The Holocaust Historiography Project

Translation of document 3706-PS


From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical
territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These
were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Saar and
Ruhr, and Memel.

I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff and
front officers, believed that these three questions,
outstanding among which was the question of the Polish
Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by
force of arms. About ninety percent of the German people
were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish
question. A war to wipe out the political and economic loss
resulting from the creation of the Polish Corridor and to
lessen the threat to separated East Prussia surrounded by
Poland and Lithuania was regarded as a sacred duty though a
sad necessity.

The at first (1933-35) secret and later unconcealed
rearmament of Germany was welcomed by me. All officers of
the army shared this attitude and therefore had no reason to
oppose Hitler. Hitler produced-the results which all of us
warmly desired.

After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Pol-

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ish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through
diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France
and England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a
matter of fact we felt that, if political negotiations came
to naught, the Polish question would unavoidably lead to
war, that is, not only with Poland herself, but also with
the Western Powers.

When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH
to prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this
war came even closer to the realm of possibility. This
conclusion was only strengthened by the Fuehrer’s speech on
22 August 1939 on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to
be an actuality. Between the middle of June 1939 and 1
September 1939 the members of my staff who were engaged in
preparations, participated in various discussions which went
on between the OKH and the army group. During these
discussions such matters of a tactical, strategic, and
general nature were discussed as had to do with my future
position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Arm during the
planned Polish campaign.

During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno
operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he, as well as the
Fuehrer visited my headquarters. In fact it was common
practice for commanders-in-chief of army groups and of
armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of the
situation and for their recommendations by telephone,
teletype, or wireless, as well as by personal recalls. These
front commanders-in-chief thus actually became advisers to
the OKH in their own field so that the positions shown in
the chart [Transcription note: see 3702-PS for an ASCII
representation of the referenced chart. Knm] embrace that
group which was the actual advisory council of the High
Command of the German Armed Forces.

                                         [signed] BLASKOWITZ


Before me, Paul A. Neuland, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an
officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel
General Johannes Blaskowitz, to me known, who in my presence
signed the foregoing “Erklaerung” (statement) consisting of
two pages in the German language, and swore that the same
was true on the 10th day of November 1945.

                                    [signed] Paul A. Neuland
                                             PAUL A. NEULAND
                                                  Major, QMC