:

The enemy powers and the British cliques round Benesch have for a long time felt bitterly regarding the loyalty to be observed generally among the Czechoslovak workers and their contribution to German war economy. They are seeking for a means to play off the Czechoslovak population and the Reich against each other. The attempt on Heydrich was without doubt planned in London. The British arms of the assailant point to parachuted agents. London hopes by this attempt to induce the Reich to take draconian measures for the purpose of creating a resistance movement among Czechoslovak workers. In order to prevent the world thinking that the population of the Protectorate is in opposition to Hitler, these acts must immediately be branded as of British authorship. A sudden and violent air attack on a British cultural town would be the most efficacious and the world would have to be informed thereof under the headline “Revenge for Heydrich". That alone should induce Churchill to desist immediately from plotting the outrages which have begun to occur in Prague. The Reich retaliates for the attack at Prague by a counterattack on world public opinion.

It is proposed to give the following information to the Press tomorrow:

Regarding the attempt on Heydrich’s life

Investigations have shown that the attempt on Heydrich was not made by Czechoslovak terrorists but by British agents. Parachutes and murderous weapons discovered were of British origin. It apparently involves four British parachutists who set out from London. One of these was injured on landing and was arrested. The authorities are on the track of the others.

Heil Hitler. Your [Dein] SCHIRACH

Sent: Rsthalter Vienna/Kloss, Received: 28/5 2045 No. 1087 (45 zl) rvst bln/manczak

[stamp:] Reported and forwarded to: (1) Regierungspraesident (2) Reference (3) Local Government (4) Central office

on 9/15/1942 by: KS. 177 Z.

Document 3881-PS

Extract from the Transcript of the Proceedings before the People’s Court [Volksgerichtshof] of the Greater German Reich 8/7-8/1944, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 625-626.

In the Great Plenary Hall of the Berlin Supreme Court

President: Dr. Freisler, President of the Volksgerichtshof

Deputy President: Guenther Nebelung, President of the Senate.

Honorary Assistant Judges: Gen. Reinecke (Infantry), Garden technician and small gardener Hans Kaiser (Berlin), Merchant Georg Seuberth (Fuerth)

Honorary Reserve Judges: Baker Emil Winter, Engineer Kurt Wernicke

Assisting Reporting Judge: Volksgericht Counsellor Lemmle

Reserve Reporting Judge: Oberlandesgerichtsrat Dr. Koehler

Prosecutors: Oberreichsanwalt (Attorney General) Lautz, Oberstaatsanwalt (Senior Public Prosecutor) Dr. Gorisch

Defense Counsel appointed by the President, Dr. Freisler, Lawyer Dr. Weissmann, Lawyer Dr. L. Schwarz, Lawyer Justizrat Dr. Neubert, Lawyer Dr. Gustav Schwarz, Lawyer Dr. Kunz, Lawyer Dr. Falck, Lawyer Hugo Bergmann, Lawyer Boden.

Defendants Erwin von Witzleben, Erich Hoeppner, Hellmuth Stieff, Albrecht von Hagen Robert Bernadis, Friedrich Karl Klausing, Peter Yorck von Wartenburg

Indictment: Participation in the attempt to assassinate Hitler on 7/20/1945

Von Hagen (a defendant): Mr. President, for me the situation was as follows: I did in fact have doubts that something was wrong. On one side was von Stauffenberg’s statement. On the other stood my superiors who would have been put in a terribly difficult position at first if my report had been wrong.

The President: Now listen here. It is natural that criminals should be put in a terribly difficult position; their place is behind bars. One must see what is to be done with them. Did you have scruples about arresting criminals?

Defense Counsel: I should also like to ask whether he did not feel limited by his position of subordination.

The President: But then he would have been perverted; for if one thinks that because one’s superior is a criminal one must protect him, one is completely perverted…

The President: Then you are also responsible for the orders. To agree to something subsequently and carry it on is exactly the same as to have drafted it beforehand; it is all the same thing.

Document 3881-PS

Extract from the Transcript of the Proceedings before the People’s Court [Volksgerichtshof] of the Greater German Reich 8/7-8/1944, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 626-628.

[Page 158]

The President: Another person who acted dangerously and stands close to the attempted assassination is the defendant Klausing, a young officer who-I must say-follows the order of his superior officer with touching lack of reflection-an order to carry out which-or even to think out whichwas a crime …

The President: If someone who delivered the explosive remarks at this moment: “It is intended for an attack on the Fuehrer", one must ask whether any healthy man or woman would not have to say to himself or herself: to do nothing now is exactly the same as to have set the explosive off oneself.

The President: Just imagine if Rehmer (Rehmer was given orders by one of the conspirators who was his superior officer but refused to obey them)-then a major, now a colonel-had thought: I have received an order, I couldn’t! Imagine what would have happened! You cannot assume that when a German officer notices: “The explosive is intended for such and such a purpose", he will just say that one has to accept the thing, one can’t do anything against it. In fact he must do something against it.

The regime was to be overthrown.

A young officer Friedrich Karl Klausing! In April of this year, von Haeften, whom we already know, told him that Stauffenberg, Schulenburg, and others intended to overthrow the regime; the war had no chance of success; the preparations were in the hands of Stauffenberg; would he join in? And he replied: yes. On the 10.7. he was ordered to go and see Stauffenberg. He was told that he was to be escorting officer to go to Berchtesgaden-and that he knew what he was doing by this, the action was coming off. He did know what he was doing and he did not refuse. He did not report it. He went along as escorting officer; he was given the assignment of having the car standing by at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden and the plane on the aerodrome. He did that. Stauffenberg came out. He had not carried out the assassination, because the Reichsfuehrer SS had not been there. Four days later, on the 14.7., came a new order to accompany Stauffenberg to the Fuehrer’s H. Q. He flew with Fromm and Stauffenberg. Stauffenberg stated that it could go on again this time. And again,he was given the assignment of being sure to have the car and the plane standing by correctly. Again he did so. Again nothing came of it. On the 20.7. he was called to Colonel Merz von Quirnheim, who told him: “The Fuehrer is dead, disorder has broken out, no one may leave the Bendler block. `Walkuere' comes into effect.” He received orders to call out the sentries, to send out teleprints, to make telephone calls. He did all this and, in the evening, when the loyal development set in, he threw down his arms, went home and gave himself up the following morning. Certainly, he is young. But in this case youth is no excuse. Certainly, he had as his superiors terrible traitors. Certainly he had got into a ghostly company of,traitors. But loyalty, the core of honor, should have proved itself here. No excuse is possible here. There can be no mitigation in this case.

He spoke to us about his illness, discoursed upon the influence which Stauffenberg had on him. He should be a soldier and a true German! Here illness does not help, here to refer to another traitor does not help. Here it is only a question of: Loyalty or treachery of oneself. He chose the path of treachery. To him, also exactly the same applies as to all the others.

Title: “Document 3886-PS [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 628.

[Vienna City Council Meeting-6/6/1942] [Page 9 lines 13-30 incl.]

3. Reichsstatthalter Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach expressed his gratitude to city treasurer Dr. Hanke for the work which had been done, above all for the success achieved during the conferences with the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

He informed the city councillors that as a result of a conference with Reich Minister for the Interior Dr. Frick, discussions will start shortly concerning the simplification of the administration of the cities of Berlin, Vienna, and Hamburg in order to give to those three cities a special position justified in this matter. This will also strengthen the municipal administration of Vienna although it has given rise to many complaints because of its complicated procedure.

A favorable factor, which is of great importance in the transformation of the municipal administrations, is that all offices of the city council are held by men who are closely linked to the party and consequently have their minds open to the right ideas.

Finally he disclosed that already in the latter part of summer or in the fall of this year all Jews would be removed from the city, and that the removal of the Czechs would then get under way, since this is the necessary and right answer to the crime committed against the Deputy Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.

(Conclusion of the session at 12:33 hours.)

Document 3921-PS

Evacuation of Jews from the Old Reich and the Protectorate, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 643-644.


Vienna, 10/27/1941

The higher SS and Police chiefs with the Reichsstatthalter in Vienna in Upper and Lower Danube Military Area XVII

The Inspector of the Ordnungspolizei Abt. RV/L--5236-No. 837/41 (g).

REFERENCE: Chief of the Ordnungspolizei of 10/26/1941 Kdo. g. 2 (01) No. 514 II/41(g).

I am forwarding for your information and further action the enclosed decree of the Chief of the Ordnungspolizei, mentioned above, concerning the evacuation of Jews from the Old Reich and the Protectorate. The request of the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) concerning the disposing of control supervisory forces according to paragraph 2) of the decree are to be granted. Report to me the position of the Begleitkommandos.

By order: [signed] Megel

[seal] certified [illegible] Meister der Schutzpolizei


Pol Praesident, Vienna Kommando of the Schutzpolizei: 1 copy Abt. W.: 1 copy

For information

Commissary for the defense of the Reich: 1 copy

Reichsstatthalter in Nd. Staff officer of the Schutzpolizei: 1 copy

Reichsstatthalter in Od. Staff officer of the Schutzpolizei: 1 copy

RV/L : 1 copy

[seal] 29 October 41 224/515/41 g


Berlin 10/24/1941. NW, Unter den Linden 74.

Chief of the Ordnungspolizei Kdo. g2 (0 1) No. 514 11/41(g).

Subject: Evacuation of the Jews from the Old Reich and the Protectorate

1. During the period from 11/1-12/4/1941, 50000 Jews from the Old Reich, the Ostmark and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia are to be evacuated by the Security Police to the East in the region around Riga and Minsk. The evacuations are to take place in transport trains of the Reichbahn of 1000 persons each.

Document 3921-PS

Evacuation of Jews from the Old Reich and the Protectorate, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 644-645.


(a) The Commanding Officers (Jnspekteure) of the Ordnungspolizei in

For information

(b) The higher SS and Police Chiefs Spree-Northsee--Center West-Fulda-Werra-South and Main-South west-Danube South east-Bohemia and Moravia-Breslau-Prague-Ostland in

(c) The Police president in Berlin.

(d) The Chief of the Security Police and the SD.

The transport trains will be made up in

2. On the basis of the agreements between the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, the Ordnungspolizei is taking in charge the guarding of the transport trains by providing an escort Kommandos 1/12 in number. The details are to be worked out with the competent officers of the SD.

The duty of the escort Kommandos has been fulfilled with the due transfer of the transports to competent Officers of the Security Police at the points of destination. Then they return without delay to their home offices.

3. Expenses incurred through provision of the escort Kommandos are borne by the Chief of the Security Police. At the end of the transport, the expense account of the Police administration must be handed in to the chief of the Security Police.

[signed] DALUEGE

Certified [illegible]

1-for personal Ds graf-[illegible pencil notation] 2for files 29 October 41

Document 3927-PS

Monasteries, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 645-646.


[Red Pencil Mark] SECRET

4 Am Hof, Vienna 1. Tel. 23-5-90, U 21-5-30 1/22/1941.

The Deputy Gauleiter: [Pencil mark: partly illegible]

To Dr. Kramer with the request of taking cognizance.

Our File No.: Sch/G. Your file no: [pencilled note, partly illegible,]

2/I a Pot (Dr. Graf)

Regierung President Dr. Dellbruegge 2 Ballhausplatz Vienna 1.

Dear President:

I am enclosing for your information a very confidential teletype letter of the deputy of the Fuehrer.

Today I submitted the teletype letter to the Reich Leiter who wishes it carried out most swiftly.

With reference to our discussions on this subject I request that you keep me posted on your planned measures. On behalf of the Party I shall take the liberty of submitting proposals to you very shortly. Gebietsfuehrer in the Hitler Youth Major General Pg. (Party member) Kowarik informed me that Vienna had the possibility of getting an Adolf Hitler school which Hamburg is also striving to obtain. The Reich Leiter attaches great importance to Vienna’s being successful especially in this quest. The monastery Klosterneuburg should be considered for the establishment of the Adolf Hitler school because of its size and the propinquity of sport places.

I request that you especially have in mind this individual case. I have asked the Gebietsfuehrer to get in touch with you immediately since according to my knowledge the time is very urgent in this matter.

Heil Hitler! [signed] Scharizer

[Stamp:] National Socialist German Labor Party Gauleitung Vienna

1 enclosure.

1/13/1941 1530 hours

Fuehrer Construction. Reich Leiter M. Bormann to all Gau Leiters.

Strictly Confidential

It has been found that the population does not show indignation if monasteries (convents) are used for what appears to be generally appropriate. A generally suitable use would be a conversion into hospitals, convalescent homes, national political educational institutes or Adolf Hitler schools, etc. Far reaching use should be made of these possibilities.

[signed] Reich Leiter M. Bormann

Document 3927-PS

Monasteries, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 646-648.

Express Letter [Schnellbrief]

Telephone A-17-5-80 4 Morzinplatz Vienna 1. 1/23/1941

Secret State Police (Geheime Staatspolizei) State Police Directorate Vienna Staatspolizeileitstelle Wien

B. No. 517/40 II B 1

Kindly note above File No. and date in reply

To the Reichsstatthalter in Vienna,, Attention Regierung President Dr. Dellbruegge Ballhausplatz Vienna 1.

Subject: Augustinerchorherrnstift Klosterneuburg.

Action: Oral order of 1/23/1941.

Enclosures: 1 fastened.

The Augustinerchorherrnstift Klosterneuburg was founded by Leopold III of Babenberg in 1106 and is considered one of the wealthiest monasteries of the Ostmark. The enlarged monastery building was erected in 1750. It comprised a Romanesque church of the 12th century with an early Gothic Archway and the so-called Verduner altar of 1811, a treasure room containing the hat of the Austrian arch duke, and a library of 120000 Volumes and 2000 manuscripts and incunabula. Worth mentioning are also the gallery of paintings and collection of coins as well as a theological private teaching establishment. The cellar rooms of the monastery with the giant barrel comprising 1000 kegs are widely known.

However, the most valuable property of the monastery may be its large real estate. On 1/1/1937 this real estate was estimated at about 82 million “square meters” outside Vienna and at about 9 million “square meters” in the Vienna city area.

After the World War the monastery leased a part of its real estate especially that in Klosterneuburg and Floridsdorf to small settlers. The contracts were so unsocial that the lessees were forced to pay about five times as much as was customary in such cases in the Alt Reich (the old, former Reich). This state of affairs led finally to an agreement between Gauleiter Buerckel and the monastery to the effect that about 1400 hectares of leased land were handed over to the Party. The revenue from this leased land Gauleiter Buerckel gave to the Fund of the German Mother, ["Fonds der deutschen Mutter"] founded by him. In this connection it is worth mentioning that it was only after lengthy negotiation and after its previous unsocial conduct had been repeatedly pointed out that the monastery seems to have found itself prepared to make this concession.

It is known furthermore that the Chorherrenstift Klosterneuburg owns several properties in Hungary. It is believed that on the property Duna-Almas a great new building was erected in 1938 which contains about 100 rooms and which is said to have been erected at the cost of about 200000 Pengoes. Further known are the landed estate of Neszmely and the meadow land of Sur, Repcze, and Czatar in the district of Vestzprom as well as the meadowland of Nagy Gyon and Meserczer in the district of Stuhlweissenburg. These estates are estimated at a total area of about 15000 Hungarian “Jocks". In connection with the building of the hotel the suspicion of having dealt illicitly with foreign currency was expressed. However, in the opinion of experts, the estates in Hungary yield revenues in such great amounts that such a new construction seems possible with their own means.

As a Catholic stronghold the monastery was closely connected with the past political system. It is known that the present prelate was an intimate friend and political follower of the mayor [Systembuergermeistee] of the city of Vienna, Schmitz. Beyond this, other members of the monastery also appeared in a manner injurious to the state. The repeated convictions of members and employees of the monastery for crimes against nature caused special sensation.

The prelate of the monastery Alipius Josef Linda was denounced by his former valet for his asocial conduct. Linda is also said to have repeatedly called his valet in the charwoman’s presence the most abusive names such as “idiot, fool, liar, bum, blockhead, mule, ape” and similar names. The valet stated further that Linda has a picture of the Fuehrer put up only if an officer of the Party or prominent personalities are expected. Linda is said to have expressed himself toward his valet to the effect that he is well supplied with shoes and undergarments and the war for his part may last another few years.

The member of the monastery Dr. Pius Parsch, born in Neustift near Olmuetz on 18 May 1884, has become known through his so-called folk liturgical church congregation [volksliturgische Kirchengemeinde]. In the rooms of the St. Gertrude chapel which belonged to the monastery he conducted liturgical masses and Bible hours. Parsch and other prebendaries try to use these occasions, since the political change for the purpose of influencing the youth in order to keep them away from the Hitler Youth service.

The prebendary and professor of religion of the monastery Roman Karl Scholz, born in Maerisch-Schoenberg on 1/16/1912 was arrested on 7/22/1940 on grounds of preparing for high treason and brought before the court. The proceedings against him have not as yet been concluded.

Document 3927-PS

Monasteries, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 648-651.

Scholz was the “chief” of the “Freedom Movement Austria” [Freiheitsbewegung Oesterreich] which, together with the “Greater Austrian Freedom Movement” [Gross-Oesterreichische Freiheitsbewegung] and a number of other subversive secret organizations, had as its goal the splitting up of the Greater German Reich. After the defeat of the German Reich in this war which was taken for granted and the ensuing collapse, the separation from the Reich and the reestablishment of a Greater Austrian Reich within the frame work of the former Austrian-Hungarian monarchy was to be brought about. For this purpose an organization was built up which did not deal only with propaganda from mouth to mouth and the distribution of pamphlets and leaflets, but which also concocted plots against vital plants and military objectives. According to his own confession Scholz founded this movement under the title of “German Freedom Movement” [Deutsche Freiheitsbewegung] as early as the fall of 1938. At that time he gathered about himself a circle of like-minded people which was composed particularly of intellectuals and students. He recruited especially people who were known to him from his activity as professor of religion and educator of youth. Furthermore, he conducted Bible classes in the Chorherrenstift Klosterneuburg and influenced the participating persons to his way of thinking; he also repeatedly kept several participants who at the same time were also members of the “Freedom Movement Austria' [Freiheitsbewegung Oesterreich] after these Bible lessons in order to hold discussions with them in the spirit of this movement. Independently from that, Scholz also told members of the movement to come into his apartment located in the monastery in order to discuss with them the projected terroristic acts. In this connection it is to be emphasized that a great part of the persons who belonged to the “Freedom Movement” were former students of the monastery Klosterneuburg.

To the members of the “Freedom Movement Austria” belonged also the private employee Alexander Heribert Ziegler, born in Klosterneuburg on 12/2/1911 who works in the monastery’s administration as an employee. He could further be convicted of having maintained the existence of the Catholic-German fraternity “Arminia” which had been dissolved after the political change ["Umbruch"] and of having promoted the aims of this fraternity by arranging for meetings with other former members.

A concrete proof of the fact that other members or persons of the Chorherrenstift Klosterneuburg also knew about the existence of the “Freedom Movement Austria” or, promoted Scholz' subversive activity and attitude could so far not be furnished. However, it seems almost impossible that these meetings and discussions should not have been noticed. The priest Karl Krajatsch, born in Iglau on 8/8/1902, also a member of the Chorherrnstift in an inn ("Heurigenschenke” i.e. an inn where this year’s wine is to be had) in Tattendorf, made the remark that all National Socialists are fools. He was sentenced to one year in jail ["Kerker"] by the Landgericht in Vienna for a misdemeanor against the law concerning Malice ["Heimtueckegesetz"].

Against the member of the Chorherrenstift, the priest Vinzenz Oskar Ludwig, born in Niederhillersdorf on 18 June 1875, charges for suspicion of forgery of documents were preferred by the Directorate of the Criminal Police of Vienna. Ludwig became known for the fact that he baptized an enormous number of Jews after the political change ["Umbruch"]. He is suspected of having accepted for baptizing up to RM 600.00. It is true that the proceedings were discontinued.

The Chorherrenstift Kloster is particularly known for several cases of crimes against nature which have occurred there in the course of the last 4 years. For instance the sexton Adolf Jungbauer, born in Pressbaum on 2 May 1886, was sentenced to 7 months in the penitentiary ["schwerer Kerker"] for this crime because he committed it against an acolyte of the monastery.

Furthermore, the sexton of the monastery Ludwig Melik, born in Joslowitz on 2/22/1900, who at the same time was Gau Leader of the Reich Association of the Catholic-German Youth of Austria ["Reichsbunder katholisch-deutschen Jugend Oesterreichs"], was sentenced to a year in the penitentiary ["schwerer Kerker"] on 8/1/1938 because he misused members of the Reich Association homosexually in the rooms of the monastery after inducing them to permit his unnatural actions especially by promising them work or a promotion.

The member of the Chorherrenstift Professor Wilhelm Fassl, born in Litzelsdorf on 7/16/1899, was sentenced on 6/20/1938 to 7 months in the penitentiary ["schwerer Kerker"], intensified by a day of fasting in each month in jail, for crimes against nature and for seduction to such crimes. Fassl committed crimes against nature with the monastery sexton Franz Buzek, born in Klosterneuburg on 9/24/1915 who at the same time was sentenced to 2.5 months in prison ["strenger Arrest"] and with two acolytes. On the occasion of the trial before the court of appeals Fassl’s sentence was increased to 18 months in the penitentiary upon the consideration that his guilt was aggravated by the fact that Fassl seduced persons who had hardly passed the youthful age to commit actions against nature and that he had continued his relationship with them for years.

In this connection the branch Klosterneuburg of the Directorate of the Criminal Police of Vienna learned the following:

The two acolytes involved in the case against Fassl were at liberty before the trial. During that time they had a discussion with Kanzlei Director Friedrich and later with Prolate Linda on which occasions they pointed out that more cases of crimes against nature had occurred between them and two other canons. The Kanzlei director and the prelate are said to have declared their willingness to reward the acolytes' reticence with financial support and the promise of giving them employment after their having undergone their term of imprisonment. Actually, the two are said to have received in installments altogether RM 120-130 before the trial. During that time the accused canons were transferred to one of the estates in Hungary. After the two had been brought into safety, the canons discontinued any further payment.

The monastery is also the camouflaged proprietor of the Bernina, the Folk-Liturgical ["Volksliturgischer Verlage"] and the St. Augustinus Publishing Houses ["Verlag"] as well as of the book store “Liturgia".

The publications of these publishing houses were repeatedly confiscated for their subversive contents, especially for glorification of Judaism.

[signature illegible, possibly Huber or Huhn]

The Reichsstatthalter in Vienna

[Editor’s Note: The following statement is handwritten]

(1) Note: According to a consultation with Oberregierungsrat Dr. Kreis (Z. R.) title of the agency to be used is “The Reichsstatthalter in Vienna-Municipal Administration", not “Reichsgau Vienna-Municipal Administration” because the municipality of Vienna in its function as authority is concerned.

I,2 Ballhausplatz. 2/22/1941

Document 3927-PS

Monasteries, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 651-652.

I a RV-6009-127/41

(2) To the Augustiner Chorherrenstift Klosterneuburg Attention: Abbot Alipius Josef Linda Klosterneuburg.

Subject: Taking over in accordance with the Law of Housing Public Offices.

On the basis of the Law of Housing Public Offices, Gesetzblatt for the State of Austria, No. 2781938 the monastery Klosterneuburg belonging to the Augustiner Chorherrenstift Klosterneuberg, is taken over for the purpose of establishing and housing an Adolf Hitler school and assigned to the Reichsstatthalter in Vienna--Municipal Administration-without a stipulated time period.

Subject to the taking over are the monastery building plus secondary buildings with all rooms located in these buildings, all the furniture constituting the accessories of the monastery, the court-yards and garden grounds in so far as they are situated in the former municipal district of Klosterneuburg and are directly; locally, connected with the monastery.

Exempted from being taken over are only the rooms serving purely ecclesiastical purposes; other rooms and real estate which at the time this Order is delivered are rented or leased, in so far as they are not needed for housing the Adolf Hitler school. The buildings and parts of buildings are to be handed over within 14 days after this Order is delivered.

As compensation for the usage the Reichsstatthalter of Vienna--Municipal Administration-must bear the cost accruing from maintenance and operating of the confiscated buildings and parts of building, and the taxes and assessments for same.

The buildings and parts of buildings taken over are not sufficiently used and are not needed for the monastery’s tasks as regards worship and administration. A fraction of the presently occupied rooms will be found to be sufficient for these purposes and the monastery can easily get the needed rooms in the houses and buildings remaining to it.

On the other hand, there exists an urgent need for taking over the demanded real estate for the establishment of an Adolf Hitler school which at present cannot be housed more favorably.

The fixed compensation appears adequate.


An appeal to the Reichsminister of the Interior against this Order is admissible and must be submitted to me in writing within 2 weeks after delivery of this Order and which must ofer reasons for the appeal. Insofar as it is directed against the assignment of real estate, the appeal has no postponing effect.

Title: “Document 3930-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 653-654.

[stamp:] Copy 9/10/1942

[stamp:] Teletype message Reich Governor in Vienna Received 9/10/1942 23.07 by Hi.

“Eherverlag” Berlin To the Reich Governor in Vienna. No 2322 9/10/1942 11 23.07

The Reich Governor in Vienna

For the editorial staff of the “Schwarzes Korps” [Black Corps] we are transmitting to you the following article of Gebietsfuehrer Kaufman, which we already transmitted tonight by telephone.


A high-ranking officer recently arrived in Berlin from Sevastopol and declared openly: “Gentlemen, this fortress was overpowered by 19-year-old soldiers, the very same we saw 4 years ago in short pants, marching through our cities with the song on their lips: `Yes, the flag is more than death'".

That statement of an old soldier means: The entire weight of this war lies on the shoulders of youth. Lads are fulfilling in fighting what boys promised in their singing. The National Socialist Movement has brought up a young generation, filling them with faith and self-denial, with endurance and fire, so that the signs of victory cannot slip from our hands.

And Aunt Emma fell silent. She has heard how dreadfully the Bolshevists have brought up their youth, so that out of 10 children 2 or even 3 died from dirt and disease, while the remaining seven became tough weather-beaten fellows who can withstand hunger and cold, can move like wildcats in the open and shoot like devils. Aunt Emma is also of the opinion that it was unwise when in 1938 her Karl did not return home from the Hitler Youth service until 11:00 at night or when some too keen and a “much too young” leader made a night march with his enthusiastic tots.

Again and again do we now hear from the very same countrymen of ours, who before the war kept calling up the authorities and imploring them to free their young son from service, because it was too hard for himthat it was a mistake not to have brought up our youth in a still harder and more Spartan way in peacetime. Just as the same spirits who formerly rejected the principle of youth being led by youth because of too early a development of self-assertion, doubtfully shaking their heads over 16-year-old platoon leaders ["Faehnlein Fuehrers"] today praise the prudence and maturity of the youngest lieutenants or are full of admiration for the lads who under a shower of bombs during British air raids are giving valuable aid at the risk of their young lives.

Document 3931-PS

Premilitary Training, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 654-657.

Teletype No. 85

Forwarded to Obergebietsfuehrer Schluender on 8/15/1941 2035 by Hi

Sender: Adjutant’s office

Received on 8/15/1941 at 2030 by Hi Reichsstatthalter Vienna No. 85 8/15/1941 2035

To Obergebietsfuehrer Schluender, Berlin

The following note was sent today:

To the Chief of the Chancellery of the Party Reich Leader Bormann-Munich 33, Fuehrer Building.

Dear Party Member Bormann,

I have taken note of the treatise of the SA high command which was sent to me. In connection with this I want to inform you of the following:

The attitude expressed in Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner’s statement is in its contents so contradictory to the actual educational work of the Hitler Youth, that I cannot believe that this is the opinion of the SA Chief of Staff, but rather am convinced that its point of origin is Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner’s wish to create new forms of activity in the SA. Since the treatise is drawn up in such detail, I am going into this matter fundamentally first of all.

Presumably the Chief of Staff of the SA can “no longer see the development of the education of youth in the interest of the common idea within the Party remain inactive and in the premilitary defense training he especially misses the manly and soldierly performance by the young man".

To this the following:

Concerning the position of the youth in relation to the Party I do not in the least feel induced to assert with regard to the Chief of Staff of the SA that for years the Party continuously has thrown difficulties in his way and he has finally been obliged to seek recourse with the Army in order to obtain there a new proposition which had not been made by the SA. (Report by the Chief of Staff to the Reich Youth Leader.) You personally know, dear Party member Bormann, that unfortunately the Chief of Staff has acted in the spirit of this assertion and that some other Party organizations as well as the Party itself were one day surprised to hear of the assignment of the SA to military training by decree of the Fuehrer. The then Fuehrer’s deputy and his staff tried then to do justice to this Fuehrer decree and to fix the limits of the sphere of activity of the organizations. This is approved in the note, as the SS, NS Motor Corps and NS Flying Corps are cited as completely independent agencies for military training, the youth however purposely not so. I find the reason for this outrageous, which states that the SA cannot effect any advanced military training during the war and therefore would have to direct its work on the age groups of the Hitler Youth. I defend myself against the reproach because of lack of a community of thought within the Party, in so far as this concerns my task as Reich Director for the education of Youth, and can only cite the following example for the execution of the aforementioned assignment of the SA: All the financing of the SA military training is being done in direct collaboration with the armed forces, while the Hitler Youth has considered it necessary from the very beginning to make the Party itself the agency for the direction and administration of its military training. Moreover I must add to my fundamental viewpoint that I consider the whole attack of the SA extraordinarily indecent at the present time, since more than 90% of all Hitler Youth leaders are in the field at the present time and the whole thought which is expressed in Juettner’s communication is nothing else but fear of their returning, to work and to the further assignment of work still to be carried out by the Hitler Youth in this field. I am not going to accept any comment from Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner on the idea “Youth Shall be led by Youth", as the Fuehrer spoke these words during the period of struggle after thoughts on education, which were already brought to fulfillment at that time and apparently have not as yet been understood by Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner to this day.

1. For more than one year an agreement in draft form has been submitted to the SA, which requests that SA-cadre be furnished for the military training of the Youth. The top SA leadership did in no case comply with this request of the Hitler Youth.

2. In a discussion between the Reich Youth Leader and the Chief of Staff the latter has recognized the military training of the Hitler Youth up to the 18 year without reservations and expressed the wish to make the Achievement Badge [Leistungsabzeichen] of the Hitler Youth similar to the Military Badge [Wehrabzeichen] of the SA. Since early July of this year this draft of the Reich Youth Direction to change the Hitler Youth Achievement Badge [Hitlerjugend-Leistungsabzeichen] has been laid before Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner, transmitted through the Chief of the Main Office Room 2 of the Reich Youth Direction [Reichsjugendfuehrung], without an opinion having been expressed in this matter.

3. Concerning the guiding principles about the organization and work of the Communications Hitler Youth [Nachrichten-Hitlerjugend] which have been cited in the previously-mentioned communication:

From a departmental point of view, I can only gather the impression from this communication of a complete ignorance in this field on the part of Obergruppenfuehrer JUETTNER. (1) Because the SA mentions a two-week radiocourse for the radio diploma [Funkernachweis] of the Air Force, which it wants to have conducted. These bold assertions are not burdened with any knowledge of the facts. Stabsfuehrer MOECKEL explains to me in this respect that in the beginning of the past year the Reich Marshal wanted courses for flying-crew radio operator replacements to be instituted within the Hitler Youth. This was immediately done in collaboration with the National Socialist Flying Corp (NSFK). AFTER 8 MONTHS 17.000 RADIO OPERATOR CANDIDATES have been furnished to the air force with the ability to receive and send at the speed of 60 words per minute. The Air Force has built communication equipment to amounts running into the millions, and further, Stabsfuehrer MOECKEL tells me in this respect that this communication training could only be given in the Air Force because aviation facilities could be found only there. He himself had taken radio training with the Air Force for 10 months, and considers the alleged two-week training course as completely impossible. That the order of the Reich Marshal for the Hitler Youth also still applies today is proven by the 20000 youths who are undergoing training this year, and who are performing their duty with the National Socialist Flying Corps (NSFK) and the Air Force in training courses.

(2) It can refute the report, that the General Commands [Generalkommandos] have looked to the SA for aid in securing premilitary training by the enclosed statistics on military training according to the compilation of 4/1/1941 and through additions from 8/1/1941 on. However, I consider it unnecessary to transmit copies of letters in additional enclosures of acknowledgment and declarations of the individual authorities of the armed forces with regard to the pre-military training of the Hitler Youth or to submit a list of the Hitler Youth leaders engaged in the military service holding the Knight’s Cross or the Iron Cross First Class. I consider this as unworthy toward the victims in leaders and men which naturally must be sacrificed by the individual units in this war; it furthermore shows a lack of taste.

Document 3931-PS

Premilitary Training, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 657-658.

(3) In order to make further corrections I can emphasize that, as you yourself have been informed through a communication of Stabsfuehrer Moeckel on 7/30/1941, arrangements with the armed forces could be made for the future to the effect that training courses of the Hitler Youth in future will only take place in Hitler Youth operated schools and only in exceptional cases in army barracks [Kasernen] for the training of cadre. The cadre which is furnished there comes for the most part from the Hitler Youth. If cadre are placed on detached service from the armed forces, then they are for the most part conscripted Hitler Youth leaders, or in any case they fall under the authority of a Hitler Youth leader who is in charge of the school. I would be happy if the SA would put personnel at my disposal for support for this purpose, similar to the way in which the SS and the police have been doing for a long time already.

I must state in conclusion:

Now that the overlapping provisions of the Hitler Youth law have once again been purposely brought up by the SA, and as a matter of fact the disloyalty of the Chief of Staff which was doubtlessly present at the time becomes obvious again in the presentation of the draft of the decree, all the consequences now have to be drawn. After the present attack of the SA on a part of the work of the Hitler Youth at this time, I do not even think of yielding to the falsely-based arguments of the SA, but rather request now, no matter how much I regret this, that the Fuehrer’s decision be obtained. For this purpose a joint consultation with the Fuehrer would be necessary. I will at the same time contact the Reich Fuehrer SS, for whom in any case the same conditions exist in this question-which however were interpreted as being in complete agreement with the Hitler Youth. If the Chief of Staff should assume the same attitude transmitted by Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner, I regret not being able to effect any cooperation with him in this field.

Heil Hitler! yours

[signed] SCHIRACH

Transmitted: Reichsstatthalter Vienna/ Hirsche

Accepted:-? 21,55 Reich Youth Leader Berlin-Hass

Document 3933-PS

Decree Of The Fuehrer On The War Commitment Of German Youth [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 658-659.

Reich Youth Leadership Berlin Teletype message No. 1516, 3/30/1942 12:25

The Reich Youth Leader to Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach, Vienna.

Below I am transmitting to you the draft of the Fuehrer decree regarding the war commitment of German youth, in respect to which a basic agreement could be reached with the supreme Reich authorities concerned, primarily with the Reich Minister for Science and Education, I request your concurrence.

This draft is going now to the Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery, who will officially request the approval of the supreme Reich authorities concerned and who will then present the decree together with Reichleiter Bormann to the Fuehrer for signature.

Heil Hitler [signed] Axmann

Postscript for teletype office: This teletype message very urgent-please present at once.

From: Reichs youth leadership, Berlin/Kleist.

Transmitted: rjf Berlin/Kleist

Received: 12.30 Reich Governor in Vienna/Hirsche.

1. For the sake of uniform direction of the tasks arising in ever-increasing degree for German youth in the framework of war commitment, I am delegating the direction of the war commitment of German youth to Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach.

2. The leader of the war commitment of German youth has to take all necessary steps in order to insure its greatest possible efficiency. For this purpose he has to coordinate the different commitment tasks, particularly those of school and Hitler Youth.

The differentiation of the war commitment of German youth from other lines of duty is carried out in agreement with the supreme Reich authorities concerned, who have to take the necessary measures in their field to further the war commitment.

The commitment of school boys and school girls takes place according to the directives issued by the leader of war commitment together with the Reich Minister of Education.

The Reich Minister of Education in agreement with the leader of war commitment regulates the educational care of youth during commitment.

3. Commitment of Hitler Youth is carried out by the Reich Youth Leader.

4. The financing of the war commitment is regulated by the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP.

5. Orders necessary for execution and general administrative regulations are issued by the leader of the war commitment in agreement with the Head of the Party Chancellery and the supreme Reich authorities concerned.

The Fuehrer’s Headquarters, the…

Transmitted: rjf Berlin/Kleist

Received: 12:40 Reich Governor in Vienna/Hirsche

Document 3936-PS

Schachts Views of Göring [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 659-660.

[Source: Second preliminary report on SCHACHT by Major Tilley of FIAT, based upon notes written for him by SCHACHT.]


“HITLER I called an amoral type but GÖRING I can only regard as immoral and criminal. By nature endowed with a certain bonhomie which he managed to exploit for his popularity, he was the most egocentric being imaginable. The assumption of political power (Note: by the Nazis in 1933) was for him only a means for personal enrichment and personal good living. The success of others filled him with envy. His greed knew no bounds. His predilection for jewels, gold and finery was unimaginable. He knew no comradeship. Only so long as someone was useful to him he was friends with him, but only on the surface.

“GÖRING’s knowledge in all fields equalled 0 [zero], especially in the economic field. Of all the economic matters which HITLER entrusted to him in the autumn of 1936 he had not the faintest notion [nicht den leisesten Schimmer] though he created an immense official apparatus and misused his powers as lord of all economy most outrageously. In his personal appearance he was so theatrical that you could only compare him with Nero. A lady who had tea with his second wife reported that he appeared at this tea in a sort of Roman toga and sandals studded with jewels, his fingers bedecked with innumerable jewelled rings and generally covered with ornaments, his face painted and his lips rouged.

“GÖRING had no influence whatever on HITLER. He was terribly afraid of HITLER and carried on permanently intrigues against all big-shots [Bonzen] who could have belittled him or ousted him from the Fuehrer’s favor. On one occasion, when I had persuaded him to report certain matters to HITLER, he told me that he would do that, but that, every time he was in HITLER’s presence his heart went to his boots [the original German expression, in fact, is much cruder, viz. dass ihm … jedesmal das Herz in die Hosen fiele].”

Document 3943-PS

Reports from the Occupied Eastern Territories No. 1, Part 01 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp.

Berlin, 5/1/1942 [Rubber Stamp:]

Chief of Security Police and SD Executive Staff [Kommandostab] The Reich Defense Commissioner for Military District XVII

Recd. 5/27/1942 Z-RV-K 1320/C/471/42 g.

To be filed 17-6-42 [Initials]

Instead of the “Reports about the activity and status of the operation group of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR", which so far were delivered monthly, there are now appearing weekly the “Reports from the occupied Eastern territories.”

Berlin, 5/22/1942 [Rubber stamp]

Secret [Rubber stamp]

Chief of Security Police and SD Executive Staff [Kommandostab] The Reich Defense Commissioner for Military District XVII

Recd. 5/27/1942 Z-RV-K 1320/C/474/42g

Reports from the occupied Eastern territories No. 4

To be filed 17-6-42 [initials]

When making inquiries, please refer to the above number of the report.

[page 5, line 31 to page 6 complete]

The Jews in the Crimea.

The first Jewish settlements in the Crimea worth mentioning date back to the end of the 18th Century when the Crimea, with the exception of Sevastopol and the Imperial summer residence Yalta, was assigned to the Jews as a zone for settlement.

At the same time when Judaism was trying to create for itself in the Asiatic part of Russia the Jewish autonomous territory of “Birodshan” the attempt was made, with the strong financial support of American Jewish organizations, to create a rather closed settlement area for the Jews also in the European part of the USSR, in the Crimea. It is characteristic of the general influence which the Jews exercised in the USSR already at that time, that the so-called “Kosed", a subdivision of the NKVD, specially created by the Reds as control organization, was completely dominated by the Jews within a short time. The settling of the Jews in the Crimea, which took place chiefly at the time when collectivation (1928) was increasing, was done almost entirely at the expense of the German nationals and Tartars. In the western and central parts of the Steppe, whole German villages had to be evacuated and surrendered to the Jews. However, just as in “Birodshan” the attempt to turn Jews into farmers failed also in the Crimea.

Already in 1939, out of the 65000 Jews in the Crimea, 44000 (that is almost 70%) lived in the cities of Simferopol, Sevastopol, Kertsch, Jewpatoria, Yalta, and Feodosia alone. In the country, they worked chiefly as administrators of large stocks and supply depots, where they carried on their usurious trade by buying and selling scarce goods as well as consumer goods.

All vital spheres in the Crimea were soon completely dominated by the Jews living in the cities. Even if in some instances the chairmen of the individual commissariats themselves were not Jewish, then their deputies or the first secretaries were Jews.

Of the Krimtschaks (approximately 6000) who were generally counted to the Jews, about half lived for the greater part in Simferopol (2500) and in Karasubarsar. Their annihilation together with that of the real Jews and the gypsies in the Crimea took place essentially until the beginning of 12/1941.

The fact that the Krimtschaks and the gypsies shared the fate of the Jew did not particularly excite the population.

Document 3943-PS

Reports from the Occupied Eastern Territories No. 1, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 662-664.

Berlin, 6/5/1942 [Rubber Stamp:] Secret! [Rubber Stamp:]

Chief of the Security Police and SD Executive Staff [Kommandostab] The Reich Defense Commissioner for Military District XVII

Recd. 6/0/1942 Z-RV-K 1320 C--499/42g.

Reports from the occupied Eastern territories No. 6

When making inquiries please refer to the above number of the report.

To be filed 6/17/1942 [Initials]

[Page 7, lines 1 to 15 incl.]

The Jews in Estonia.

As Estonia in the Czarist Russia was closed to Jewish immigration till about the middle of the last century, the Jewish people with only 0.38% (4,500) remained there numerically unimportant.

Nevertheless their influence in all spheres of life was far stronger. Above all, through their connection with NKVD, the Jews knew how to create for themselves a strong position within the Estonian life.

At the entry of the German troops, the majority of the Jews left Estonia. Only about 2000 Jews remained there of whom about half lived in Reval. Through the Security Police and SD, the Jews were seized by and by, avoiding all unnecessary trouble in the economic life of Estonia.

Today there are no more Jews in Estonia.

Berlin, 6/12/1942 [Rubber Stamp:]

Secret! [Rubber Stamp:]

Chief of the Security Police and SD Executive Staff [Kommandostab] The Reich Defense Commissioner for Military District XVII

Recd. 6/16/1942 Z-RV-K 1320C-525/42g

Reports from the occupied Eastern territories No. 7

To be filed 6/17/1942 [initials]

When making inquiries please refer to the above number of the report.

[Page 4, line 24 to page 5 complete]

The Jews in Latvia

The number of the Jews in Latvia in 1935 was 93479--4.79% of the entire population. While before 1940, the year of Latvia’s occupation by the Soviet Union no Jews were employed in the Latvian Civil Administration, all influential positions were in their hands soon afterwards. For example, about 50% of all judges were Jews. In the higher judicial instances, particularly in the courts the share of the Jews even mounted to 80%. Similar conditions prevailed in the economic and cultural life.

After the entry of the German troops into Latvia there were still about 70000 Jews, while the others had fled with the retreating Bolshevist armies.

The acts of sabotage and arson which occurred in Latvia shortly after the entry of the German troops were caused or committed to the greatest extent by Jews.

For example, in Dunaburg so many fires were laid by Jews that a large part of the town was destroyed thereby. The removal of 33038 Latvians is also to be attributed to Jewish influence. At the present time there are only a few Jews in the ghettos who are doing specialized work.

Document 3943-PS

Reports from the Occupied Eastern Territories No. 1, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 664-665.

The figures are as follows: In Riga about 2500, Dunaburg about 950, Libau about 300

Aside from these Jews, Latvia has become free of Jews in the meantime.

Berlin, 6/26/1942. [Rubber Stamp:]

Secret! [Rubber Stamp:]

Chief of the Security Police and SD Executive staff [Kommandostab] The Reich Defense Commissioner for Military District XVII

Recd. 6/30/1942 Z-RV-K 1320/C/552/42g

Reports from the occupied Eastern territories No. 9

To be filed 7/1/1942 [initials]

When making inquires please refer to the above number of the report.

[Page 7, line 11 to page 8, line 16 incl.]

The Jews in White Ruthenia

The White Ruthenian area has always been the most densely populated by Jews of all areas of the Eastern territory. According to a census taken in 1926 more than 400000 Jews lived in what was then the White Ruthenian Socialist Soviet Republic (RSSR). In the Western territories belonging to the former Poland which are also populated mainly by White Ruthenians more than 500,000 Jews were living there according to a census last taken in 1931. Experience shows that the Jews, when censuses were taken, for reasons of camouflage only partly acknowledged to be Jews, and therefore the figures given embrace only a part of the Jews actually living in the White Ruthenian settlement area, so that their total number in reality is far higher.

At the outbreak of the war, more than half of the Jews in White Ruthenia lived in the larger cities, above all in Minsk, where out of 238,000 inhabitants 100,000-120,000 were Jews. Although the great majority of the White Ruthenian Jews were impecunious, they still had exercised for a long time a great influence in all spheres of life, in the former Polish area as well as in the originally Soviet Russian area. At the same time, the influence of the Jews in the former Polish territory was due mainly to their very strong economic positions. While in the Soviet Russian part of White Ruthenia they had their powerful positions in the state apparatus, and above all in the Communist party, especially in its real centers of power, the Central Committee and the Politbureaus.

The measures taken by the Security Police and SD have caused basic changes also in White Ruthenia in regard to the Jewish question. In order to bring the Jews under an effective control, independent of the measures to be taken later, Jewish Councils of Elders were formed, who were responsible to the Security Police and the SD for the behavior of their racial comrades. Besides, the registration of the Jews was initiated and they were concentrated in ghettos. Finally the Jews had to wear yellow insignia in front and on their back to be recognized, in the manner of the Jewish star introduced in the territory of the Reich. In order to utilize Jewish labor fully the Jews were generally used for uniform employment and for clearing up operations.

With these measures the foundation was laid for the later intended final solution of the European Jewish problem, for the White Ruthenian territory as well.

[stamp] Z-RV-K Berlin, 1/22/1943

The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service, Command Staff

[stamp] Secret!

Reports from the occupied Eastern territories No. 38

Only for personal information.

[stamp] The Reich Defense Commissioner for the Reich Gau Vienna

Received 1/26/1943 Z-RV-K 1320/2/61/43 secret

In inquiries please refer to above number.

[Illegible handwritten pencil notation.]

Document 3943-PS

Reports from the Occupied Eastern Territories No. 1, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 666-668.

[Page 2, line 23 to Page 3, 21]

In the last few weeks altogether four large scale drives were started in the White Ruthenian territory, with utilization of active SS or Police regiments. The reconnaissance for these drives was carried out by commando units of the Security Police and of the Security Service:

1. Operation Munich [ “Muenchen” ] in the territory North of RADOSCHKOWITSCHI. The guerrillas had a total of 63 dead during the battle; 6 prisoners could be taken. There were no losses on our side. The booty in cattle, grain, food, weapons, and ammunition was considerable. Altogether 14 camps of the guerrillas were destroyed.

Booty: 1 mortar, 15 light machine guns, 295 rifles, 5 machine pistols, 9 pistols, 1 automatic rifle, 141 hand grenades, 46000 rounds infantry ammunition, 78 kilograms of explosives, 2 telescopes, 1 compass, 274 sledges, 265 hides, 10 cw linseed, 10 cw hemp, 265 cubic meters wood

in addition large amounts of hay and straw. One camp as well as 18 shelters were destroyed. 1,308 persons were seized for labor mobilization in the Reich. The following were secured: 395 horses, 2803 head of cattle, 572 pigs, 1560 sheep, 459 tons of corn

Our own losses: 6 dead, 17 wounded. 4 members of the Security Police received the Iron Cross second class [EK. 2] for outstanding service.

Berlin, 2/12/1943

The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service Command Staff

[stamp] The Reich Defense Commissioner for the Reich Gau Vienna

Received on 2/27/1943 Z-RV-K 1320/2/188/43/secret

[stamp:] Secret!

Reports from the occupied Eastern territories No. 41

Only for personal information

[illegible pencil notations.]

In inquiries please refer to the above number!

[Page 3, line 2 to line 33]

Fighting against guerillas in the sphere of the commandants of the Security Police and of the Security Service in White Ruthenia. Concerning the operation “Harvest Thanksgiving I” [Erntefest I"] the following final report is at hand: Operation “Harvest Thanksgiving I” West of TSCHERWEN--OSSIPOWITSCHI--on point of juncture rear army area and White Ruthenia finished. Own forces utilized: 11 Police and Protective Battalions [Schutzmannschaftsbataillone] and 3 Security Service commando units.

Total result: 805 or armed enemy killed, of whom 2 were officers and 2 commissioners. 1,165 persons received special treatment, because they took sides with the guerrillas, 34 prisoners were brought in.

2. Operation Nurnberg East of Lake BONIN. The guerrillas lost 168 dead during the battle. Our own losses: 1 dead and 1 wounded. Here, too, the booty in equipment and food supplies was great.

3. Operation Hamburg in the territory of SLONIM. This was the greatest success until now in the White Ruthenian territory. The information of the reconnaissance units of the Security Police and of the Security Service was so exact that every camp was found. In numerous battles 1,676 bandits were killed. Furthermore, 1,510 persons suspected of belonging to the guerrillas [bandenverdaechtig] were shot. Among the very great booty there were 4 tanks and 8 guns, or antitank guns. The amount of cattle and grain is almost inestimable. Furthermore, in the communities which were within the territory of the drive 2,658 Jews as well as 30 gypsies were taken [wurden gestellt]. Our own losses: 7 dead and 18 wounded.

4. Operation Altona in the territory KOSSOW-BYTEN. This drive was aimed at a larger group of guerrillas which had broken through to the South during the operation Hamburg. The reconnaissance was carried out by the commando units of the Security Police during the period of the operation. The guerrilla band lost 97 dead in battle. Furthermore, in this area 785 persons suspected of belonging to a band [bandenverdachtig] were shot and 126 Jews and 24 gypsies were taken [wuden gestellt]. The booty in cattle and food was considerable, and in weapons and ammunition not very great. There were no losses on our side.

Berlin, 3/19/1943

The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service, Command Staff

[stamp] The Reich Defense Commissioner for the Reich Gau Vienna

Received on 3/23/1943 Z-RV-K 262/43 secret 1320/2

Document 3943-PS

Reports from the Occupied Eastern Territories No. 1, Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 668-670.

[stamp] secret

[stamp:] 3/24/1943

[illegible pencil notations]

Reports from the occupied Eastern territories No. 46

Only for personal information.

In inquiries please refer to the above number.

[Page 1, line 22 to Page 2, line 8]

Guerrilla activity in the sphere of the commandant of the Security Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia

During the period from 2/8-26/1943 the operation “Hornung” was carried out in the PRIPJET-Swamps in the area of

Chief of the Security Police and of the SD [Security Service] Executive Staff [Red pencil]: ZKV.

Berlin, 4/9/1943 [Rubber Stamp]

Secret! [Rubber Stamp]

The Reich Defense Commissioner for the Reichsgau Vienna

Received on 4/15/1943 Z-RV-K 333/43 (D) 1300/2

Reports from the Occupied Eastern Territories No. 49

For personal information only.

To be filed [Initials in pencil]

When making inquiries please refer to above number of report.

Guerrilla Activity in the Command Area of Latvia in 2/1943

By the end of 1/1943, guerrilla activity in the eastern border areas of Latvia-Lettgallen had increased to such an extent that many inhabitants left their property and moved into the interior.

Only when the large scale operation which was prepared under the leadership of SS Obergruppenfuehrer JECKELN went under way in the middle of February, the guerrilla raids diminished.

Among others, commandos of the security police, several battalions of the Latvian police force, one Ukrainian police force battalion, motorized rural police, an antiaircraft combat troop, and several planes took part in the Operation “Winterzaber". By the beginning of March, the area Lipovka-Rosica-Muschina-Schamborovo-Bigosovo and Ustje was cleared of guerrillas and a dead zone 15 kilometers wide had been created at the Russian border.

Up to that time our own losses amount to: Police Force: 4 killed, 1 seriously wounded, 4 slightly wounded, 2 missing. Security Battalion: 3 killed, 1 wounded. Losses of the enemy: 137 guerrillas killed in battle, 1807 guerrillas and their helpers were shot, 51 guerrillas were taken prisoner, more than 2000 persons whose participation in the activity of the guerrillas could not be established were evacuated from the captured villages and were taken to Camp Salaspils near Riga.

Booty: 527 heads of livestock as well as 55 horses were captured. The booty in arms consists among others of 2 antitank guns, machine guns, rifles, several cases of machine gun and rifle ammunition, 207 hand grenades, and 1 dump of explosives. Three ammunition dumps were blown up, and 83 villages held by the guerrillas were burned down.

Title: “Document 3945-PS, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 672.

[ITEM 1]

[This page represents file-cover.]

[Stamp] The President of the Secret Cabinet Council.


Berlin W 8, Vossstrasse 6, 8/28/1939

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery Rk. 22766 B

To: The President of the Secret Cabinet Council, Berlin, w 8, Vossstrasse 6

In reply to letter of 8/9/1939, without G. No.

In conformity with your request, I have had the sum of RM 10000, which had been placed at your disposal for special expenses in connection with the obtaining of diplomatic information, handed to Amtsrat Koeppen.

I enclose the draft of a certificate showing how the money was used, with the request to send me the certificate after execution at the latest by the end of the financial year.

[signed] Dr. Lammers

[Note in pencil at foot of the original letter]

The certificate of use was executed on 3/31/1940 and forwarded to the Reich Chancellery on 4/2/1940.

[initialled] K.

Re. Rk. 2 2766 B.

Certificate of use 10000.00 RM

I have received “Ten thousand Reichsmarks” from the Reich Chancellery for special outlay entailed in obtaining diplomatic information. In conformity with my duty, I hereby affirm that I have used the above mentioned sum for the purpose stated. Receipts from the persons who received individual sums could not be demanded.

Berlin, 3/31/1940.

[signed] Neurath.

Title: “Document 3945-PS, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 673-674.

[Item 4]

Berlin, 4/2/1940.

In reply to your letter of 8/28/1939-Rk. 2 2766 B-, I beg to enclose herewith the duly executed Certificate of use.

On behalf of [signed] Koeppen.

To: The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Berlin.

[Note in pencil at foot] from Dept. 1-2/4 K.

Berlin, 5/31/1943

Highly esteemed Herr Reich Minister

I beg to inform your Excellency that the private means of the office till will soon be exhausted. The amount of 10000 RM paid in on 5/9/1941 will be used up with the payments to be made in the month of June.

Your Excellency, With thanks, I remain, Yours faithfully, [signed] Koeppen

Berlin, 6/30/1943.

In my bureau there is a need to incur special expenses, to audit which it does not appear to me advisable. As I am no longer being allotted special means to be at my disposal, I shall be obliged if you will place the sum of 10000 RM at my disposal for the purposes indicated.

[signed] Freiherr von Neurath.

To: The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, Berlin.

Berlin W. 8., Vossstrasse 6, 7/11/1943.

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery [Stamp] Now at Field quarters. All mail, without exception to be sent to Berlin address.

[ Stamp] The President of the Secret Cabinet Council, recd. 7/15/1943.

To: The President of the Secret Cabinet Council, Berlin, w. 8.

Re. letter of 6/30/1943.

In accordance with your request, I place at your disposal the sum of 10000.00 RM out of the Fuehrer’s disposal funds which I administer and which are for the purpose of meeting special outlays, the auditing of which does not appear to be advisable. I will have this amount transferred to Amtsrat Koeppen.

As the presenting of a detailed statement of the expenses paid out, for the purposes of auditing accounts, might be impracticable, I request you to return to me the attached Certificate of Use as soon as these means have been disposed of.

[signed] Dr. Lammers.

Title: “Document 3945-PS, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 674-675.

[ITEM 8]

Certificate of use 10000.00 RM

I have received “Ten thousand Reichsmarks” from the Reich Chancellery for special expenses, the auditing of which does not appear to be advisable. In accordance with my duty, I hereby certify that I have used the above named amount for the purposes stated.

Berlin, [no date, no signature]

Berlin, 7/14/1943

Highly-esteemed Herr Reich Minister,

When I went into the matter of the Private Fund, the competent people in the Reich Chancellery showed an entirely understanding attitude to this matter, and asked for a written application from Your Excellency. When I replied that I did not wish to bring about such an application before success was announced, they asked for a little longer for a further exchange of views. After a few days I received an intimation that I could bring about the application without hesitation, upon which I handed over the letter which I had previously withheld. The amount requested has been handed to me today and I have duly entered this sum in my special cashbook as a Credit.

I am, Your Excellency, always Yours faithfully, [initialled] K.

Document 3947-PS

Utilization Of Jewels And So Forth, Which Were Acquired By Official Agencies In Favor Of The Reich [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 675-676.

Berlin, 3/31/1944.

According to the oral confidential agreement between vice president Mr. Puhl and the chief of one of Berlin’s public offices, the Reichsbank took over the selling of local and foreign currencies, gold and silver coins, precious metals, securities, jewels, watches, diamonds, and other precious objects. All incoming objects will be processed under the code name “MELMER".

The large number of precious objects acquired hereby have been turned over to the Municipal Pawn Shop, Div. III Main Office Berlin N 4, Elsaesser Str. 74, for the best possible utilization after checking the number of pieces and their weight, provided they have not been smelted. As it is evident from the enclosed copy of a letter from the Pawn Shop, dated 3/29/1944., it refuses further acceptance of such items and declines to process items already in their possession, whose processing has not yet been completed.

We have been informed that the City Treasurer, to whom the Zentralstelle as a municipal office is subordinated, wants to use its personnel in the office for war damages.

The question of a uniform utilization of the precious objects is important not only because the Reichsbank should be given the opportunity to sell unprocessed jewels, etc., from the Melmer delivery the same way as it did before, and not only because its equivalent belongs to the Reich, but also due to the following reasons:

So far the Pawn Shop made the purchases according to the world-wide gross prices minus 10% for purchasing charges. In case the price obtained in the final disposition was a higher one, this surplus went to the benefit of the Reich. Through sales to foreign countries, a considerable amount of foreign currency must have been acquired. A large number of goods ready for export are still in possession of the Pawn Shop. Among others, diamonds of 35000 carats and very small diamonds (roses) of a very high value.

The Reichsmarshall of the Greater German Reich, the deputy for the Four Year Plan, informed the German Reichsbank, in a letter of 19.3.44., a copy of which is enclosed, that considerable amounts of gold and silver objects, jewels, and so forth, at the Main Office of the Board of Trustees East should be delivered to the Reichsbank according to the order issued by Minister of the Reich, Funk and Graf Schwerin Krosigk. The utilization of these objects should be accomplished in the same way as the Melmer deliveries. The Reichsmarshall informed us also about the utilization of objects of the same kind, which have been acquired in the occupied Western territories. We do not know to which office these objects have been delivered and how they are utilized.

We received a further inquiry about the utilization of jewels a.s.f. from the Reichsbank in Kattowitz (compare with enclosed copy) .

Besides the above-mentioned cases, where the Reichsbank is, or will be, indirectly participating in selling of jewels, there is yet to clear the question of utilization of jewels a.s.f. which have been acquired as war booty. As far as we know, the entire war booty consisting of jewels a.s.f. is in the safes of the Reichshauptkasse. Probably there are objects and items still fit for export which after smelting can give us gold and silver. The official in charge of it is Ministerialrat Dr. Maede, as attorney-in fact-from the Reich Ministry of Finance in Sigmeringen.

In our opinion it is absolutely essential that a uniformed utilization be established of goods acquired by official agencies. The simplest solution would be to separate the pawn institution, which has the necessary skilled personnel and the connections necessary for sale abroad from the Municipal authorities for this war job. Should this be impossible, another appropriate agency should be appointed for this work.

Considering the large amount of incoming foreign currency as a result of the sale of these objects in foreign countries and the considerable acquisition of gold and silver not fit for export from smelting, the immediate uniform settlement of this problem seems to be very advisable.

Hauptkasse [signed] KROPP

Title: “Document 3948-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 677-678.


To the Municipal Pawn Brokerage Div. III-Central Office Berlin N 4, Elsaesser St.74

Second Shipment

We submit to you the following valuables with the request for the best possible utilization:

Item 1: 247 rings of platinum and silver with stones: kg rough: 0.911.0, kg gross: 0,950

Item 2: 154 gold watches: kg rough: 3,413.5, 42 gold watch chains and watch pendants: kg rough: 0,685.5, 245 silver watch chains and watch pendants: kg rough: 4,047.5, [Total]: kg gross: 8,614

Item 3: 207 earrings, with stones believed to be diamonds: kg rough: 0,337, 1601 earrings of gold: kg rough: 1,425, 721 earrings of silver: kg rough: 0,759, [Total]: kg gross: 2,694

Item 5: 41 bracelets and wrist bands, said to be of gold with precious and semi-precious stones: kg rough: 0,512,, 9 bracelets and wrist bands: kg rough: 0,161, 13 brooches with stones said to be diamonds: kg rough: 0,085, 55 brooches, pins, and clips of gold: kg rough: 0,226, 99 gold pendants: kg rough: 0,379, 5 pendants with diamonds: kg rough: 0,013, 116 bracelets and wrist bands, silver: kg rough: 0,761, Diverse brooches, pins, clips of silver: kg rough: 1,187, Diverse pendants of silver: kg rough: 0,902, [Total]: kg gross: 5,650

Item 6: 132 jewel rings with stones said to be diamonds: kg rough: 0,391, 254 jewel rings with various stones: kg rough: 0,730, [Total]: kg gross: 1,274

Item 7: 324 silver wrist watches: kg rough: 6,622, kg gross: 6,809

Item 8: 784 silver pocket watches: kg rough: 54,420, kg gross: 55,435

Item 9: 12 silver candelabras, 170 silver goblets and containers, 99 silver boxes and cases, 127 silver spoons, forks, and knives, 18 silver money purses and pocketbooks, 43 diverse articles of silver, [Total]: kg rough: 26,950, kg gross: 28,295

Item 10: 5 necklaces and collieres with stones said to be diamonds: kg rough: 0,038.5, 48 necklaces and collieres of gold: kg rough: 0,572.5, 5 necklaces and collieres with pearls, and 49 loose pearls: kg rough: 0,082.5, 317 necklaces and collieries of silver: kg rough: 1,778.5, 5 necklaces and collieres with garnets: kg rough: 0,085.0, 1 collar pin with stone said to be diamond: kg rough: 0,001.5, 13 collar pins of gold: kg rough: 0,019.5, 3 collar pins of silver: kg rough: 0,004.0, 2 studs with stone said to be diamond: kg rough: 0,002.5, 23 studs of gold: kg rough: 0,092, 60 studs of silver: kg rough: 0,211, 160 diverse dentures, partly of gold: kg rough: 0,973, [This line is crossed out in original.] Various parts of jewels an watch cases: kg rough: 1,809, 187 pearls, 4 stones said to be diamonds, 10 precious and semi-precious stones, 27 corals: [Total]: kg. gross: 0,071.0, [Total]: kg gross: 5,788

We should like itemized statements for the individual items and further request that the amount be transmitted by check as soon as possible to the “Precious Metal” ["Edelmetall"] account.

Deutsche Reichsbank Hauptkasse [Signature illegible]

Document 3949-PS

Concerning: Conversion Of Notes, Gold, Silver, And Jewelry In Favor Of The Reich Minister Of Finance [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 678-679.


1-Partial statement of values received by our “Precious Metal” ["Edelmetall"]

1. Shipment received on August 26 of this year. 1. Foreign notes and coins (compare encl. 1): RM 123,827.65, 2. 32 gold ingots (cf. encl. 2): RM 446,234.93, 3. 116 silver ingots (c.f. encl. 3): RM 38,229.40, 4. Diverse jewelry [and] 5. Diverse strings of pearls, pearl jewelry, and loose pearls: not yet examined and evaluated, 6. Diverse gold coins (cf. encl. 4): RM 77,692.06

2. Shipment received September 4 of this year. The examination of the nine locked trunks received revealed the five objects indicated, whose conversion has been begun. In addition, the following have been ascertained. a. Cold coins (cf. encl. 6): .RM 1,953.68, b. Silver coins (cf. encl. 7): RM 53.16, c. Foreign notes (cf. encl. 8) contents of two trunks: RM 77,452.71

3. Shipment of September 7 of this year. The locked trunk received contained the gold coins evaluated in enclosure 9 in the amount of: RM 112,037.70, In addition we took foreign notes in the amount of (cf. encl. 10): RM 89,130.64, Statement of the ten gold ingots given us separately, ca. kgr. 139,189 in the amount of (cf. encl. 11): RM 217,763.66

[Total]: RM 1,184,375.59

Before we turn over the total amount taken in to date, to the Reichshauptkasse, account of the Reich Minister of Finance, we beg to be informed under what initial this and later amounts -should be disposed of.

It might further be of advantage to call the attention of the responsible office of the Reich Ministry of Finance in time to the amounts to be transferred from the Deutsche Reichsbank.

Deutsche Reichsbank Hauptkasse

11 Enclosures

[stamp] Paid by check Berlin, 10/27/1942. Hauptkasse

Title: “Document 3993-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 692-693.

Berlin W 8, 1 Voss Strasse, 1/30/1939

Der Stabschef [Chief of Staff]

To: Reichleiter Alfred Rosenberg Margarethenstrasse 17 Berlin W 35

Dear Party Member Rosenberg:

Please accept my thanks for your congratulations incidental to the Fuehrer’s decree which assigns all pre-military and post-military training to the SA.

With the assurance of my continued loyalty as fellow combatant and in comradeship

Heil Hitler Your [signed] LUTZE

Date stamp at Rosenberg Chancery: Entered under No. 6009 Received: 1/31/1939 Filed [?] L Rt; submitted 31 January

Document 4004-PS

Hours Of Historical Decision [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 693-695.

[By SS Brigadefuehrer Fritz Rainer Gauleiter of Salzburg.]

We were in the battle all through 3/11/1938. At 5 o'clock Globocnik and I had gone to the Federal Chancellery where we met Dr. Seyss-Inquart who had been in the most gruelling negotiations ever since 1 o'clock. We had to force the formation of the National Socialist cabinet under Dr. Seyss-Inquart that very night, or else civil war would have flared up. At 7:30 Miklas had said his last word. He remained firm and refused to have a government under a National Socialist Federal Chancellor.

I agreed with Globocnik that he should stay in the Federal Chancellery and advance there the development by all means while I hurried to the command posts of the party to give the orders for the occupation of the country. Klausner, the recently deceased Gauleiter of Carinthia, had given both of us general authority. At 8 in the evening I met at headquarters in the Seitzergasse, Lukesch, the Fuehrer of the SA, and Kaltenbrunner, the fuehrer of the SS. Lukesch was able to mobilize 6000 SA men within half an hour. In addition Kaltenbrunner commanded 700 SS men. These 6,700 men received the order to advance toward and occupy the Federal Chancellery. and to hold the Ring and the building until the National Socialist Government was proclaimed. A special detachment of 40 SS men under the command of Kaltenbrunner’s adjutant, Felix Rinner, received the order to force their way into and occupy the Federal Chancellery.

In the meantime Klausner had arrived. I asked him for the instruction to issue to all nine Gauleiters in Austria the order for the seizure of power by the party. At 8:30 this order was issued and with it the seizure of power for A. Hitler rolled over the country. Upon an urgent call from the Federal Chancellery I returned at 9 o'clock to that place. When I arrived at the gate, entrance was refused. Through the narrow peephole I saw the shining bayonets of the guards. The building was occupied by the police and the guards. Outside security guards were concentrated in large numbers. At last, upon the intervention of Dr. Seyss-Inquart, I was admitted through a back-door, had to climb over machine guns and open munition boxes in order to get to the second floor where my comrades were assembled. Under these circumstances I deemed it impossible for Felix Rinner to carry out his order. Now there arrived minute after minute the news of the occupation of the country and of the most important positions in Vienna. General Secretariat of the Fatherland Front, Ministry of War, Trade Unions' Building, Ravag. It was going on 10 o'clock when the commanding officer of the guards reported to the Minister of Security, Dr. Seyss, who happened to be in our room, that a man accompanied by 40 others demanded to be let in through the gate, invoking higher orders. I quickly informed Dr. Seyss that these were Rinner and his 40 men who had been detailed for the occupation of the Federal Chancellery. Dr. Seyss ordered that Rinner be brought upstairs. I shall never forget this moment. Escorted by a guardsman as tall as a lamppost, Felix Rinner, the famous Austrian track champion and all-round athlete, stepped into the room where expectation had reached the boiling point. He wore a shabby dark overcoat, no hat, his face was pale and resolved, a swastika brassard was around his arm. Rinner was the first National Socialist Sturmfuehrer who entered enemy headquarters during the night of liberation.

Dr. Seyss, on his own responsibility, gave the order to open the gate and to let the 40 men in. These 40 men knew what was at stake for them. Two-thirds of them had been there on 7/25/1934, when the SS Standarte had for the first time fought its way into the Federal Chancellery. Then they had faced death boldly for weeks and for years had they been in prison. Now they had fallen in a second time to force the decision for the movement. They had nothing but pistols, no uniforms, the swastika brassard over the coat, 40 determined men whom no power could oppose. While the political negotiations continued and from the country there came in by telephone one victory message after another, while the report of the investment of the Federal Chancellery by 6700 stormtroopers was carried to Miklas and gigantic demonstrations of the population assembled in Vienna surging toward the building, while the members of the coming cabinet, first of all Klausner, arrived at the Federal Chancellery, while all these nightly events rolled off in feverish haste, Rinner posted one SS guard after another in the Federal Chancellery. Ludwig was still hanging on the telephone and begging Paris and London for help when suddenly two SS men as tall as lamp-posts entered his room and took their posts. He then gave up. Under the pressure of this national uprising and of the news from the Reich, Miklas collapsed. He accepted the resignation of Schuschnigg and entrusted around midnight Seyss-Inquart with the formation of a cabinet. He had to set his signature under the new cabinet, then he was escorted to a motor car. When he stepped out of his room, two SS men were posted as sentries at the door. He took off his top hat and bowed before them who looked at him in iron discipline and cold contempt, leaving his office never to return.

I hereby certify that the above document is a complete and correct copy of a newspaper article by Dr. FRIEDRICH RAINER published on 3/12/1939, and that this copy is part of the files of the Landgericht for Criminal Procedure Vienna in the case against Dr. SCHMIDT and others.

Nurnberg, 6/10/1946

[signed] Dr. Wolfgang Lassmann

DR. WOLFGANG LASSMANN Representative of the Republic of Austria [Seal] Federal Ministry of Justice.

Document 4005-PS

[The Attached Document Is The Text Of A Speech Made By Dr. Friedrich Rainer On 3/11/1942 In Klagenfurt Before The Leaders Corps And The Bearers Of Honor Insignia (Ehrenzeichen) And Blood Orders (Blutorden) Of The Gau Karinthia], Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 695-698.

[This document is part of the files of the Landgericht for Criminal Procedure Vienna in the case against Dr. SCHMIDT and others.]

National Socialism in Austria from the July Rebellion in 1934 to the Seizure of Power on 3/11/1938.

Speech by Gauleiter Dr. Friedrich Rainer made on 3/11/1942 in Klagenfurt before the Leaders Corps and the bearers of honor insignia [Ehrenzeichen] and blood orders [Blutorden] of the Gau Karinthia.

My Party comrades, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Beginning with back of page 7

… We had the following political attitude:

The Ministry Glaise-Horstenau was designated to function as appeasing Ministry. Negotiations were under way between the German Reich and Austria with regard to the press system and the exchange of books. Within the Party internal discussions started again within a short time. Differences of opinion about the agreement soon appeared again. That led to the fact that Captain Leopold began to represent a different attitude from that of us three Karinthia representatives. Leopold was of the opinion that it would be possible to get permission from Schuschnigg directly to rebuild the NSDAP in the form of a cultural association. We were of the opinion that any legal form of association (even a rabbit breeding association) could only be permitted if we made an ideological compromise; but this would be impossible. The ideological line must be kept.

I relied on the Fuehrer word: “My idea will also melt those ice blocks on the other side.” From this I recognized that the Fuehrer, first of all had confidence in the dynamics of his idea. Then: “Did you use all political possibilities.” There were different ones to be utilized in the process of which we tried to avoid bringing the unity of the Party to a breaking point again. That demanded the severest personal sacrifices. We had to take accusations bordering on the grotesque. We had to meet situations sounding overaged today; at that time it was a matter of life and death. We had to fight it through. I tried over and over again to explain my attitude to Leopold and his co-workers. Jury again and again met me half way. After Leopold expressed confidence in myself and Globus, Klausner was compelled to talk to him. There were, to say it again difficult discussions. There already was a representative of the Reich involved, Gruppenfuehrer Kepler and his co-worker Kaesemeier, who were present as the official representatives of the Fuehrer.

At the end of 1936 the time had come when Kepler declared unequivocally: The political programatic represented by the Carinthians is the only correct one. But it must be tried to make this attitude into the generally accepted one, so that Leopold is converted to it. I should like to state: Party comrade Leopold, who was killed in the East, stands firmly in his clear-cut attitude; existing political mistakes cannot be considered as a guilt in retrospect.

At that time it was difficult to find the right way. I believe that it was only possible for us to follow the right way at that time because we were with the Fuehrer on 16 July, and heard from him what he wants. In the most difficult moments I always tried to remember: “What did the Fuehrer say?” I cannot and I must not deviate from it. This attitude was right. At that time we made political progress. Schuschnigg soon demonstrated that he only intended to be a chiseler. Leopold saw that a compromise would not work. The “Seven Committee” also did not progress very far. A number of gentlemen tried to find a platform; Wolsegger and Hasslacher worked on it. Only in cooperating with us-Jury and a number of co-workers of Leopold-and also with Leopold’s consent it was possible to achieve Seyss-Inquart’s appointment to the post of State Council [Staatsrat], 7/1937.

More and more Seyss turned out to be the clever negotiator. We knew that he was the one who would best represent the interests of the movement in the political forefield. He also unconditionally subordinated himself always to Klausner’s leadership. He always conducted himself as Klausner’s deputy and conscientiously followed Klausner’s instructions. With Seyss' appointment to the post of Staatsrat we found a new possibility to enter into further negotiations. At that time there were a number of very grotesque situations. We were informed on events in the Schuschnigg camp by the political apparatus, our own connection to Ribbentrop, Göring and Himmler we have via Kepler.

In a cafe in the Ringstrasse negotiations between us and Reich German representatives took place. We again had conferences with our people in the government or at another key point in the Austrian system to an extent that we were able to penetrate into the Ministry. And, when the commission was formed, the Reich German commission on the one side and the Austrian on the other, it was always the following game; the Reich German Commission was informed up to the last detail and these conferences always ended with a 100% victory for the German Reich. We got more and more opportunities to make our wishes felt in the Reich. With regard to exterior conditions the developments between the government and the LS-population became constantly more critical. The Neurath visit led to demonstrations; a new wave of arrests came. In 11/1937 the situation was such that a break or further violations of the relation between Germany and Austria were inevitable. It was Globus who first had the idea: “A Schuschnigg visit to the Fuehrer must -take place.”

He told me that it was necessary. I was against it; it would be impossible and too dangerous. We cautiously considered the idea in Berlin and Kepler presented it to Ribbentrop. Papen was commissioned to make preparations for this conference.

Papen had been expressly told to handle preparations for the conference confidentially. In Austria only Schuschnigg, Schmidt, and Zernatto knew about it. They believed that on our side only Papen was informed.

Papen too, thought that only he knew about it but we too were informed and had had conversations with Seyss about the subject. Now Schuschnigg still wanted to speak with Seyss and make some concessions before he went to Berchtesgaden, which he would announce to the Fuehrer at the Obersalzberg. We were invited by Tschammer to the Olympic Games to Garmisch and when we found out, Zernatto said: “I see you go with mixed feelings.” We then had a meeting with Papen and with Seyss. Tschammer and Papen went through some negotiations. Globus and I then went to Berlin and made there a number of demands of the party. All July putschists should be released, as well as all “explosive matter-criminals” [Sprengstoff-Verbrecher] and given total amnesty, a further ministry formed which was to be given as ministry of the interior and of safety into Seyss' hand, etc., readmission of swastika armband, etc.

Document 4005-PS

[The Attached Document Is The Text Of A Speech Made By Dr. Friedrich Rainer On 3/11/1942 In Klagenfurt Before The Leaders Corps And The Bearers Of Honor Insignia (Ehrenzeichen) And Blood Orders (Blutorden) Of The Gau Karinthia], Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 698-702.

It was just before our departure from Berlin. We had continued working during the night and made plans with our Berlin friends. In the morning we had the feeling: What will happen if Schuschnigg accepts the demands, then there would be the danger that he was legal, that we would have to reckon with him. In all haste we composed a report declaring that the party needed these conditions, but if possible without Schuschnigg; he would never be a partner. Then we threw Ribbentrop’s adjutant out of bed and asked him to pass the report on to Ribbentrop. Then we were in Berlin and Schuschnigg asked Seyss again for a conversation at his place. Seyss had been negotiating for months the so-called Klausner program. Schuschnigg wanted to accept this and Seyss told him that in the meantime the situation had changed. The situation has stiffened. The two separated without a result, after Schuschnigg had dragged out the conversation long enough as to just have time to drive to the station to catch the train to Salzburg. Zernatto wrote a book about these days and said: “We are realizing, more and more, that Seyss was a stooge and that behind him were to be found a number of SS officers among whom are Klausner, Globotschnig, and Rainer and that these people are the real wire-pullers. We had always thought that nobody knew about this visit to Berchtesgaden except Papen, the queer behavior of Seyss made the Austrian Chancellor very apprehensive. One knew that Seyss must have known about it. (Au revoir in Salzburg.)

Schuschnigg’s opinion was that the Reich in view to the foreign 3 policy situation (Paris and London) needed again to make an agreement in the style of 1936. It would be sufficient if Schuschnigg made a number of concessions. They would separate, the Fuehrer would be enthusiastic, the matter would be settled.

We had already prepared the following:

The last result of the conversation Seyss communicated to me in a place in the Kaertnerstrasse. I called the telephone number where Globus [Globocnik] was to be reached in Berlin, and told him about the negative result of the conversation. I could speak with Globus entirely freely. We had a secret code for each name, and besides we both spoke a terrible dialect so that not a soul would have understood us. Globus immediately wrote down this report, and communicated it immediately via the security office by teletype to Munich, where it was written down. In the meantime Kepler had gone to Munich by sleeping-car. When he left the train the Statepolice Munich handed him the letter with the latest Vienna report, with which he left for Berchtesgaden. I then forwarded instructions by Party member Muehlmann who proved to be an excellent liaison man to party and government offices in the Reich. He left for Salzburg on the same train as Schuschnigg. While Schuschnigg had his car taken of at Salzburg and spent the night there and continued by auto to the Obersalzberg on the following day, Muehlmann continued on and was in Berchtesgaden. Kepler and he went to the Fuehrer before Schuschnigg and could tell him everything. Schuschnigg arrived in the morning, was received, and lived to see the boundless surprise t-hat the Fuehrer took up the negotiations where they had broken off without results the day before between Seyss and him. The Fuehrer did not conduct the negotiations as Schuschnigg expected. He went the whole hog. Schuschnigg was finished off that time. The Fuehrer got hold of him, insulted him [beleidiste] and shouted at him and reproached him for all the dirty tricks Schuschnigg had committed during the years past. Schuschnigg had become a heavy smoker. We had connections even into his bedroom. We knew about his way of life. Now he was smoking 50, now 60 cigarettes. Now at the Fuehrer’s he was not allowed to smoke.

Ribbentrop told me he really pitied Schuschnigg. He only stood at attention before the Fuehrer, had his hands against the seams, and all he said was “Yes Sir” [jawohl]. Schuschnigg tried to object to something but got so terribly shouted at that he fell back into silence. Then the meal was taken. Then the Fuehrer called Sperle who had just relinquished the Command in Spain. The Fuehrer asked him to speak about the air force [Luftwaffe].

Schuschnigg was given a very impressive picture of the German Army. Keitel too was present. After the meal the Fuehrer asked Ribbentrop to continue conversations with Schuschnigg. Before the conversation with Schuschnigg began, Schmidt went to Ribbentrop and said: “Please permit that the Austrian chancellor smokes one single cigarette,” which was allowed. Ribbentrop then talked to him: “Now look at the situation as it is-the Fuehrer is not a man to joke with. There are chances for you; the Fuehrer wants to conclude the treaty with you, if you concede.” The development leads to National Socialism. He developed before him how Hitler saw the future Reich, how the Anschluss was. Ribbentrop had the feeling of having mollified Schuschnigg by his kind words. So it was possible to draft a number of regulations in the final conversations.

Schuschnigg had taken it onto himself to obtain President Miklas’s consent. During this conversation, which lasted for quite a while, Zernatto in Vienna was hanging nervously on the telephone. He called up the security director, who is still in the CC [KZ] to day, in Salzburg and asked about Schuschnigg, and when Schuschnigg did not come back, he understood that the conversations were not developing as desired, as Schuschnigg wa being delayed at the Obersalzberg. Preparations were made to liberate the Federal Chancellor; the Salzburg garrison was mobilized but not put into action, but it was ready.

In the meantime Schuschnigg was back and had spent the night in Salzburg. Zernatto wanted to learn something from him and tried to speak to him over the telephone but Schuschnigg was finished.

We were in Vienna and got our news. Zernatto was in greatest anxiety. He was at the station the following day to meet Schuschnigg, spoke with him and got the following description: “The Fuehrer is a devil, he is a Beserk, a lunatic. It was terrible, the way he treated me.” Schuschnigg was so much under the weight of the events that he was completely without a will of his own. He was simply k. o. Guido Schmidt too confirmed that it had been terrible. Ribbentrop had been kind, he had been the only one.

Now the treaty had to be ratified by Miklas. The good old catholic Miklas, who was under the influence of the Pope, was not easy to fell. We had to fight for 3 days with the result that even the threat of an invasion was made, that Miklas’s confessor finally was informed by us. Finally Miklas signed the contract but with greatest repugnance. You know the result. A Ministry was formed with Seyss, Schuschnigg took the opportunity of not only taking in Seyss but also other people who were to counterbalance him.

Also a possibility for activity of the National Socialists was allowed, not for the NSDAP, a considerable enlargement of the demographic department [volkspolitisches Referat]. These demographic departments had already been set up before with consent of the Reich. Their purpose was to form an outlet for the spokesmen of the nationalistic part of the population. I must state here, that these demographic experts worked very well and the men were all decent without exception. The most difficult case at the time seemed to be in Carinthia. The chief of section Perkonig was described to us in a biased way. In Maier-Kaibitsch’s office-room Perkonig sided unconditionally with the party and he kept his promise. In that way we had the possibility through this man in whom Zernatto as well as Schuschnigg confided, to have news brought to both these men. And besides these demographic departments were organized with Seyss as chief and Jury as his deputy. The leadership of the Party the Fuehrer had transferred to party member Klausner who in the meantime had had a conversation with the Fuehrer at the Reich Chancery at Berlin where he had made a report to the Fuehrer about the development in the last years. So shortly before the decisive actions, the complete unity of the NSDAP was reestablished. Klausner re-established the old construction, which had been formed for the first time at the Kaertner Hof in 1935 which had been renewed in 1936 and which then had to struggle with difficulties for a long while.

Now came a period during which we had to be ever. so careful and had to be clever politicians.

It was therefore difficult, as it was clear that Schuschnigg looked for possibilities to get out of the Berchtesgaden agreement.

Schuschnigg wanted to bring the party into opposition to the policies of the Reich. Schuschnigg figured that the German Reich could not stand a burden on account of foreign politics. He wanted to create a situation in Austria which would make Germany the mischief maker, in order to get a guarantee of independence for Austria from Paris, London, and Moscow-Prague.

Document 4005-PS

[The Attached Document Is The Text Of A Speech Made By Dr. Friedrich Rainer On 3/11/1942 In Klagenfurt Before The Leaders Corps And The Bearers Of Honor Insignia (Ehrenzeichen) And Blood Orders (Blutorden) Of The Gau Karinthia], Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 702-705.

In those last days of February Schuschnigg made a step from a Catholic politician to a politician who is ready to ally himself with the Soviets in order to prevent the “Anschluss". He prepared the formation of a black-red coalition. This made the situation of the party difficult. At the same time we received the strictest instructions from the Fuehrer. According to the February agreement it was as follows: The Fuehrer salute could be used, the songs were sung. Large demonstrations occurred at Graz.

The Fuehrer sent us Kepler with instructions to be extremely careful regarding the political developments of the Austria situation. Kepler was sitting in the airplane when he was recalled. He said: “We have to go the road of the revolution, no uprising shall develop as yet; we shall not whirl for the time being. Klausner kept the party back. Those are the reasons why the demonstrations of Graz which had been prepared and which had started, had to be recalled. Such was the situation in Graz that Schuschnigg believed that it might become necessary to use troops and he hoped to split the party from the government of Seyss and Glaise.”

Significant was the following: It could be seen from these actions that the men of the party marched according to a political command. Just as they assembled, they also departed on the minute. When the troops arrived the streets of Graz were free. When Seyss visited Graz, the whole city was covered with swastikas for one hour, but one hour later everything had quieted down. Schuschnigg now recognized that the party had political leadership and those who march on the streets are like those who are in a reserve position, and the party is not blind but has political leadership. In this manner the plebiscite developed by which he hoped to take the Reich by surprise and to hasten the guarantee of the Western States for an independent Austria.

These actions had another consequence. The Fuehrer could convince himself that the party in Austria is ready and that the masses of the population are on its side. This was decisive for the decision which the Fuehrer had on 11 March. The Federal Diet [Bundestag] took place and Schuschnigg said again and again “very good for Austria". I was with Reintahler as a representative of the people in the visitor’s gallery of the Bundestag. That was the first time I saw Schuschnigg really well, previous I only saw him fleetingly in a theater box. I saw how unnatural this man was in his behaviour and his speeches. I saw the big propaganda circus of Zernatto. Our political outposts, Seyss and Glaise, were very much perturbed about this conduct of Schuschnigg showing complete lack of understanding while we three people from Carinthia rubbed our hands. Who will make the first mistake? We lay in wait; the one that makes the first mistake will be at a disadvantage; Schuschnigg made this mistake. He saw that the development continued without a stop and nothing seemed to disturb the road of evolutionary “Anschluss” with the Reich. It will take months. He could participate in this development by letting himself be carried by it. He would have been ousted honorably, but Schuschnigg returns to his old German-baiting attitude. He ties up with the Reds. We received news that he begins to negotiate with this group of the mayor of Vienna Smitz, that Smitz negotiates with Seitz and with Communistic leaders, that certain fighting organizations are secretly formed and that they are tolerated by Smitz, the mayor of Vienna. We received news that a federal councilman [Bundesrat] proposes a plebiscite to Schuschnigg. At 9 in the morning of Wednesday, 9 March, Globus and I were riding in a loaned car-which was our pride-from the illegal shack [Bude] in Vienna to the Seitzer street where the office of the demographic expert was located. Klausner and Jury waited for us at the door. Klausner said that Jury had interesting news; Schuschnigg intended to hold a plebiscite on the following Sunday. Klausner said that was no nonsense; it was a fact. We drove to Seitz at Hof 8 and sat down there, Klausner, Jury, Globus, and myself.

Under a pretext Schuschnigg decided with his intimate advisers that this plebiscite shall take place Sunday. The regulations which I remember were such that the whole voting was a fraud. The rules were laid down. Only a few intimates were familiarized, Zernatto, Smitz, the whole left wing of the Christian Social party. The rules were dictated by Zernatto to his secretary. It was resolved to keep this intention secret till the evening of next day. Schuschnigg went to Innsbruck and was to announce the decision from there. Zernatto said: “It is Wednesday when the Nazis hear about it. Their actions can start at the latest on Thursday; they can begin with their propaganda on Friday. We gain an advantage of two days and with this advantage we can carry out the plebiscite with a small majority.”

The secretary of Zernatto became ill, she had to go out. In reality she was a National Socialist and once outside she took a piece of paper in great haste and wrote on it what she knew and sent this slip to us by the surest method. At 10:30 we knew the whole plan. Early in the morning Seyss was taken to Zernatto. Zernatto had asked him in the name of the Bunderkanzler to give his word of honor not to speak about what he had heard. Seyss gave his word of honor. Whereupon Seyss phoned to Jury, that something was going on, he could not speak about it, but we should come to a conference. We asked Seyss: “Is it true …?” Seyss said: “I am bound not to speak by my word of honor, but we want to act as if it is true” (diplomat that he was). The matter was clear for us. We had a short conference. All of us were of the opinion that this was the treachery of Schuschnigg, the treachery of the agreement of Berchtesgaden. How we should react at the moment, we did not know at this moment. We had to conduct ourselves according to the Fuehrer.

We contemplated “No” votes … We could only do it if the Fuehrer agreed. To vote “Yes” is out of question; that could not be expected of the Party. It is only possible if the Fuehrer gives the order. It was necessary to get in touch with the Fuehrer at once on the issue of the slogan “not to vote.” Seyss and I wrote a letter which I typed myself and which was sent to Zernatto on the same forenoon. In this letter we stated that Minister Seyss-Inquart who according to the agreement of Berchtesgaden was made a trustee of a treaty between between Germany and Austria has been informed about the plebiscite. That on account of this plebiscite this agreement has been broken by Austria alone. I laid great stress about this version, and stated it was necessary for us to give the Fuehrer an opportunity to intervene. At that time the execution of the whole action was important. Direction Paris, London, always the world war was in mind. The Fuehrer had to get the possibility for German intervention on the basis of the broken treaty. We also wrote about breaking the assurances to the National Socialists. This letter went to Zernatto and a copy to Globus. The latter flew from Vienna to Berlin at about 12 o'clock. I telephoned with Kepler and told him an extraordinary important message is on the way which has to go at once to the Reich Chancellery. Globus reached the Fuehrer in a few minutes. The Fuehrer said that the letter is a political masterpiece. “You remain here, you get a good meal and wait for the next move.” Globus said, “I have to return at once". The Fuehrer said: “You will hear more.” In the meantime we took the first measure in Vienna, till we received the answer of the Fuehrer as we had to gain time. . Papen had been recalled as ambassador, but had returned to Vienna. We drove to Papen in the German embassy and we had a long discussion. That turned around the question: “What will happen". Various ideas were expressed. We have to demand from Schuschnigg that he declare the Anschluss paragraph of the treaty of St. Germain invalid, then the party could vote “Yes". Then “the party can only vote yes, because it will become illegal otherwise.” The situation was getting darker and more unpleasant all the time. Klausner and I sat around and we thought that there was not much to do. In the meantime the radio had begun and Schuschnigg made the speech. “Mander, it is time". The whole circus was on the loose. I then said-when we said goodbye without settling anything and without a solution-when Klausner and I went home: “It is out now, the whole thing will break loose in Austria. The party has to issue a slogan.”

I then dictated to Mohrenschildwho had remained in service m a private apartmenta directive, which during the night went out to all Gau districts in the usual way. The Party’s standpoint toward Schuschnigg’s proclamation is: the whole is a violation of the agreement in an internal and external political sense. The party cannot recognize this swindle. The Fuehrer will determine what is to be done. Complete abstention from voting and the orders for Sunday will follow. That was the first order.

The propaganda circus [Propagandazirkus] of Zernatto started on Thursday, 10 March. I was with his co-workers at that time. Klasner had conversations with Seyss, Jury, and other personalities. There was much activity in the streets, trucks came, airplanes dropped leaflets, and people congregated everywhere. I had a report of the former red community police, 3000 were uniformed and armed. We still did not know what was going on. Globus has not returned. He was still in Berlin in the Reich Chancellory, anticipating events. He told everyone: “I must get back, they are waiting for me.”

Document 4005-PS

[The Attached Document Is The Text Of A Speech Made By Dr. Friedrich Rainer On 3/11/1942 In Klagenfurt Before The Leaders Corps And The Bearers Of Honor Insignia (Ehrenzeichen) And Blood Orders (Blutorden) Of The Gau Karinthia], Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 705-709.

In the night from Thursday to Friday all Gauleiters were in Vienna waiting for information. National Socialists were attacked and so on 10 March we issued orders to the SA and SS, Lukesch and Kaltenbrunner, on our own initiative to call out beginning Friday half of our formations for the protection of . National Socialists in the streets, whereas the best men were to remain armed in their barracks in the event of a civil war. We had to be ready to deal not only with the executive authorities but also with the red mob.

In the evening at 7 p. m. I received a report that a National Socialist had been knifed. He was dead or wounded. I gave orders to party member Lukesch to deploy closed SA formations in Vienna. Such a closed SA formation, not yet uniformed and without swastika armbands marched in ranks over the “Guertel,” the mob raged but no one dared touch them. I telephoned to Berlin and described the situation in the worst light: civil war!

Conferences took place. Next day the total decline of the voting became evident. We were at the airport too, Seyss and Glaise arrived. They had been visiting Buerckel in the Saarpfalz. The Fuehrer had retained Glaise in Berlin. I held conversations with Seyss. We could not agree yet. The Embassy told us shipping was still open-Seyss is to discontinue negotiations. Opinions clashed. On the 11 March, after receiving the letter the Fuehrer had a short conference with officers of the Wehrmacht and ordered strategic concentration of troops. He sought to obtain the liberation of Austria by force of arms. We knew nothing about it, not even Globus. Globus returned, was sent back to Vienna Thursday evening by special airplane. Göring was against it, since the plane, having to cross Czechoslovakian territory, was in danger of being shot down by Czech fighters.

The Fuehrer gave the Party in Austria full liberty of action. He will not let us down. That was all we knew. That is what Globus told us when we went to meet him at the airport. We went to the hotel, where all Gauleiters of Austria were assembled, and were given information about the Fuehrer’s message. I was determined to act accordingly in matters of Klausner. It became necessary to briefly consider all possibilities and to adjust the Party accordingly. I explained in the next 3 days, there are 3 possibilities:

1. That the people’s vote is vetoed, is designated as number 1, which should be known to all Gauleiters by at least 2 o'clock in the afternoon. This means: great victory for the party, display of flags.

2. Schuschnigg could not withstand this loss of prestige and resigns. Result: National Socialistic Government.

3. Schuschnigg has rejected demands of the Reich and of the Party. Result: civil war. In this case every Gauleiter and leader of formations has to act and force the seizure of power. Fortified with this information the Gauleiters left with their cars about 1 or 2 o'clock for their respective garrisons. Next day Glaise arrived. He brought information from the Fuehrer. Glaise with Seyss together went to Schuschnigg and demanded the fixing of a constitutional vote within a period of 6 weeks according to the constitution of the 1 May. Schuschnigg declined. The two ministers retreated to the office of direction of state affairs.

We were all together there, Klausner, Jury, Muehlmann, Globus, and myself. The two ministers told us everything. I knew that the Fuehrer only waited for a cue from us. We retired together with Klausner, Jury and Globus, and Klausner declared: On my authority as the leader of the Austrian National Socialists I order you to issue a written ultimatum to the Schuschnigg Government. In the event of nonacceptance of the ultimatum they will have to tender their resignation by 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The text of this ultimatum, again composed by myself and Seyss, was written by me and sent to the Bundeskanzler. Upon its receipt he called together his ministers for 2 o'clock.

It was therefore not possible to enforce the time-limit of 14 o'clock. Thereupon we stated the following: if a satisfactory answer is not forthcoming until 3 o'clock at a certain telephone number, the Party will proceed to seize power. The Party will assume that Schuschnigg declined the ultimatum and that both ministers were imprisoned. In this case a proclamation already prepared for such an event and ready in the print-shops of the Party was to be issued to the population. Thus individual actions for seizure of power will be initiated.

As the loss of Party leadership would have spelled unpredictable results, Klausner and Jury had to betake themselves to a battle-station near Vienna. SA and SS have moved into camouflaged quarters. Klausner transferred to Globus and myself the further execution of political action. We took the last political documents in safekeeping. Meanwhile, it was 2:30 o'clock. I parted from Globus and went to the telephone where I was to receive Seyss call. The phone rang at 2:45. The Bundeskanzler had agreed to one half of our demand. The people were to vote on it. He declined however, to carry out the constitutional vote. Afterwards he declared a state of emergency: curfew for the population, mobilization of the Army Bundesheer and of the police. I requested Seyss to continue negotiating and I faced t a difficult decision. What should I tell the Gauleiters? Since 14 o'clock they are waiting for announcement of case 1, case 2 or ; case 3. Was there no possibility to issue other directives? I could not wait for a directive from Berlin. It was important to me in this critical moment, to fill the party with confidence and bring them out on the streets. I passed on case 1.

At the same time the result was telephoned by the Embassy in Vienna to the Reichs Chancery. Shortly afterwards Göring as on the phone and demanded to speak to his brother-in-law Hueber. I listened to the conversation. Göring said that in the Fuehrer’s name a partial solution of the problem could not be accepted. The Fuehrer had given Schuschnigg all possible chances. Schuschnigg did not react. Now, one had to speak in a different tone. The shame of fraternal war would have to cease. Schuschnigg has only time until 5 o'clock or he must resign. A government under Seyss must be formed or else we march. This report had to be forwarded to Seyss who was negotiating in the office of the Bundeskanzler. Globus went there. I changed my position and went to another telephone in the inner city. A short time later I was called by Globus. It was no longer necessary to submit to Seyss the contents of the telephone message. It was already presented to Schuschnigg in the form of a stenogram, as all conversations in the Embassy were being listened in. There was a conference between the two. In this conference, Schuschnigg resigned at 3:30 o'clock. Globus was looking for me. Seyss requested an order from me. I explained it was important to legalize the formations as quickly as possible. Seyss would have to continue negotiating. SA and SS would have to report to the police as security organs. That was done. Shortly afterward Globus appears with his car and says to me: “Things are terrible in the office of the Bundeskanzler. Miklas declines to accept Schuschnigg’s resignation.”

We returned to the German Embassy and Globus now telephoned Göring and told him what he had ascertained in the office of the Bundeskanzler. Göring asks for time until 7 o'clock. At the same time the German military attache was ordered to make the strength of German troop concentrations known to Bundes President Miklas. We realize that we have to accomplish everything in this hour, for the situation in Vienna could no longer be held in check. We should have had to fight the Black-Red mob that very night. We deliberated and decided to go personally to the office of the Bundeskanzler. Globus and myself and Muehlmann as our courier went to the office of the Bundeskanzler.

On the second floor in the hall of columns was Glaise and Seyss. I asked how things were, and Glaise said nothing more could be done. Miklas refused, and negotiations had been broken off. Seyss was finished. I recognized that too. He said he had to rest, go home for a short time. While we were talking, Zernatto came out of Schuschnigg’s room. Twice I had had discussions with Zernatto and knew him. Recognizing this difficult situation, I told him my mind, that he was responsible for the civil war, the party could not go back. I held him responsible for the disaster. Zernatto was all in and said he did not know what he could do. He left the house. As I learned later, especially from his book, Zernatto had come to the following opinion: he writes: “When Globotschnig and Rainer had entered the chancellery, we knew that National Socialism could not be held back any more.” Actually he drove home, informed Stockinger, put travel money in his pocket, took along the widow of Dollfuss and left by way of Pressburg as the first refugee. Globus and I wanted to talk with Miklas, but he would not receive any National Socialist. The Foreign Minister came and I said that he must see to it that the cabinet with Seyss was reorganized. He went to Schuschnigg and soon after Kepler came by special plane from Berlin with the order to urge on the formation of the Seyss government. Kepler came and I well remember how he came up and said: “Well, how do things stand with the Seyss-Inquart government?” “We are not yet that far.” And then Kepler … is appointed Foreign Minister, Rheinthaler is going to be this, Göring has these desires …” Globus and I were already in a silent rage “We are not yet that far.” He then went to Miklas and stated to him the German strategic concentration [Aufmarsch]. Smitz was also in there and Kepler would not permit talk of interference. He shouted at Smitz with the result that Smitz without one word went out through the door and already surrendered inwardly. He had nothing more wherewith to stem the coming flood.

Document 4005-PS

[The Attached Document Is The Text Of A Speech Made By Dr. Friedrich Rainer On 3/11/1942 In Klagenfurt Before The Leaders Corps And The Bearers Of Honor Insignia (Ehrenzeichen) And Blood Orders (Blutorden) Of The Gau Karinthia], Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 709-713.

In the meantime the situation was this: more and more people in the streets. We knew, that in the meantime in all the cities and villages of Austria torch processions, the demonstrations were getting under way. In Vienna also the streets were full. Many swastika armbands could be seen. The taking over of power was in full sway in the streets. It was 7 o'clock. At 7 o'clock it was so far, that, after a last attempt to negotiate with Miklas, he declared that he could not appoint a National Socialist as “Bundeskanzler". “God help me!” The situation in the chancellery [Bundeskanzleramt] had now become critical. Guards and police were occupying it. We were a very small group of illegal Nazis, really only Globus and I, a few more people of the field in between, Seyss, Glaise and Muehlmann, Kepler with Kaesemeier. At 7:30 o'clock I said, now the German Armed Forces are marching. Kepler said, the German Armed Forces are not at all marching. Yes, the ultimatum has expired. No, said Kepler, it is not so far. We must create a pretext for the Fuehrer to march in. We must take action of some sort. I said: We must use the moment, when the government believes that the march is on for action and I said, I will give the order for the “Machtuebernahme".

Kepler said, “you can not do that.” I said, “Klausner will give me his consent. You are not the authority, you have nothing to command.” Globus had to remain behind. I and Kaesemeier drove away. Globus had seized the telephone and constantly used the phone of the chancellery and kept up the connection with

our party offices on the outside. In the meantime Seyss had arrived and Glaise and they steadily continued their discussions under the pressure of the German marching in “Einmarsch". At our billets we found the leaders of the party-formations in highest tension. We occupied our command post in the center of the city. Klausner and Jury arrived there also. He had left the place.of safety, which he as General “Feldherr” must occupy and at this moment everything depended on Klausner. I described the situation to him and asked him for the order to strike the first blow. He gave it. I laid the order before the district leadership [Gauleitung] and with unheard of clearness and calmness gave it through by Mohrenschild over the telephone:

“1. Order: In the face of Schuschnigg’s resignation and in the absence of a legal government, the leader of the National Socialists, to maintain order and safety, has given the order to Klausner, to Minister Seyss-Inquart to carry out the government, and in agreement with Seyss-Inquart issued the order to seize the power to all party-formations.”

This first order was given out at 8 o'clock in the evening. In the meanwhile only one district had gone ahead and seized power--Carinthia. Sucher at that time had only requested of Pawlowski, whether he could later be judge again. He also requested, to be allowed to phone to Vienna next day, to get Schuschnigg’s confirmation. In Vienna also the actions were started. The SS and SA deployment [Einsaetze] were discussed with Lukesch and Kaltenbrunner. In the Bundes-Chancellery we could make headway only if we got it into our hands. In this whole action we always kept the 25 July in mind so as to avoid certain mistakes and accidents which we at that time had had. I asked Lukesch: how many men can you mobilize? “6000 men can march within half an hour.” Kaltenbrunner could organize L 500 SS men. These were to march to the Bundes-Chancellery. The resistance of the guards was to be overcome by fraternization. They have to take the Bundes-Chancellery. 50 SS-men, many of them men of the 25 July, received, under the leadership of Rinner the order, to occupy the building. Further orders to

take over the Vaterlaendische Front, industrial enterprises, electric power plant, State offices, town-hall. Colonel Angelis, then liaison-man between the party and the Armed Forces, received orders to take the Ministry of the Army. In the course of the seizure of power it was funny: We called out the Hitler Youth with the order, to create the mood for fraternization in the streets. Schoas who led the HJ, later told that he had given the order to carry fraternization to the extent that girls could throw their arms around a policeman’s neck. The whole inner city then was full of people and in all the other Bundeslaender it was exactly the same. The demonstrations of joy mounted. In the meantime was the last address of Schuschnigg, which ended with the song “Roses from Tyrol". Then Seyss spoke, for everybody was waiting for the announcement of the new government. It was 8:45 o'clock, that is when Globus called from the office in the Seizergasse. We simply cannot go on.

Klausner, Jury and I and Kaesemeier came to the Bundes-Chancellery. It was locked. We knocked, a policeman opened. Who is there? By order of Seyss we wanted to enter. Question passed back-then one came, led us through somewhere in the rear and there everybody was armed to the teeth. In the court were machine-guns. They wanted to prevent a new surprise attack like the one on 25 July. We were taken upstairs, up there the situation was the same as before. Seyss shrugged his shoulders. There is nothing can be done. I told about it: In the meantime we had started the strategic concentration of 6000 SA men, etc. Seyss went out to the Bundes-President and reported this to him. In the meantime the reports arrived of the seizure of power. But in the ; meanwhile all telephone conversations had been directed via Globus.

The Nazis in the Bundes-Chancellery were already organized, the man of the house was Globus, the house was occupied by policemen, around the house SA and SS, in the house were we, who acted and the Austrian government, who did not act. Act we did. Until 1 o'clock in the night Ludwig and his companion sent calls for help by wireless to Paris. We then put an end to this by placing two strapping SS-men in his room.

The negotiations continued tenaciously. I was aware that if Mr. Miklas finds out that the Reich does not march, the situation may become critical. As long as he does not know this he will be under the impression: The German avalanche rolls across the border. When this moment arrives we must be able to proclaim a National Socialist government.

I had a typewriter brought, I myself wrote again. I asked whether there was anybody who understands something about forming a government. Riemer came forward. He had worked illegally with us for a long time. I sat down on a couch and the table was so high that I recall it with horror. Seyss sat on one side and on the other side was Kepler, then Klausner and Globus, and the government of Seyss-Inquart was formed. Next to us was a telephone on which Jury was and he had a connection with the Ravag we had occupied, with the instruction to broadcast the news about the provisional change of Government. That had to be done to have a legal government right away. In any case, it would have been proclaimed legal by the Office of the Bundes Chancery.

But we had to wait some time yet. We had established this Government which was the same that was confirmed by Miklas three hours later. In the meantime, I telephoned in the Seizergasse and said a torch-light procession must be organized. This began to march. I ordered: The future members of the Government must come! They came.

Then a policeman arrived and aid: somebody is downstairs with a swastika armband, he had orders to occupy the Bundes Chancery. It was Riemer with 50 SS men. He was the first Nazi, in that night, whom I saw in the Bundes Chancery with the swastika armband. Seyss gave the permission that these men had to be admitted into the Bundes Chancery. That was enough; Globus brought them upstairs. In the meantime reports came from the provinces. Partly inquiries. Wintersteiger in Salzburg had gone to Mr. Rehrl and demanded assumption of power. Rehrl said that he had to inquire. He asked in the Bundes Chancery: “There is an individual with the name of Wintersteiger and, with reference to an order of the Bundes Chancellor Seyss-Inquart demanded the handing over of the Government authority.” Globus was on the other end of the line. He said: “Clear out as fast as possible.” Rehrl followed suit, and Wintersteiger took over. It happened the same way in all principal cities. In the meantime, the taking over of power had also been accomplished in Vienna. In the Bundes Chancery we played the National Marches.

In the meantime I drafted together with Klausner the proclamation which was to be published after the announcement of the government, and the further negotiations which were conducted by Seyss. Once the door opened and a strapping guardist arrived with beer and seltzer bottles and ham sandwiches for us. That was the first sign that we had assumed power.

But we were not yet through. At last, it was already around 12 o'clock. Miklas, under the pressure of the already accomplished seizure of power by the NSDAP in the whole of Austria, acknowledged the resignation of Schuschnigg, but did not yet appoint Seyss as Bundes-Chancellor, but has asked him to continue with the business of the Bundes Government. Seyss informed us of this. It was possible according to article 84, etc., of the Constitution. We read what this meant. This was a Government which required for each of its acts the counter-signature of the Bundes-President. Nothing could be done with such a Government. We had, however, to be satisfied. Therefore we have formed a second Government in accordance with article 84 of the Bundes-Constitution. Legal difficulties arose. Seyss therefore had to negotiate further. In the meantime, Himmler had phoned from Munich: whether we were not finished soon; he wanted to fly over already. We said he would have to wait yet. Klausner made a speech to the torchlight procession that was standing in front of the Bundes Chancellory. The members of the Government, Klausner, and Seyss stepped out on the balcony. I was in the midst of conferences and of issuing instructions. Globus arrived: “Friedel, you also must step onto the balcony!” I had to go. I said I had no time, and went back.

Document 4005-PS

[The Attached Document Is The Text Of A Speech Made By Dr. Friedrich Rainer On 3/11/1942 In Klagenfurt Before The Leaders Corps And The Bearers Of Honor Insignia (Ehrenzeichen) And Blood Orders (Blutorden) Of The Gau Karinthia], Part 06 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 713-715.

We continued working, and then-it was already after midnight-came Seyss and said: “I was appointed Bundes Chancellor. I must submit a list of the members of the Government.” We wrote, therefore, the third list of the Seyss-Inquart Government. Miklas did not appoint Klausner and Kaltenbrunner and refused to take them into the Government. We telephoned to Himmler that he could start. I said it does not make any difference what Miklas did, we need the signature. Thus the signature was obtained. Globus said: “We must go to the airport, Himmler is coming.” Seyss was tired, he drove home. Klausner was the leader of the party, and we drove to the airport. Hereby the following incident occurred. When we entered the car in the courtyard of the Bundes Chancellor, Skubl, who had to report to Himmler, was still in it. Outside the whole street was crowded with National Socialists. They noticed the departure of cars. First there was the car with Klausner, one with Kaltenbrunner, then a car with us. Suddenly I became very frightened. Skubl was sitting in here, nobody knows me and Globus, but everybody knows Skubl. When they see Skubl, anything can happen, we might even be killed by our own people. Skubl, however, crouched low in the car. In that way we arrived at the airport, and there we sat around. Excitement which nobody ever forgets who has experienced it. The SA from Aspern had already taken up position in civilian attire; they looked terrible. Skubl was so fatigued that he lay down in an office. We sat in the restaurant. Kaesemeier brought a ring of Cervelade-sausage. That was the first food I had, as I had not eaten the ham sandwiches in the Bundes Chancellery because I had no time. Then it was said: “He comes, Himmler.” Skubl was awakened in the last moment. SA men stood in the lobby of the airport, and the men of the Leader and of the Reichsfuehrer assembled outside. Then SS leaders stepped down from the airplane at whom we stared; men with machine-pistols formed a circle around the airplane, ready to fire.

They had no idea how it was. But Himmler saw immediately what was going on. We made a report, then we went into the airport. Klausner drove to town with Himmler to the Hotel Astoria where the quarters were. Globus said to me: there are a few more SS men who can ride with you. Then we ourselves had no car left. Globus and I were all alone. How could we get to town? There was no streetcar anymore. Globus began to telephone, at six o'clock he luckily caught a taxi. We got into it and drove to our quarters, slept an hour, and in the morning we both drove to our office. Hereby I saw: in the streets people with the swastika armbands, happy, the broken standards of the Vaterlaendischen Front. Newspapers were sold. I bought a paper where I read the results from the Bundes Capitals. I then realized what had happened there. The entire previous day we had been so engrossed in our fight and kept a clear head. We had to wait and operate coldly.

I therefore could only occupy myself with this task. I could not comprehend the greatness of the time. All that for which we fought for years, that we accomplished all this, that the fight was over, that was so incomprehensible. I had literally read the result the next day in the papers, and I had to take pins, to grit my teeth to control my emotion. Thus also ended the struggle of the Party.

The Fuehrer arrived on the same day. Klausner was ordered to report to the Fuehrer in Linz. We received from Klausner the order to follow him in an airplane. We flew to Linz with an airforce squadron and could report to the Fuehrer, receive his handshake, returned then to Vienna and were present when the Fuehrer on the second day, coming from St. Poelten, arrived in Vienna and made the most important announcement in German history.

Thus ended the struggle of the party for the power in Austria.

Document 4006-PS

[Bulletin of the Reich Minister for Armament and Munition], Part 01 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 715-717.

Page 1, Heading.

Page 2, column 1, lines 33-40

General Plenipotentiary for Labor commitment.

By request of the Reich Minister for Armament and Munition the Reichs Statthalter and Gauleiter Fritz SAUCKEL was appointed “General Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment” within the compass of the Four Year Plan.

[Pages 169-171]


Berlin, 12/1/1942

Enclosure 1 relative to Communication No. 16,1942 of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions

The Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions

The Commissioner for Armaments within the framework of the Four-Year Plan G. Z.: 9077-168/I

The Plenipotentiary general for Labor Commitment G. Z.: 5550/850

To the Heads of Armament Commissions, Armament Inspectors, and Armament Commanders

To the Presidents of Regional Labor Offices and Heads of Labor Offices.

Subject: Cooperation in the commitment of labor for armament purposes.

In order to meet completely and within the time set the demands made in the field of armaments it is an indispensable prerequisite that all offices involved cooperate as closely and as considerately as possible.

Inasmuch as the formation of armaments commissions out of government authorities and offices in the Greater German Reich which are concerned with the tasks to be accomplished in the armaments economy has already dealt with this need, from the organizational point of view, kY virtue of the decree of the Reich Marshal of Greater Germany, dated 9/17/1942, the following is set forth in regard to cooperation by offices of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions with the offices of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment:


For this cooperation the following presuppositions are to be the point of departure:

1. In keeping with his total responsibility for the issue of the armaments program, the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions alone will decide on all questions of priority for all armament assignments and the urgency in providing the labor needs involved in the armament programs.

2. To the extent that an outline of quotas for assignment of labor for the individual armament programs has not already been established in the “Central Planning Board"-in cooperation with the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment-he (the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions) will ascertain them and bring them to the attention of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment, submitting to him at the same time lists of the factories involved in the program. In special cases centrally ascertained assignment figures for individual plants will also be submitted (red slip procedure.)

3. In addition to the leading program directed by the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions, the tasks of the offices of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions will also extend to the following groups of industries:

Factories under the supervision of the Wehrmacht, machine tool, tool, and apprenticeship industry, industry building locomotives and coaches for the Reich railway, including repair shops, motor vehicle industry, merchant marine ship yards, petroleum industry, producers of fuel, gunpowder and explosives, chemical production plants, contractors and subcontractors of the above-mentioned groups of industry.

To the extent that the above-mentioned establishments are not under the supervision of the Wehrmacht, the respective supervising agencies are to be included.

Document 4006-PS

[Bulletin of the Reich Minister for Armament and Munition], Part 02 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 717-719.

4. Making available and directing laborers according to requirements of armament economy laid down by the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions, will be handled through the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment within the frame-work of his jurisdiction over labor commitment as a whole.

5. To carry through labor mobilization, the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment will give the necessary directives to the offices under his jurisdiction, for the execution of labor commitment distributes the available labor taking into consideration the varying degree of burden resting upon individual establishments who have armaments tasks, and other tasks of importance to the war.


1. In all questions pertaining to priority within the armament i field as they arise regionally, decisions will be up to the chairmen of the armaments commissions.

2. Having made contact with the presidents of the regional labor offices, they decide on the practicability and necessity for transferring labor from one plant to another within the same kind of production for the Wehrmacht in compliance with ret quests made by Wehrmacht units. In general, such transfers are to be approved only if they do not involve change of domicile for the respective worker. This restriction will not apply to key workers and who, upon the request of a committee, or a group, or of the supervising authority can temporarily be assigned to work in plants of similar production located elsewhere. Such applications in case of transfer within the area of an armaments commission will be acted on by the chairman, in case of transfers between plants, by the Armaments Office.

Transfers are to be made according to applications submitted to the respective authorities.

3. Armaments offices will participate decisively when, through measures taken by the labor commitment offices, the course of armament production of the plant will be essentially affected and to the extent that through their inclusion a rational commitment of labor within armament industry will be encouraged. (par. III, 2).

4. The district labor offices take care of fulfilling demands for armament according to directives of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment.

They check up on the normal need to be reported to them by armament plants, compare it with statistics on needs possibly given them from central offices, and they work out a plan of coverage taking into consideration all labor reserves to be recruited locally.

They inform central offices where needs backed by lists are found to be inaccurate as regards kind and amount involved, or where it appears that plants do not obey instructions to give up employees.

On the employment of labor resulting from the man power gained by a decrease in central needs, for the benefit of other armament plants with jobs of high priority, the chairman of the Armaments Commission will decide.

Labor commitment offices will at once commit locally available labor and such labor reserves as are made available through the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment.

5. Wherever the prerequisites are met, numerically limited intra-plant measures of equalization as well as transfers involving more than one establishment in order to cover specially urgent needs-will be carried out directly, in which case care must be taken that the withdrawal of labor in the first case will not endanger completion within set time of assignments as per stages Ii, II and III of priority order (r Labor assignment, 8/14/1942; in the second case also including stage IV) be not jeopardized.


1. As regards execution of individual assignments which are of particular importance for the course of the armaments program, the chairman of the armaments commission will appoint investigation committees. They will be directed by members of the Commitment Administration which will be appointed in consultation with the president of the regional labor offices.

2. Following a suggestion of Labor Commitment offices and supervisory offices, such investigation committees will be operative

a. in examining supplementary supply requests of appreciable volume, and especially whenever doubts arise in regard to demands given centrally.

b. in examining principles underlying plant-equalization measures, in order to meet a greater demand,

c. in connection with screening measures called for by fluctuations in the urgency in programs; changes in the employment situation especially through withdrawal of orders; scarcity of raw materials; scarcity of power and seasonal fluctuations.

d. in the case of equalization measures involving more than one establishment to assure a wholesome structure conducive to attainment of the highest possible labor yield in all armaments establishments (inclusion of skilled labor, foreign labor, female labor, in proportionate measure).

3. In each instance the investigation committee must include one representative of the armaments inspection and of the labor commitment administration. Depending upon the type of work involved, there should also be included an additional representative of the military area, the armaments foreman and, in special cases, additional experts.

4. The committee may transfer the task of investigation to individual members.

5. Preparations for investigations can be assigned to local labor commitment offices.

6. Suggestions of the investigation committee for transfer of personnel must be carried out by the labor commitment offices unless, within ten days of announcement to the plants involved, protest is raised by the latter or by the supervising agency. Reduction of labor will be made according to limitation imposed by paragraph II, figure 5.

7. Protests raised against suggestions made by the investigation committee will be acted upon by the chairman of the armaments commission.

Document 4006-PS

[Bulletin of the Reich Minister for Armament and Munition], Part 03 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 719-721.

Doubtful cases which in their regional aspect cannot be finally clarified, must be referred to the central offices which will make a decision. It is expected that all parties involved will at all times remain aware of the magnitude and urgency of the present armament tasks and of the decisive importance that cooperation without friction will have, and at all times there will exist just one will everywhere, namely to master completely and in the spirit of closes comradeship what is left to be accomplished.

[signed] SAUCKEL

[signed] SPEER

[Page 323, column 1, line 1 to column 2, line 12]

Berlin, 9/16/1943

The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production General Plenipotentiary for Armament Tasks within the compass of the Four Year Plan.

Decree dated 9/16/1943 concerning the tasks of the Office for Planning issued by the General Plenipotentiary for Armament Tasks within the compass of the Four Year Plan and of the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production. By decree dated 9/4/1943 the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich has established a Planning-Office in my Ministry for the purpose of a coordinate treatment of all basic questions of war economic planning.

Hereto I decide:

1. The Planning Office prepares the decisions of the Central Planning Board and supervises their execution.

2. For this purpose it has in particular to prepare the distribution of the raw materials (e.g. ore, metals, coal, mineral oil, nitrogen and other important raw materials) to the consumers.

3. The Planning Office must establish for the Central Planning Board-as its standard order of procedure-the production and distribution for the entire war economy the basis of which shall be the planning of the requirements for the entire German sphere of influence. Hereby import and export must be considered. The entire planning must be previously coordinated with the administrations and agencies concerned under consideration of the prerequisites of production. The Planning Office has to correlate and utilize currently the necessary statistic material.

4. The Planning Office must propose to the Central Planning Board for its decision the assignment of all workers in the Greater German sphere of influence to the individual main sectors (industrial war economy, transport, food, etc.) and draw up statistics for its execution.

[Page 357 Column 1, lines 1-6]

Berlin, 3/2/1944

The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production.

Combat against lack of discipline of the workers in the plants. To all Works Managers!

[Page 357, column 2, line 17 to page 358, column 1, line 20]

Loafers and defaulting workers will be punished according to the extent of their offense. As established in the annexed decree, Trade-educational measures are first of all to be used, and the inclusion of the German Labor Party is most urgently recommended. Should these educational measures prove insufficient, notorious loafers i.e. malevolent elements and defaulting workers must be dealt with severely. The next step is to send them to a labor training camp for a period up to 56 days or in more severe cases to a concentration camp. The competent police-authorities decide whether a transfer to a labor training camp or to a concentration camp is to be effected and for how long. On their release from detention, workers must on principle be sent back to their former place of employment. Thus no plant will permanently lose its workers by their denunciation.

I must now state, that unexplicably some of the Works Managers do not use these measures and prefer to reckon constantly with a certain absenteeism caused by loafers.

For reasons of output one of the tasks of the Works Managers is to diminish it by all means at their disposal, and to take all possible care to assure a high number of workers assuming duty in any situation and season. I therefore demand of every single works manager to exhaust all given possibilities of overcoming any existing lack of discipline at work, and also to instruct his works assistants concerning these tasks.

[signed] SPEER.

[Page 411, column 2, from line 11]

Berlin, 6/22/1944

The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production Plenipotentiary General for the Labor Commitment

Document 4006-PS

[Bulletin of the Reich Minister for Armament and Munition], Part 04 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 721-724.

Mutual work of Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment and of the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production

The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production and the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment have agreed to a still closer cooperation between their offices in order to meet the increased demands for armaments and war production in all fields.

The chairman of the Armament Commission together with other members of the Armament Commission has to see to it that all measures required for this should be taken and brought into harmony with other armament affairs. In the sphere of labor commitment in Armament and War Production guiding principles will currently be issued jointly by the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production and the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment.

The labor available to the entire Armament and War Production are to be committed according to the basic principles of the most rational commitment of labor on the basis of centrally issued instructions or on the basis of decisions of the President of the Armament Commission.

The President of the Gau Labor Office is obliged to execute without delay the decisions of the chairman of the Armament Commission in all cases of examination of requirements, acknowledgment of requirements and the transfer of labor. In cases where he thinks that the decision arrived at is not on account

[Page 412, column 1]

of consideration of principle suitable in regard to Labor Commitment, he is to inform the Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment, which however does not have a delaying effect on the decision for the chairman of the Armament Commission.

The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment will bring these cases to the notice of the Reich Minister of Armament and War Production and bring about a decision.

The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production [signed] SPEER

The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment [signed] SAUCKEL

Berlin, 6/22/1944

The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production ZA/Org. 223/61

Decree with reference to Intermediary Authorities

As the distribution of tasks in War Industry as regulated by my decree of 10/29/1943 not printed in communications has proved to be correct, the New Order of the Intermediary Authorities as was held out in prospect in this decree, should now be tackled. The installation of Armament Commissions which has stood the test in every respect for 1½ years without doubt forms the best foundation for the New Order of Intermediary Authorities. The Chairmen of the Armament Commissions, who according to the above mentioned Decree, Paragraph IV 3a, were to direct uniformly all the offices engaged in questions of armament industry and had to give the necessary instructions to the members of the Armament Commissions should more than ever be made chiefly responsible for the course of Armament in their district. In order to supply the chairmen immediately for the time being with the necessary personal informations and instructions, I have already begun to call them together for official discussions at short regular intervals.

In order further to intensify the activity of the Chairmen of the Armament Commissions I moreover ordain as follows:

[Page 412 column 2]

1. The Offices of my Ministry in the future are to direct all decrees, circulars etc. which are basic in nature, intended for the Armament Commissions and their members, directly to the Chairmen of the Armament Commissions and if occasion arises to send copies at the same time directly to the immediately interested members of the Armament Commission.

2. The Chairman of the Armament Commission together with the members of the Armament Commission is to take care that all the requisite measures are taken and shall be brought into harmony with other interests of Armament, which are necessary in order to meet the increased demands of Armament and War Production in all districts. In the future there will currently be issued jointly guiding principles of the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production and the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment in the field of Labor Commitment in Armament and War Production.

The Presidents of the Gau Labor Offices are obliged to execute without delay the decisions of the chairman of the Armament Commission in all cases of examination of requirements, acknowledgment of requirements and transfer of labor.

The other members of the Armament Commission and the offices engaged in questions of Armament are obliged to proceed in accordance with the instructions of the chairmen and also in cases where special tasks were assigned to them in the decree of 10/29/1943 Paragraph IV. If for instance the agricultural offices have to direct through their Power Consultant the power industry or to regulate the Armament Offices, amongst others the labor commitment within Armament and War Production and the transportation and traffic matters as well as order warehouses, the President of the Armament Commission can intervene authoritatively in the execution of these tasks, so far as there are no special central instructions in individual cases.

[Page 413 column 1 39 lines]

Only under these presuppositions can the Chairman — of the Armament Commission be responsible for the highest output of Armament and War Production, within his district.

3. The delegates, plenipotentiaries, special plenipotentiaries and the like appointed by me, in so far as the continuance of their activity according to the examination now in progress still appears necessary, are to get into touch with the chairman at the beginning of their activity in the domain of an Armament Commission and to regulate with him the execution of their task in accordance with local exigencies and given conditions. This order will be made known also to the delegates for careful attention.

Document 4006-PS

[Bulletin of the Reich Minister for Armament and Munition], Part 05 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 724-727.

4. I lay particular emphasis on close agreement between the Chairmen of the Armament Commissions with the Gauleiters as Reich Defense Commissioners in all questions which concern the sphere of their tasks. The Gauleiters are to be currently informed through the Chairmen of Armament Commissions about the most important matters and in case of necessity to ask their support for their execution. At possible plant inspections it is self-evident they must be given corresponding information about manufacture etc. in these plants.

I expect all the offices and people active in Armament and War Production to take into account the above decree and to avoid, above all, any competitive quarrels for which I have no sympathy.

[Signed] SPEER

[Pages 456 and 457]

Executory Decree concerning the agreement of 6/22/1944 re collaboration of the Plenipotentiary-General for Labor Commitment and the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production of 8/21/1944.

To promote labor commitment in the professional war industry, especially in armaments in the best possible way by reason of the mutual agreement of 6/22/1944 the following executory instructions are given:

1. The Labor Commitment Offices are to take all steps to ensure themselves regular supervision concerning the employment situation in the area under their jurisdiction and to watch all manufacturing branches and workshops to see if labor will be available for a short term or for a longer period. (Seasonal fluctuations in employment situation in the various manufacturing branches; completion of jobs tying up labor, especially emergency jobs in the construction and communications industries; transfer of production jobs and the like.)

In regard to the factories in professional war industry the Labor Commitment Offices will inform the competent chairmen of the Armament Commissions or the competent Armament Offices by way of suggestion or proposal.

The Armament Commissions or the Armament Offices will immediately examine these proposals and suggestions as regards feasibility of execution and will effect the necessary measures which will be executed through the Labor Commitment Offices.

2. The Labor Commitment Offices are to see to it as far as armament factories are concerned, within the scope of the examination committees together with the Armament Offices, that industrial commitment will assume as rational a form as possible (Exchange of younger workers for older ones, of men for women, of skilled workers for unskilled, of foreigners, employed at easy tasks, for natives etc.).

Where they jointly determine that workers are allocated unnecessarily, impractically or technically misfit, the Armament-and-Labor Commitment Offices will initiate the necessary steps. The commitment of these workers in favor of the armament industry is executed according to paragraph 7 of this decree.

As far as the Labor Commitment Offices establish adequate observations in factories of the other professional war industry the necessary proposals have to be submitted to the competent chairman of the Armament Commission immediately, if the offices in charge do not agree with the measures of the Labor Commitment Offices. After hearing from the offices in charge he decides according to a strict standard appropriate to the labor commitment situation, if the proposals of the Labor Commitment Administration can be met.

3. The Armament Offices for their part will also inform the Labor Commitment Offices about observations concerning shortages in the industrial labor commitment and the possibility of release of workers and jointly with them will effect relief of the shortages. As far as the shortages affect factories in professional war industry the Labor Commitment Offices are to relieve them in agreement with the chairman of the Armament Commission. The commitment of workers possibly to be released is to take place according to paragraph 7.

4. The Armament Offices will inform the Offices of the Labor Commitment Administration about fluctuations in urgency rendering feasible the postponement of jobs to be completed and the release of workers. In appraising fluctuations in urgency for armament the Labor Commitment Offices are bound by the decisions of the chairman of the Armament Commission.

5. During occurrences, especially important for Labor Commitment (injury to industrial production from enemy air operations with temporary release of part of the staff, loss of workers, on the move due to destruct-ion of their dwellings, transfer of factories etc.) both of the offices are to cooperate closely from the very first. They must jointly examine how a practical commitment of laborers, collectively rational, would be possible.

6. In fundamental questions of Labor Commitment of special importance for advancement of armament (Mobilization of labor from circles 7 persons and of the population, that have not worked previously, commitment of war-invalids, of students, racial Germans, commitment of families, prisoners, concentration camp inmates) both of the Offices are to examine jointly, how the directions issued centrally may best be brought into effect regionally. The Armament Offices are to do away with the difficulties by all means available, wherever there are obstructions in plants against commitment of certain groups of persons. They are to expedite in every way the creation of appropriate working conditions for the commitment of persons who are not at once fully productive.

7. To cover the demands both of the Offices are monthly on the occasion of the examination of the demands, utilizing all above sketched regional possibilities, to set up a joint plan for the guidance of the Labor Offices in their measures of allocation. By continual close connection the plan will be assured, of being continually adapted to the daily needs of armament, and that suddenly arising urgent demands in particular will if occasion arises be covered by supplementary measures with the necessary dispatch.

The commitment of labor available for professional war industry takes place according to the actual valid order of precedence for the distribution of labor or according to the special demands of the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production. The special demands and red slips must hereby take precedence in being covered.

Demands of the Chairman of the Armament Commission to give preference to coverage of a definite labor demand by reason of special emergencies, are to be met from the Gau labor Offices.

The commitment of labor still available after covering the special demands will be carried out by the Labor Commitment Offices in close agreement with the Chairmen of the Armament Commissions.

Document 4006-PS

[Bulletin of the Reich Minister for Armament and Munition], Part 06 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 727.

8. Proposals for transfer made by Main Committees and Rings which exceed the competency of an Armament Commission are to be centrally examined as to necessity and practicability. However as the regional circumstances cannot always be completely supervised centrally for each single case, the Regional Offices concerned must also with all means strive to have all super-regional movements limited to a minimum, that is to say, for instance a demand for auxiliary workers must under all circumstances be covered by regional measures and not by transfer from far distant plants. The danger existing for the unity of Labor Commitment when a larger number of Committees and Rings initiate Labor Commitment measures that are partially contradictory, under some circumstances even for the individual plants, must be excluded by a strong regional control and a strong regional activity.

The super district transfers granted by the central offices (Reich Minister for Armament and War Production and Plenipotentiary General for Labor) are to be executed within the time set from the offices of the Labor Commitment Administration, if necessary by settling formalities subsequently.

As far as intra regional transfer measures are necessary after all possibilities of Labor Commitment have been exhausted and are ordered by the chairmen, they are to be executed by the Regional Labor Offices and the Labor Offices within the time set. The formalities delaying transfer are also to be taken care of subsequently.

9. For execution of the above mentioned measures both of the offices are to institute special examination of plants to the extent necessary. These are to be accomplished by the examination committees or by special deputies. Detailed directives will follow shortly.

Concerning Labor Commitment matters of armament both of the Offices in the future are to act unanimously towards factories and other offices. Such close cooperation will enable the regional reserves for the armament to be exhausted still more effectively than heretofore and will cause an over all intensification of the armament work which will ensure an increase in armament production.

Berlin, 8/21/1944

[signed] SAUCKEL

[signed] SPEER

Title: “Document 4009-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 728.

Munich Ainmillerstrasse 39, 4/21/1938

The Pressereferent of the Supremecommand of the SA and Main office of the Editor of the “Der SA Man”

Office Rosenberg Entry No. 1169 Oy 4/23/1938 8a E

Reichleader [Reichsleiter] Alfred Rosenberg Berlin


The periodical “Der SA Mann” looks back these days upon 10 years of its existence. This is for us the occasion to publish an enlarged edition dated May 15th. As you, dear Reichsleiter, on the occasion of the reception of the Culture circle [Kulturkreis] of the SA proposed a contribution to our combat paper, I take the liberty of begging you once more to put at our disposal for the Jubilee edition an article, e.g., on the subject “Ideology and Combat-paper” ["Weltanschatung und Kampfblatt"] or something similar to it.

I do hope that you will be agreeable to our wish and I am convinced that especially a contribution from your pen will be greeted with particular enthusiasm by our 750000 subscribers.

If we should receive your contribution before the 8th of May we could see to an appropriate make up.

May I beg you, Reichsleiter, to give me a positive answer.

Heil Hitler! [signed]: Koerbel Obersturmbannfuehrer.

Document 4011-PS

Third Report Regarding The Activity Of The SA In War Time, Part 01 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 730-732.

[stamp] Confidential

[in pencil]: Munich, Barer Street 7-11, 6/23/1941 Telephone: 5 47 91

To be returned to Office ROSENBERG after acknowledgment

The Supreme Command of the SA. [in pencil]: Dr. Meyer.

1. From the beginning of the war the entire work of the SA is only directed to the goal determined by the Fuehrer, namely to carry on the war to the final decision. The SA man at the front and in the hinterland, as well as the millions of volunteers in the SA military training detachments (SA-Kriegswehrmannschaften), know that the war will be won by Germany. The question of the duration of the war changes nothing in the firm will for victory. It is also general knowledge that the Fuehrer has military operations carried out only after the most intensive preparation and at a time when they will most likely result in a minimum of victims of German blood.

2. The morale of the SA men, the volunteers of the SA military training detachments and also of the women of the SA men in the field becomes apparent in uncounted letters interchanged between front and home and which come to the knowledge of the supreme SA leadership, by the Welfare Offices (Betreuungsdienststellen) of the SA.

[illegible initials]

These letters show how different is the bearing of the German people in this war compared to its bearing in the years of the World War. An unshakeable belief in the power of the German Communal destiny, in the statesmanship and in the generalship of the Fuehrer, in the leadership and bravery of our soldiers, and in the surpassing effect of their arms, show up in every one of these letters which are partly written in the most primitive way. They also demonstrate that the necessity for renunciation and restrictions, for sacrifices and the greatest efforts of all workers, as the fight for the existence of the German nation demands is thoroughly recognized.

[Page 2 of orig.]

3. The SA in the Wehrmacht. Almost all men of the SA who are capable of bearing arms, in so far as they need not remain in plants essential for the war effort, are in the Army, in the Air Force, or in the Navy, and most of them with fighting units; at the present time they number 789685, up to 65% in individual groups. 80% of the SA Leader Corps (SAFuehrerkorps), among them 95% of all SA Colonels (Standartenfuehrer), … are in the Armed Forces and have participated in the fighting from the very beginning. The largest part of the “Standarte Feldherrnhalle” consists of parachutists: the “Standarte” took part in forming the cadre of this troop. Their performance and success in the fighting in the West, especially in Holland, and in Crete are established historically.

The remainder of the “Standarte Feldherrnhalle” is included in an infantry division as an infantry battalion; this battalion first fought successfully on the front near Saarlautern and later assisted in the breakthrough of the Maginotline, and it is now fighting in the East. The leader of this unit in peace time, SA-Colonel (SA-Standartenfuehrer) BRAUN (Major of the reserve) was killed in the fighting in Crete. The first war time commander of the battalion, SA Colonel (SA-Standartenfuehrer) RABEN (Major of the reserve) was killed storming the French line of pill boxes. His successor is Major BOEHME who comes from the ranks of the SA (possessor of the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross).

The “Standarte” has done honor to its proud name. The proportion of the losses of the SA in the total losses, is higher than the proportion of SA-men with regular units on the total strength of the fighting units, and also higher than the percentage of losses of German soldiers altogether.

Up to 5/25/1941, in other words about one month before the beginning of the campaign in the East, 9,445 SA-men were reported as killed in action, amongst them 6 SA-Generals [Obergruppenfuehrer] or SA-Lieutenant Generals [Gruppenfuehrer], 5 SA-Major Generals [Brigadefuehrer], 7 SA-Brigadiers [Oberfuehrer] and 14 SA-Colonels [Standartenfuehrer].

The following decorations given to the SA can so far be confirmed: 21 Knight’s Crosses of the Iron Cross, 31,125 Iron Crosses second and first class.

[Page 3 of orig.]

On war and/or auxiliary war ships approximately 40% of the crew was decorated with the Iron Cross; of the SA-men used on similar ships 72% and/or 75% received the Iron Cross.

Of the two first Infantry Combat Badges (Inf. Sturmabzeichen) which could be awarded, one was issued to an SA-man.

Because of good achievements in the armed services so far a total of 120000 SA-men has been promoted to officers and/or non-commissioned officers so far during the war.

The letters of unit commanders who previously did not have any relations with the SA to the Chief of Staff (Stabschef) and the Supreme SA-leadership about the behavior of SA-men in combat units are numerous. These communications testify that the SA-men in unison with the leadership-corps of the active unit have formed the backbone of the units in combat.

Communications of this kind also give information about the SA-men in detail. One battalion commander without any connections with the SA (Captain K), for example, writes to the Supreme SA-leadership on 2/9/1941 amongst other things:

“In leaving my battalion my heart urges me to report quite privately to the Supreme SA-leadership of an exemplary SA-man. He is Standartenfuehrer Erich Schl.

“At the Fuehrer’s call to arms on 8/25/1939 Standartenfuehrer Schl. reported voluntarily and entered my company as a rifleman. I did not know him and I did not know anything about him. Schl. was rifleman 1 of machine gun 1 as nobody like him, and already days later he was the spiritual leader of his group. The hearts of all men turned toward him, he was the model of a German soldier; above all he from the very first devoted himself in his spare time to spiritual care and the National-Socialist educational task within the company.

Document 4011-PS

Third Report Regarding The Activity Of The SA In War Time, Part 02 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 732-734.

We stood on the west wall, we marched in Poland. I did not give anything to Schl. free. The greater his tasks, the more untirelessly he worked. The hearts of the whole company belonged to Schl.

[ Page 4 of orig. ]

“In the West Schl. commanded my 2nd platoon as Staff Sergeant (Feldwebel). Reconnaissance-troop leader, spearheadleader, he was always the first in the company. In storming Fort Barchon, Schl. exemplarily proved his worth in spite of being wounded. I was pleased when the battalion commander presented him with the Iron Cross 2nd Class. Schl. became a lieutenant, and today he is my adjutant. For more than 17 months we have stood side by side in the fight for Fuehrer and nation. We became comrades. It may well be the duty of each and every SA-man to live and to fight in such as way as Schl.

“He, however, is an example in this.”

Such estimations of the individual SA-man exist in large numbers with the Supreme SA-leadership. Only one of the first ones according to time was to be shown here. However, all of them show in the same manner the behavior of SA-men in combat units.

Just as in the year 1940 the Chief of Staff (Stabschef) repeatedly took occasion to visit SA-men with units of the army and the air forces, so in the spring of 1941 a journey took him to the SA-men who enlisted in the navy and who are serving in Holland, Belgium and France in the field of coast-security.

4. The SA in the Communications Zone. a. The SA-men who have remained in the communications zone primarily care for the maintenance of the SA-organization. All units, even the smallest ones are alive, and the men willingly sacrifice their spare time for duty in the party. This includes assistance to the political leaders in the educational and orientation tasks, propaganda and counter-propaganda, preparations for meetings, control of the population in frontier areas, and care of repatriated Germans from abroad, auxiliary work during enemy air attacks, extension of air raid precaution facilities, black-out control, harvest-assistance and harvest-protection, emergency service. During the flood-catastrophe on the Elbe in the spring of 1941, for example, there were SA-Engineer units who first arrived to effect assistance and who by means of their amphibious equipment saved humans and animals from drowning. For all tasks of this kind SA-units will be employed according to requirements.

[Page 5 of Orig.]

In a similar manner SA-men are constantly employed to assist the National-Socialist Public Welfare (NSV), for collections, for supplying the needy with coal, for the preparation of billets and in auxiliary service of all kinds.

Numerous SA-leaders and sub-leaders [Unterfuehrer] were furnished to the German Labor Front (DAF) for duty in the TODT organization.

b. The SA also fulfills extensive authoritative requirements and helps wherever the participation of the SA for the fulfillment of tasks in connection with the war is desired, for example in the Frontier Control Service, during investigations etc.

c. Those duty achievements of the SA, which deal with direct support of the armed forces and which benefit the poller of German arms, have developed in all directions.

At the time this report is written and/or in the previous weeks the following were employed: 9 groups SA-units for dispatching horses and war equipment; 21 groups SA-men for guarding prisoners; 8 groups SA-men to watch and salvage enemy planes; 18 groups SA-men to guard vital communication points; 21 groups SA-men to assist in the transports of wounded.

19 SA-groups have formed blood-donor units for the Armed Forces. In the group Berlin-Brandenburg, for example, 8615 SA-men reported voluntarily as the result of one single call for this sacrifice. Of these 2855 are at the disposal of the Armed Forces as permanent blood donors (Group O). In the SA-Group Central (Mitte) a Medical Troop Leader has used 66,400 cubic meters in 166 cases, and a Medical Platoon leader [Rottenfuehrer] 30,200 cubic meters in 74 cases. Similar reports are on hand from many other groups.

[Page 6 of orig.]

The preliminary military training practiced by the SA since the outbreak of war on a voluntary basis in the SA-war defense groups [Kriegswehrmannschaften] has been already explained in detail in reports 1 and 2 regarding the activity of the SA in the war.

This educational work is primarily to assist the fighting spirit, to retain and fortify the willingness to fight, and to harden the National-Socialist communal idea in German men to become an uncompromising testimonial to the comradeship in arms.

The practical training, that is the means of education, includes physical exercises on the basis of achievement regulations for the SA-military badge [SA-Wehrabzeichen], for the SA-Engineer, SA-Signals, SA-Medical, and SA-Riding certificate.

Planned target practice, instruction and practice in handling and cleaning rifles, as well as shooting on the range and in the field, and furthermore the throwing of hand-grenades under assumed combat conditions are included in the marksmanship service [Schiessdienst].

In terrain duty, the knowledge of maps, spotting of terrain, description of terrain, utilisation of terrain, transmission of reports, sketches, orientation in the terrain with map and compass, target approach and calibration are being primarily practiced. Camouflaging with the utmost variety of ground-coverings and marching in daytime and in the dark with and without gas-mask are also required.

[Page 7 of orig.]

Additional signal training is provided for such as feel especially attracted to the Signal Corps and is subject to the efficiency regulations laid down in the Signals certificate established by the German High Command.

Since the outbreak of war preparatory training for radio operators is carried on in single SA groups and special importance is attached to it. Within the sphere of the SA groups Donau (Danube) alone 4196 men were trained for the Air Signals Corps. The success achieved led to the pre-military training of radar-operators for the Air Force being agreed upon in 3/1941 and accepted by all SA groups on request of the Reich Air Ministry.

The Reich Postmaster General has put suitable elements of the Reich postal service at the disposal of the SA as instructors. Already in the first training course 4200 volunteers were given preliminary training as wireless operators.

The training for sapper and medical services, riding and driving is additional also, i.e. the volunteers in question are classified like any others for the basic training in shooting and ground duties and in addition undergo the so-called special training.

Document 4011-PS

Third Report Regarding The Activity Of The SA In War Time, Part 03 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 734-737.

In the Marine SA and Army Training Detachments affiliated to these units, the practical training is carried on according to the requirements of the Naval High Command (O.K.M.).

The pre-military army training by the SA includes all men over 18 years of age, who have not yet done their service, are worthy having not to bear arms and are subject to the draft, in so far as they volunteer. Since the drawing of the report 2 of 21-6-1940 on the wartime activities of the SA, they were being trained in SA Military Training Detachments.

[Page 8 of orig.]

In 6/1940 out of 1262388 listed volunteers 655,688; 7/1940 out of 1191460 listed volunteers 605228; 8/1940 out of 1191737 listed volunteers 565044; 9/1940 out of 1162057 listed volunteers 534921; 10/1940 out of 1117888 listed volunteers 484125; 11/1940 out of 1093780 listed volunteers 459551; 12/1940 out of 864405 listed volunteers 385476; 1/1940 out of 867120 listed volunteers 358261; 2/1940 out of 848388 listed volunteers 322148; 3/1940 out of 817295 listed volunteers 302954; 4/1940 out of 801599 listed volunteers 290616; 5/1940 out of 779821 listed volunteers 276915

As only a limited number of instructors are available, only one-third of the volunteers can take part in the training at a time. In report 2 of 6/21/1940, these educational and training duties of the SA are given the appreciation and acknowledgment of the Supreme Commanders of the 5 branches of the Armed Forces as well as of the Chief of the Army High Command.

Meanwhile the acting Generals in Command and numerous troop commanders, having been present during the service of the SA Military Training Detachments (SA Kriegswehrmannschaften) have expressed themselves in the same sense. Some of these opinions are quoted:

Acting Army Corps Headquarters I.A.K.:

“Those having enjoyed pre-military army training delight especially in their military service; they distinguish themselves from the masses by their firm carriage, discipline ad sense of order. With lengthened pre-military training the acquirements in ground duties, map-reading and shooting-instruction are noticeable. A quicker understanding of these branches of the service facilitates training. More efficient shooting has been confirmed everywhere.”

[Page 9 of orig.]

Acting Corps Headquarter IInd AK (Army Corps):

“The opinions about the value of the preliminary military training are somewhat divergent; however on the whole there is emphasis on a favorable training of replacements as to conduct character, enthusiasm for the job and readiness for action basic knowledge of field duties and in shooting.”

Acting Corps Headquarters IIIrd AK (Army Corps)

“The better military character, the better conduct and behavior, a quicker and better understanding for the official duties, are acknowledged.”

Acting Corps Headquarter IVth AK (Army Corps)

“The preliminary military training is favorably noticeable in the newly enlisted recruits.

It is stressed, that the basic training is essentially facilitated and advanced by the preliminary military training. The military bearing and the personal attitude are unmistakable; the men are more interested and as far as ability to perform is concerned are above average especially at the beginning of the basic training. Training in shooting is very successful, in exercising and in field duties they also excel advantageously. The army recognizes the preliminary military training in the SA military staffs and characterized it as beneficial for the basic training.”

Service Command Headquarters IV

“It may be stated in recapitulation that the Army almost without exception recognizes the value of the preliminary military training through the SA and characterized it an advantage for the training of recruits.”

Acting Corps Headquarter Vth AK (Army Corps)

“On the occasion of my presence at the training of the SA army staff on 6/2/1940. I established that the preliminary military physical training of the SA staff, especially under the difficult conditions brought about by the present times, is being practiced by all those concerned with great zeal, and has partially produced rather good results.”

Acting Corps Headquarters VIIth AK (Army Corps)

“The recruits with preliminary military training generally show already after a short training-time and advantage over the

[Page 10 of orig.]

other recruits more or less important according to the quality of the training received. Especially concerning the willingness to act, preparedness, character, subordination, perceptive faculty as well as in shooting-and field duties. Therefore the preliminary military training is certainly suitable, to facilitate considerably the training of recruits in the Replacement Army … .”

Document 4011-PS

Third Report Regarding The Activity Of The SA In War Time, Part 04 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 737-739.

Acting Corps Headquarters VIIIth AK (Army Corps):

“Most of those men contrast favorably with the other recruits as regards soldierly bearing, physical and mental agility and enthusiasm for the job. Through their elementary knowledge of field service and shooting and training in marching their training advances rapidly. The Acting Corps Headquarters wish that as many recruits as possible may participate in this preliminary military training.”

Acting Corps Headquarters IXth AK (Army Corps):

“The Acting Corps Headquarters asked for a report from the subordinate units some time ago about the effectiveness in the Army of the preliminary military army-training of the SA. Nearly all offices are emphasizing that the recruits having gone through the school of preliminary military training of the SA, excel the others in assurance of behavior and in prompt adaptability to military life. They showed throughout a good comprehension of duties and a definite understanding for military tasks. The value of the preliminary military training was confirmed especially for shooting and field training. The Signal Corps Units have especially stressed the good technical training of those who have preliminary military training. A few offices have remarked that it is desirable, for the SA army personnel who have a certificate confirming successful participation in the preliminary military training, should, when issued this certificate be informed by the SA, that they should, when reporting for military service instantly announce the possession of such a certificate, so that the military unit might be informed beforehand in regard to this fact.”

Acting Corps Headquarters X AK (Army Corps.):

“The basic principle of the preliminary military instruction in the SA militia has to be answered entirely in the affirmative and its development on a still larger basis is to be aimed at, especially as the presently valid principle of reporting voluntarily generally comprises only those circles interested to a higher degree in military service.”

[Page 11 of orig.]

Acting General Command XIII army corps:

“For short term training, membership in the SA-armed forces will be a very good military preparatory school. Belonging to these armed forces must be compulsory, so that all recruits entering the army may have more or less the same preparatory military training.

Those trained in specialized SA formations (intelligence, engineers, health) have more or less knowledge on which to build the military training. This has particularly been the case for men trained in the intelligence service.”

Acting General Command XVII army corps.:

“Those with preliminary military training display a better bearing, greater interest in military things, good will, eagerness and valuable skill in the use of weapons The degree of training acquired by preliminary training in cities is better than the training acquired in the country. For some reserve formations the training of the SA men was so good, that after only 6-8 weeks of training they could be used as assistant instructors.

The preliminary military training has in our experience so far proved to be very valuable, the existing installations should be extended.”

Acting General command XVIII army corps:

“Good and partly very good results were observed among those who had received preliminary military training in SA formations. The men with preliminary training show a good mental attitude, philosophical broad mindedness and willingness to serve. From the beginning they displayed a smart military bearing and discipline, a superiority in the knowledge of basic military conceptions, and in fundamental training in drill. The basic military training was greatly speeded up by the acquired knowledge and their special training could be begun after a short time. In many reserve formations it was possible after a few weeks to employ them as assistant instructors, and in certain cases some could even be employed as independent instructors after 8 weeks of service.”

[Page 12 of orig.]

Acting General command XX army corps:

“It must be admitted that the preliminary military training in the SA has produced good results.”

Acting General command XXI army corps:

“The army has always obtained good results with recruits who had gone through preliminary military training in SA troops. The preliminary military training has proved to facilitate greatly the short term training of recruits. The advantages appear specially in field training and in technical knowledge of weapons. These men are physically better trained and show more resistance and endurance under prolonged strain (marches). Their zeal and efficiency in military matters, their better comprehension and their good comradeship may be stressed.”

Chief of signals and communications of the Luftwaffe:

“The chief of S and C (NVW) has received information from the Higher Signal “Fuehrer” of air command No. 4 that 4 men are being trained as Radar operators by the signal units of the SA groups in area No. 4 of the air fleet. The chief of Signals and Communications approves this measure and proposes to extend it to the entire Reich territory.”

Gau Air Force command XVII:

“For the pre-trained SA Radio operators the training with the unit which generally takes several months in the army, could be reduced to 4 or 6 weeks because of the pre-training in the SA. Some men could even be incorporated after 2 weeks. Gau air force command XVII will in the future attach special importance to the fact that SA radio operators be given preliminary training in as great a number as possible and be reserved to the LN Flugm. Res. Kamp. (Airforce signal Obscuration Reserve Company).”

Document 4011-PS

Third Report Regarding The Activity Of The SA In War Time, Part 05 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 739-741

The summarizing reports of the acting general commands are supplemented by numerous individual reports and expressions of praise from unit commanders; some of these statements are reproduced here:

[Page 13 of orig.]

The Officer commanding a Replacement Division writes:

“Having, in my position, ample opportunity to observe the development of the replacement recruits, I think I may venture to give an opinion as to what the work that is done in the SA means for the Armed Forces at the present time.

When I look at the recruits shortly after their arrival and conclude my observations by calling forward those who have already been trained in Party organizations, I have usually been able to establish that the recruits who stand out from the mass by their good bearing and confident appearance were SA leaders or SA men. And after some time, I again find these same personalities in the special training groups where the best recruits for subsequent utilization as “Unterfuehrer” are trained. This is proof that the training in the SA is particularly apt to develop character and prepare for army training. These remarks are particularly true as regards the special arms. The signal units gratefully welcome the SA men and leaders trained in the signal sections of the SA, as they provide them with a steady in-flow of human material which they can, after a comparatively short time, employ as “Truppfuehrer” for independent tasks.

Members of the Engineer Storm Troops are likewise welcome by the Engineer batallions as good, all-round replacements. The SA man, too, who possesses no special qualities, of command will very soon have secured for himself with his superiors and fellow recruits, a place as a practical soldier who does not shrink from any task and, above all, as a model comrade.”

The General in Command of a front line A. K.:

“To what extent the SA by their fighting spirit and training have contributed to the Army’s reactions for action, I have already and repeatedly had occasion to remark. As divisional commander, I have experienced personally how true it is that your SA men have been the best soldiers and the kernel of the fine spirit of the troops.”

The Commander of a Division:

“The pre-military army training takes a number of minor tasks off the hands of the Armed Forces, thanks to which the Armed Forces gain time for exclusive military training and, moreover, preparations of the men for military service in the direction of their attitude and principles is of particular importance.”

[Page 14 of orig.]

The Head of the Naval Medical Service:

“I should like to take this opportunity of thanking you again for the transfer of your brave SA men.”

Equally informative are letters from men who have gone into the Army but took part in pre-military training in the SA.

Report by a Political Leader:

“I feel I must tell you that I am already reaping the first benefits of the military sports in which I had decided to take part-though as a Political Leader I was not forced to do so. At the inspection by Lt. Col. L., I was specially congratulated, in particular for the demonstration of the 98K rifle loading and placing at safe as well as unloading and unlocking. I owe this ability exclusively to the basic training of the SA. I particularly wish to ask you to express my most sincere thanks to Sturmfuehrer Party member K. of Sturm 34/76. Acting as he has done so far, he will not only educate military men but also good SA men and National Socialists.”

Similar opinions regarding individual SA men are reported in great numbers to the SA High Command. This is reproduction of one of the latest.

The comrade-like relations between the SA formations and the SA men incorporated in the army is constantly looked after by the welfare office of the SA. In return SA men at the front always endeavor to give to their foremen SA Units proof of their community of ideas. We also quote an example.

Captain Franz v. WERRA, captured by the British and transferred to Canada, (then was decorated with the knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross) and who recovered his freedom wrote on his return to the Reich to his SA group on 24.4.1941 among other things, as follows

[Page 15 of orig.]

“It goes without saying that, being back from captivity as a war prisoner it is now a special joy to me to report back to my old SA group, and it grieves me deeply that I can make this report in writing only, for the moment … it is impossible to arrange for a personal report to my old SA comrades. Should … permit, I should very much like … to tell something about my experiences during the war whilst vigorously shaking the hands of old SA comrades.”

Document 4011-PS

Third Report Regarding The Activity Of The SA In War Time, Part 06 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 741-742

5. Work done by SA in regained territories.

The two SA groups “Vistule", with headquarters at Danzig, and “Warthe” with headquarters at Posen were formed in the formed in the East. The territory of Upper-Silesia was assigned to unit Silesia, the territory of Memel and Suwalki to the Baltic Provinces (Ostland) unit. Very soon the SA units formed a network of solid strong-points for the National-Socialist movement.

The Vistula unit comprises 15 Standarten with 507 companies [Stuermen] the Warthe unit 28 [Standarten], counting 684 Companies [Stuermen]. In these regions also as in combat, the SA was the assault-unit for the Party. It assists in collecting German manpower, in strengthening it and bringing it into alignment according to National-Socialist principles. In that respect it was often necessary to start by teaching the German language and then explaining the basic ideas of National Socialism. Many young racial Germans were trained as SA assistant leaders in SA schools. In these regions also the SA service, practically speaking is directed towards strengthening the defensive forces. It was therefore necessary to overcome the inferiority complexes of the racial Germans, the result of Polish suppression, and to bring their external appearance and bearing into keeping with SA standards. Then only was it possible to begin the real military training. The work of the SA in the West is also similar to that in the East. There it was possible in a short time to bring into the SA an important part of the male population through the recruiting of former German soldiers of the World War.

[Page 16 of orig.]

The leaders of the “Standarten” are predominantly Reich German SA-leaders. The “Sturmbanne” and “Stuerme” are practically without exception led by Alsatians who have received special training in a special SA school in the Reich. Reich German SA leaders and men stand at their side to advise and help.

The Chief of Staff visited these territories in the East and West, besides numerous inspections in other parts of the Reich, just at the period of this report, and gained a clear insight into the service, not only in the main cities, but particularly in the small and smallest garrisons of the SA. He thus formed an opinion as to the attitude and spirit of the Companies [Stuerme] Troops and Groups [Scharen] of the SA and the SA War Defense troops. The result was practically everywhere entirely satisfactory.

The Chief of the High Command of the Main Office [signed] SUETTNER Obergruppenfuehrer

Title: “Document 4013-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 742-743.

Local Editor’s office

Berlin, 2/3/1934

To Munich Editor’s Office.

The Munich Editor’s Office shall forward immediately in a well closed envelope the following communication to the Chief of Staff.

The authorities here learned that Austrians in Berlin have informed Vienna that the SA plans to have the Austrian formations in Bavaria march into Austria around the 8th or 9th February. Then a military dictatorship would be proclaimed.

This morning I had an inquiry from very important English quarters whether it could be possible that, behind the back of Hitler and Habicht, the Austrians in Germany could invade Austria. My informant added that so far the Austrian charges had been laid aside, but this information had come from such a reliable source that they simply had to contact us. I am afraid of a possible provocation by hired elements which, if announced to the world just at that time, could produce conflicts.

I explained that the Fuehrer does not follow a peace policy with Poland and at the same time start any military conflicts with Austria. I report this matter that if occasion requires, the supreme SA Command takes the necessary steps.

[signed] Rosenberg.

11.27 o'clock please acknowledge received

Title: “Document 4015-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A: Closing Address, Closing Arguments, Closing Statements; Documents Introduced in Evidence By British and American Prosecutors. District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. p. 743.

“Wiener Zeitung” of 3/11/1938

The Federal President has addressed the following letter to the Federal Chancellor Kurt v. Schuschnigg:

In accordance with Article 86 of the Constitution of 1934, I herewith relieve you at your request of your office as Federal Chancellor as well as of the charge of the Federal Ministry of Defense.

I further relieve-in accordance with article 86 of the Constitution of 1934-all other members of the Federal Government as well as all Secretaries of State of their respective offices.

Vienna, 3/11/1938.

Miklas Schuschnigg.

[Seal of Landesgericht Vienna for Criminal Matters]

[Stamp]: Compared and identical with the original Landesgericht for Criminal Matters VIII. Vienna, Landesgerichtstrasse II. Section 4. 6/7/1946.

[ Signature illegible.]