The Holocaust Historiography Project

Partial translation of document C-35

                   GERMAN NAVAL WAR DIARY
                 30 January 1941 (Page 401)

7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the “Barbarossa” case
to be submitted to the High Command of Armed Forces.

I. Objectives of war against Britain. a. Main purpose of the navy
consists in continued actions against Britain. Possibility of
intensifying U-boat war be necessary discontinuance of submarine
training in the Baltic and thereby release of part of the training ships
for combat duty.

b. Importance of securing of sea lanes on the West Coast of Norway by
the temporarily suspended traffic in the Baltic. Since some
battle-worthy security forces are not sufficient, additional
combat-units from the Western theater of operation are indespensable.

II. Objectives of war against Russia. Solution of the problem in spite
of Russian superiority possibly by the sacrifice of a temporary
discontinuance of our sea traffic (ore transports) in the Baltic.

a. Protection of our coast secured by presently existing or about-to-be
reorganized coast artillery. Defense against enemy submarine attack by
using units of submarines, pursuit ships, and mine sweepers.

b. Prevention of escape of enemy combat vessels from the Baltic secured
by the defense power of our coastal batteries, by creating new mined
waters, with suitable barrage and the existing big air threat.

Additional safety measures:

To get ready loaded minelayers for immediate tactical blockade and the
installation of the “Schlesien” and “Schleswig-Holstein” ships as
floating batteries.

Since it is not possible for the Navy to prevent the escape of smaller
Russian combat vessels through the Weissmeer canal, immediate commitment
of air force is required to destroy locks of this canal.

c. To declare mines in waters and to effect blockades to fortify present
defensive power and to discourage operations of Russian waterborne
combat units against the Western Baltic at the start of war:

(1) Danger zone “Oland” between Memel and south end of “Oland.”

(2) Danger zone “Bornholm” between Kolbergbornholm and Bornholmystadt.

(3) Danger zone at the south outlet of the Sund (renewed and enlarged).

(4) Danger zone “Gjedser Enge.”

(5) Danger zone at the western outlet of the Finnish Bay (offensive

Demands to the Swedish navy to blockade Swedish waters including the
Southkvarkenstreet (Aaland Sea).

d. To harrass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:

(1) Lightninglike commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force
units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea,
and Ice Sea.

(2) Actions with mines (for example with E-boats) against the Baltic
strong points, attack of submarines against traffic center points,
attack of camouflaged minelayers from the cliffs. If opportunity arises,
premature laying of delayed action mines.

(3) To make use of the fighting power of the Finnish fleet is desirable.
Important support of German objectives by a surprise laying of a
blockade with Finnish ships inside the Gulf of Finland. (If the
opportunity arises, material support is required).

e. Protection of the sea lanes in the Ice Sea is possible, however, not
so the elimination of the Russian main stronghold of Polarnoje-Murmansk.
Here, a lightninglike attack of the air force is necessary (bombers and
air mines).

f. In the Black Sea, on account of Russian superiority, limitation to
coastal defense and securing the Danube and its estuaries.

For early regulation of the Rumanian and Bulgarian objectives, timely
appointment of liaison officers is asked. Besides support by furnishing
mines and coastal guns, the transfer of river flotillas from the
Netherlands to the lower Danube is intended.

Possibilities of preparing a minelayer for offensive purposes and air
mine action are being examined.

g. In case Russia respects Swedish rights in her waters, German sea
traffic in Swedish waters under convoy of Swedish war ships is aspired
from North Sweden to the Kattegat.

h. Even after the elimination of the Russian Baltic Fleet, long lasting
effects from the mine war, to be expected of Russia, are to be reckoned
with. Since our minesweeper units are not at disposal, it is attempted
to use also Finnish and Swedish combat vessels and to commit captured
Russian booty ships, if the opportunity arises, with a Russian crew. The
head of the naval war

                                                              [Page 854]

staff agrees with these proposals. They are submitted to the Armed
Forces High Command per naval war staff I op 94/41. Top Military Secret,
matter for Chief.