- Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression
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Partial translation of document C-33
OPERATIONS BARBAROSSA AND MARITA
8. Proposals for command and organization of operation “Barbarossa".
a. The organization remains intact. Group North has the operational
responsibility in the Naval Sphere during operation “Barbarossa".
b. Under the direction of Group North the Flag Officer Cruisers (Bd.K)
will, as “Flag Officer Baltic", direct operations for “Barbarossa” from
the Command Station Swinemuende.
c. “The Flag Officer Baltic” has under him:
The S.O. Minelayers. Augmenting of the Staff of Flag Officer
Baltic by Chief of Staff, Staff of S.O. torpedo boats and the
assigning of a staff officer for U boats. For missions of coastal
aviation units in the Baltic, Fliegerfuehrer “EAST” is at his
Flag Officer in Charge Baltic Defenses is responsible for the
security of passages into the Baltic, the Kottegot and Skayerrok.
The responsibilities for security of the Baltic Station are limited
to the sea territory west of the narrows of Gj edse.
d. For the tasks of organization and defense of the conquered coastal
areas the following are to be set up:
Flag Officer (Coastal) Baltic Coast
Flag Officer (Coastal) Gulf of Finland
with corresponding sea commandants.
Responsibility for the Arctic Sea Coast is given to the Admiral Polar
e. The duties of the Flag Officer Cruisers are to be taken over by the
Fleet Command where questions of the fleet forces are concerned and by
2nd Admiral of' the fleet where questions of the training squadron are
concerned. The Chief of Naval War Staff agrees to the above.
2.41 Until the regrouping for “Barbarossa” takes place, efforts must be
made to obtain increased activity of air and naval warfare.
8. From a memorandum passed to Ia for information, of an interview of
the Commander in Chief of the German Army with the Fuehrer, it becomes
clear that with regard to the imminent Marita/Barbarossa operations, the
troops in reserve for operation “Felix” will have to be utilized for the
new undertaking. For “Marita” 6 Panzer divisions are to be held in
readiness as a precaution in the event of Turkey’s entry into the war.
The Chief of Naval War Staff ordered an inspection of defenses in the
French Naval Bases, in case of internal disturbances caused by sudden
attacks from inland by the French. This question was also pressented to
the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Lt. Commander Junge). Lt.
Com. Junge’s verbal reply was as follows:
The defense of naval bases in France remains the duty of the Army
even after a reduction of forces there. It is intended to leave 31
divisions in France during operation “Barbarossa.”
In German Naval War Staff 1st Division Ref. 2567/41 Top Secret dated
11.2 Admiral for France, was asked what arrangement could be made with
Army authorities in France in such a case.
b. In carrying out operation “Attila” the surprise occupation of
Korsika should be considered.
c. For the taking of Malta the employment of the XI Flieger Korps is
C-in-C Air Force is to be asked to give an opinion as to whether it is
possible to employ the airborne corps against Malta before “Barbarossa”
Time for intended negotiations with Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia
and Rournania which should be as late as possible, is to be set by
German Supreme Command of Armed Forces. High Commands are asked to make
their respective desires known to the German Supreme Command.
Report by Ia concerning an order from Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces for instructions for Deception of the Enemy (German Naval War
Staff I of 153/41 Top Secret S.O. only).
Aim of the deception is to conceal the preparations for operation
"Barbarossa". The important point is that in the first period, i.e., up
to about the middle of April the now prevailing uncertainty concerning
our intentions should be maintained. Later, the preparations for
Barbarossa that can no longer be camouflaged, must then be represented
as a deception diversion from the invasion of England. The following
directions for this deception are given:
a. for the first period. To increase the already existing impression of
an impending invasion of England. Estimate of new weapons and
transportation equipment. Exaggeration of the importance of minor
operations and the troops employed therefor. ("Marita” “Sonnenblume” X.
Reasons for deployment for “Barbarossa” as exchange measures between
West, Homeland, and East.
b. During the second period the deployment for “Barbarossa” is to be
made the greatest deception in the history of warfare the purpose of
which is to camouflage the last preparations for the invasion of
The Carrying out of this Deception.
Regulating of communications service through Chief of Counter
Intelligence Abroad in agreement with the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces,/Armed Forces Ops Staff/Department L and the High Commands.
Measures to be taken by the High Commands.
In spite of the farreaching disintegration of the operation “Seelowe”
everything possible should be done to maintain the impression amongst
our own troops that the invasion against England is being further
prepared. In order to create further uncertainty about our plans, the
Army High Command has to prepare the sudden “blocking” of certain
territories on the English Channel and in Norway. (Code word for this
Whether measures having to do with “Barbarossa” e.g., Maximum Capacity
Schedule [Hoechstleistungsfahrplanes], cancelling of leaves, etc. can be
made to coincide with operation “Marita” for purposes of deception is to
be investigated by Army High Command.
12. Report by Ia on intended organization for Operation “Marita".
The following Commands to be established:
a. Admiral Balkan (for the Balkan area to work under Naval War Staff).
Duties: To safeguard Naval interests in the Balkans, cooperation with
other Armed Forces elements (Army group List).
Later on cooperation with the Italian Navy in question of Coastal
defense and sea warfare.
Location: At first Bukarest, later Sofia or Athens, to be close to Army
b. F.O.I.C.Roumania (F.O. of the Naval Mission to Roumania).
(1) Duties: Commanding the entire defense by German and Roumanian units.
Under him an Artillery Commander in the Constanza Sector.
(2) Direction of Roumanian Naval warfare.
(3) Liaison with the Head of the German Military Mission in Roumania and
the two other Wehrmacht components, to be stationed at Bukarest.
c. Naval Liaison Staff, Bulgaria: Duties: To represent German Naval
interests in Bulgaria. To influence measures taken by the Bulgarian
Naval Command and Coastal Defense. To be located at SOFIA.
d. F.O.I.C. Greece.
Duties: To support the army in its actions against Greece in question of
enemy naval actions.
In regards to the impending operation “Barbarossa” for which all S-boats
in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of same can only be considered
after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations.
Chief of Naval War Staff decided after discussion that on SKL's
suggestion an evasive reply should be given to the Camp. (Ref. I of
149/41 Top Secret /0 only [Written in in longhand.] “Since the proposed
operation — Barbarossa cannot yet be determined”
5. Instructions of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces for operation
Construction of bridge across the Danube to begin on 28.2. Invasion of
Bulgaria on 2.3.
6. A request of Group North to lay a minefield “Swine” between Shetlands
and Bergen approved by Chief of Naval War Staff.
7. Captain Bruening who was sent as a mine adviser for the Roumanian
Navy to Bukarest demands for the Roumanian Navy 2000 explosive floats
and the necessary personnel for assembling and laying these mines by a
destroyer. Furthermore, it is necessary to draft at short notice a
suitable and experienced junior officer (Sperr) and mine expert in an
advisory capacity. It is desirable for sake of precautions, to transfer
a unit suitable for disposal of Electrical Aircraft Mines in the Danube
and Black Sea ports from the sector “S.C. Mine Sweepers Netherlands".
There are at present no facilities for sweeping Electrical Aircraft
Mines in Roumania.
The shipment of explosive floats is promised together with the necessary
personnel and they are both on their way.
The transfer of a mine sweeping unit is refused for the time being and
German sweeping apparatus for the Roumanian boats in question is
promised. A radio minesweeping apparatus (Stell F R G) is being chipped
with the explosive floats.
5. To give notice to the OKW Dept L. as to the time required for the
intended liaison with the Finnish, Swedish and Roumanian Navies in
a. Finland: Time required, 4 weeks for:
aa. Delivery of mines to Finland for intended mining of Gulf of
bb.Use of Finnish Naval Units for,joint naval operation in the
Northern Baltic, especially in the Gulf of Finland.
cc. Preparation of Finnish Naval bases for acceptance of German
naval units (Minelayers, U-boats, and, should occasion arise,
S-boats) for operations area. on the Finnish area.
dd. Support of German Intelligence Service (B-Dienst) against
Russia through the Finnish News Service units as was already the
practice up to 1939.
b. Sweden: Time required, 14 days for:
aa.Protection of Swedish territorial water for carrying on German
shipping by the employment of Swedish naval units.
bb.To lay Swedish barrages in Swedish territorial waters, as a
continuation of German prohibited areas and as a protection for
the sea of Botten.
These measures may have to be carried out at a correspondingly later
date should negotiations with Sweden start later.
c. Roumania : Time required, 8 days for
aa..Preparation of Roumanian naval elements and the fitting out of
auxiliary mine layers for offensive action in mine warfare.
bb.Increase of general security measures which were possibly
limited after the “Marita” operation.
d. In the event that longer periods for the preparations of the Army be
necessary and conceded to, great store would be set by the full use
being made of the Navy, as the appointed periods are very limited.
(Ref. I op. 154/41 Top Secret S.0. only)
2. It is the task of German Naval Units in the Balkans to safeguard the
Balkan Sector towards the Sea against hostile landing attempts and
against the shelling of important coastal installations. Utilization and
protection of the shipping routes along the coasts of the Black Sea and
the Aegean for our own shipping. The possibility of using the Turkish
Straits must be brought about by political means.
3. A later extended task, especially in the Greek Sector, with the aid
of Italian naval units, is the conquest of the Aegean Islands, support
of the Dodecanese, and finally the capture of Crete. The final aim to be
envisaged must be the gaining of a jumping off point from which to
conduct warfare in the Eastern Mediterranean.
4. For gaining this objective we have at our disposal: German naval
units negligible; Roumanian and Bulgarian forces very insignificant; at
a later time commitment of Italian forces in the Greek sector can be