The Holocaust Historiography Project

Partial copy of document 3598-PS

                    AND DECEMBER 8, 1941

      Printed for the Use of the Joint Committee on the
   of the Pearl Harbor Attack (79th Congress, 1st Session)
          United States Government Printing Office
                      Washington: 1945

[Pages 204-205]


From: Tokyo
to: Berlin
November 30, 1941
#985. (Part 1 of 3)a
Re: my Circular #2387.b

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last
April during the administration of the former cabinet, in
spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now
stand ruptured — broken. (I am sending you an outline of
developments in separate message #986 c). In the face of
this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with
determination.  Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately
interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
and confidentiality communicate to them a summary of the
developments. Say to them that lately England and the United
States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say
that they are planning to move military forces into various
places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to
counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them
that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out
between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash
of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this
war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Army 25552
Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)
JD: 6943
a Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S.I.S. #25553.
b Not available
c See S.I.S. #25554, 25555.



From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
#985. (Part 3 of 3)


4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians
question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that
we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians
in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves
southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the
Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England
and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we
are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however,
right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and
for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any
direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view
and must under all circumstances be held in the most
absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will
you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how
important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has
communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a
suitable translation

                                                  [Page 310]

to Premier Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano. As soon as
a date is set for a conference with the Germans and
Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together
with the separate message.

Army 25553
Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)