The Holocaust Historiography Project

Translation of document C-6

                                                     Berlin, 30.12.1939.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
No. 222 48/39 Most Secret, S.O. only WFA/Section L.I.

                                                               10 Copies
                                                               5th Copy.

Subject: Intensified Measures for Sea and Air Warfare in connection with
Fall “Gelb.”

In addition to the instructions directly concerned with Fall “Gelb”
which have already been issued for the Navy and Air Force, the following
intensified measures for the conduct of sea and air warfare come into
force with the start of operations in the West:

1. The Navy will approve the sinking without warning of all ships by
U-boats, in sea areas off the enemy coasts where it is possible to use
mines. In this case outward appearances should create the impression
that mines have been used. U-boats should bear this in mind when taking
action and using arms.

[Red pencil note referring to underlining.]  This would be an
undesirable limitation.

[Note in green pencil referring to red pencil note-] Not intended to be.

The C-in-C of the Navy decides on the exact limits of these areas, and
give notification of them via the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

2. As long as army operations in the West are in progress the Air Force
has the following tasks:

(a) To give direct support to these operations (Directive No. 6 section

In doing so it is important to attack, outside the actual theater of
operations, troop transports from England to France, Belgium or Holland,
including ports of embarkation and disembarkation, as well as British
air force ground installations in the home country itself, which are
used as bases for operations against the continent.

(b) To tie up as strong forces as possible of fighter aircraft in the
British homeland.

It is not in keeping with the whole conduct of the war, however, to
unleash the full force of aerial warfare on our own initiative, before
we have created for ourselves favorable conditions for it, and before
there are strong forces available suitable for operations against

For this reason, attacks also, which imperil to any great extent the
civilian population, are to be reserved for cases which demand

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[The following note is added “Superseded by OKM No. 22010/ 40 Most
Secret. WFA/L I 6 dated 17.1.40, Skl I Op 64/40 la J18/c".]