The Holocaust Historiography Project

Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression

Volume VII

Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality

United States Government Printing Office
Washington

For sale by the
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

CONTENTS
  Pages
Document number D-283 through document number D-786, arranged numerically 1–242
Document number EC-3 through document number EC-620, arranged numerically 242–609
Document number ECH-1 through document number ECH-24, arranged numerically 609–642
Document number ECR-14 through document number ECR-197, arranged numerically 642–752
Document number L-3 through document number L-361, arranged numerically 752–1114
Document number M-1 1115–1116

(A descriptive list of documents appears at the end of the last volume.)

A Collection of Documentary Evidence and Guide Materials Prepared by the American and British Prosecuting Staffs for Presentation before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany, in the case of

The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

— against —

Hermann Wilhelm Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Robert Ley, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Karl Doenitz, Erich Raeder Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Artur Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath, and Hans Fritzsche, Individually and as Members of Any of the Following Group or Organizations to Which They Respectively Belonged, Namely: Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); Das Korps Der Politischen Leiter Der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party); Die Schutzstaffeln Der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the "SS") and including Die Sicherheitsdienst (commonly known as the "SD"); Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly known as the "Gestapo"); Die Sturmabteilungen Der N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known as the "SA") and the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces are as defined in Appendix B of the Indictment,

Defendants.

Document D-288

“Document D-288: [Sworn Statement: Dr. Wilhelm Jaeger: Krupp Workers Camp] [translation]”, pp. 2-5.

Essen. 10/15/1945

I, Dr. Wilhelm Jaeger, am a general practitioner in Essen, Germany, and its surroundings. I was born in Germany on 12/2/1888, and now live at Kettwig Sengenholz 6, Germany. I make the following statement of my own free will. I have not been threatened in any way and I have not been promised any sort of reward.

On 10/1/1942, I became senior camp doctor in Krupp’s workers’ camps, and was generally charged with the medical supervision of all of Krupp’s workers camps in Essen. In the course of my duties it was my responsibility to report upon the sanitary and health conditions of the workers’ camps to my superiors in the Krupp works. It was a part of my task to visit every Krupp camp which housed foreign civilian workers and I am therefore able to make this statement on the basis of my personal knowledge.

My first official act as senior camp doctor was to make a thorough inspection of the various camps. At that time, in 10/1942, I found the following conditions:

The eastern workers and Poles who laboured in the Krupp works at Essen were kept at camps at Seumannstrasse, Spenlestrasse, Grieperstrasse, Heecstrasse, Germaniastrasse, Kapitan-Lehmannstrasse, Dechenschule, and Kramerplatz. (When the term eastern workers is hereinafter used, it is to be taken as including Poles). All of these camps were surrounded by barbed wire and were closely guarded.

Conditions in all of these camps were extremely bad. The camps were greatly overcrowded. In some camps there were twice as many people in a barrack as health conditions permitted. At Kramerplatz, the inhabitants slept in treble tiered bunks, and in the other camps they slept in double tiered bunks. The health authorities prescribed a minimum space between beds of 50 cm, but the bunks in these camps were separated by a maximum of 20-30 cm.

The diet prescribed for the eastern workers was altogether insufficient. They were given 1,000 calories a day less than the minimum prescribed for any German. Moreover, while German workers engaged in the heaviest work received 5000 calories a day, the eastern workers in comparable jobs received only 2000 calories. The eastern workers were given only 2 meals a day and their bread ration. One of these two meals consisted of a thin, watery soup. I had no assurance that the eastern workers, in fact, received the minimum which was prescribed. Subsequently in 1943, when I undertook to inspect the food prepared by the cooks, I discovered a number of instances in which food was withheld from the workers.

The plan for food distribution called for a small quantity of meat per week. Only inferior meats, rejected by the veterinary such as horse meat or tuberculin infested was permitted for this purpose. This meat was usually cooked into a soup.

The clothing of the eastern workers was likewise completely inadequate. They worked and slept in the same clothing in which they had arrived from the east. Virtually all of them had no overcoats and were compelled, therefore, to use their blankets as coats in cold and rainy weather. In view of the shortage of shoes many workers were forced to go to work in their bare feet, even in the winter. Wooden shoes were given to some of the workers, but their quality was such as to give the workers sore feet. Many workers preferred to go to work in their bare feet rather than endure the suffering caused by the wooden shoes. Apart from the wooden shoes, no clothing of any kind was issued to the workers until the latter part of 1943, when a single blue suit was issued to some of them. To my knowledge, this represented the sole issue of clothing to the workers from the time of their arrival until the American forces entered Essen.

Sanitary conditions were exceedingly bad. At Kramerplatz, where approximately 1200 eastern workers were crowded into the rooms of an old school, the sanitary conditions were atrocious in the extreme. Only 10 children’s toilets were available for the 1200 inhabitants. At Dechenschule, 15 children’s toilets were available for the 400-500 eastern workers. Excretion contaminated the entire floors of these lavatories. There were also few facilities for washing. The supply of bandages, medicine, surgical instruments, and other medical supplies at these camps was likewise altogether insufficient. As a consequence, only the very worst cases were treated.

The percentage of eastern workers who were ill was twice as great as among the Germans. Tuberculosis was particularly widespread among the eastern workers. The T.B. rate among them was 4 times the normal rate (2% eastern workers, German .5%). At Dechenschule approximately 2.5% of the workers suffered from open T.B. These were all active T.B. cases. The Tarters and Kirghis suffered most; as soon as they were overcome by this disease they collapsed like flies. The cause was bad housing, the poor quality and insufficient quantity of food, overwork, and insufficient rest.

These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever. Lice the carrier of the disease, together with countless fleas, bugs and other vermin tortured the inhabitants of these camps. As a result of the filthy conditions of the camps nearly all eastern workers were afflicted with skin disease. The shortage of food also caused many cases of Hunher-Odem, Nephritis and Shighakruse.

It was the general rule that workers were compelled to go to work unless a camp doctor had prescribed that they were unfit for work. At Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germanistrasse Kapitan-Lehmannstrasse, and Dechenschule, there was no daily sick call. At these camps, the doctors did not appear for two or three days. As a consequence, workers were forced to go to work despite illnesses.

I undertook to improve conditions as well as I could. I insisted upon the erection of some new barracks in order to relieve the overcrowded conditions of the camps. Despite this, the camps were still greatly overcrowded, but not as much as before. I tried to alleviate the poor sanitary conditions in Kramerplatz and Dechenschule by causing the installation of some emergency toilets, but the number was insufficient, and the situation was not materially altered.

With the onset of heavy air raids in 3/1943, conditions in the camps greatly deteriorated. The problem of housing, feeding, and medical attention became more acute than ever. The workers lived in the ruins of their former barracks. Medical supplies which were used up, lost, or destroyed, were difficult to replace. At times, the water supply at the camps was completely shut off for periods of 8-14 days. We installed a few emergency toilets in the camps, but there were far too few of them to cope with the situation.

During the period immediately following the 3/1943 raids many foreign workers were made to sleep at the Krupp factories in the same rooms in which they worked. The day workers slept there at nights, and the night workers slept there during the day despite the noise which constantly prevailed. I believe that this condition continued until the entrance of American troops into Essen.

As the pace of air raids was stepped up, conditions became progressively worse. On 7/29/1944, I reported to my superiors that:

“The sick barrack in camp Rabenhorst is in such a bad condition one cannot speak of a sick barrack any more. The rain leaks through in every corner. The housing of ill is therefore impossible. The necessary labour for production is in danger because these persons who are ill cannot recover”.

At the end of 1943, or the beginning of 1944,I am not completely sure of the exact dateI obtained permission for the first time to visit the prisoner of war camps. My inspection revealed that conditions at these camps were worse than those I had found at the camps of the eastern workers in 1942. Medical supplies at such camps were virtually non-existent. In an effort to cure this intolerable situation, I contacted the Wehrmacht authorities whose duty it was to provide medical care for the prisoners of war. My persistent efforts came to nothing. After visiting and pressing them over a period of two weeks, I was given a total of 100 aspirin tablets for over 3000 prisoners of war.

The French P.O.W. camp in Nogerratstrasse had been destroyed in an air raid attack and its inhabitants were kept for nearly half a year in dog kennels, urinals, and in old baking houses. The dog kennels were three feet high, nine feet long, and six feet wide. Five men slept in each of them. The prisoners had to crawl into these kennels on all fours. The camp contained no tables, chairs or cupboards. The supply of blankets was inadequate. There was no water in the camp. What treatment was extended was given in the open. Many of these conditions were reported to me in a report by Dr. Stinnesbeck dated 6/12/1944, in which he said:

“315 prisoners are still accommodated in the camp. 170 of these are no longer in barracks but in the tunnel in Grunertstrasse under the Essen-Mulheim railway line. This tunnel is damp and is not suitable for continued accommodation of human beings. The rest of the prisoners are accommodated in 10 different factories in Krupps works. The first medical attention is given by a French Military Doctor who takes great pains with his fellow country men. Sick people from Krupp factories must be brought to the sick parade. This parade is held in the lavatory of a burned out public house outside the camp. The sleeping accommodation of the 4 French Orderlies is in what was the men’s room. In the sick bay there is a double tier wooden bed. In general, the treatment takes place in the open. In rainy weather it is held in the above mentioned small room. These are insufferable conditions: There are no chairs, tables, cupboards, or water. The keeping of a register of sick people is impossible. Bandages and medical supplies are very scarce, although badly hurt in the works are very often brought here for first aid and have to be bandaged here before being transported to hospital. There are many loud and lived complaints about food which the guard personnel confirms as being correct.

Illness and loss of man power must be reckoned with under these conditions.

In my report to my superiors at Krupps dated 9/2/1944, I stated:

Camp Humboldstrasse has been inhabited by Italian prisoners of war. After it had been destroyed by an air raid, the Italians were removed and 600 Jewish females from Buchenwald Concentration Camp were brought in to work at the Krupp factories. Upon my first visit at Camp Humboldstrasse, I found these females suffering from open festering wounds and other diseases.

I was the first doctor they had seen for as least a fortnight. There were no doctors in attendance at the camp. There were no medical supplies in the camp. They had no shoes and went about in their bare feet. The sole clothing of each consisted of a sack with holes for their arms and head. Their hair was shorn. The camp was surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded by SS guards.

The amount of food in the camp was extremely meagre and of very poor quality. The houses in which they lived consisted of the ruins of former barracks and they afforded no shelter against rain and other weather conditions. I reported to my superiors that the guards lived and slept outside their barracks as one could not enter them without being attacked by 10, 20 and up to 50 fleas. One camp doctor employed by me refused to enter the camp again after he had been bitten very badly. I visited this camp with a Mr. Grene on two occasions and both times we left the camp badly bitten. We had great difficulty in getting rid of the fleas and insects which had attacked us. As a result of this attack by insects of this camp, I got large boils on my arms and the rest of my body. I asked my superiors at the Krupp works to undertake the necessary steps to de-louse the camp so as to put an end to this unbearable, vermin-infested condition. Despite this report, I did not find any improvement in sanitary conditions at the camp on my second visit a fortnight later.

When foreign workers finally became too sick to work or were completely disabled they were returned to the Labour Exchange in Essen and from there, they were sent to a camp at Friedrichsfeld. Among persons who were returned over to the Labour Exchange were aggravated cases of tuberculosis, malaria, neurosis, cancer which could not be treated by operation, old age, and general feebleness. I know nothing about conditions at this camp because I have never visited it. I only know that it was a place to which workers who no longer of any use to Krupp were sent.

My colleagues and I reported all of the foregoing matters to Mr. Ihn, Director of Friedrich Krupp A.G., Dr. Wiels, personal physician of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Senior Camp Leader Kupke and at all times to the health department. Moreover, I know that these gentlemen personally visited the camps.

[signed] Dr. Wilhelm JAEGER.

“Document D-313: [Sworn Statement of Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki] [translation]”, pp. 18-20.

Essen, 10/13/1946.

1, the undersigned, Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki, a doctor in the Polish Army, was taken prisoner by the Germans on 1/3/1941 and remained as such until the entry of the Americans. I gave medical attention to the Russian, Polish and French P.W.s., who were forced to work in various places of Krupps factories. I personally visited the Russian P.W. camp in the Raumastrasse in Essen, which contained about 1800 men. There was a big hall in the camp which could house about 200 men comfortably in which 300-400 men were thrown together in such a catastrophic manner that no medical treatment was possible. The floor was cement and the paillasses on which the people slept were full of lice and bugs. Even on cold days, the room was never heated and it seemed to me as a doctor, unworthy of human beings that people should find themselves in such a position. It was impossible to keep the place clean because of the overcrowding of these men who had hardly room to move about normally. Every day, at least 10 people were brought to me whose bodies were covered with bruises on account of the continual beatings with rubber tubes, steel switches or sticks. The people were often writhing with agony and it was impossible for me to give them even a little medical aid. In spite of the fact that I protested, made complaints and was often interviewed, it was impossible for me to protect the people or see that they got a day off from work. It was difficult for me to watch how such suffering people could be dragged to do heavy work. I visited personally, and myself in danger, gentlemen of the Krupp Administration as well as gentlemen from the Krupp Directorate to try to get help. It was strictly forbidden as the camp was under the direction of the SS and Gestapo, and according to the well known directives, I had to keep silent, otherwise I could have been sent to a concentration camp. I have brought my own bread innumerable times to the camp in order to give it to the prisoners as far as it was possible, although bread was scarce enough for me. From the beginning in 1941 conditions did not get better but worse. The food consisted of a watery soup which was dirty and sandy and often the P.W.s. had to eat cabbage which was bad and stank. I could notice people daily who on account of hunger or ill-treatment, were slowly dying. Dead people often lay for 2 or 3 days on the paillasses until their bodies stank so badly that fellow prisoners took them outside and buried them somewhere. The dishes out of which they ate were also used as toilets because they were too tired or too weak from hunger to get up and go outside. At 3 o’clock, they were awakened. The same dishes were then used to wash in and later for eating out of. This manner was generally known. In spite of this it was impossible for me to get even elementary help or facilities, in order to get rid of these epidemics, illnesses or cases of starvation. There can be no mention of medical aid for the prisoners; I never received any medical supplies myself. In 1941, I alone had to look after these people from a medical point of view but it is quite understandable that it was impossible for me as, the only one, to look after all these people and apart from that, I had scarcely any medical supplies. I could not think what to do with a number of 1800 people who came to me daily, crying and complaining. I myself often collapsed daily and in spite of this I had to take everything upon myself and watch how people perished and died. A report was never made as to how the P.Ws. died. I have seen with my own eyes, the prisoners coming back from Krupps and how they collapsed on the march and had to be wheeled back on barrows or carried by their comrades. It was in such a manner that the people came back to the camp. The work which they had to perform was very heavy and dangerous and many cases happened where people had cut their fingers, hands or legs. These accidents were very serious and the people came to me and asked me for medical help. But it wasn’t even possible for me to keep them from work for a day or two, although I had been to the Krupp directorate and for permission to do so. At the end of 1941, 2 people died daily and in 1942 the deaths increased to 3 - 4 per day. I was under Dr. May and r was often successful in getting him to come to the camp to see the terrible conditions and listen to the complaints, but it was not even possible for him to get medical aid from the Medical Department of the Wehrmacht or Krupps, or to get better conditions, treatment or food. I was a witness during a conversation with some Russian women who told me personally that they were employed in Krupps factory and that they were beaten daily in a most bestial manner. The food consisted of a watery soup which was dirty and unedible and its terrible smell could be noticed from a distance. The clothing was ragged and torn and on their feet they had rags and wooden shoes. Their treatment, as far as I could make out, was the same as that of the P.Ws. Beating was the order of the day. The conditions lasted for years, from the very beginning until the day the American troops entered. The people lived in great anxiety and it was dangerous for them to describe to anyone anywhere these conditions which reigned in their camps. The directions were such that they could have been murdered by anyone of the guards, the SS or Gestapo if they noticed it. It was possible for me as a doctor to talk to these people; they trusted me and knew that I as a Pole, would never betray them to anyone.

[signed] Dr. APOLINARY GOTOWICKI

residing Essen - Steele, Bochumerstr. 55.

“Document D-316: Employment of Russians [translation]”, p. 20.

3/14/1942. Machine Building Workshop 8 through Mr. KOCH

To: Mr. HUPE

During the last few days we have established that the food for the Russians employed here is so miserable that the people are getting weaker from day to day.

Investigations showed that single Russians are not able to place a piece of metal for turning into position, for instance, because of lack of physical strength. The same conditions exist at all places of work, where Russians are employed.

If it can not be seen to, that the feeding is changed in such a way that a normal output can be demanded from these people, then the employment of these people, with the necessary expense connected thereto, has been in vain; I do not think it is worth while employing any more Russians, from whom I cannot expect any results in production, although they are sent to me as productive workers.

I expect that the same conditions prevail inside all the other works. It would only be right if you via the firm take steps to clear up this matter.

[signature illegible]

“Document D-317: Thoughts about the Industrial Enterpriser [partial translation]”, pp. 21-24.

Speech written by KRUPP for the occasion of an invitation to the UNIVERSITY of BERLIN during 1/1944, but not delivered.

[Resume of first 11 pages] [Krupp goes into lengthy details about the human qualities and considerations that are required of leading men of Industry.

He points out the characteristics of leadership, and the necessity for sufficient industrial and financial background to fill a leading position.

From there Krupp leads to the idea of “being born for leadership”, and affirms his belief in a dynasty of industrialists. This leads to a discussion about the merits of armament factories and armament “Kings” for one’s own country, and finally Krupp continues:]

“Therefore, I don’t see why this thought still flutters in many a head occasionallythat the production of war materials should be a sinister trade! No: war material is life-saving for one’s own people and whoever works and performs in these spheres can be proud of it; here enterprise as a whole finds its highest justification of existence. This justificationI may inject this here crystallized especially during that time of the “Interregnum”, between 1919-1933, when Germany was lying-down disarmed. I have already often repeated orally as well as in writing, and today I also want to restate to this group that, according to the terms of the Dictate of Versailles Krupp had to destroy and demolish considerable quantities of machines and utensils of all kinds. It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy that it did not remain idle during those bad years, even though its activity could not be brought to light for obvious reasons. Through years of secret work, scientific and basic ground work was laid, in order to be ready again to work for the German Armed Forces at the appointed hour, without loss of time or experience. This required many and various things, this demanded also the introduction of specific products suited to maintain the skills of experienced engineers and war-workersthis tremendous fund of knowledge and experience; this required further the equipping and maintenance of scientific laboratories and research establishments etc. etc.

Just as once 100000 men kept up the tradition of the old glorious Army so there also wasfiguratively speakinga 100000 men army of business men who kept up the tradition of war industry. The circumstances caused by the military collapse were even more difficult considering the necessary changes in old war plants to peacetime production, which in itself caused untold difficulties in politically confused times. It was necessary for instance, to expand the Krupp Works into-a structure capable of survival and competition, but, at the same moment they also had to be ready as war plants for future times

Only through this secret activity of German enterprise, together with the experience gained meanwhile through production of peace time goods, was it possible, after 1933, to fall into step with the new tasks arrived at restoring Germany’s military power (only through all that) could the entirely new and various problems, brought up by the Führer’s Four Years Plan for German enterprise, be mastered. It was necessary to exploit new raw materials, to explore and experiment, to invest capital in order to make German economy independent and strong; in short, to make it war worthy. On the basis of various remarks of outsiders, who are able to overlook the entire situation from a vantage point, I may well say that German enterprise proved itself here again, by tackling and solving the new problems with that energy, that I might say: enthusiasm, with which it has always approached historical tasks.

In this connection I want to bring to attention something else, something which probably has hardly been considered in other circles so far: That is the fact, that the proven success of the Four-Years-Plan, the creation of new raw materials as substitutes for scarce ones, something which at the beginning showed only the quiet and modest degree of success we had hoped to achieve, (brought about) that not only were the well-known materials fully replaced in the customary field of usage, but that the new raw materials go many times far beyond their conception as substitutes for many usesI am almost inclined to say: can be moulded fully as one wishes. That applies to artificial rubber, to synthetic gasoline and to various other similar things, and opens new vistas for the future which cannot be envisaged today.

After 1933, the German businessmen did not undertake such historical tasks of greatest range and scope only in organizational, technical and commercial respects.

The National-socialist Revolution has hardly ever brought another profession face to face with such in many ways newsometimes fortunately shockingly newsituations, as it has the enterpriser how he became the Führer of his employees. It would of course be extremely unjust to claim that even before 1933 the enterprisers did not also have an understanding for this side of their profession leading and caring for peoplefor how could they otherwise have gained economic success in the long run? Particularly that is the pride of so many large enterprises, that they can look back to a rich and old social-political tradition, and yet, before 1933, it was madeGod knowsmany a time quite difficult for the enterpriser to act and show himself as the deeply responsibility-conscious leader of his business. This change since 1933 which occurred with almost elementary suddenness, concerning the conception about the spiritually founded partnership of interests between employer and employee. I am again making use of this old formula intentionally should be attributed to the singular genius of the Führer and to his revolutionary movement, the Führer who won through the power of his personality and his doctrines the whole of the German people to his expounded ideas of National Socialist ideology. It is clear that through them by appointing the enterpriser as Leader of his employees by law, a much wider and nicer, more promising field of activity than before was assigned to him, full with success especially concerning the human aspectand I think I may state here, that the German enterprisers followed the new ways enthusiastically, that they made the great intentions of the Führer their own by fair competition and conscious gratitude and became his faithful followers. How else could the tasks between 1933-1939 and especially those after 1939 have been overcome ! Not by force, but only through good willmore so: only through devotion and enthusiasm could and can tasks of such world historical scope succeed.”

[Resume: Krupp then lists the social achievements of National Socialism that were interrupted by the War and continues to speak about the team work of employer and employee under conditions of War.

Another paragraph speaks about the position of the enterpriser in public life, and then Krupp continues: Page 20]

“Into the future, I think, and this you probably felt too, due to my previous statements, the German enterpriser may look with full confidence. He will be even more necessary in the political, economic and social structure of our Greater German Reich after the War. I don’t feel called upon to act as a prophet, but yet the grand vision of a New Europe floats happily before my eyes, and in this great space, which will then overflow with new economic, technical transportation, commercial and financial problems of all kindsin this New Europe one will not only need farmers, frontier-guard-peasants and tradesmen, state and private officials, but in all countries and provinces as well, daring enterprisers ready for decision. And again people will say as before, during my time in Peking in 1900: ‘Germans to the Front!’ The German enterpriser will have to be the model for the new type of European enterpriserjust as the German worker will determine the future type of the European expert worker.”

“Document D-321: [Sworn Statement of Adam Schmidt] [translation]”, pp. 25-26.

Essen, 10/12/1945

Sworn Statement.

I the undersigned, Adam Schmidt, employed as Betriebswart in the Essen-West Railway Station, and residing in Margarethenhoehe, Im Stillen Winkel 12, make the following statement voluntarily and on oath:

I have been employed by the Reichs Railway since 1918 and have been at Essen West Station since 1935. In the middle of 1941 the first workers arrived from Poland, Galicia and Polish Ukraine. They came to Essen in goods wagons in which potatoes, building materials and also cattle have been transported, were brought to perform work at Krupp. The trucks were jammed full with people. My personal view was that it was inhuman to transport people in such a manner. The people were squashed closely together and they had no room for free movement. The Krupp overseers laid special value on the speed the slave workers got in and out of the train. It was enraging to every decent German who had to watch this, to see how the people were beaten and kicked and generally maltreated in a brutal manner. In the very beginning as the first transports arrived, we could see how inhumanly these people were treated. Every wagon was so overfilled that it was incredible that such a number could be jammed into one wagon. I could see with my own eyes that sick people who could scarcely walk (they were most people with foot trouble, injured and also people with internal trouble) were taken to work. One could see that it was sometimes difficult for them to move themselves. The same can be said for the Eastern workers and P.Ws. who came to Essen in the middle of 1942.

The clothing of the P.Ws. and civilian workers was catastrophic in a few words it was humanly impossible. It was raggy and ripped and the foot wear was the same. In some cases they had to go to work with rag:3 round their feet. Even in the worst weather and bitterest cold, I have never seen that any of the wagons were heated. One could see from the very beginning that their treatment on their arrival in Essen was very brutal, although at that time, there were no catastrophic conditions in Germany as there were at the end of 1944/45.

Later I had the opportunity of learning through conversation with the people, what food they received. The people concerned were those who travelled to work every day. Their food was solely a watery soup with a few capers and on this bad and insufficient food they had to perform the work laid down by Krupps the whole day. At the beginning of 1941, approximately three trains a day arrived at Essen West Station at about 6 or 7 a.m. loaded with about 500 people, who had been ordered to work for Krupp. In 1943/44 the first air attacks began and it often happened that the people stood about for hours in the cold waiting for their transports to arrive. Through this they often arrived back in camp 2 or 3 hours late, frozen through and in an ailing condition.

[signed] ADAM SCHMIDT

“Document D-335: [Sworn Statement of Dr. Jaeger] [translation]”, p. 27.

Essen. 6/12/1944.

To Gau Camp Dr. JAEGER.

In the middle of May I took over the medical supervision of the P.W. Camp 1420 in the Noeggerathstrasse. The camp contains 644 French PWs.

During the air attack on 27 April of this year the camp was largely destroyed and at the moment conditions are intolerable.

315 Prisoners are still accommodated in the camp. 170 of these are no longer in barracks but in the tunnel in Grunertstrasse under the Essen-Muelheim railway line. This tunnel is damp and is not suitable for continued accommodation of human beings. The rest of the prisoners are accommodated in In different factories in Krupp works.

The first medical attention is given by a French Military Doctor who takes great pains with his fellow country men. Sick people from Krupps factories must be brought to the sick parade. This parade is held in the lavatory of a burned out public house outside the camp. The sleeping accommodation of the 4 French Orderlies is in what was the men’s room. In the sick bay there is a double tier wooden bed. In general, the treatment takes place in the open. In rainy weather it is held in the a/m small room. Those are insufferable conditions! There are no chairs, tables, cupboard or water. The keeping of a register of sick people is impossible. Bandages and medical supplies are very scarce although people badly hurt in the works are very often brought here for first aid and have to be bandaged here before being transported to hospital. There are many loud and lively complaints about food which the guards personnel confirm as being correct.

Illness and loss of manpower must be reckoned with under these circumstances.

The construction of barracks for the accommodation of the prisoners-and the building of sick quarters for the proper treatment of the sick beings is vitally necessary.

Please take the necessary steps.

signed. TINNESBECK.

“Document D-338: [Special Medical Report: Camp Rabenhorst] [translation]”, pp. 27-28.

M.I. Room, Camp Administration. 7/28/1944.

Special Medical Report.

The sick barrack in Camp Rabenhorst is in such a bad condition, one cannot speak of a sick barrack anymore. The rain leaks through in every corner. The housing of the ill is therefore impossible. The necessary labour for production is in danger because those persons who are ill cannot recover. The barrack must be roofed over, if possible, quickly, or the sick must be transferred to the various hospitals. This must be avoided owing to their being overburdened at the present.

(Signed) Dr. Jaeger. Camp and Works Doctor.

Copies to K.V.D. Essen Dr. Heinz, Mulheim-Ruhr Mr. Ihn. Dr. Beusch. Dr. Wiele. Dr. Seynsche. Mr. Kupke.

“Document D-411: Protection Of Troops Against Partisans And Sabotage [translation]”, pp. 49-50.

SECRET.

12th Infantry Division Int. Sec. No. 607/41 Secret

Int 54/816/41 Secr. Received 11/27/1941. Div. H.Q. 26th Nov. 1941.

To: The General Command of H.Q. 2nd Army CorpsIc.

Enclosed the divisional intelligence section sends a secret order dated 11/17/1941 concerning combatting of partisans. . For information.

For Div. H.Q. Chief of the General Staff [Signed] WEISER [ ?] Adj.

1 enclosure.

Div. H.Q. 11/17/1941.

12th Infantry Division Section Ic/Ia/Adj. No. 607/41 sch.

Subject: Protection of Troops against Partisans and Sabotage.

Reference: C.-i-C. ArmyGen. Staff of the Army. “Ausb.” section (Ia) No. 1900/41 dated 10/25/1941.

I. The conduct of the troops in the Eastern territories (see enclosure: secret order by Field Marshal v. Reichenau, dated 10/10/1941)

II. Herewith enclosure 1, a blueprint of a captured map 1:100000 Sheet no. 0-36-XI (West) Demjansk (the original was not sent to H.Q. 2nd Army Corps).

This print contains the defence areas allotted to regiments and independent detachments of the Division.

The Commanders of the units in question are responsible for the carrying and of the cleaning up of partisans in these areas and their permanent control. They regulate the employment of troops at their disposal in the area. In case of the appearance of partisans, Ic and neighbour will be notified. The anti-tank company in Igoghewo and 12 Detachment of the field military police -excluding the squad attached to the Adjutantwill be at the disposal of Quartermaster Section in their area.

2. The surrounding area of villages, paths and roads will be kept under control also at night by patrols and occasional snap controls.

3. The Commanders will consider the employment of local commanders in the occupied villages and will submit their names to the division.

In all places of their defence area even when not occupied, after scrutinizing the local conditions, village elders (natschalniks) will be installed, if this has not yet been done. The notifications handed out by the Ic Section of the division will be hung up even in places which are not occupied. The exhibition of these notifications must be constantly checked.

4. The village-elders will be directed to compile lists of the population in which all strangerswith the date of their arrivalwill be shown particularly. The houses of every place are to be numbered in an easily visible manner, and the number of their inhabitants to be listed with special columns for men, women and children. Check through snap roll calls. Strangers will be reported to the competent Command by the village elders. Collective punitive measures will be carried out immediately for noncompliance with these orders (in serious cases the shooting of the responsible inhabitants, in lighter cases their arrest and the confiscation of foodstuff etc.) For this the order of a Commander (C.O. BN) is necessary.

5. The travelling of Russiansmen, women or childrenon roads will be stopped. The leaving of villages is allowed only in exceptional cases (of economic nature) with the written approval of the Garrison Commander. Such permits must bear the date of the day, the route to be covered and place to be visited. The validity of the pass will on principle be not longer than one day. A record of issued permits is to be kept. The permits will be returned on the day of expiration. Threat of penalties for the nonreturning of permits! All persons found on the high roads without a permit will be arrested. Every soldier has the duty of arresting civilians. Caution when approaching. Every suspected civilian in the battle area will be ruthlessly shot.

6. Civilians living in dug-outs in the woods will be accommodated in inhabited localities or in certain cases in dugouts in the immediate vicinity of inhabited localities.

7. The following will be shot as partisans: Russian soldiers in uniform and mufti who did not report to the nearest Garrison Command or to the military authorities by the 20.11. and those civilians who are found on the high roads without a permit and who do not belong to the nearest village.

Apart from that, those civilians found in possession of arms of any kind or explosives.

8. The population is to be encouraged to cooperateby rewards. (See special orders concerning supplies No. 60 dated 8/30/1941)

9. The shooting or hanging of partisans and such elements who support partisans and who are in possession of arms will take place in the locality where they have been encountered. If possible, persons concerned should be interrogated firstabout their organization and leaders.

Special distribution: 39

Appendix to 12 Inf.Div. I.c/Adj.

No. 607/41 Secret date 11/17/1941. Cop of a Cop High Command of the Army Gen. Staff of the Army/Quarter Master General Branch Admin.

H.Qu. High Command of the Army 10/28/1941.

(Qu.4/B) II. 7498/41 g.

Subject: Conduct of Troops in the Eastern Territories

By order of the C.in C. Army, an enclosed copy of an order by G.O.C. 6th Army on the conduct of the Troops in eastern territories which has been described by the Führer as excellent, is being forwarded with the request to issue corresponding instructions on the same lines if this has not already been done.

By order. [signed] Wagner Army H.Q., 10.10.41

Army Command 6. Sec. IaAZ.7

Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.

Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the onesided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations.

Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e. the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.

The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle.

The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the Armed Forces from Army Kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply.

When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories. The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative considering the long and vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation of the battle so the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male population who were in a position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous apparently anti-soviet elements which originates from a “wait t and see” attitude, must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judged and i treated a member of the Soviet System.

The fear of the German counter-measures must be stronger than the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far from all political considerations of the future the soldier has I to fulfill two tasks:

1. Complete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces.

2. The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty an thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in Russia.

This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.

Commander in Chief [signed] von Reichenau Field Marshal.

Certified Copy: signed [illegible] Captain.

“Document D-423: Memorandum On The Conversation Between The Führer And Ambassador Oshima, In Presence Of The Reich Foreign Minister In The Wolfschanse On 1/3/1942 [partial translation]”, pp. 53-54.

[From 1615 to 1800 hours.]

F.7 0086 The Führer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic, emphasizing that he considers his most important task is to get -the U-boat warfare going in full swing. The U-boats are being re-organized. Firstly he had recalled all U-boats operating in the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now be posted outside USA ports. Later they would be off Freetown and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown. He hopes to put 20 to 24 boats into operation along the coast of the United States alone by February. These boats are in a position to remain there for four weeks, before having to return. After having given further explanations on the map, the Führer pointed out, that however many ships the USA built, one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that reason even Merchant Ships would be sunk without warning with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it gets round that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people. The training of seagoing personnel takes a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be taken prisoner, which is not always possible on the open sea, U-boats were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats.

Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Führer’s comments and said that the Japanese too are forced to follow these methods.

“Document D-436 [partial translation]”, p. 54.

The Archive [Das Archiv] 9/27/1940. Page 550.

Following announcement of promotion of Karl Doenitz to Vice-Admiral

At last, in Autumn 1935, after a successful command as captain of a foreign going cruiser, the then Fregattenkapitaen is entrusted with the leadership of the first U-boats of the young navy. With the whole of his strength and energies, in the fullness of his wisdom and the power of his personality, he in these days undertakes the building up of the U-boat arm under his care. He does not do it from the office table, but arrays himself again in leather overalls and personally instructs his first captains and crews In four years of untiring, and in the fullest sense of the word; uninterrupted work of training, he succeeds in developing the young U-boat arm personnel and material till it is a weapon of a striking power unexpected even by the experts. More than three million gross tons of sunken enemy shipping in only one year, achieved with only few boats, speak better than words of the services of this man.

“Document D-443: [Doenitz] Final Address At The Meeting Of Commanders Of The Navy In Weimar On Friday 12/17/1943 [partial translation]”, pp. 54-55.

Naval High Command/General Service Dept/ Ref. No. 156/44/S.O. only

Top Secret S.O. ONLY COPY No. 91 BY HAND OF OFFICER ONLY

Admiral of the Fleet Doenitz.

I am a firm adherent of the idea of ideological education. For what is it in the main? Doing his duty is a matter of course for the soldier. But the whole importance, the whole weight of duty done, are only present when the heart and spiritual conviction have a voice in the matter. The result of duty done is then quite different to what it would be if I only carried out my task literally, obediently and faithfully. It is therefore necessary for the soldier to support the execution of his duty with all his mental, all his spiritual energy, and for this his conviction, his ideology, are indispensable. It is therefore necessary for us to train the soldier uniformly, comprehensively, that he may be adjusted ideologically to our Germany. Every dualism, every dissension in this connection, or every divergence, or unpreparedness, imply a weakness in all circumstances. He in whom this grows and thrives in unison is superior to the other. Then indeed the whole importance, the whole weight of his conviction comes into play. It is also nonsense to say, perhaps, that the soldier or the officer must have no politics. The soldier embodies the state in which he lives, he is the representative, the articulate exponent of this State. He must therefore stand with his whole weight behind this State.

We must travel this road from our deepest conviction. The Russian travels along it. We can only maintain ourselves in this war if we take ,art in it with holy zeal, with all our fanaticism.

Not I alone can do this, but it can only be done with the aid of the man who holds the production of Europe in his hand, with Minister Speer. My ambition is to have as many warships for the Navy as possible, so as to be able to fight and to strike. It does not matter to me who builds them.

“Document D-444: [Order of the Day and Speech of Doenitz on Death of Hitler, 5/1/1945] [translation]”, pp. 55-57.

21.30, 21.42, 21.57

Attention, attention! The German Radio will broadcast a serious and important announcement to the German people (Music by Wagner and Bruckner).

(Repetition of the announcement)

(Drums) It has been reported from the Führer’s Headquarters, that our Führer Adolf Hitler has died this afternoon in his Battle, Headquarters at the Reichschancellery fighting to the last breath for Germany against Bolshevism.

On the 30th April the Führer nominated Grand Admiral Doenitz to be his successor. The Grandadmiral and Führer’s successor will speak to the German nation.

German men and women, soldiers of the German Armed forces. Our Führer Adolf Hitler is dead. The German people bow in deepest sorrow and respect. Early he had recognized the terrible danger of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against it. His fight having ended, he died a hero’s death in the capital of the German Reich, after having led a straight and steady life.

His life was dedicated to the service of Germany. His devotion in the fight against the Bolshevist flood was in the interest not only of Europe but of the entire civilized world. The Führer has nominated me as his successor. Fully conscious of the responsibility, I am taking over the leadership of the German nation in this fateful hour, my first task is to save German men from being destroyed by the advancing Bolshevist enemy. For this reason only do the Armies continue fighting. As far and as long as the achievement of this task is being prevented by the British and Americans, we have to defend ourselves against them too and must go on fighting. Thus the Anglo-Americans are no longer carrying on the fight for their own peoples but only for the spreading of Bolshevism in Europe. What the German people have achieved in this war through fighting and sufferings they have undergone at home are unique in history. In the coming emergency arising for our people I shall to the best of my ability make it my business to secure for our brave women, men and children the most tolerable conditions essential to life.

In order to do this, I need your help. Give me your confidence as your road is also my road. Uphold order and discipline in towns and country. Let everybody remain at his post doing his duty. Only thus will we be able to mitigate the suffering, which the future will bring for every one of us, and prevent the collapse. If we do all that is in our power, God will not forsake us after so much suffering and sacrifice.

(“Deutschland, Deutschland ueber Alles” and the “Horst Wesel” Song)

22.30 There is now a radio silence of three minutes.

22.33 As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Grandadmiral Doenitz issued the following order of the day to the German Armed Forces:

German Armed Forces, my comrades. The Führer is dead. Faithful to his great idea to save the peoples of Europe from Bolshevism. He has devoted his life and has died the death of a hero. With him one of the greatest heroes of German history has gone. With proud respect and sorrow we lower the flags for him.

The Führer has designated me to be his successor as head I of State and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. I am taking over the Supreme Command of all branches of the German Armed Forces with the will to carry on the struggle against the Bolshevists until the fighting forces and until hundreds of thousands of families of the German Eastern area have been saved from slavery and destruction.

Against the English and Americans I must continue to fight on as long as they prevent me from carrying on the fight [-translator’s addition-? against Bolshevism].

The situation requires from you, who have achieved such great historic deeds, and who are longing for the end of this war, further unconditional devotion. I demand discipline and obedience. Only by carrying out my orders unconditionally will chaos and destruction be avoided. He is a coward and traitor who, especially at this time, evades his duties and thus brings death or slavery to German women and children. The oath sworn by you to the Führer is now owed to me by everyone of you as the successor appointed by the Führer.

German soldiers do your duty. The life of our nation is at stake.

(serious music) Reichsprograme North (Hamburg)

“Document D-446: Extract From The BDU War Diary of 9/16/1942 [translation]”, p. 57.

With four full boats in tow U 156 has been bombed five times by an American aircraft of the “Liberator” type, and this in spite of flying a large Red Cross flag. Both periscopes are temporarily out of action. The boat is discontinuing her help and putting all the shipwrecked men overboard. She is ordered to take no further part in rescue operations. All boats are again told that their own safety may under no circumstances be endangered. If necessary, they should resort to any measures, even the ruthless breaking off of all salvage operations. Only Italians should be kept on board and be handed over to the French at the rendezvous agreed upon. As is evident from the message from U 156, the Commanding Officer believed that the enemy would refrain from making an attack when he saw a Red Cross flag, and the rescue measures being taken. This point of view is incomprehensible. It must be assumed that the sight of so many hundreds of survivors struggling for their lives possibly influenced him to think thus.

“Document D-448 [translation]”, p. 58.

Voelkischer Beobachter, 4/25/1942

On the 24th of April, Admiral of the Fleet Raeder celebrates his 66th birthday

It was to Raeder’s credit to have already built up by that time a powerful striking force from the numerically small fleet, despite the fetters of Versailles.

With the assumption of power through National Socialism began, too, the most fruitful period in the reconstruction of the German Fleet.

The Führer openly expressed his recognition of Raeder’s faithful services and unstinted co-operation, by appointing him “General-Admiral” on 4/20/1936. In 4/1939, on the 45th anniversary of the day on which Raeder first joined the Navy, the Führer on 4/1/1939, after the launching of the battleship “Tirpitz,” expressed his congratulations to the General-Admiral on board the battleship “Scharnhorst” and in further recognition of his merit in building up the Navy of the New Germany, promoted him to “Admiral of the Fleet.”

This highest distinction crowned a military career as brilliant as it was meritorious. As a soldier and a seaman, the General-Admiral has proved himself to be the Führer’s first and foremost naval collaborator.

The heroic and successful deeds in the years of the World War have been repeated in the War against England. To have created this striking force for the Führer is Admiral of the Fleet Erich Raeder’s greatest merit.

“Document D-472: International Biographical Archives [Internationales Biographisches Archiv] 4/22/1943: Joachim von Ribbentrop, Minister for Foreign Affairs, SS Obergruppenführer [translation]”, pp. 59-63.

1. Joachim von Ribbentrop who adopted in 1925 the particle “von” as a title was born on 4/30/1893 and was the son of a retired Lt. Colonel Richard Ribbentrop who died in Berlin on 1.1.1941 and his wife whose maiden name was Rittwitz and Caffron. Ribbentrop’s family came originally from Lipperland.

Ribbentrop spent his childhood and his school years mainly in Metz where his father’s garrison was stationed for a time. Between the ages of 15-17 he lived in Switzerland, then he spent a year with a family of a professor in England. At the age of 18 he went to Canada where he had to earn his living. He obtained work on the construction of the great Quebec bridge, across the river of St. Lawrence and was engaged for two years on building caissons and railway trucks. With the outbreak of the 1914 war he made his way through to Germany on a Dutch ship. He entered, as a volunteer, the 12th Hussar Regiment where he received a commission in 1915. After being wounded, he was made, in the spring of 1918, Adjutant to the Plenipotentiary of the War Ministry in Turkey; at the end of the war he worked at the War Ministry and was later appointed Adjutant of the peace delegation. He retired as a first lieutenant.

Ribbentrop turned now into a tradesman and started an import and export business limiting himself mainly to dealings in wines. These activities led to his marriage on 7/5/1920, to Anna Henkell, the daughter of the owner of the well-known German champagne vaults. Up to the present there.are five children of this marriage. Having already made connections abroad he now established fresh links with England and France. He succeeded in extending these to political circles, having joined in 1930 the service of NSDAP

At the time of the final struggle for power in the Reich, Ribbentrop played an important, if not strikingly obvious part in the bringing about of the decisive meetings between the representatives of the president of the Reich and the heads of the NSDAP, who had prepared the entry of Nazis into power on 1/30/1933. Those meetings as well as those between Hitler and von Papen tool place in Ribbentrop’s house in Berlin Dahlen.

After the 30.1 too Ribbentrop remained something of a confidential deputy of the Führer in his discussions with foreign statesmen and politicians until in 4/1934 he was appointed by the president of the Reich, von Hindenburg, Special Commissioner on the question of disarmament. In this capacity he undertook, in 5/1934, journeys to London and Rome, where he established contact with Mussolini; in June he was received by Barthou and Doumergue in Paris, in December by Laval. In 9/1933 he was the guest of the Leader of the French Ex-Servicemen’s Association Coy, with whom he had in common the desire to bring about closer co-operation between France and Germany through the activities of the ex-servicemen’s organizations of the two countries. But in particular he prepared in this capacity diplomatic achievement of the equality of Germany in political and military matters which became a reality with the declaration of her sovereign rights to re-arm on 3/16/1935.

On 5/31/1935 Ribbentrop was appointed ambassador of a special mission and on 5/21/1935 charged with securing a Naval treaty with England on the basis of 35 to 100, the signature of which followed on 6/18/1935. After the re-occupation of the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland on 3/7/1936, Ribbentrop represented the Reich at the extraordinary session of the League of Nations in London as a special envoy and explained before that assembly the reasons for Germany’s attitude. Soon after this Council meeting Ribbentrop handed over to the British Government the Great Peace Plan which had been developed by the Führer and Reichschancellor in Reichstag on 3/29/1936.

On 8/11/1936 the Führer and Reichschancellor appointed Ribbentrop as ambassador in London. At this difficult post Ribbentrop strove to achieve an understanding with England. During his activities in Elondon Ribbentrop was at the same time German representative at the non-intervention conference, which was expected to localize the Spanish Civil War. In his capacity as the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador, Ribbentrop led in autumn 1936 the discussions in Berlin with Muschakoji, the Japanese Ambassador at that time, on the German-Japanese AntiComintern Pact, which was signed on 11/25/1936. On 11/6/1937 Italy too entered this pact.

On 2/4/1939 the Führer and Reichschancellor appointed Ribbentrop to the post of the Foreign Minister in succession to Baron von Neurath, who in his turn was appointed President of the Secret State Council. In that capacity Ribbentrop took part, as early as 2/12/1938 in the conversations of the Führer in Obersalzberg with Dr. von Schuschnigg then Austrian Reichschancellor. The Anschluss of Austria on 3/3/1938 must be marked as the hour of which the Great German Reich [Grossdeutschen] was born. On 14.3. Ribbentrop took over also the work of the Austrian Foreign Ministry. Between the 2. and 9.4 he remained in attendance with Hitler during his seven days’ state visit in Italy.

After a summer full of crises, including the threat of war, the question of the Sudeten-Germans was cleared up at the conference of the “Four Great Men” (Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, Deladier) in Munich (9/29-30/1938), when the purely German parts of Czecho-Slovakia were awarded to the Reich. On the following day, the tension which was felt throughout the world was eased by the declaration made jointly by Hitler and Chamberlain on the German-British relations. A German-Italian Court of Arbitration called by the Governments of Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia and presided over by Ribbentrop settled, on 11/2/1938, territorial disputes between these two countries. Still under the retrospect influence of the Munich discussions, the Reich’s Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, who had travelled specially to Paris, and the French Foreign Minister, Bonnet, issued on 12/6/1938, as a result of their deliberations, a declaration, similar to the British-German one of Munich, on the mutual relations of their respective countries. As the relations between the Reich and Poland (5/1/1939, Beck was in Munich, 26-27.1Ribbentrop in Warsaw) as well as with other European countries could at that time still be regarded as friendly, the Führer felt himself justified in stating, in his Reichstag declaration of 1/30/1939, that, during the historic year of 1938, “Ribbentrop’s correct and bold judgment, and sometimes excellent ways of dealing with all problems of foreign policy, meant to him extraordinary help in carrying out his policy.” In 5/1939 in order to ensure the policy of the Reich, the pact of alliance with Italy was concluded. Soon, however, the animosity between the Slovaks and the Czechs degenerated into a threat to the peace of Central Europe. Thanks to the foresight of the President of the Czech Protectorate, Dr. Hacha and his Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky, also this crisis would be solved without fight. On 3/14/1939, Dr. Hacha, in view of the invasion by German troops, laid the fate of the Czech people and country into the hands of the Führer of the German Reich. (16th March institution of the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia.) At the same time Slovakia announced her autonomy and asked for the protection of the Reich. After previous negotiations between Ribbentrop and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Urbsys also the Memel-land could return into the Reich on 3/22/1939.

Although it had been possible to regain without conflagrations all the territories, cut off the Reich by the Dictate of Versailles, all endeavours to settle with Warsaw the questions of Danzig and the Corridor were frustrated through the interference of England. An English promise of guarantee stiffened Poland’s attitude to such an extent, that in the course of the summer the crisis, which had existed since the spring 1939 increased to a danger of war, although the Führer had offered a guarantee of the Polish frontiers in return for the return of Danzig into the Reich and a very magnanimous solution of the Corridor question. When the Western Entente already thought the ring round the Reich closed, the German Foreign Policy succeeded in coming to an agreement of consultation and non-aggression with Russia which was signed by Ribbentrop in Moscow on 8/23/1939. On the 28th and 29th September, when Ribbentrop was in Moscow for the second time, the negotiations on a frontierand friendly agreement and German-Russian economic planning were ended.

Polish frontier violation released on the 9/1/1939 the 18 days’ victorious campaign through Poland. All previous negotiations between Ribbentrop and the British and French Ambassadors and an offer of mediation by Mussolini proved unsuccessful; on the 3rd. September first the British and three hours later the French Ambassador handed their Governments’ declarations of war to Ribbentrop. In spite of that on the 10/5/1939 the Führer in the Reichstag addressed another peace appeal to Britain and France, but again in vain.

During the lull in the winter of 1939/40 President Roosevelt tried to use his influence on European events. On 2/1/1940 his emissary, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sumner Welles, had talks with the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister.

With the occupation of Denmark and Norway on 4/9/1940, only a few hours before the landing of British troops in these territories, the battle began against the Western Powers. Simultaneously with the marching of the German Armies into Holland and Belgium, on the 10th May von Ribbentrop disclosed, in front of representatives of the foreign press, the English French intentions which had been made known in Berlin, to invade the Ruhr district via Belgian and Dutch territory. After Marshal Petain had asked for an Armistice on 6/17/1940, shortly after Italy’s entry into the war, the Führer in the presence of the high generals and the Reich Foreign Minister, received in the wood of Compiegne on 20th June the French Delegation, which had come to accept the terms of armistice.

After the victory in the West, the Führer turned to the realization of his plans for. a United Europe. In agreement with allied Italy, shown clearly by the repeated meetings of the Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, and Count Ciano, and by decisions of importance in talks between Hitler and Mussolini themselves, began at first an economic infiltration of the South Eastern States and the building up of mutual conditions of confidence. The latter induced the Hungarian and Rumanian Government in their negotiations on territorial reconciliation to ask for an arbitrator’s decision by the Axis, which took place under the chairmanship of von Ribbentrop on 8/30/1940 in Vienna. After that, at first Hungary, which since 2/1939 adhered to the Anticomintern Pact, joined on 11/1940 the Tripartite Pact, which had been signed between Germany, Italy and Japan on the 9/27/1940. The necessity to transform the Anticomintern Pact into a security pact with a possibility of other countries to join, had resulted from the attitude of the USA. becoming more and more threatening towards Japan and the Axis and from the increasing help being given to Britain, which culminated in the USA. law for help to Britain in : 3/1941. Rumania, under her new Head of State, General Antonescu followed the example of Hungary. General Antonescu himself performed the signing of Rumania’s declaration of adherence to the Tripartite Pact in Berlin.

On the 11/12/1940 the Chairman of the Committee of the People’s Commissar, the Foreign Commissar Molotov, returned in Berlin the Reichsforeignminister’s visit of autumn 1939.

The year 1941 brought Bulgaria into the Three Power Pact on 1/3. Later, on 25/3 Jugoslavia also joined the Three Power Pact. However, a few days after the signing of the Pact in Vienna, a revolution took place in Belgrade, brought about by London and Moscow and resulted in a German invasion of Jugoslavia on 6/4. On the same day, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop issued a declaration of the Reich Government’s resolution concerning Jugoslavia and Greece. The conclusion of the German-Turkish Pact of Friendship (18.6.41) was regarded as a German diplomatic victory over England.

The Foreign Office communique issued the morning of 22.6. contained extraordinary significant information regarding the treacherous activities of the Soviet Government since the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact of Friendship, at the same time the German invasion armies crossed the Russian frontier.

On 25.11.1941., a State Government meeting was held in the Ambassador’s Hall of the new German Chancellery. A Pact was signed by the representatives of the signatories of the Anticomintern Pact, prolonging the Agreement, and the representatives of the Governments of Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Croatia, Rumania and Slovakia joyfully acclaimed the participation of their respective countries in this Pact.

Rules were laid down for mutual operations against the Anglo-American enemy and after the entry of Japan and USA. in the war, a military convention was signed in Berlin on 18.1.1942 between Germany, Italy and Japan.

“Document D-473: Combating Of Crime Amongst The Polish And Soviet-Russian Civilian Labourers [translation]”, pp. 64-65.

The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD) III A 4 (new)-296/44

Berlin, 12/4/1944

To c) the Criminal Police (Head) Offices by way of information.

(authorization for the Criminal Police to independently prosecute cases of minor and medium crimes).

Reference: Decree III A 5 b no. 187/431763 of the 30.6.43

According to the decree of the 30.6.43, crimes committed by Polish and Soviet-Russian civilian labourers are being prosecuted by the State Police (Head) Offices, and even in those cases, where for the time being the Criminal Police had, within the sphere of its competence, carried on the inquiries. For the purpose of speeding up the process and in order to save manpower, the decree of the 30.6.1943 is altered, and the Criminal Police (Head) Offices are authorized as from now on to prosecute themselves the crimes they are inquiring into within the sphere of their competence, insofar as they are cases of minor or medium crimes. Included in these are for instance crimes of negligence, damage to property, theft and receiving (unless committed in gangs), fraud, games of chance, as well as all offenses against the war industry regulations, also insofar as in this connection it is a case of being a crime. Cases of doubt are to be arranged by local discussion between the heads of the State Police (Head) Offices and the Criminal Police (Head) Offices.

The following are available to the Criminal Police as a means of prosecution:

Police imprisonment

(See No. 15 in the series of publication of the Reich Criminal Police Department, “Preventive action against crime;” decree by the Reichsführer of the SS and Chief of the German Police S II A 2 No. 57/43176 of the 3/19/1943, publication of orders, page 86, and directives hereto; decree by the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service V. A. 2 No. 557/43 of the 5/10/1943.)

Admission into a concentration camp for preventive custody as being anti-social or dangerous to the community.

(See No. 15 of the series of publications of the Reich Criminal Police Department “Preventive action against crimes;” decree of the Reich Ministry for the Interior Pol. S.Kr. 3 No. 1682/37 2098, and directives hereto, of the 14.12.1937; decree of the Reich Criminal Police Department of the 4.4.1938, in this case of the 8.4.1942; and decree of the Reich Security Department V. A. 2 No. 387/43 of the 31.3.1943, the first paragraph of which is to be applied to Soviet-Russian civilian labourers too).

Their stay in the concentration camp is normally to be for the duration of the war.

Besides this, the Criminal Police (Head) Offices are authorized to hand over Polish and Soviet-Russian civilian labourers in suitable cases and with the agreement of the competent State Police (Head) Offices to the Gestapo’s penal camps for the “education of labour.”

Where the possibilities of prosecuting an individual case are insufficient because of the peculiarity of the case, the incident is to be handed over to the competent State Police (Head) Office.

Signed: Dr. Kaltenbrunner

“Document D-566: Affidavit Of Peter Joseph Heisig, Oberleutnant Zur See 11/27/45 [translation]”, pp. 72-74.

The news that German U-Boat officers are accused of murdering shipwrecked allied seamen makes me feel it my duty to give the following testimony.

In 9/1942 I was sent as a midshipman to attend a course for U-Boat Officers of the Watch (UWO Lehrgang) at the 2nd U-Boat Training Division (2te ULD) at Gotenhafen-Oxhoelt.

At the end of Septemberor it might have been at the beginning of OctoberGrand Admiral Doenitz, who was then still C-in-C U-Boats carried out an inspection (data for the exact date of this inspection are in a diary at my parents’ and are not available to me at the moment). During the period between 10 and 11.45 o’clock rand Admiral Doenitz spoke about the military situation in the Theatre Hall of the 2nd ULD.

The gist of this talk of Admiral Doenitz’s about the position, during which I heard his words clearly and distinctly, was as follows: U-boat successes have diminished at the moment. The reason for this is the energetic use of air patrols by the enemy. One cannot however expect the old successes to be achieved again in a few months as a result of the development of new anti-aircraft weapons. Hitler personally assured him, Doenitz, that U-boats would be given priority in the allocation of the new antiaircraft weapons.

To a question by an officer with reference to an article in the “Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung” about ship-building in the JSA, Admiral Doenitz replied:

“According to news received from America we were bound to reckon with the possibility that in the Allied countries more than 1 million net registered tons of new merchant shipping space would be brought into service monthly. This was more shipping space than would be sunk even with good U-boat successes. The bottleneck of the Allies lay only in the problem of personnel for these newly built ships. The Atlantic route was too dangerous for seamen so that they even had to be brought aboard ship under compulsion. This was the point where we, the U-boat crews, had to take a hand. He therefore demanded that we should from now on carry on total warfare against ship and crew. That meant: so far as possible, no seaman from a sunk ship was to get home any more. Only thus could the supply line of the British Isles be seriously endangered and only thus in the long run could we strike a noticeable blow at Allied merchant shipping traffic. In this way it would be impossible for the opponent even to make use of his newly built ships, since no more crews would be available to him. After the sinking of a ship, every possibility of rescue must be denied to the crew, through the destruction of every means of saving life.

I later discussed these remarks of Admiral Doenitz’s with the others, and all present unanimously and unambiguously took them to mean that after the sinking of a ship, all possibility of escape, whether in boats, on rafts or by any other means, must be denied to the crew and the destruction of the crew was to be attempted by every means. This mode of warfare was for me as for most of my comrades completely new. Owing to Admiral Doenitz’s authoritative position, it was nevertheless fully and completely accepted by many of them. He sought to invalidate in advance any doubts which might arise, by pointing to the air war and the bombing.

I still remember details of this address; it is, however, not possible for me to cite them all in this statement.

“Document D-569: Procedure In Cases Of Unnatural Death Of Soviet-Russian Prisoners Of War [translation]”, pp. 74-76.

The Reich leader of SS troops The Inspector of the concentration camps Pol / File No: 14 f 8 -10/Ot/U /41 Secret Journal No.

Oranienburg, 10/29/1941.

Reference: Local Police Order / File No. 14 b/Ot/U.--Secret Journal No. 89/41 of the 11.10.41. Enclosures: None.

To the Commandants of the concentration camps Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo., Neu., Au., Gr.-Ro., Commandant of the Prisoner of War Labor camp Lublin.

As amendment to the local police order Polish/ File No. 14 b 18/Ot./U.-Secret journal 89/41 of the 11.10.41 it is ordered, that in cases of unnatural death of Soviet Russian prisoners of war (shot whilst trying to escape suicides, etc) a short report by the legal officer (with a short note about the result of the examination if occasion arises) should be submitted here in addition to the prescribed death notice to the inspector of the concentration camp.

This report of the legal officer is duly intended for the local office and for the camp; for the present it is not to be sent to WAST. The competent SS and police courts are also not to be informed of cases of unnatural death of Soviet Russian prisoners of war.

By order, [Signature unreadable] Lieutenant-Colonel of SS Troop.

The Reich Leader of SS Troops The Inspector of concentration camps Pol. File No: 14 f 14 /L/Ot. U: Secret Journal No. /41

Oranienburg, 15/11/41

Regarding: Execution of Russian prisoners of war. Ref: None Enclosures: None To the Commandants of the concentration camps Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo., Nu., Au., Gr.Ro.

Copies to: Camp Doctors Protective custody camp leaders (E), Administrative authorities.

The Reich leader of SS troops and Chief of the German police has agreed in principle with the postponement of the execution of Russian prisoners of war (particularly commissars) sent to concentration camps to be executed, if their physical condition enables them to work in a quarry. For the carrying into effect o this measure it is necessary to obtain approval of the Chief of the Security Police and of the SD (Security Service).

It is, therefore, ordered:

That on arrival of execution transports in the camp, the physically strong Russians who are fit to work in a quarry, are to be picked out by the leader of the protective custody camp (E) and the camp doctor. A list of names of the picked Russians is to be submitted here in duplicate. On this list the camp doctor must rectify, that from a medical point of view there are no objections against employment of these men.

After a declaration of agreement by the Chief of the Security police and of the Security Service the transfer to a quarry camp of the Russians concerned will be ordered from here.

[signature illegible] SS Brigade leader and Major General of the Waffen SS.

Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht Schoeneberg (German High Command)

Berlin - Badenschestr. 51 Az. 2 f 24.19 AWA/Prisoners of War (16) 22 1941 re:Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War

1. The following order was issued in the Army regulations:

“It is the duty of every soldier to watch every unguarded Soviet prisoner of War, to arrest him and to hand him over at the.nearest Police Station.

If there is a prisoner of War camp in the immediate vicinity the arrested man is to be conducted there.

OKW. 10/29/1941 Az. 2 f 24 19m AWA/Prisoners of War (16)

If escaped Soviet prisoners of War are returned to the camp, in accordance with this order, they have to be handed over to the nearest Service Station of the Secret State Police in any case.

2. Owing to the fact that at present these misdemeanors on the part of Soviet prisoners of war are particularly frequent, due, most likely, to their living conditions still being somewhat unsettled, the following temporary regulation comes into force; it may be amended later.

If a Soviet prisoner of war murders another prisoner of war in the camp, or commits manslaughter or any act not covered by German Penal Code laws, the perpetrator of the act is to be handed over to the Head of the Security Police.

Also, if a Soviet prisoner of War commits any other punishable offense, the Commandant of the Camp must hand the guilty man over to the Head of the Security Police, unless he is convinced that a disciplinary measure or legal punishment will cover the case, after it has been submitted to Court martial, and camp discipline will thus be maintained.

3. In cases 1 and 2 the prisoner of war is to be released from the POW camp, and the handing over to the Secret State Police is to be reported to the Army Information Office, provided an entry to that effect has already been made.

Distribution:

(C. in C. Army) (General Staff. Army) (Q.M.G)) O K H/ Gen. St. d. H. /Gen. Qu.: 10

(Air Minister and C. in C. Air Force) R d. L. and OB. d. L.: 2

O K M (Navy G.H.Q. Admiralty): 2

W. Kdo. I, II, III, IV, V, VI (6) (14) (14) (15) (14) 21: .95

p.p. Chief of the High Command

[signed] REINECKE

The Head of the Security Police and the SD B. No. 210 B/41 g - IV A 1 c-

Berlin 12/11/1941 Secret!

Express Letter!

Re: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War. Proceeding: Operational Order No. 8. Decree of the Head of the Security Police and the SD of the 7/17/194121 B/41 g’Rs.

Enclosures: 1 enclosure.

I enclose herewith a copy of a decree issued by the OKW (German High Command) dated 22 41Az. 2 f 24 19m AWA Prisoner of War (16) No. 3624/41 secret.for your kind attention.

I hereby decree as follows, to come into force at once:

1. All Soviet prisoners of War, who come under paragraphs 1 and 2 of the above-mentioned decree of the OKW, are to be taken over by the State Police Control Centres and the Operational Commands of the Security Police and the SD respectively, as soon as the Wehrmacht brings them in.

2. Soviet prisoners of War, who committed no crimes during an escape (such as attacks, robbery, murder, manslaughter, etc) and who have not been found unmanageable according to the directives issued (see Decree dated 17-7-4121 B/41 g’Rs) and provided the place of their arrest is on Reich territory or on that of the General-Government (of Occupied Polish Territories)are to be sent to the nearest concentration camp or the Prisoner of War Labor camp Lublin, situated on General-Government territory, for compulsory labor.

Operational groups in the Line of Communications area (in the rear of the Army) must adopt measures suitable to local conditions.

Otherwise, when dealing with these cases, I direct you to observe the directives and supplements to operational order No. 8.

Please give the Operational commands instructions to that effect and forward the enclosed copies on to them, for perusal.

The Head of the Police Force has had a copy of this decree ad has been requested to pass these instructions on to subordinate Service Stations.

Distribution: To all State Police Control Centres. To the Commander of the Sipo (Security Police and SD in Metz. To the Commander of the Sipo (Security Police and SD in Strassburg To the Commander of the Sipo (Security Police and SD in Oslo To the Chief Liaison Officer, to the commandant of Prisoners of War Camps in the General-Government. Lublin To the Officer commanding the Sipo and the SD in Lublin To the Officer commanding the Sipo and the SD in Krakow To the Officer commanding the Sipo and the SD in Warsaw To the Officer commanding the Sipo and the SD in Radom To the Officer commanding the Sipo and the SD in Lemberg To the Chief Liaison Officer to the Commandant of Prisoner of War Camps in Military Administrative district I Koenigsberg To the Operational Commander of the Sipo and the SD attached to the AOK (Army Head Quarters Staff) in NORWAY, Command Port Finland.

To Operational Group A SKDO 1a, (Schutz Kommando) SKDO 1b, SKDO 2 EKDO 3

Operational Group B SKDO 7a SKDO 7b EKDO 8 EKDO 9 SKDO “Moscow”

To Operational Group C SKDO 4a SKDO 4b EKDO 5 EKDO 6

To Operational Group D SKdo 10a SKdo 10b EKdo 11a EKdo 11b EKdo 12

To the Senior SS and Police Leaders, North (101) To the Senior SS and Police Leaders, Midland (102) To the Senior SS and Police Leaders, South (103) To the Senior SS and Police Leaders, z. b. V. (for special employment)

For information:

To the Reich Leader of SS troops and Head of the German Police Force. To the Head of the Sipo and the SD, To the Heads of Administration I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII. To the Report Centres IV D 2 and IV D 3 To the Section leader IV D-SS-O.-Stubaf. Dr. Weinmann To the Reich Leader SSInspector of Concentration camps Oranienburg To all Senior SS and Police Leaders (except The Hague) To all Inspectors of the Sipo and the SD To the Officer Commanding the Sipo and the SD in Veldes To the Officer Commanding the Sipo and the SD in Marburg/ Drau To all Criminal Police Control Centres.

[signed] Heydrich

Certified: Signed: Signature (D.S.) Chancellery Staff Official

Reich Leader of SS Troops Inspector of Concentration Camps POL/AZ: 14 B 18/12.41/L/Ot: Secret Report No. /41

Oranienburg, 12/15/1941

Re: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War (Decree of the Head of the Security Police) Reference: Erl. d. Ch.d. Sipo and the SD B. No. 2103 B/41 g IV A 10 of 12/11/1941. Enclosures: 1

To the Commandants of Concentration Camps. Bu., Da., Sah., Flo, Mau., Neu., Au., Gr.-Ro., Natz., Nie. and POW camp Lublin.

Attached copy of a Decree issued by the Head of the Security Police and the SD concerning the treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War is being forwarded for perusal.

per pro [illegible] SS Obersturmbannführer

The Reichsführer SS. The Inspector of Concentration Camps POL/Az. 146 18/12 41/L /Ot

Oranienburg, 12/16/1941 SECRET

Secret Journal No. /41.

Concerns: Cash confiscated from Soviet Russians condemned to be executed.

Reference: Ch. d. Sipo u.d. SD (Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service) B. No. 2102 B/41 gIV A 1c. 12/3/1941. Enclosures

To the Camp Commandant of the Concentration Camp:DA., SAH., BU., FLO., MAU., NEU., AU., GRO.-RO. - Dachau, Buchenwald, Auschwitz, etc.)

The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Department decrees under the above Reference Number that all cash confiscated from Soviet Russian condemned to execution in the camps is to be forwarded through the Administration of the Concentration Camp to the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service Accounts Branch, 8 Prinz Albrecht Street, Berlin, S.W. 11.

[signature illegible]

Copy of a Copy

Army High Command Az 2 f 24 19m AWA/ Prisoners of War (16) No. 4411/41 Secret (X)

BerlinSchoeneberg 12/29/1941 Badensche Str. 51.

Concerns: Carrying out of death penalty on Soviet Russian Prisoners.

In a case where Soviet Russian Prisoners of War have been condemned to death by the verdict of the Army Court Martial, and the verdict is to be carried out by hanging, doubt has arisen as to who should be called upon to act as executioner for carrying out the punishment.

In order to settle this doubt for future cases the following has been decreed:

Should a death sentence against a Soviet Russian prisoner of war have to be carried out by hanging, the Commandant of the prisoner of war camp concerned should select from among the Soviet prisoners of his camp a person suitable for carrying out the sentence, who will be compensated in some way (money, food etc.) for his trouble.

If nobody is to be found among the prisoners who is willing to do this, the condemned man is to be handed over to the nearest office of the Secret State Police (Gestapo), as they are likely to be in a position to have the sentence fulfilled by foreign prisoners.

Members of the German armed forces will not be called upon to carry out the sentence.

On behalf of the Chief of the Army High Command

[signed] Reinecke.

f. d. R.d. A. {signed] WINTER [seal] Official of the Chancellery f.d. R. d. A. [signature illegible]

Berlin, 2/18/1942.

To the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Dept. IV A. 1. c. B No. 2279 B/42g

Express Letter SECRET

Concerns: Carrying out of the death sentence on Soviet Russian Prisoners of War Preamble: None Enclosures:-1-

I am forwarding herewith a copy of the Order of the Army High Command of 12/29/1941Az 2 f 24, 19m AWAPrisoners of War (16) No. 4411/41 Secret (X) concerning the carrying out of the death sentence on Soviet Russian Prisoners of War for your information.

In order to exclude all doubt I decree that:

1. The carrying out of death sentences passed by Army Courts Martial on Soviet Russian Prisoners of War must in no case be effected by the members of the Security Police or the Security Service.

2. Soviet Russian prisoners of war handed over by the Army in such cases are to be hanged by other prisoners of foreign nationality, in agreement with the Camp Commandant either at the camp of origin or at the nearest adjacent camp. The Commandant of the camp in question is to be given instructions to this effect if occasion should arise. The result is to be reported briefly to me.

I request that the leaders of all operational Commands be instructed to this effect, and send You the enclosed additional copies to be passed on to them for daily use.

Signed on behalf of Mueller witnessed [signed] Winter (Chancellery official)

SS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DIRECTIVE

Oranienburg, 2/20/1942

The Inspector of Concentration Camps Pol./ Az.: 14 f 14 /L/ Ot: Secret journal No. 105/42

Concerns: Carrying out of the Death Penalty on Soviet Russian Prisoners of War Reference Chef der Sipo und des SD. IVA 1 c B. No. 2279 B/42g. of 2/18/1942. Enclosures2

To the Camp Commandant of the Concentration Camp. DA, SAH, BU, MAU, FLO, NEU, AU, GRO.-RO. (Buchenwald, Dachau, Auschwitz, etc).

To the Commandant of the Prisoner of War Camp; Lublin.

The attached copy of the letter of the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service IV A 1 o B No. 2279 B/42 g of 18.2.42 and copy of the letter of the German High Command Az: 2 f. 24 19m AWA/ Prisoners of War (16) No. 4411/41 Secret (X) of 29.12.41 are forwarded for information.

[signature illegible]

SS Economic Administrative Head Office

Oranienburg, 13.6.42.

Department Group DConcentration Camps D I/1 File: 14 b 18/L/Ot. Secret journal No. 385/42

Concerns: Transmission of notices of the death of Soviet prisoners.

Reference: RSHAIV A 1 oB. No. 9017/42 of 11.6.42.

Enclosures: -/-

To the Camp Commandants of the Concentration Camps. DA., SAH., BU., MAU., FLO., NEU., AU.,GR.-ROSEN, NATZW., NIE., STU., ARB., RAV and Prisoners of War Camp, Lublin.

A Camp Commandant has notified the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the execution of Soviet prisoners of war by means of a death announcement. This was returned by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces with the request to send a new communication on neutral separate sheets.

As, upon Soviet prisoners of war being passed on for execution, their release as prisoners of war automatically follows, there is no question of such a notification being necessary.

Executions of Soviet prisoners of war are, as hitherto, only to be notified to the Office charged with arranging the execution and to the Chief of Department Group D in the SS Economic Administrative Head Office.

Death notices are, in accordance with instructions, only to be sent out for deceased Soviet prisoners of war who were delivered over by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Stalags) to the prisoners-of-war labour camps of the Armed Forces, to the Services Casualties Information Office.

The Chief of the Central Office Signature Lieutenant Colonel of SS Troops.

SS Economic Administrative Head Office Department Group D Concentration Camps

Oranienburg, 6/27/1942.

DI/File: 14 f I/L./Ot. Secret journal No. 428/42 Concerns: Carrying out of executions by prisoners Reference: RSHA., B.No. IV240/42 Secret Rs. of 6/25/1942. Enclosures:-/-

15 Copies Secret Reich Matter.

To the Camp Commandants of the Concentration Camps. DA., SAH., BU., MAU., FLO., NEU., AU., GR.-RO., NATZ., NIE., STU., ARB., RAV., Prisoners of War Camp, Lublin.

The Reich Leader of SS Troops and Chief of the German Police, in modification of his previous instruction, has ordered that Polish or Soviet-Russian prisoners in concentration camps, who have to carry out executions of their fellow countrymen, are no longer to receive 5 Reichsmark, as formerly, but only 3 cigarettes.

In future, the above order of the Reich Führer is to be followed.

Signature. SS Major-General and Major-General of Arms.

SS Economic Administrative Head Office Department Group D Concentration Camps

Oranienburg, 2/11/1943.

D I/1 /File: 14 c 2 /Ot./ U. Secret JournalNo. 111/43 Secret

Concerns: Prisoners who come under the “KEITELDecree”.

Reference: The present circular decree D I/File: 14 c 2/Ot./U. Secret journalNo. 551/42 of 8/18/1942.

Enclosures: None.

To the Camp Commandants of the Concentration Camps. DA., SAH., BU., MAU., FLO., NEU., AU., GR.-RO., NATZ., NIE., STU., HERZ., RAV., and Prisoners of War Camp, Lublin.

From the Camp Commandant of a Concentration Camp, the wife of a deceased French prisoner, who was expressly mentioned in the dossier as prisoner in the matter “PORTO” [postage ?], the death certificate was sent direct to the wife, so that she would receive information of his death.

I once again draw attention, with special emphasis, to the fact that the extract from the Night and Fog Decree sent with the above referred to secret communication is to be most strictly followed. The object of the Night and Fog Decree is to leave third persons in the Occupied Territories in uncertainty as to the whereabouts of prisoners transferred to the Reich. This also includes the fact that the relatives may not learn anything when such prisoners die in concentration camps.

The whole of the correspondence concerning prisoners who come under the Night and Fog Decree is to be carried out exclusively with the competent office of the Security Police as “Secret”. Neither any civilian persons nor any other offices are to learn anything regarding the whereabouts of Night and Fog Decree prisoners.

It is the duty of the Camp Commandants to see that the above order is carried out.

The Chief of the Central Department SIGNATURE Lieutenant-Colonel of SS Troops.

SS Economic Chief Administration Office Branch Office “D” Concentration Camp.

Oranienburg, 6/7/1943

SECRET D I/1 /Az.: 14 c 2/Ot/B Secret Journal No. 743/43.

Concerns: Treatment of Prisoners under the “NN” (Night and Fog) Decree.

Reference: Reich Security Office IV c 2 Gen. No. 103/42 g of 5/31/1943. Enclosures: None.

To the Camp Commandant of the Concentration Camp. Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo., Neu., Au., Gr-Ro., Natz., Stu., Rav., Herz., Ri., Lub. and Zil-Bergan, Belsen.

The following decree of the Reich Security Head Office concerning treatment of “N.N.” (Night and Fog prisoners is sent for information and strictest observance.

The “N.N.” decree is intended to eradicate all forces inimical to Germany in the Occupied Territories and to effect their transfer to the Reich. The relatives and the population are to be kept in uncertainty as to the fate of these persons. In order to achieve this, the “N.N.” prescribes that the receipt of all letters, mail or parcels, permission for interviews and issue of information is forbidden for this class of prisoner. It is immaterial whether the “N.N.” prisoner is of the old or new style. “N.N.” prisoners, old style, are those who have been handed over by the military courts to the directional centres for transfer to the Reich, whereas the new style “N.N.” prisoners are those who have been transported to the concentration camps within the Reich direct by the Arrest Service of the Security Police and the Security Service, without the participation of the military courts.

The competent offices of the Security Police and Security Service have received instructions to fill in a form concerning every prisoner coming under the “N.N.” regulation, specifying the particulars, racial origin, reason for arrest, former place of residence and other data of interest, and to forward it to the eventual concentration camp. These forms must be furnished with the “Nacht und Nebel” stamp [Night and Fog].

On receipt of the reports of the Security Police and Security Service Offices, with the forms attached, a collective order for arrest will be issued from here (i.e. Head Office) and the offices will be further instructed to transfer the prisoners to a concentration camp.

Where “N.N.” prisoners of German race are concerned, these will be directed exclusively to the Natzweiler Concentration Camp. In all other cases the “N.N.” prisoners will be allocated to any other concentration camp, according to the location of the allocating Office of the Security Police or the Security Service, and with relation to the graded participation and available accommodation of the various camps.

The Camp Commandants of the Concentration Camps already containing “N.N.” prisoners will immediately proceed with the examination of these prisoners from the point of view of their racial origin, and will transfer the “N.N.” prisoners of German origin to the Natzweiler Concentration Camp. Compliance with this instruction will be reported in every individual case on the appropriate form. The Camp Commandant of the Natzweiler Concentration Camp will see to it that the “N.N.” prisoners are accommodated separately from the other prisoners. For the rest the principles of the RSHAReference IV D 4sent with Secret Letter No. 551/42 of 8/18/1942, will be applicable.

It is further orderedas already decreed by Circular of 2/11/1943Secret Journal No. 111/43that announcements of deaths of “N.N.” prisoners will be issued only to the office of the Security Police or Security Service allocating the prisoner, to the RSHA, and to the local Office, in order to prevent the whereabouts of “N.N.” prisoners from becoming known. In this respect the regulations issued for procedure to be observed in eases of death, particularly the notification of relatives, are cancelled. The effects of a deceased “N.N.” prisoner will be sent without exception to the Office of the original allocation of the prisoner, which will keep them in their care until further orders.

The Chief of the Central Office [signature illegible] SS Obersturmbannführer

SS Head Office for Economic Administration Chief of branch office D Concentration Camps D I/ File No. 14 c 2/Ot/S.-Secret Journal No. 205/44

Oranienburg, 22.2.44.

Secret Regarding: Prosecution of punishable offenses against the Reich or against the occupying power in occupied territories (Night and Fog decree).

Reference: Head Office for Security of the ReichIV D 4 103/42 secret.

Enclosures: None.

To the Commander of the concentration camps Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo., Neu., Au IIII, Gr.-Ro., Natz., Stu., Rav., Herz., Lubl., War., Group Leader D. and transmit camp Ber-Bels.

According to information from the Head Office for the Security of the Reich, the Minister of Justice has, by decree to the legal authorities of the 6.3.1943 journal No. IV a398/43 secret i.a., ordered the following:.

“7. The corpse of executed or otherwise deceased “Night and Fog” Prisoners is to be handed over to the State police for burial. Attention is drawn to the appropriate instructions in regard to secrecy. In this connection it is necessary to take special care that the graves of NN prisoners should not be marked with the names of the deceased.

Corpses are not to be given up for instruction and experimental purposes.”

The corpses sent to concentration camps by Gestapo head offices for cremation are to be taken over and cremated.

In order to do this the following order is issued:

1. The above mentioned cases must figure in the lists of the camp crematories.

2. The ashes are to be kept in an urn and the lids to bear inscriptions.

3. The urns are to be stored in the concentration camps until further notice.

4. Death certificates are to be made out by the camp registries and to be sent to the Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service in Paris with the remark that they belong to deceased Night and Fog prisoners.

[signature illegible] SS Group leader and Lt. Gen. of Arms SS.

“Document D-629 [translation]”, pp. 99-100.

Top Secret

The Chief Of The Higher Command Of The Wehrmacht

WFA/Dept. L No. 22126/40 g.k. (IV)

Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76. 4/3/1940 2 copies 2d copy

To the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs

Dear Herr von Ribbentrop,

The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been, by command of the Führer, long in preparation by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht has therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions connected with the carrying out of this operation. The time at your disposal for the political preparation of this operation is on the contrary very much shorter. I believe myself therefore to be acting in accordance with your own ideas in transmitting to you herewith, not only these wishes of the Wehrmacht which would have to be fulfilled by the Governments in Oslo, Copenhagen, and Stockholm for purely military reasons, but also if I include a series of requests, which certainly concern the Wehrmacht only indirectly, but which are however of the greatest importance for the fulfillment of its task.

I would request, in order to bring about complete agreement of action, that personal contact between the German Plenipotentiaries and the military Commanders appointed for Oslo and Copenhagen should be established as soon as possible. The entire direction of the military operation is in the hands of Inf. General v. Falkenhorst, Commander of group XXI. Under him, the occupation of Denmark will be directed by the High Command for special operations Documents D-283-D-786; EC-3-EC-620; ECH-1-ECH-24; ECR-14-ECH-197; L-3-L-361; M-1I, C. in C. Air Force Kaupisch.

In accordance with the Führer’s specific instructions, may I furthermore request, that the number of persons participating in the preparations be restricted to the utmost. Apart from the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Wehrmacht, other higher Reich authorities and similar offices are not in principle participating. The necessary instructions to the Higher Reich Authorities will only be given on the day of occupation itself by the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

Heil Hitler,

Yours faithfully, K. 3/4

“Document D-630 [translation]”, pp. 100-101.

[Extracts from B.d.U. War Diary, 9/1942]

T.C.I.2100/17/9/42 T.O.O. 1924/17. TRITON O.

To: All commanding officers.

1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.

2. Orders for bringing in Captains and Chief Engineers still apply.

3. Rescue shipwrecked only if their statements will be of importance for your boat.

4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.

“2. The attention of all Commanding Officers is again drawn to the fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for the conduct of warfare by annihilating enemy ships and their crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the Captains and Chief Engineers still stand.”

“America” W/T. service.

T.O.I. 0044/18/9/42. T.O.O. 1930/17. TRITONA

From: Schacht.

163 Italians handed over to “Annamite.” Navigating officer of “Lyconia” and another English officer on board. 7 lifeboats with about 330 English and Poles, including 15 women and 16 children, deposited in naval grid square FE 9612. Women and children accommodated on board for one night. All shipwrecked persons given hot meals and drinks, clothes, and bandages where necessary, 4 more boats sighted lying to a sea anchor in naval grid square FE 9619. Both positions passed to “Gloire,” which moved off immediately to search. Still 28 cubic meters, 20 days’ provisions, 9 “eels,” fully operationally effective.

“America” W/T service.

T.O.I.1217/20/9/42 T.0.0.1107/20. TRITONA

To: Schacht.

Action as in W/T message of 17/9. was wrong. Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for the rescue of English and Poles.

“Document D-632: International Biographical Archives [Internationales Biographisches Archiv] 10/26/1944: Franz Von Papen (German Statesman) [translation]”, pp. 102-106.

Franz von Papen was born in Werl, Westphalia on 10/29/1879. He went through the officer’s course and was appointed Lieutenant in the 5 Lancer Regiment, Dusseldorf, on 3/15/1898. After attending the Military Academy, he was transferred to the 1st Uhlan Guards Regiment in the spring of 1911 and attached to the General Headquarters Staff, where he was promoted to Captain on 3/22/1913. Shortly afterwards he was appointed Military Attache at the Embassy in Washington and was ordered to the Embassy in Mexico. After the outbreak of World War, he was instructed to create the greatest difficulties to American munition transports. As a result of a complaint made by the American Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, von Papen was finally recalled to Germany in the late autumn of 1915. His luggage was seized on the return journey contrary to international law and a number of documents confiscated from which it was attempted to prove him guilty of sabotage.

Von Papen was then appointed officer on the General Staff with the 4th Guards Infantry Division on the Somme and other sectors on the Western Front as well as Battalion Commander and he was promoted to Major on 9/16/1917.

Later he became General Staff Officer to the 4 Turkish Army under Liman von Sanders. The rumors which appeared in the | press during the election propaganda in 1932, that in 1917 Papen arrested General Liman, when the latter was ill, and undertook on his own the seizure of Jerusalem, have been described as fully untrue by Papen in a letter written to the Marshal’s widow.

After the collapse he took to politics. Being a Catholic, he joined the Center Party [Zentrum] and was a deputy in the Prussian Parliament [Landtag] from 1921-1928 where, on the extreme right wing of the Center, he used to upset the party leader. Owing to this he got himself into increasing opposition to the leaders of the party who struck his name off the list of candidates for the Prussian Parliament elections on 4/24/1932. Nevertheless, as one of the main shareholders of the “Germania,” he succeeded in switching the paper’s ideology more and more to the right.

At this moment the Bruening Cabinet resigned and he was appointed to form the new cabinet. Kaas who was at that time Head of the Center Party, was not willing to give his consent to it. But at a special wish of the President of the Reich, von Hindenburg, and after leaving the Center Party and after resigning the presidency of the Supervision Board of the “Germania” on 6/1/1932, he formed the new Cabinet in the beginning of 6/1932, which caused immediately a strong opposition of the Center Party. The NSDAP also soon went into opposition to the “Baron’s Government,” so that the new cabinet had actually only the support of the German Nationals and a part of the People’s Party [Volkspartei]. In spite of that it was a favorable condition for Adolf Hitler’s seizure of power. One of the first of Papen’s official actions was the removal of the Braun-Severing Prussian Government and the union of the ruling power of the Reich and Prussia in his hand, in Prussia as Reich-Commissar (20/7/1932). Von Papen was also the first German Chancellor, who on 6/28/1932 at a conference in Lausanne, where the German political debts were practically buried, had the courage to oppose the discrimination of Germany. The Reichstag elections of 31 July which were the result of von Papen’s disbandment of the Reichstag on 4 June, strengthened enormously the NSDAP so that von Papen offered to the leader of the now strongest party his participation in the Government as Vice-Chancellor. Adolf Hitler rejected this offer on 13 August.

The new Reichstag which assembled on 30 August was disbanded by the 12 September. The new elections brought about a considerable loss to the NSDAP but did not strengthen the Government Parties so that Papen’s Government retired on 11/17/1932, after unsuccessful negotiations with the party leaders. After the new Government had been formed by the Reichswehrminister, von Schleicher, the President of the Reich wrote to the retiring Reich Chancellor a farewell letter expressing his special acknowledgment (press of 12/5/1932).

The meeting with Hitler which took place in the beginning of 1/1933 in the house of the banker, Baron von Schroeder, in Cologne is due to his initiative although von Schroeder was the mediator. Both von Papen and Hitler made later public statements about this meeting (press of 1/6/1933). After the rapid downfall of von Schleicher on 1/28/1933, the Hitler-von Papen-Hugenberg-Seldte cabinet was formed on 1/30/1933 as a Government of national solidarity. In this cabinet von Papen held the office of Vice-Chancellor and Reich Commissar for Prussia. This Government issued on 1 February, a proclamation to the German people. In the election of 3/5/1933 von Papen was elected as a candidate of the “Kampfbund Schwarz-Weiss-Rot” and later in the election of 11/12/1933 as a candidate of the Joint-List. After the nomination of provincial Governors [Reichstatthalter] Papen left by his own request the appointment as Reich Commissar for Prussia on 4/11/1933. But as Vice-Chancellor he was still at the Führer’s disposal for special tasks. Thanks to his repeated visits to Rome, he prepared, for instance, the Concordat between Germany and the Roman press. The concordat was signed on 7/8/1933.

Owing to the decision of the Cabinet on 11/15/1933, a new task was given to von Papen, namely he was appointed Saar Plenipotentiary of the Reich Government. A strong emphasis of his union with Hitler induced Hitler to write to von Papen on 4/27/1934 on the occasion of the planned appointment of von Papen as Minister Extraordinary in Vienna responsible only to the Reich Chancellor. The document of his appointment and the handwritten letter to von Papen bear the last signatures of the Reich President von Hindenburg given by him before his death on 8/2/1934. Before his departure to Vienna, he brought the Reich Chancellor the political testament of the late Reich President which had been given to him by the son of the President. The testament was published on 8/16/1934. On the same day, Papen presented his credentials in Vienna. On 7/14/1936 he concluded an agreement between Germany and Austria which seemed to clear the way for a complete elimination of all difficulties. After that the Führer appointed him on 7/27/1936 to Plenipotentiary Minister Extraordinary on a special mission. Then, when the Austrian Chancellor [Bunderkanzler] von Schuschnigg negotiated with the Führer in Obersalzberg about new methods which were to insure a better effectiveness of the agreement of 7/14/1936 and when seemingly a new agreement between the two Governments was reached on 2/12/1938, von Papen was recalled from Vienna in 2/1938. After the events of 3/1938 which caused Austria’s incorporation into the German Reich, von Papen had the satisfaction to be present at the Führer’s side when the entry into Vienna took place having just been admitted on 3/14/1938 into the Party in recognition of his valuable collaboration and having received the Golden Party Badge from the Führer. At first, von Papen retired to his estate Wallerfangen in the Saar district but soon the Führer required his services again in that he on the 4/18/1939, appointed von Papen German Ambassador in Ankara. After the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact at the end of 8/1939, the southeast European press wrote that since the beginning of July, von Papen had negotiated with representatives of the Moscow Government and that the negotiations were proving themselves successful. But von Papen did not succeed in preventing Turkey from concluding pacts with England and France which were signed in the summer of 1939. But at the outbreak of war, Turkey remained neutral and owing to her export difficulties concluded with the Reich in 2/1942 a Trade Agreement for the exchange of goods to the value of 721 million Turkish pounds.

Even later von Papen managed to induce Turkey to remain quiet, until Turkey, apparently because of the war situation, saw herself induced to break her relations with the German Reich on 8/1/1944. At the same time, the two Russians who had been sentenced to 20 years penal servitude for taking part in the attempt on Papen’s life in Ankara on 2/24/1942 were released by virtue of a general amnesty decree which was especially issued for that purpose. After his return to the Reich, von Papen was awarded the Knights Cross of the War Merit Order with Swords.

Von Papen married in 1905 the daughter of the Saar industrialist von Galkan, the proprietor of the pottery works Villeroy and Bock. By this marriage he has four daughters and one son.

“Document D-633 [translation]”, pp. 106-107.

Berlin, 11/13/1932.

The Reichs Chancellor Herr Adolf Hitler, Munich.

Dear Herr Hitler,

When the President of the Reich appointed me to be leader of the Government on 1 June, he gave orders that the Presidential Cabinet, which I was to form, should represent the strongest possible concentration of all nationalist elements. You warmly welcomed this decision of the Reichs President at the time and you pledged your support of such a Presidential cabinet. When after the election of 31 July we tried to establish that concentration within the Presidential cabinet, you took the attitude that such concentration of all national elements was only possible under your leadership. You know how much I, in a series of conferences, tried to find a solution which would profit the country best. But for reasons which are well known to you, the Reichs President considered he had to refuse your claims for the Chancellor’s office.

Since then a position has arisen, owing to the political antagonism of the nationalist elements amongst themselves, which can only be considered regrettable from a patriotic point of view.

A new situation has arisen through the election of 6 November and at the same time a new opportunity for all nationalist elements to be concentrated anew. The Reichs President has instructed me to find out by conversations with the leaders of the individual parties concerned, whether and how far, they would be prepared to support the carrying out of the political and economic program on which the Reichs government has embarked. In spite of the national-socialist press calling it a naive attempt for Reichs Chancellor von Papen to confer with the people concerned in the nationalist concentration, and that there can be only one answer, namely: “No negotiations with Papen,” I should consider it neglecting my duties and I would be unable to justify it to my own conscience, if I did not approach you in this matter. I am quite aware from the papers, that you are maintaining your demands to be entrusted with the Chancellor’s office, and I am equally aware of the continued existence of the reason for the decision of 13 August. I need not assure you again that I myself do not come into this matter at all. All the same I feel that the leader of so great a national movement, the merits of which for people and country I have always recognized, in spite of necessary criticism, should not refuse to enter into discussions on the situation and the decisions required with that German politician, who at present bears the full responsibility. We must attempt to forget the bitterness of the elections and to place the welfare of the country, which we both of us serve, above all other considerations.

Since I am very occupied next week with official visits of the Reichs Government to Saxony and Southern Germany, I shall be at your disposal on Wednesday and Thursday, 16 and 17 November, during the coming week.

Yours faithfully (etc.)

[sgd] PAPEN.

“Document D-634 [translation]”, pp. 107-110.

11/16/1932

Reichs Chancellor von Papen.

Dear Reichs Chancellor,

After a full consideration of your request dated 13 November for a conference on the situation and the decisions required, I have to give the following reply:

In spite of misgivings, I share your opinion that as leader of a large party one should not refuse to “enter into negotiations on the situation and the decisions required with that German politician who at present bears the full responsibility.” However, the nation expects more from such a conference than a theoretical approach to the difficulties and problems which occupy them at present. Besides I have so often in my writing and speeches explained my attitude concerning this, that you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, must be aware of same. Small as appear to be the advantages of such a general discussion, as large may be damaging consequences derived therefrom, because millions of our fellow countrymen expect positive results from negotiations if they take place at the present moment and if they become generally known. And quite rightly so ! Discussions of the position by themselves won’t help anybody. Therefore I consider negotiations at this very moment only advisable if their negative outcome is not established from the onset. I am therefore obliged, dear Reichs Chancellor, to name four conditions under which such an exchange of ideas might take place.

Item 1. I am unable to attend a verbal discussion but would ask that, if ideas are to be exchanged, this should be done in writing. The experience of the verbal discussions which have taken place so far and in the presence of witnesses, proves that the recollecting powers of the two parties do not yield in identical reproduction of the text and context of the negotiations. You yourself, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, state right in the beginning of your letter, that you had at one time been assured of the support by the national-socialist party of the Presidential cabinet to enable you to carry out your instruction “to effect the strongest possible concentration of all nationalist elements.” The facts are that I stated in the presence of Hauptmann Göring, when I was informed that the cabinet was to be reshuffled after the elections, that I would not insist on this, provided the government would fulfill its nationalist duties. I instantly refused a request made to me about the same time to issue in writing a declaration of support, and stressed that this was quite out of the question. One could not possibly ask me to give a blank cheque to men, who were partly personally and in any event politically unknown to me. The economic and political measures taken by this cabinet during its first six weeks in office, have justified this reserved attitude of mine.

Your contention, Reichs Chancellor, that I had demanded total powers, whilst in fact I only asked for the leadership, prove how far verbal discussions may lead to erroneous conceptions. You yourself were to be a member of the new cabinet in your capacity as foreign secretary, General Schleicher, enjoying the special confidence of the Reichs President, was to be minister in charge of the Reichswehr and, agent from the Home Office and two, or at the very most three, ministries of no political significance, all positions were to be staffed by personnel who were either already in office or were to be agreed upon in negotiations between the parties concerned. You, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, have interpreted our demands, which at that time were more than modest, in such an erroneous light, that, wise through experience, I am no longer willing to deviate from the only safe method, that is, to deal with such questions in writing, all the more, since I am obviously powerless against so-called official communiques. You, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, are not only able to submit your interpretation to the German people through the officially inspired broadcasting system, but you can also force it on to the readers of my own party newspapers by means of the publications regulation [Anflageverfahren]. I have no defense against such methods. If therefore, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, you intend to enter into a discussion, under observance of the other three conditions, I would ask you to let me know your attitude and/or your questions in writing when I shall similarly let you have my written replies.

Item 2. There is no point in starting discussions, unless you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, let me know in advance, how far you do in fact feel and regard yourself as fully responsible in your capacity as the leading German politician. Under no circumstances am I prepared to expose myself again to the methods used on 13 August. For in my opinion it is inadmissible for the “German politician bearing the full responsibility,” to share out his responsibility at a given moment when responsible action is required. I refer here to a passage of your letter in which you now speak of reasons leading to the decision of 13 August, reasons which continued to apply, though at the same time you remark that you yourself do not come into this discussion at all! Mr. Reichs Chancellor, once and for all I should like to state: Just as I regard myself as basically responsible for the political decisions of the national-socialist party, as long as I am the leader of that party, so are you responsible for the political decisions of the Reichs government, as long as you are Reichs Chancellor. For that reason I asked you on 13 August to take the responsibility for the breaking-off of our negotiations yourself, instead of setting it on the Reichs President. I told you that since, as you assured me, our demands could not be met owing to reasons connected with the Reichs President. I had obviously to refuse to call on him in the circumstances. I told you that, as long as a Reichs Chancellor bore the political responsibility, it was his duty to cover his sovereign, he a king or a president. When you asked me what ideas I had on this subject, I suggested you should issue an official communique to the effect that negotiations concerning the Reichs Government reshuffle had taken place between you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, and me in my capacity as leader of the national-socialist movement; these negotiations had been unsuccessful and had therefore been broken off. For since I had previously been a presidential candidate, it seemed to me inadvisable toward the millions of my adherents to let the Reichs President appear as being in any way connected with my being turned down, which was now to be expected. You were the politician bearing full responsibility for the Reich, and in my opinion it was up to you especially in this case, to shoulder the responsibility, except if your conscience would have prevented you, in which case it would have been your duty to resign. Unfortunately you could not be prevailed upon to shoulder the due proportion of your responsibility; I carried mine all right. Your chancellery, however, succeeded by means of a subterfuge, against my wishes and in spite of the declaration which you had made, to involve me in a discussion with the Reichs President. The outcome, which to you was a foregone conclusion, may have relieved you of the responsibility in your own eyes; it did not destroy me, but it dragged the Reichs President, at the age of 85 years, into a common squabble and settled him with a heavy responsibility. I do not wish to see a repetition of this game. I am therefore only prepared to enter into a correspondence on the situation in Germany and the alleviation of our difficulties, if you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, are first prepared to admit unambiguously your full responsibility for the future.

Item 3. I would ask you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, to inform me to what purpose an inclusion of the national-socialist movement is desired. If you intend to get me and the national-socialist movement to subscribe to the political and economic program, on which, as you state in your letter, the Reichs government has embarked, any correspondence in this matter would be irrelevant, nay superfluous. I am willing and unable to give an opinion on what the government regards as the program of its own violation, since, in spite of the closest consideration, I have never quite understood that program. However, if it is a question of continuing those internal, foreign and economic-political measures which are being carried out at present, I shall have to refuse any support on the part of the national-socialist movement, since I consider these measures partly as inadequate, partly as insufficiently planned, partly as completely useless, even as dangerous. I know that you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, have a different opinion, but I consider that the practical activities of your Government have already been proven to be at least unsuccessful.

Item 4. You say in your letter that as a result of 6 November “a new opportunity for the concentration of all national elements” had arisen. I must confess that I am quite unable to understand the purport of this remark. I am of the opinion that that possibility has obviously only deteriorated through the dissolution of the diet in September, because the result is on the one hand an immeasurable strengthening of Communism and on the other a revival of the small splinter parties, which are without the slightest practical political value. The formation of a politically practicable block within the German people is thereby, from a party point of view, only imaginable by the inclusion of the Nationalists [Deutschnationale] and German people’s party (DVP), because I have to decline a prior suggestion, which you seem to have in your mind, to include the Socialist party (SPD). As you know yourself, the leader of the Nationalist party [Deutschnationale] has, prior to the elections, most unambiguously branded any cooperation with the R.C. center party [Zentrum] as treason and a crime against the nation. I do not believe that all of a sudden Geheimrat Hugenberg would prove himself so lacking in character that he would do after the elections what he had so strongly condemned before the elections. Your endeavors, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, appear to me vague and thereby as much a waste of time as they are useless, as long as you are unable to inform me that Mr. Hugenberg has changed his mind after all.

These four points, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, I regard as my conditions for an exchange of ideas and/or correspondence. Approval or disapproval depends on you.

In conclusion I should like to assure you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, that I am nursing no bitterness on account of the elections. During the 13 years of my struggle for Germany I had to suffer so much persecution and so many personal attacks, that I have learned in time to place the big task which I serve above my own miserable self. What embitters me is merely, to have to observe how, under your somewhat unfortunate statecraft, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, day after day some of the national wealth, in the creation of which, within the framework of German history, I participated to the best of my ability, is being squandered. This wastage of the hope, faith and trust of the nation in a German future is what fills me with sorrow and pain but at the same time confirms me in my unswerving resolution, to insist on my demands, which in my opinion can alone overcome our danger.

Yours faithfully (etc.)

(sgd) Adolf Hitler.

P.S. Since I understand that General von Schleicher has been informed of the contents of your letter, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, I take the liberty of forwarding on my part a copy of this reply.

“Document D-635: Radiogram from Vice Chancellor von Papen to Board of Trade for German-American Commerce, 230 Fifth Avenue, New York, 3/27/1933 [translation]”, pp. 111-113.

To your telegraphic inquiry the following reply is sent: The reports circulating about alleged encroachments against American business interests and other excesses are absolutely unfounded. Business, life, traffic, and commerce are normal since the National Government is in power. Complaints about wrongs against American interests were not reported by the local American Chamber of Commerce which gave on the 10th a big farewell dinner to ambassador Sackett. Reports about the existing state of siege and censorship of news are imagined. The degree for censorship for letters and telegrams was instituted against communistic activity of suspected persons. The goal of the National revolution to free Germany from the threatened communistic danger and administration or inferior elements has been accomplished with remarkable order. The American Embassy reported less than a dozen cases of excesses against Americans to the Reichs-Government, which all were of a light nature. It could not be determined whether these were committed by National Socialists. The reports circulating in America about alleged torture of political prisoners and mistreatment of Jews are received here with indignation and are rejected by us without foundation Hundred thousand Jewsno matter what their nationalitylive here unmolested if they are not active politically. Business in numerous Jewish business places and in big Jewish publication houses, as Mosse, Ullstein, Frankfurter Zeitung, etc., is entirely normal. Synagogues and Jewish cemeteries were not disturbed. Certainly some regrettable incidents occurred, but since the declaration of the chancellor on 12 March that unlawful single actions should be stopped as otherwise they would be strongly resented, nothing has happened anymore. The opposite reports circulating in America to which also the alleged Bartholomews night planned for the night of 4 March belongs, originate undoubtedly from sources with strong interests to poison the friendly relations between Germany and America and the National Government and discredit us with the American people systematically although we are supported by the majority of the German people.

[signature] Vice Chancellor von Papen

I affirm that this is a true copy of the translation. [signed] WILBUR K. THOMAS. 12/3/1945.

[Extract from New York Times, Tuesday 3/28/1933.]

Von Papen’s message was as follows:

News which has reached you of alleged encroachments against American business interests and of other excesses is entirely without foundation. Business life, travel, and commercial intercourse have been proceeding absolutely normally since the national government has taken office. No complaints about interference with American interests have been reported by the American Chamber of Commerce in Berlin which on 10 March gave Ambassador Sackett a great farewell banquet.

“State of Siege” Denied

Reports that a state of siege and news censorship exist are free interventions. The emergency decree under which mail and telegraphic communications can be supervised is directed against persons suspected of communistic plots. The national revolution, the goal of which it is to free Germany from serious communistic danger and remove from the administration all inferior elements, has been accomplished with remarkable order.

The American Embassy has reported to the Reich Government less than a dozen cases of excesses against Americans, all of which are of a light nature and which by no means have been established as having been committed by National Socialists. Reports circulated in America and received here with indignation about alleged tortures of political prisoners and mistreatment of Jews deserve strongest repudiation.

Hundreds of thousands of Jews irrespective of nationality, who have not taken part in political activities, are living here entirely unmolested. Operations of large Jewish enterprises and big Jewish publishing houses, such as Mosse, Ullstein, and Frankfurter Zeitung, are absolutely normal. Synagogues and Jewish cemeteries are undisturbed.

Undoubtedly there have been a few regrettable excesses. However, since the declaration of the Chancellor on March 12 that illegal acts by individuals have to stop and will be most severely dealt with, nothing more has happened. News to the contrary which is circulated in America including a story of an alleged St. Bartholomew night, said to have been planned for the night of 4 March, clearly emanates from sources strongly interested in poisoning the friendly relations between Germany and America and systematically discrediting’ with the American people the national government, although it is based on a majority of the German people.

The radiogram, sent from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the trade board here at 230 Fifth Avenue was made public by Albert Degener, secretary-treasurer of the board.

“Document D-636: Examination Of Descent Of SS-Leaders [translation]”, p. 114.

Carried out in the SS bureau for problems of descent.

SS No.: 63083 gazette No.

Person making the application: von Ribbentrop Joachim Fiancee/Wife

Name: v. Ribbentrop Christian Name: Joachim Occupation: Foreign Minister Rank: SS Gruppenführer (Lieutenant General) SS Unit: R.F. SS SS No.: 63083

Reason for missing particulars and remarks:

To No. 1: J. v. R. was adopted by Gertrud von Ribbentrop on the 5/15/1925 and thereby received the (civil) name “von Ribbentrop.” Gertrud von Ribbentropborn Berlin 5/19/1863., spinster, lives in Naumburg on Saale, Sedanstrasse 28. She is the daughter of Karl Berthold Sigismund von Ribbentrop, knighted on the 6/3/1884., Lt. Gen. in the Royal Prussian Army.

“Document D-640: [Extract From A Speech By The C-In-C Navy To The Commanders-In-Chief On 2/15/1944] [translation]”, p. 116.

Although no word should really be lost over it, I feel myself bound to emphasize this point yet again. As officers we have the obligation to be the guardians of this unity of our people. Every disunity would also affect our troops. We have to guard this unity of our people, which in the National Socialist state has proved itself to a degree previously unimaginable. It is the duty of every officer to do so, and he who offends against this and thus against his people, must be smashed by me. I believe it to be necessary to train our young officer candidates, who have to be in a position of command after a very short training period particularly from this aspect. They must be trained militarily, but above all will also be trained in such a way that, as officers, they must be the unconditional guardians of our National Socialist State.

I always come back with very great joy from my visits to the men of the outpost boats, M.T.B.’s, destroyer and U-boat forces, from troops who, compared with 1918, stand tower-high, because the unity of our people stands behind them. If this had not been the case the troops would long since have broken up. From the very start the whole of the officer corps must be so indoctrinated that it feels itself coresponsible for the National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the exponent of the state, the idle chatter that the officer is nonpolitical is sheer nonsense.

“Document D-642: [Extract From Befehlshaber Der U-Boote’s (B. D. U.-Commander Of The U-Boats)

Secret Standing Order No. 154, Signed Doenitz.] [partial translation]”, p. 124.

Para. e). Do not pick up survivors and take them with you. Do not worry about the merchant-ship’s boats. Weather conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible! We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began the war in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters.

“Document D-650: Secret Decree of Grand Admiral Doenitz of the 4/11/1945 [translation]”, pp. 148-150.

Copy

Enclosure 1. KMA 23641/4 secret.

I. The enemy has streamed deep into Germany. This fills everyone with sorrow. It is a matter of course that brains are occupying themselves with this difficult situation. My opinion on this matter is as follows:

1. Capitulation means for certain the occupation of the whole of Germany by our enemies along the lines of the partition discussed by them at Yalta. Therefore also the cession (to Russia) of further considerable parts of Germany the west of the Oder. Or does anyone think that at that stage the Anglo-Saxons will not keep to their agreements and will oppose a further advance of the Russian hordes into Germany with armed force, and begin a war with Russia for our sake? In this respect therefore the idea is wrong: not the Anglo-Saxons into the country, then at least the Russians will not come.

The occupation of the whole of Germany further means the conscription of German people throughout Germany for work, particularly in Russia but also in other enemy countries. The majority of these slave-labourers will be demanded by Russia, and she will get them too. Or does anyone think that for the sake of these German people the Anglo-Saxons will then start a war with Russia.

The capitulation further means Bolshevism in the Russian occupied territories, and with it the annihilation of all those elements amongst all classes of the population that are capable of resistance. In the territories occupied by the Anglo-Saxons, National-Socialism w}ll be.eliminated at one stroke. The result will -be internal chaos and the self-mutilation of the German people. And those intellectual weaklings who think such thoughts of capitulating will be the first to perish or be taken away as slave workers. Or does anybody believe that they will be able to lead the life of peaceful citizens in such a starving chaotic Germany?

2. I turn against the short sighted weaklings who are incapable of forming a judgmentweakling who say: “If we had not had National-Socialism, all this would not have happened”. If we had not had National-Socialism, we would have got Communism, growing unemployment and internal political chaos in Germany in the 20s already. Without the rearmament which the Führer brought us, Germany would have been overwhelmed by the Russians; or does anyone believe that the Russians would (in conformity with a code of chivalry) have come to a halt before Germany in his push for expansion to the west, simply because, owing to the smallness of our armed forces, composed of 100000 men, we were incapable of defending ourselves?

3. I turn against the wiseacres who mention that we should have avoided war with Russia in 1941. If the leadership of the State had done this, the unweakened Russian would have overwhelmed us long ago, at a time which suited him, and then these same wiseacres would have said: “Of course, the leadership of the state should have taken preventive measures by attacking Russia in good time”.

4. I turn against the dilettante strategists who say that we should have withdrawn to Germany in good time, when we would have had the arms and the forces at our disposal to defend ourselves. Quite wrong. Exactly the opposite is true. In this war with long range arms like the air force, space is of decisive importance for keeping the enemy as far away as possible from the home territory and from the home armaments. Further: every narrowing of space brings to the enemy too a shortening of his lines and thus a liberation of forces. The narrower the ring becomes, the greater the enemy pressure on the defense ring, and the greater the effectiveness of the enemy’s action on the remaining space. So far for the fundamentals of this question. Over and above this, the evacuation of enemy territories is always accompanied by great losses, because the enemy does not after all stand by kindly, but presses after. He therefore gets more and better equipped forces freed for other uses than oneself. If the whole of the armed forces had grasped these problems fully, it would have been better.

5. Please do not worry about the leadership of the state not knowing the state of mind of the population. The Führer knows more about the state of mind of the German population and has taken to heart and pondered the tasks of a leader (arising therefrom) in the field of home politics more than any of us soldiers. Please too be easy in your minds, and do not say too glibly that the whole bag of tricks must be changed completelythat the C-in-C of the navy must now raise 3 army corps from the navy, or remove the armaments from the ships and use them in the land fighting, or do something else. These things too have been discussed with the Führer for a long time, and have been done in as far as the general war situation and existing facts allowed. I therefore have no use for all this unfruitful and brooding criticism. We should rather see the real facts clearly. Only the Führer has for years realized with what danger Bolshevism threatens Europe. For this reason he eliminated our lack of unity and the vast unemployment, made us capable of defending ourselves and, like a preacher in the desert, tried to enlighten Europe on this subject. On the other side stands this Churchill, blinded by hatredthe grave-digger of Britain as a great power, who entered the war to protect the balance of power in Europe and to fight for the freedom of the small nations. What remains now of this balance of power, and what point has the freedom of the small nations reached? Poland and all the other small states in Eastern Europe are provinces of Bolshevik Russia. At latest in the year, perhaps even this year, Europe will realize that Adolf Hitler is the only statesman of stature in Europe. All the negative hyper-criticism is therefore unfruitful and false in its data. Since it is born of weakness, it cannot indeed be otherwise, since cowardice and weakness make people blind and stupid.

II. So it is not only our duty and honour as soldiers that command us to fight obediently, hard and faithfully, incapable of being led astray by anything, but every clear, intelligent reflection also tells us that this is the only way to better our position. Every action in the opposite direction will with all certainty prepare the way for dissolution and extermination and thus for certain destruction. Only by hard endurance are we in a position fully to exploit the military and political possibilities which are and can be in our favour, and to reap their fruits. We cannot speak about the former without realizing our present military intentions to the enemy. About the secondthe political possibilitiesI should like only to say the following: Europe’s blindness will one day come to a sudden end and thereby bring Germany psychological help and political possibilities arising therefrom. If we ourselves give ourselves up before this, it will be too late for these possibilities. Then we will be dead, and they will no longer be of any use. I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the navy

1. That they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of military duty, whatever may happen. I demand of them that they stamp out ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men which endanger the following of this path. They have been given the handling of this work by the Führer’s OKW/WFST Qu II 0011538 top secret of the 23. 9. 44. I demand from senior commanders that they should take just as ruthless action against any commander who does not do his military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not burdened with any tasks as a leader.

2. The honour of our flag on board is holy to us. No one thinks of surrendering his ship. Better go down honourably. That goes without saying for us all. That is just how we behaved in the fighting on land. If it comes to having to defend our naval bases, the place will, according to the Führer’s order, be defended to the last man. The watchword will then bedeath or victory. Any commander who lacks the moral strength for this and is weakening, must according to the Führer’s order, consult his men and hand over command to harder fighters.

3. The Navy will fight to the end. In days to come, posterity will judge it according to its bearing at the biggest crisis in this war. The same goes also for every individual. Former deeds are wiped out if he fails at the decisive hour, to endure which he became a soldier. Or does anyone believe that the enemy respects someone who capitulates in a cowardly manner? He is in fact welcome to him, but is then despised and treated accordingly.

4. Let us be clear about the fact that we have to be the exponents of our people’s will to live. Just like the leadership of the state, we must not tire, even if parts of our people were to become, or are, soft, otherwise we would be bad leaders. If someone proves to me that by resignation something better occurs or is achieved, I shall immediately sink into apathy. Till then, however, I shall act according to the exact opposite.

5. Thus the unanimous will to fight of our navy must continue in existence. That is the best contribution we can make to the turning of the present crisis.

A situation is never such that it can not be improved by a heroic attitude. It is certain that any contrary attitude means dissolution and with it chaos and inextinguishable dishonour.

C.-in-C. Navy.

Enclosure 2.

Secret Baltic order of the day No. 19 of the 4/19/1945.

III. Promotion of under-officers and men who have shown themselves to be personalities in warfare.

(C.-in-C. Navy, Chief Mar. Wehr./Tr. 1 4780 secret of the 3/10/1945)

The C.-in-C. Navy has ordered:

I desire that the leaders of units responsible for ratings and the flotilla commanders and other commanders superior to them should interest themselves more in the promotion of those underofficers and men who have shown in special situations in the war that, thanks to their inner attitude and firmness, by energy and inner drive in short, owing to their gifts of personalitythey are capable of taking right decisions independently and of carrying them out without wavering in their aim and with willing acceptance of responsibility.

An example: in a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser “Cormorau” in Australia, a petty officer acting as camp senior officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a way that the guards did not notice. This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. After his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown that he is fitted to be a leader.

There are more men like that in the navy. They show themselves to be willing to make decisions and to act rightly in the mastering of difficult situations as soon as they are left to their own resources. They thus show their inner value.

These men are to be recommended immediately for training for posts as under-officers or officers. I expect from all the commanding officers designated, rapid and energetic measures.

Enclosure 3.

Secret decree of Grand Admiral Doenitz.

SSD MBKO 6611 7.4. 1315 Re: Plan “Paula” East. pp…..

We men of the navy know how we have to act. Our military duty, which we carry out without swerving, whatever may happen to the left and right of us and around us, leaves us standing brave, hard, and faithful like a rock of resistance.

Anyone who does not act like this is a cowardly scoundrel, and must be hanged and a placard tied to him: “Here hangs a traitor who contributed by his low cowardice to German women and children dying, instead of protecting them like a man.”

C-in-C. Navy.

“Document D-653: Raeder’s Speech, 3/12/1939 Hero Commemoration Day and Day of Freedom to Rearm [partial translation]”, pp. 153-156.

The Archive [Das Archiv] 3/1939, Pages 1841-1846.

Throughout Greater Germany solemnities took place on the occasion of “Hero Commemoration Day”. On 3/12/1939, these solemnities were combined for the first time with the celebration of the freedom to rearm. The day’s chief event was the ceremony held in the Berlin State Opera House in Unter den Linden. In the presence of Hitler and representatives of the party and armed forces etc., General Admiral Raeder made a speech, extracts of which are given below:

“Today, four years later, we look back at the road, the mile stones of which are real witnesses of German history. What at that time could be but a hope or expectationin the heart of the individual person, but what has previously been for centuries, for so many Germans, a dream and an intense longing, became a reality: Greater Germany! In a development which may seem to an outside spectator to be a miracle, but which in reality has been won thanks to an unshakeable power of faith and unparalleled will to act and conscious of his success, the Führer aware of his good right and supported by the weapons given by him to the armed forces since that day, opened the road to the Homeland to the brothers and sisters in Austria (Ostmark) and in the Sudetenland.

This day is an appropriate one for the commemoration as it is not a day of mourning for what has once been lost, but on the contrary it is a day of pride because of that which has been gained forever. The flags and banners which have been hoisted on the tops of the masts are a sign that the legacy of our dead has been carried out. Those who gave their lives in the belief of Germany’s greatness either in the rejoicing and in the limitless enthusiasm of the year 1914 as in the firm and obstinate determination of the year 1918, would not understand, if we, who through the long and dark years have held in our faithful hands their legacy, today on the day of its fulfillment, were only in mourning.

We see in our dead a spiritual power, which reading beyond the grave, allowed the first obstinate belief in a new future of the nation to take roots, we see an image of a fighting soldier of the last year of the war and at the same time an example of fighting courage to the last. It was this power which enabled these men, who were called upon to form a new Reich based on the experience of frontline fellowship and to unite it in the new great German community. In spite of all the insults and sufferings of the period after the war this power achieved a victory! A brilliant victory! and we celebrate this victory by remembering our heroes and at the same time by thinking of our new excellent armed forces. On this occasion we are not forgetting the greatest sacrifice made by our fathers and brothers. Just because this death is the foundation of our greater Germany we remember it with gratitude which will never die. No matter where the German soldier stood and fought, on the ground, at sea, or in the air, on any front, he was always fighting against odds. He has been called upon to make greater and greater efforts and the privations and over-exertions became superhuman. He carried this burden with unshakeable belief in himself and Germany’s greatness, being conscious of his responsibility towards his homeland, he considered himself its protection, its shield. He shed blood, he died. And yet he won. If the German armed forces and with them the entire German nation honours their victorious war leaders and if just today the names of the late Field Marshal von Hindenburg, of the generals Ludenorff and Conrad von Hoetzendorf or of the admirals Scheer and Count Spee and of the greatest of all airmen, Captain Richthofen are held in respectful remembrance by everyone, it is so because they already became symbols for us. These symbols embody the thought of the millions of unknown and never mentioned dead which the Great War called away from us in order that the nation should live and the Reich continue to exist. … Thanks to him, this way was made possible after the conditions for this gigantic struggle have been created. National Socialism, which originates from the spirit of the German fighting soldier, has been chosen by the German people as its ideology. The German people follow the symbols of its regeneration with the same great love and fanatical passion. The German people has had practical experience of National Socialism and it has not been

I imposed, as so many outside critics believe. The Führer has shown his people that in the National Socialist racial community lies the greatest and invincible sources of strength, whose dynamic power ensures not only peace at home but also enables us to make use of all the nation’s creative powers. He restored to the German people its confidence in itself and in its own ability, and enabled it, through the hallowed right, which had been denied to the German people during their period of weakness, to regain its own strength and apart from that it enabled them to tackle boldly and solve the tremendous problems facing them. With that the German people and its Führer have done more for the peace of Europe and for the entire world than some neighbours are capable of realizing. This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons to fight Bolshevism and international Jewry, whose race destroying activities we have sufficiently experienced on our own people. Therefore, the alliance, with all similar minded nations who, like Germany, are not willing to allow their strength, dedicated to construction and peaceful work at home, to be disrupted by alien ideologies as by parasites of a foreign race. And therefore the demand for equality of rights and for equal respect with all other nations.

These conditions alone can provide a guarantee for a peaceful life together on the globe. Within the sphere of our German racial community, we soldiers received from the Führer the task of protecting our Homeland and our peaceful national development and to be teachers of young soldiers who have been entrusted to us and who pass in numbers through our hands. If later on we instruct in the technical handling of weapons, this task demands that the young soldier should also be taught National Socialist ideology and the problems of life. This part of the task, which becomes for us both a duty of honour and a demand which cannot be refused, can and will be carried out, if we stand shoulder to shoulder and in sincere comradeship to the party and its organization, w hose will and actions like ours serve one purpose only, namely the creation of a German man in a community brought together by a common bond. The armed forces and the party thus became more and more united in attitude and spirit. We should have to look to the necessity of a still closer union, if it were not already one of the fundamental principles of the military and national socialist spirit, if we look to see what is happening beyond our frontiers …

Germany is the protector of all Germans within and beyond our frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria are proof of that. That, we can say it today fully conscious of our strength, is the work and the entire merit of one man, whose genial leadership, carried by the unshakeable belief in his people and with immeasurable determination, has led a whole nation in a few years from the deepest night into a bright future, who as the creator of Greater Germany is leading us in his unmistakeable way into the future. This example gave all Germans new hopes, new courage, and his own convictions. The thanks which the armed forces return to their Führer and commander in chief will be the vow of unshakeable faithfulness in obedience and the fulfilment of their duties. Faithfully following his example, we will never stray from the path shown to us and with unanimous determination will give of our best for the people and the Reich. It was the Führer, who led his faithful followers from victory to victory. His conviction gave us strength. His will created a new idealism of action, to which his comrades have stayed faithful to death. Many fell, but they fell as those fighters of the great war fellfor a free Germany. They all planted into a younger generation great tradition of death for a holy cause knowing that their blood will lead the way towards the freedom of their dreams.

Therefore our thought for the millions of dead of the Great War include also those men, who died in the national socialist movement, in the “Freicorps” in Austria and in the Sudetenland, for their free and greater country. And jointly with them we salute the brave men, who voluntarily marched with the columns of the Spanish fighters for freedom, in order to stake their lives for a great idea, the fight against world-bolshevism. They, who died in foreign lands, knew for all times that their blood was shed, in a higher sense, for their country, as a symbol of that mighty torrent of power, that links everything that is German in the world with earthly goods and with blood. And we think also of the dead of the new Wehrmacht, who died a hero’s death whilst serving self-sacrificingly, confident of their task as the weapon-bearers of the nation. To us, they are a pledge of the most loyal fulfilment of their duties in the spirit of our great military past.

“Document D-654: [Sworn Statement of Adolf Schmidt] [translation]”, pp. 156-157.

Dominion Of Canada Province Of Alberta.

To Wit, I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 104333 T, do solemnly declare that:

1. I am now confined to Camp No. 133, Lethbride, Alberta.

2. That on the first day of war, 9/3/1939 a ship of approximately 10000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the evening by the U-30.

3. That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again, approximately half an hour after the explosion the commandant called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship.

4. That I have seen the ship with my very eyes but that I do not think that the ship could see our U-boat at that time on account of the position of the moon.

5. That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go to the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship.

6. That apart from myself Oberleutnant Hinsch was in the tower when I saw the steamer after the attack.

7. That I observed that the ship was listing.

8. That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was launched.

9. That I myself observed much commotion on board of the torpedoed ship.

10. That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack

11. That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes were fired which did not explode but that I myself have heard the explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer.

12. That Oberleutnant Lemp waited until darkness before surfacing.

13. That I was severely wounded by aircraft 9/14/1939.

14. That Oberleutnant Lemp, shortly before my disembarkation in Reykjavik 9/19/1939, visited me in the forenoon in the petty officers quarters where I was lying severely wounded.

15. That Oberleutnant Lemp then had the petty officers’ quarters cleared in order to be alone with me.

16. That Oberleutnant Lemp then showed me a declaration under oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing concerning the incidents of 9/3/1939 on board the U-30.

17. That this declaration under oath had approximately the following wording: “I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I shall shroud in secrecy all happenings of 9/3/1939 on board the U-30, regardless whether foe or friend, and that I shall erase from my memory all happening of this day”.

18. That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was drawn up by the commandant in his own handwriting, with my left hand very illegibly.

19. That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of the Athenia, the idea came into my mind that the U-30 on the 9/3/1939 might have sunk the Athenia, especially since the captain caused me to sign the above-mentioned declaration.

20. That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning these events.

21. That due to the termination of the war I consider myself freed from my oaths and I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing it to be true and knowing that it is of the same force and effect as if made under oath and by virtue of the Canada Evidence Act.

[Signed] Adolf Schmidt

Declared before me at Calgary in the province of Alberta 8/9/1945.

(Signed) W. B. Gore-Hickman Barrister, Solicitor, Commissioner for Oaths.

“Document D-655 [translation]”, pp. 158-159.

C-in-C. Navy’s private interview with the Führer following the conference on 6.1.1943.

C-in-C. Navy declared that after the remarks just made by the Führer about the morale of the navy, etc., and after the message that he had had passed to him by telephone on 1.1.43, he could no longer consider himself capable of holding the post of C-in-C. Navy, as he was responsible for the morale of the navy. immediately tried to tone down very considerably his assertions about the morale of the navy, saying he had not criticized the morale of the navy as such, but he had merely contrasted the U-boat arm with the big ships.

Führer (Hitler)

R. further explained that the new task, which involved an enormous amount of work and mental and nervous strain, was beyond his powers. In any case, he had intended to request his release from the post of C-in-C. Navy on 30.1.43after 10 years service under the Führer. He was now asking to be retired on this date, as he was no longer competent to meet the heavy demands, and the danger was ever present that he would one day be considered inadequate for his position.

H. pointed out the constant heavy burden of his own office and was of the opinion that such a release would cause yet another strain for him following the numerous rumours about the pensioning of of the generals.

R. said he agreed that this must be avoided at all costs and if the Führer was anxious to demonstrate that the parting was of the friendliest and wished that the name Raeder should continue to be associated with the navyparticularly abroad, it would perhaps be possible to make an appointment to “Generalinspector”, giving appropriate publicity in the Press, etc. But a new C-in-C. Navy with full responsibility for this office must be appointed. The position of ‘Generalinspector”, or whatever it was decided to call it, must be purely nominal.

H. accepted this suggestion with alacrity; the “Generalinspector” could perhaps carry out special tasks for him, make tours of inspection, etc. The name Raeder has still to be associated with the navy.

After C-in-C. Navy had repeated his request, the Führer definitely agreed to 30.1. as his release datehe would like to think over the details.

R. referred at the same time to the constant underhand attacks made on the navy by the Reichsmarshall [Göring].

H. tried at first to deny this. However, R. drew attention to his written evidence and mentioned, as an illustration, the Reichsmarshall’s assertions viz-a-viz Admiral Marshall about the number of navy personnel. These allegations were made despite the fact that the Reichsmarshall had to admit that the figures had already been corrected at H.Q. by Vice-Admiral Krancke. H. remembered the right figures, which amounted to about 600000.

“Document D-658: SKL War Diary, 12/9/1942 [partial translation]”, p. 164.

The Naval commander, West France, reports that during the course of the day explosives with magnets to stick on, mapping material dealing with the mouth of the Gironde, aerial photographs of the port installations at Bordeaux, camouflage material and food and water for several days were found. Attempts to salvage the canoe were unsuccessful. The Naval commander, West France, has ordered that both soldiers be shot immediately for attempted sabotage, if their interrogation which has been begun, confirms what has so far been discovered; their execution has, however, been postponed in order to obtain more information.

According to a Wehrmacht report, both soldiers have meanwhile been shot. The measure would be in accordance with the Führer’s special order, but is nevertheless something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.

“Document D-659: The War Diary Of The Chief Of U-Boats 9/27/1939 [partial translation]”, p.

U-30 comes in

She had sunk:

SS “Blairlogie” 4425 tons SS “Fanad Head” 5274 tons:

9699 tons

“Document D-662: War Diary Of The Commanding Officer Of U-Boat U-30 [translation]”, pp. 169-170.

Date and time: 22 Aug 9 04.00 hrs. Narrative: Left Wilhelmshaven.

Date and time: 22-28 Aug. Location, wind, weather, sea, light, visibility, moon, etc.: North Sea, wind S.W.2-3, sea 2, misty to foggy Narrative: North Sea, Shetlands, Faroes, approached waiting position. Little interference. Were not sighted. (sgd.) Lmp.

28 Aug Sept. 39 14.00 hrs. Square AL 2845 In waiting position. North of operational area in accordance with operational orders for periods of tension. Attempt to negotiate broke down. Hostilities against Poland. (sgd.) Lemp.

3 Sept. 9 14.00 hrs. Square AL 0278 wind N.W.3, sea 2, swell, visibility good. Hostilities against Gt. Britain after British declaration of war. Entered operational area at 180 degrees, speed 10 sea miles.

17.00 hrs. French declaration of war.

17.26 hrs. Received wireless message: “Open hostilities against Gt. Britain immediately. Don’t wait for attack.” sgd.) Lemp.

4 Sept. 39 Wind SSW. 5-7, sea 5, squally, misty. South West corner of operational area. (sgd.) Lemp.

5 Sept 39 Wind S.W. to W.5, misty. Sighted steamers, one Norwegian and one passenger vessel. According to schedule this was “Duchess of Bedford” (20000 tons). In accordance with orders, did not stop her. (sgd.) Lemp.

10 Set. 39 Wind N.W. 2-3, sea 2 Met U-boat “U-48” on way ack home. Took in bread. (sgd.) Lemp.

“Document D-663: Operation Order Atlantic No. 56 for U-Boats in the Atlantic Dated 10/7/1943 [partial translation]”, p. 170.

High Command of the Navy. 2nd Section, Naval War Staff/F. O. U-Boats B. No. Top Secret 6420. A. 1 Copy No. 57.

b. Rescue shipsA so-called rescue ship is generally attached to every convoya special ship of up to 3000 g.r.t., which is intended for the picking up of survivors after U-boat attacks. These ships are for the most part equipped with a ship-born aircraft and large motor-boats, are strongly armed (depthcharge throwers) and very maneuverable, so that they are often called U-boat traps by the commander. In view of. the desired destruction of ships’ crews, their sinking is of great value.

“Document D-665: Affidavit of Arnold Robert [translation]”, pp. 170-172.

The leaflet “G 42” attached hereto was produced by a British official organization in which I, Arnold Robert Walmsley of the Research Department of the Foreign Office, was working at the time. It contains a mechanical reproduction of a document on three sheets numbered 1, 2, 3 in the leaflet. This document was passed to my section of the British War Office as an original document captured in 3/1942 in Lybia from the staff of the 2nd Battery of Artillery Regt. 75 of the German Army.

[signed] A. R. Walmsley.

Hitler’s license for the SS

The document overleaf contains Hitler’s ideas on the “necessity of the Waffen-SS.” He wanted the widest possible publicity for them. We are giving them it.

In this secret document one can read Hitler’s real war aims for the first time: he is not fighting for the defence of Germany but for the conquest of a new “Greater German Reich.”

The task of the Waffen-SS in this new “Greater German Reich” is, according to Hitler’s own words, war in the interior.

1. Against whom is the Waffen-SS to conduct war in the interior for Hitler?

Against the subjugated peoples of Europe.

“The Greater German Reich in its final form will not include within its frontiers nothing but national entities who are, right from the beginning, well disposed towards the Reich. It is therefore necessary to maintain, outside the core of the Reich, a State military police capable of representing and imposing the authority of the Reich within the country in any situation.”

Against all the working class of Europe, including that of Germany.

“Such a formationproud of its puritywill never fraternize with the proletariat and with the underworld which undermines the fundamental idea … .”

2. Why does not Hitler wish to employ the Wehrmacht on the Home Front? Because he cannot rely on the German soldier firing on his own compatriots.

“We must never again tolerate in the future that the German Wehrmacht based on universal conscription should be used against its own compatriots, arm in hand, when critical situations arise in the interior.”

3. Who has delivered up the German people to the Waffen-SS?

Not only Hitler. The Generals were in agreement with this employment of the Waffen-SS on the Home Front. In this manner, they safeguard their own position of power within the state and yet keep a clean record, for they are after all “purely and solely meant for employment against the Reich’s external enemies.”

Since 8/6/1940, when Hitler ordered that the Waffen-SS, “having returned home in the ranks of the army after having proved themselves in the field”, are to carry out “their tasks as State Police” against the enemy at home, he has increased the Waffen-SS more than tenfold and has turned them into a separate body outside the army.

Hitler cannot disown this official document. He thus silently admits:

That he is not conducting a war of defence but of conquest;

That he has expressly earmarked the Waffen-SS to be his own permanent civil war army on the Home Front.

And the Generals allow Germany to be delivered up by Hitler to Himmler’s soldiery.

THE FÜHRER’S IDEAS ABOUT THE WAFFEN-SS

Copy of a copy

H.Q., O.K.H., 3/21/1941.

SECRET High Command of the Army General Staff of the Army /Wes. Dept. No. 137/3.41 Secret (I)

Subject: Statements of the Führer re future State military police.

Reference: OKH, General Staff of the Army/Army Bes. Dept., No. 24/9.40 Secret of 11.9.40.

Doubts have arisen as to whether, when the Führer’s ideas on the Waffen-SS were passed on some time ago, it was intended that they should be given wider publicity. The Chief of the OKW has laid down in this connection that it can be nothing but desirable that the Führer’s idea should receive the greatest publicity.

The above-mentioned enactment was only distributed down to commanding Generals at the time. The Führer’s ideas re the Waffen-SS are therefore published again in the enclosed.

Signed: signature Lieut. Col. in the General Staff.

Enclosure: 1 sheet.

Subject: Waffen-SS.

On the 6.8.40 on the occasion of the order for the organization of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (Adolf Hitler bodyguard), the Führer stated the principles regarding the necessity for the existence of the Waffen-SS, as summed up below.

The Greater German Reich in its final form will not include within its frontiers nothing but national entities who are right from the beginning well-disposed towards the Reich.

It is therefore necessary to maintain, outside the core of the Reich, a State military police capable of representing and imposing the authority of the Reich within the country in any situation.

This task can be carried out only by a State Police which has within its ranks men of the best German blood and which identifies itself unreservedly with the ideology at the base of the Greater German Reich. Only a formation composed in this way will resist disintegrating influences even in critical time. Such a formationproud of its puritywill never fraternize with the proletariat and with the underworld which undermines the fundamental idea.

But further, our future Greater German Reich, a body of police will only have the necessary authority over its compatriots if it is trained along military lines.

Our people are so military-minded as a result of glorious events of a warlike nature and indoctrination by the National Socialist party, that a “sock-knitting police” (1848) or a “bureaucratized police” (1918) can no longer prevail. It is therefore necessary for this “State Police” to prove its worth and provide sacrifices of blood at the front in closed formations in the same way as every unit of the armed forces.

Having returned home in the ranks of the army after having proved themselves in the field, the units of the Waffen-SS will possess the authority to execute their tasks as “State Police.”

This utilization of the Waffen-SS in the interior is just as much in the interests of the Wehrmacht itself. We must never again tolerate in the future that the German Wehrmacht based on universal conscription should be used against its own compatriots, arm in hand, when critical situations arise in the interior. Such a step is the beginning of the end. A state which has to resort to such methods is no longer in a position to use its armed forces against an enemy from without, and thereby surrenders itself. Our history contains sad examples of this. The Wehrmacht in future is intended for all time for use solely against the Reich’s foreign enemies.

In order to ensure that the quality of the men in the unit of the Waffen-SS always remains high, the organization of the units must remain limited. The Führer sees this limitation in the fact that the units of the Waffen-SS should in general not exceed 5-10% of the peace-time strength of the army.

5.10. Division (mot.) Sect. IIa/III)

Div. Battle H.Q., 4/23/1941.

Distribution: II and III. Above copy for information.

1st Arty. Regt. 75 Sect. Ia No. 179/41 Secret

Sect. Battle H.Q. 5/3/1941. A. B. Sgd. Major and Adj.

to 1, 2, 3 Batteries, H.Q. battery. One copy sent to each with request that you take note. A.B. (signed) Lieut. and Adj.

1 Battery, Arty. Regt. 75 received 5/3/1941 Ref. No. 93/41 Secret. (initialled).

“Document D-729 [partial translation]”, p. 177.

Secret State Document

NOTES on the conversation between Field Marshal Göring and the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia on 10/23/1942.

… The Reichsmarshal then described Germany’s method in fighting the partisans. To begin with the entire livestock and all food-stuff is taken away from the areas concerned, so as to deny the partisans all sources of food. Men and women are taken away to labour camps, the children to children’s camps, and the villages burnt down. Thus for example had the railways in the vast wooded areas of Bialowiza been safeguarded should attacks occur, then the entire male population of villages would be lined up on one side and the women in the other side. The women would be told that all the men would be shot, unless they (the women) indicated which of the men did not belong to the village. In order to save their men, the women always pointed out the stranger. Germany had experienced that, generally speaking, soldiers were no use in carrying out such measures. Members of the Party discharged this task much more harshly and efficiently. For the same reason armies that were strengthened by a political creed such as the German (or the Russian) fought much more energetically than others. The SS, the guard of the old fighters of the Party, who have personal ties with the Führer and who form a special elite, confirm this principle. Under this heading one might mention that communist commissars had rarely surrendered voluntarily. …

Berlin, 10/26/1942.

(Sgd.) Schmidt.

“Document D-730: Voluntary Statement Of Pw L.D. 1059 Generalleutnant Walther Grosch [translation]”, pp. 177-179.

During my interrogation on 12/7/1945 I was told to write down all I knew about the SAGAN case:

I. All the prisoners of war taken by the German armed forces came under the OKW (Supreme Command of Armed Forces). It was the OKW which framed the necessary regulations and made the ultimate decisions. In relation with outside authorities, i.e. outside the armed forces the OKW. represented PW interests. reserving the ultimate decisions for itself.

For the custody of prisoners of war it made use of Wehrkreiskommandos (Military District HQs) which provided and ran the camps. For matters of administration and discipline the camps in a Wehrkreis (Military District) came under a “Commander of Prisoner of War Camps for the Wehrkreis”. The Commander was in charge of all the Germans and prisoners of war within the sphere of his command. In the Autumn of 1943, however, the “Director of Prisoners of War at the OKW” disposed of the services of an Inspector-General of Prisoners of War, who had access to all camps and whose main duty was to check the measures taken to prevent escape.

II. The Luftwaffe had reserved the right to take captured airmen into custody in Camps belonging to the Luftwaffe. These camps were provided by the Luftwaffe. in accordance with building regulations issued by the OKW. Camp staffs, from the Commandant down to simple guard belonged to the Luftwaffe. Prisoner of War Camps of the Luftwaffe came en bloc under the “Commander of Prisoner of War Camps of the Luftwaffe”. This Commander, as in the case of camps run by the Army, was O.C. Troops in his Luftwaffe camps and responsible for the whole camp routine. With effect from 5/1/1943 this office was dissolved.

Prisoner of War camps of the Luftwaffe came under the Luftgau Kommandos (Territorial Administrative H.Q. of the Luftwaffe). In every respect, particularly with regard to administrative and disciplinary matters. With effect from 5/1/1943 the Luftgau Kommandos took full responsibility for Prisoners of War and for German personnel. The Luftgaukommandos had the whole administration of the camps to supervise. They were in charge of the administration and discipline of German camp staffs and prisoners of war.

To the extent that the disbanded “Office of the Commanders of Prisoner of War Camps of the Luftwaffe” had had duties of inspection and other tasks as the special office dealing with prisoner of war matters (these duties were transferred to the existing Inspectorate of Luftwaffe Construction Troops at the Air Ministry “Reichsluftfahrtministerium”). The name of this Inspectorate was changed, with effect from 5/1/1943, into “Inspectorate of Luftwaffe Construction Troops and Prisoners of War”. (L.IN.17). L.IN.17 remained an inspectorate in the Air Ministry and came under the “Director of Air Defence”. Chef de Luftwehr”.

Air Ministry Under-Secretary of State [Staatssekretaer]

Director of Air Defence Quartermastergeneral (Air) [Generalluftzeugmeister ]

L.B. L.D. L.IN.17. L.In.13

The Inspector of L.In.17 had no right of direct access to higher authority.

With effect from 5/1/1943 Generalmajor Grosch, until then head of the “Q” branch [Oberquartermeister] of the Luftflotte (Air Fleet) 5, was appointed Inspector of this new Inspectorate.

III. The broad outlines of the working instructions of this new Inspectorate had been added by Dept. 2 of the General Staff to the order providing for the setting up of the organization. Final working instructions were to be given only after the office had had a trial period.

The duties of L.In.17 were very soon defined as follows:

1. Passing on of the orders issued by the OKW to the Luftgaukommandos or Luftflottenkommandos. If these orders could not be brought into line with the views of the Luftwaffe, they were to be made the subject of negotiations with the OKW before being passed on to the Luftgaukommandos.

2. Preparation of extensive construction plans in order to provide accommodation in good time for prisoners of war, whose numbers increased steadily after 8/1943.

3. Gathering experience in all branches of prisoner of war work: assessing it and issuing directives in suitable form to all Luftwaffe camps.

4. Improvement of staffing and equipment of prisoner of war camps, in particular:

a. through bringing influence to bear on the Personnel Branch,

b. through influence on the Luftwaffe administrative office,

c. through measures for the training of commanders and specialist personnel of the camps.

5. Contact with the Director of Prisoners of War at the OKW, being the office of the Air Ministry dealing with matters concerning the protecting power, the Red Cross, the Y.M.C.A., so far as they concerned the inmates of the prisoner of war camps run by the Luftwaffe.

6. The sphere of work of L. In. 17 did not extend to all matters of obtaining information from prisoners of war.

7. In the General Staff prisoner of war matters were dealt with by Luftwaffe Staff Ic, with whom contact had to be kept (e.g. when writing to the OKW in matters relating to the Foreign Office, the Protecting Power, etc.). L.In.17 in turn kept close contact with prisoner of war camps by means of tours of inspection to which even officers of the Luftgaukommando were asked. Wherever difficulties were encountered they were either removed by bringing influence to bear on the relevant Luftgaukommando or cleared up at the Air Ministry with the relevant special offices, so far as this was possible, having regard to shortage of staff and material which became more acute from the Summer of 1943 onwards. Additional difficulty was caused by the fact that the Inspector had no authority to issue orders.

Having described the origin and duties of L. In. 17 I come now to escapes in general.

Wherever prisoners of war are kept in custody there will be escapes. It is the right of prisoners of war to escape. In the case of unsuccessful escapes prisoners of war are punished according to the rules of the Geneva Convention. On the other hand it is the right and the duty of the German authorities to prevent escapes. If an escape is successful then the German measures or the German personnel will have to be blamed.

The assessment of a search operation regarding officers who have broken out from a camp, made and passed on to L.In.17 in the year 1943 disclosed that between 300000-400000 men were employed on prisoner of war duties. At any rate, that is a remarkable number of men who were withdrawn for a fairly long spell from their actual duties.

Taking the conditions into consideration which I had found in the camps, I found it necessary to stress emphatically that L.In.17 should increase the safeguards against escapes. Courses of instruction for Commandants were set up, and, in agreement with the O.K.W., such courses were also instituted for the security officers of the prisoner of war camps, so as to have an adequate number of pre-trained candidates for these posts in the camps that were to be set up, and also to have at any time a reserve on hand which could be drawn on if individual holders of these posts turned out to be failures.

Apart from these measures technical provision had to be made. Up to that time only listening equipment had been supplied by an army authority. The Luftwaffe had no office dealing with security installations. To get things moving at all in this matter, a special person had to be appointed for this work within L.In.17. His job was to be to attend to all matters that would provide additional safeguards against escapes, and to be in a position, by means of the knowledge which he would acquire, to assist the security officers of the camps and make suggestions for local additional safeguards against escapes. Circulars were to be published at regular intervals to pass on suggestions and experiences to the camp Commandants and their security officers. This was the job of Major Thiede whom I mentioned in the Interrogation on Friday, 7th December.

Towards the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944 a teleprint was received from the office of the Adjutant to the Reichsmarschall, stating that the Reichsmarschall, ordered that instructions were to be issued forthwith to camp commandants to keep close contact with the local SS and police authorities and to give them ample opportunity to check up on existing security precautions; and that so far as possible requests by the police for improvement should be complied with. The order was passed on to the Luftgaukommandos for circulation to the camps.

For experienced police officers to assist by their advice the Luftwaffe officers who were inexperienced in all matters concerning prisoners of war, could, on principle, only be welcomed. They were not to be granted any influence upon the treatment of prisoners of war, nor was this in fact demanded.

When I look back I can say now that the Reichsmarschall’s order was unfortunate because it led only to officers being spied upon by the police, and their support did not prevent any escapes.

C.

The SAGAN Case.

In the middle of 1/1944 I was ordered to report to the Ministers’ office to carry out a manpower combing-out campaign, called for short the Bodenschatz campaign. To start with this was supposed to last 3 months, and during that time I was away from L.In.17. In my absence Oberst Walde dealt with current matters. I myself was kept informed by him about important matters. Whenever I was in Berlin, I also stayed for a few days with L.In.17 to take a hand in things and to give fresh instructions if necessary. Out of the Bodenschatz campaign a new task developed which forced me to keep only a loose contact with the Inspectorate until I was transferred for good. Oberst Walde became my successor as Inspector of L.In.17.

I mention this because it gives the reason why I cannot reproduce as completely from memory as I would have done, had I watched the Sagan Case unfold itself without any break in my capacity as Inspector.

I cannot remember any more on what day and at what place the news of the mass escape reached me. It can certainly be assumed that it was passed on to me as quickly as possible and that I went through Fuerstenwalde at the next opportunity.

When there has been an escape the camp commandant informed the authorities concerned with recapture according to a plan laid down by the OKW; in addition to these he informs the superior administrative authorities under which the camp comes and also L. In. 17. The Search is a matter for the Police authorities.

A few days after the day of the escape, I cannot remember the date any more, Oberst Walde informed me that the OKW had called a conference in Berlin, I believe on the premises of a high SS and police authority and that L. In. 17. was to send representatives.

I should have liked to have gone myself, but had to attend another conference in Berlin, and asked Oberst Walde to attend as representative of L. In. 17. After his return Oberst Walde informed me that the spokesman of the OKW had informed them that there was a decision by the Führer to the effect that on recapture the escaped British airmen were not to be handed back to the Luftwaffe but were to be shot.

Whether the shooting was already passed on in this form or whether it was paraphrased, I cannot recollect. I suggest that Oberst Walde be questioned on this point. It is however, certain that the danger of their being shot was even then clearly recognizable.

I asked Oberst Walde whether such a far-reaching decision would be notified in writing to the Supreme Command of the Luftwaffe or the Reichsluftfahrtministerium or whether he had been given anything in writing. Oberst Walde gave me to understand that the assembly were told they would receive nothing in writing nor was there to be any correspondence on this subject. The circle of those in the know was to be kept as small as possible. I asked Oberst Walde whether the spokesman of the OKW had said anything to the effect that the Reichsmarschall or the OKL had been informed about the matter. Oberst Walde assured me that the OKW spokesman had told them that the Reichsmarschall was informed.

Up to the time of Oberst Walde’s report I had not received even so much as a hint from anywhere that escaped prisoners of war should be treated in any other way than according to the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

The same afternoon I rang up my superior officer, the Director of Air Defence, to ask time for an interview with General def Flieger Foerster to be allotted to me. This was fixed for the next morning.

When I came to report I found General Foerster together with his Chief of Staff. I asked General Foerster for permission to speak to him alone and put the facts before him. In conclusion I expressed the opinion that if the British airmen were to be shot

a. There would be a breach of the Geneva Conventions,

b. Reprisal measures endangering the lives of German airmen held by the British as prisoners of war would have to be expected.

I asked General Foerster to bring the matter to the notice of the Reichsmarschall even at this very late stage, and to stress those two points.

General Foerster was immediately prepared to do this. When it came to the choice of the way in which the matter could be brought to the attention of the Reichsmarschall, it was decided to report to the Under-Secretary of State [Staatssekretaer], Generalfeldmarschall Milch.

In my presence General Foerster rang up the office of the Under-Secretary of State [Staatssekretaer] and obtained the interview at once. General Foerster left the room and while doing so he instructed me to wait for his return in his study. After some time General Foerster came back and told me that he had reported the matter to the Under-Secretary of State [Staatssekretaer] and that Feldmarschall Milch had made the necessary notes.

I gave Oberst Walde the order, despite the ban by OKW to incorporate a detailed written statement about the conference in our records. So far as I know this was done.

I have made the above statement voluntarily and without compulsion.

(Sgd.) GROSCH Generalleutnant

Signed in my presence: (Sgd.) A. P. SCOTLAND Lt.-Col.

“Document D-731: Voluntary Statement By Pw Ld 1060 Oberst Ernst Walde [translation]”, pp. 183-186.

In the matter of the mass escape of captured British Air Force officers from Prisoner of War Camp No. 3 of the Luftwaffe at Sagan on 3/24-25/1944 I make the following statement. I have to point out that, in view of the absence of any documents, I am forced to reconstruct events, which happened almost a year and 9 months ago, completely from memory. I therefore ask that this fact and the possibility thus arising of my making mistakes be taken into consideration, and that due allowances be made for reservations which I am forced to make here and there.

The escape of about 30-40 prisoners (the exact number had to be ascertained by roll-call) was reported by telephone from the Sagan Camp to the ‘Inspektion’ in the early office hours of 25 MarI think it was Saturday morningand duly passed on in the same way by this office to the higher authorities which were to be informed in case of mass escapes. These were

1. Office of the Adjutant of the Reichsmarschall.

2. The Supreme Command, Director of PW (O.K.W. Chef Kgf)

3. Inspector General of PWs (Generalinspecteur des Kriegsgefangenenwesens )

4. Director of Operations Air Ministry (Chef der Luftfahrt). ‘Inspektion 17’ came under the departments numbered 2 and 3 for duty, while it was subordinate to the Director of Operations Air Ministry (Chef der LuftfahrtGeneral Foerster) for discipline.

The Inspector at that time, General Grosch, was not present on that day; I am unable at present to say where he was, because from the beginning of 1/1944 till about the end of 3/1944 he had other duties which entailed very much travelling, and during this time he returned to the office only at intervals and for very short periods. On each occasion he asked for an account of the more serious events which had occurred during his absence, except in cases which I had already reported to him personally by telephone or in writing. This mass escape I also probably reported to him immediately, although I cannot now state the day, hour or place. But, as far as I remember, it must have been Saturday evening, immediately after my return from Sagan, because I still remember distinctly hearing him say on the ‘phone: “But you should have had your journey to Sagan by car authorized by General Foerster.” (Journeys of a distance exceeding 200 km had to be authorized by a full General). As no further reports had come from Sagan, I suddenly decided to drive to Sagan that same morning with the Inspector’s duty car to form my own opinion as quickly as possible and above all to get detailed statements concerning the method and scale of the escape, so that I could make a more precise report by teleprinter, especially to the office of the Adjutant of the Reichsmarschall. I knew that this department especially was most keen to be first informed about such incidents within it sphere. I made this report by teleprinter from Sagan before my departure for Fuerstenwalde, giving a short, telegraphic account of the circumstances from my own observation and from the report of the Camp Commandant, Oberst von Lindeiner. A roll-call taken in the meantime had revealed the number of escapees as 80, as far as I can remember, of whom 4 had been recaptured in the tunnel and had been taken back to camp immediately. My stay at Sagan extended over midday.

Oberstleutnant Mueller was there at the same time with me, having been sent by the Director General of PWs [Generalinspekteur fuer das Kriegsgefangenenwesen] to make investigations and to send a personal report to the Director General.

In the meantime it had been made known, probably through the Police Department at Breslau [Kriminalpolizei Leitstelle Breslau], which had to be notified of the escape immediately by the camp, that the general alarm [Grossfahndung] had no been raised. To my knowledge this meant that the Security Service [Reichssicherheitsdienst] was brought into action with all its organizations: a machine, which apart from the permanent police forces comprised perhaps hundreds of thousands of male auxiliaries, who for the period of the emergency were taken from their ordinary work in the fields or the factories. The order for a ‘Grossfahndung’ could only be given, I believe, by the highest authority, and all orders and provisions for the recapture of the escapees were exclusively within the competence of the Security Service (Reichssicherheitsdienst) and therefore completely and solely their responsibility.

Luftwaffeninspektion 17, being a department of inspection, basically had no power of command even within its own sphere except, perhaps, in special cases. Therefore, naturally, they had no influence in cases like the present, where prisoners deliberately renounced the protection of the Army, or rather the Air Force, and the moment they left the camp entered the sphere of those responsible for public security. The ‘Luftwaffen-Inspektion’ could therefore only await the result of the search with interest and instruct the camp to keep them informed.

As recaptured prisoners were not to be taken back to their camp according to an order issued several weeks previously by the Director of PWs (OKW Chef Kgf), and as no information of any kind as to the success or failure of the escape was to be made known in the camp no clear picture could at first be formed about the progress of the search. Not all departments interested in the search apparently knew about this order, but information received by the Sagan Camp in reply to enquiries by telephone could obviously not be checked. lt was based partly on reports passed on to the camp by individual police posts, contrary to the, above mentioned order, and partly, in the opinion of the camp authorities, on duplicated reports. The figures of recaptured prisoners thus arrived at had no claim whatsoever to be precise and could not be regarded as official. I can make no estimate of the number, nor, despite all my efforts during the last few days, can I remember details about those days; but I seem to remember that the officer responsible for British and American prisoners of war, Major Dr. Huhnemoerder, and I, noted with a certain feeling of relief on the following Monday morning that more than half of the escapees had then been recaptured. On this Monday a conference took place at the Security Headquarters [Reichssicherungshauptamt] at Berlin, Albrechtsstrasse. As far as I can remember this conference had been called by the Director of Prisoners of War (OKW Chef Kgf) and I attended as representative of ‘Luftwaffe Inspektion 17’, since General Grosch was unable to attend in person, for reasons which I cannot remember; the Director of Prisoners of War, as far as I know, was represented by Oberst von Reurmont, while the Security Office [ReichssicherungHauptamt] was represented by Gruppenführer Mueller and Gruppenführer Nebe, the Chief of Police [Kriminalpolizei] at that time. I find it impossible to give a verbatim account of the conversation or to state what was said by every single person. But I remember this much: that we were informed about a conference which had taken place the previous day, that is Sunday, at the Führer’s H.Q. in connection with mass escape from Sagan, in the course of which heated discussions had taken place between the participants. In this connection the names of Himmler, Göring and Keitel were mentioned. Whether Ribbentrop’s name was also mentioned, I do not remember. The Führer was not mentioned. At this conference appropriate measures were said to have been discussed, or taken, to check any such mass escapes in future. The nature of these measures was not disclosed. Later and more or less in conclusion Gruppenführer Mueller declared that requisite orders had already been given and put into effect the previous morning. Regarding the search for escaped prisoners [Grossfahndung] he could or would not make any statement: he merely declared that according to reports so far received shootings had taken place at some points for attempted escapes. I think he said the number was 10 or 15.

After these last remarks by Gruppenführer Mueller, which unmistakably caused a shattering effect, it became clear to me that a decision had been made by the highest authority, and that therefore any intervention by subordinate departments was impossible and pointless. Both the Director of Prisoners of War (Chef Kgf OKW) and Luftwaffen Inspektion 17 were faced with a fait accompli, which they could do nothing to alter in view of their relative positions in the whole chain of command.

The whole search operation was exclusively in the hands of the Security Service [Reichssicherungsdienst], which came under Himmler. To this department therefore the full responsibility for everything that happened during this search must be attributed. Whether, if any, orders or instructions were given to this office or issued by it as well as the nature of any such orders has never been known either to me or to the “Inspektor”. But from the conference at the Security H.Q. [RSHA] I gained the definite impression that the two Gruppenführer Mueller and Nebe knew of such orders, and probably even issued them personally. On this point the former chief of the Security H.Q. [RSHA] Kaltenbrunner, at present detained at Nurnberg should in my opinion be able to give information.

The various reports still coming in at the “Inspektion” during the following days do not spring to mind; they were mainly being dealt with by the responsible officer (Major Huhnemoerder) and as usually passed on to the director of prisoners of war (OKW Chef Kgf) through the usual channels. Moreover General Grosch was back in the office and took his part in current affairs. The responsible officers referred to him directly so that I was no longer completely au courant. My memory of the days after the conference at Security H. Q. [RSHA] is almost completely blank; alone I am unable to find any clues. I am for instance unable to say when I informed General Grosch on what transpired at the conference which was decisive and of such moment for the “Inspektion”. But there is no doubt that I did this as soon as possible. For he was the “Inspekteur” and as such the decision on what to do and what not to do was solely his. On the further course of events connected with the mass escape and the way they were being dealt with I have no memory as I have already stated: all instructions of the police [Kriminalpolizei] went through Breslau Police Headquarters directly to the camp in which at that time there were constantly officials from Breslau. The “Inspektion” heard for instance among other things from the camp that the slowly accumulating urns of the dead were to be collected and buried collectively in the camp on a certain day. About this, as about all other queries, the responsible officer is the best informed person, because being continuously present in the office, he took all reports and queries and had to deal with the complete correspondence and returns concerning Anglo-American Ps W of the Luftwaffe. As far as I know a final report, again giving lists of figures and names, was rendered with several copies of the “Inspektion” to the Director of Prisoners of War [OKW Chef Kgf].

By order of the G.O.C., Luftgau Kdo III Berlin, General Hoffman, responsible for the discipline of Sagan Camp, Oberst von Lindeiner, Camp Commandant, was relieved of his duties on the afternoon of the day of escape and instructed to remain in his room at the disposal of the authorities. The next senior officer Oberstleutnant Cordes, was put in charge of the camp for the time being. Later he was replaced by the new Commandant, Oberst Braune. On the conclusion of investigations carried out by order of Luftgau Kdo. III in collaboration with the Police HQ Breslau [Kriminalpolizei-Leitstelle Breslau], court martial proceedings were instituted against Oberst von Lindeiner, as the result of which he was condemned to one year’s confinement in a fortress. Whether this sentence on which the inspection gave its opinion in writing before it was submitted to the Reichsmarshall, was confirmed by him or not, I do not know.

I have made the above statement absolutely freely and without compulsion.

(Sgd.) Ernst WALDE

(Sgd.) A. P. SCOTLAND, Lt. Col.

Signed in my presence L.D.C. 12/13/1945.

“Document D-735 [partial translation]”, p. 190.

Note Reich Foreign Minister. 5/ /42 Secret Reich Matter. Secret Reich Matter.

On the discussion between the Reich Foreign Minister and Count Ciano in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Cavallero in the Führer’s HQ after breakfast on the 12/19/1942.

The Reich Foreign Minister began by pointing out that … and said that … Field Marshal Keitel had told the Italian gentlemen that the Croatian area was to be cleaned up by German and Italian troops working in cooperation, and this while it was still winter, in view of the strong British influence in this area. The Führer had declared that the Serbian conspirators were to be burnt out, and that no gentle methods might be used in doing this.Field Marshal Keitel here interjected that every village in which partisans were found had to be burnt down . Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister declared that Roatta must not leave the third zone, but must on the contrary advance, and this in the closest collaboration with the German troops. In this connection Field Marshal Keitel requested the Italian gentlemen not to regard the utilization of Croatian troops to help in this cleaning up operation as a favoring of the Croatians. The Reich Foreign Minister stated in this connection that the Poglavnik (Croatian Führer), to whom he had spoken very clearly, was 100% ready to come to an agreement with Italy.

Berlin, 12/23/1942.

[Sgd] SCHMIDT.

“Document D-736 [partial translation]”, pp. 190-191.

Note Fueh. 25/43. Secret State Matter. Secret Reich Matter.

On the discussion between the Führer and the Hungarian Regent Horthy in Klessheim Castle on the morning of 4/17/1943.

The Führer then described to Horthy the German rationing measures which were carried out with perfect orderliness. There was no black market in Germany, and the peasants willingly delivered the quotas fixed for them. For produce which they placed at the Government’s disposal over and above these quotas they were paid considerably higher prices by government offices in some cases even double the price, so that the peasants also had the possibility of getting hold of some money in this way. Horthy remarked to this that these problems were very difficult for Hungary. He had so far been unable to master the black market. The Führer replied that it was the fault of the Jews who considered hoarding and profiteering as their main sphere of activity even during a world war, in exactly the same way as in England sentences for rationing offenses and the like now chiefly concerned Jews. To Horthy’s counter-question as to what he should do with the Jews now that he had deprived them of almost all possibilities of livelihood, he could not kill them offthe Reich Foreign Minister declared that the Jews must either be exterminated or taken to concentration camps. There was no other possibility. To Horthy’s remark that it was easier for Germany in this respect, because she did not possess so many Jews, the Führer quoted figures which showed the extraordinarily great predominance of Jews in certain professions. Horthy replied that he had not known this at all. In this connection the Führer came to speak of the town of Nurnberg, which had not tolerated any Jews within its walls for 400 years, while Furth admitted Jews. The result was that Nurnberg flourished greatly and Furth degenerated completely. The Jews did not even possess organizational value. In spite of the fears which he (the Führer) had heard repeatedly in Germany also every thing continued to go its normal way without the Jews too. Where the Jews were left to themselves, as for instance in Poland, the most terrible misery and decay prevailed. They are just pure parasites. In Poland this state of affairs had been fundamentally cleared up. If the Jews there did not want to work, they were shot. If they could not work, they had to succumb. They had to be treated like tuberculosis bacillae, with which a healthy body may become infected. This was not cruel, if one remembered that even innocent creatures of nature, such as hares and deer, have to be killed, so that no harm is caused by them. Why should the beasts who wanted to bring us Bolshevism be spared more? Nations which did not rid themselves of Jews, perished. One of the most famous examples of this was the downfall of a people who were once so proudthe Persians, who now lead a pitiful existence as Armenians.

Salzburg, 4/18/1943.

(SCHMIDT)

“Document D-737 [partial translation]”, pp. 192-193.

Memorandum

Reception of the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister by the Reich Foreign Minister at 15.30 hrs on 4/29/1939.

The Reich Foreign Minister started by reviewing the general political situation. He mentioned inter alia that we did not take too serious a view of the wave of propaganda instigated by England. It was, however, dangerous for other countries to join such a constellation. The Berlin-Rome Axis was the strongest element in Europe today. There was no intention on our side of bringing about a quarrel with England. We certainly would not attack. Should France and England, however, desire a quarrel, they could have it any day. We were endeavoring to come to an agreement. The Führer’s constant policy would presumably also lead to this agreement. How far we had gone to meet France was shown by our renunciation of Alsace Lorraine. If we intended to attack, we would not have sunk milliards in Western fortifications. If France really did attack us, she would finally sink to the level of a second-rate power at the end of the war, owing to the serious losses which she would have to sustain.

The Reich Foreign Minister added that it was firm conviction that, no matter what happened in Europe, no French or English soldier would attack Germany. Our relations with Poland are gloomy at the moment. It is more than doubtful whether Poland was really well advised when it declined the Führer’s extraordinarily far reaching proposal, in which Poland would have been 100% the gainer. In any case this proposal was not one to be repeated.

The South Eastern European area is our sphere of interest. The Rumanian and Yugoslavian Foreign Ministers stated here that their countries would never align themselves with any combination against the anti-Comintern powers, which would indeed be madness in view of relative strength.

The Reich Foreign Minister stressed that should the Western powers unleash a War, Germany and Italy could enter it with about 200 divisions. This number should be counted as double, in view of the leadership of Hitler and Mussolini. On the contrary it would take years before England could really carry through conscription. Its present introduction was a question of psychology and left us quite cold. We naturally knew that the British Empire was still strong. But, in view of the general world situation England would think it over a hundred times, before she started war against us, into which Italy and Japan would immediately be drawn. In such a case Spain would at least maintain benevolent neutrality. In reply to the remark of the Reich Foreign Minister that he had no doubt that in such case Hungary would take up her position by the side of the Axis powers, the Hungarian ministers signified their agreement.

The Reich Foreign Minister then remarked that, in the event of a European war, the United States would in his opinion, send only war material but no soldiers to Europe. The situation was basically altered as compared to the World War owing to the fact that Japan had then been an ally of the Entente. The ratio of the American navy to that of Japan was today 10;7.5. As, however, he considered the morale and quality of the Japanese crews to be double that of the American, one reached a ratio of 15;10. One must, furthermore, throw into the balance the fact that about half the American navy would have to remain in the Atlantic Ocean so that the ratio of the Japanese navy to the American navy would actually work out at 3;1.

Poland constituted a secondary problem for us militarily in which connection one had to remember that the Greater German Reich had a population of 80 millions, while Poland had only 18 million Polish inhabitants.

Both Germany and Hungary could be very content with the events of the previous year. They were now both interested in a peaceful development, so that they could begin by carrying out an internal consolidation of the areas regained to date.

Berlin, 4/30/1939.

[signed] V. Erdmannsdorff.

“Document D-738 [partial translation]”, pp. 193-194.

Notes.

Second conversation of the Reich Foreign Minister with the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on the 1st May at 1530 hrs.

The Reich Foreign Minister then returned to our attitude towards the Polish question and pointed out that the Polish attitude had aroused great bitterness amongst us. The Poles had every reason to be grateful to us for the return of the Teschen area and for our cooperation in the creation of the common Polish-Hungarian frontier. We had no intention of involving Poland in war; he had however told Beck that a violation of Danzig territory would be considered by us to be a violation of the Reich’s frontiers. Though we would welcome an agreement with Poland, he nevertheless begged the Hungarian ministers not to undertake the demarche mentioned at the beginning of these notes, because this would look as if Hungary were not doing.this on its own accord but at our instigation. In answer to a remark b the Hungarian Prime Minister to the effect that such a Hungarian communication to Poland would perhaps be proper later, the Reich Foreign Minister said that he could not empower him to do this. He then pointed out again that Poland presents no military problem for us. In case of a military clash, the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch.

Berlin, 5/1/1939.

[sgd] von Erdmannsdorff.

“Document D-740 [partial translation]”, pp. 194-196.

Memorandum RAM 19/43 secret Reich matter. Secret Reich Matter.

Memorandum of the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Secretary of State Bastianini in the presence of Ambassadors von Mackensen and Alfieri at Klessheim castle on the afternoon of 4/8/1943.

The Reich Foreign Minister’s supposition that this strike had perhaps been contrived by British agents, was energetically contested by Bastianini. They had been Italian communists, who still existed in Italy, and who received their instructions from Moscow. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that, in such a case, only merciless action was any good. Generally speaking he understood Italy’s difficulties, but he did not wish to speak his mind any further on military and technical points, as he was not sufficiently informed on these things and could therefore not permit himself any final judgment. The whole matter would undoubtedly be discussed fully by the Duce and the Führer. He only wished to say generally that, should reverses occur, energetic action would have to be taken. This had been seen particularly in Russia, where, after the Russians’ defeats, Stalin had enforced his will with a really barbaric want of consideration and even cruelty. He did not want to discuss Italy, but rather the occupied territories, where it had been shown that one would not get anywhere with soft methods on the endeavor to reach an agreement. The Reich Foreign Minister then exemplified his train of thoughts by a comparison between Denmark and Norway. In Norway, brutal measures had been taken which had evoked lively protests, particularly in Sweden. In this connection he had to recall that, after the collapse of France, the very same Swedes had negotiated about the cession of Narvik who today were lamenting the fate of their “Norwegian brothers”, from whom they had wanted to take valuable territory at that time without further ado. The strict regime in Norway had been of great service to that country, as it would very largely have become a theatre of war if Germany had not thrown out the British. In Denmark he had, with the assistance of the very clever Dr. Best, who had been appointed as German representative and who had at one time been one of Heidrich’s collaborators, tried an experiment to ascertain the effect of the method of the gentle hand and of agreement. The result was that no more acts of sabotage took place in Norway, whilst they were increasing in number in Denmark.

In Greece too, brutal action would have to be taken if the Greeks got fresh. He was of the opinion that the demobilized Greek army should be deported from Greece with lightning speed, and that the Greeks should be shown in an iron manner who was master in the country. Hard methods of this kind were necessary if one was waging a war against Stalin, which was not a gentleman’s war but a brutal war of extermination.

One could not do Laval a better service either than to act in an energetic manner. In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister also informed Bastianini about the supervision of Petain to prevent his escape from France. Here only Draconian measures would prevail. He had therefore pointed out in Rome certain things which were going on on French territory and proposed that the French police be allowed to commit themselves quietly and that they should not be interfered with when taking unpopular measures.Bastianini remarked to that that the French police were playing a double game.The Reich Foreign Minister went on to explain that these kinds of reflections lay further from the minds of soldiers, so that politicians had to intervene here. He himself had done this in many cases with regard to decisions of the military in the occupied countries.

Coming back to Greece, the Reich Foreign Minister once again stressed the necessity of taking severe measures. The dynamic forces of the peoples conquered by the Axis were naturally directed against conquerors. An agreement, for instance between Italy and Greece, was simply impossible. One therefore had merely to restrict oneself to appointing a government that would obey Germany and Italy as far as possible.

If the Axis were to publish a statement at all, this could only be done at a time when the military situation was 100% in their favor. The following difficulty also existed: the Führer would have to take radical measures in the occupied territories to mobilize the local labor potential, in order that the American armament potential might be opposed by something of equal value. If governments were now to be appointed in the occupied territories these measures would be rendered immensely more difficult by this.- If however, the occupied territories were promised their independence at the present moment, the effect of such a declaration would have vanished 14 days later. They had to be offered.clear and substantial concessions. Should they, however, be granted governments for example, then the dynamic forces of these countries, which had been patently directed against the Axis and which clearly appeared in Holland and France for example, would be consolidated thereby and provided with points of crystallization which would finally lead to a situation in which twice the present number of divisions would have to be despatched there in order to keep the new political will in check. Salzburg, 4/10/1943.

(signed) Schmidt.

“Document D-741 [partial translation]”, pp. 196-197.

Secret Reich Matter.

Memo. RAM 7b/43.

Memorandum about the discussion between the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador Alfieri in Berlin on 2/21/1943.

Continuing the Reich Foreign Minister brought the discussion round to the Balkan area, where a certain concern was felt on the German side regarding the attitude of the Italian army, of this concern the Duce had already been informed. The Italian army must become active in Croatia now. He (The Reich Foreign Minister) had to inform Alfieri quite frankly that the policy of arming the Cetnici as pursued by General Roatta, had been a big mistake and would produce devastating results in the event of a British landing. The whole problem had been discussed thoroughly with Ciano and Coballero. Both gentlemen had promised all that Germany desired, but nothing had happened.

Three to four German divisions were at the moment engaged in clearing up the bandits. But the collaboration of the Italian army was absolutely necessary for the attainment of really final results. Roatta believed that he could play off one party against the other, but in doing this he overlooked the fact that the apparently opposed elements like the Tito gangs, the Cetnici and the followers of Mihailovic were united in their hatred of anything Italian or German and were quite frankly referred to by Eden as the British advance guard in a possible invasion attempt.

The continued existence of these gangs, which carried out acts of sabotage like the demolition of bridges and such like, and who would thereby endanger the supplies, which had to rely on a single railway line, were so dangerous owing to this very possibility of an English landing on the Adriatic coast of the Balkans.

Alfieri remarked in this connection that, as far as he remembered, Cabellero had entirely agreed with the policy of force suggested by Germany, and had already told him (Alfieri) that he had made the necessary arrangements.

Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that the conditions which Roatta’s policy had helped to produce in Croatia were causing the Führer great concern. It was appreciated on the German side that Roatta wished to spare Italian blood, but it was believed that he was, as it were, trying to drive out Satan with Beelzebub by this policy. The gangs had to be exterminated, and that included men, women and children, as their continued existence imperiled the lives of German and Italian men, women and children.

Berlin, 2/22/1943.

[signed] Schmidt Ambassador Schmidt.

“Document D-744-A: [Questionarire: Von Ribbentrop] [translation]”, pp. 197-199.

QUESTIONNAIRE.

I. PARTY DETAILS.

v Ribbentrop. (name) Joachim. (Christian name) Brigadeführer. (rank)

Exact home address: Berlin-Dahlem, Lentzeallee 9. Date of Birth: 4/30/1893. SS number 63 083. Party Membership number 1199 927.

II PERSONAL DETAILS.

Married: yes. Children: four. Education: Matriculation (Abitur): yes. Foreign languages: English, French. Civilian Occupation: Extraordinary and plenipotentiary envoy of the German Reich.

III MILITARY DETAILS.

Service in the army before 1914: No, unfit for service because of an operation. Service during the war: Yes. Rank: Lieutenant. War decorations: Iron Cross first and second class. Wound badge: black: Yes.

Führer Questionnaire

Name Joachim v. Ribbentrop. Rank Lieutenant Retired. Party Member No. 1199927. Profession Merchant. Residence Berlin - Dahlem, Lentzeallee 9. How and When can you be reached by telephone: Uhland 1385. Date of Birth: 4/30/1893. Place of Birth: Wesel on Rhine. Married. Children 3. [Pencilled note Rank: SS Standartenführer 30.V.37 initials illegible].

Military Service

12th Hussar Regt. from 9/1/1914-1919. Last rank held: Lieutenant [Oberleutnant] Till when: Until retired. Orders and decorations: Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class, etc., Wound badge. Wounded: Yes. War Disablement (0) : Yes. Service when a member of the NSDAP (Activities?): 1932. Various activities Belonged to what political associations? Special knowledge of languages: English, French. Holds drivers license: Yes.

Short Life Summary

Born the son of Lieutenant Ribbentrop on 30.4.93 in Wesel on the Rhine. After leaving school went abroad to study languages, then as a business man and merchant in England, France and especially America and Canada. At outbreak of war in Canada. After interrupted voyage through British blockade in Aug. 14, joined the 12th Hussar Regt as ensign. From October 14 on Western Front. 1915 officer in the Regt on various war fronts. From June 18 Adjutant to the Plenipotentiary of the Ministry for War in Turkey. 1919 Peace commission Adj. to Gen. v. Wresberg [?]. 19 retired with rank of Lt. Then once again merchant. For some years connected with NSDAP and helped with S.A. Berlin. Member since 1932. 1932-33 was interested in government formation. Since end of the war and particularly during the last years interested in foreign politics and endeavoured to smooth the path for Nat. Soc. ideology, in foreign countries, especially in England. In 1932, adopted by the line of Artillery General v Ribbentrop, in order to continue this noble line which was dying out.

Berlin-Dahlem. 5/22/1933.

[signed] v Ribbentrop.

Dept Police Inspector No. 17180.

To Baron von Ribbentrop. Berlin-Dahlem. Lentzeallee 9.

I grant you the rank of SS Standartenführer (Colonel) with permission to wear the uniform.

The Reichsführer SS [Initials]

Berlin, 3/13/1936

The Reichsführer SS Personnel Office Diary No. 1071

To SS Brigadeführer Joachim von Ribbentrop Berlin. Wilhelmstrasse 64.

In accordance with the decree of 1/23/1936, diary No. 370/36 concerning the new organization of the leadership corps of the SS, you are appointed w/e from 4/1/1936 SS-leader on the Staff of the Reichsführer SS.

You are requested to send your SS pass for alteration to the personnel office of the Reichsführer SS, Berlin S W 11, Prinz Albrechtstrasse 9.

The personnel representative attached to the Reichsführer

signature [illegible] SS-Brigadefuehror

SS Brigadeführer (Major General) von Ribbentrop, Joachim. SS No. 63 083Führer on the Staff of the Reichsführer SS

I promote you, with effect from 9/13/1936, to SS Gruppenführer (Lt. General).

(Initials) H.H. [sgd] A.H.

Questionnaire for correcting or adding to the Führer records of the SSPersonnel Office

1. Personal Details. Name v. Ribbentrop; Christian Name: Joachim: Rank SS Gruppenführer (Major General): Are you an SS Führer at the head office? Yes. Exact Address (Town) Berlin - Dahlem (Street) Lentzeallee 9. Date of Birth: 30.4.93. Place of Birth. Wesel Rhein Are you married ? Yes. Your wife’s maiden name: Henkell Date and place of Birth Mainz 12.1.96. Is your wife a party member. Yes. Party Membership No. 1411594. How many male children have you? Two. How many female? Two. How old are your sons? 15 years; 1 year. Your daughters? 14 years; 3 years. Do your sons attend a national political school? Did you yourself attend a secondary school. Yes. Up to which form. Obersekunda. Have you passed matriculation: No. What did you study? Languages. What profession did you learn? Merchant. Which profession are you practising at present? Politician. Who is your employer? Reich. Do you possess a driving license? (vehicle?) Yes. Which languages can you speak and write? French. English. Have you passed an interpreter’s examination? If so in what languages? No. Religion. None.

2. Party Details. SS No. 63083 Party Membership No. 199927. Were you a member of the SA ? H.J. No. SA Reserve? No. NSKK? No. Were you a political leader? No. Do you possess the SS-Totenkopfring (Death’s head ring)? Yes. Do you possess the dagger of Honour of the Reichsführer-SS? Yes.

3. Details of Military Career. Until the end of the War. Did you serve actively? Yes. In what branch of the Service? 12th Hussars Did you serve at the Front? Yes. In what branch of the Service 12th Hussars. What rank did you attain? (Oberleutnant) (Lieutenant) Were you a prisoner of war? No. What decorations, won in the face of the enemy do you possess? E K 1, 2. (Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class) and others. Have you a wound medal (Black, Silver, Gold)? Black.

c. after reintroduction of compulsory service on 16.3.35. Did you undergo one year’s or eight weeks’ training, in accordance with the law of 16.3.35.? No.

4. Abroad Have you been abroad ? Yes. Where? England, France, Switzerland, Canada. For how long? 4 Years. In what capacity? (Merchant, Farmer, Employee etc.) Mercantile employee, contractor. Have you visited any former German colonies? No.

J. v. Ribbentrop Signature. SS. Gruppenführer (Major General) Rank.

To be handed back by 8/20/1937.

QUESTIONNAIRE

for adding to or correcting the card index of leaders and the list of seniority in the service.

Name and Christian name: v. Ribbentrop, Joachim. Rank and SS No.: Gruppenführer (Lt. Gen.), 63 083. Party No. and date of entry according to Party Book: 1,199,927. 5/1/1932. SS Leader at Head Office?: No. Married: Yes. Maiden name of wife: Henkell, Anna Elisabeth. Date of birth: 1/12/1896. Place of birth: Mainz. Party member, N.S.F. N.S.V.F.M. ?: (Giving the membership Nos. in each case) Party member No. 1,411,594. N.S.F. 8908. N.S.V. 4,491,301. Date of birth of sons: Rudolf 11.5.1921. Adolf 2.9.1935. Date of birth of daughters: Bettina 20.7.1922. Ursula 29.12.1932. Do your sons go to a national political educational institute: Rudolf born 11.5.1921 is joining one at the end of August. Which one: Ilfeld. Your present occupation: Extraordinary ambassador plenipotentiary of the German ReichCommissioner for foreign political questions on the staff of the Führer’s deputy. Religion: Gottglaeubig (this is a Nazi designation for people who have left the Christian church but still believe in God). Military training after the 16..35: None. Driving licenses: Driving license for motor cars. Other details: Political leader. Member of the “Lebensborn”: Yes. Holder of the Tulleuchter (Yule beacon)?: Yes. Decorations of the movement: Golden Party Badge. Olympia-Decoration (what class): Yes, 1st class. Medals won in the face of the enemy: Iron Cross 1st class: Yes. Iron Cross 2nd class: Yes. Medal for Front soldiers: Yes. Wound medal (black, silver or gold): Yes, black. Mistakes in the list of seniority in the service of 1.12.6, concerning your person: None. Berlin W. 8. Wilhelmstrasse 62.

[signed] Joachim von Ribbentrop.

Berlin 7/21/1940.

To SS Gruppenführer (Lt. General) von Ribbentrop, Joachim. SS No. 63 083Führer on the Staff of the Reichsführer SS

I promote you, with effect from the 4/20/1940, to SS Ohergruppenführer (General).

[signed] H. Himmler. certified copy. (initials) H.H.

Extracts from the SS Register of Joachim von Ribbentrop.

SS No. 63083. Colonel (Standartenführer) 5/31/1933. Brigadier Oberführer)4/20/45. Major General (Brigade Führer) 6/18/1935 Lt. General (Gruppenführer) 9/13/1936. Position in the Party. entered at the beginning of 1932. Membership No. 1 199927, worked for NSDAP since 1930; earlier party activities: worked for NSDAP since 1930. Employed in the party. yes. Party post: Commissioner of the Reich for questions of disarmament. Personal: Name, Von Ribbentrop, Christian Name Joachim. Occupational training: Merchant. present occupation: Reich Commissioner for questions of disarmament. Position in the Occupation: State employee. Income over 200 Reichsmarks. Bread Winner Yes Whether married or single: Married. Number of children: 1 boy, 2 girls, aged between 1 1/2 years and 13. Date of birth. 4/30/1893. Place of birth: Wesel. Religion: nil. Place of residence: Dahlem. Address: Lenze Allee 9. Height 172 cm. Shoe size 42. Size of head 57 cm. Knowledge of languages: English, French. Military service: Unit on active service: 12th Hussars, Torgau, from the 9/1/1914-1920. Last service rank: Oberleutnant a.D. (1st lieutenant retired) since 1919/20. Orders and decorations: E K I (Iron Cross I) Wounded: yes; war disablement: yes. Driving license: yes, class 3 C. (SS) Unit: Eastern Sector. SS No. 63083 Remarks: Ehrenführer SS (Honorary SS führer) Eastern Sector 1.4.34 Führer on the Staff of the Reichsführer SS. Berlin 22.3.1935.

Signed Taulbert Service rank SS-Standartenführer (Colonel) Position Staff führer of the Eastern Sector.

[Rubber stamp] National Socialist German Worker’s Party SS Eastern Sector.

RECORD OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OATH

to SS Gruppenführer Joachim von Ribbentrop as guardian of the “blood and life law” of the SS on 11/9/1937.

The administered oath was confirmed by shaking hands with me.

The oath reads:

“I undertake, as a Gruppenführer of the SS, to see to it with all my powers that, without consideration of the person of the individual or the achievements of his parents and ancestors only such applicants shall be admitted to the SS as correspond fully and completely to the most rigorous demands of the SS in force at the time.

I shall stand by this, even if it entails the rejection of my own children or of children of my relatives.

I undertake further to see to it that every year one fourth of the applicants for the SS consist of men who are not sons of SS men.

I swear to carry out these obligations by my true allegiance to our Führer ADOLF HITLER and by the honor of my ancestors so help me God.”

The Reichsführer of the SS [signed] H. Himmler.

“Document D-744-B [translation]”, pp. 204-205.

GESTAPO BUREAU Signal communications.

ReichführerSS MUE 2809 9.8.35 1150

To: Head Adjutancy of the RFSS for passing on to SS Obergruppenführer Schmitt Von Ribbentrop has been promoted to SS Brigadeführer by the RFSS with effect from 18.6.

[signed] WOLFF SS Obergruppenführer.

The Head of the SS Head Office SS Personnel Bureau Diary No. 19302.

Berlin 8/9/1935.

TO: SS Obergruppenführer von Ribbentrop, Joachim, Berlin-Dahlem, 9 Lenze Allee.

The Reichführer SS has promoted you SS Brigadeführer with effect from the 6/18/1935. The promotion certificate will follow after it has been signed by the Reichführer SS.

You are requested to send in your SS Führer Pass for alteration to the SS Personnel Bureau, Berlin, 9 Prince Albrechtstrasse.

The Head of the SS Personnel Bureau. (initials) SS Sturmbannführer.

Head of a main department in the SS Personnel Bureau.

The Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Envoy of the German Reich. Adjutancy.

Berlin, W.8. 64 Wilhelmstrasse. 9/9/1935.

To the: Head of the SS Personnel Bureau, Berlin, S.W. Prince Albrechtstrasse.

In reply to your letter of the 9 August, Diary No. 19302135, I enclose Ambassador von Ribbentrop’s SS Führer pass for alteration. Please excuse the delay in replying on the grounds of lengthy absence from Berlin.

Heil Hitler [signed] THORNER.

Enc.: Ambassador von Ribbentrop’s SS Führer Pass. Rubber Stamp: SS Head Office Received 20 Sep, 35. No. 19302135.

The Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Envoy of the German Reich. Adjutancy.

Berlin, W.8 64 Wilhelmstrasse, 5.11.35.

To the: Personnel Office of the Reichführer SS Berlin S.W. 11., 8 Prince Albrechtstrasse.

In reply to your question, I have to inform you that Brigadeführer von Ribbentrop’s ring size is 17.

Heil Hitler [signed] THORNER.

TELEGRAM

Berlin 9/4/1936.

Personnel Office Rubber Stamp: Personal Files. SS Brigadeführer Joachim von Ribbentrop, Berlin-Dahlem, Lentzealle, 9.

The Führer has promoted you to Gruppenführer with effect from the 9/13/1936. The Reichführer SS expresses his heartiest congratulations. The new badges of rank can be put on for the Reich Party Rally.

The Personnel Representative attached to the Reichsführer SS. [Initialled] SS. Brigadeführer.

Office of the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Envoy of the German Reich.

Berlin, W.8, 54 Wilhelmstrasse, 1/25/1937.

TO: SS Brigadeführer Schmitt, Reich Leadership of the SS, Berlin, W8, 9 Prince Albrechtstrasse.

SUBJECT: SS Gruppenführer Conference in Tolz.

On the orders of SS Gruppenführer von Ribbentrop, I take the liberty of reporting that he will be prevented from taking part in the conference of SS Gruppenführers in Tolz owing to official duties, since he has to be in London these days.

Heil Hitler By Order [signed] OSWALD SS Sturmbannführer.

Foreign Office Prot C.

Berlin, 1/10/1939.

Dear Gruppenführer,

On the orders of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, I express to you his best thanks for the despatch of the work “Letters of a Fighter” by Dr. Hermann Gmelin, which was sent on the orders of the Reichführer SS by the SS Personnel Office.

[signed] WAGNER.

To the: Head of the SS Personnel Office SS Gruppenführer Schmitt, Berlin.

Foreign Office Prot. C.

Berlin, 4/11/1939.

On orders from the Reich Foreign Minister, SS Gruppenführer von Ribbentrop, I confirm the receipt of the pamphlet “The National Socialist Man’s Honor and the Protection of his Honor” by Reichsleiter SS Obergruppenführer Duch. Sent by the Personnel Office on the orders of the Reichsführer SS.

[signed] WAGNER Legation Secretary.

To the: Reichsführer SS SS Personnel Office Berlin.

EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY THE FÜHRER TO THE REICHSTAG ON 7/19/1940.

I can not finish this honoring without finally thanking the man who has for years past put into effect my directives in the field of foreign politics in faithful, untiring and self-sacrificing work.

The name of Party Member von Ribbentrop will for all time be linked up as Reich Foreign Minister, with the political rise of the German nation.

NEWSPAPER EXTRACT RIBBENTROP, BORMANN, LAMMERS promoted to SS Obergruppenführers

Berlin 21 July.

As the NSK (National Socialist Party Correspondence) reports, the Führer has promoted SS Gruppenführers Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann and Reichminister Dr. Lammers to SS Obergruppenführers.

The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs Adjutancy. [Rubber stamp]: SS Personnel Head Office. Received 2/16/1943. Wilhelmstrasse 73 Berlin, W.8.

We acknowledge with many thanks the receipt of the book ‘Klednes Erdengluck” by Rolf d’Alquen which was sent to the Reichminister for Foreign Affairs on the orders of the Reichsführer.

Heil Hitler [signed] LIMPERT Legation Counsellor and Adjutant.

To the Reich Leadership of the SS, SS Personnel Head Office, Berlin, S.W., Prince Albrechtstrasse. 8.

Adjutancy of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs Legation Counsellor First Class Limpert.

Wilhelmstrasse 73 Berlin, W.8. Phone 1164-41 Headquarters in the Field 29.9.44.

Subject: 1 3 bFile No. /37 C 12V.K./K

We acknowledge with thanks the receipt of the book by Dagmar Brandt called “Gardariki”, which was sent on 12 inst., on the orders of the Reichsführer SS to SS Obergruppenführer Joachim von Ribbentrop.

Heil Hitler [signed] LIMPERT

SS Personnel Head Office Berlin Charlottenburg Wilmersdorfer Strasse 98/99.

“Document D-745-B: Deposition On Oath By Kaindl, Anton, Born On 7/14/1902 At Munich At Present At No. 5 Civilian Internment Camp. [translation]”, p. 209.

1. I was Commandant of the Concentration Camp Sachsenhausen from 8/22/1942 to the end of April/beginning of 5/1945.

2. When I took up my duties guard personnel and camp staff consisted of Waffen SS, all told 1980 men.

3. This figure increased to 3000 men guards and 210 men camp staff at the beginning of 1945 and remained so till the end of the war.

4. During my term of duty approximately 1500 men were posted and replaced by others, so that from the time I took up my appointment to the end of the war approximately 4700 men of the Waffen SS have served at one time or another at Sachsenhausen.

5. There was no difference as to the employment of personnel. The guard personnel formed the reservoir wherefrom the camp staff was drawn, but on the other hand personnel were also posted from the camp staff to the guard.

Signed: Anton KAINDL.

Sworn before me 3/19/1946 at No. 5 Civilian Internment Camp.

[sgd.] D. MACMILLAN, Major, R.A.

“Document D-746-A: Deposition On Oath Of Fritz SUHREN, Male, Of No. 5 C.I.C. Sworn Before Capt. A. Vollmar, 22 Dragoons, An Officer Of The Judge Advocate General’s Branch, HQ BAOR, At No. 5 C.I.C. On 3/8/1946 [translation]”, pp. 209-210.

1. I was commandant of Ravensbruck Concentration Camp from 11/1942 until the capitulation of Germany in 5/1945. I can give the following details as regards personnel employed on guard or administrative duties in this camp.

(a) The Commandant’s staff comprised 90 males and approximately 150 females who were employed in duties at Ravensbruck itself, another, 300 females (approximately) were employed in Aussenkommandos who also belonged to the staff. All these both male and female were members of the SS.

(b) The number of German guard personnel in Ravensbruck itself was approximately 200 and in the Aussenkommandos approximately 350. These were all males and all members of the Waffen SS and NOT the Allgemeinen SS.

(c) All females employed on duties in or outside the camp were members of the Waffen SS and not the Allgemeinen SS and this applied also to all the males.

(d) SS male guard personnel did not belong to any special SS unit but the guard itself was known as SS Totenkopf Wachsturmbann.

2. In Ravensbruck there were approximately 20 civilian employees comprising such trades as plumbers, electricians, carpenters, etc., and they lived in the barracks outside the camp walls. They were all released personnel from Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp. There were also approximately 20 civilians who worked in the factories belonging to the SS organization and which were next to the camp itself. These factories employed otherwise only internees of Ravensbruck.

Signed: Fritz SUHREN.

Sworn by the said deponent Fritz Suhren voluntarily at No. 5 CIC on 3/8/1946 before me Capt. A. Vollmar, an officer of the Judge Advocate General’s Branch HQ BAOR, AND I HEREBY CERTIFY that the said deponent not understanding English this deposition was translated by myself to him before signature and that he fully agreed to the contents thereof.

Sgd. A. VOLLMAR, Capt. JAG Branch, HQ BAOR.

“Document D-746-B: Deposition On Oath By Suhren, Fritz, Born On 6/10/1908 At VAREN At Present At No. 5 Civilian Internment Camp [translation]”, pp. 210-211.

1. I was Commandant of the Concentration Camp Ravensbruck from 11/1942 to beginning of 5/1945.

2. When I took up my duties there were approximately 250 men Waffen SS as guard battalion and 85-90 men Waffen SS as Camp Staff; for the end of 4/1945 the corresponding figures were 550 men and 90 men.

3. Approximately half of this personnel has been replaced, in the course of time, by older age-groups, Landesschuetzen, Luftwaffe and Volksdeutsche who were all transferred to the Waffen SS. During my term of duty there have served, at one time or another. 950 men Waffen SS at Ravensbruck and its outposts.

4. With regard to the SS auxiliaries (Waffen SS) who served as warders, it should be noted, that Ravensbruck served as a training camp, and therefore the great majority of them was posted after a short time. Accordingly during my term of service 3500 (female) SS auxiliaries served at some time or other at Ravensbruck and its outposts.

5. As far as possible the Camp staff was not changed; personnel was replaced, in case of posting to field units, and occasionally posted to the guard battalion.

Signed: Fritz SUHREN.

Sworn before me 3/19/1946 at No. 5 C.I.C. Signed. D. MACMILLAN, Major, R.A.

“Document D-748: [Affidavit of Karl Totzauer] [translation]”, pp. 211-212.

AFFIDAVIT of TOTZAUER, Karl born on 6/15/1909 at UDRITSCH at present at ALTONA.

1. From 6/1940 to Summer 1943 I was employed in the Orderly-Room of the Concentration camp Neuengamme and I became, after having passed a course and having been promoted to Untersturmführer, Adjutant of the Camp. I was responsible for all military matters of the SS.

2. The personnel originally employed in the concentration camp came from the Deathhead’s units and the Verfuegungstruppe of the General SS. But already in Summer 1940 replacements and reinforcements came from the Waffen SS, either men transferred from the General SS to the Waffen SS, or men called directly to the Waffen SS. From 1944 onwards single men, also small units of the Armed ForcesLandesschuetzen and Airforce came to Neuengamme, who were clothed by, and transferred to the Waffen SS. It is to be observed that in respect of the outposts [Aussenkommandos] the Guards were, in some cases, provided by the service for which the factories worked, for instance the Navy in Wilhelmshaven, the Airforce at Porta or Helmstedt.

3. In Autumn 1940 there were three guard companies and one HQ section of SS at Neuengamme, approximately 400 men Waffen SS. By 11/1942 this figure increased to approximately six hundred men. Great reinforcements began in Spring 1944, which came from all the Training-and-Holding-units of the Waffen SS and, as already mentioned, from the Armed Forces. The number rose quickly to approximately 2000-2500 SS men for Neuengamme and its outposts and this figure remained more or less unchanged till the end of the war.

4. I am unable to state numerically to what extent personnel has been posted and replaced by others. The figure may amount to 500- 600 men. Consequently, I am inclined to believe that, since the time I took up my duties, all told 2500-3000 men of the Waffen SS have been employed in Neuengamme and its outposts.

5. As to the employment of personnel it should be noted, that no difference was made in respect of duties as guard or in the camp. Personnel could first be employed on guard duties and then in the Camp. If somebody served to the satisfaction of the commandant in the camp-HQ staff or camp administration [Schutzhaftlager] it rarely occurred that he was put back on guard duties.

[sgd.] Karl Totzauer.

Sworn before me 3/15/1946 at the Mil. Gov. Prison at Altona sgd A.R. Frisby, Major, RCASC, SO II, Fin/Int, HQ Mil, Gov, Hansestadt Hamburg. 3/18/1946, HQ, BAOR.

“Document D-750: [Deposition by August Harbaum] [translation]”, p. 213.

Deposition on oath by HARBAUM, August, born on 3/25/1913, at GUTERSLOH, at present at No. 5 Civilian Internment Camp.

1. I was the Chief of the branch A/V4 of the Wirtschafts and Verwaltungs Hauptamt (WVHA), first as Hauptsturmführer and then as Sturmbannführer. My branch dealt with postings, promotions etc., of the Waffen SSOR’S, NCO’s and WO’semployed in Concentration Camps.

2. I took up my duties in 3/1942 and stayed there until the middle of 4/1945.

3. In 3/1942 there served approximately 15000 men Waffen SS as guards and camp staffs to the Concentration Camps.

4. In 4/1945 approximately 30000-35000 men of the Waffen SS served with the Concentration Camps.

5. Due to postings to the front and other postings I am inclined to believe that approximately 10000 men of the Waffen SS were replaced and that, accordingly, approximately 45000 men Waffen SS served at one time or another in the Concentration Camps between 3/1942-4/1945.

Signed: A. HARBAUM.

Sworn before me 3/19/1946 at No 5 Civilian Internment Camp.

Sgd. D. MACMILLAN, Major, R.A.

“Document D-753-A [translation]”, pp. 214-216.

The Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery. Berlin 1/1/1945. at present House on the Werbellinsee. (Postal Communications only via Berlin, Reich Chancellery).

To the Director of the Party Chancellery, Herr Reichsleiter Bormann. Führer’s Headquarters.

My Dear Bormann,

Owing to the tremendous concentration of the entire forces of the nation for final victory, and the successful offensive which is beginning in the West, the war year of 1944 has closed with a promising prospect for the future and for victory, which gives us all courage and strength to hold out further in the new year, the fighting year of 1945, and which has tremendously strengthened our confident and unshakable belief in final victory. As far as one can see, this year of 1945 will also be the decisive year. The address to the German people which the Führer delivered on the occasion of the New Year was wonderfully inspiring. It will not have missed its effect in the field of home and foreign politics.

At the beginning of this new year, which is of such import for the German people and for every individual, I do not want to fail to wish you, dear Bormann, all the best most sincerely for your responsible work for Führer and people, but also for your personal prosperity and that of your family. I would also like to express the hope that our hitherto happy official collaboration and our personal friendly relations may remain the same as they have now been for years.

The time of our official and personal relations, appears, however, to have somewhat loosened recently, to my very great regret, not through my fault, but for obviously not very important reasons which I do not know more closely and which I can only assume. I would like to speak frankly in this connection, and I wish, in the first place, to talk about the problems of a general nature which are causing me tremendous concern:

1. From the moment when, for perfectly justified reasons, I was ordered on the 21st October of last year to give up my field quarters attached to the Führer’s Headquarters, I have been completely disconnected, by the Führer and his headquarters. My last official interview with the Führer took place more than three months ago, on the 24th September of last year. Although I know that, owing to his preoccupation with the immediate direction of the war, the Führer was often unable, for several months on end, to grant me and us jointly an interview, it was nevertheless my duty to press for this visit. For it actually concerns matters the completion of which the Führer himself demands from me, and for the early completion of which I am responsible to him. I therefore have pressed, and still press by no means for my own sake, but only because of the Führer and the cause.

It is after all, mainly a question of matters important for the conduct of the war, and many other matters to which this attribute does not exactly apply, but which must also one day be dealt with during the war, if the number of little things not attended to is not gradually to cause disorder and damage, and finally create the impression that the functioning of the state machinery has come to a standstill.

I am being continually pressed from all quarters to bring about the numerous Führer’s decisions which are urgently awaited. What I can deal with myself I deal with myself. What I can divert elsewhere I divert elsewhere. But the very things which are the most important and the most urgent, if they are settled at all are not settled by me, because this is made impossible for me. But I have to bear the whole or at least part of the responsibility for them just the same.

A further result is that the Reich ministers, the other supreme Reich authorities and other bureaux which come directly under the Führer and whichaccording to the Führer’s instruction are under my care, when they see that through me they get nowhere, choose othernot always the desirable and rightways to the Führer or address him direct. For the Führer this is an extra burden or, at least,looked at from the point of view of time,a multiple burden!

It brings for me both with the Führer and with the ministers etc., the odium of not having got the things done! Further it puts me, in the unpleasant and often embarrassing position of having decisions by the Führer passed onto me in which I did not collaborate at all, but for which I have to be responsible, and some of which I have to sign jointly and responsibly without ever having been in the position to draw the Führer’s attention to some essential aspects which might have brought him to a different decision.

2. lt is painful for me to be excluded, just now of all times, from the most important matters which I was appointed by the Führer to cooperate in,matters which belong to my principal tasks. Not that I have not enough work to do. I always have some of that in the mass of current administrative work with which I need not trouble the Führer. But I believe that I could do bigger and better thingsand would do them willinglyif the possibility were not now completely taken away from me by the fact of my “disconnection”.

I am notand you know it wellone of those people who trouble the Führer when it is not necessary, and, so far, even in those periods in which I saw the Führer comparatively seldom, I was always able to look after myself, and nevertheless mastered the tasks I had to do and thisas the Führer often assured meto his full satisfaction. But now, when for four months already I have not had the opportunity to speak to the Führer and when I am now so to speak completely “disconnected” i.e. for some time to come have no prospect at all of speaking to the Führer, the moment has come in which my duty compels me to report to the Führer that under such circumstances I cannot fulfill my office and the duties connected therewith. As I believe I can take it for granted that the Führer has not withdrawn from me the confidence which he has so far reposed in me and assured me of, but am rather of the opinion that the Führer is simply not informed of what a multitude of important matters I have waiting to put before him and what harm and difficulties arise if I continue to be kept out as is the case at present. I would request you, my dear Bormann, to arrange a short interview with the Führer for me simply to clarify these questions. I would not bring any reports with me. I just consider it my duty to place these questions before the Führer in detail and I hope that he will understand that I am compelled to do this. If the Führer issolely for the reasons which are well known to me not in a position himself to take very soon decisions as Reich Chancellor on matters whose presentation he himself demands of me or which I am in duty bound to place before him, then it is still my duty to explain the position in greater detail and leave him to examine the question whether he will at least depute certain decisions to other authorities, insofar as they do not have to be taken by him, so that the state machinery should not come to a standstill in those matters which must be decided in war time too. I emphasize especially that I am not aspiring to be the authority to whom this duty should be deputed. I would also like to place before the Führer a number of other suggestions which would serve to guarantee the impeccable functioning of the state machinery during the further course of the war, without the direct participation of the Führer. I therefore request you once more to arrange me a date for a report to the Führer as soon as possible, just so as to work out these questions.

3. I certainly fully understand that during the war, when military matters are of course of first importance, the Führer cannot, as Reich Chancellor be available for the Chief of the Reich Chancellory to the same extent as in peace time. But I think that I have always taken this into account by asking for an interview only when it was really necessary, and then only laying before the Führer the most important matters with the greatest conciseness, never a matter that had not been previously considered, that was unripe and therefore not suitable for an interview. It was often difficult to keep this up during the war. But keeping it up was greatly eased by the collaboration, in accord and confidence, with you, dear Bormann, which, even if not often yet always to a sufficient extent, led to joint interviews with the Führer and, in connection with them, to my reporting to him on my own. That such collaboration did take place you have often confirmed to me yourself with the remark that it had a beneficial and successful effect for the Führer and the people. Why has it suddenly ceased? As late as the 21st October of last year at the Führer H.Q. and the 14th and 29th November of last year in Berchtesgaden we had our discussions which up to now have always proved their worth. Then, after your departure to Berlin and already during the Führer’s short stay in Berlin and still more after his departure to the west, all contact between us was suddenly cut off. Not through my fault! During your stay in Berlin, which was interrupted at times, you did not make even a single attempt to get in touch with me, though I had expected this and was bound to expect it. My numerous attempts to reach you by telephone did not succeed. I had the impression confirmed to me by various circumstancesthat you did not want to be rung up and got people to say that you were not there. Since you also did not keep to your statements, made via your telephone exchanges, that you would ring me up, I gave up any further attempts to reach you. I could not and did not wish to run after you continually. Only once did we speak to each other by telephone during your Berlin stay and then mainly about the urgency of my and our joint interview with the Führer. Here you gave me the advice to apply for this to the office of the personal adjutant of the Führer, which I did, but, I am sorry to say, without success. This was our last telephone conversation. That I followed your advice and demanded the mediation of the office of the personal adjutant of the Führer you could hardly have taken any offense at. Also I received no telephone call from you from the West. Why suddenly this constant silence on your part? It has been reported to me-I don’t know if it is true-that you took offense at my “Führer information” via the office of the personal adjutant of the Führer. If this is true, I would be grateful to you if you would tell me why you don’t like this “Führer information”. You declared to me in our last telephone conversation, that it is also impossible for you to bring certain urgent matters to the Führer’s attention, you yourself advised me to apply to the office of the personal adjutant of the Führer and you would not speak to me on the telephone. What else should I have done to bring matters of the most urgent nature only those were concernedto the Führer’s attention, than to have recourse to the so-called “Führer information” as an ultimo ratio and send it through the office of the personal adjutant of the Führer? It is certainly not pleasant for me to send information to the Führer in writing. If it is long one can not expect the Führer to read it. If it is short and clearly sufficient, it is mostly incomplete. Also speech and counter-speech and the possibility of answering the Führer’s questions go, and these are of fundamental importance for his decision. I have sent you copies of the “Führer information” at the same time, so that you should be in the picture. So what did you object to in this “Führer information”? I do not assume that you wish to prevent me, as a Reich Minister directly under the Führer, placing things before the Führer direct. Your claim to participation, insofar as it existed, was granted by the copies sent you.

I only wish you had ensured my interestsi. e., my cooperation and participationin the affairs which come within my competency or in affairs in which I must participate in the same manner recently as used to be the rule before. I am sorry to say that this has frequently not happened. I only want to remind you of the decree for the creation of the Volkssturm (Home Guard), of your difference of opinion with Staats Minister Frank about the construction of emplacements in the Protectorate and of the last Führer decree about the Youth-leaders of the German Reich without going into details here. Trustful cooperation is only possible if it is mutual. I always observed this in my relations to you.i I never separately and one-sidedly reported to the Führer or any party matter or any matter in which the party was concerned, or in which it was only interested. I even went so far as always trusting to discuss with you numerous matters which did not require your participation and to deal with them in agreement with you, because I considered this indeed not necessary, but suitable and expedient. I have never yet claimed to intervene with authority in purely party affairs. I believe that you will have to admit this. I am totally unaware and unable to explain what other grounds you could have for being ill disposed towards me or for letting anything come between us, which is already the subject of talk by third persons. I would be very grateful to you if you would be kind enough to inform me frankly of such grounds. A frank word and an honest discussion are, after all, always the best. All arguments of third persons who may have misinformed you or wrongly influenced you would thus fall to the ground. Otherwise, they would be glad that they had succeeded in bringing about our estrangement. For our unanimous cooperation to date has for a long time been a thorn in the flesh of one person or another, because they would have preferred to play us off one against the other.

In conclusion I should like only to repeat what I wrote at the beginning of this letter, namely to express my wish that our official and personal relations should remain in the new year the same as they were in the past. I am not aware of having interfered with them. It is now your turn to speakbe it in writing or orally! I am always at your disposal for a discussion.

Hearty Greetings,

Heil Hitler,

Yours [sgd] Lammers.

“Document D-753-B [translation]”, pp. 219-221.

NSDAP Party Chancellery Führer’s HQ, 1/5/1945 Munich 33 BO/Ur. Führer Building.

The Head of the Party Chancellery. To the Head of the Reich Chancellery. Reich Minister Dr. Lammers. Berlin W.8. Vossstrasse 6.

My dear Lammers,

I will answer by return of post your letter of the 1/1/1945, which I have just received.

1. No one could regret more than I do the fact that you are not near to us at the present moment, for of course I also see the disadvantages described by you.

If you were here we could at any rate often meet and talk things over and all unintentional misunderstandings would perforce not arise.

2. Now as for these misunderstandings: example Protectorate! Contrary to your supposition, I did not make a report to the Führer, but instead, shortly after your information was received, my Herr Mueller was told by the personal adjutant’s office,in fact by Sturmbannführer (Major) Guensche-that the Führer wanted to see me on this matter.

Then when the Führer saw me he gave me, without any further discussion of the situation, the order to see to the commencing of the construction of emplacements as soon as possible and to remove the differences of opinion with Secretary of State Frank by discussion with him. I thereupon sent my expert Zander, with whom I conduct all tasks of enlisting the people, to Prague on the same day, and in two thorough discussions there, a solution was found which left the autonomy of the Protectorate and Frank’s authority untouched on the one hand, but which makes use of the Party’s experience and knowledge concerning the construction of emplacements on the other.

Regarding the decrees on the Volkssturm and on the relationship between the Hitler Youth and the party leadership, these are purely party matters, the coming about of which I shall tell you about at the next opportunity.

[Pencil note beside this paragraph: If the Volkssturm is a party matter, then the war is too]

3. Your assumption that during my stay in Berlin I wanted to avoid you is untenable! Shortly after his arrival, the Führer went to Professor v Eicken for treatment and was therefore not at home to anybody during this time. I used this opportunity to get some fresh air in Mecklenburg after the unhealthy life in underground shelters. So I was in Berlin only for a very brief period during the whole staff of the Führer’s HQ. At that time you were not in the Reich Chancellery but outside.

[Pencil note to above paragraph: “Where I can be reached at any time and from where I can get to Berlin at any time.]

Actually it was very difficult to reach me during the whole time, because even in the worst weather I rode around for hours, went to this or that farm and I went to bed mostly at 22.00 hours, after the sleepless nights at the Führer’s HQ.

It was very good that I got a bit of rest there, because the exertions here have not decreased. If I did not ring you up from my present quarters this is due firstly to the telephone restrictions and the everlasting interruptions of the linetoday all the better known places in this area were bombed againfrom then on the fact that I was kept not very pleasantly busy. The state of communications here in the West calls for the greatest possible employment of the enlisted people. We no longer work on fortifications but on the reconstruction of the railway lines and other means of communication. For your information I enclose the pertinent instructions.

Besides this, we are now to make the airfields bigger for high performance planes with the enlisted people and to take over all sorts of other tasks. To this is added the effect of the air raids, on which I should not like to comment in writing.

As soon as you can come here, I can tell you this better verbally. I shall ask the Führer as soon as possible when you can come.

I myself want to go on Sunday to Munich for a week for conferences etc., but perhaps I shall pass through Berlin on my way back, if we do not meet in the HQ.

Thank you for all your good wishes, which I heartily reciprocate! Also give all my good wishes to your family.

Heil Hitler,

[sgd] M. Bormann.

“Document D-762: Combatting Of Terrorists And Saboteurs In The Occupied Territories [translation]”, pp. 221-222.

TOP SECRET

Führer’s Headquarters, 7/30/1944 OKW/Operational Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu. 2/Admin. 1 No. 009169/44

30 copies 24th copy. Jurisdiction.

The continually increasing acts of terror and sabotage in the occupied territories, which are being committed increasingly by uniformly led gangs, compel us to take the severest countermeasures, corresponding to the rigour of the war that has been forced on us. Those who attack us from the rear at the decisive stage of our fight for existence deserve no consideration.

I therefore order that:

I. All acts of violence by non-German civilians in the occupied territories against the German Armed Forces, the SS and the police and against installations which serve their purposes, are to be combatted as follows as acts of terrorism and sabotage:

1. The troops and every single member of the Armed Forces, the SS and the police are to overcome on the spot all terrorists and saboteurs whom they catch in the act.

2. Those who are apprehended later, are to be handed over to the nearest local station of the Security Police and SD.

3. Accomplices, especially women, who do not participate directly in the fighting are to be put to work. Children are to be spared.

II. The Chief of the OKW will issue the necessary executive instructions. He is entitled to make alterations and additions, as far as any need of the war operations makes it imperative.

Signed Adolf Hitler

certified copy (signed) Oberfeldrichter (Senior Field Judge)

“Document D-763: Criminal Acts By Non-German Civilians In The Occupied Territories Against The Security Or War-Preparedness Of The Occupying Power [translation]”, p.

Copy

Führer’s HQ., 8/18/1944

OKW Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu.2/Admin 1. No. 009169/44 top secret WR 1/s No. 79/44 top secret

30 copies 24th copy.

On the basis of section II of the Führer’s order of 7/30/1944/OKW/Ops Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu. 2 (Admin 1, No. 009169/44 top secret) it is resolved:

Non-German civilians in the occupied territories who endanger the security or war-preparedness of the occupying power by any other means than acts of terrorism or sabotage, are to be handed over to the SD. Section I. No. 3 of the Führer’s order applies also to them.

The Chief of the OKW

Signed Keitel certified copy (signature)

“Document D-764: 1. Combatting Of Terrorists And Saboteurs In The Occupied Areas. 2. Jurisdiction Over Non-German Civilians In The Occupied Territories [translation]”, pp. 223-224.

Führer’s Headquarters 8/18/1944

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Fst/Qu 2/Verw 1.No.00969/44 g.Kdos. WR (1/3) No. 79/44 g. Kdos. (Operational Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu.2/Admin 1. No. 009169/44 WR (1/3) No. 79/44 top secret

30 copies 24th copy

2 enclosures.

1. Enclosed are copies of the Führer’s decree of 30.7.1944 and of the 1st Executive Decree of 18.8.1944.

2. The Führer’s decree and the Executive Decree do not apply to Finland, Rumania, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia and Bulgaria, nor to the subjects of these countries.

3. The Führer’s decree is to be made known at once orally to all personnel of the Armed Forces, SS and police and must form the subject of regular emphatic instruction. It must only be distributed in writing down to divisions and similarly ranking units.

4. Current legal proceedings for all acts of terrorism and sabotage and all other crimes by non-German civilians in the occupied territories which imperil the security or war-preparedness of the occupying power, are to be suspended. Accusations must be taken back. The execution of sentences is no longer to be ordered. The culprits are to be handed over with a report of the proceedings to the nearest local authority of the Security Police and SD. In the case of death sentences which already have legal force, the present instructions are to remain valid.

5. Crimes which affect German interests but do not imperil the security or war-preparedness of the occupying power, do not justify the retention of the jurisdiction over non-German civilians in the occupied territories. I authorize the commanders of the occupied territories to draw up new regulations in agreement with the Higher SS and police chiefs. The following measures, inter alia, are to be considered:

a. Handing over to the SD for forced labour.

b. Settlement by police administrative criminal proceedings.

c. Handing over to any existing local German civil courts.

d. Handing over to courts of their own country.

I reserve the decision with regard to Denmark.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Signed Keitel

certified copy Senior Military Judge

Distribution:

1st copy Commander-in Chief West. 2nd copy Military Commander France. 3rd copy Commander of the Armed Forces in Belgium/Northern France. 4th Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands. 5th copy Commander in Chief Southwest. 6th copy Plenipotentiary General of the German Armed Forces in Italy. 7th copy Commander in Chief Southeast. 8th copy Military Commander Southeast. 9th copy Commander of the Armed Forces in Denmark. 10th copy Commander of the Armed Forces in Norway. 11th copy Gestapo Office for the attention of SS Oberführer Panzinger.

For information:

12th copy Army High Command/Chief of the Military Judiciary. 13th Army High Command/Legal Dept. 14th copy OKL/Luftwaffe Legal Dept. 15th copy OKM/Naval Legal Dept. 16th copy The SS Judge attached to the Reichsführer SSfor the attention of SS Standartenführer Bunder. 17th copy Reichsführer SSChief SS Court. 18th copy President of the Reich Military Tribunal. 19th copy Foreign Officefor the attention of Ambassador Dr. Albrecht. 20th copy Reichminister of Justice for the attention of Ministerialrat von Ammon. 21st copy Party Chancelleryfor the attention of Reichsamtsleiterkapp. 22nd copy Reich Chancelleryfor the attention of Oberlandesgerichtsrat Sommer. 23rd copy Foreign Countries Department. 24th copy Operational Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu. 2. 25th-30th copy WR (Draft and spares).

“Document D-765 [translation]”, pp. 225-226.

BERLIN, W 35 the 9/2/1944 Tirpitzufer 72-76 Telephone No. local 21-81-91 distant 21-80-91 Secret

OKW 14 n 16.18 WR (1/3) 446/44 secret

It is requested that the above reference the date and brief contents should be given in the reply.

Express Letter

9/5/1944 No. OC 822/44 secret

To: 1. The Foreign Office for Consul General Speiser.

2. The Reich Minister of Justice for Ministerialrat von Ammon.

3. The Reich Security HQ for SS Obersturmbannführer Huppenkoten.

4. The Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery for Councillor of the Court of Appeal Sommer.

5. The Head of the Party Chancellery for Reichsamtsleiter Kapp.

6. The Reichführer SS Central Office SS Court.

7. OKW/Ops Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu/Admin 1.

8. OKW/Ops Staff of the Wehrmacht/Foreign Countries Dept.

9. Army High Command/Dept. of Justice.

10. Navy High Command/MR.

11. Air Force High Command/LR.

Subject: Criminal acts by non-German civilians in the occupied territories against the security or war-preparedness of the occupying power.

Reference Führer’s decree of the 30.7.44 (OKW/Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu.2/ Admin 1. No. 009169 top secret) and OKW decree of the 18.8.44 (Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht Qu.2/ Admin 1. No. 009169 top secret) WR I/3 No. 79/44 top secret.

According to the decrees referred to above all non-German civilians in the occupied territories who have endangered the security or war-preparedness of the occupying power by acts of terrorism or sabotage or by any other means, are to be handed over to the Security Police and SD.

The question is whether it is necessary to issue a corresponding regulation in respect of non-German civilians who were legally sentenced before the publication of this order and have begun to serve a punishment of imprisonment.

The High Command invites you to a conference on this question on Friday the 8.9.1944 at 10 a.m. in the building of the Reich Military Court, BerlinCharlottenburg 5, Witzlebenstr. 4/10, Room 106.

By order (sgd) Dr. Lehmann

Certified copy signature Military Judge

“Document D-766: Criminal Actions By Non-German Civilians In The Occupied Territories Against The Security Or War-Preparedness Of The Occupation Power [translation]”, pp. 226-227.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-766

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces WR I/3 No. 79/44 Top Secret 9/4/1944 Ops Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu 2/Admin 1, No. 009169/44 top secret

30 copies … copy.

On the strength of section 2 of the Führer’s decree of 7/30/1944 (OKW/Ops Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu.2/Admin 1, No. 009169/44 top secret) it is decreed in agreement with the Reichsführer SS and the Chief of the German police, the Reich Minister of Justice and the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

[] Non-German civilians in the occupied territories who have been legally sentenced by a German court for a criminal act against the security or war-preparedness of the occupation power and who are in custody in the occupied territories or in the home area are to be handed over with the facts to the nearest local office of the Security police and SD. Excepted are only persons who have been legally sentenced to death when the execution of the punishment has been ordered.

Sentenced persons, who, according to the directives of the Führer for the prosecution of criminal acts against the Reich or the occupation power in the occupied territories, dated 12/7/1941, are not allowed to have any contact with the outer world, are to be specially marked.

The Chief of the Security police and SD will agree on the time for handing over with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Reich Minister of Justice or the Reich Minister and head of the Reich Chancellery for their spheres of competence.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Signed Keitel

for the accuracy of the copy [signature illegible] Senior Military Judge

Distributor:

Gestapo office for Oberregierungsrat Keisel 1st copy Reich Minister of Justice for Ministerialrat von Ammon 2nd copy Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery for Oberlandesgerichtsrat Sommer 3rd copy High Command of the Army Chief of the Army judiciary 4th copy High Command of the Army/Legal department 5th copy High Command of the Luftwaffe/Luftwaffe legal department 6th copy High Command of the Navy/Navy legal department 7th copy Reichsführer SS, main office SS court 8th copy The SS Judge attached to the Reichsführer SS for SS Standartenführer Bender 9th copy The President of the Reich Military Court 10th copy Supreme Command of the armed forces/troops department/Str. 11th copy Commander in Chief West 12th copy Commander of the Armed Forces, Netherlands 13th copy Commander in Chief Southwest 14th copy Plenipotentiary General of the German armed forces in Italy 15th copy Commander in Chief Southeast 16th copy Military Commander Southeast 17th copy Armed Forces Commander Denmark 18th copy Military Commander Norway 19th copy Foreign Office for ambassador Dr. Albrecht 20th copy Party Chancellery for Reichsamtsleiterkapp 21st copy Office for foreign countries 22nd copy Armed Forces Operational staff/Qu.2 23rd copy Legal department (draft-and spare copies) 24th-30th copies

“Document D-767: Criminal Acts By Non-German Civilians In The Occupied Territories Against The Security Or War-Preparedness Of The Occupying Power [translation]”, p.

TOP SECRET

Qu. (Admin 2) Further to 79/44 top secret [pencil note] Previous referenceterrorists182. O.U., 9/13/1944 1 copy.

I participated in the discussion on the 9.9 for the purpose of gaining information. After it had been ascertained that the “Nacht und Nebel” (night and fog) decree had become superfluous as a result of the terror and sabotage decree the Wehrmacht Legal Dept. presented the attached draft No. 009169/44 top secretWehrmacht Legal Dept. (I/3) No. 79/44 top secret of 9/1944 for discussion. There were no important differences of opinion. More technical questions regarding practical application were discussed immediately afterwards by the people directly concerned.

According to the letter of the Reichsführer SS, it is a question of approximately 24000 non-German civilians who are detained or under arrest and whose speediest transfer to the SD he demands. The question that came up during the discussion as to why this transfer to the SD had become necessary at the present time, although no inconsiderable administrative work was involved, remained unanswered.

It was agreed that paragraph I of the draft decree refers also to those prisoners who have been turned over to- the civil courts.

As OKW does not set any great store by passing sentence on the trifles still remaining for the military courts, it has been left for local agreement to deal with them by decree.

The representative of the Foreign Office pointed out that members of neutral countries also had been “vernebelt” (turned into fog) by mistake or intentionally (i.e. as accomplices) who, according to the basic decree, should not have been “vernebelt”. The question as to what is to be done with the foreigners, and what information is to be given to the neutral countries can, as was stated by the representative of the SD, only be answered in each individual case according to the state of affairs existing at the time; the Foreign Office’s objections have thus not been entirely removed.

(signed) Westerkamp

[pencil note] returned to Qu.2 25.9 (Admin.2)

“Document D-769 [translation]”, p. 229.

TOP SECRET

KR WHFH 0426 9/21/1940 to OJW/Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht

Owing to strike of railwaymen, all communications in Holland are at a standstill. Railway personnel does not obey the appeal to resume work. The call for providing motor vehicles and other means of transport to make the troops mobile and to maintain supplies is no longer answered by the civil population. According to the Führer’s decree of the 8/8/1944 and the executive instructions of the Chief of the OKW (Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu. 2) (Admin 1) No. 009169/44 top secret published as a supplement thereto, the troops may use armed force only against persons who commit acts of violence as terrorists or saboteurs, whereas persons who endanger the security or war-preparedness of the occupation power in any other way than by terrorism or acts of sabotage are to be handed over to the SD. This regulation has proved too roundabout and therefore ineffective. In the first place, the necessary police forces are lacking.

The troops must again receive authority to shoot with or even without summary trial, such persons also as are not terrorists or saboteurs in the sense of the Führer’s decree but who endanger the fighting forces by their passive attitude. It is requested that the Führer’s decree be altered accordingly, as the troops cannot otherwise assert themselves effectively against the population, which, in its turn, appears to endanger the conduct of the operations.

Commander of the Armed Forces, Netherlands, Chief of Staff No. 4489/44

Signed Fr. Christiansen, Luftwaffe General.

“Document D-770 [translation]”, pp. 229-230.

Ops Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu. 2 (Admin. 1) 9/24/1944

SSD Teleprint 10 copies copy

To: 1. Commander of the Armed Forces in Norway.

2. 20th (Mountain) Army HQ.

3. Commander of the Armed Forces in Denmark.

4. C-in-C West.

5. Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands (further to Ops. Staff Adj. No. 4489/44 top secret of the 9/21/1944).

6. C-in-C Southwest.

7. Plenipotentiary General of the German Armed Forces in Italy.

8. C-in-C Southeast.

Ref: OKW/Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu. 2 (Admin 1) No. 009169/44 top secret of the 7/30/1944.

Subject: Combatting of criminal acts by non-German civilians in the Occupied Territories.

According to the Führer’s order of the 7/30/1944 non-German civilians of the occupied territories who attack us in the rear in the decisive stage of our battle for existence deserve no consideration. This must be the guiding line for the interpretation and application of the Führer’s decree itself and of the Chief of the OKW’s executive decree of the 18.8.44.

If handing over to the SD is impossible owing to the military situation and the state of communications other effective measures are to be taken ruthlessly and independently. There are naturally no objections to passing and executing death sentences by summary Court procedure under such circumstances.

(signed) Keitel

OKW/Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu.2/(Admin 1) No. 0011520/44 top secret

Distribution: (after despatch)

1. General Staff of the Army/Chief of the General Staff of the Army 2nd copy

2. OKM/1st Naval Ops. Staff 3rd copy

3. OKL/OPs. Staff of the Luftwaffe 4th copy

4. Reich Führer SS and chief of the German PoliceCommand Staff 5th copy

“Document D-778: Treatment Of Anglo-American Terror Fliers [translation]”, p. 235.

6/18/1944

Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu.(Admin 1).

1. Memorandum re telephone call Ambassador Ritter. 17.45 hrs.

Ambassador Ritter states that the Foreign Office’s attitude cannot be submitted before tomorrow evening, as he had not even received information about the matter until yesterday afternoon, and inquiries in Berlin are still necessary.

2. Chief Qu. [in pencil] D/18/6

3. On the subject (command matter)

[pencil note: illegible initial18/6]

“Document D-779: Treatment Of Enemy Terror Fliers [translation]”, pp.

Berlin W 8. Leipziger Str. 8. H.Q., 6/19/1944

The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich. The Adjutant’s Office. Adj. No. 7685/44. Top Secret.

2 copies. 1st Copy.

Ref: Your letter No. 771793/44 Top Secret. Chief matter, second subject Op. Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu (Admin. 1.) of the 6/15/1944.

To: the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Field Marshal Keitel

The Reich Marshal has made the following note with regard to the above letter:

“The population’s reaction is in any case not in our hands. But if possible the population must be prevented from acting against other enemy fliers, to whom the above state of affairs does not apply. In my opinion a state of affairs as above can also at any time be tried by a court, as it is here a question of murders, which the enemy has forbidden his fliers to commit.”

per pro (sgd) Gerke Lt. Col. in the General Staff.

J. K. W. S. [Initialled by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, Saln]

“Document D-781: Treatment Of Enemy Terror Fliers [translation]”, p. 239.

Translation of Document V/250

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces No. 771793/44 top secret Command Matter 3rd subject. Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu. (Admin 1)

Führer’s Headquarters, 6/23/1944. Top Secret Only through Officer!

2 copies and copy.

Re: OKW/Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu. (Admin 1) No. 771793/44 top secret Command Matter, 2nd subject of 6/15/44 and your letter Adj. No. 1605/44 top secret 6/19/1944.

To: the Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe, for the attention of Colonel von Brauchitsch of the General Staff.

It is unfortunately not possible to gather from your letter whether the Reich Marshal has agreed to the facts communicated to him which are to be regarded as terroristic actions in the publication of a case of lynch law, and he is prepared to give the commandant of the Air Force reception camp of Oberursel verbal instructions to this effect.

It is again requested that the Reich Marshal be induced to give his consent and that this be notified, if possible, by the 27th instant.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

By order [initialled] 24/6

“Document D-782 [translation]”, pp. 239-240.

Foreign Office No. 466

Salzburg 6/25/1944

Secret State Matter

Further to the telephone conversation of today’s date, I am enclosing for your provisional information the draft of a reply to the letter of the Chief of the OKW, dated 6/15/1944 Ops Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu. (Admin) No. 771793/44 Top Secret Command matter 2nd-subjectas submitted to the Foreign Minister.

As the Foreign Minister has gone away for a few days, he has not yet been able to approve the draft. I must therefore reserve the right to make any changes that may be necessary.

(signed) Ritter

To the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht for the attention of Colonel Poleck Strub-Barracks.

“Document D-783: Treatment Of Terror Fliers [translation]”, p. 240.

6/26/1944

Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu. (Admin 1).

Telephone memorandum

Telephone call Adjutant’s Office of the Reich Marshal (Capt. Breuer):

The Reich Marshal agrees with the formulation of the concept of terror fliers as stated and with the proposed procedure. He asks for information this very day, about measures taken.

Signed [illegible] 3/92

“Document D-784: Treatment Of Enemy Terror Fliers [translation]”, pp. 240-241.

Operational Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu. (Admin 1). No. 006988/44 Top Secret. [Pencil note] “We must act at last. What else is necessary for this?” [Initialled] W. [Warlimont]

3 Copies. 1st Copy. Initialled K [Keitel].

TOP SECRET Notes for a Report.

1. The draft of an answering letter from the Reich Foreign Minister to the Chief of the OKW, which was transmitted to the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces via Ambassador Ritter, is presented as an enclosure hereto.

Ambassador Ritter telephoned on the 29.6 that the Reich Foreign Minister has agreed to this draft, but has given ambassador Sonnleitner the task of reporting the Foreign Office’s opinion to the Führer before the letter is sent off to the Chief of the OKW. Only when the Führer has agreed to the principles laid down by the Foreign Office will the letter to the Chief of the OKW be sent off.

2. The Reich Marshal is in agreement with the formulation of the concept “terror flier” as proposed by the OKW and with the method suggested.

(sgd) Warlimont

Distribution:

Chief OKW, via deputy chief of the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces 1st Copy. War Diary 2nd Copy Qu. (Admin. 1) 3rd Copy.

“Document D-785: Terror Airmen [translation]”, p. 241.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces No. 007195/44 Top Secret/ Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu. (Admin 1)

Führer’s HQ., 7/4/1944 Top Secret 2 copies 2nd copy

Reference: 1. OKW/Ops. Staff of the Wehrmacht/Qu. (Admin 1) No. 771793/44 Top Secret Command Matter second subject of 6/15/1944.

2. The Reich Marshal of the Greater German ReichAdjutant’s Office No. 1605/44 Top Secret of 6/19/1944.

[Pencil note:] terror airmen!

To: The C in C of the Luftwaffe for the attention of Colonel von Brauchitsch of the General Staff.

Please report whether instructions have been given to the commandant of the Air Force reception camp of Oberursel in the sense of the statements of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Operational Staff of the Armed Forces of the 15th June, or when it is intended to do so.

By Order, [signature illegible]

[Pencil note:] no answer to be had from the C-in-C Luftwaffe!

“Document D-786: Notice About The Terror Fliers Affair [translation]”, p. 242.

Operational Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu (Admin. 1.)

On the 4.7., in the midday situation report, the Führer decreed the following:

According to press reports, the Anglo-Americans intend in future to attack from the air small places, too, which are of no importance to war economy or militarily, as a retaliatory measure against the “V1’s”. Should this news prove true, the Führer wishes it to be made known through the radio and the press that any enemy airman who takes part in such an attack and is shot down will not be entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war, but, as soon as he falls into German hands will be killed and treated as a murderer. This measure is to apply to all attacks on small places which are not military targets, communications centres, armament targets etc., and which are not of importance to the war.

At the moment nothing is to be ordered; the only thing to be done is to discuss such a measure with the WR and the Foreign Office.

“Document EC-3: War Economy Notes Concluded 11/30/1941 [translation]”, pp. 242-244.

Liaison Staff of Supreme Headquarters Armament Procurement Office (WiRueAmt) with the Reich Marshall. Nr. 260/41 g.

C. P. 11/25/1941

Ref: Order of the Chief, WiRueAmt, Supreme Headquarters, dated 7/29/1941.

To the Chief of the WiRueAmt General Thomas Berlin

The conceptions occasionally mentioned during the reporting period are comprised in the notes of the conference on 11/8/1941. Compare Reich Marshall of greater Germany report for the V. J. P. Nr. 19 203/9 g.v. of 11/20/1941. The Reich Marshall has not been in the supreme headquarters East since that time so that no lectures have been given.

In order to preserve presentation with respect to the existing reports, the general principles of economic policy in the newly occupied Eastern territories based on the East conference” in Berlin of 11/8/1941 are stated in the following:

“I. For the duration of the war the requirements of the war economy will be the all-dominant factor of any economic measures in the newly-occupied Eastern territories.

II. Seen from a long range point of view the newly-occupied Eastern areas will be exploited economically from the point of view of colonial administration and by colonial methods.

Exceptions will be made only for those parts of the East land which are to be Germanized by order of the Führer, but even they are subject to the principle expressed in paragraph I.

III. The main emphasis of all economic work rests with the production of food and raw materials.

The highest possible production surplus for the supply of the Reich and of other European countries is to be attained by cheap production based on the maintenance of the low living standard of the native population. Besides covering thereby the European needs for food supplies and raw materials as far as possible, this measure is intended to create a source of income for the Reich which will make it possible to liquidate in a few decades, with utmost consideration for the German taxpayer, an essential part of the debts incurred in the financing of the war.

IV. Manufacturing in the occupied Eastern territories will be considered only if absolutely necessary:

a. to decrease the volume of transportation, (i.e. manufacturing processes up to steel or aluminum blocks),

b. to take care of urgent repair needs inside the country,

c. to take advantage of all facilities in the armament sector during war-time.

It remains to be decided to what extent a resumption of the production of trucks and tractors can be considered during the war (in view of the overburdened European industrial capacity).

V. The development of a considerable consumer goods and finished products industry in the occupied Eastern territories is not permitted. It is rather the task of European and especially German industry to process the raw materials and semi-finished products produced in the occupied Eastern areas and to take care of the most urgent requirements for industrial consumer goods, and production means of these Eastern areas which are to be exploited like a colony. The larger the number of products of daily needs we send to Russia, the greater will be the quantity of raw materials we can extract, the greater will the difference in values become, and the earlier will our war debts be liquidated.

VI. To supply the population with high-valued consumer goods is out of the question. On the contrary, all tendencies to raise the general standard of living are to be suppressed right from the start with the most drastic measures. The question as to which kinds and quantities of consumer goods and production means are to be delivered to the newly-occupied Eastern areas is to be settled in conjunction with the Economic Office of the Reich commissars.

The Eastland [Ostland], too, may, at the beginning, be furnished only very limited quantities of consumer goods. The long range order for the Germanization of the Eastland must not be allowed to lead to a general rise of the living standards of all the nationalities living there. Only the Germans living there, or to be settled there, and the elements to be Germanized may receive preferential treatment.

VII. The Russian price and wage scales are to be kept as low as possible. Any interference with the price and wage policy which is to be established exclusively to benefit the interest of the Reich is to be punished mercilessly. The Eastland, too is subject to the principle that surpluses, specifically the agricultural ones, have to reach the Reich at the lowest possible prices.” (signed) Nagl

Liaison of the OKW/WiRueAmt with the Reich Marshall

C. P., 9/18/1941 31/41

Re: Economic Notes for the Reporting Period of 8/15-9/16/1941.

In that period discussions pertaining to war and general economy took place only on the 15th and 16th of September. Nothing of basically new importance came out of the discussions so that no notes could be taken about it.

The following persons participated in the conference of 16 September which had been preceded by a short meeting on the 15th of September:

The Reich Marshall. Secretary of State Backe (4-Year Plan). General of the Luftwaffe Gosrau (Administrative Office, b d L). Lt. General von Seidel (Quartermaster General Ob d L). Lt. General Osterkamp (Army Administrative Office). Lt. General Wendersleben (Army Administrative Office). Colonel Baentsch (Quartermaster General, OKH). Ministerialdirektor Riecke (Economic Staff East, 4-Year Plan and Reich Minister, East). Major General Nagl (Liaison Office, OKW/WiRueAmt). Ministerialrat Dr. Goernnert (Reich Marshall). Captain on the General Staff of the Luftwaffe von Brauchitsch (Reich Marshall).

At this conference which was concerned with the better exploitation of the occupied territories for the German food economy, the Reich Marshall called attention to the following:

It seems that the Wehrmacht demands too much, especially preserved food from home. With the exception of tobacco goods, chocolate, dried vegetables, etc., all food supplies for the troops, used or utilized in the Eastern territories, have to be furnished by the occupied territories themselves. If that cannot be accomplished, perhaps on account of insufficient organization or out of sympathy for the native population, or because of transport difficulties or indolence, or because the use of preserved foods is simpler, then those reasons must be done away with. On no account do I permit an increased supply from the Reich, which especially with regard to meat supplywould lead to a decrease of rations for the German civilian population. On no account do I give my permission for that.

The morale at home would suffer from that or become shaky. The home front has to take enough already (bombings, mounting losses, slow successes in the East, and in addition, the fact that this war is a second one within a generation). This would furnish an excellent weapon for enemy propaganda. It already employs these days the method of instructing the populations of the occupied countries to cry for food time and time again, to hide stores, to keep from delivering food supplies, etc., so that every place and not the least at home food difficulties and bad feelings associated with the sinking of morale, arise.

It is clear that a graduated scale of food allocations is needed.

First in line are the combat troops, then the remainder of troops in enemy territory, and then those troops stationed at home. The rates are adjusted accordingly. The supply of the German non-military population follows and only then comes the population of the occupied territories.

In the occupied territories on principle only those people are to be supplied with an adequate amount of food who work for us. Even if one wanted to feed all the other inhabitants, one could not do it in the newly-occupied Eastern areas. It is, therefore, wrong to funnel off food supplies for this purpose, if it is done at the expense of the army and necessitates increased supplies from home.

(signed) Nagel (Reich Marshal)

“Document EC-14: Speech By Major General Thomas Before The Wehrmacht War College Delivered On 11/1/1937 [partial translation]”, pp. 246-248.

Chief of the Military Economy Staff in the Wehrmacht Office Berlin W 35 Tirpitzufer 72-76 Telephones Local Long Distance) Switchboard No. 218191.

Introduction to Military Economy, with Consideration of the Present Economic Situation of the Reich

When, two years ago, the Wehrmacht War College was founded, a great number of lecture hours in the curriculum were to my satisfaction assigned to Military Economy. It has become a tradition that the Chief of the Military Economy Staff, at the beginning of these lectures, which are for the greater part given by professional experts, delivers an introductory speech, in which is taken up also the subject of the military economic situation as it presents itself to us in Germany today. I therefore would like to divide my speech, this year also, into two parts. In the first part, I will attempt to explain to you briefly the theory of military economy, while, in the second part, I will take up the practical tasks of military economy and, in particular, the situation in Germany.

What we understand by military economy I need not explain to you today any more in detail, for in various newspapers and magazines the meaning of military economy, as we want to have it interpreted, has been thoroughly discussed. I should like to point out only that by military economy we understand no system of economy, also no doctrine of economy, but that by military economy we want to have understood the conversion of the entire economic thinking and acting in accordance with the idea of national defense.

Major Beutler, who, until recently, worked in my office, has written on Military Economy in the German Volkswirt [political Economist] Periodical No. 42. In this article, he has thoroughly discussed the concept of military economy. He has expressed the fact that there exist three viewpoints on the concept of military economy. The first interpretation understands by military economy the preparation and carrying out of the defense of the nation in the domain of peace-time economy. The second opinion sees in military economy simply a new form of controlling the economy and demands that political economy and military economy become the same.

The third view, which I follow, is of the opinion that military economy is a task and a task with regard to war at that; it is the task, in war, of placing all economic forces at the service of the conduct of the war. The economy, therefore, is the intellectual principle of the influence of national defense on economy. Just as strategy puts the military forces into operation, so military economy directs the economic forces. Therefore, political economy and military economy can never be considered the same. These few words may suffice to explain the concept of military economy.

The connections, which exist between the military forces of a country and its economy have really, up to now, been sought only in the material sphere and I must state that they are just as strong in the realm of the ideal especially the principles of military economy, which have been established by us have attached great importance to the clarification of ideal connections.

Those gentlemen who, before 1933, worked in the mobilization, will know how difficult it was, at that time, to find understanding for the defense of the country even in the Reich and State Ministries. It was still more difficult in economy, for economy, as such, found all measures for the defense of the country to be a burden from the economic viewpoint and the idea of military forces was, in most cases, just as remote to the employer as it was to the employee. The economy, as a whole, was just adapted to purely economic conditions and not to military ones and the task then was to reshape the inner attitude of the leaders of the economy and their personnel, because we believed that a military economy could be operated only by military persons. And here we may state, that it was two ponderables which helped us in the mental conversion, namely the World War and the national revolution. In evaluating the experiences of the World War and demonstrating them to the economy, we increased our understanding of our work and we proved that the economic preparation for mobilization is for the benefit of the economy itself and the prerequisite for a modern national defense. The national revolution brought about the intellectual conversion of the entire people which was the prerequisite for a military economic arrangement of the economy. The economy today realizes that it can be successful in the long run only if it is protected by a sharp sword. And, on the other hand, the military authorities today know that an army has no striking power unless it is backed up by a powerful economy.

For the conversion of the economy to military economy organization measures were necessary. The reorganization of the entire economy, especially the establishing of the Reich Groups Industry, Trade and Handicraft have made the economy ready for national defense and armed it with striking power. Furthermore, the establishment of the Reich Food Estate must be interpreted along these lines. The appointment of labor trustees and the creation of the Management and Labor Communities [Betriebsgemeinschaften] must be viewed as a considerable strengthening of the national defense, because social peace forms the basis for our reconstruction. Let us remember how harmful strikes and other social struggles have been for our supply efforts during wartime and how different the course of the last months of the war could have been if social peace had been maintained at home. The Labor Front with its organization “Strength Through Joy” might also have favorable effects in that respect, provided, that the “Strength Through Joy” movement is directed along the line of: Joy through vigorous work and joy from work through health of body and soul. Thus, there is a great number of organizational measures which have been carried out in the Third Reich and which are accomplishing outstanding results for the binding of the economy and the military power in an ideal relationship and which give us the foundation for a real military-economic preparation for war.

If you consider that one will need during the war considerable means in order to organize the necessary propaganda, in order to pay for the espionage service, and for similar purposes, then one should be clear that our internal Mark would be of no use therefor, and that foreign exchange will be needed.

“Document EC-27: Lecture of General Thomas before the Staff Instructors’ Course [Dozenten-Lehr-gang des Lehrstabes] on 2/28/1939 in Saarow-Pieskow [partial translation]”, p. 250.

“The national socialist state, soon after taking over the power, has reorganized the German economy in all sections and directed it towards a military viewpoint, which had been requested by the Army for years. Due to the reorganization, agriculture, commerce and professions become those powerful instruments the Führer needs for his extensive plans, and we can say today that Hitler’s mobile politics as well as the powerful efforts of the Army and economy, would not have been possible without the necessary reorganization by the National Socialist government. We can now say that the economic organization as a whole, corresponds with the needs, although slight adjustments will have to be made yet. Those reorganizations made a new system of economics possible which was necessary in view of our internal and foreign political situation as well as our financial problems. The directed economy, as we have it today concerning agriculture, commerce, and industry is not only the expression of the present State principles, but at the same time also the economy of the country’s defense.”

“Document EC-28: Lecture of Major General Thomas, Given on 5/24/1939 at the Foreign Office [partial translation]”, pp. 250-254.

The field of military economy has expanded into such a large field during the few years in which we have known this concept that in view of the short time at my disposal I can only give you today a few cross sections. I have chosen fields which touch on our common work and which will be of particular interest for your work here in the Foreign Office. We shall deal with the following three topics:

I. With the state of our own rearmament as compared with that of the Western powers.

II. With the question: can the advantage of the German rearmament over that of the Western powers be maintained also in the future?

III. With the connections between the rearmament and the present economic situation in Germany.

I hope that the treatment of these three points will give you a certain insight into the three main tasks which occupy the economic division with the High Command of the Wehrmacht most particularly for the time being and which would be of a certain importance for the judgment of our foreign political situation.

I begin with the state of German rearmament. You have already been given a survey of the present organization of the Wehrmacht by the parts of the Wehrmacht so that I can be brief and only will have to cover the development of the rearmament.

You know that the dictate of Versailles had limited the number of the German divisions to seven, that an air force was prohibited and that the Treaty completely forbid the navy to build ships of over 10000 tons or submarines. The production of arms, ammunition and military equipment was limited to a few authorized plants. All other establishments had been systematically destroyed. Until the end of 1933, in spite of secret camouflaged attempts, no essential change occurred in the situation, so that we can state that the present rearmament represents the work of four years.

The 100000 men Army of 7 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions compare today with a peacetime army of 18 corps headquarters (General kommandos), 39 infantry divisions, among them 4 fully motorized and 3 mountain divisions, 5 panzer divisions, 4 light divisions and 22 machine-gun battalions. In addition to this there is on the border a large number of permanent border protection units. Since all large-scale procurement of new arms for the 100000 men army was out of the question, but the development of new types was busily carried on in secret our present army could be equipped in all fields .with the most modern weapons and it surely leads the world in its whole infantry armament and in the large number of its types of guns. Completely new and developed only in the last 5 years are the 5 Panzer divisions, the modern battle cavalry and the light divisions, the light cavalry.

Conditions in the field of material are the same. Newly created was the entire equipment of the armored divisions and the light divisions. This accomplishment can be fully appreciated only by a person who knows what it means to produce after these troops had been prohibited for 15 yearsin a tank fit for combat which will satisfy the modern requirements of speed, cross country mobility and armor.

In addition an enormous number of special motor vehicles, sometimes of the most difficult construction, was developed and procured and the artillery partly motorized and provided with the most modern sound and light measuring equipment. The great increase of the technical troops makes special demands on the armament industry.

To this manifold rearmament is added the construction of border fortifications which were first begun in the East and which were started in the West as soon as the situation permitted. You all have seen the concentration of the development in the West during the last year. In this connection I want to mention that the construction of modern fortresses makes the highest demands on the armaments industry which are building turrets.

The pre-war peace time army was increased from 43 divisions to 50 divisions in the period from 1898 to 1914i.e. in 16 years. Our rearmament from 7 infantry divisions to 51 divisions representsas I have already statedthe work of 4 years.

The navy, in 1933 had, in addition to a few obsolete pre-war line ships, one armored ship of 10000 tons, 6 light cruisers and 12 torpedo boats. Since 1933 we have put into service, 2 battle ships of 26000 tons each, 2 armored ships of 10000 tons each, 17 destroyers and 47 submarines, a total tonnage of 125000. Also launched were: 2 battle ships of 35000 tons, 4 heavy cruisers of 10000 tons, 1 aircraft carrier, 5 destroyers and 7 submarines totalling 106000 tons. The launching of additional ships is impending.

The Luftwaffe has risen again and today has a strength of 260000 men. Today already, the Luftwaffe possesses 21 squadrons consisting of 240 echelons. Its increase is in process. The antiaircraft arm, with its four types, is certainly the most modern in the world and already embraces almost 300 antiaircraft batteries. Antiaircraft guns of still larger calibers are being introduced.

The German armament industry has been developed to the same extent. Out of the few factories permitted by the Versailles Treaty has arisen the mightiest armament industry now existing the world. It has attained performances which in part equal the German wartime performances, and in part even surpass them. Germany’s crude steel production is today the largest in the world after America’s, the aluminum production exceeds that of America and of the other countries of the world very considerably. The output of our rifle, machine-gun and artillery factories is at present larger than that of any other state. Our powder and explosive production in the next year is again to reach the volume of the Hindenburg program.

And, in spite of this extraordinary accomplishment of reconstructionto which the Four Year Plan in particular has greatly contributedthere are still considerable deficiencies in the field of armament industry. I shall deal with these especially further on, since they are of decisive importance for the later appraisal of our capacity for endurance.

Added to this material armament preparation is the development of a personnel organization in the form of a military economic organization. The World War had made us sufficiently aware of the lack of an economic mobilization organization. Consequently soldiers already a few years after the War began to set up an organization which was to handle economic preparations for war. From this embryo has grown the present great military defense economy organization which has its center in the economic division with the High Command of the Wehrmacht and the branch agencies of which exist in the defense industry inspectorates under the jurisdiction of each corps headquarters [Generalkommando].

It is natural that this organization has chiefly devoted itself to handling of the armament industry proper and in particular has carried through the mobilizational preparation of these plants. The preparation of the mobilization of the rest of industry, which was to be effected by the Economics Ministry, did not at first enjoy the support required for a modern war, because the Economics Ministry did not possess the machinery to prepare mobilization in an orderly fashion. In recent months joint efforts of the High Command of the Wehrmacht and the (machinery) Commissioner General for War Economy have made it possible to find a solution whereby the mobilizational preparation of all industry is insured. The Reich Economics Ministry, like the Wehrmacht, has set up, in the defense industry sections with the provincial presidents [Oberpraesidenten] and the chambers of commerce, organs which on their part too are now in a position to make economic preparations on a large scale. All the economic preparations for war are now being made in accordance with uniform directives, which are worked out jointly by the economic division of the army and the Commissioner General of the Wehrmacht. The economic division of the army and the Commissioner General for War Industry carry these out through their branch organizations and there is no longer, as formerly, a division of industry into two partsarmament and war plants and plants vital to existencebut a division of tasks, so that the faults of the former organizationthe dualism of industryis avoided.

In conclusion we can state that the total German rearmament in the field of personnel as well as of material represents an accomplishment of the German people probably unique in the world and a testimony to a resolute leadership and to the energy and creativeness innate in the German people. The great financial and labor efforts of the German industry and of the German people have no doubt yielded the desired result and we can perceive today that German armament in its breadth and its state of preparedness has a considerable start over the armament of all other countries.

“Document EC-68: [State Peasants Association [Landesbauernschaft]] [translation]”, pp. 260-262.

49-7 III B 5 C (in pencil)

Minister for Finance and Economy of Baden Karlsruhe, 3/6/1941 State Food Office Dept. A. (State Peasants Association) [Landesbauernschaft]

Confidential To all District Peasants Association [Kreisbauernschaften] Only for Official Business

Subject: Directives on the treatment of foreign farmworkers of Polish Nationality

The agencies of the Reich Food Administration [Reichsnaehrstand]State Peasant Association of Baden have received the result of the negotiations with the Higher SS and police officer in Stuttgart on 2/14/1941, with great satisfaction. Appropriate memoranda have already been turned over to the District Peasants Associations. Below, I promulgate the individual regulations, as they have been laid down during the conference and how they are now to be applied accordingly:

1. Fundamentally, farmworkers of Polish nationality no longer have the right to complain, and thus no complaints may be accepted any more by any official agency.

2. The farmworkers of Polish nationality may not leave the localities in which they are employed, and have a curfew from 1 Oct. to 31 March from 2000 hours to 0600 hours, and from 1 April to 30 Sep. from 2100 hours to 0500 hours.

3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are possible, for riding to the place of work in the field, if a relative of the employer or the employer himself is present.

4. The visit of churches, regardless of faith, is strictly prohibited, even when there is no service in progress. Individual spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is permitted.

5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures or other cultural entertainment are strictly prohibited for farmworkers of Polish nationality.

6. The visit of restaurants is strictly prohibited to farmworkers of Polish nationality except for one restaurant in the village, which will be selected by the Rural Councillor’s Office [Landratsamt], and then only one day per week. The day, which is determined as the day to visit the restaurant, will also be determined by the Landratsamt. This regulation does not change the curfew regulation, mentioned above under no. 2.

7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly prohibited, and wherever it is established, it must be reported.

8. Gatherings of farmworkers of Polish nationality after work is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or in the living quarters of the Poles.

9. The use of railroads, buses, or other public conveyances by farmworkers of Polish nationality is prohibited.

10. Permits to leave the village may only be granted in very exceptional cases, by the local police authority (mayor’s office). However, in no case may it be granted if he wants to visit a public agency on his own, whether it is a labor office or the District Peasants Association or whether he wants to change his place of employment.

11. Arbitrary change of employment is strictly prohibited. The farmworkers of Polish nationality have to work daily so long as the interests of the enterprise demands it, and as it is demanded by the employer. There are no time limits to the working time.

12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment toward farmworkers of Polish nationality, if instructions and good words fail. The employer may not be held accountable in any such case by an official agency.

13. Farmworkers of Polish nationality should if possible be removed from the community of the home, and they can be quartered in stables etc. No remorse whatever should restrict such action.

14. Report to the authorities is compulsory in all cases, when crimes have been committed by farmworkers of Polish nationality, which are to sabotage the enterprise or slow down work, for instance unwillingness to work, impertinent behaviour; it is compulsory even in minor cases. An employer, who loses his Pole who must serve a longer prison sentence because of such a compulsory report, will receive another Pole from the competent labor office on request with preference.

15. In all other cases, only the state police is still competent.

For the employer himself, severe punishment is contemplated, if it is established that the necessary distance from farmworkers of Polish nationality has not been kept. The same applies to women and girls. Extra rations are strictly prohibited. Noncompliance of the Reich tariffs for farmworkers of Polish nationality will be punished by the competent labor office by the taking away of the worker. In any case of doubt, the State Peasants AssociationI B will give information.

Forwarding in writing of the above agreement to the farmworkers of Polish nationality is strictly prohibited. These regulations do not apply to Poles who are still prisoners of war and are thus subordinated to the armed forces. In this case, the regulations published by the armed forces apply.

Heil Hitler! By Order /s/ Dr. Klotz

“Document EC-126: Economic Policy Directives for Economic Organization, East, Agricultural Group [partial translation]”, pp. 295-298.

5/23/1941

Economic Staff East, Agricultural Group.

Prior to World War I, Russia was the country with the largest surplus of agricultural products in the world. Situated in the zone of extensive cultivation and extensive cattle production, Russia produced a yearly average during the years 1909-1913 for the world market of: approximately 11 million tons of grain, about 1/3 of the total amount of grain in world markets; 228000 tons of oil seeds; 660000 tons of oil cake; 266000 tons of sugar; 68000 tons of butter; and 218000 tons-5 billion eggs. Today, Russia exports only very small percentages thereof, i.e. annual grain export averaging approximately from 1 to not more than 2 million. At the same time, the territory cultivated in Russia, however, according to their statistics, has increased considerably. For example:

For Grain: From 1913: 94,4 Mill. ha To 1938: 102,4 Mill. ha Potatoes: From 1913: 3,1 Mill. ha To 1938: 7,4 Mill. ha Sugar beet: From 1913: 0,6 Mill. ha To 1938: 1,2 Mill. ha Sun flowers: From 1913: 1,0 Mill. ha To 1938: 3,1 Mill. ha (1928/32 even 4,2 Mill.) Linseed: From 1913: 0,4 Mill. ha To 1938: 0,4 Mill. ha Soya To 1938: 0,2 Mill. ha Fodder: From 1913: 2,0 Mill. ha To 1938: 9,1 Mill. ha Flax: From 1913: 1,0 Mill. ha To 1938: 1,9 Mill. ha Cotton: From 1913: 0,7 Mill. ha To 1938: 2,1 Mill. ha Hemp: From 1913: 0,6 Mill. ha To 1938: 0,9 Mill. ha (1928/32)

Accordingly, the crops have increased according to the Russian statistics.

Grain: 1909/13: 70,0 Mill.t. 1937: 120,3 Mill.t. 1938: 95,0 Mill.t. thereof: (1940: 112,0) Wheat: 1909/13: 20,6 1937: 46,9 Rye: 1909/13: 18,9 1937: 29,2 Oats: 1909/13: 13,4 1937: 21,9 Barley: 1909/13: 9,0 1937: 10,6 Maize: 1909/13: 1,3 1937: 4,8 (1933) Potatoes: 1909/13: 20,2 1937: 65,6 Sugar beet: 1909/13: 9,9 1937: 21,9 Flax: 1909/13: 0,5 1937: 0,6 1938: 0,6 Cotton: 1909/13: 0,23 1937: 0,82 Hemp: 1909/13: 0,33 1937: 0,27 1938: 0,84

The explanation for these figures is to be seen in the following:

i. The total population has increased from 140 million in 1914 to 170 and a half million in 1939. In particular, the city population has increased from approximately 10% to approximately 30% of the total population.

ii. The number of pigs has increased from 14.2 million in 1913 to 30.6 million in 1938, and with it the requirement for fodder.

iii. The number of sheep and goats has increased from 74 million in 1913 to 102.5 million in 1938.

It can be assumed that the present crops are not greater than in the pre-World War I period, despite an expansion of the cultivated areas … The grain surplus of Russia is decisively determined not by the size of the crop but by the level of domestic consumption. Even a small decrease of 30 kgms. per person of the population (220 kgms. instead of 250 kgms.) and a decrease of the ration for horses of 25 will create an export surplus equalling almost the amount prevailing in peace-time.

This fact is the key upon which our actions and our economic policy must be based.

a. Doubtless, war activities will decrease production in the beginning and possiblydepending upon the amount of destructionfor many years. An increase in production will require years.

b. Since Germany and Europe, respectively, require surplus under all circumstances, the consumption must be decreased correspondingly. The examples given above show the extent to which the amount of surplus can be increased by a limitation of consumption.

c. Such a decrease of consumption, contrary to the territories so far occupied, is feasible here because the principal food surplus area is clearly separated from the principal deficit area. Contrary to territory under the General Gouvernement, the Protectorate, France and Belgium, here no mixture of deficit and surplus areas such as would prevent a seizure due to black market, or direct contacts between producer and consumer.

The surplus territories are situated in the black soil district (that is, in the south and south-east) and in the Caucasus. The deficit areas are principally located in the forest zone of the north.

Therefore, an isolation of the black soil areas must in any case place greater or lesser surpluses in these regions at our disposal. The consequences will be cessation of supplies to the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

1. All industry in the deficit area, particularly the manufacturing industries in the Moscow and Petersburg regions as well as the Ural industrial region, will be abandoned. It may be assumed that these regions today absorb an annual 5-10 million tons from the food production zone.

2. The Trans-Caucasian oil district will have to be excepted, although it is a deficit area. This source of oil, cotton, manganese, copper, silk and tea must continue to be supplied with food in any case, for special political and economic reasons.

3. No further exceptions with a view to preserving one or the other industrial region or industrial enterprise must be permitted.

4. Industry can only be preserved insofar as it is located in the surplus region. This applies, apart from the above-mentioned oilfield regions in the Caucasus, particularly to the heavy industries in the Donets district (Ukraine). Only the future will show to what extent it will prove possible to maintain in full these industries, and in particular the Ukrainian manufacturing industries, after the withdrawal of the food surpluses required by Germany.

The following consequences result from this situation, which has received the approval of the highest authorities, since it is in accord with the political tendencies (preservation of the “small” Russians, preservation of the Caucasus, of the Baltic provinces, of White Russia to the prejudice of the Great Russians):

I. For the forest belt

a. Production in the forest belt (the food-deficit area) will become “naturalized,” similar to the events during the World War and the Communistic tendencies of the war, etc., viz: agriculture in that territory will begin to become a mere “home production.” The result will be that the planting of products destined for the market such as, in particular, flax and hemp, will be discontinued, and the area used therefor will be taken over for products for the producer (grain, potatoes, etc.) Moreover, discontinuance of fodder for that area will lead to the collapse of the dairy production and of pig-producing in that territory.

b. Germany is not interested in the maintenance of the productive power of these territories, except for supplying the troops stationed there. The population, as in the old days, will utilize arable land for growing its own food. It is useless to expect grain or other surpluses to be produced. Only after many years can these extensive regions be intensified to an extent that they might produce genuine surpluses. The population of these areas, in particular the urban population, will have to face most serious distress from famine. It will be necessary to divert the population into the Siberian spaces. Since rail transport is out of the question, this too, will be an extremely difficult problem.

c. In this situation, Germany will only draw substantial advantages by quick, non-recurrent seizure, i. e. it will be vitally necessary to make the entire flax harvest available for German needs, not only the fibers but also the oleaginous seed.

It will also be necessary to utilize for German purposes the livestock which has no fodder base of its own, i. e. it will be necessary to seize livestock holdings immediately, and to make them available to the troops not only for the moment, but in the long run, and also for exportation to Germany. Since fodder supplies will be cut off, pig and cattle holdings in these areas will of necessity drastically decline in the near future. If they are not seized by the Germans at an early date, they will be slaughtered by the population for its own use, without Germany getting anything out of it.

It has been demanded by the Führer that the reduction in the meat ration should be made good by the fall. This can only be achieved by the most drastic seizures of Russian livestock holdings, particularly in areas which are in a favorable transport situation in relation to Germany …

In respect of flax cultivation, too, the German economy will be interested in these territories. On the other hand, if at all possible, it must be attempted to treat these territories leniently, for political reasons: the conflict between White Russians and Lithuanians on one hand against Great Russians on the other. Only the future will show to what extent this is possible.

3. The problem of fisheries

The fisheries in the North constitute a special problem. Germany’s aim must be to seize the approximately 100 steam fishing vessels in Murmansk, Kola, etc., in order to utilize them for German benefit in fishing operations based on Norway … Thus, there is no question of a development of Russian fisheries, but what is needed is conquest of the Russian fishing fleet.

A destruction of the Russian manufacturing industries in the forest zone is also an indispensable necessity for Germany’s more remote peace-time future. Even in Tsarist Russia, the high prices of consumer goods were a device, in addition to taxes, for increasing the grain surpluses of the producing zone. Peasants in this zone were compelled to sell all their produce, except for a subsistence minimum, in order to pay their taxes and buy the consumer goods which they needed. In future, Southern Russia must turn its face towards Europe. Its food surpluses, however, will only be paid for if it purchases its industrial consumer goods from Germany, of Europe. Russian competition from the forest zone must therefore be abolished. It follows from all that has been said that the German administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take place, and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other important food crops giving a high yield. However, these measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people in this area will become redundant and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempt to save the population there from death by starvation by importing surpluses from the black soil zone would be at the expense of supplies to Europe. It would reduce Germany’s staying power in the war, an would undermine Germany’s and Europe’s power to resist the blockade. This must be clearly and absolutely understood. The manufacturing industries in Belgium and France are much more important for Germany and the German war effort than those in Russia. It is therefore much more essential to safeguard food supplies to those countries through surpluses from the East than to make an ambitious attempt to preserve Russian industry in the food-consuming zone. One must always bear in mind that the Great Russian people, whether under Tsarism or Bolshevism, is always an irreconcilable enemy not only of Germany, but also of Europe. From this it also follows that there can be no question of introducing marketing regulations or food rationing in these territories. Rationing would establish a claim against the German administration on the part of the population, and such a claim must be rejected beforehand.

For the rest, it can be pointed out that even given the best intentions on the part of the German administration to supply the forest zone with the surpluses of the South, such supplies would fail on account of transport conditions alone. The Russian rail network is weak in itself, and will be taxed to capacity by the tasks of supplying the Army and the necessity of exports to Europe.

II. For the black soil belt

2. The battle for increased production, and the seizure of surpluses, presupposes a retention of large-scale farming units (collective and Soviet farms)….In view of the Russians’ mentality an increase in production is only possible by decree from above…. A splitting-up into several millions of individual peasant holdings would make any German influence on production completely illusory. Every attempt to liquidate the large-scale-units must therefore be fought with the most drastic means.

I. Supplies for the Army

Germany’s food situation in the third year of war demands it imperatively that the Wehrmacht, in all its provisioning, must not live off Greater German territory or that of incorporated or friendly areas from which this territory receives imports. This minimum aim, the provisioning of the Wehrmacht from enemy territory in the third year, and if necessary in later years, must be attained at any price. This means that one-third of the Wehrmacht must be fully provisioned by French deliveries to the army of occupation. The remaining two-thirds (and even slightly more in view of the present size of the Wehrmacht) must without exception be provisioned from the Eastern space. This leads to the following particulars:

1. Bread Cereals. The requirements of the Wehrmacht as to bread cereals amount annually to about 1 and a half million tons. France supplies 470000 tons yearly in accordance with the Hague Convention for Land Warfare and the Armistice Treaty. France will have to continue to make such shipments also in the third year. The East will, in future, have to make available under all circumstances about 1 million tons. In furnishing bread cereals to the Wehrmacht, consideration must also be given to the problem of supply of foodstuffs and beer.

2. Oats. The requirements of the army amount to about 1.8 million tons. France and other occupied territories in the West ship approximately 600000 tons. Accordingly, 1.2 to 1.5 million tons would be the quota for the East.

3. Meats. The requirements of the Wehrmacht amount to about 600000 tons annually. France, with Holland and Denmark delivered up to now 200000 tons and will, in the third year of the war, ship 125000 tons at the most. Accordingly, there remain about 475000 tons of meats which the Eastern territories will have to supply, or figured in the exchange of value of grain, 2.4 million tons of grain.

4. Fats. The requirements of the army amount annually to about 100000 tons. France has been up to now unable to supply fats and will in the future also be unable to do so. The entire 100000 tons will have to be shipped by the Eastern territories.

5. Besides, the Eastern territories will have to supply the proportionate requirements of the Wehrmacht as to hay and straw respectively; furthermore, they will have to furnish the requirements as to fruit, vegetables, canned fish, sugar, prepared foodstuffs and legumes.

From this it follows that about 1 million tons of bread cereals, 1.2 million tons of fodder cereals, 2.4 million tons of grain for meat production, or a total of from 4 and a half million to 5 million tons of grain will have to be supplied from the Eastern territories for the requirements of the army, in addition to the shipments of hay, straw, fats, eggs, etc. It is to be noted that hereby the transport situation for exports to Germany from the East and for supplies from Germany will be considerably relieved.

These quantities have by all means to be furnished for the army in the Eastern territories. They will be increased by these amounts by which the French quotas might possibly be reduced.

It cannot be anticipated today what troop transfers will take place during the third.year of war (possibly also demobilization of a considerable number of soldiers). Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that a part of the army, such as for instance, the “Flak” (anti-aircraft batteries), the personnel in training, especially the youngest training age class, etc., will also in the future be permanently stationed in Germany. For all these reasons, the estimated size of the Wehrmacht in the East may be considerably reduced during the third year of war, which would lead to an increase in the number of consumers in Germany herself. Also, in this case, the quantities made available for the estimated 2/3 of the entire Wehrmacht will have to be supplied under any circumstances from the Eastern territories. Obviously the transport situation will hereby be considerably burdened.

II. Supplies for the German civilian population.

1. Only after meeting these requirements of the army which, under any circumstances, will have to be made available from the Eastern territories, can shipments to Germany to cover civilian needs begin. In this matter, any dissipation of energy on side issues must, under any circumstances, be abstained from. First and foremost is the transport to Germany of oil seedsparticularly of sunflower seeds, but also of flax seed, cotton seed, soya beansin order to increase the stocks of fats. For, from the fat stocks in the third year of war there will be a lack of about 150000 tons of oil which Japan and Manchukuo up to now shipped through Russia. Furthermore, the remaining oil seed reserves that are still on hand will be used up in the third year of the war economy. For these reasons, it will be necessary to procure from the East from 400000-500000 tons of oil which must be considered equivalent to about 1.5 million tons of oil seeds. This transport problem must under all circumstances be solved, and in doing so the fact that in the Eastern territories the oil seeds are being pressed to oil will not lead to an alleviation of the situation for the reason that greater Germany can likewise not do without the resulting oil cake. It will be a question of expediency as to whether oil seeds or oil and oil cake should be shipped. The final result must be the delivery of about 400000 ton of oil and 1 million tons of oil cake.

2. Only after the transport of these oil seeds is accomplished, may an export of grain be effected, which of course, is extremely desirable, because greater Germany must at an increasing rate supply the occupied territories and must also herself replenish her reserves after the bad harvest in 1940 and after this year’s harvest which, at best, must be expected to be an average one. In any case, the grain surpluses of the newly-annexed border territories and also of regions situated favorably in respect of transportation, must be exported to Germany in order to obtain soon the quantities which the Russians anyway would have supplied voluntarily. In any case, however, if transportation is not possible, all grain surpluses that exist in the Eastern territories above the quota for army requirements, must be secured so that these stocks can be transferred to Germany during the coming year.

3. As the shortening of rations in Germany has already now shown, the weakest point in the German food situation is the meat supply. The relief resulting from the fact that 2/3 of the army is procuring its meat from the Eastern territories, is not sufficient to make good in the fall the cut that was made in meat rations, because Germany’s fodder supply situation makes it absolutely necessary to reduce further the stocks of pigs. Therefore, it will be necessary to place quantities of meat, also, from the Eastern territories at the disposal of the Reich.

While, however, the supply to the army must come from all territories in the East (according to the troop contingents stationed in the individual territories), and while the export of oil seeds and grain will for the most part originate in the black soil zone, the procurement of meat for German purposes, even for the purposes of the current requirements of the Wehrmacht, must take place from the forest belt and, in that zone, especially from the White Russian region and the central industrial areas in the vicinity of Moscow.

One has to be entirely clear regarding the following situation: The stocks of cattle in the whole of Russia amount to about 63 million compared with 22 million in greater Germany, the stocks of pigs amount to 30 million compared with 24 million in Germany at the present time. The cattle stocks are more concentrated in the natural pasture-lands; these are the regions north of Moscow, excluding the Baltic provinces, up to Siberia and the Steppe regions in the south-east. The pork larders are situated in the north-west wooded regions as far as Moscow. These territories in the future will, in any case, have to reduce their stocks of cattle very considerably, especially their pig inventories, on account of the interruption in grain deliveries from the black soil zone. In such a situation, the danger exists that if our authorities do not seize the stocks of cattle immediately, in order to supply the army on the one hand and the homeland on the other, the livestock might be slaughtered within a very short time for the purposes of the local population and would therefore no longer be available for German purposes.

What matters, therefore, is not only to prepare making available stocks of cattle for 1 year for 2/3 of the Wehrmacht and to ship to the Baltic Sea ports livestock, especially from the north-west and the central regions, in order to utilize it for German civilian requirements by way of the border slaughter house in the North of Germany, but the decisive point is to assure, as far as possible, meat stocks for the future as well. The problem of preserving meat therefore will be of utmost importance, especially in the northern regions. Everything in tin-plate that is obtainable or can be made in Russia must, therefore, be withdrawn from all other canning purposes and serve in the manufacture of canned meat, which can be stored over a longer period of time only in tin-plate cans. Possible exceptions to this rule, perhaps in the case of canned fish, will only be ordered later as far as it should be necessary. Another important point is to use as well all other methods of preserving food (pickling, freezing and smoking of food). It is necessary for this important purpose to make use of all meat packing houses that are located in these regions. The importance and urgency of this task will have to be pointed out again and again. The interruption in the fodder supply will make it impossible to get hold of the cattle later on.

IV. Collection: The solution of these problems requires, apart from the maintenance of production in the surplus area, a smooth functioning of collection. For this reason alone the collective farming structure must not be touched, since collection is the easier the bigger each individual farming unit. In conducting collection in the reconstruction areas, i.e. in the surplus-producing districts, the food supplies of the producing peasants and farm laborers will have to be considered, in order to insure maintenance and increase of production in future years. Such considerations will not always be possible, or necessary, in the food consuming areas of the forest zone, except for the special treatment to be accorded the Baltic and, if possible, the White Russian territories. Apart from collecting provisions and supplies for the Wehrmacht, the important thing in the food-consuming areas will be to seize the largest possible portion of the oil seed harvest and to collect the largest possible quantities of grain in order to insure export to Germany. The seizure of livestock which will be needed has already been discussed. In order to obtain barter goods for the peasants in the surplus producing zone, sugar crops will be seized without exception. The same goes for tobacco, alcohol, hides, leather, and fiber crops for the manufacture of textiles, as well as for industrial consumer goods, such as coal, kerosene, etc.

In conclusion, the principles must be pointed out once more: under the Bolshevik system Russia has, purely out of power motives, withdrawn from Europe and thus upset the European equilibrium based on division of labor. Our task is to re-integrate Russia with the European division of labor, and it involves, of necessity, the destruction of the existing economic equilibrium within the Soviet Union. Thus, it is not important, under any circumstances, to preserve what has existed, but what matters is a deliberate turning away from the existing situation and introducing Russian food resources into the European framework. This will inevitably result in an extinction of industry as well as of a large part of the people in what so far have been the food-deficit areas.

It is impossible to state an alternate in sufficiently hard and severe terms.

Our problem is not to replace intensive food production in Europe through the incorporation of new space in the East, but to replace imports from overseas by imports from the East. The task is two-fold:

1. We must use the Eastern spaces for overcoming the food shortage during and after the war. This means that we must not be afraid of drawing upon the capital substance of the East.

Such an intervention is much more acceptable from the European standpoint than drawing upon the capital substance of Europe’s agriculture.

2. For the future new order the food-producing areas in the East must be turned into a permanent and substantial complementary source of food for Europe, through intensified cultivation and resulting higher yields.

The first-named task must be accomplished at any price, even through the most ruthless cutting down of Russian domestic consumption, which will require discrimination between the consuming and producing zones.

The second task, however, presupposes adequate feeding of the working people, since no production increase is possible without adequate feeding of the men who have to accomplish it.

“Document EC-128: Report On The State Of Work Of Preparation For War-Economic Mobilization As Of 9/30/1934 [partial translation]”, pp. 306-308.

Berlin, 9/30/1934

The Reichs economic ministry has been charged with the economic preparation for war, a task considered important in view of lessons of the first World War.

The situation is so much worse now, that the loss of important areas in the East and West has to be reckoned with.

The economic ministry is charged with all industry except actual armaments, for whom the raw materials and half-products are supplied however. Close liaison is being maintained with all other economic agencies.

The work can be divided into two parts. The theoretical part includes the legal and organizational preparation, such as laws, directives. Practical preparation includes building up of stockpiles, new construction of facilities to produce scarce goods, redeployment of industry to secure areas and influence over fiscal and trade policies.

Preparations had to be made for two contingencies, the sudden outbreak of war in the immediate future and a future goal of active mobilization. The first goal was to be reached with mostly negative measures (restrictions) the second one needs active measures and directive.

The task of stockpiling is being hampered by the lack of foreign currency. The need for secrecy and camouflage also is a retarding influence.

The organization consists of 5, later 6 committees under presidium of the respective economic ministry officials and keeps in close touch with the armed forces, the ministry of food and agriculture, and ministry of work and the communications ministry. Later this was more centralized under “Committee for defense against economic war measures.” The six committees are:

1. Hauptausschuss: General direction of work and organizational basis.

2. Rohstoffausschuss: Supply of raw materials except coal and motor fuel.

3. Kraftausschuss: Coal, gas, electricity, motor fuels, power.

4. Fertigwarenausschuss: Finished products with exception of armaments, price regulations, manpower.

5. Technischer Ausschuss: Technical questions, machines, and standardization.

6. Aussenhandelsausschuss: War economic organization of foreign trade.

The current tasks

The Hauptausschuss coordinates and synchronizes the activities of all economic agencies, keeping liaison with the armed forces. It has obtained action on urgent measures in cases of international crisis.

The Rohstoffausschuss conducted a survey on needs and sources of supply of raw material, the amounts needed by each branch of economy and of commercial stockpiles. Action was initiated to remedy shortages and to redeploy industry towards the center of Germany.

The main work of the Kraftausschuss was the supply of motor fuels. Measures such as storing up reserves and encouragement of synthetic production were taken. Under the assumption that the coal areas in East and West would be lost, stocks of coal were placed in the center of Germany. Cross connection between electric power systems was prepared.

The work of the Fertigwarenausschuss was hampered by the fact that no statistics existed on the demand. An extension survey was therefore conducted, establishing the production, manpower used, materials unused, reserves of industry as well as the demands of public agencies (armed forces, R.R., mail service etc.) and incorporated into a card index system. This survey is to be repeated 2 years. Measures were initiated to increase production in central Germany. A rationing system was prepared for the case of war as well as a price central organization.

The work of the Technische Ausschuss was limited by the fact that technical problems are much more abundant in the production of war material, which comes under the War ministry, than in civilian production. Therefore the problem was to organize civilian supply under the consideration that most plants would be working for the armed forces. Influence was exerted towards the standardization of consumers goods, especially with the large organizations, such as public utilities and R.R. The conversion to bituminous coal was also prepared. The legal preparations included drafts of laws for the seizure and redistribution of means of production on the export and import of machine tools.

The work of the Aussenhandelsausschuss was started last, as it required statistics from the work of the other committees as basis. It made proposals for the organization of foreign trade in wartime, export and import central statistics on import-export and a survey on the physical equipment for foreign trade (harbours etc.) Studies of the possibilities of barter trade with supposedly neutral countries in case of war.

Fiscal and Monetary Preparations

Measures were prepared to increase the amount of money in circulation in wartime while keeping the currency stable at the same time. (RKK)

Basic Principles of the Proposed Plan

The aim of the directives proposed is the establishment of strict economy. The uncertainty of conditions under which a future war may be fought, together with the lack of raw materials and foreign currency requires that right now. Therefore strict control of all economic activity is required, with special attention paid to the use of scarce materials (rationing, priority system).

Part B Directives and Laws Proposed

1. Establishment of 14 economic supervisory boards to control production [Bezirkswirtschaftsaemter] in designated areas.

2. Establishment of control boards for 17 branches of production (strategic).

3. Law covering procedure on orders for the armed forces.

4. Law on rationing of civilian consumption.

5. Law on the protection (licensing) of trade.

6. Law on the establishment of a commissariat of foreign trade.

7. Prohibition of export of goods important in wartime.

8. Directive on facilitation of certain imports. (Strategic materials duty free.)

9. Directive on the prohibition of unnecessary goods.

10. Directive on the establishment of foreign trade companies for 7 specified branches of economy.

11. Law on the establishment of the RKK and its functions.

12. Law changing certain parts of banking laws. (Redemption of loans, notes by the Reichsbank.)

13. Directives on the distribution of coal.

14. Directives on the distribution of minerals and soils.

15. Directive on the distribution of steel and iron.

16. Directive on the distribution of non-ferrous metals.

17. Directive on the seizure and use of means of production.

18. Directive on the distribution of chemical products.

19. Directive on the distribution of animal and vegetable oils for technical use.

20. Directive on the distribution of wool.

21. Directive on the distribution of cotton.

22. Directive on the distribution of cellulose fibers.

23. Directive on the distribution of synthetic textiles.

24. Directive on the distribution of paper.

25. Directive on the distribution of leather.

26. Directive on the distribution of rubber and asbestos.

“Document EC-174: Report On The State Of Work Of Preparation For War-Economic Mobilization As Of 9/30/1934 [translation]”, pp. 326-327.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-174

Summary”War Economy” trip to Godesberg undertaken by General Staff between 25 May and 2 June. (W.W. 23-1).

Welcome to General Staff’s “War Economy Trip” to Godesberg in 1937. Contrary to the first trip last year which was limited to very few men, the following individuals will participate this year; members of war economy organization, representatives of the three branches of the Armed Forces, a considerable number of men representing the Plenipotentiary General and several men who join us in these measures for rearmament. Particularly welcome is President Schacht who promised to be present during the final conference on Saturday.

Previous trips of this nature were concerned mainly with visiting industrial organizations and making the acquaintance of their leading men. Last year’s trip already went one step further as mobilization of organizations was discussed, as well as, in one instance, the solution of the difficult worker problem.

During fall of the past year a first experiment was made in starting on a small scale a war game in war economy. We gained considerable experience which was applied this year. This year’s trip has two main aims; first, examination of cooperation within war economy organizations, coordination of the war economy staff with the branches of the Armed Forces, and the cooperation between the war economy staff and the GB under presumed conditions of war; second, inner organizational mobilization.

I talked with many soldiers and industrialists regarding the nature and execution of these trips, but most of them did not understand them.

We, too, do not know much about this kind of war game in war economy. We also consider it a dangerous experiment, but hope to be able to utilize, on a large scale, what we learn from it.

The circle participating in this war game is considerably larger and therefore prevented us from basing it on a situation exposing the actual German plan of operations. We had to construct a situation which provided a reasonable and practical foundation for one game on one hand but which, on the other hand, is constructed in a manner that the purpose of the game is completely fulfilled in regard to business. Please do not examine the game too critically regarding tactical and strategic moves, but remember that the main purpose of this trip is a possible solution of war economic problems.

I want to point out, however, that all material and all information received has to be kept in strict secrecy.

A second point. The first round of a war game cannot solve all problems, it can only bring it closer to their solution. Therefore, I shall not discuss basic problems and situations, but I shall take note of originating differences in order to have them clarified in Berlin later on. We based the situationespecially regarding Redregarding organization on several assumptions which do correspond with the real German situation and which need further examination before they can be suggested for acceptance by the Armed Forces. I, therefore, ask you not to discuss these questions as, I repeat, we all want to gain experience from this kind of war game and want to become acquainted with the advantages and disadvantages of one or the other organization. It is possible to get acquainted only if one plays with them with the help of a practical example. The main purpose of the war game consists in pointing out to those present here how the actions of the soldiers in total war is influenced by economy and how on the other hand, economy is completely dependent on military operations. During war time there is no polarity: Armed Forces here, Economy there! It is important that they cooperate and we are attempting to find a successful method to effect this.

As the time provided for this war game is very limited we can only indicate arising questions and discuss in detail only very few subjects. Therefore, please limit your discussions. I shall only direct parts of the game; Lt. Col. Huenerman and Major Beutler will take over the lead of the remaining part of the game. I am doing this in order to keep at a certain distance from these things. I have to do this in order to gain and retain the full perspective and method of the game and to make future conclusions from gained experience.

Hopes to become better acquainted with everybody.

Part I of Speech welcoming Dr. Schacht.

Before I start with the discussion of the war game in war economy, I have to express how grateful we all are that you, President Dr. Schacht, have gone to the trouble to personally participate in our final discussion today despite all your other activities. This proves to us your deep interest in war economy tasks shown at all times and your presence here is renewed proof that you are willing to facilitate for us soldiers the difficult war-economic preparations and to strengthen the harmonious cooperation with your offices.

“Document EC-177: Protocol Of the 2nd Session of the Working Committee of the Delegates for Reich Defense [translation]”, pp. 328-329.

TOP SECRET

The Reichswehr Minister Berlin, 5/22/1933

T. A. Nr. 421/3 g. Kdos. T 2 III A: 40 Copies 10th Copy.

Time: 4/26/1933 Start: 1000 hours End: 1230 hours

Place: Large Conference Room in Reichswehr Ministry

Participants: Reich Ministry:

Dept. of the Field Army Chief Lt. Gen Adam [Truppenamt]:

T 2 Chief Col. Keitel Capt. Schmundt Capt. Prueter

T 2 Administration Min. Rat. Dr. Weber

T 1 IV Major Gercke (ret)

Dept. of Air Raid Protection: Capt. Speidel

Dept. of the Res. Tng. and Repl. Army (Wehrmacht): Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Winzer In 6 Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Guderian In 7 Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Fellgiebel

Ordnance Dept. [Waffenamt] Lt. Col. Stud Wa Wi. Major Warlimont

Administrative Dept.: [V3] Min Rat. Reich Ministry Office: W. Col. von Vietinghoff Capt. Tschache Security Capt. Wahle

Delegates for Reich Defense from the Reich Ministries: Foreign Office: Legation Secretary von Buelow Interior: Om. Reg. Rat. Erbe Finance: Gen. Finanzrat Wapenhensch Economics: Min. Rat. Godlewski Reg. Rat Dr. Barth Labor: Min. Rat Sieler Postal: Min. Rat Delvendahl Traffic: Min. Rat Koffka Justice: Min. Rat Koffka Food and Agriculture: Amtsgerichtsrat Bretschneidner Air: Capt. Belle (ret) Prussian Ministry of the Interior: Ob. Reg. Rat Diels

Lt. Gen. Adam: Welcoming of the delegates especially of the representative of the Air Ministry present for the first time.

Information about the decision of the Reich Cabinet of the 4/4/1933 to form a “Reich Defense Council”.

Reference to:

a. Change of the responsibility for the defense of the Reich.

b. The decision to make the activities of the delegates a full-time job, and the necessity for this measure order to master the important and extensive tasks.

With a wish for trustful cooperation in the working committee of the RVR (Reich Defense Council) transfer of the presidency to Col. Keitel (Chief T 2).

Col. Keitel: After welcoming takes up business of the day.

Item 1 Thoughts about a Reich Defense Council

All great European powers which are at freedom to arm, have a RVR. One does not have to refer to history to prove the necessity of this institution. The war has shown conclusively that the cooperation with the various ministries has not been close enough. The consequences did not fail to materialize. The soldier is not in a position to have a say in all matters. The disadvantages of the past system were caused by parallel efforts of the various ministries in matters of the Reich defense. To avoid these mistakes a central agency has been created which occupies itself already in peacetime in the widest sense with the problems of Reich Defense. This working staff will continue its existence in time of war.

In accordance with the cabinet decision of 4/4/1933 the Reich Defense Council, which until now had been prepared for war emergency, will go into immediate action.

In time of peace its task will be to decide about all measures for the preparation of the defense of the Reich, while surveying and utilizing all powers and means of the nation. To this effect a law placing every German and his personal property at the war service of the nation (Kriegsleistungsgesetz) is being prepared which will be submitted to the committee after its completion.

Composition of the Reich Defense Council:

President: Reichs Chancellor Deputy: Reichswehr Minister

Permanent Members: Minister of the: Reichswehr Foreign Affairs Interior Finance Economic Affairs Public Enlightenment and Propaganda Air Chief of the Army Command Staff Chief of the Navy Command Staff

Depending on the case: The remaining minister, other personalities, e.g., leading industrialists, etc.

In order to regulate the work it is necessary to determine who will do the drafting of the various tasks and in what manner. The Reich ministries will receive instructions in this regard from the Reichswehr Minister.

Item 2 Full-time Employment of the Delegates

Whether the full-time employment of delegates for the Reich Defense Council necessitates changes of personnel within the permanent committee will have to be decided by the ministries concerned. It is requested to settle this matter with the various ministries and to inform the Reichswehrminister which full-time delegate is slated for the working committee.

Ob. Reg. Rat Erbe (Interior): The solution of this question is rendered more difficult by the fact that each of the delegates has already a large field of work, to which he is deeply attached and which he will part with unwillingly.

Ob. Reg. Rat Diehls (Prussian Ministry of the Interior): Is of the same opinion. He himself is in addition, in charge of the Secret State Police. Remedy: Full time assistants.

Min Rat Godlewski (Economics): Recommends the solution of the Reich Ministry of Economics: The delegate keeps his own field of work with addition of the Reich Defense tasks, which are handled by a special official (at present Rat Dr. Barth) exclusively and as a full time job. This way a higher official retains the direction, without being overburdened with the work.

Lt. Gen. Adam: Agrees with the opinion of Min. Rat Godlewski and proposes a similar solution for the other Reich Ministries.

Amtsgerichtsrat Bretschneider (Food and Agriculture): Does not believe that the Ministry of Food and Agriculture will be able to send a special delegate in view of the general overload with work.

Col. Keitel: The amount of work of the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture will not decrease. Food supply, however, is of the utmost importance in case of mobilization, so that an intensive cooperation on the part of this ministry is absolutely essential.

Min. Rat Schmidt (Traffic): At the Traffic Ministry hardly any higher officials can be made available for this full time task. A good deal of the work in the realm of the Reich Defense could be done by the H.T.K.

Lt. Gen. Adam: The tasks will be distributed and it is a matter of the various ministries to take care of same. Best solution: Higher official with full time assistants.

Col. Keitel: Points out once more the urgency of the tasks, since it had been possible to do only very little in this connection during the last years. He asks the delegates to consider the Reich Defense at all times and represent it accordingly at the drafting of new laws. Experiences of the wars are available and are at the disposal of the various ministries: (e.g. Reich Archives, Memorandum of an administrative official about gasoline supply). All these sources must be taken advantage of for the future. The task of the full time delegates is also to bring about a close cooperation of the ministries with each other.

Min Rat Schmidt (Traffic): Requests a complete roster of the committee members.

Col. Keitel: Agrees to that, as soon as the ministries have named their full-time delegates.

Item 3 Nature of Work Plans

In the work plans the questions and ideas are laid down, which have come up in the Reichswehr Ministry and must be considered in case of mobilization. Up to the present time the support on the part of other ministries was frequently based only on personal helpfulness since any authority from above was lacking. The following work plans are finished:

a. Work Plan for the Reichs Ministry of Economics Work Plan for the Reichs Ministry of Food and Agriculture Work Plan for the Reichs Ministry of Labor

These three are composed in one work plan for the preparation of a war economy.

b. Work Plan for the Reich Postal Ministry

c. Work Plan for the Reich Traffic Ministry

Request the plans to be worked through carefully by the competent ministries. The plans will be discussed beginning of June, when proposals for improvements may be made. The other ministries which have no work plans yet will receive them later on. The office of air raid protection, will work out a work plan in conjunction with the Reich Commissariat for aviation.

Min. Rat Godlewski (Ministry of Economics): 1. In case a completed plan for mobilization is to be created a preparation of requisition orders for the supply of raw materials, creating of war industries and getting in touch with personalities to be charged with these tasks in case of war, is necessary. All this means years of work.

2. What about the financial aspects of this work? Naturally, large sums will be required for it, with which the ministry concerned will be debited. To what extent can this be carried out in practice and to what extent will it remain only paper work once more?

Col. Keitel: Certainly, the working out of these plans requires a long time. The Reichswehr Ministry has worked for years on the principles of Reich Defense, too. The organization of a war economy always requires plenty of money and time. It is just the reason for and the purpose of the working committee of the Reich Defense Council to overcome these difficulties. Proposals and inquiries of the various Reich ministries must be made the subjects of sessions of the Reich Defense Council (Cabinet) by the working committee. It is to be decided there, which tasks have priorities over others and for which purposes means have to be available. Nevertheless, the financing of the various proposals remains a matter of the ministry concerned. The direct influence of the Reich Chancellor on these tasks represents, however, a great progress compared with past times. The various ministries have to submit yearly budget proposals, which are to be approved separately.

Min. Rat Delvendahl (Postal Ministry): Sees an acceleration of the tasks in a direct cooperation with the Wehrmacht experts. Which is the competent agency for that in the Reichswehr Ministry ?

Col. Keitel: The Army Organization Department is competent only for the great guiding principles. Technical matters are to be settled with the special offices of the Reichswehr Ministry. Inquiries regarding the specialists are to be addressed to the secretary of the Reich Defense Council, Capt. Schmundt.

Min. Rat Delvendahl (Postal Ministry): Who is competent in questions of general nature?

Col. Keitel: Can be decided only from case to case.

Item 4 Secretary and Secrecy

Question has been brought up by the Reich Ministries.

The secrecy of all Reich defense work has to be maintained very carefully. Communications with the outside by messenger service only, has been settled already with the Post Office, Finance Ministry, Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the Reichswehr Ministry. Main Principle of security: No document must be lost since otherwise, the enemy propaganda would make use of it. Matters communicated orally cannot be proven, they can be denied by us in Geneva. Therefore, the Reichswehrministry has worked out security directives for the Reich Ministries and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior.

Reading of the Security directives (Rn. M.T.A. Nr. 285/33 g.K. T 2 III A dated 4/19/1933), by Capt Schmundt.

Col. Keitel: Under no circumstances communications by mail.

Min. Rat. Delvendahl (Postal Ministry): Secret but urgent letters can be mailed in locked leather cases wrapped in special envelope. He asks for a moderation of the dispatching directives.

Col. Keitel: The main thing is that the mail in the various ministries is opened by the addressee himself and not by the main office or another agency. It is of utmost importance that ways and means are provided to guarantee an absolutely safe transportation.

Min. Rat. Koffka (Ministry of Justice): It is most dangerous to mark the outside of the letters “Secret”. Incidentally, up to the present time there is no real protection furnished in the Ministry of Justice. Only one steel safe is available.

Col. Keitel: The need for steel safes grows only slowly. The Reichwehr Ministry has spent a lot of money to obtain a sufficient number of steel safes for itself and the branch offices. Steel safes remain, nevertheless, an urgent requirement. Letters are to be addressed to the recipient personally.

Gen Finanzrat Wapenhensch (Finance Ministry): If letters pertaining to Reich Defense can be written in such a way that in case of their loss their contents cannot be recognized as mobilization measures by enemy news services, express matters must be dispatched by mail.

Col. Keitel: The purpose of the directive is not to represent clear unequivocal instructions for all cases, but to point out inherent dangers in case of leakage. Have to be decided separately in every case. Proposals about this matter in June. The purpose, not the form decides.

Item 5 Leaves of absence resp. releases from duty for the purpose of participation in training measures outside the Wehrmacht.

Notices pertaining to this subject have been sent to Ministries already. Reich Cabinet has decided to grant leaves of absence to officials in the services of the Reich, etc., without deducting that time from their recreational leaves. The Reich authorities in the Reich will be informed by the Wehrkreigkommandos. I request the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to state whether this measure is to be in effect in its sphere, as well.

Ob. Reg. Rat Diels (Pr. Min. of the Int.): Agrees for Prussia.

Min. Rat Schmidt (Traffic): For the RR officials etc. this will be settled by the H.T.K. The authorities will be informed orally, but how is one to go about with the instruction of the laborers. 27000 workmen at the administration of waterways construction alone? Does that not invite abuses? What about secrecy in that case?

Col. Keitel: Only the authorities are to be informed. The men will be advised by the Wehrmacht agencies themselves. The men volunteer since they are mostly in reserve units. During the training

b. Regulation of leaves of absence

will be explained. Unfortunately, the announcement of a leave schedule is not possible. The Ministries need not worry about the orientation of the men. What matters is that the superiors authorized to grant leaves are informed accordingly in advance.

Item 6 Storage of Weapons

a. Renting of state owned lands (e.g. State Forestry areas) must be accomplished without cost.

b. The Finance Ministry has set up a “re-enforced border control service”. The value of this organization lies in the distribution of personnel among the customs sectors equal to border protection sectors. Exchange of personnel rosters between the customs etc., authorities and the Wehrkreise is in effect already The peace-time maneuvers of the re-enforced border control service are of great importance.

c. Storage of weapons near the location where they will be needed. Unfortunately weapon stores are not always secret any more (Czech newspaper). Secrecy must be maintained to a much greater extent, appeal to the assembled gentlemen.

d. Request to the postal authorities: Protection of Reich mail service to be prepared for the event of mobilization (at present available only in case of domestic disorders). The border protection maneuvers in Breslau have disclosed many deficiencies in communications in case of a Polish invasion of Upper Silesia. Police is not to be made available for such purposes. What has been the mission of the Landsturm in days past will have to be carried out by organizations created by the Reich Ministries themselves.

e. Consideration of the interests of Reich Defense when drafting new laws. (Examples: Construction Industry, electrification of railways). Cooperation by the Ministries is requested. Considerations of thrift alone must not be the determining factor. The interests of Reich Defense must not be forgotten for one moment.

Min. Rat Delvendahl (Postal Ministry): Asks for the text of the cabinet resolution with regard to the Reich Defense Council.

Capt. Tschache (Ministry Office): Reads it.

Col. Keitel: Promises each of the ministries a copy of the decree of the cabinet resolution. A discussion of the work plans in separate sessions is planned for the beginning of June.

Ob. Reg. Diels (Prussian Min. of Int.): Asks the council to deal directly with the Gestapo Department with regard to Reich Defense problems, since furnishes the best guarantee for the secrecy of the problems and tasks and because that office is anyway the competent agency in the Pr. Min. of the Int. to deal with the district registration offices, Control agencies, border protection, etc.

Distribution: [See list of participants in the first part of the document.]

“Document EC-243: Jurisdiction re Development of Raw and Synthetic Materials [translation]”, pp. 338-339.

Berlin, 11/26/1936.

Ministerpraesident General Göring Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year-Plan St.M.Dev.1007.

[] 1. According to No.V of my decree of 10/22/1936St.M. Dev.265the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials will handle the following tasks:

a. Increase in production of German industrial raw material,

b. Planning and execution of production of German synthetic materials with the exception of industrial fats,

c. Promotion of research required in connection with the tasks mentioned,

d. Mineral oil industry, including control of imported materials as well as materials produced outside of the Four-Year-Plan.

Under No.XI paragraph 2 of the same decree, I made clear that only the head of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials will carry the responsibility for carrying out the raw and synthetic materials program within the limits of the means at hand and also of the available materials and manpower. An exception will be the department for industrial fats, which according to my order is under the supervision of engineer Keppler.

On the other hand I have decided under No.I paragraph 2 of the above mentioned decree that the work must be done in fullest cooperation with the proper offices, whose responsibility remains unlimited within their field of work.

For the competency of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials on one hand and of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the subordinate offices on the other hand as also for the cooperation between the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, the following procedure will apply:

2. The mineral-oil industry (under d above) will be controlled by the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials. It includes in its field of work the following:

a. Promotion of increased industrial production;

b. Control of the existing fuel-production plants;

c. Increase in oil production;

d. Regulation and supervision of fuel storage;

e. Safeguarding of the supply of the Armed Forces and industry;

f. Regulation of the fuel market;

g. Promotion of import.

To carry through these tasks, the powers in the field of the mineral oil industry, which had been delegated to the Reich Minister of Economics by a decree of 9/4/1934 (RGBl I, p.816) concerning commodity exchange in particular the supervision over the control agency for mineral oilare transferred to the Head of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials. Orders of the Reich Office for Foreign Exchange Control will also be issued to this control agency with the approval of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials only, in accordance with and pursuant to section 2, paragraph 2 and section 3, sentence 2, of the law on Foreign Exchange Control of 2/4/1935 (RGBl I p. 106).

The bureaus “Distribution of Raw Material” and “Foreign Exchange” [Devisen] of the Four-Year-Plan shall participate in the work of the mineral oil industry to such an extent as their purposes should warrant.

The Institute for Scientific Research [Wifo] will be subordinate to the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials insofar as this Institute carries out construction of fuel tank storage plants.

The field of work of the bureau of the fuel industry is so closely related to that of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, that the supervision must be exercised by the latter. Insofar as it remains a part of the general organization of economics, instructions on general policy will be issued by the Reich Ministry of Economics. In order to maintain this connection, it is necessary that these instructions shall always be given in agreement with the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials.

1. The task of planning and carrying out of production of German synthetic materials (above under b) concerns the production of materials, which will replace raw materials, which up to the present have not been produced in Germany at all or have only been produced in insufficient quantities. The duty of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials is the development of suitable and adequate production branches, which must be set up within the framework of the Four-Year-Plan. The development of the production in question includes the guarantee for the financing of plants.

The Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials shall regulate in close cooperation with the bureau “Distribution of Raw Material” of the Four-Year-Plan the systematic allocation of synthetic materials from their production to their further processing, and the use of those materials wherever the production is sufficient and the materials can be used as a substitute for raw materials.

In organizing, financing and executing the production of German synthetic materials as well as in allocating these for further processing, the above mentioned offices will be held responsible for the prompt, complete, and expert accomplishment of the tasks to be solved within the framework of the Four-Year-Plan.

2. Adequate participation of the Reich Ministry of Economics will be necessary in order to protect the natural relationships with the whole system of economics and therefore with the general economic policy. This will occur in the setting up of the new branches of production, especially when experts of the Reich Ministry of Economics will be consulted, who will thus be given the opportunity to judge the plans submitted by my offices and their execution from a professional and over-all-economic point of view. Financially the cooperation of the Reich Ministry of Economicsregardless of the participation of the Reich Ministry of Financewill exist insofar as agreements about market guaranteesexcept in the field of mineral oil industryare concluded by the Reich Minister of Economics, and this in addition to the current cooperation of an expert competent in the field. The participation of the Reich Minister of Economics in the allocation of synthetic materials to further processing takes place through the control agencies as in the case of other raw material control.

It is self evident that, in view of the tasks which are handled by the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, research (compare above under c) shall be brought to the closest attention of the executive office. A technical surveying office has been established which will accumulate practical knowledge in the relevant fields of work, and which will also be at the service of other departments. In view of this it seems unnecessary to maintain any longer with the Reich Ministry of Economics the present office of a Commissioner for Raw Materials. I request, therefore, that this agency be dissolved.

[] The increase in production of German industrial raw materials within the framework of the Four-Year-Plan (compare above under a) will be mostly concerned with increased production of the mining of metallic raw materials. The planning and determination of objectives as well as the control over the execution of the tasks which must be accomplished within the framework of the Four-Year-Plan, are the responsibility of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials which supersedes the authorities which have heretofore been in charge of these tasks. This does by no means exclude the further participation of these authorities. On the contrary, the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials will call on them as much as possible to insure a smooth and efficient execution and a complete and expert control of the work. Close cooperation must be maintained with the Department of Mining of the Reich Ministry of Economics for which the directives under III No.2 will apply. Under the jurisdiction of the Department of Mining will remain specifically the policing of mines and the general economic-political management of existing and newly constructed plants, as has been the practice and as it is specified by law. The Department of Mining will maintain close connections with the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials insofar as their activities will affect the work of the latter office. The above mentioned instructions re financing will also apply to these activities of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials.

In its work the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials will have to keep in direct contact with the expert of your organization. If, in the course of business negotiations, differences of opinion should occur between my office and those offices subordinate to you, they will be cleared in concurrence with your Ministry.

signed Göring

To The Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics.

“Document EC-244 [translation]”, p. 342.

Berlin W.35 2/22/1937

The Reichwehrminister and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. WFStG.O. Nr. 599/37 g.K.IaF

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

The plenipotentiary for war economy is to be considered under your instructions as laid down in the Reich Defense Law of 5/21/1935 a Supreme Government Authority. You have appointed Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht as head of that organization.

The President Dr. Schacht has notified me that he is not acting in his capacity as plenipotentiary for the time being since in his opinion there is existing a conflict between the powers conferred upon him and those of Col. General Göring. Because of this the preparatory mobilization steps in the economic field are delayed.

For purposes of clarification may I point out that in my opinion there is no overlapping in the realm of economic mobilization between the work of Col. General Göring as head of the Four Year Plan and that of the plenipotentiary for war economy.

The Four Year Plan has as its object, with regard to economic rearmament, to clear all bottlenecks within this program now, i.e. in time of peace. Especially the proposals to secure Germany’s own needs for ore, fuel and rubber are of greatest significance from the point of view of a war economy.

The plenipotentiary on the other hand is entrusted with the task of preparing the existing economic forces of Germany for the event of war and to exploit these forces in the most useful way for the people and the army, should war break out. It is a matter of course that the two organizations should keep each other informed about all transactions made by either one of them. Since, moreover, the basic directives for the preparation of economic mobilization originate with my office, any controversy between the plenipotentiary and the head of the Four Year Plan can easily be avoided.

If you, my Führer, agree with my view regarding these jurisdictional questions, it may be possible to induce Reichsank President Dr. Schacht, whose co-operation as plenipotentiary for preparation of war is of great significance, to resume his former activity.

Signed: von Blomberg

q.t.l. [signature illegible]

“Document EC-252 [partial translation]”, p. 346.

7/8/1937

[Letter from Schacht to v. Blomberg]

After referring to the economic war measures of Godesburg [wirtschaftliche Kriegsspiel], Schacht emphasizes that he cannot conceive any conduct of war without complete cooperation between Blomberg and himself. He states:]

The direction of the war economy by the plenipotentiary would in that event never take place entirely independently from the rest of the war mechanism but would be aimed at accomplishment of the political war purpose with the assistance of all economic forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to the Defense Act [Reichaverteidigungsgesetz].

“Document EC-257 [partial translation]”, p. 347.

[Personal letter dated 12/29/1937 from Schacht to Thomas.]

I think back with much satisfaction to the work in the-Ministry of Economics which afforded me the opportunity to assist in the rearmament of the German people in the most critical period, not only in the financial but also in the economic sphere. I have always considered a rearmament of the German people as conditio sine qua non of the establishment of a new German nation.

I particularly enjoyed the cooperation with your staff and particularly with you personally. In the past four years I have met with all kinds of opportunism and only rarely met with true and sincere friendship. I have no regrets in forgetting about opportunists with the resignation from the Ministry of Economics but the friends have remained. I thank you that you have accorded me such unreserved assistance in our mutual work and ask you to convey this message to your assistant.

“Document EC-258: The Preparation Of The Economic Mobilization By The Plenipotentiary For War Economy Status At The End Of 12/1937 [translation]”, pp. 347-349.

CONTENTS

I. The task.

In warIn peace.

II. The organization.

The leading staff as superministerial agency. The GB offices as ministerial level. Central offices under the ministerial level. The field authorities of the GB divisions as central level. Special deputies of the GB on the staff of the chief of the Civil Administration with the High Command of the Armies. Subordinate offices of the field offices of the GB divisions as agencies on a lower level.

III. The measures.

1. Industrial war economy. A. Central regulation: Statistics of war economyeconomic planspreparations for the execution of economic plans, special regulationscoal economymotor fuel economypower economyconstruction of storage rooms and preparation buildings, storing evacuation and salvageregulation of consumption. B. Local securingDistinction between R and KL plants. Protection of the KL plants.

2. War food economy. War food planPreparations for execution of the war food planstoringevacuation and salvagingregulation of consumption for the civilian populationsupplying the Wehrmachtagricultural card indexcard index of the food industrysecuring the KL enterprises.

3. War forestry and wood industry. Wood economy planeconomic systemascertaining the KL enterprisessecuring the KL enterprises.

4. Foreign trade in times of war. Plans for import and exportpreparation of the carrying out of the plans for import and exportascertaining and protection of KLexport enterprises.

5. Transportation in the war economy. Ascertaining transportation requirementscoordination of transportation requirements of military economy and Wehrmachttransport situation in the Rhemisch-Westphalian Industrial Regionascertaining and securing of trucks of KL enterprises.

6. Conscription of manpower in war. Legal basispreparation of labor conscriptionascertaining the available amount of manpowerascertaining war requirements of manpowercovering of wartime requirementsabolition of right to choose domicile in the event of warrelaxation of provisions on the working hours and the prohibition to employ certain personssocial protection.

7. War finance and money economy. War finance requirementscovering of war finance requirementsself financing of war economywar taxes war loansrestrictions on traffic of moneysecuring of war important money requirements.

IV. Final remarks.

The Plenipotentiary for War Economy (GB) pursuant to the non-published Reichs Defense Law of 5/21/1935, has the task to make available in case of mobilization all economic forces to the conduct of war and to secure the life of the German people economically.

The reasons for the law emphasize that the experiences of the great war proved the necessity to concentrate during a war the total economy and the whole system of financing of the conduct of the war under one uniform direction. According to the will of the Führer and Reichs-Chancellor, the GB is to be in charge of this responsible direction and thus, together with the Reichsminister of War, who hold the executive power, be independent and responsible for the scope of his activities under the Führer and Reichs Chancellor.

In Peace Time

The Plenipotentiary (GB) appointed by the Führer and Reichs Chancellor for the case of mobilization has, pursuant to the resolution of the Reich Government of 5/21/1935, to begin his work already in peace time. According to the direction by the Führer and Reichs Chancellor, in his capacity as Chairman of the Reich Defense Council, he has to direct the economic preparations for the case of war as far as they are not within the jurisdiction relative to the armament industry of the Reich War Minister. GB and Reich War Minister have to make their preparations for mobilization in close mutual understanding.

II. THE ORGANIZATION

The Leading Staff as Superministerial Agency.

For the uniform planning coordination and performance of all fundamental war economic preparations the GB has established a leading staff consisting of specialists of the following ministries and Reich authorities which are subject to it in war time and bound by its directions in peace time:

Reich Ministry for Economy. Reich Ministry for Food. Reich Ministry for Forest-Economy. Reich Ministry for Labor. Reich Ministry for Finance; Reichsbank Directory: for financing the conduct of the war.

The Reich Ministry for Transportation which, contrary to the request of the GB has not been brought into the sphere of the GB has, upon the desire of the GB, put specialists at his disposal to work on questions of war economic transportation.

The War Economic Departments at Ministry Level

The offices within the GB, in order to carry out the directions given to them by the GB and its leading staff, have appointed a Reich Defense Division Chief who is immediately under the Secretary of State or, as to the Reichsbank, placed immediately under the President of the Reichsbank. The Reich defense Division Chiefs are responsible that the war economic preparations within the divisions are carried out uniformly. While as a rule the Reich Defense Division Chiefs make use for this purpose of the peacetime economy sections of the GB Divisions, there has been formed in the Reichs Ministry for Economy under the direction of the Reich Defense Division Chief an independent Economic Division for Armament which, in collaboration with the other sections of this division, shall take the measures necessary for the preparation of industrial war economy.

Central authorities below the ministry level.

The divisions placed under the GB, for the purpose of carrying out the individual war economic tasks, have assigned mobilization tasks to the following central agencies.

The Reichs Ministry for Economy:

The Reichs Office for Statistics to assemble statistical figures for war economic production; The Control Offices to prepare the management of materials; The Reich Chamber for Economy to limit economic publications; The Economic Groups to prepare plans for war economic foreign trade; The WIFO [Economic Research Corporation with Limited Liability] to construct fuel depots and places for alertness and for the storage of raw materials and fuels important for war;

The Reichs Ministry for Food:

The Reich Research Institute for Food Economy for drawing war food plans; The Reichs Offices to prepare the war food economy; The Reich Food Estate to prepare the war food economy;

The Reich Office of Forestry: The Control Office for wood to prepare the war wood economy.

The Reichs Ministry for Labor: The Reich Office for procurement of employment and unemployment insurance, to make preparations for the procurement of labor in case of war.

The field offices of the GB divisions as intermediate level.

The Reich Ministry for Economy, The Reich Ministry for Food, The Reich Office for Forestry and The Reich Ministry for Labor, for the purpose of carrying out district and local tasks, have created branch offices with 7 Prussian Chief Presidents, 2 Prussian District Presidents, 1 Bavarian District President and 4 Non-Prussian Lander Governments which are at the seat of a Military District Command. With regard to the close cooperation with the military offices of the Military District Command the areas of the field offices are not to be coordinated with the areas of the offices of the general and interior administration to which they are attached, but with the Military districts. An exception is made as to the areas of the field offices Dusseldorf and Munster which together correspond to Military District VI.

To guarantee the uniform collaboration within the sphere of GB also on the intermediate level, GB has since 1 1/2 years requested that the field offices of GB be combined at the same seat of the office into economic section for armament under the direction of a Government Director to be appointed by him in agreement with the GB departments. The Reich Minister of Interior has not met this demand yet but advocated in a drill for the Preparation of the War Administration [KRG], which at present is with the Führer and Reichskanzler, the formation of general RV division comprising all mobilization preparations in the civilian sector under a director to be appointed by him.

In wartime the field offices of the GB divisions form the Gau economic offices to be formed within the offices of the general and interior administration with the following divisions: Industrial War Economy, War Food Economy, War Forestry and Wood Economy, War Labor Economy.

The Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank for the purpose of carrying out their tasks within their field districts make use of their following subordinated offices: The Finance Offices for the Provinces, Local Finance Offices, Main custom offices etc., and the Reichsbank Main Branches, Reichsbank offices and Reichsbank subordinate offices.

Special deputees of GB on the staff of the chief of civil administration with the Army High Commands.

In wartime the executive power in the field of operations passes over to the Army Chief Commanders who exercise their authority in the civil administration through the Chiefs of Civil Administration [CdZ] assigned to them by the Reichsminister of Interior. The GB sends an own special deputy to the staff of each CdZ who has to carry out all war economic orders issued by the Army Chief Commander to the CdZ. If there are no directions to the contrary by the Army Chief Commander, the Special Deputy of the GB on the staff of the CdZ has to take care that all orders of the GB and the divisions belonging to the jurisdiction of the GB are carried out uniformly in the field of operations. For this purpose the Gau economic offices within the offices of the general and interior administration are subordinated to him. The GB has selected the Special Deputies in agreement with the Reichsminister of Interior, the GB must now appoint and instruct them.

Subordinate offices of the field offices of the GB departments as agencies on a lower level.

The following offices are subordinated to the field offices of the divisions under the authority of the GB, for carrying out district and local preparations:

The Regierungs Presidents and corresponding non-Prussian authorities;

The Landrate, Chief Mayors and corresponding authorities for preparation of ration certificates and the preparation of industrial evacuation and salvaging;

The Industry Supervising Offices for examining the procurement of labor forces in the industrial KL plants;

The Chambers for Economy for general war economic preparations in the economic districts and for limitations on economic publications;

The Chambers of Industry and Commerce for securing the productive capacity of the industrial KL plants;

The Foreign Trade Offices for securing the capacity of the industrial KL plants as to export production.

To the field offices of the Reichs Food Ministry:

The Land farmers organizations with the especially created offices for making the food situation secure, for the preparation within their districts of the war-food economy.

The Kreis farmers organization for the local preparation of the War Food Economy;

To the field offices of the Reich Forestry Office:

The Land Forest Masters and Land Forestry Administrations for general district questions referring to war forest and wood economy;

The Forestry Offices for local questions of the war forest economy;

To the field offices of the Reich Labor Ministry:

The Land Labor Offices for general preparation of wartime use of labor in their districts;

The Labor Offices for securing the labor forces in the KL plants of the total war economy and other plants in need of labor outside of the Wehrmacht.

A general survey of the total organization for the preparation of the war economy is shown in the attached chart.

III. THE MEASURES

1. Industrial War Economy.

A. Central Regulation. The preparation of industrial war economy is divided into:

(1) a central regulation of the production and consumption of industrial products.

(2) a local securing of production in the industrial KL plants and of consumption of the civil population.

Statistics of War Economy.

For the purpose of securing basic information for the central general regulation of production, and consumption, the Reichs office for Statistics has collected comprehensive war economic statistical figures of the whole German industry in 1936, just as it was done in 1933.

These statistics comprising 300 branches of industry with 180000 industrial plants, pertains to the composition of the labor force as to sex, age and training, the consumption of raw and auxiliary material, fuels, power, the productive capacity, the domestic and foreign trade as well as the supply of material and products in the beginning and at the end of the year.

The information received from the individual plants has been collected in a factory card index and will, when photostated, be put at the disposal of the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy as basis for locally securing of the industrial KL factories.

The reports of the individual enterprises will also be put together for the district of each foreign field office and for the Reich classified as to branches of industry- and will be used in the central and intermediate agency as basis to judge on the significance of the individual enterprises within the Reich and foreign districts.

The results of branches of industry of a coherent industry group supplementing each other are for the purpose of showing the mutual dependence with respect to various materials and products combined into industrial family trees. Equally, the flow of materials into the various branches of industry and over the various grades of processing is shown by material family trees.

Economy Plans.

On the basis of these statistics collected by the Reichs Office for Statistics, economic plans are drafted in the division for war economy of the Reich Ministry for Economy in cooperation with the control offices and industry exports for about 200 materials, half of which have already been worked out. In these plans the needs of the Armed Forces and the civilian minimum needs in wartime are compared with the covering thereof by supplies and production. A deficit will be reported to the office for German raw and working materials and be considered in the execution of the Four Year Plan. In addition it will be registered as import needs in the foreign trade plans which are worked out by the war economy division of the Reichs Ministry for Economy in cooperation with the economic groups of the organization of the industrial economy. The export needs set up in these plans for the purpose of compensating with the import needs, as far as raw materials for manufacturing purposes are concerned, again find consideration in the economic plans mentioned before. For East Prussia special economic plans are being worked out.

Preparations for carrying out the economic plans.

The economic plans serve as basis for the legal and organizational preparations. According to the unpublished War Contribution Law [RLG] of 5/21/1935, in case of war, contractual agreements are replaced by the contribution duty of the individual. Based upon this law [RLG] a decree on the creation of Reichs offices, orders the establishment of State economic offices authorities, which are set up by converting the control offices into Reich offices with increased authority (the right to earmark, seize and assign). The supervisory boards already drawing up their plans for distribution of war contracts are preparing their orders for the regulation of war contracts and fees, they are securing for themselves their indispensable personnel by collaboration with the replacement offices of the Wehrmacht and the field offices of the Reich Office for the Procurement of work and Unemployment Insurance, and they are working out, on the basis of the economic plans submitted to them, a system of management within the framework of their authority. They are preparing the orders which are necessary to carry out this economy in case of mobilization.

Special regulations.

For the handling of coal motor fuels and power further-going regulations have been prepared in view of the k and l importance of these materials.

Coal economy.

In case of mobilization, the authority to supervise the coal production and to distribute the coal will be transferred to the Reich Coal Commissar. He will also be in charge of the immediate distribution to the large consumers and armament factories. The Gau economic offices in whose “individual economy” division Gau coal offices are set up, are further charged with distribution of the contingents allotted to them by the Reich Coal Commissar for the other war important and vital plants and for domestic consumption. Special local coal offices serve this purpose which will be incorporated into contemplated economic offices in the offices of the Landrate, Chief mayors and corresponding authorities. To improve the coal stock situation in the protected territory the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate maintains a mobilization stock of 500000 tons near Magdeburg. For the same purpose, the Reichsbahn has increased its supplies by 500000 tons. To ease the situation of the Reichsbahn which in case of a mobilization will be heavily burdened by the deployment of and replacement for the Wehrmacht, the industrial plants with an annual consumption of more than 3000 tons have been requested to store a coal supply of 3-4 months.

Motor fuel economy.

For the preparation of the fuel management, investigations have been carried out in order to find out the needs for fixed and movable motors, and in order to find out the capacity of the storage facilities an investigation regarding the tap and gasoline stations has been carried out. On the basis of the results of these investigations and the needs of the Wehrmacht and the existing possibilities to cover the demands, the Control Office for Mineral Oils as Reich Office will allot to the Gau Mineral Oil offices which are to be established in the divisions for industrial war economy of the Gau economy offices group contingents for the distribution to large consumers, such as railroads, post, shipping. In addition the Gau Mineral Oil offices will allot subcontingents to the Kreis Mineral Oil Offices, to be created in the planned economic offices of the Landrate, Chief Mayors and corresponding authorities, of which their k and l plants and other k and l important consumers can dispose by ration cards which have been prepared already. Besides now definite gasoline stations and gasoline stores have been designated to the Wehrmacht for the first equipment of the troops in case of mobilization, and which are needed only for the first days after mobilization. A report on the construction of Reich owned large gasoline storage places and intermediate gasoline storage places as well as on the storage of national fuel reserved in these for purposes of the Wehrmacht will be rendered in another place in connection with the work of the Economic Research Corporation [Wifo] .

Power economy.

In the field of energy economy, the Law Concerning Power Economy furnished effective means to prohibit war economically undesirable construction plans and to promote construction plans necessary for the war economy. In the center of the military energy policy is at present the extension of the German compound economy by combining the individual lines into a Reich collecting line, the German Ring. The already appointed Reichs Burden Distributor and ten district burden distributors will have to decide on power supply in the case of mobilization. By instructing these burden distributors about the needs of the R-industry and the war economy to be covered under any circumstances, care will be taken that in case of energy saving which might become necessary, in the first time the need unimportant for war be throttled or cut off. It is practiced by maneuvers what measures have to be taken in case places of power generation should be eliminated.

Construction of supply rooms and readiness arrangements supplies.

The Reichsminister of Economy, to overcome bottlenecks in the war economical situation founded in the fall of 1934, the Economic Research Corporation m b h [Wifo]. The Wifo which at present employs 1300 employees and workers including guards has, for the finishing of constructions and storage, invested up to now 248 million Reichsmarks.

The constructions of Wifo are as follows:

(1) Large storage facilities: total of 9 with a capacity of 150000 tons,

(a) ready: 3 (b) under construction: 6

(2) Facilities for supplement: a total of 30 with a capacity of 150000 tons,

(a) ready; 7 (b) under construction; 6 (c) planned: 17

(3) Readiness constructions for the production of nitric acid, Oleum, carbide alcohol and alumina: a total of ten, of which are

(a) finished and taken into operation according to the provisions of the Four Year Plan: 3 (b) finished: 4 (c) under construction: 3

In all these readiness constructions can be produced;

183000 tons per year of nitric acid, 118000 tons per year of oleum, 20000 tons per year of carbide alcohol, 50000 tons per year of alumina.

The supplies furnished by Wifo comprise, according to the status of 12/1/1937:

266000 tons carburetor fuel, 94000 tons Diesel fuel, 43000 tons of lubricating oil, 40000 tons of manganese ore, 4000 tons of ferro nickel, 1000 tons of copper, 800 tons of magnesium, 400 tons of antimony, 75 kilograms of platinum

Evacuation and salvage.

In cooperation with the 6th division of the General Staff of the Reich War Ministry directions on the preparation and execution of the economic evacuation have been worked out. According to an emergency list for evacuation goods and an evacuation list for skilled workers, the supplies and skilled workers in the evacuation zones are registered, earmarked for transportation into certain salvage areas and registered with the Military District Commands by the field offices of evacuation and salvaging plans. The Military District Commands following these evacuation and salvaging plans issue their evacuation plans, the execution of which is prepared with special regard for transportation under the supervision of the District President, the Landrate and corresponding authorities with the support of special evacuation commissars. The supplies secured by evacuation will find consideration as supplementary reserves in the central economic plans.

Regulation of consumption.

The management of production is supplemented by a regulation of the consumption of the civil population. The Reich Minister of Economy in cooperation with the Reich Food Minister and the Reich Minister of Interior has worked out a decree for securing the vital needs of the German people with four executive decrees (for food, coal, soap and cleansing agents, textiles and shoes). For purposes of economy and in order to prevent covering of needs which is not uniform (hoarding) these orders introduced a system of ration cards which will be effective immediately in case of mobilization. The 80 million ration cards necessary for this purpose have already been printed and deposited with the Landrate, Chief Mayors and corresponding authorities. The further distribution of the ration cards to the individual households is prepared by these authorities to take place within 24 hours after mobilization ha been ordered. The ration cards are valid for the first four weeks after mobilization. Subsequently a more detailed separate system of rationing will become effective for the industrial war economy and the war food economy which is being prepared at present.

B. Local Securing.

The central regulation of the production and consumption of industrial products is supplemented by a local securing of the production by the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy.

Distinction between Rand KLEnterprises.

The aforementioned resolution of the Reich Government dated 5/21/1935 confers the direction of the economic preparations for the event of war on the Plenipotentiary (GB) only insofar as these preparations are not within the jurisdiction of the Reich War Minister relative to the armament industry. The Reich War Minister has combined the war requirements of the three parts of the Wehrmacht with regard to first equipment and replacement in a programme for finished goods. According to this plan for finished goods the military agencies will place with certain suitable industrial enterprises mobilization contracts providing for the delivery of finished implements of war and war contracts providing for the delivery of finished implements of a kind customary in commerce. Industrial enterprises which obtain an order for finished implements of war will be designated by the Reich War Ministry as armament enterprises (R-enterprises). Thereby they pass under the special jurisdiction of the Reich War Ministry; at the present time there exist approximately 2800 R-enterprises. Within the scope of his jurisdiction as Plenipotentiary (GB) the Reich Minister for Economics has responsibility for maintaining the KL production and the production for export which is within the capacity of the R-enterprises not absorbed by mobilization contracts. However, he must report to the military authorities which have jurisdiction over those R-enterprises which measures are necessary to secure the aforementioned maintenance of production and the military authorities shall first ascertain that these measures do not impair the performance of the mobilization contracts and shall then include them in the mobilization calendar. Only after the inclusion in the mobilization calendar, may be taken the measures relative to the part of the R-enterprises not used for mobilization contracts.

As to all measures outside of direct production, e.g. providing with material, fuel and motor fuel, energy and manpower, the Plenipotentiary has jurisdiction also with regard to R-enterprises. Through the Reich Ministry for Economy and its field offices he supervises also those industrial enterprises which the military authorities … agencies needing manpower which are necessary for maintaining of export and the supplying of the civilian economy and population with vital necessities and are designated by the Reich Minister for Economy as KL-enterprises. Wholesale and craftsman enterprises which are important to the war economy can also be designated as KL-enterprises. The field offices report to the Command of Military Districts all of the KL enterprises (approximately 25000). The Command in turn will see to it that the KL-enterprises are covered by the Local Police Protection and the Airprotection of the District Confidence Agencies of the Reich Group Industry which are placed under the authority of the Reich Air Minister. Besides the most important KL-enterprises will be reported by the field offices to the District Military Commands in order to insure to them Active Air Protection (Flaks, fighter squads).

Security of KL-enterprises.

The field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy appoints in each KL-enterprise a trusted person whose reliability has been investigated by the Secret State Police. In accordance with the directives of the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy these trusted persons shall carry out the measures which guarantee the maintenance of the production of their enterprises in event of mobilization. In particular they shall report to the competent Labor Offices for exemptions from military service and draft for civilian service all of their workers and employees who are indispensable to their enterprise. In the same manner they shall report to the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy for exemption from military and civilian draft requirements all of the motor trucks on which their enterprises depend. The field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy apply with the competent Military Replacement Inspections for exemption of the trucks and secure for the KL-enterprises the trucks exempted and not required by the Wehrmacht. For those KL-enterprises as to which in the extent of mobilization there must be expected with certainty a maximum use of their capacity (e.g. mining iron industry) as a transformation of their production (e.g. chemical industry, etc.) production plans will be made by the Reich Ministry of Economy. These plans will be transmitted by the field offices to the trusted persons of these KL-enterprises. The trusted persons of these enterprises shall have all protective measures on these plans of production. The trusted persons shall list all the protective measures taken by them in a mobilization calendar. For this purpose the trusted persons have been furnished with special instructions.

2. War Food Economy.

In order to obtain an exact survey of the possibilities of supplying Germany in the event of a mobilization, which takes into account various cases, such as a blockade or a war on two fronts, the Reich Food Ministry has caused the Research Agency for Food Economy to draw up annual food plans beginning 4/1/1934.

Preparation of the Execution of the War Food Plan

In order to execute the War Food Plan the Reich Food Minister has completed drafts of a skeleton decree relative to the organization of the War Food Economy and of several decrees relating to the public management of the various agricultural products. The provisions thereof have been drafted in such a manner that they can be adapted at any time to the changes based on the peacetime economic measures. On this legal basis the competent Central Associations of the Reich Food Estate and the Reich agencies of the Reich Food Ministry prepare plans concerning the management of the individual kinds of victuals.

In order to carry out the Food Economy Plan the Reich Food Estate is placed under the authority of the Reich Food Ministry in the event of mobilization. With the District Economy Offices which will function in the event of mobilization as an intermediate government agency of the general administration. There will be established a branch for War Food Economy. The external agencies of the Reich Food Ministry are the germ cells from which that branch will develop. The branch will be divided into two subdivisions, one of which will deal with the regulation of the production and its control by the competent Country Peasantry while the other will handle the regulation of distribution and consumption by the competent agencies of the general administration. Similarly divisions for war food economy will be established with the planned Economic Offices of the Landrate, Chief Mayors, and of similar governmental agencies. The related agencies of the Kreis Peasantries shall be merged into those divisions for war food economy.

Owing to the serious food situation it has not been possible to store food to the extent necessary in case of mobilization. At the present time there exists only the following national reserve in case of war:

1900 tons of oats, 2000 tons of legumes, 1500 tons of butter and considerable quantities of fruit pulp for the making of marmalade.

Evacuating and Salvaging

Within the framework of the directives agreed upon by the Plenipotentiary (GB) and the Reich War Ministry relative to the preparation and execution of the evacuating and salvaging of agricultural products and of animals has also been regulated. Excepting certain deviations, that regulation follows generally the same lines as the procedure prescribed for the removal and salvaging of industrial products. The provisions salvaged by removal will constitute an additional reserve for the war food economy in the protected zone.

Rationing of Supplies for Civilian Population.

As was stated above in the section on industrial war economy, in the event of mobilization all vitally important foodstuffs will be covered by a system of rationing certificates pursuant to a Decree on the Safeguarding of the Vital Necessities of the German People and regulations thereunder. Drafts of both the decree and the appertaining regulations have been completed. It has already been stated that ration certificates have already been printed and have been distributed to the lower administration agencies and that preparations have been made to issue them to the individual households within 24 hours.

A special regulation made in accord with the Reich War Ministry regulates the supplying of the members of the Army, or the Police etc. who live in common lodgings in Germany and are fed in messes.

Supplying of Wehrmacht

Pursuant to the Principles regarding Supply agreed upon with the Reich War Ministry productive enterprises have been ascertained which have been directed to furnish the food replacement warehouses with certain quantities in the event of mobilization. The collection of oats, roughage and potatoes for the Wehrmacht has been prepared by fixing the shares of the intermediate and lower agencies of the Reich Food Estate. Similarly the supplying of the Wehrmacht in the zones of operation will be regulated.

Agricultural Card Index

In order to ascertain the kind and efficiency of the agricultural establishments the Reich Office for Statistics is preparing a card-index of altogether 1,6 million establishments. Under the supervision of the Reich Food Ministry and its field offices this card-index is being distributed among the Kreis-Peasantries and managed by them. From year to year it will be kept up to date b means of a farm card.

Card-Index of Food Industry

Within the framework of the Inquiry into Military Economic Production of the German Industry made by the Reich Office for Statistics the establishments of the food industry have also been checked and the material has been collected in a factory card-index. This factory card-index system is being managed by the field offices of the Reich Food Ministry, which, on the basis of that index, investigate the ever-important establishment of the food industry and declare them to be KL-establishments.

Protection of KL Establishments

KL-establishments of the food economy are protected similarly to KL-establishments of the industrial economy. Thus, in particular, the field offices of the Reich Food Ministry will notify the Commands of the Military Districts of the KL-establishments which may have to be the subject of local police action and active and passive air protection. The material needed by agricultural enterprises has been ascertained for each district on the basis of thorough investigations by the Reich Food Estate. The field offices of the Reich Food Ministry will notify the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy of that material needed and the latter field offices shall see to it that these needs will be satisfied. The field offices of the Reich Labor Ministry, the State Labor Offices and the Labor Offices will cooperate in preparing the securing of the indispensable farm hands and of the skilled workers necessary for the food industry. In the same manner as it is done in the case of the industrial economy the trucks necessary for agricultural enterprises and enterprises of the food economy will be ascertained and secured. It is planned to collect all protective measures in mobilization calendars.

3. War Forests and Wood Economy

Wood Economy Plan

In order to establish a Plan for Wood Economy, the Reich Forest Master has initiated a thorough investigation of the existing wood supply and the requirements of wood. On the basis of the existing material related to the peace time requirements, the civilian minimum requirements in the event of war can be estimated with a fair degree of accuracy. However, in spite of several requests made, it was not yet possible to obtain from the Reich War Ministry information on the requirements of the Armed Forces. For this reason the Wood Economy Plan could not yet be completed.

System of Management

Independently from this not yet completed work, the Reich Forest Master has made legal and administrative preparations to carry out the management of wood in event of War. As was done in the field of industrial economy, it has been provided to transform, in the event of mobilization, the Supervisory Office for Wood in a Reich Office with enlarged authority (power to investigate, seize and allot). To carry out regional tasks there will be established a Division for Forest and Wood Economy with the Gau Economy Offices in the intermediate branch of the general administration. This division will be composed of the field office of the Reich Forest Master, of the State Forest Office or the State Forest Administration at the seat of a command of a military district and of the competent marketing association and will be headed by a State Forest Master.

Ascertaining of KL Enterprises

On the basis of the factory card-index established by the Reich Office for Statistics, the field offices of the Reich Forest Master have ascertained the KL enterprises of the wood economy situated within their respective precincts, especially the raw-mills.

Protection of the KL Enterprises

In view of their requirements of material and fuel, of indispensable labor and of absolutely essential trucks, these KL enterprises are protected in the same manner as the KL enterprises of the industrial and food economy. This is being done in cooperation with the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy, the State Labor Offices and the Labor Offices and with the competent agencies of the armed forces.

4. Foreign Trade in Times of War

Plans for Import and Export

On the basis of material which will be gathered by the departments of the Plenipotentiary (GB), the Plenipotentiary (GB) will draw up plans for imports and exports which will take into consideration the probable war situation. The plans shall show which import requirements must be met during the war, what amount of exports can still be maintained and what will be the probable terms of foreign currency (Devisen) and of clearing possibilities.

Preparation of the Carrying out of the Plans for Import and Export.

A draft of a decree has been completed, which shall become effective in the event of mobilization. It provides that for the direction and regulation of the foreign trade during the war there shall be appointed a Reich Commissioner for Foreign Trade who shall be placed under the authority of the Plenipotentiary. With the Reich Commissioner there will be established a Working Committee for the Foreign Trade consisting of representatives of all Ministries which have jurisdiction over foreign trade. It is incumbent upon the competent Ministries in the event of War to carry out their tasks in the field of foreign trade.

For the purpose of regulating imports and managing the foreign currency needed in the traffic with goods, the Reich agencies of the GB-Departments shall be required to cooperate in case of War. In order to direct exports, particularly in the field of industrial-economy, export offices will be established with those Groups of the Economy which relate to branches of the economy which, even during a war, may engage in exporting. These export offices will take over the tasks and powers of the now existing investigating offices.

As to foreign trade and the transfer of currency, which are already at present to a large extent subject to regulation by law, regulations are being prepared relative to the carrying out and supplementing of the existing provisions. Mainly involved are: the issuing of prohibitions of imports and exports, made necessary by the war, the introduction of custom decreases or exceptions from customs duties with respect to war essential goods, the supplementing of existing currency laws and provisions under which trade treaties and economic agreements with foreign countries become ineffective.

Ascertaining and Protection Of KL-Export-Enterprises

As mentioned already in the section on industrial war economy,the field offices ascertain all of the enterprises the exports of which amount to the value of 500000 Reichsmark annually. Those enterprises will be designated as KL enterprises (export) and their production will be protected in accordance with the procedure applicable to KL enterprises.

In order to obtain more detailed material the Economy Groups have been directed to collect with respect to enterprises engaged in export certain data on the export turnover and the direction of the export and to combine the data in a card-index. This card-index will be made known to the competent field offices so that they may supplement their factory card-index. The field offices shall then use these statements as a basis for the protection of production.

5. Transportation in the War Economy

Ascertaining of Transportation Requirements

In order to ascertain the transportation requirements of the War economy, classified separately as to means of transportation and kinds of goods, the following has been done:

(1) With the aid of the Reich Office for Statistics, the traffic statistics have been evaluated and the results have been combined in Verfleck-Sungs-cards.

(2) The Groups of the Economy have furnished coherent re ports on the individual kinds of goods.

Consideration of Transportation Requirements of Military Economy and Wehrmacht.

The transportation requirements of the military economy will be coordinated with the military transportation requirements of the Wehrmacht centrally by the Plenipotentiary in the War Transportation Committee [KTA]. A similar coordination shall be effected in the precincts of the field offices of the GB-departments together with the military agencies of the Regional Transportation Committees [BTA]. Deroutings, which are to be expected during war because of changes in the domestic and foreign traffic, will be taken into account.

Transport Situation in the Rhenish-Westphalian Industrial Regions

The General Staff has stated that the examination of the transport situation in the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial regions is of prime importance. Hence, a special investigation has been initiated in order to secure, in spite of the military use of the railways, the supplying of the population, particularly the supplying with food, of which no stores can be maintained in view of the present food situation, by transportation of supplies into the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial region in the event of mobilization. Corresponding investigations have been initiated to keep up the necessary business travel.

Ascertaining and Securing of Trucks of KL Enterprises

The Plenipotentiary, in cooperation with the Reich War Minister, has prepared directives for the securing of the requirements of the KL enterprises relative to motor trucks. As mentioned above, the trucks of the KL enterprises are ascertained by the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy, of the Reich Food Ministry and of the Reich Forest Office. They request the District Military Commands to release these vehicles. With a few exceptions to the contrary, the Commands of the Military Districts have not granted the requests to a sufficient extent, particularly as far as trucks with a net loading capacity exceeding one ton are concerned. The Plenipotentiary has taken up negotiations with the Reich War Ministry regarding a change of the distribution of trucks.

6. Conscription of Manpower in war

The basis for the wartime conscription of manpower is the hitherto unpublished law on the German People’s Service of 5/21/1935. It established conscription of the people for all nationals of the 15th until the completion of the 65th year of life, insofar as they are not called to the colors or expressly exempted from the people’s service. It is incumbent upon the Reich Minister of Labor to direct the people’s service. For the carrying out of his directions he may use the agencies of the Reich Office for the Procurement of Work and Unemployment Insurance.

Preparation of Labor Conscription

In order to prepare the Wartime conscription of labor, the Reich Minister of Labor and the Reich Office for the Procurement of Work and Unemployment Insurance, pursuant to directives issued by the Plenipotentiary, ascertain the available amount of manpower, the wartime requirements of manpower and measures for the covering of the Wartime needs.

Ascertaining the Available Amount of Manpower

Pursuant to the Law on the Introduction of Labor Passports the Labor Offices maintain in card-registries relative to 22 millions of workers and employees, i.e. more than 2/3 of the working population. The card-registries, which are kept up to date on the basis of information received from the enterprises, contain exact data as to the professional training, the occupation of the individual up to the present time and the existing skills. This material is supplemented by a card-registry relative to 16 millions of independent craftsmen who in war time constitute a valuable reserve of skilled labor. Similar investigations have been initiated as to leaders of enterprises and managers and as to farmers and members of their families who help on the farms. Hence, the entire population, classified according to professions, is surveyed by the Labor Offices, excepting only officials and professional men.

The card-registries of the Labor Offices are checked against the Military Conscription Lists of the Military Regional Commands and the holders of Military passports who in the event of War are called to the colors are especially marked. Furthermore, the amount of manpower employed in peacetime in R-enterprises, KL enterprises and War-essential government agencies is especially indicated. Hence, in the district of each Labor Office and for each profession there is apparent the following:

(1) the number of existing workers

(2) the number of holders of military passports,

(3) the number of men already employed in the war economy or other war-important jobs.

The difference shown constitutes the number of workers employed in enterprises of lesser importance and of other reserves, which eventually can be used elsewhere.

Ascertaining of War Requirements of Manpower

Under the supervision of the field offices of the competent GB departments, the KL-enterprises of the industrial economy, of the food economy and agriculture and of the forest and wood economy compute their probable labor requirements in the event of war. Insofar as the mobilization-production of a KL enterprise is not yet known exactly, its peacetime production is taken as a basis for the time being. The manpower requirement in the event of mobilization thus computed is compared with the peacetime amount of manpower used in the enterprise, from which must first be deducted, however, the number of the holders of military passports. The Labor Office is notified of the result of the computation.

Covering of War Time Requirements

In principle, the manpower employed in peace time in KL enterprises and KL agencies shall remain intact. The need for replacing the holders of military passports and for the increased production in the event of mobilization will be covered by using reserve manpower (manpower theretofore used in nonessential enterprises, women etc.). As reserve manpower will be used also the skilled workers who, within the framework of the economic evacuation, have been brought back from the evacuated zonesa process in which the Labor Offices play a part and who are used in salvage zones with a great need for skilled labor. For workers who are irreplaceable for the enterprise (defense workers) the KL enterprises file with the Labor Offices applications for exceptions from the military service (Indispensability Applications). The lists of defense workers made by the Reich Labor Ministry serve as directives for the selection of those forces. The Labor Offices examine the applications and transmit them to the Military Replacement Agencies. The decision is made by the Commander of the Military Region and, upon appeal, by the Military Replacement Inspector.

The procedure, established for the scope of the Office of the Plenipotentiary has been acceptedwith insignificant deviationsby the Reich War Minister for the R-enterprises and the civilian personnel requirements of the Armed Forces, by the Deputy of the Führer for the mobilization of the personnel of the German National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP), its formations and affiliated associations, the Reich Minister for Propaganda and Enlightenment for the agencies and enterprises within his jurisdiction, the Reich Traffic Minister for local traffic and inland shipping and the Reich Minister of Finance for the monopoly enterprises. Similar negotiations have been initiated with the Reich Post Department and the Reich Railway.

The agencies of the air protection, of reinforced police protection and of road construction have been directed by the competent departments to notify the Labor Offices of their requirements as to replacements of, and increases in personnelinsofar as the requirements relate to persons who hitherto were within the scope of the activities of the Labor Offices.

Negotiations are being conducted with the other agencies needing manpower (Department of the Interior, Reinforced Border Supervision Service). Their purpose is to concentrate in the civilian sector all preparations for the wartime use of manpower in one place, namely at the Labor Office, which closely collaborates with the Military Regional Command that has jurisdiction over the military sector.

Abolition of Right to Choose Domicile in the Event of War.

The planned preparation of the use of manpower in the event of war necessitates measures against freedom of workers to choose their domicile. Therefore, a completed draft of a Law on the Use of Labor and the Conditions of Labor in Times of War makes every change of the working place and every hiring of workers dependent upon the consent of the Labor Office. The law also provides that, in the event of war, wages and salaries may not be increased; thereby it shall be prevented that higher wages and salaries cause changes of the place of labor. At the same time it is intended to stabilize the price level by freezing wages and salaries.

Relaxation of Provisions on the Working Hours and of the Prohibitions to Employ Certain Persons

In view of the labor shortage which must be expected with certainty in the event of war, a completed draft of a decree relaxes, in the event of war, the existing limitations on working hours and renders ineffective the prohibition to employ women and juveniles insofar as this can be justified in contemplating the nation in its entirety.

Local Protection

A decree on the Housing of Individuals and Families regulates the transfer of manpower which is inevitable in war in connection with the planned direction of labor. For the same reason there have been enlarged for the case of war, the provisions relative to the granting of travel expenses, work equipment and family allowances for double households, which shall facilitate the employment of workers coming from other places.

7. War Finance and Money Economy War Finance Requirements

The Reich Finance Minister estimates that the financial war requirements for the first year of war will amount to approximately 50 billions of Reichsmark.

Covering of War Finance Requirements

The covering of the War finance requirements must be effected by taxation and loans, as far as the war economy cannot be limited to self-financing.

Self-Financing of War Economy

Enterprises which have to perform mobilization-contracts and contracts for delivery of war goods shall cover their financial needs primarily out of their own resources or by way of regular private loans. Wherever this is not possible the leaders of the enterprises will be afforded the possibility of obtaining credits for operating and investing purposes by the issuance of Army Bonds (Securities payable to the bearer which may be lombarded). Through these securities the Reich assumes the role of a surety.

Insofar as the war economy cannot be requested to rely on self-financing, it is attempted to cover the financial war needs primarily by means of war taxes. A completed draft of a law provides for the following war taxes:

Additions of 50% to the Income and Wage Tax, Additions of 62% to the Corporation Tax, Additions of 8% to the Increased Wage Income, Addition of 30-100% to other Increased Income, Additions to 200% to the Property Tax.

The entire revenue to be derived from these war taxes, it is estimated, will amount to approximately 5 billions annually.

Since the planned war taxes will cover only a fraction of the financial war requirements, it is provided that they will be supplemented by war loans, the issue terms and price of issue of which even in case of war will depend on the economic and political situation existing at the time. Hence it is probable that large demands will be made upon the Reichsbank for the discontinuance of Treasury Notes. Preparations have been made to make possible the enlargement of the credit volume by amending the Banking Law.

Restrictions on Traffic with Money

In order to secure the credit economy and to prevent withdrawals caused by fear in one of war, regulations have been prepared providing for restrictions on withdrawals and for bank holidays.

Securing of War-Important Money Requirements

Since most war expenses are made without the use of cash the increase in the quantity of cash is only a fraction of the entire financial war requirements. This increased need for money tokens amounts for the first three war months according to an investigation relating to 1937/1938 to the following:

Need of Wehrmacht (reported) approx 3 billions RM

Need of Civilian Administration (reported) approx 0.4 Billions RM

Need of Economy (estimated) approx 1.5 Billions RM

So called panic Needs (estimate) approx 0.7 Billions RM

Total approx. 5.6 Billions RM

To satisfy those needs there is at our disposal, in addition to the usual amount of current legal tender which at present exceeds 7 Billions of Reichsmark the reserve of money tokens in the amount of 13.5 billions of Reichsmark which is in the custody of the main office of the Reichsbank and of the Reichsbank Offices at the places where it is needed.

Final Remarks

Since its establishment in 1935, the agency of the Plenipotentiary for the war Economy, just as the Reich Defense Council as a super-ministerial office directing the preparations for mobilization, has been treated as a secret. Since all of the great powers have created similar forms of organization during the last years, secrecy is at present no longer of the same importance as in 1935. It should be considered whether, on some suitable political occasion, the Führer should announce the existence of those forms of organization, which the foreign government naturally assume to exist after, in addition to the Plenipotentiary, the Reich War Minister and the Reich Foreign Minister have furnished opinions relative to the effects of such an action.

(signed) WOHLTHAT

“Document EC-265 [translation]”, pp. 375-376.

Telegram (Open Text) Paris, 10/1/1940 21.45 hrs. Received: 10/1/1940 22.00 hrs. No. 740, 10/1/1940

The solution of the Jewish problem in the occupied territory of France requires, besides various measures, a regulation as soon as possible of the citizenship status of Reich German Jews who were living here at the beginning of the war regardless of the fact that they might have been interned or not. Heretofore the individual procedure of expatriation was based on Paragraph 2 of the Law from 7/14/1933 and refers only to actual violations of the duty of loyalty without considering racial membership. Suggest for the future a collective expatriation procedure for the occupied territory of France based on lists made here in agreement with Hoheitstrager (High Party Leaders) in which should be listed primarily the members of the following groups:

1. Jews, so called ex-Austrians, that is, those who according to Circular [Runderlass] from 8/20/1938R 17 178 did not change their Austrian passports for German passports before 1231/1938.

2. Those Reich German Jews who by neglecting their duty of registration [Meldepflicht] violated Paragraph 5 of the Law for Registration Abroad [Auslandsmeldegesetz] from 2/3/1938. Measures requested above are to be considered only as a first step for the solution of the whole problem. I reserve for myself further proposals. Request telegraphic acknowledgment.

Prepared in 19 Copies. From these have been sent:

No. 1 to R (Arb. St.)

No. 2 to RAM (Reich Foreign Minister)

No. 3 to SS (State Secretary)

No. 4 to Chef AO (Chief of Foreign Branch NSDAP)

No. 5 to BRAM (Plenipotentiary of Foreign Minister)

No. 6 to U.St.S. Pol. (Under State Secretary Political Div.)

No. 7 to U.St.S. Recht (Under State Secretary Legal Div.)

No. 8 to Dir. Pers. (Director Personnel)

No. 9 to Dg.Pol. (Dirigent Political Div.)

No. 10 to D.W. (Director Economic Div)

No. 11 to Dg.W. (Dirigent Economic Div)

No. 12 to Dg. Recht (Dirigent Legal Div)

No. 13 to Dir.Kult. (Director Cultural Div)

No. 14 to Dr.Kult. (Dirigent Cultural Div)

No. 15 to Dir.Presse (Director Press Div)

No. 16 to Dir.Deutschld. (Director Germany Div)

No. 17 to Dir. Prot. (Director Protocol)

No. 18 to Pers. Stab Hewel (Personal Sta (Hewel))

No. 19 to Landerref.pol. (Referent for France in Pol. Div.)

“Document EC-286 [translation]”, pp. 380-384.

COPY

Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economy General Consultant Berlin, W. 8, 4/2/1937 Behrenstr. 43 Telephone: A6 4351

Please refer to above heading and subject in future correspondence

My dear Colonel,

Herewith enclosed I send you privately a copy of a letter written by President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to Prime Minister General Göring, for your confidential information.

Heil Hitler!

Very truly yours, [signed] Blessing.

To Colonel Thomas, General Staff Corps.

To Prime Minister General Göring Commissioner for the Four Year Plan.

My dear Prime Minister:

You were kind enough to send a letter to me, dated March 24, written by the Reich Commissioner for price control to you, in order that I may voice my opinion. I return this letter herewith and desire to make the following comments:

I fully agree with the Commissioner for price control that we should exploit by all means the present chances for export trade. Further, I agree with him when he says that “Germany at present does not take nearly sufficient advantage of the present situation in world trade, either to the fullest possible extent or with the greatest possible energy”. As a matter of fact the obstacles which the world trade presented to the German export trade in the past, have become much fewer, particularly in the last few months. Caused by the international armament boom the purchasing power of the raw material producing countries has markedly increased and their desire to purchase industrial investment goods and finished products has risen. Long planned building projects like constructions of railroads, electric power plants, foundries and rolling mills, new construction or enlargement of factories, replacements of plants, long delayed during times of crises are now being carried out everywhere speedily. As a result, the prices for a number of German export products have risen considerably. This is especially true for products of the iron producing and foundry industries, for machine tools, special products of the precision type and optical instruments, as well as for the sale of cellulose and for mills producing paper. These signs of revival on the world market, however, do not concern at present the products of the glass, ceramics, wood products, by far the largest part of the iron and sheet iron and metal products (hardware) industries, textile and clothing, large fields of machine construction, especially textile machinery and paper producing machinery. The same applies for great investment transactions for which strong international competition exists since countries which usually compete for such items on the world market, such as Italy and Czecho-Slovakia, use their unutilized capacities exclusively for export purposes.

If, therefore, in the face of such developments on the world market, the value of German export has not increased more, then the reason is not, as the Reich Commissioner for price control assumes, that my export policy was not adopted fast enough to a new situation; on the contrary the fault lies with handicaps of a decisive nature which the German export industry experiences from within. I do not wish to burden you, my dear Prime Minister, with particular instances, of which I could cite many, but I would like to confine myself to a short description of these handicaps:

a. German economy brought into high gear through armament and the Four Year Plan very frequently induces the German manufacturer to neglect exports in favor of lucrative domestic business with risk.

b. Although the supervising agencies under me have strict orders to give priority in the distribution of raw material destined for export shipments, the lack of raw material for export orders becomes more and more noticeable. In many cases it does not help the firms engaged in the export business if they merely get the raw material required for an immediate foreign order, because they cannot break even without having at the same time domestic business for which raw material is not available in sufficient quantities. A further point is that in the industries which make semimanufactured goods or parts, it is impossible to ascertain whether the raw material contained in such parts is destined for foreign or domestic markets. Ill these industries, therefore, special raw material difficulties appear which make the exportation of the final product more difficult.

c. Armament and Four Year Plan have absorbed so many skilled workers that an extraordinarily serious lack of suitable labor has arisen for the production of articles for export. This applies especially to those industries which have the greatest chances to export.

d. Extent and urgency of army orders and recently also of the orders for the Four Year Plan have taxed the capacity of the German industry to such an extent that for the fulfillment of export orders insufficient or no facilities at all remain.

As a result, German industry has to delay delivery for export to such an extent that foreign buyers prefer to buy in Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium, the United States and Czecho-Slovakia. Frequently time of delivery agreed upon cannot be kept, a fact which must destroy the confidence in the German businessman as to his desire and capability to deliver the goods.

Aside from the export difficulties already mentioned, doubts have recently arisen with firms engaged in the export business as to whether the point of view always represented by me, namely that export business has priority over domestic business, was still valid. The Office for German Raw and Synthetic Material has recently repeatedly expressed the opinion to a large circle of business men that the principle of priority supply for export shipment which was in force until now and has been formerly acknowledged by you in the Inner Cabinet has been abandoned or would not be enforced any more to its fullest extent. Aside from the fact that such contradictory orders cause uncertainty and unrest in economic life, it is obvious that a number of firms see in the opinion of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Material a welcome opportunity to refuse export orders which are less desirable on account of the greater risk and effort involved.

If I understand the letter of the Reich Commissioner for price control correctly, he seems to be of the opinion that we have accepted lower prices for our export products than we could have achieved with the prevailing tendencies of increasing prices in the world market and through this the proceeds of foreign exchange have been reduced. May I first of all state that it is incorrect that there is a scarcity of goods practically all over the world. As I have already explained, the boom is different in various categories of goods. Whereas in some categories, as for example in semi-finished iron parts, machine tools, precision instruments, optical products and cellulose, as well as in paper products, there exists a definite scarcity, there has been no boom in a number of other export goods. Therefore, one cannot generalize the boom which is most intense in very important fields, and it would be wrong to assume that in a short time the prices in foreign markets would generally surpass the German domestic prices. To cite an example, may I point to the fact that the unutilized capacities of the English and Japanese textile industries are still exercising a constant pressure upon the textile markets of the world.

In all fields where tendencies of increasing prices were noticed, I took immediate steps in order to obtain higher prices for our export goods. You will know, Mr. Prime Minister, that in 1935 I set up a price control agency for each export group, altogether 25, whose main duty it is to secure the highest prevailing prices for German export goods. These control agencies constantly watch over the export, compare the prices, and report about possible changes of export subsidies. Thanks to the activities of these control agencies, the customary cut price policy by German exporters competing against each other has been limited to the lowest possible extent. Only with the help of the control agencies was it possible to give that flexibility which was necessary in order to adjust constantly the prices in accordance with the price developments of the world markets. Due to our extremely scarce foreign exchange situation, we could however not afford to change the German export prices abruptly, because we must avoid by all means even a temporary stoppage of our exports. Nevertheless, we have, in all fields in which price increases were noticed or could be expected with some certainty, cut or even cancelled the subsidies without delay. Just to cite a few examples, in 8/1936 the export subsidies for pile-planking iron were reduced from 24% to 10%, on 10/31/1936, the subsidies for ship profiles from 17% to 8%, on 11/24/1936, the rates for grooving machines, free-form-forged-prices and quality bar iron from 26% to 15%. In the last few weeks, the subsidies for the entire iron producing field (plates, pipes, mine tracks and so forth) have been considerably reduced, or even cancelled. In the same manner have subsidies been considerably reduced or cancelled in the field of the machine industry, and especially where it was at all possible likewise in the field of special products of precision and optical industries. Compared to this, the possibilities for reductions of export subsidies in the field of the iron, sheet iron, and metal goods industries (finished goods) and the ceramic industries have been insignificant. For automobiles a reduction was not yet possible at all because the foreign automobile manufacturers have not yet raised their prices. When the Reich Commissioner for price control says that there is “not enough pressure applied against the entire export industry”, then I would like to retort that in my opinion there is no better pressure than the fact that the exporter profits by his export business. This principle has of late conquered even the food-administration. Unfortunately, it happens frequently that the export prices, despite the improvements in various fields, cannot compete with the prices which are paid by the Army for their orders. Due to the fact that export subsidies are paid on the amount received from exports, the present system offers already an incentive for the exporter to get the highest possible foreign prices because thus he receives higher subsidies. Furthermore; the export prices unfortunately do not increase so generally and not to that extent above the domestic prices as supposed by the Reich Commissioner for price control, because in that case no pressure would be necessary in order to induce the German exporter to export and get bigger prices. Apart from the pressure already applied by the apparatus of the control agencies, I cannot see what kind of pressure could yet be invented in order to help the exporters to receive better export prices.

Although I do not quite agree with the Reich Commissioner for price control in regard to the export price question, I understand and share the deep concern which the Reich Commissioner for price control entertains with regard to the future German export developments. Rearmament and the policy of procuring employment up to the end of 1936 have been made possible by trade-political measures (new Plan), by decreasing non-essential imports in favor of essential imports, and in addition, by the stocks in hand and by imports of raw materials which were much larger than formerly. This policy was also successful because the extraordinarily good harvest in 1933 and the average harvests of 1934-1935 did not necessitate extraordinary imports for food purposes. The continuation of the armament policy and the execution of the Four Year Plan, which makes considerably larger demands for raw material than the procurement of employment policies of the years, 1933/1936 were jeopardized by the end of 1936 because on one hand the domestic stocks of raw materials were exhausted and because furthermore the imports from abroad, despite favorable results from exports, were not large enough to satisfy the increased demands.

At this moment, in accordance with your instructions, it has been undertaken to draw upon the substance of the German property abroad, with the aim of furthering the armament program and of carrying out the Four Year Plan. You, most honored Prime Minister, proceeded in this matter from the consideration that the decrease of Germany’s foreign requirements would be vindicated by the fact that the German economy would strengthen its self-sufficiency by the investments to be provided by the Four Year Plan. To this let me remark that in spite of the increase of internal raw material production, the import requirements frequently do not only become less but become greater. Thus, in spite of the increase of internal production of light motor fuels from 570000 tons in the year 1933 to 1.24 million tons in the year 1936, the import of 922000 tons (1933) rose to 1.208 million tons (1936) because consumption rose from 1.491 million tons (1933) to 2.448 million tons (1936). The figures for crude oil (Gasoel) are the following: internal production 193360000 tons, 1936110000; import 1933 490000 tons, 19361.125 million tons; consumption 1933: 550000 tons, 19361.235 million tons.

The resort to German foreign property values has up till now had the following results:

a. Foreign exchange receipts from sale of securities: 130 million RM

b. Gold intake: 25 million RM

c. Speeded up collection of outstanding export and import claims from capital shares: 227 million RM

Total: 382 million RM

Up till now this sum has been disposed of as follows:

a. For the total food sector: 153 million RM

b. For the industrial sector to cover the most pressing need in the first half year 1937: 173 million RM

c. For the return of land arrears, Spanish observation committee (Spanischer Ueberwachungsausschuss): pp. 21 million RM

Total: 347 million RM

There is, according to this, a balance of 35 million RM.

The comparatively favorable results which were achieved during the last few months in the collection of foreign property values must not lead one beyond that, apart from the fact that the possibilities still existing here are no longer very great. At first the more easily realizable stocks were called upon, in order to achieve quick results; in addition the speeded up collection of outstanding export claims means that later continuous foreign exchange returns are decreased by the earlier deductions. I do not share the conception that one could achieve higher amounts by a legalized confiscation of foreign securities. To be sure, the securities can be transferred by confiscation into the hands of the Reichsbank or some other agency; but the possibility of their disposal in foreign countries is more likely to be reduced by the foreign countermeasures which are to be feared, particularly those of our creditor nations.

At the present tempo and rate of foreign exchange consumption, the proceeds from previous special collections will be used up at the latest by the end of 1937, to which the partially exorbitant increase of raw materials contributes decisively. At this I completely disregard possible unexpected events which could occur in the food sector. Thus, toward the end of 1937 we will have reached a situation in which we can fall back neither upon inner raw material supplies nor upon receipt from foreign property values of the German people. Then we are forced to derive the necessary import requirements only from the proceeds of our export activities, that is, we can carry out only as much of our programs as remains on hand after deduction of the necessary food requirement, for the import of industrial raw materials from export proceeds. The decisive problem is therefore the export problem.

As I have already set forth above, the possibility definitely exists for Germany, from the point of view of the world market, to considerably extend her exports at comparatively good prices at the expense of her competitorshere I entirely agree with the Reich Commissioner for pricesand thereby decisively to better her current foreign exchange and raw material situation, and in fact, much more as the ability of our competitors to deliver is considerably impaired in exactly those spheres which have been cornered by the world boom by preoccupation with its own armament. This applies particularly to Germany’s main competitor: England.

These unusual possibilities for export, existing perhaps only for a comparatively short period, cannot be taken advantage of by Germany under the present circumstances because the internal obstacles to German export set forth above stand in the way.

In the present situation, lately made more acute by the fact that individual instructions have been issued by the Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetic Materials, as well a the procurement agencies of the branches of the Wehrmacht, to the effect that export orders are to be postpone, one must consider that export chances in the world market not only cannot be taken advantage of, but that on the contrary, one must count on a decrease of German expOrt in the second half of 1937. [pencilled marginal note by Keitel: “this would be very regrettable!”] I therefore have fears that export proceeds and therewith the possibilities for imports will become less at the same moment that incomes from foreign property values will no longer be available. I do not have to emphasize that by such a development not only the carrying out of the Four Year Plan is jeopardized, but that the continuation of armament is made questionable, and in fact that much more if the result of the next harvest should make larger import requirements necessary. That such a development would influence the freedom of our foreign political dealings is self-evident.

I therefore emphasize, just as the Reich Commissioner for prices, my conviction that we should take advantage of the chance offered to us by the world market. I am therefore of the opinion that we should promote our export with all resources, by temporary decrease of armament, and that further, with reference to the Four Year Plan, we should solve only those problems which appear the most pressing pencilled marginal note by Keitel: “But we are doing that already!”] Among these I include the gasoline program, the buna program, and the program of developing internal resources of ores, insofar as this development does not of itself require large amounts of raw material which must be withheld from export.

On the other hand all other measures of the Four Year Plan should be postponed for the time being. I am convinced that by such a policy, our export could be increased so greatly that our exhausted stock-piles would experience a certain improvement and that the resumption of a strengthened armament would again be possible in the not-too-distant future from the point of view of the raw material situation. To what extent a temporary postponement of armament would have military advantages, I am unable to judge. Yet I would suppose that such a pause in armament would not only have advantages for the training of officers and men, which has yet to be done, but that this pause would afford an opportunity to survey the technical results of previous armament and to perfect the technical aspect of armament.

I would be thankful, most honored Prime Minister, if you would consider present developments from these viewpoints.

Heil Hitler!

Your respectful (Hjalmar Schacht).

To President Dr. Schacht with the request for acknowledgment. [signed] Göring

Berlin, W. 8, 3/24/1937. Leipziger Platz 7.

Prime Minister General GÖRING Commissioner for the Four Year Plan Reich Commissioner for Price Control T.Nr. pers. Prime Minister General GÖRING Berlin W 8 Leipziger Strasse 3

Honorable Prime Minister!

On the occasion of the last conference accorded me, on Wednesday, the 17th of this month, I referred to the question of export, and along with it our faulty methods of action. In almost every general council meeting since the middle of November, I have called attention to the price development of the world market and continuously pressed the gentlemen of the Ministry of Economy, to take advantage of the openly changing situation with stress, for the benefit of the German export and a completely substantial increase of our export price. Unfortunately I had time and again to observe along with the gentlemen of the R.W.M. also in other various kinds of transactions, that they didn’t believe the opening developments of the world market would last for any length of time, and for that reason they took a hesitating attitude, which, according to my opinion, did not contribute to Germany’s advantage in the export price.

In the meantime they have changed in the Ministry of Economy to a certain degree and try now to catch up with export prices.

My latest findings, which on my part are never based on theory, but are explained by facts, have strengthened by conviction that the present situation of the world market is not being taken advantage of to the full extent and with all possible energy on the part of Germany. It is beyond doubt that in the whole world, scarcity in nearly all goods prevails and at present prices are offered which only a few weeks ago were believed to be impossible. I do not mean to include in these prices the prices for products which are needed everywhere. At the present we are , no longer very far removed from the moment in which the prices for goods on the world market will exceed our prices within Germany. This fact already is beginning to appear variously. Thus a German export deal for paper to the Far East at the price of about 24 RM for 100 kg was concluded while the normal price within Germany is around 20 RM or 21 RM.

The various gentlemen who have been active in export for years and whom I know as extraordinarily active confirm to me continuously that we are very well in the position to drive up our prices for finished goods to be exported.

In my opinion, this demand will not be realized to the full extent on all sides because sufficient pressure does not stand behind the entire exporting industry and because appropriate measures are not used.

In this case our export subsidies play a very important role. As you well know the difference between the domestic price and foreign price striven for in the export is paid to the export firm through this subsidiary agency. With all its disadvantages which are necessarily brought about in such a procedure, it was without doubt desirable in the past.

Today we must change this procedure according to my opinion, slowly and surely and with a steadily increasing tempo. Pressure must be exerted on the exporting firms, to force them to agree on prices for the goods, which as soon as possible must be adjusted to our normal domestic prices.

Even though I may not be able to present in this letter these matters in their entirety, which must be considered here, I nevertheless believe I have made it sufficiently clear as to the way with which they must be dealt, in order to extract the utmost for Germany from the present world market development.

I am convinced that in this manner we may attain many millions more foreign currency.

In this connection I think it necessary to point out a second train of thought, time and again defended by me. We must succeed in repressing home consumption in several fields, thereby freeing goods for an increased export with energetic leadership and continued pressure on the economy in the next 6 months, which will be for our benefit towards the end of the year and during the year 1938 in the form of great gains in foreign currency, and which will then place us in a position to buy the products needed for Germany against cash on the world market. According to my reckoning, one will be able towards the end of this year to buy foreign currency for cash everywhere, because the present boom in quantities and prices naturally will cause an expansion of production of raw materials, etc. If the unexpected rise of today goes down in the coming year, contrary to expectations, it would only be a gain for us, because then we would be able to buy at considerably better terms with our great foreign currency surplus of this year.

If I speak of the restraint of domestic consumption for some goods, I cite in this respect as an example our present paper consumption in Germany. From the year 1935-1936 our domestic consumption of paper per capita has risen from 29.76 kg to 33.27 kg, even though the consumption of paper for the press, on the other hand, in 1932 and other years still stands at 1012% lower. We can today strive for prices for paperas already mentioned abovewhich are better than our domestic prices. I have presented two vital points in general with these representations, which must receive the strongest consideration on the part of Germany, and should influence most strongly our political trade position with respect to export in order that we can make use of a situation in 1937/1938, which today no one indeed can overlook. On concluding I still deem it necessary to mention something. The present price development, which is also set before all things for finished goods on the world market to a great extent, will last longer because England too is extraordinarily interested in this. In this way England wants to reduce her cost of rearmament to a great extent. She has always bought her raw materials for this and perhaps also for the next year, in as much as they were accessible at all, for foreign currency at substantially more favorable prices, and has assured herself priorities and attained gains by means of the highest possible prices for half-finished and finished goods, which substantially ease the total mobilization costs. Today it is presumed by all that there will be a longer duration of the present development, because of which we must prepare appropriately, as far as export is concerned, for more than a full year.

Heil Hitler!

Your very obedient [signed] WAGNER

(Gauleiter JOSEF WAGNER Reich Price Commissioner 1936/42)

“Document EC-293 [translation]”, pp. 391-394.

Berlin, 12/24/1935. Behrenstr. 43.

The Reich and Prussian Economics Minister

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

To the Reich War Minister:

From letter Aktz. 66 b 9950 W wi (II a) of 29 November I gather that an increased Wehrmacht demand for copper and lead is anticipated, and that to about double the previous consumption. This concerns only the current needs, while the equally urgent stockpiling is not contained in the figures. You expect me to obtain the necessary foreign currencies for these requirements. I respectfully reply that I see no possibility of this under the prevailing circumstances. I proceed here from the assumption that not only copper and lead, but also other materials are involved in the increased demand for raw materials, and I should be grateful if I could obtain from you an estimate of your deficit in the other principal raw materials.

In all previous conferences with the Führer and Reich Chancellor, as well as with the leading military agencies, I have expressed the conviction that it would be possible to provide foreign currencies and raw materials until 4/1/1936, for armament on the scale maintained thus far. Although this program of mine has been made extremely difficult by our cultural policy, which is encountering opposition throughout the world, as well as by our agrarian policy, and will continue to be made difficult, I still hope to be able to realize my original anticipations. If a degree of armament going beyond these is now demanded, it is, of course, quite far from me to deny or change my advocacy of the greatest possible armament, expressed for years, before and since the seizure of power; but it is my duty to point out the economic limitations to this policy.

The gold and foreign-currency reserve of the Reichsbank today amounts to 88 million RM. I should only like to point out the political and military impossibility of trying actively to master foreign political decisions with such a low reserve of foreign currencies. A reducing of the foreign-currency reserve, which has already been commenced owing to the food supply difficulties, involves, however, the danger that the population will be filled with distrust, not so much about the stability of the currency as because of the fact that our food supply difficulties will thereby become manifest.

In the conference with the Führer and Reich Chancellor of the 26th of last month I gave an exact account of the receipt and use of foreign currencies. The estimate there presented gave the following picture for the six months from 10/1935-3/1936:

Industrial requirements (including armament: 1,288 Mil. RM

Food requirements (minimum, probably more): 474 Mil. RM

Other Imports (so-called commercial-policy imports: 2,152 Mil. RM

In contrast thereto, at the same time, means of payment to foreign countries estimated at 1,776 million RM are available, so that there is a deficit of 376 million RM. The task of providing coverage for this deficit is an enormous one and quite uncertain of success. In addition, we already owe about 30 million RM in foreign currencies to foreign countries in overdue payments of the Reich Railways (Polish Corridor), the Reich Postal System, and the foreign-currency agencies, and furthermore must in the near future make available about 35 million RM in foreign currencies for the Saar Territory (Roman Convention) and for Danzig.

The additional copper and lead requirements imposed by you now demand alone approximately 3 million RM monthly. To these must be added the additional requirements of other raw materials on which I am still awaiting a tabulated statement from you. To these direct additional requirements must be added the indirect requirements for the accessory industries (Zulieferungsindustrien) and the requirements of those raw materials which are needed for military structures, as well as for the housing, food and clothing of the workers belonging to those industries.

Alongside of this additional industrial demand for foreign currencies, I fear, precisely during the coming year, an increased demand from the food sector. Already, the receipt of industrial raw materials has considerably declined in proportion to the agrarian imports. Imports of live animals and foodstuffs has risen considerably in the last few months, while industrial raw material imports have only with difficulty been kept at the previous level. As late as the spring of this year, the Reich Food Ministry estimated the foreign cash demands for fats for the second half year of 1935 at 300-400 thou. RM per work day, but already on 4 October a special expenditure of 3 million RM of foreign cash was demanded, and on 28 November new foreign cash demands amounting to 12.4 million RM, were made in addition to the current work-day assignment of 400000 RM. For the month of 1/1936, indeed, 690000 RM per work day were demanded.

It is obvious that such estimates, which are being changed every moment, upset the whole foreign-currency procurement policy and must make my task almost hopeless. After the fodder harvest, already in the fall of 1934, was declared to be extremely scant; after the hog censuses at the beginning of March and the beginning of 6/1935 made it very clear that the stocks were going down; after we had nevertheless entered the new harvest of 1935 with the unusually high grain reserve of 3.3 million tons instead of having used a part of it to fatten hogs; and after we had read, as late as 7/14/1935 an article entitled: “Hog Flood Finally Avoided” in the weekly newspaper of the Kurmark Peasant Union, which designated a recession in the stocks of hogs, especially middle-aged animals, as an “especially gratifying result”; there would appear to be justification for the question whether the above-mentioned mis-estimates do not have fundamental causes. In view of the uncertainty as to how much additional foreign currency the Reich Food Ministry will demand, I am unable, in any case, to make a sure prediction as to whether even the carrying out of the previous program up to 4/1/1936 will succeed with respect to foreign currencies and raw materials.

In the field of trade policy, too, the agrarian mis-estimates have produced regrettable consequences. In the fall of 1934, I could have negotiated extraordinarily favorable opportunities for raw material purchases in some South American countries, if I had been able to promise these countries to take even small consignments of frozen meat. This chance was spoiled by the resistance of the Reich Food Ministry. Yet exactly one year later, the same ministry suddenly raised an urgent cry for frozen meat imports, and I could not trade these imports off as compensation, but had to jeopardize a part of the industrial raw material imports in order to import frozen meat. A similar situation arose with the importation of cattle and hogs demanded by the Food Ministry in the fall of this year, when not enough time was left me to exploit these things from the viewpoint of commercial policy.

The picture of the hampering of my trade and foreign-currency policy would, however, not be complete if I did not point again and again to the cultural-policy hindrances, which keep alive throughout the world resistance to and dislike for business connections with us. The economic and legal treatment of the Jews, the anti-church movement of certain party organizations and the legal arbitrariness associated with the Gestapo form a detriment to our armament task, which, by the application of more reasonable methods, could at least be considerably diminished without sacrificing the objective.

If we have nevertheless succeeded in raising our raw materials imports in 2 years from 26 million tons to over 40 million tons, this was due only to the commercial-policy shifts imposed by the New Plan, which made possible an increase in our exports to some regions of the world; and it was furthermore only possible through the well-known export subsidies which weigh upon our economy. The longer and more broadly our cultural and legal-policy methods take effect out in the world, the fewer are the prospects of continuing the heretofore successful course in our trade policy.

An internal deviation through restriction of the raw material imports of certain industries, for example the cotton industry, in favor of metal imports, is also intolerable for reasons of internal policy, since this would lead at once to discharges of workers and to an increase in the cost of living. A restriction of the textile industry would, moreover, hit precisely those workers who are already on short hours. Furthermore, a saving of foreign currencies for other raw material imports than metals would lead to undesirable repercussions upon our exports. Exportation, however, is the indispensable basis of all foreign-currency and raw-material procurement, including armament.

Charged with the conduct of affairs:

Signed: Dr. HJALMAR SCHACHT President of the Reichsbank Direktorium.

“Document EC-297-A: Address Of The Reichsbank President Dr. Hjalmar Schacht To The Employees Of The Former Austrian National Bank [translation]”, pp. 394-398.

Vienna, 3/21/1938

My comrades:

Though I am nursing a heavy cold and my voice usually sounds somewhat more pleasant, I did not want to put off today’s celebration for it is completely clear that just as Austria feels drawn toward Germany, so does Germany feel strongly drawn toward Austria. This is what has occupied my mind and for this reason I wanted to be with you as soon as possible, in order to prove to you how we are thinking in our community and to absorb from you your ways of thinking and feeling; for we use both for the work which we will have to perform jointly from now on.

The feeling that we are living in one of the greatest moments ever recorded in German history has entered deeply into all our hearts. The road of the Nibelungen from the Rhine to the Ostmark has become free again. It is our aim that intercourse of mutual work and cordial friendship will take place on it, in order that that road may never be blocked again in the future. We have often heard certain quarters say during the last weeks and months that Austria has a Special Mission. My friends, it is obvious that Austria has a mission as Bavaria or the Hanseatic cities have. After all, it cannot be denied that Prussia has had a certain German mission. But, friends, there is no German mission outside of Germany. (Large applause). Austria has certainly a great mission, namely, to be the bearer of German culture, to insure respect and regard for the German name, especially in the directive of the Southeast. Such a mission can only be performed within the Great German Reich and based on the power of a nation of 75 millions whichregardless of the wish of the opponents, forms the heart and soul of Europe.

We have read a lot in the foreign press during the last few days, that this aim, the union of both countries, is to a certain degree justified, but that the method of effecting this union was terrible. This method, which certainly did not suit one or another foreigner, is nothing but the consequence of countless perfidies and brutal acts of violence which foreign countries have practiced against us. These immoral methods started with Wilson’s 14 points, in which the right of self-determination of all nations was proclaimed. Just as soon as we put our arms down, in order to make a peace based upon those 14 point, all those promises were gone with the wind. In 10/1918, Germany and Austria were about to effect a “Zollunion” (Customs union) and a very close alliance. Then came the Armistice, and thereafter, the provisional Austrian “Nationalversammlung” (national assembly), based on Wilson’s points, declared it wanted the “Anschluss” (union) with Germany. That was on 11/12/1918, and on 2/21/1919, the constitutionally elected “Nationalversammlung” confirmed this resolution. But the Entente disregarded this declaration of the will of a free people, just as if nothing had happened. That, so far as Germany was concerned, the identical will for reunion existed was evident from the fact that the Weimar constitution of 8/11/1919, provided for Austria’s participation in the German Reich, its parliament and its government. The dictates of Versailles and St. Germain expressly prohibited a union of Austria and Germany. Of the many disgraceful things which happened at that time, I would like to point out only one, since the whole world today is overflowing with morality. The castle of St. Germain contained rooms for a museum of ethnology, and precisely the room in which the peace dictate for Austria was written was for the extinct races of mankind. When this was pointed out to Clemenceau, he said the following cynical words: “Well, that fits the Austrian perfectly.” This was the morality which those gentlemen practiced against us. They have no right, not the slightest right, even to waste a word over methods that don’t suit them. But we are glad the Austrian “race” has not died out, but that it has today received in greater Germany opportunities for greater achievement and development than it ever enjoyed before.

In 2/1921, the Austrian national council again made an attempt at Anschluss (union). It again provided for a plebiscite in order to proceed with the Anschluss. The Entente again threatened Austria with withdrawal of credits, hunger, blockade, and various other things, in order to frustrate this plebiscite. To make the Anschluss impossible, they even went so far as to threaten Austria with the loss of German Burgenland to Hungary. Nevertheless, the older ones among you probably recall the spontaneous voting in Tyrol and Salzburg with the results 98.5% in the Tyrol and even more than 99% in Salzburg in favor of union with the Reich. I believe that these expressions of will reveal much better the basic ideas of the Austrian people than a large number of editorials and speeches which we have read during the last months.

The economic difficulties of Austria had induced again and again the attempt to achieve closer relations with the great German Reich. The only road which finally was left was indebtedness to the foreign countries. When the Allies finally saw that something had to be done with Austria very soon, the first “Voelkerbund Anleihe” (loan of the league of nations) was given to Austria. The so-called Geneva loan protocol of 10/4/1922 contained as principal condition for this loan the obligation on the part of Austria, that it would never give up its political and economical independence! With such methods of extortion, it was tried to influence the feeling of the people by economical means. The next years are filled with plans, originating partly in Prague, partly in Paris, for a so-called “Danubian Confederation” since it was known that the small country of Austria by itself was not capable of surviving and since it was felt that something had to be done concerning its means of survival. It was the then “Bundeskanzler” (chancellor of the Federal Government), Dr. Seipel, who expressed in the Austrian National Rat on 6/27/1928, the feeling of the Austrian people when he said: “Whatever the economical schemes planned for Austria, we shall never manage without Germany.” All this did not prevent the Allies from persisting in their delusion. When the German Government in the face of increasingly difficult conditions tried to bring about a customs-union in 3/1931, the Allies again intervened by exerting all sorts of political and economic pressure. As a result, both of us, i.e. Austria first and Germany later, were drawn into the most terrible credit crisis which had ever swept over Europe.

In 1932, Austria was once more temporarily helped out of the crisis by a renewed bondage to foreign countries and no compunction was felt in reiterating the clause of the old Geneva Protocol of 1922, according to which Austria may not surrender its economic independence.

I think it is quite useful if we recall these things to our mind in order to expose all the sanctimonious hypocrisy exuding from the foreign press. Thank God, these things could after all not hinder the great German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a communion of German will and German thought, he bolstered it up with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht and he then finally gave the external form to the inner union between Germany and Austria.

I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which give offense and there I would not like to depart from this custom (hilarity). I know that there are even here in this country a few peopleI believe they are not too numerouswho find fault with the events of the last few days. But nobodyI believe doubts the goal and it should be said to all grumblers that you can’t satisfy everybody. One person says he would have done it maybe in one way, but the remarkable thing is that they did not do it (hilarity), that it was only done by our Adolf Hitler (long continued applause) and if there is still something left to be improved, then those grumblers should try to bring about these improvements from the German Reich and within the German community, but not to disturb it from without. (Lively agreement.)

The union of our two banks is but a small link in this great event, a link which has to maintain the chain, but which gives a special new task to each of us. May I also point out here, that Austria did not come to us with empty hands; rather I should like to recall to you who are working in the Austrian National Bank, the proud tradition of this institution. The German Reichsbank is slightly older than the Austrian National Bank, for it was founded already by Frederick the Great in 1765 and it transferred as the Prussian Bank to the … Reichsbank in 1875. The Austrian National Bank was founded as privileged National Bank in 1817, formed then from 1878 on together with Hungary, the Austrian Hungarian Bank and after the war, from 1923 on has been carried on under the name, Austrian National Bank. The economic and currency problems in the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy were, to some extent, much more difficult than in most other countries. The older ones among us, who know the history of the note banks, can only speak with the greatest respect of the achievements of the Austrian National Bank or of the Austro-Hungarian Bank. It has mastered all problems with immense objectivity, with the best scientific foundation, and yet with a strong sense for the necessity. It was a model institution, and if the employees and workers of this institution are still full of that same spirit which I have known from previous occasionsand I am convinced that this is so that I can only say: “We, in the German Reichsbank are glad to have you as co-workers.” (Long, lasting applause.)

My dear friends, whenever I have occasion to speak at home before the Reichsbank and its employees, I always try to remind my co-workers of this: the Reichsbank has never succumbed to any inner-political influences. The Reichsbank has always been true to the exhortation of Frederick the Great to be the servant of the state, to pursue a national policy and never to do anything not useful to the benefit of the German people. This goal united everybody in the Reichsbank from the executive down to the last clerk and therefore we are proud of being members of the Reichsbank. The Reichsbank considers itself as that office upon whose cleanliness, conscientiousness and sense of duty the state can most securely depend. (Stormy applause.)

The wish to which I want to give expression here. in the full conviction that it will be fulfilled is:

Transfer the faith, the sense of duty, with which you have served this office, to the greater institution, grew together with us in an inseparable esprit de corps of decency, diligence and performance of duty. Then we are not only going to be good comrades to each other, but we all are going to have the feeling that everybody is accomplishing on his part, a great task, even if it seems to be very small.

I would like to say a few details about our future co-operation. First, in regard to the business side, we already started to make direct payments by “sino” between Berlin and Vienna. On Saturday “sino” remittance from Berlin to Vienna and today it is also working the other way. We shall soon extend this arrangement to all branches and the whole Austrian territory will be incorporated in the “sino” system of the Reich. When we arrived here a few days ago, we had, of course, to take a number of security measures, which should mainly prevent the removing from Austria of anything that we can use quite well, here (Hilarity). In the course of carrying out these precautions, we froze payments above a certain amount. Since, however, I am certain that border intercourse around greater Germany will, within a very short time, be efficiently supervised, I believe that we can abolish this freeze in a few days.

Without laying any blame upon the National Bank, a large part of its business consists in winding up engagements from the depression year of 1931 now that the Reichsbank is opening its doors here, I should like to make an attempt to build up new business in new fields. We want to become a good and successful helper of the Austrian economy and we shall soon find sufficient opportunity for this. Austrian business will unquestionably pick up in the course of the development being stimulated here by the National Socialist economic policy. This will also open up new business opportunities for the Reichsbank and the latter will be able to render good services to both the discount and the loan (Lombard) business. At the moment, the money market in Vienna is still comparatively fluid. I believe that, when business is once stimulated in Austria, this money will, in the course of time, be put to good use. But we want to try right away to give Vienna the benefit of the Berlin money market and provide opportunities for short-term investments.

In particular, the promissory notes [Selawechsel] of the Gold Discount Bank pay better interest than anything available at the moment here in Vienna and we, therefore, want to make them available for money investments here also. Furthermore, it is quite obvious that the Austrian Banks will also participate in the next Reich loan.

You will see from that that we have the desire of strongly promoting the economic activities of Austria. We know very well that the incorporation of Austria into the control machine which we were forced to impose upon our economy, will cause some difficulties. But we shall try to keep the difficulties as small as possible and to give a major independent activity to Austrian economy in industry as well as in banking. I especially hope that the old Austrian Export Business will be maintained at the same high level as in the past. Finally we are going to give to the stock exchange here a broader security market by introducing a number of first-class German stocks.

A few more remarks about the organic fusion of the two institutions. From the greetings conveyed to me by wire from Vienna and from the branches, I have already realized how great are joy and readiness for cooperation existing everywhere and I would like to express my thanks for these greetings here and now. It is unavoidable that we should first send a group of German experts to reduce the organization to the same denominator. Their number will, however, be very small, first because there are very great similarities in the organization of the two institutions, and second, because we are confident that the officials and employees of the Austrian National Bank will work just as well and as faithfully as those of the Reichsbank. I have confidence in all of you, that you are going to perform your duties within the frame work of the Reichsbank just as well as the old members of the Reichsbank, and I know you are not going to disappoint me. (Strong, lasting applause.) This is also the reason for our willingness to incorporate at once the entire staff of the Austrian National Bank into the Reichsbank. May I make a human remark: confidence is enjoyed only by him who bestows confidence.

And now I should like to express the gratitude of the Reichsbank board of directors and my personal thanks for everything that has been done up till now. I want to thank the management of the Austrian National Bank for the laborious work performed through all these years. These have been difficult times, which have made almost superhuman demands on the willingness to sacrifice, the health, the strength and the endurance of the individual. My thanks go also to the assessors [Zensoren], whose cooperation, I trust, we shall continue to enjoy in the future, for it has always been a main point of our program to keep in close touch with all circles of industry, as well as with the farmers.

And now I am at the end of today’s remarks. I wanted to come to you as quickly as possible to show you that nothing stands between you and us and that we are one single family in the Reichsbank (stormy, lasting applause). If you form such a family unit, it is above all necessary to get mutually acquainted and therefore I should like to present to you two of my companions, who have come here with me today: Reichsbankdirektor Blessing, who in the future, will be in charge of Austrian affairs in Berlin and, further, our loyal personnel administrator, Stellenleiter Oberkampf. For I have said to myself that it is not only a matter of getting acquainted with “Big shots” (lively hilarity), but also of having the staff get into touch with one another. I also thank your Fachschaftsleiter, Mr. Wolf, very particularly for his words of welcome, which have shown me that we shall certainly grow into one family. And I thank you, Mr. Wolf, very especially for saying that the denunciation nuisance must stop. (stormy applause). In all movements and in all human works there are loud-mouthed and silent fighters. The loud-mouthed fighters are seen and heard, but the silent fighters are often overlooked. I consider it completely impossible that even a single person will find his future with us who is not wholeheartedly for Adolf Hitler (strong, continued applause; shouts of “Sieg heil”). Whoever does not do so had better withdraw from our circle of his own accord. (Stormy applause.)

I think I can say that I am quite well liked among my officials and employees in the Reichsbank, for in every stage of life I have stood up for the people entrusted to my management (stormy applause). Today I should like to say quite frankly to you: If you have to make any complaint against co-workers, I am the competent authority, and no one else. I shall see to the removal of anyone who does not fit into our frame work, but I will also not allow anyone to be insulted or denounced with impunity. The Reichsbank will always be nothing but National Socialist, or I shall cease to be its manager (heavy, protracted applause).

Now I shall ask you to rise. (The audience rises.) Today we pledge allegiance to the great Reichsbank family, to the great German community; we pledge allegiance to our newly arisen, powerful Greater German Reich and we sum up all these sentiments in the allegiance to the man who has brought about all this transformation. I ask you to raise your hands and to repeat after me:

I swear that: I will be faithful, and obedient to the Führer of the German Reich and the German people, Adolf Hitler,’ and will perform my duties conscientiously and selflessly. (The audience takes the pledge with uplifted hands.)

You have taken this pledge. A scoundrel he who breaks it. To our Führer a triple “Sieg heil”.

“Document EC-305: Meeting Under The Chairmanship Of Minister President General Fieldmarshal Göring On Questions Concerning The East [partial translation]”, pp. 402-403.

[in pencil]: Wi Rue Dept 383/40 Most Secret V.P.2999 Top Secret

Berlin 2/12/1940

20 copies 8th copy

Most Secret.

The following, among others, were present:

Reich Minister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, General Governor Reich Minister Frank, Reichstatthalters Forster and Greiser, Lord Lieutenants Koch and Wagner, ReichsführerSS Himmler, State Secretaries Koerner, Neumann, Landfried, Backe, Dr. Syrup, Kleinmann, Alpers, The Head of the Main Trust office East, Dr.h.c. Winkler.

By way of introduction, the General Fieldmarshal explained that the strengthening of the war potential of the Reich must be the chief aim of all measures to be taken in the East. Therefore it is necessary, that the conditions be stabilized as soon as possible, even if this means that the type and methods of administration will be different in the new Eastern Gaus from those in the General Government. From this it is obvious that, with the possible exception of the Beskiden Gau no part will be finally included within the German frontiers.

If all measures must serve the chief purpose of strengthening the economic power, we must refrain, within the area, from the attempt of Germany to bring it up to the standard of the Old Reich (Altreich) immediately. The process assimilation in the new Eastern Gaus will, therefore, be much slower than was possible in Austria and in the Sudeten Gau in times of peace. It will be the task of the Reich to carry out the reconstruction of the East with all its power after the end of the war.

With this chief purpose in view, the following principles for individual problems are to be observed:

1. Agriculture:

The task consists of obtaining the greatest possible agricultural production from the new Eastern Gaus disregarding questions of ownership. The Minister of Food and Agriculture has the sole responsibility for this, regardless of when, where and how they will later be settled. Transfer of property can be considered only for the Baltic Germans and for the Wolhynien German. …

2. Trade economy:

In the Reich Gaus, all essential industrial concerns of importance to the war, are to be reinstated. The examination of the raw material stovehouses is to continue; no great results will, however, be achieved by this. It is possible that the investigation of raw materials will have better success in the General Government. The main thing here is the petroleum which must be exploited and transported into the Reich regardless of how the payment for it is to be arranged. The mining of iron ore also must be pressed forward.

4. Special questions concerning the Government General:

… The General Government will have to receive the Jews who are ordered to emigrate from Germany and the new Eastern Gaus. However, it must not occur again that transport trains are sent into the General Government without notification of the General Governor in the regular way and at the right time.

II.

The following reported on the situation in the Eastern Territories:

1. Lord Lieutenant Gauleiter:

… There have been no evacuations. The Jews are employed on road construction and are needed for this purpose for a time. The Pole are employed in agriculture and in factories. Should the prisoners of war, employed in agriculture in East Prussia, be removed, as intended, into the interior of the Reich, East Prussia will need 115000-120000 Polish farm workers.

2. Reichsstatthalter Gauleiter Forster:

The population of the Danzig/West Prussia Gau (newly acquired territories) is 1.5 million, of whom 240000 are Germans, 850000 well-established Poles and 300000 immigrant Poles, Jews and asocials ( 1800 Jews). 87000 persons have been evacuated, 40000 of these from Gotenhafen. From there, also the numerous shirkers, who are now looked after by welfare, will have to be deported to the General Government. Therefore, an evacuation of 20000 further persons can be counted on for the current year. …

3. Reichsstatthalter Gauleiter Greiser:

The Gau has approx, 4.5 million inhabitants, of whom 400000 are Germans and 400000 Jews. So far, 87000 persons have been evacuated. Among these are no workers, except those who were politically tainted; agricultural workers have not been deported.

4. Lord Lieutenant Gauleiter Wagner:

Agriculture is in good shape. Industry could increase its output by 30-50% if it were possible to eliminate the transportation difficulties. No evacuations have taken place so far. However, for the future the deportation of 100000-120000 Jews and 100000 unreliable Polish immigrants is being considered.

The Reich Commissar for the consolidation of the German race, Reichsführer-SS Himmler, reports that 40000 Reich Germans had to be accommodated in Gotenhafen, and that room had to be made for 70000 Baltic Germans and 130000 Wolhynien Germans. Probably not more than 300000 persons have been evacuated so far (the Polish population being 8 Mill.)

On the other hand it will probably be necessary to transfer into the Eastern Gaus 30000 Germans from the Lublin area East of the Weichsel which is to be reserved for Jews.

“Document EC-317: The Evacuation Of The Harvest Crops And The Destruction Of The Means Of Production In The Agricultural And Food Economy In Parts Of The Occupied Eastern Territories [translation]”, p. 405.

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

Enclosure No. 2

The Reich Marshall of the greater German Reich Representative for the Four-Year PlanOffice of the Economic StaffEast V.P. 11207/6/3 gRs

9/7/1943. 3 Leipziger Str., Berlin. W. 8.

SECRET REICH MATTER!

40 copies/13th copy 8 supplementary copies 2nd supplementary copy.

By direction of the Führer, I give the following order:

1. In the territories East of the line fixed by the highest military command, the following measures are to be taken gradually, according to the military situation at the time. The measures are to be determined by the OB of the Army Groups:

i. All agricultural products, means of production and machines of enterprises serving the agricultural and food economy are to be transported away.

ii. The factories serving the food economy, both in the field of production and of processing, are to be destroyed.

iii. The bases of agricultural production, especially the records and establishments (storage plants, etc.) of the organizations charged with seizing the food economy are to be destroyed.

iv. The population engaged in the agricultural and food economy is to be transported into territory West of the fixed line.

2. The Chief of the Economic Staff, East, General of the Infantry, Stapf, is charged with the direction of the measures, as representative of the Economic Executive Staff. Execution takes place under the responsibility of the highest military command offices which are bound by the substantive orders of the pertinent departments of the Economic offices.

3. In the performance of his task, General Stapf is bound by the directives of the chief of the department of my office dealing with “Food”, State Secretary Backe. He is entitled to give binding orders to all military and non-military offices for the purpose of executing his task and of receiving the transported goods in the occupied territories and in the war theater of Germany.

[signed] GÖRING.

“Document EC-338: Directives For The Treatment Of Soviet Prisoners Of War [translation]”, pp. 411-413.

Berlin, 9/15/1941

Amt Ausl/Abw. Nr. 9731/41 geh. Chef Ausl. F XIV, E 1.

Secret To be submitted to the Chief of OKW

Notes of Speech.

REFERENCE: 2 f 24.11 AWA / Kriegsgef. (I) Nr. 3058,41 secret

To be submitted to the Chief of AWA

I. 1. The legal position is as follows:

The Geneva Convention for the treatment of Prisoners of war is not [“not” is underlined in purple pencil] binding in the relationship between Germany and the USSR, therefore only the principles of general international law on the treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since the 18th century these have gradually been established along the lines that war captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but solely protective custody [Sicherheitshaft] the only purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from a further participation in the war. This principle was developed in accordance with the view held by all armies that it is contrary to military tradition to kill or injure helpless people; this is also in the interest of all belligerents in order to prevent mistreatment of their own soldiers in case of capture.

2. The decrees for the treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War enclosed as supplement No. 1 are based on a fundamentally different view point, as is shown in the opening phrases. According to this view point military service for the Soviets is not considered military duty but, because of the murders committed by the Russians, is characterized in its totality as a crime. Hence the validity of international legal standards in wartime is denied in the war against Bolshevism. Furthermore much is set aside which, according to previous experience has proved itself not only as militarily useful but was also considered absolutely essential for the maintenance of discipline and efficiency of the own troops.

3. The instructions are very general. But if one considers their basic principles the expressly approved measures will result in arbitrary mistreatments and killings, the formal prohibition of arbitrary actions notwithstanding.

a. This results in the first place from the instructions about the use of arms in cases of insubordination. The guards and their superior officers who are entirely unacquainted with the languages of the prisoners of war will frequently not be able to determine whether non-compliance with orders is caused by misunderstanding of disobedience. The principle: “Use of arms against Soviet prisoners of war is as a rule justified” exempts the guards of any obligation for deliberation.

b. The treatment of the prisoners of war is removed to a large extent from the supervision of the Wehrmacht; to outward appearance, however, the responsibility will remain with the Wehrmacht.

aa. The screening of the civilians and politically undesirable prisoners of war as well as the decision over their fate is effected by the action [purple pencil note “very efficient!”] of detachments of the Security Police [Sicherheits Polizei] [underlined in purple] and the SD along principles which are unknown to the Wehrmacht authorities and the compliance with which they cannot check.

bb. The establishment of a camp police equipped with clubs, whips and similar tools is contrary to military conception, even though the policing is done by camp inmates; furthermore, the Wehrmacht authorities are thus handing over means of punishment to unknown persons without being able to really check on their use.

c. The final phrase of the decree suggests that the commanders of the prisoners of war camps act even more severely than the decrees provide for, in order to be sure not to be held responsible themselves.

4. According to general experience, unfair treatment provokes the spirit of insubordination, so that the guarding of these prisoners of war in all probability will always remain difficult. The instructions already provide for the employment of one guard for each 10 prisoners during work so that with the present number of approximately 1.5 millions of employable prisoners a minimum of 150000 men is required for guard duty.

5. Enclosure No. 2 is a translation of the Russian decree for prisoners of war which complies with the principles of the International Law and to a very large extent also the Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war. This decree will no doubt be disregarded by the Russian troops at the front but both the Russian as well as the German decree, are mostly for home consumption. Although it can hardly be assumed that the Russian decree will be adhered to in the Russian territory of the Soviet Union, there is the danger that the German decrees will be seized upon by the enemy propaganda and will be compared with the Russian decrees.

6. The reconstruction of the occupied territories, so essential for the German War Economy, will be handicapped. It will be made impossible for these prisoners of war who, because of their anti-Bolshevistic attitude or because of some special training or for other reasons could be used for the administration of these territories, to work for us after their release even though they might be inclined to do so after their experiences in the prisoners of war camps. Instead of taking advantage of the tensions among the population of the occupied territories for the benefit of the German administration, the mobilization of all international opposition forces of Russia for unified hostility will be facilitated.

7. Under the special conditions prevailing in the Russian theatre of operation, the will to resist of the enemy troops will be extremely strengthened by the enemy intelligence service and the very rapidly effective whispering campaign.

8. Possible sources of information will be blocked; prisoners of war who, as internal political opponents of the Bolshevistic regime, especially those belonging to minorities, could be used for counter-intelligence purposes will lose all willingness they may have to be enrolled. This applies especially to the nationalities of the territory of the Caucasus which is so decisive for the war economy.

9. It will be impossible to protest against the bad treatment of German soldiers in Soviet Russian captivity. [purple pencil note: I consider it useless!]

II. Office Ausl/Abw. (Foreign Counter-Intelligence) has not been consulted before issuance of these decrees of the order for their execution. For fundamental reasons as well as for the detrimental results certainly to be expected with regard to political and military matters, the office Ausl./Abw. has had considerable misgivings about them.

Signed: Canaris

2 Enclosures [The following notations appear on first page:]

Ink and pencil: vol 222-2 pencil: 338 Blue pencil: v. P 23 Nov. Brown pencil: submit to chief, office of Foreign Intelligence Berkner (?) 25 Sept. Red stamp: Secret Purple pencil: K 23 Sept. The Objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous warfare! This is the destruction of an ideology! Therefore I approve and back the measures K. Indelible ink: -2- chief foreign and chief intelligence III C. (illegible initials) 1 Oct. Blue pencil: (initials) 29 Sept. pencil: (initials) 22 Nov. Blue pencil: (initials IV 20 Oct. back to staff Ia 20 Nov. (initials) VI Indelible pencil: Ia [illegible letters]

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Az. 2f .11 General Armed Forces Dept. /P.W. (I) No. 3058/41 Secret 2 Enclosures

Berlin-Schoeneberg, 9/8/1941 Badenschestrasse 51

SUBJECT: Regulation for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.

Reference: 1. OKW/P.W. 26/41 Most Secret dated 1/16/1941 (only for the P.W. commandants in Service Command I and the General Government.

2. OKW/P.W. 2144/41 Secret dated 6/26/1941.

3. OKW/P.W. 2401/41 Secret dated 7/17/1941.

4. OKW/P.W. 15 No. 5015/41 dated 8/2/1941.

Appended is a collection of and/or additions to the orders already issued in various directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. The directives, already issued by OKH/Gen. Qu. for the operational areas, have been considered. By this order, any orders on this subject become invalid so long as no direct reference is made to them in the appendix.

Distribution:

Supreme Command army/gen. staff army/gen. Hq.: 10 Reich air force minister and C-i-C of air force: 2 Supreme Command Navy: 2 Armed Forces C-i-C Norway: 2 Service Commands I-XIII, XVII, XVIII, XX, XXI, also for branches 6 each: 102 Military Commander Government General and PW Commander: 25 PW Commander service command I: 15 Armed Forces Commander Baltic territories Riga, and PW Commander with armed forces commander Baltic territories at present Riga: 20 Armed Forces commander Ukraine, Powne, and PW Commander with armed forces Commander Ukraine, at present Berditschen: 20 Air district hq. II,XI,XII: 3 Naval station North Sea, Wilhelmshaven: 1 Naval station Baltic, Kiel: 1 carry over: 203

[red stamp and blue ink ]to No. 9731/41 secret foreign

carry over: 203

for information:

Reich Labor Ministry, attention Councillor Dr. Hoelk: 1 Reich Leader SS and Chief of German Police, Berlin SW: 11 Reich Labor Service: 10 Supreme Command Armed Forces /staff/ hq.: 2 Supreme Command Armed Forces JAG: 2 Supreme Command Armed Forces Armed Forces Propaganda: 2 Supreme Command Armed Forces foreign office/counter intelligence/foreign: 2 Supreme Command Armed Forces Foreign office/counter intelligence/counter intelligence I: 2 Supreme Command Armed Forces Foreign office/counter intelligence/counter intelligence II: 2 Supreme Command Armed Forces/Foreign office/counter intelligence/counter intelligence III: 2 Supreme Command Armed Forces general armed forces office/inspect./PW: 1 Supreme Command Armed Forces PW: 4 Supreme Command Armed Forces reserve: 20 Supreme Command Armed Forces draft: 1 [total:] 255

Chief of Supreme Command Armed Forces by order:

[The balance of this enclosure appears in Document Number 1519-PS. The second enclosure is a translation from Russian into German of a Russian decree pertaining to treatment of German PW’s.]

“Document EC-344-7: III. Armament Economy In Poland, 1939-1940 [partial translation]”, pp. 416-419.

[p. 1.]

B. Problems which influenced the armament economy

The foregoing part III A has given a total picture of the national economic situation of the general government territory with which the Wi organization had to contend with at the beginning and during its activities. In the following the questions of general and principle importance are to be illuminated as well as individual problems which had to be solved by the Wi in Ober-Ost in connection with measures for the armament economic exploitation.

I. Principal Questions

a. Hague Convention on land warfare

The war economic exploitation of the occupied enemy territory in favor of the occupying power can only be accomplished by interference with state or privately owned enemy property. The material right of requisition has been regulated by Article 52 of the Hague Convention, paragraph 1. (Expropriation by force to cover the needs of the occupying army) and by Articles 53 and 54, the right of the occupying power to the mobile state-owned property which can be useful to serve the purposes of the war. “OKW-Foreign Countries” has in digested form by directive of 11/9/1939, made clear the most important points which also are contained in Appendix TF II. Accordingly, the title to the mobile property of the enemy state is transferred as “booty” without compensation; these are war and armament economically important goods from the Polish state depots and armament works which were blocked and secured during the advance by the VO; the troops; the WT and later by the WIST (Armament Commands) and the Delegate for raw materials.

But also the mobile privately owned enemy property is liable to blocking insofar as it can be used to serve the war activities. With this, the legal instrument for the effective measures by the W WI authorities for the exploitation of the Polish armament economy were practically given, insofar as they concern the blocking and utilization of “mobile” goods because, with the modern conception of total war, not only battle actions but also the “economic armaments” belong to the war enterprise and therefore industrial inventories of raw materials, half- and finished products, as well as machines can be looked upon as serving the war actions. The question of compensation after the war for privately owned property according to the Hague Convention for the War on Land (Article 53, paragraph 2) does not touch, at least for the present, the measure of the W Wi agencies.

The immobile state property (see Article 56 of the Hague Convention) is only subject to use and administration by the occupying army but not to confiscation. There are no regulations about the privately owned immobile property apparently because at that time it was taken for granted that it was protected against interference.

Immobile property is legally everything that is tightly connected with the ground. If, therefore, the regulations of the Hague Convention were applied according to the letter of the law, it will have been illegal to block and remove installed machines (state and privately owned) which were a very important object of the war economic exploitation.

But such an interpretation is contrary to the recognized principle of the Hague Convention about the preference of the “necessitee de la guerre”. By analogous application of this principle, it is decisive, if the measures are justified by the necessities of war because according to Article 23g the destruction and confiscation of enemy property during hostilities is allowed if the necessities of war make it imperative, as is also acknowledged by the reporter of the Hague Conference, Rolin, for the rights of the occupation.

The analogy must be decided in the affirmative. All measures for the relief of the economic shortages for the benefit of waging war are necessities of war, considering Germany’s economic emergency and the prime importance of the economic war forced upon her. The economic war obeys the same laws as the war itself. All definitions of the law of war, rules, prohibitions and principles apply also to the economic war, which was not knownnot even dreamed ofin its present form at the time of the Hague Conference but only brought to life during the World War by the Anglo-Saxon interpretation of the war as people against people.

The blocking and removal of machines, even if they were securely tied to the floor and in this way made part of the ground and immobile or the breaking up of factory sheds and the utilization of their machines and the sheds in German Armament industry, has been made imperative by the necessities of the war and, therefore, the occupying power does not violate the principles and the meaning of the rights of war, even if the Hague Agreementnot foreseeing the development of the economic war in this respect contains limiting regulation. [This apparent gap of the Hague Convention, which has its reason in the unpredictability of the modern economic war, has been closed during the later phase of the war in respect to occupied France by steady practice in this way that no formal legal measurement for the civil law term “immobile goods” has been applied. Taking in consideration the necessities of the war, the German authorities, coming in touch with this question, have agreed to a very broad interpretation of this terminology so that in all cases where the connection with the ground was not very strong and unbreakable so that by its removal the object was not destroyed, they consented to it that the object was mobile.] “The war necessities (necessitee de la guerre) are in the same relation to the rights of war as the state of self defense to the criminal law.

This state of self defense must also be acknowledged as the reason for the confiscation of immobile privately owned property (principally machines) in which respect by analogous application of the regulations about the confiscation of mobile privately owned property (Article 53, paragraph 2) also a compensation has to be paid.

The employment of Polish workers in armament industries can in no way be regarded as a breech of the letter or meaning of the Hague Convention. The regulations of Article 52, paragraph 1, which say that services by inhabitants for the needs of the occupying army can be requested contain only the limitation that the population cannot be requested to take part in warlike actions against their own country. Even if the work in armament industriesthe production of war materials for the enemy can be regardedin a very broad interpretation as participation in actual warfarethis employment of Polish workers in armament industries will not be a breech of the Hague Convention because no force whatsoever was applied against the workers but allas shown in part III and Voffered voluntarily to work.

“Document EC-344-16 and 17: Report Summarizing Experience With “German Armament Industry In Poland 1939/40 [partial translation]”, pp. 419-421.

Copy

Chief Wi. Rue. Amt Berlin, 8/20/1940.

Distr. to Staff Wi Rue Ro W. Preispr.: with cc for the groups

I have ordered Rittmeister Varain to draw up a report regarding our experience with the armament industry of Poland, the structure, organization and achievements.

The following records which are on file with the Wi Rue Amt have been used as the basis.

1. The preparations for mobilization

2. The activity of the VO (liaison officer) with the OAK’s

3. The activity primarily of the Rue In Oberost

I request the departments and groups to inform Rittmeister Varain by 28.8.190 of all records in their possession with indication of subject matter (e.g. Survey Report of the VO), the file number (e.g. Vol. 16a) and the department having prepared the record (e.g. Rue. II c). This refers also to material which is already filed away in the record basement. Negative answer requested.

Rittmeister Varain will contact the departments regarding loan of the records for a short time.

If there are no special records concerning only Poland, attention must be called to material relative to this matter contained in other records and is to be loaned upon request in the individual cases.

As far as data are required directly from the Rue. In. Oberost they will be requested from this agency in case of need or will be used on the spot in Krakow.

(signed) THOMAS

cc: Rue.In.Oberost (Nachrichtlich)

REPORT BY CAPTAIN DR. VARAIN FOR GENERAL THOMAS ON “GERMAN ARMAMENT-ECONOMY IN POLAND” 1939-40, PART III B, P. 29, 30. [25.11.41]

In the first interview which the chief of the Central Division and the liaison officer between the Armament Department Upper East and the Chief Administrative Officer (subsequently called Governor General) had with Minister Frank on 10/3/1939 in Posen, Frank explained the directive, and the economic and political responsibilities which had been conferred upon him by the Führer and according to which he intended to administer Poland. According to these directives, Poland can only be administered by utilizing the country through means of ruthless exploitation, deportation of all supplies, raw materials, machines, factory installations, etc., which are important for the German war economy, availability of all workers for work within Germany, reduction of the entire Polish economy to absolute minimum necessary for bare existence of the population, closing of all educational institutions, especially technical schools and colleges in order to prevent the growth of the new Polish intelligentsia. ‘Poland shall be treated as a colony; the Poles shall be the slaves of the Greater German World Empire.’ When the representative of the Armament Office remarked that the Polish armament industry could be a valuable asset to the German armament industry, as had been established on the basis of the existing reports of the liaison officers, the Governor General rejected this argument because of political considerations. However, Minister Frank agreed to support the efforts of the Armament Inspection Upper East to participate in the securing and deportation of all materials, machines, etc. It seems that the reason for Frank’s opinion was that the war would be a short one and that it was most important now to make available as soon as possible raw materials, machines and workers to the German industry, which was short in all of these. Most important, however, in Frank’s opinion, was the fact that by destroying Polish industry, its subsequent reconstruction after the war would become more difficult, if not impossible, so that Poland would be reduced to its proper position as an agrarian country which would have to depend upon Germany for importation of industrial products.

“Document EC-347: Secret Directives For The Operation Of The Economy In The Newly-Occupied Eastern Territories (Green Folder) Part II (3rd Edition) Supplementary Material To Part I Berlin, 9/1942 [partial translation]”, pp. 421-423.

Economic Staff, East (OKW/WiAmt/Z 1/II Nr. 6250/42 geh.) 6000 copies.

Directives as Well as Fundamental Decrees and Orders of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Concerning the Eastern Territories Under Civilian Administration

A. Excerpts from the Directives of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories for the Civilian Administration (Brown Folder, Pt. I, pp. 25-30)

The principal task of the civilian administration in the occupied Eastern territories is to represent the interest of the Reich.

This basic principle is to be given precedence in all measures and considerations. Therefore, the occupied territories, in the future, may be permitted to have a life of their own in a form not as yet to be determined. However, they remain part of the greater German living space and are always to be governed according to this guiding principle.

The regulations of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which concern the administration of a country occupied by a foreign belligerent power, are not applicable, since the USSR is to be considered dissolved, and therefore the Reich has the obligation of exercising all governmental and other sovereign functions in the interests of the country’s inhabitants. Therefore, any measures are permitted which the German administration deems necessary and suitable for the execution of this comprehensive task.

High Command of the Army Gen St d H/Gen Qu Az. L/498 B (Qu 3/III) Nr. 1. 36201/41 geh.

Concerning Seizure and Transport of Raw Materials from the Occupied Eastern Territories

The raw material situation makes it imperative to bring into, and utilize for, German war economy, all available quantities of non-ferrous metalsin particular, copper, zinc and their alloysand also of textiles, leather, rubber, mineral oil, etc. Satisfactory results of the campaign of collecting scrap, old metals and other used materials can be expected only if forces of the army and of the RAD are made available to the organization for the seizure of scrap and old metals in the occupied territories (Major Schu), appointed by the Reich Marshall of the greater German Reich, representative of the Four-Year Plan. The actual collection must be done by prisoners of war and the civilian population. …

1. In the entire field of operations, collection and utilization of metals must be executed with all available forces. Factories, buildings, etc., must be ruthlessly stripped.

Factories and other enterprises are excepted which are necessary for supplying the army (munitions, armaments and leather factories) and for executing the principal economic tasks (the mineral oil economy, the food economy, as also those industries which constitute the foundation for the mineral oil and the food economy) .

J. Food Supplies for the Civilian Population the Occupied Eastern Territories

(Special Decree of the Economic Staff, East. dated 11/4/1941)

The following regulations are decreed for food supplies for the civilian population in the occupied Eastern territories, with the exception of the three former Baltic states. The regulations replace special decree, No. 31 issued by Wi Stab Ost/Fue/La No. 3584/41 of 9/4/1941.

The Reich Commissars for the Ukraine and Ostland will act upon these regulations, the latter only in the old Russian and former Polish territories.

Food Supplies for the Civilian Population

Ruthless looting and destruction by the Bolsheviks have most seriously dislocated economic life and transportation in the occupied Eastern territories. Misery and distress have been the inevitable consequence for the population, especially in the large cities. Responsibility for this rests exclusively with the Soviet rulers who gave the orders for senseless destruction.

It is nevertheless the task of the economic agencies in the zone of operations to safeguard the feeding of the population, insofar as this is possible without prejudice to German interests.

No special food supply regulations are required for the rural population, since it will be in a position, in general, to supply itself. The food supply of the urban population must definitely take second place after the requirements of the Wehrmacht and German agencies, and the delivery quotas for the Reich.

The following maximum ration scales, which can only be applied under the above qualifications, will provide the basis for urban food supplies:

Weekly Maximum Ration Scales (i grams)

a. For consumers not engaged in any significant work: Meat and meat products: none Fat: 70 Bread: 1500 Potatoes: 2000

b. For consumers performing useful work: Meat and meat products: 100 Fat: 100

In area of Army Groups, North and Center: Bread: Potatoes: 1500

In area of Army Group, South: Bread: 2000 Potatoes: 2500

c. For consumers permanently engaged on heavy manual work: (Supplements additional to b): Meat and meat products: 100 Fat: 50 Bread: 500 Potatoes: 1000

d. For children under 14 and Jews: (50% of the maxima as under a)

Other products than those listed above may only be allocated to the urban population after other requirements have been satisfied.

It has to be particularly taken into account that:

a. The food and transport situation does not permit a generous treatment of the civilians, and any allocations in excess of the maxima fixed above would result in unbearable disadvantages for food supplies to Germany.

b. Wehrmacht stocks or those earmarked for Wehrmacht or Reich consumption must on no account be drawn upon for feeding the civilian population.

c. The population itself in many cases still disposes of hoards, since, during the evacuation of the Russian forces, existing food stocks were distributed to, or looted by, the population. Therefore, genuine distress will in general only occur later on.

The following specific rules are laid down in agreement with the OKH (Quartermaster-General):

1. The Commandants or other agencies concerned determine as quickly as possible the number of inhabitants and report it to the local Economic Commands or Agricultural Leaders. A percentage of the population, which will depend on local conditions but is not to exceed 20%, is to be recommended for the highest ration scales as under b) above. Supplements as under c) may only be granted to the staff of enterprises which continue operations for German benefit (e.g. armaments plants).

2. Responsibility for procuring food supplies for the civilian population rests with the Economic Commands (Groups La) and their subordinate local Agricultural Leaders.

3. The Economic Commands (Groups La) determine the weekly ration scales which can be made available after provision has been made for other requirements (Wehrmacht, Reich delivery quotas, etc.), within the maximum scales fixed above. They also determine the percentage of the population which is to qualify for the increased maximum scales according to b). Finally, as soon as the necessary data can be obtained, they will limit supplementary rations as under c) exclusively to those workers of plants operating for German benefit who, according to German domestic regulations, would qualify for heaviest workers’ supplements. In determining the weekly rations, the following has to be observed:

For the initial period, the rations are to be kept as low as possible, in order to force the population to use up its own hoarded food supplies and to prevent encroachments upon Wehrmacht requirements, which are difficult to meet in any case because of the transport situation.

Meat and fat are not to be issued at all for the time being. Potatoes, as far as possible, are to be replaced by beets of all kinds, bread by buckwheat and millet. Gradually the rations can then be raised up to the maximum scales fixed above.

4. The quantities of foodstuffs calculated on the basis of the population figures determined as under 3) will then be released for civilian consumption. The distribution of released food to the population will take place exclusively through the native administrative agencies and distributive services.

For a better utilization of the food allocated, essential plants, if at all possible, will institute factory canteen feeding. In other cases too, when circumstances permit, communal feeding will be given preference.

5. Transportation needed for civilian food supplies is to be taken from local resources. Motor vehicles of the Economic Commands, local Agricultural Leaders or military vehicles may not be used for this purpose.

6. The population is to be instructed by suitable propaganda media (wall posters, etc.), that the blame for the food supply difficulties is to be found entirely in the destruction and dissipation of food stocks and equipment by their own compatriots.

7. Exceptional provisions for the feeding of Russian workers and employees are contained in the decree OKH/Gen St d.H/Gen Qu Az.l/833/41 IVa (IV, 1) of 8/23/1941; and for the feeding of Soviet prisoners of war in the decree OKH/Gen St d.H/ GenQu/IVa (III, 2) Az. 960 Nr. I/23 738/41 geh. of 10/21/1941.

The additional food requirements under these regulations are to be balanced by a corresponding reduction in the general rations within the areas of the Economic Commands.

(signed) DR. MUSSET

“Document EC-369 [translation]”, pp. 426-429.

Copy.

RK 717B 1/11/1939

recorded DAY MONTH YEAR TIME executed 10/1 2020

Berlin Main Telegraph Office 11/1

Telegraph Service of the German Reich Telegram from Berlin FD 112/109 10 2002

TO the Führer and Reichs Chancellor Berlin Berlin Main Telegraph Office

The Subscription to the fourth Reich loan of 1938 which ended yesterday did not bring the expected results despite special propaganda. Of the amount of RM. 1500 Millions, taken over by the Reich Loan Committee, a partial amount of RM 415 millions could not be placed through public subscriptions. Of this shortage approximately RM. 275 Millions will be subscribed to through the credit facilities of the Savings Banks and Associations. The banks represented in the Loan Committee hope to be able to sell gradually the balance of RM. 140 millions. The already unsatisfactory result is too further impaired by the fact that approximately RM. 160 Millions of previous loans had to be serviced during the subscription period.

Signed: Dr. Schacht

[Notes written in longhand on document.]

Respectfully submitted to the Reich Minister [ Initialed]

Vorg. RK 707 B LB S. Ang.v. 14,1 Miss Buge [Initialed] 1. [one word illegible] 1 photostat remains with the Files 2. Presented to the Führer today 3. Illegible Initials

Berlin SW111, 7 Jan.1939

The President of the Reichsbank Directory Confidential Reichsbank matter. To The Führer and Reich Chancellor Berlin!

The Reichsbank, for a long time, has pointed out the dangers to the currency resulting from overstraining of public expenditures and of short term credits. At the end of 1938, the currency and financial position has reached a danger point, which compels us to ask for measures which make it possible to master the threatening danger of inflation. From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the reconstruction of the German armed forces. It (the Reichsbank) therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to finance the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was the necessitywhich pushed all other considerations into the backgroundto carry through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible.

In carrying out this program it was decisive to prevent sign of inflation, because an inflation would not only have undermined the confidence in the National Socialistic leadership, but also because nothing can be gained materially through an inflation. At best, an inflation can deceive for a very short time the unexperienced broad masses as to the declining purchasing power of money, but leads then very quickly to an all the greater disappointment. Economically it leads to the destruction of liquid capital funds, it disorganizes the tax revenues and with them the total finances of the state, it undermines the desire to save and therefore renders impossible the placement of government loans, it raises the cost of imported necessary goods and will stop the clearing machinery and its great advantages, so that finally foreign trade comes to a stop.

In order to prevent signs of inflation, the Reichsbank, from the beginning, has insisted on two fundamental requirements:

1. a control over the money and investment market

2. a control of prices and wages.

In connection with the latter, the first signer of this letter as minister of economy, has urged the reinstatement of a price controller (after the discontinuance of the price control offices headed by Dr. Goerdeler), who was then newly appointed in the person of Gauleiter Josef Wagner.

The other requirement has been taken care of by a decision of the cabinet in 5/1933, which provided for a control committee presided over by the president of the Reichsbank.

The control over the money and investment market was intended to serve 2 purposes: first, the consolidation of short-term Reich obligations in the investment market and second, the placement of short-term Reich notes (Mefo-acceptances etc.) in the money-market. The use of the money-market made it possible to place approximately RM 6 Milliarden Mefo-acceptances outside the Reichsbank, in addition to the Mefo-acceptances of approximately RM 6 Milliarden which the Reichsbank carried in its portfolio, without burdening the money circulation. This was possible as the Reichsbank declared itself ready to cash at any time Mefo-acceptances, so that the available cash funds of the German economy could find in these acceptances a continuously renewing investment, however temporary.

These two controls over the money and investment market on the one hand and over wages and prices on the other hand operated (functioned) fairly satisfactorily, so long as the German economy had not arrived at the point of full employment. The production costs remained low due to greater utilization of the productive capacity and industry could cover its working capital requirements from rising operating profits without availing itself of the investment market to any large extent. The effectiveness of the controls however had to decline the closer the German economy neared the point of full and overemployment. The expansion of industrial plants, the employment of unskilled labor and lower productivity due to longer working hours, increased the costs of production, exhausted operating profits and forced industry more and more to replenish its financial requirements in the open investment market, which until then could be held available mainly for the financial requirements of the Reich. The investment market therefore was bound to fail for the increased requirements.

The overemployment of the economy was accompanied by scarcity of materials and labor and by a lowering of the quality. At the same time the relative production of consumer goods for daily needs lagged, so that the problem arose of increased total wages against a smaller quantity of consumer goods. Fast growing wages and price increases were the causes of this development. Of course the past increases of prices and wages differentiate. There are a number of goods for which prices have been maintained or probably even were lowered a little and there are labor groups which were not affected by the wave of wage increases for instance certain groups of the textile industry. However among other labor- and merchandise-groups, wage- and price-increases took place which especially lately assumed very extraordinary proportions. These increases become especially evident during the last 10 months of 1938. Beginning in March and through the period of the Austrian and Sudetenland invasion and the actions connected therewith, the wage- and price structure totally fell apart. Also, it is regrettable that a slackening or even a return to the former basis is not noticeable after the termination of our foreign political actions.

In regard to investments in stock on hand to which must be added the stock for armaments, the price increases are due to the excess of orders and the pressure for quick production. These demands have caused the failure of all planning by the authorities placing the orders, as well as the firms executing them. The parties placing the orders force the manufacturers to corner material and labor which has caused an excessive price- and wage racket because of the shortage of material and labor. In the field of consumer goods increases in prices were due to lack of sufficient quantity and quality. Especially in the field of daily requirements for the home and clothing, the lack of supply and above all the decline of quality is most evident. Children clothes, workers clothes etc., which formerly lasted for years last now only months, but cost the same or even more than the former good merchandise. On top of it, the well paid laborer overbids the less fortunate worker, which creates much ill feeling especially as far as food is concerned.

The currency however is endangered to a decisive degree by the unrestricted public expenditures. The unlimited growth of the government expenditures nullifies each attempt for an orderly budget, it brings the government finances to the verge of bankruptcy despite a tremendous increase in taxes and it undermines the Noten-bank and the currency. There is no “recipe” for system of financial or money technic, regardless how ingenious or well thought out it may be, there are no organization or control measures, which would be effective enough, to prevent the disastrous effects on the currency caused by a policy of unlimited expenditures. No note-issuing bank is capable of maintaining the currency standard against an inflationary policy of expenditures by the government.

Due to Treasury deficits running into billions [Milliarden], the Minister of Finance, during the last months, was continuously placed in the position to declare insolvency or to cover the deficit in the Reich finances through inflationary means of using the printing press (to issue money). Unfortunately, the Reichsbank can prevent this in the following field. The above-mentioned placement of approximately RM 6 Milliarden MEFO acceptance Bills in the money market was possible only with the promise of the Reichsbank to honor them (The MEFO acceptance-Bills) at any time (against cash). Should it be necessary for the Minister of Finance because of excessive expenditures, to draw funds from the institutions with which MEFO acceptance-Bills have been placed, then these acceptances will be presented to the Notenbank and will cause an inflationary increase of money in circulation. The ingenious and risky structure, which the Reichsbank organized to finance the armament, is consequently being shaken in its very foundation.

Furthermore to prevent the danger of inflation, provisions had been made, to redeem the MEFO acceptance-Bills 5 years from date of issuance. We are however faced with the fact that approximately RM 3 Milliarden of such acceptances cannot now be paid, though they will be due in 1939. Thus one of the most important correctives to prevent inflation, becomes ineffective, and one of the basic conditions, under which the early financing of the government expenditures through the Notenbank seemed bearable no longer exists.

The overall German exchange position at the present is therefore as follows:

1. Foreign: gold or foreign exchange reserves of the Reichsbank are no more in existence. The unfavorable balance of imports over exports is increasing fast. Exports no longer equal the value of our necessary imports. The reserves, created through the annexation of Austria and the requisition of foreign securities and domestic gold coins, are exhausted. The receipts for foreign exchange, which were issued by the control office [Devisenstellen] at the time of importation, are today, to a greater part, not covered by actual income of foreign exchange and therefore run the risk, that some day they cannot be paid due to lack of foreign exchange. Therefore the last foreign credit to cover our imports of goods would then be ruined.

2. Domestic: the assets of the Reichsbank consist almost in total of government securities (mainly MEFO acceptance-Bills). The Notenbank (note issuing bank) is therefore totally blocked and will not be in the position to grant the necessary credits when so required by commerce and industry. Exclusive of the Reichsbank, there are approximately RM 6 Milliarden MEFO acceptance-Bills which can be discounted against cash payment at any time at the Reichsbank, which fact represents a continuous danger to the currency.

On 7/1/1933, the currency in circulation amounted to 3560 Million Reichsmark. Up to 3/1/1938 it increased to 5278 Million Reichsmark. This increase of approximately 1,7 Milliarden Reichsmark in more than 5 years did not cause any mistrust in the currency policy, because during the same period the production of German industry almost doubled and there was not only an increase in the production of capital goods but also in the production of consumer goods.

From 3/1-12/31/1938, however, the currency circulation rose to 8223 Reichsmark, that is without including 2 Milliarden Reichsmark required for Austria and the Sudetenland. It therefore increased during the last 10 months more than during the preceding 5 years. The relationship of currency in circulation to the production of consumer goods alone is of vital importance to the stability of the currency value. Provided the currency circulation increases faster than the consumer goods production then an increased purchasing power is available to the total number of consumers against a lesser amount of goods offered, which must cause prices to rise. Covering the expended money with real estate, securities, etc., cannot retain the currency value as is clearly evidenced by the history of the assignat money of the French Revolution where in spite of forced rates, severe penalties, etc., a complete depreciation of currency occurred.

While an increase of public expenditures during the two great actions in Austria [Ostmark] and Sudentenland was a matter of necessity, the fact, that after the termination of these actions a reduction of the expenditures is not noticeable, makes it now our imperative duty to pay attention to the effects on the currency, because all indications are that a further extension of the expenditures is planned.

It is not our duty to prove to what extent an unrestrained policy of expenditures is compatible with the income and saving of the German economy or with the social requirements of the population. However it is our responsibility, to draw attention to the fact that a further use of the Reichsbank, be it direct or through requisitioning of the money market otherwise, is not compatible with a sound currency policy, but must lead direct to the road of inflation. The undersigned directors of the Reichsbank agree that, while they have gladly cooperated to attain the great goal, it is now time to put a stop to it. An increase in the production of goods is not possible by the increase of paper money (scraps of paper). By increasing the circulation of money and in view of the already fully taxed and even overtaxed German industry, one can only increase prices and wages but not production.

We are convinced that the effects on the currency caused by the policy of the last 10 months can be mended and that the danger of inflation again can be eliminated by strict maintenance of balance budget. The Führer and Reich Chancellor, himself, has publicly rejected, again and again, an inflation as foolish and fruitless (useless). We therefore ask for the following measures:

1. The Reich as well as all the other public offices must not incur expenditures or assume guaranties and obligations that can not be covered by taxes or by those funds which can be raised through loans without disturbing the longterm investment market.

2. In order to carry out these measures effectively, full financial control over all public expenditures must be restored to the Reich Minister of Finance.

3. The price and wage control must be rendered effective. The existing mismanagement must be eliminated.

4. The use of the money and investment market must be at the sole discretion of the Reichsbank.

(signed) Reichsbank-Directory Dr. Hjalmar Schacht Dreyse Pocke Ehnhard Puhl [illegible] Blessing

Reich Chancellery Rk 11 B g now RK 717 b, 707 B

Berlin, 1/14/1939

1. to a. Mr. Reich Minister of Economy Funkpersonally!

b. Mr. Secretary of State Reinhardt c/o Mr. Government Counsel Guendelpersonally! re a. Dear Mr. Reich Minister! re b. Dear Mr. Secretary of State.

Brk Kpl./Brk 14.1. enclosed in each one copy [initials]

With reference to the long distance telephone conversation, which Mr. Reich Minister Dr. Lammers had with you, I am pleased to enclose, by order of the Reich Minister, the photostat of a petition addressed to the Führer by the directors of the Reichsbank, which please keep confidential.

Heil Hitler Respectfully yours Signed: Kritzinger Ministerialdirektor

2. after making copies Obediently submitted to the Reichminister for his information (N.d.H.Min.Dir.Kritzinger) 8 initials

Berlin, 1/19/1939

1 RK 27 B g Rs now RK 1628 B

secret matter of state

To the Führer and Reich Chancellor

Respectfully submitted together with the two certificates of dismissal for the Reichsbank President, Reichsminister Dr. Schacht.

I was unable today to reach Dr. Schacht via long distance, but I informed him by telegram and his housekeeper by messenger, that you, my Führer, are expecting him tomorrow morning at 9 o’clock.

1/2 Bg 19.1 Bg. one copy submitted to Min. Dir. Dr. Meerwald 2. 2 telegrams of the Reich service: Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht

a. Berlin SW 111 Reichsbank b. Berlin-Dahlem, Vogelsang 9 Führer expects you tomorrow Friday morning nine o’clock

Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichschancellery

Dr. Lammers (N.d.H.RMin. ) 3. Z.d.A.

Copy of Telegram (German Reich Post)

To Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht Reichsbank Berlin C 111 During the night free of charge Reich Chancellery

Führer expects you tomorrow Friday morning 9 o’clock

Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery Dr. Lammers

19.1.39 at 23.35 o’clock transmitted by telephone to the Main Telegraph office initialed 19/1

belongs to file RK 27 Bg. Rs

Reich Minister RK 1628 B copy Berlin, 1/20/1939

1. The Führer has today signed the enclosed decree. It will not be published

2. To the Reichsbank Directory Berlin SW 111 enclose-1photostat

I am pleased to enclose, in photostat, a decree by the Führer dated 1/19/1939 of which please take notice.

At the same time I have the honor to inform you that the Führer has recalled from office the President of the Reichsbank Dr. Hjalmar Schacht in accordance with paragraph 6 section 7 of the banking act and has appointed to the presidency of the Reichsbank, Walther Funk, who retains his office as Reich Economic Minister.

The Führer has further recalled from their offices, the members of the Reichsbank Directory, Vice-President Dreyse and Reichsbank Director Huelse.

[handwritten note]: “A copy of the letter covering 1 and 2 has today at 11 o’clock been handed by me to Mr. Vice President Dreyse” [initialed]

Copy

3. To Mr. Vice President of the Reichsbank Directory Dreyse Berlin SW 111

Dear Mr. President:

The Führer has recalled you from your offices as member of the Reichsbank Directory in accordance with paragraph 6 section 7 of the banking act.

Please allow me to enclose the certificate of your dismissal

Respectfully yours

enclose 1 copy.

4. To the member of the Reichsbank Directory Mr. Reichsbank Director Huelse Berlin SW 111

Dear Mr. Reichsbank Director (same as 3) enclose 1 copy

5. a. Mr. Min. Dir. Kritzinger [initialed]

b. Mr. Reichscabinet Counsel Dr. W … [initialed] please take notice.

6. Z.d.A. (N.d.H.RMin.)

1/10/1939 (stamped) Secret!

now RK 707B 1 enclosure (double) REICHSBANK-DIRECTORY

Berlin, SW 111, 1/7/1939

Respectfully submitted to Reich Minister [initials illegible]

We are pleased to enclose a petition to the Führer and Reich Chancellor signed by the members of our board which you will please submit to the Führer at your earliest convenience. We enclose a special copy for your own information.

Reichsbank Directory

(signed) Dr. Hjalmar Schacht Dreyse Miss Buge [some words illegible]

Pencil notes:

1. Presented today to the Führer

2. Decision of the Führer appears in the enclosed decree of the Führer today and the dismissal and appointment documents dated 1/20/1939.

3. Illegible initials To the Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, Chief of Reich Chancellery, Berchtesgaden

Bank 12 [illegible pencil notes]

“Document EC-376 [translation]”, p. 436.

Copy

The Reichs and Prussian Minister of Economics Berlin, 12/11/1936 W 8, 43 Behrenstr. T4 12 G.O. GW 12/14/1936.

To All Supervisory Offices, (Excerpt IVI)

To remove all doubts I once more notify you about the co-operation with the office for German raw and synthetic materials, with the Reichs Commissioner for price control and with the business groups for distribution of raw materials of the president of cabinet council Supreme Commander Göring who is the deputy-in-charge of the Four Year Plan, as follows:

The supervisory offices are obliged to accept instructions from me only. They must answer all official inquiries of the office for German raw materials in order to give any information at any time to the fullest extent. If requests are directed by the office for German raw and synthetic material, the Reichs commissioner for price control or the business groups for distribution of raw materials to the supervisory agencies with which these offices agree in accordance with instructions and directives given by me, I herewith authorize the supervisory offices to take the necessary measures for themselves. In ease doubts should result from requests of the above offices and these doubts cannot be removed by oral negotiations with the specialized workers of that office, I should immediately be informed. I then will order in each ease the necessary steps to be taken.

Charged with the business management

(signed) Dr. Hjalmar Schacht President of the Reichsbank.

“Document EC-383 [translation]”, pp. 436-437.

Military Weekly Gazette [Militar-Wochenblatt]

Founded 1816 Editorial Administration Berlin SW 68, Koehstrasse 68-71 Telephone: A 1 Jager 7591

[in pencil] I. Schacht Berlin, 1/16/1937

Most esteemed Colonel:

In accordance with your wish, we are sending the article about Dr. Schacht back to you with our best thanks. It will appear on 22 January in “Militar-Wochenblatt” No. 28.

With German greetings, Devotedly, Tillmanns Major Gen., ret.

Dr. Hjalmar Schacht

On 22 January, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, the President of the German Reichsbank, entrusted by the Führer and Reich Chancellor with the direction of the Reich Economics Ministry, will celebrate his 60th birthday.

When the history of our age comes to be written, his person will play a special role in it. President of the Reichsbank at a time when the German currency, which had collapsed in the inflation, had to be built up again, guardian of this currency in the system period as long as he was able in any manner to reconcile it with his conscience, adviser to the Führer in the period of struggle, again Reichsbank president and director of German economic policy and, as such, finally, the man who made the reconstruction of the Wehrmacht economically possibletruly a career that, running through all depths and heights, elevates this man to one of the most significant phenomena of our day.

The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today as one of the men who have done imperishable things for it and its development in accordance with directions from the Führer and Reich Chancellor. The Defense Force owes it to Schacht’s skill and great ability that, in defiance of all currency difficulties, it, according to plan has been able to grow up to its present strength from an army of 100000 men. Together with the pro-Defense Force Reich Finance Minister, President Schacht insures the provisioning of the Defense Force and is a helpful and energetic adviser to the leading military agencies in all defense industry questions. The will of the Führer to bring the Defense Force up to ever greater strength is also a first commandment for Schacht; his economic policy is sound defense policy.

The Defense Force [Wehrmacht] wishes for this great political economist and warm friend of the Defense Force that many years of activity for the good of Führer and people, Reich and Defense Force may still lie before him. He should know on this day that the Defense Force thinks of him with gratitude and cordiality.

“Document EC-384 [translation]”, p. 438.

Secret Reich Matter

Copy of GB 151537 g. Rs.

20 copies 11th copy

A re-examination, made by the two undersigned at the instance of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, of the basic questions raised earlier, which are hereby settled, has shown that the tasks of the Deputy for the Four Year Plan and the tasks of the Commissioner General for War Economy are being solved in closest mutual cooperation. Moreover, no doubt exists about the fact that the Commissioner General for War Economy has the position of a supreme authority of the Reich.

Signed: Hermann Göring. Signed: Dr. Hjalmar Schacht.

Berlin, 7/7/1937.

“Document EC-397 [translation]”, p. 438.

Berlin, 1/19/1939

Dear Mr. Minister!

On the occasion of your recall from office as President of the Reichsbank Directory I take the opportunity to express to you my most sincere and warmest gratitude for the services which you rendered repeatedly to Germany and to me personally in this capacity during long and difficult years. Your name, above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the national rearmament. I am happy to be able to avail myself of your services for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reichsminister.

With German Greetings

Your (Signed) A. Hitler

To Mr. Reich Minister Dr. Hjalmar Schacht Berlin

“Document EC-398: [Reichsbank] [translation]”, p. 438.

In the Name of the German People

According to section 6 of the banking law I dismiss you as president of the board of directors of the Reichsbank.

Berlin, 1/20/1939

The Führer and Reich Chancellor (Signed) Adolf Hitler

To the President of the board of directors of the Reichsbank, Reichminister Dr. Schacht (Signed) Dr. Lammers

“Document EC-404: Minutes of Conference of the sixth session of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council [translation]”, pp. 443-445.

The Reichwehr Minister [Stamped] 2/9/1934 Berlin 2/7/1934 50 copies 14th copy

Stamped WaWi 2/12/1934

Secret Command Matter

[Footnote: “the reports of the individual departments are repeated in form of excerpts”] [Stamp on bottom of first page: No. 279/34 g. Kdos. Wa Wi”]

time: 1/23/1934 Beginning 10 :15 A.M. 1/23/1934 End 13:10 P.M. 1/24/1934 Beginning 10:15 A.M. 1/24/1934 End 13:50 P.M.

Participants:

Reichswehr Ministry:

Troop Office: Lieutenant General Beck Colonel v. Gossber (only on 24 Jan.) Lt. Col. Stapf Lt. Col. Niedenfuehr Lt. Col. Jodl Ministry Counsellor Dr. Weber Maj. Zorn Maj. Wagner Maj. Richter (only on 24 Jan.) Maj. (retired) Gercke Capt. Wolff Capt. Prueter Capt. Schmundt

Wehr Office: Col. Guderian Maj. Osterkamp Maj. Nehring Maj. Nieter Maj. Irmisch (only on 24 Jan.) Maj. (retired) Punt Capt. Koelitz

Minister Office: Major General v. Reichenau (only on 24 Jan.) Col. v. Vietinghoff Corvette Capt. Langsdorff Major Wable Capt. Boehme Capt. Count Kanitz Capt. (retired) v. Holtzendorff Capt. (retired) Heiss (only on 23 Jan.)

Arms Office: Lt. Col. Stud Maj. Warlimont Maj. Hauger (only on 24 Jan.)

Administration Office: Ministry Councillor Reich Ministry Counsellor Heufer

“H”, Army: Division Chief Kuethe (only on 23 Jan.) “Regierungs” Counsellor Muehle

Navy Administration: Rear Admiral Dr. (honorable degree) Groos Fleet Capt. Knenipel Fleet Capt. Ciliax Fleet Capt. (retired) Gochle Corvette Capt. Horstmann Corvette Capt. Nordmann Corvette Capt. Machens (only on 24 Jan.) Lieutenant Capt. Wagner Ministry Counsellor v. Stein Ober Regierung Counsellor Beuster (only on 24 Jan.)

Reviewers for the Reich Defense of the Reich Departments and the Prussian State Ministry.

Foreign Office: Legation Secretary v. Buelow Legation Secretary Haas (only on 23 Jan.)

Reich Ministry of the Interior: Ministry Counsellor Erbe

Reich Finance Ministry: Ministry Counsellor Dr. Bender Ministry Counsellor Wapenhensch

Reich Economy Ministry: Ministry Counsellor Godlewski Regierung Counsel Dr. Barth

Reich Labor Ministry: Ministry Counsellor Schroeder Reich Labor Office Director Jaspersen (only on 24 Jan.) Lt. Col. (retired) Hofmann Reich Command of the Labor Service

Reich Post Ministry: Ministry Counsellor Delvendahl (only on 23 Jan.) Lt. Col. Dohne, “V.O.” with the Reich Post Ministry (only on 23 Jan.)

Reich Traffic Ministry: Ministry Counsellor Schmidt Regierung Banrat Walther Reichsbahn Director Dr. Ebeling (only on 23 Jan.) Ministry Counsellor Sussdorf Reichsbahn Oberrat Luettge Maj. Zuckertort, “VO” with the Reich Traffic Ministry

Reich Justice Ministry: Ober-Regierungsrat Dr. Riese

Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture: Ober-Regierungsrat Dr. Dietrich Major (retired) Kriegsheim Staff director of the main division 1 in the Administration Office of the Reich Food Estate

Reich Air Ministry: Major (retired) Speidel Capt. (retired) Behrendt Regierungsrat Giessler Mr. Heydenreich (only on 24 Jan.) Mr. Tschirsig (only on 24 Jan.)

Prussian State Ministry: Regierungsrat Dr. Schnitzler

Supreme SA Command: Brigadeführer Juettner Sturmbannfischrer Count v. d. Schulenburg.

The Chief of the Troop Office

Lt. Gen. Beck: opens the sixth session and welcomes the representatives of the chief of staff of the SA and of the Reichsbahn Administration who are present for the first time.

Pointing to the military political situation, as was stated in the beginning of the fifth session, Lt. General Beck emphasizes that the preliminary work for the Reich defense allows for no delay.

Establishment of the actual state of preparations is the purpose of this session. It represents the basis for the continued work. At the same time, the competence of various offices, particularly in the field of war economy has to be settled definitely.

The questions raised by the Reichswehr Ministry may give some suggestions to the report writers.

Reich Finance Ministry

First Report: Ministry counsellor Dr. Bender

Questions 1-3 deal mainly with measures for the accomplishment of preparedness of financial for war.

Answer: This question is divided in three main groups

a. Financing a mobilization and the need for the first 30 days.

b. Making the funds available.

c. Financing the continued war course.

Measures have not been taken, since decisions of the participating departments chief have not yet been submitted. An examination has been concluded in the Reich Finance Ministry as far as department reviewers are concerned.

Later negotiations with the Reichsbank were taken up with the Reich Economy Ministry participating. At present, preliminary questions are being worked on at the Reichsbank. In about three months, the preparatory work can be finished as far as department reviewers are concerned.

In case of a suddenly occurring conflict, financing of mobilization can be carried out in the shortest time (24 hours). According to the opinion of the department reviewers of the Reichs bank, the inventories of the Reichsbank of piece money (Stueck Geld) (paper money and coins) are sufficient.

At present, statistics are also being compiled to be able to make comparisons with inventories at the outbreak of the world war. Important is the knowledge of Army needs for each single day of the first 30 days of mobilization and for the second and third months of the war. The question of financing later conduct of the war is not urgent, but has to be examined.

The question of to what extent purchases for the mobilization can be made against “Anerkennt-Nisse”acknowledgments have to be answered from the standpoint of Reich finances to the effect that should be made of them as much as possible.

An early knowledge of the new War Services is very desirable.

Lt. General Beck: Data on the need of the Wehrmacht (armed forces) have to be compiled speedily.

A draft of the War Services Law will be handed out in February.

Question 4: What Financial and fiscal measures will have the effect of strengthening plants essential for war and of maintaining them?

Answer: Finance political measures: Subsidies, loans and shares.

Fiscal measures:

1. Paragraph 1 of the Reich Taxation Regulations [Reich Abgaben Ordnung] enables the Reich Finance Minister to moderate taxes or to make exemptions from them. Examination of the individual case.

2. The Law of 7/1/1933 (Reichgesetzblatt, Reich Law Bulletin-1 page 323) provides for tax reductions for replacement procurements: Procurement costs of machines may be deducted from the profits.

3. The Law of 7/15/1933 (Reich Law Bulletin) page 491; paragraph 1 provides for tax reduction for repairs in and additions to plant buildings. 10% of these expenditures may be deducted from taxes.

4. Paragraph 3 of the same law authorizes the Reich Finance Minister to grant tax exemptions and reductions.

REICH ECONOMY MINISTRY.

Ministry Counsellor Godlewski:

Starts his report with general statements. At the beginning of the work. A new field. The question of whether to pick up where the war economy of 1918 left off or to start from scratch was in view of the changed circumstances, decided in favor of the second alternative. Since the time limit is set for 10/1/1934, the work is divided in three parts:

1. Statistics on requirements and the possibility to cover it.

2. Draft of plans for filling supply gaps and legal preparations.

3. Preparations for setting up an organization.

The foreign political situation forces us to deviate from the plan and out of the three parts to give preference to the most necessary measures, which can be taken before 4/1/1934. Then the first goal will be followed (on 10/1/1934) by the distant goal, which will have to be:

To provide about 240000 plants with mobilization orders and a mobilization calendar; to accomplish this work that will take years is necessary.

Regierungsrat Dr. Barth: Takes over in answering the questions.

Question 1a: Status of preparations of organizational measures for the conduct of war economy in its preparatory peace activities?

Answer: Present organization for planning and management of the work:

a. On the highest level: Beside the general review office and the groups for raw material, fuel, finished goods, technical matters, and foreign trade, corresponding committees are to be set up which should be in close touch with the Army Arms Office

Sub-committees for statistics, prices and skilled workers. Classification of skilled workers who hold key positions is important. The money economy will be regulated with the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank. The Reichsbank has appointed a full-time administrator. In the Reich Economy Ministry full time assistants to experienced department workers have been appointed, and an increase in their number has been prepared.

b. In the local organization: Solution for the time being trade inspectors of the provinces [Laender] are temporarily at the disposal of the Reich Economy Ministry. Final solution: 14 full-time department workers with eight Prussian Provincial Prefects and six Reich Governors or State Governments (landesregierungen). Details have to be worked out. Funds for this purpose have been requested in the budget for 1934-35.

Question 17b: Status of organizational measures for the conduct of war economy in view of a surprising “1” case, occurring before the conclusion of the planned preparations.

Answer: A plan for further extension has been drafted:

a. Enlargement of the Reich Economy Ministry.

b. Twenty-three War Economy Offices (attached to fourteen Prussian Provincial Prefects and Reich Governors).

Directors: People from the Reich Economy Ministry, from Chambers of Commerce and foreign trade agencies who have to be provided with far reaching power.

c. Establishment of War Economy Offices in countries and country-free cities.

d. Professionals, public-law management agencies at main headquarters. The carrying-out of measures directed at saving of individual raw materials, etc., by assignment, ear-marking and settlement.

The ability to function is only a question of people and space. On paper the organization is set up, it can be ready by 1 May.

Ministry Counsellor Godlewski: To this end assignment of the persons concerned is necessary. Fundamental decision of the question whether this seems possible from the viewpoint of foreign policy.

Lt. Col. Stud: Connection with industry has to be taken up. Proposal: Nothing in writing, the military purpose may not be traceable.

Lt. General Beck: Promises a decision.

Question 2. Status of preparation for legislative measures involved in surprisingly occurring “A” case.

Answer 1: A decree concerning ear-marking and seizure of 38 raw materials, is ready. Others will follow.

2. As to finished products, data for the regulation of consumption (ration coupon system) will probably be ready by the middle of February. Their transformation into a decree is set by 1 April.

3. Decrees with the purpose of facilitating importation and rendering exportation more difficult are ready for 38 raw materials.

4. The price examination decree is ready.

5 The authorization law for the Reich Economy Minister is prepared. Publication of the “War Services Law” by the Reichswehr Ministry is urgent!

Lt. Col. Stud: Supports the proposal and deems it necessary to let go into effect the parts applicable in peace-time.

Lt. General Beck: A draft of the War Services Law will be forwarded to the Reich Ministry in the beginning of February.

“Document EC-405: Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council [partial translation]”, pp. 450-452.

Time: 6/26/1935 Place: Large Conference room of R.K.M. Begun: 10:00 Ended: 12:40

Generalmajor v. Reichenau:

1. Opens meeting and introduces to the Working Committee as new members:

Herr Min. Dir. Dr. Kruemmel, as R. V. special representative (Referent) for the Reich Ministry for Science and National Education (Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung)

Herr Director Dr. Mueller of the Reichsbank, as R. V. special representative for the Reichsbank Board of Directors.

He states that, with the exception of the Reich Conservator of Forests [Reichsforstmeister], who has already requested that a R. V. special representative be designated, all the highest Reich authorities are participating in the preparations for and the responsibility for the defense of the Reich and are represented in the Working Committee.

He greets, further, SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich, who was requested for his own enlightenment to take part in the meetings of the Working Committee.

In taking up the newly added fields of activity, Gen. Major v. Reichenau repeats the already frequently expressed plea that, in confident cooperation, not only the demands of the Wehrmacht be supported, but that, also, suggestions for new lines of activity be brought forward from one’s own sphere of work and placed before the Working Committee.

He states, further, that the securing of the Wehrmacht’s supply bases and the preparation for planned employment of the German people’s economic resources are just as important prerequisites for the defense of the German living space [Lebensraum] as are the military preparations proper.

2. There has been a change in the head of Section L of the Wehrmachtsamt and also in its representation in the Working Committee. Oberst v. Vietinghoff gen. Scheel has been succeeded by Oberstlt. Jodl.

3. The information concerning the military situation, desired by certain departments, has been stricken from the agenda because the rapid expansion of the Wehrmacht and the fluid political situation make going into such matters at this time seem in expedient. Insofar as information concerning the military situation will help the members of the Working Committee to perform their tasks, it will be furnished them in the course of their cooperation with the individual Wehrmacht offices.

The question of standardization of identification papers has also been dropped from the agenda, since the preliminary work in one of the departments [Ressort] concerned has not yet been finished.

4. Today’s deliberations occur at a turning point in the history of our nation, the regaining of military sovereignty and the reintroduction of universal compulsory military service.

The most important legal foundations for the restoration of military preparedness and the direction of the nation in war have already been laid.

The compulsory military service law [Wehrgesetz] has already been proclaimed. In addition, the following laws have been drawn up by the Reich Government and put into effect:

a. The Reich Defense Law.

This furnishes the framework and foundation for all preparations for the defense of the Reich. Certain conceptsdefense status and mobilizationpertaining to a unified preparedness for war are established and defined herein.

It also regulates the powers of the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy. Wartime economy will be able to solve the problems put to it, only if it has been prepared in time of peace. Therefore, this peacetime preparation, also, was to be assigned to the Plenipotentiary General. For this reason, the Reich Government drew up the following decree on 21.V:

“Supplementing the Reich Government’s resolution of 4.4.33 and 12.4.34 regarding the formation of a Reich Defense Council, the Reich Government has drawn up the following decree:

1. The “Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy”, appointed by the Führer and Reich Chancellor for the eventuality of mobilization, begins his work while peace still obtains. Following directives issued by the Reich Defense Council, he will direct the economic preparations for the event of war, insofar as they do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Reich Minister of War where they concern the armament industry. In case of mobilization, there will be placed under his authority:

Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs, Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture, Reich Labor Ministry, Reich Finance Ministry, Reichsbank,

the last two, insofar as financing the conduct of the war is concerned. These Ministries and supreme Reich authorities are bound, in peacetime, too, by his directives for the preparation of the war economy.

2. The Reich Minister of War and the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy will cooperate closely in the preliminary measures of mobilization.

3. The Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy is a permanent member of the Reich Defense Council. In the permanent Working Committee, he represents, through his operations staff, the interests of the war economy. The special representatives [Referenten] in the Reich Defense Council of the Ministries listed under Point 1 are bound by the directives of this operations staff.”

The regulation of the tasks of the Plenipotentiary General relative to this peacetime preparation will be contained in the military Economic Regulations [Wehrwirtschaftsordnung], now in process of preparation in the Reich War Ministry, which will be distributed to the highest Reich authorities concerned, for their opinions.

By decree of 5/31/1935, the Führer and Reich Chancellor has taken the President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, into consideration as the Plenipotentiary General.

b. Law Providing Total Mobilization for War [Kriegsleistungsgesetz]

This law makes it possible to require from the German people all services and material contributions that must be demanded of them for the conduct of the war and the achievement of victory. It places every German, his person and his property, at the service of Reich defense.

This drafting of the entire strength of the people is an absolute prerequisite for the necessary total preparedness in the sense of the modern conduct of war.

The utilization of German manpower in its entirety is effected through the “Deutscher Volksdienst” [German National Service]. This service, which will drastically affect the individual life of every German, is incorporated in a special law, the

c. National Service Law [Gesetz uber den Deutschen Volksdienst]

The Volksdienst makes possible the drafting for personal service of all Reich citizens between the ages of 15-65 who have not been called up for military duty.

The direction of the Volksdienst is the responsibility of the Reich Labor Minister.

Military service and national service are to be administered with the closest possible agreement between the Reich Minister of War and the Reich Minister of Interior, on the one hand, and the Reich Labor Minister on the other.

In connection with these war laws, the Cabinet further determined upon a “Security Law” [Gesetz ueber den Sicherungszustand], to replace Article 48 of the old Constitution. Even though internal disorders are not to be expected under present conditions, the enactment of this peacetime law is necessary to the completion of the legal framework for safeguarding the security of the Reich.

The Führer has ordered that the promulgation of these laws be postponed until further notice. Although unproclaimed, they constitute the basis for military and civil preparations in case the situation becomes serious. The Total Mobilization Law [Kriegsleistungsgesetz] will be made known, subject to special security provisions, to the administrative authorities of the middle grades [mittleren Verwaltungsbehoerden], including the district presidents [Regierungspraesidenten], and to the authorities of like grade in the other Reich departments [Ressorts]. An order concerning this has recently been issued to the Reich departments.

Generalmajor v. Reichenau:

The Reich War Minister is entirely aware of the validity of the demands made by the individual departments, which are based for the most part on his directions. For this reason, he has decided to divert from Wehrmacht funds a considerable sum for the Reich defense measures in the civil field.

All departments must recognize the fact that the demands of the Wehrmacht have first priority. As long as it is not even possible to assure the financing of the planned 36 Divisions of the Army [Heer] and the other Wehrmacht units in the desired strength, even urgent demands of the civilian administration must be rejected. Moreover, the Reich Minister of War will do what he can this very next year to see that sufficient funds are secured for the most pressing civil needs.

F. Oberstlt. Jodl (W.A. (L)): on “Participation in Mobilization Preparations”.

The practical execution of the preparatory mobilization measures ordered by the Wehrmacht and the supreme Reich authorities requires a considerable expansion in personnel concerned. The principle that “results are more important than concealment” [Wirkung geht vor Deckung], applies here in connection with mobilization preparations. This loosening of the heretofore closely restricted circle of persons must not be permitted to result, after the publishing of the conscription decrees [Wehrfreiheit], in alarming the public, here and abroad, by a succession of conspicuous measures preparatory to mobilization.

The provisions of the decree, “The Reich Minister of War W.A. No. 1375/35 g.K. L IV a of 26.6.35”, are in general the authority for the guidance of officials, organizations, and individuals in the future. In accordance with this, all the resources of the nation that are indispensable to the preparation of the R.V. can be drafted or at least prepared, while keeping within the limits of the security regulations issued.

The existence of mobilization preparations is not to be admitted, however, to persons not directly concerned [Unbeteiligten]. The individual mobilization measures are still subject to the directives issued concerning secrecy. Insofar as they cannot be camouflaged, they are to be explained on the basis of peacetime necessities.

The demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his speech of 21.5.35 and other utterances, the Führer and Reich Chancellor has stated that the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact regarding the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the Aide memoire of the French Charge d’affaires, of 17.6.35, on “Recruiting offices [Ersatzdienststellen] in the demilitarized zone”, the German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting authorities [zivile Ersatzbehoerden] nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have been entrusted with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of war or in preparation therefor.

Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present under all circumstances, only those preparatory measures that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The existence of such preparations or the intention of them must be kept in strictest secrecy, in the zone itself as well as in the rest of the Reich.

These preparations include, in particular, the following:

a. Mobilization measures pertaining to the national police [Landespolizei] and the security police [Schutzpolizei], as well as to the Gendarmerie.

b. Mobilization measures pertaining to transportation and communications.

c. Preparation for the “liberation of the Rhein”.

d. Preparation of local defense [Ortsschutz].

e. Preparation of the Reinforced Frontier Guard [Verstaerkten Grenzaufsichtsdienst].

f. Preparation of blockade measures [Sperrmassnahmen].

g. Preliminary mustering of horse-drawn and motor vehicles.

h. Preparation for evacuation measures.

i. Mobilization measures for drafting of persons. [Mob. Massnahmen fuer die personelle Erfassung.]

j. Preparation of economic mobilization.

Commitment to writing of directives for mobilization purposes is permissible only insofar as it is absolutely necessary to the smooth execution of the measures provided for the demilitarized zone, and without exception such material must be kept in safes. Weapons, equipment, insignia, field-grey uniforms and other items stored for mobilization purposes must be kept from sight. Mobilization drills, roll-calls, and training with military weapons are forbidden. I am calling the attention of all administrative authorities participating in mobilization preparations in the demilitarized zone to the prudence prescribed by the present political situation and am emphasizing especially that in the demilitarized zone, in contrast to the rest of the Reich, the principle that “concealment is more important than results” [Deckung geht vor Wirkung] must be applied at present.

“Document EC-406: Minutes Of The Eleventh Meeting Of The Reich Defense Council [partial translation]”, pp. 455-457.

Time: 12/6/1935

Start: 1000 End: 1335 Place: Large Conference Hall of the Reich Ministry of War.

Participants:

Wehrmachtamt: Reich Ministry of War: Major General Keitel

L: Lt. Col. Jodl Commander Krancke Lt. Col. (E) Hofmann Major Zeitzler Major Boenicke Lt. Commander Meyer-Doehner Captain Voelter Major (E) von Steinwehr Major (ret’d) von Mauch

W Stb: Colonel Thomas Lt. Col. Warlimont Major Beutler Major Mueller Major (E) Drews (Liaison officer to the Reich Ministry for Economy) Captain Czimatis

Abw: Major (E) von Frankenberg und Ludwigsdorf

H: Min. Dir. Tischbein Min. Rat Hollender

J: Captain (E) Ritgen Captain Hielscher

W R: Min. Rat Dr. Rehdans

Just. I: Min. Rat Rosenberger

Supreme command of the army:

Army General Staff: Lt. Col. Wagner Lt. Col. (E) Petersen Lt. Col. (E) Gercke

Supreme Commander of the Army:

General Staff of the Army: Captain Bluemke Captain Bader Captain von Grolmann

Allgemeines Heeresamt: Colonel Kempf Colonel Engelbrecht Major Schindke (Liaison Officer with the Reich Ministry for Post) Captain Hassel

Army Weapons Office: Captain Loehr

Army Administrative Office: Min. Rat Reich

Supreme Commander of the Navy: Captain (Navy) Coupette Captain (Navy) Fleischer Captain (Navy) Ciliax Captain (Navy) (E) Goehle Commander Tobye Commander Nordmann Lt. Commander Kaehler Min. Rat Frerichs

Supreme Commander of the Air Force: Lt. Col. Doerstling Major Maass Major (E) Lademann Min. Rat Knipfer

Advisors (Referent) for Reich defense of the highest Reich authorities and of the Prussian State Ministry

Plenipotentiary of the Führer and Dipl. Reich Chancellor for economic questions: Eng. Keppler

Leadership Staff of the GB: Min. Dir. Wohlthat Min. Rat, Geh. Rat Worbs Min. Rat Sussdorf Ob. Reg. Rat Nolte Reg. Rat Dr. Burandt Dr. Noack

Foreign Office: Leg. Sekr. von Buelow

Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior: Min. Rat Wagner Staatsanwalt Dr. Roeder Major of Protective Police Abraham

Reich Ministry of Finance: Min. Rat, Geh. Rat Dr. Bender Min. Rat, Geh. Fun. Rat Wapenhensch

Reich and Prussian Ministry for Economy: Min. Rat Godlewski

Reich and Prussian Ministry for Food and Agriculture: Ob. Reg. Rat Dr. Dietrich, Reich Commissioner for Special Assignment (z.b.V.) Kriegsheim

Reich and Prussian Ministry for Labor: Min. Rat Schroeder

Reich Ministry for Justice: Min. Rat Haastert

Reich and Prussian Minister of Communications: Min. Rat Schmidt, Rudolf

Reich Ministry for Postal Service: Postrat Timme

Reich Ministry for Public enlightenment and propaganda: Major (ret’d) von Wrochem

Reich and Prussian Ministry for Science, Education and Public Knowledge: Min. Dir. Dr. Kruemmel

Directorate of the Reichsbank: Director with the Reichsbank Dr. Mueller

Main Administration of the German Railroad Corporation Reichsbahndirektor Dr. Ebeling

Reichsbahnoberrat Luettge Inspector General for the German Highway System: Ob. Reg. Baurat Schoenleben

Reich Chief Forester and Prussian State Chief Forester: Ob. Landforstmeister Schuette

Prussian State Ministry: Min. Rat Bergbohm

Schedule of the Day

A. Utilization and tasks of the leadership staff of the Plenipotentiary-General for war economy. Page: 7

B. Nutritional standard, in case of mobilization, based on the harvest of 1935. Page: 12

C. Required overseas imports in time of war. Page: 20

D. Preparation for procurement of funds for the individual phases of mobilization. Page: 24 Procurement of funds for ships abroad. Page: 27

E. Legal obligations of the shipping corporations, demands of the Armed Forces to be filled in new ship construction. Page: 30

F. Mobilization book for the civil administrations. Status of the preparations. Page: 34

G. Unification of war-time police system (reinforced police protection). Page: 38

H. V.G.A.D. in the Saar territory. Page: 44

J. Change evacuation plans. Page: 46

K. Unification of individual identification cards. Page: 47

L. Organization of the civilian air-raid precautions. Do difficulties exist in limitations to other civilian mobilization tasks? Page: 50

M. Miscellaneous. Page: 55

N. Questions by the Reich authorities. Page: 56

Major General Keitel

1. Opens the conference and takes over the chairmanship of the Reich Defense Council, expresses his thanks to Lieutenant General von Reichenau for his work until now as chairman of the Reich Defense Council in the latter’s name and forwards thanks and farewell greetings of Lieutenant General von Reichenau.

He points out the progress, achieved in the meantime, in the extension of the Reich Defense by the Reich authorities and its legality instead of improvisations. He emphasizes that hand in hand with the accelerated building-up of the Armed Forces, the organization of the entire nation for Reich defense must be carried out, namely at an increased speed, if we want to catch up rapidly to the advantage of the other nations.

He further explains: the mobilization year begins on 1 April and ends on 31 March. The mobilization book for the civilian administrations will be issued for the first time on 4/1/1936. That 1 April must find us ready for action in the realm of possibility.

2. It is basically new in the organization of Reich defense to commission the Plenipotentiary-General for the war economy with its leadership and preparation.

The leadership staff appointed by him for the first time is present in the Reich Defense Council.

Major General Keitel, therefore, welcomes as new permanent members of the council

Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat as Chief of the Leadership Staff of the Plenipotentiary-General for the war economy

Ministerialrat, Geh. Rat Worbs as financial advisor in the Leadership Staff of the Plenipotentiary-General for the war economy.

He explained that the highly developed economy of a large state needs unified leadership and strict management in time of war. The Armed Forces have greatly welcomed the appointment of the Plenipotentiary-General for the war economy. Because it takes into account the experience of the last war and because it is assured that by this division of responsibility no decomposition of the organic structure of the combined preparations will result, but that the efficiency will increase.

He also welcomes the Reich Defense Advisor of the Reich Chief Forester Oberlandforstmeister Schuette.

Major General Keitel emphasizes to the new members, that the slogan for our common effort in the field of the Reich defense is “Unity and Unification.”

Thereafter, Major General Keitel discusses two important fields: raw materials and money.

According to the will of the Führer, the economic leadership puts the increase of our armed might knowingly ahead of other requirements of the state. It is the task of all members of the Reich Defense Council to utilize the national property, made available, primarily for this purpose and economically in the framework of the entire situation, and request only such funds and raw materials which serve absolutely and exclusively the Reich defense. Limitation and thrift in the individual measure increase by themselves the extent and thereby the effectiveness of the preparations.

3. The following are dropped from today’s schedule: Reports on the activity of the East Prussia Council and on the cooperation of the Reich authorities amongst themselves and with the service commands [Generalkommandos] at the Mittel and Kreis level, because they are not yet to be discussed in the Reich Defense Council. They will be included in the report at the next conference.

A. Ministerdirektor Wohlthat. Chief of the Leadership Staff of the Plenipotentiary-General for the war economy:

Utilization and tasks of the Leadership Staff of the Plenipotentiary-General for the war economy.

1. The Reich defense law of 5/21/1935 and the decision of the Reich Cabinet (Reichsregierung) of the same day concerning the Reich Defense Council constitute the legal basis for the Leadership Staff of the Plenipotentiary-General.

2. The directives for the unified preparations of the Reich of 11/1/1935 regulate the cooperation between the Plenipotentiary-General and the Chief of the Military-Economic Staff.

In the same manner as the Chief of the Military-Economic Staff coordinates all war economical preparations in the Ministry of War and represents them to the Leadership Staff of the Plenipotentiary-General, the Leadership Staff of the Plenipotentiary-General coordinates the war economical preparations of the authorities under the Plenipotentiary-General and represents them to the Chief of the Military-Economic Staff.

In questions of the war-food economy, this representation takes place on the part of the Reich Minister of War in close cooperation with the Supreme Commander of the Army (Army Administration Office) and on the part of the Plenipotentiary-General in cooperation with the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Food and Agriculture.

Colonel Jodl (W.A(L)):

Mobilization book for the civil administrations. Status of the preparations.

Obscurities still exist about the technical execution of the unified preparations for Reich defense. In the following explanations, therefore, the survey about the status of the preparations and the intentions of the Chairman of the Reich Defense Council is to be given.

The preparations for the civil administrations for Reich defense are established in: “work-plans”, in “the mobilization book” and in the “mobilization calendars.”

1. In the work-plans the task of the civil administration for the preparation of Reich defense are established. They further contain the limitations of competence and necessary participation of other Reich authorities in the individual measures.

The work-plans, being the directives of the Reich Minister of War and of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and of the Plenipotentiary-General for the War Economy, form the basis of all mobilization preparations of the civil administrations.

The work-plans will be decided on together by the appropriate special agencies of the Armed Forces and the highest Reich authorities, and will be issued by the office of the secretary of the Reich Defense Council.

Insofar as the working plans for individual administrations are not yet decided upon, or do not need to be renewed, their completion is to be attempted by 4/1/1936.

The Reich Defense Advisors are requested to review their plans in that respect and to forward their requests to the office of the secretary of the Reich Defense Council.

2. The mobilization book for the civil administrations has a dual purpose:

a. It creates for the responsible state leadership a survey of the extent of the civilian mobilization measures and their political importance.

b. It forms a unified basis for the execution of the mobilization outside the Armed Forces.

“Document EC-408: Report Memorandum on the Four Year Plan and Preparation of the War Economy [translation]”, pp. 465-466.

Div. of National Defense [Abt. Landesverteidigung] Secret Command Matter Initialed G. 31/10

12/30/1936 4 copies 3rd. copy.

The Führer and Reich Chancellor has conferred powers in regard to mobilization preparations in the economic field that need further definition. Powers were granted:

1. The Reich Minister of War and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, by decision of the Reich Government on 4.4.33, to act as competent representative of the Führer and Reich Chancellor in matters concerning Reich defense.

As stated in the cabinet decree, he is responsible for the execution of the measures determined upon by the RVR and issues the directives for it to the Reich ministries and other offices, which are then responsible for the further steps necessary.

This grant of authority definitely takes into account the superior position, in time of war, of the R.K.B., which is emphasized by the delegation of the executive power (cf. RVC).

2. The Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy, through the Reich Defense Law and the Reich Government’s resolution of 21.5.35.

The GB [Generalbevollmachtigte], according to this, is to commence his work in peacetime and direct the economic preparations for the eventuality of war.

To this end, the economic departments [Ressorts] were uniformly placed under his authority in matters concerning the R. V.

3. Minister President Generaloberst Göring, as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, by authority of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, granted 18.10.36.

As regards the war economy, Min. Pres. Gen. Oberst Göring sees it as his task “within 4 years to put the entire economy in a state of readiness for war.” (Cf letter Göring-Schacht St. M. R. V. 516 g.Rs. of 18.12.36.)

Minister President Gen. Oberst Göring was also given far-reaching powers to issue directives to all the highest offices [Obersten D1enststellen] of the state and the party.

The mere comparison of these tasks has shown (see correspondence Min. Pres. Gen. Oberst Göring-Minister Schacht as GB for War Economy) that this situation is untenable.

A fruitless correspondence will be carried on among the offices of the three persons empowered to accomplish the same tasks, without leading to unified cooperation in attaining the goal.

It is recommended, therefore: That the Führer be asked to limit the authorized powers on the following basis:

1. Reich Minister of War. During war: Executive power, in order to secure uniformity in the conduct of the war by order of the Führer. In peacetime:

a. Power to issue directives to all highest Reich agencies for the uniformity of all preparations, insofar as demands must be adjusted and the decisions concerned do not warrant the attention of the Führer.

b. Unlimited command and control right in the armament concerns and in their utilization as well [sowie deren Bestimmung].

2. Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy. during war: Centralized direction of war economy, excluding armament industry. In peacetime: Unified preparation of the war economy as heretofore.

3. Commissioner for the Four Year Plan. During war: suspended [aufgehoben]. In peacetime: Safeguarding the independent basis of the life and economy of the German people. To the extent that this task entrenches upon the sphere of the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy [GB fuer die Kriegswirtschaft], joint action should be taken [im Einvernehmen handeln]. In case of divergent purposes, the decision will be made by the Führer and Reichs Chancellor after consultation with the Reich Minister of War.

“Document EC-410 [translation]”, pp. 466-469.

Volume 37a [in pencil] Copy Appendix 10 [in red ink] Berlin W 8 10/19/1939 Leipzigerstreet 3.

Ministerpresident General Field Marshal Göring Deputy for the Four Year Plan, President of the Council of Ministers for the defense of the Reich Lt. M. Dev. 9547

To the Reich Ministers, the offices [Geschaeftsgruppen] and plenipotentiaries of the Four Year Plan In the meeting of October 13th, I have given detailed instructions for the economical administration of the occupied territories. I will repeat them here in short:

1. The task for the economic treatment of the various administrative regions is different depending on whether a country is involved which will be incorporated politically into the German Reich or whether we deal with the Government General which, in all probability, will not be made a part of Germany.

In the first mentioned territories the reconstruction and expansion of the economy, the safeguarding of all their productive facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well as a complete incorporation into the Greater German economic system at the earliest possible time. On the other hand, there must be removed from the territories of the Government General all raw materials, scrap materials, machines etc. which are of use for the German war economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely necessary for the meager maintenance of the naked existence of the population must be transferred to German?, unless such transfer would require an unreasonably long period of time and would make it more practical to exploit those enterprises by giving them German orders to be executed at their present location (compare also appendix 2 of the decree by the supreme command of the army of 10/9/1939, number 1927/39 secret).

2. In spite of the different political treatment, the fact, that all territories have up to now belonged to a uniform economic expanse with many mutual obligations, requires a uniform economic direction center for the time being and this can be exercised from Berlin only, the way things stand now.

3. I have reserved this uniform direction for myself already in my decree of 9/28/1939 (St. M. Dev. 8924/39). Also under the new order of these matters, I reserve for myself to a large extent not only the issuing of general directives, but also of individual orders in the economic field.

4. In order to make the territoriesespecially also those to be added to the Reichserve in the best way the aim pursued by the Führer, the property of real estate, plants, mobile objects and claims, which are to be taken over by the Reich from Polish hands, must receive uniform custody and administration.

For this purpose, I have formed a Main Trustee Office East [Haupttrenhandstelle Ost] which is under my personal jurisdiction and which has to fulfill the following tasks:

a. The seizure of the property of the Polish state within the territories occupied by German troops and provisions for its lawful administration; corresponding measures are in force for private property in Polish and Jewish hands;

b. The regulation of the money and credit system according to more detailed instructions by the Reich Ministry for Economics;

c. the ordering of all economic measures which are necessary for the transfer of the economic administration to the individual administrative districts, and the execution of the necessary settlements of claims and accounts;

d. the preparation of a settlement with the foreign creditors which might possibly become necessary.

e. The Main Trustee Office East [Haupttrenhandstelle Ost] which has its seat both in Berlin and at the Reich Minister Frank will set up trustee offices in the individual administrative districts; these offices will be under the direct jurisdiction of the Main Trustee Office East. The trustee offices have to keep the administrative chief of its administrative district, at ail times, informed about their activities.

f. Only the Main Trustee Office East can, in agreement with the corresponding administrative chiefs, respectively with the Governor General (Supreme Administrative Chief) order confiscations. Confiscations carried out up to now by local offices are valid only if they are confirmed by the Main Trustee Office East. If the confirmation has not been issued up to 2/1/1940, the confiscation loses its validity.

The Main Trustee Office can appoint commissary administrators for the administration of enterprises and property of all kind. Inasmuch as such administrators have already been appointed by other offices, the Main Trustee Office can recall them and assign other administrators. The administrators need the exoneration of the Main Trustee Office East. The Main Trustee Office East may transfer its power to the local trustee office. Military requisition and the use of real estate, furniture etc. for the direct purposes of the civil administration will not be affected.

g. The Main Trustee Office East may issue administrative regulations for the execution of its task. General orders have to be published in the official gazettes of the administrative districts, in order to become valid.

h. I have charged the mayor Winkler, retired, with the setting up and temporary direction of the Main Trustee Office East.

5. As I have already outlined in the meeting of October 13th, I expect the leaders of the administrative districts to give the fullest support to the measures carried out by the Main Trustee Office and the trustee offices. The smoother this support will be rendered, the faster the Main Trustee Office East will be in a position to finish its activity in the individual administrative districts. Every wild confiscation and every enrichment of individuals will be prosecuted on the basis of the general penal and martial laws; the main issue is that the dispossessed Polish property which has been confiscated will be used in the interest of the Reich, that means in everybody’s interest, but not for the benefit of some individuals.

Signed Göring

To: a. Reich Minister Frank b. Gauleiter Forster c. Supreme President and Gauleiter Koch d. Supreme President and Gauleiter Wagner, Breslau e. President of the Senate, Greiser, Posen I send you this copy for your acknowledgement and further action.

Signed Göring

Verified: STRANDMANN Administrative Secretary

“Document EC-411 [translation]”, p. 469.

Order by Hess, Deputy Führer, of 11/20/1939.

“I hear from party members who came from the Government General that various agencies, as, for instance, the Military Economic Staff, the Reich Ministry for Labor, etc., intend to reconstruct certain industrial enterprises in Warsaw. However, in accordance with a decision by Minister Dr. Frank, as approved by the Führer, Warsaw shall not be rebuilt nor is it the intention of the Führer to rebuild or reconstruct any industry in the Government General.”

“Document EC-415: Schacht In His Statements [Schacht in Seinen Aeusserungen] [partial translation]”, pp. 469-471.

[Berlin, 1937, Printed in the Reichsbank Printing Office] [Page 20]

Responsibility means not only to initiate a matter, but to carry it through to the end.

Everyone who has to rely upon himself, will utilize his forces to do the right thing, whereas the member of a mass will only too gladly rely upon the others. The masses lack initiative which necessarily originates within the individual. That is why the masses always like to follow a leader personality.

When we envisage-dangers, we have to be able to identify them. And we have to take precautions that these dangers do not come up.

(The End of Reparations, Oldenburg, 1931).

Only when a nation values her own ability and efforts as something valuable and when it sets its own cultural values above all others, is it able to add something worthwhile to international peaceful cultural cooperation.

(Principles of German Economic Policy, Oldenburg, 1932).

[Pages 131-132]

How can it be that, despite the most strenuous economic efforts, two decades of the postwar period have been able to restore so little? A new generation has grown up, and the devastated fields and cities have been rebuilt. But the memory of war weighs undiminished upon the peoples’ minds. That is because deeper than material wounds, moral wounds are smarting, inflicted by the so-called peace treaties. Material loss can be made up through renewed labor, but the moral wrong which has been inflicted upon the conquered peoples in the peace dictates leaves a burning scar on the peoples’ conscience. The spirit of the Versailles has perpetuated the fury of war, and there will not be a true peace, progress or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning.

(Address of 7/16/1936 in Hamburg at the occasion of the launching of the “Pretoria”).

From the first moment after the war I have joined the ranks of the then few who pointed out the senselessness of a policy dictated by the shortsighted hatred and chauvinist ignorance.

Strange as it may sound, the occupation of the Ruhr signified the turning point in the question of reparations, because it created, in the economic and moral sense, a legal situation favorable to Germany, since it exposed in full clarity to the world the stupidity of Poincare’s policy in its economic implications.

The Versailles dictates can not be an eternal document, because not only its economic, but also its spiritual and moral premises are wrong.

(The Stabilization of the Mark, Stuttgart, 1927).

Germany has too little living space for her population. She has made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other nation, to extract from her own existing small space whatever is necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in spite of all these efforts, the space does not suffice. The lack of industrial raw materials is even greater than the scarcity of foodstuffs. A securing of the means of livelihood for the German people can not be effected by commercial-political agreements of any kind. The allocation of colonial space is the given solution for the existing difficulties.

(Lecture of 12/9/1936, at the occasion of the Centennial for Geography and Statistics in Frankfurt-on-the-Main).

“Document EC-416: Secret Reich Matter. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting [Ministerrat] of 9/4/1936 [translation]”, pp. 471-472.

[12 Noon.]

Chairman: Ministerpraesident Generaloberst Göring. Reichskriegsminister Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg. Reichsbankpraesident und Kommissarischer Reichs- und Preussischer Wirtschaftsminister Dr. Schacht. Reichsfinanzminister Graf Schwering von Krosigk. Preussischer Finanzminister Prof. Dr. Popitz. Staatssekretaer Koerner. Wirtschaftsbeauftragter des Führers Keppler. Ministerialdirektor Staatsrat Neumann. Stabsamtsführer des Reichsbauernführers Dr. Reischle. Keeper of the minutes: Lt. Col. Loeb of the General Staff.

Min. Pres. Göring:

Today’s meeting is of greater importance than all previous meetings.

At the last cabinet meeting of 8/11/1936 it was agreed that supplementary material was needed in order to make it possible to reach a decision.

Meanwhile new trouble has arisen, especially in connection with non-precious metals and rubber; even the Führer has been drawn into this affair.

In the discussion of 9/1/1936 it was established that any trouble must be avoided before the party meeting [Parteitag]. Geh. Rat Allmers had no authority for the letter in which he speaks of a 2-3 working week for the automobile industry. On 1 September temporary measures for the period lasting until the middle of October, when a decision will be reached, were ordered and are to be carried through.

In the same meeting special attention was called to our unpaid claims upon foreign countries which are presumably higher yet than the reported claims. Thus it is stupid to rack one’s brain because of a few million marks. But an examination must be made in order to find out whether the claims reported as bad cannot really be collected.

Existing reserves will have to be touched for the purpose of carrying us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by the Führer has been reached; in case of war they are not a reliable backing in any case.

Certain persons have been asked for memoranda on the basic conduct of economy. So far only one was presented by Dr. Goerdeler and it is absolutely useless. In addition to many other erroneous thoughts it contains the proposal of considerable limitation of armaments.

In this connection it should be stated that the authority of the Col. General refers to the “insuring of armaments” which must rather be speeded up than slowed down.

The Führer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the Col. General and the Reich War minister which represents a general instruction for the execution thereof.

It starts from the basic thought that the showdown with Russia is inevitable. What Russia has done in the field of reconstruction, we, too, can do.

Just what sort of risk is it, that our industry is afraid of, compared to the risk in the field of foreign affairs which the Führer runs so continuously?

The Führer is going to have a memorandum issued concerning the financial angle of this problem.

Research on the problem of increasing exports, e.g., has shown that fundamentally new ways can hardly be found. It will not be possible to create a balance of foreign exchange merely by means of export. The “New Plan” of the Reichswirtschaftminister is acceptable in its basic featuresbut it can be improved in details.

The Colonel General reads the memorandum of the Führer.

The Colonel General is responsible for the execution of the tasks outlined in the memorandum.

If war should break out tomorrow we would be forced to take measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the present moment. They are, therefore, to be taken. Two basic principles:

1. We must strive with greatest energy for autonomy in all those fields in which it is technically possible; the yearly amount of foreign exchange savings must still surpass that of the first proposal of the raw materials and foreign exchange staff anticipating a savings of 600 million Reichsmarks.

2. We have to tie over with foreign exchange in all cases where it seems necessary for armament and food.

In order to provide for foreign exchange, its flow abroad must be avoided by all means; on the other hand, whatever is abroad must be brought in.

The Führer is going to speak very soon to the industrial leaders and expose to them his fundamental thoughts.

In view of the power of the State the necessary measures can definitely be carried through. Frederic, the Great, to whom reference is being made from the most diverse sides, was in his financial behaviour a strong inflationist.

Through the genius of the Führer things which were seemingly impossible have become a reality in the shortest time; last example: introduction of the two-year service law ‘and recognition on the part of France that we need a stronger Wehrmacht than France herself. The tasks now ahead of us are considerably smaller than those which we have already accomplished.

All those measures which can be carried through with internal German money are possible and should be carried out. Through them the requirements of industry and food supply needing foreign exchange must be pushed into the second line.

All measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.

The execution of the order of the Führer is an absolute command.

End of meeting: 1300.

“Document EC-419: [Rearmament Financing] [translation]”, pp. 474-476.

D.R.d.F.

Berlin, 9/1/1938

Secret Matter Of State

There has been no possibility to explain verbally to you the financial situation of Germany, although I asked for this opportunity. I consider it my duty to describe to you the present situation and for further explanations and additions, I am at your disposal at any time.

1. Since the assumption of power, the definite policy has been followed to finance the large and once occurring expenditures for the first labor procurement and for the rearmament by means of loans. When this was not possible through the normal use of the moneyand investment market, that is from the annual savings increase in Germany, the financing was arranged through the discounting of bills of exchange (trade and MEFO [Metallurgic Research Inc.] bills of exchange) at the Reichsbank, which means the printing of money. This creation of funds was of no danger to the currency because the increased circulation of money was offset by a corresponding increase of production. When, at the turn of 1937-1938, the state of full production was reached, the system of MEFO bills of exchange, which at that time amounted to 12 milliards RM, was abandoned, because this system by now would have resulted in inflation. Also it could be abandoned as the increasing income from taxes and the growing savings offered the possibility to cover the normal expenditures through taxes and loans. The income from federal taxes, from 1932-1937, increased from 6.5 milliards to 14 milliards. During the same period armament expenditures rose from 3/4 milliards to 11 milliards.

The development of the Reich debt is as follows:

In milliards RM. Funded debt: 12/31/1932: 10.4 6/30/1938: 19. Current debt: 12/31/1932: 2.1 6/30/1938: 3.5. Debt (not subscribed to by public): 6/30/1938: 13.3. Trade and MEFO Bills of Exchange): 12/31/1932: 12.5 6/30/1938: 35.8

This shows that the Reich debt has tripled.

Provisions were made to cover the armament expenditures for the year 1938 (the same amount as in 1937) as follows:

5 milliards from the budget, that is taxes. 4 milliards from loans. 2 milliards from 6 months treasury notes (which means postponement of payment until 1939). Total: 11 milliards

Income from taxes and the investment market offered the security that this program would be maintained within its limits.

2. During 1938 a basic change occurred.

(a) The armament expenditures increased to 14 milliards caused by the retaking of Austria, the fortifications in the west, and the increased tempo of armament. I have provided for cover as follows:

6 milliards from the budget, that is taxes. 6 milliards from loans. 2 milliards from 6 months treasury notes (which means postponement of payment until 1939). Total: 14 milliards

The increase from 5-6 milliards charged to the budget is covered by the increase of corporations taxes, from 30-40%, and the transfer of certain tax incomes from the communities to the Reich. The amount of 6 instead of 4 milliards from loans can be obtained if the investment market is made unavailable for all other purposes, especially the building of homes; corresponding measures have been taken in collaboration with Minister Funk.

(b) It was intended to float another loan in September (the last loan was floated in April). This is very necessary because the increasing cash expenditure for the Army (900 millions in August, 1200 millions in September) have completely exhausted the cash balances of the Reich. The cash resources will be exhausted during September; a statement regarding the proceeds resulting from a loan is not necessary, as the securing of funds by means of printing of currency is out of the question.

(c) The intended floating of a new loan is faced with the difficulty, that during the last weekssince the middle of July and in an especially alarming degreeReich obligations have appeared on the market and had to be absorbed by the Reich. If these obligations would not be taken up, Government issues would drop in value; because of it the floating of future loans by the Reich would be difficult or impossible. Up to now, 465 million RM’s had to be absorbed.

(d) The reasons for the liquidation of Reich loans is found in:

(1) The necessity of industry to finance itself.

(2) A larger inventory of stocks (to safeguard against any temporary shortage of materials).

(3) The hoarding of money caused by the fear of the limitation of credit.

(4) And in the conversion of Reich obligations into material values caused primarily by a warand inflation psychosis. The inflation psychosis is strengthened due to the wage and price increases since 1937 which now are very evident in the western territories. The war psychosis originates from the gossip by all circles of the people that war would begin on October 1.

3. The change in the situation, therefore, is due to the fact that we are steering towards a serious financial crisis, the forebodings of which have led already abroad to detailed discussions of this weak side in our economic preparations and to an apprehensive loss of confidence domestically.

To regain the confidence, it is most important to eliminate the inflation psychosis. For this purpose, the authorities should make declarations and give explanations in accordance with the following outline:

(a) Increase of the Reich debt is not inflation. The floating of loans has always been and is also now necessary for large, once occurring national tasks. Even so, the Reich debt would rise to 50 milliards, it would only represent two thirds of the annual national income and the annual service of the debt would not be as much as the unemployment compensation payments during the year 1932.

(b) The printing of money without a corresponding production increase is self deception. The Third Reich, therefore, will not choose the way of inflation but will continue to float loans, the subscription to which is as much a patriotic duty as is the safest investment.

(c) The hoarding of money is not only a crime against the nation as a whole, but also it is foolishness.

(d) A planned regulation and distribution of government expenditures will see to it that prices and wages are not forced up by government offices competing against each other.

(e) The over-employment in public offices has caused idleness, double work and frictions. A thorough simplification will remedy this.

If you, my Führer, would inform the German people along these lines already at the annual party-meeting, it would put a stop to the inflation psychosis and it would be an important step for the possibility to float further loans and with it, would stabilize our financial policy.

4. The second step is to clarify our foreign policy. As every war in the future will be fought not only with military means but also will be an economic war of greatest scope, I consider it my unavoidable duty to present to you, my Führer, in fullest truthfulness and sincerity my deep anxiety for the future of Germany, which is based on my knowledge of the economic conditions of our country and also those of the outside world.

Whether or not the war stays localized in the event of a showdown with Czechoslovakia depends mainly on England. Judging from my knowledge of England and the English people, gained over many years, the now repeatedly expressed attitude to take action is no bluff, which fact undoubtedly can be discerned in their careful English way of expression. Even if Chamberlain and Halifax would not want war, the war mongers and possible successors, Churchill-Eden, stand behind them.

The fact that England is not ready for war militarily, does not prevent England from entering it. Because she possesses two great trump cards. One is the soon expected active participation of the United States of America in the war. At present, two tendencies prevail in the United States, one is a propaganda of hate against Germany of the greatest scope, mainly supported by Jewish circles, and the other is the continuing economic crisis, the solution to which can be found only in a European war because of the failure of every experiment tried by Roosevelt. American industry, now only occupied to the extent of 25%, would at once be converted into a war industry of unimaginable production capacity, altogether different from 1914-1918.

The second trump card is, Germany shows financial and economic weaknesses, although she has a head start militarily. Germany’s self-sufficiency for the required war needs is only in the early stages. In my opinion, it is Utopia to think that we can secure the necessary raw materials with imports from the southeast and by the exploitation of our own resources. Economically, we are in a position which corresponds with Germany’s situation in 1917. The Western powers would not run against the west wall but would let Germany’s economic weakness take effect until we, after early military successes, become weaker and weaker and finally will lose our military advantage due to deliveries of armaments and airplanes by the United States. But also a decisive point is the attitude and morale of the people. From it depends the spirit with which the army will fight. It is difficult for a nation that already experienced and lost a war within a generation to raise the inner strength, morally and physically, which is so vital to the victory of a new war. When the restitution of our military freedom, the occupation of the Rhineland and liberation of Austria was involved, the whole nation was deeply convinced of our rights and the necessity of our actions. But the people’s attitude towards the Czech situation is different. Should this problem again result in a world war, then the German people’s confidence in you, my Führer, would be shaken in its roots; because it believes you will never put our nation in the same situation as in 1914-18. And it would not be able to bear for very long the sufferings of war, large and small, such as the rationing of fats, bombing attacks, the loss of husbands and sons.

Most important is: “Time works in our favor”. (1) The increase in power which we gain each month and each year through the completion of our military and primarily our economic preparations, is considerably greater than the added strength which the Western powers gain from their own rearmaments. (2) Certain powers inside France, growing month by month, try to break the alliance with Czechoslovakia, although I am now of the opinion that France, probably with clenched fists and a heavy heart, would fulfill her duty as an ally in order not to lose face as a major power and to keep her national honor. (3) In America a reaction against the Jewish propaganda of hatred is noticeable; this reaction requires time to develop. Each improvement of the economic conditions in the United States of America reduces the urge to find a solution of her difficulties in a war and it strengthens the prevailing tendency of the broad masses of the American people to stay aloof from European quarrels.

We therefore can only gain by waiting. For this reason, the fanatical desire of the Communists, Jews, and Czechs, is to involve us now in a war because they see in the present situation the last possibility to cause a world war out of the Czech problem and consequently the possibility to destroy the hated Third Reich. I am firmly convinced that, if Germany awaits her hour with the calmness of the strong against all provocations and completes her armaments in the meantime and especially creates a balance between military and economic preparations which now does not exist, and the creation and publicizing of a demand which is convincing in its righteousness to the German people and the outside worldthe demand, for instance, for the right of self-determination by the Sudeten Germans would weaken any slogan coined by England to take her people into war against Germany would put Czechoslovakia in the wrong before the world, the day will not be far off when the final death thrust can be dealt to the Czechs.

I am, my Führer, in steadfast loyalty.

Your very devoted

(signed) Schwerin-Krosigk

“Document EC-420: Law for War Administration [translation]”, pp. 479-480.

Draft

Berlin, 12/19/1936

Military Economy Staff No. 4610/36 g.K. F.O. IaF. Reference: L No. 2098/36 g.K. IV a of 12/9/1936.

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

The Military Economy Staff expresses the following opinion on the letter of reference:

1. The control of war economy in the civilian sector in case of war is possible only for that person, who, in peacetime has made preparations for war under his own responsibility. Upon recognizing this fact, a year and a half ago, Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht was appointed Plenipotentiary General for War Economy and an Operations Staff was attached to his office. This arrangement has only the one disadvantage that the right of the Reich War Minister to give him directives is disputed by the Plenipotentiary General; the latter intends also in case of war, to place himself outside the executive power to be given to the Reich War Minister. There is unanimity between L and the Military Economy Staff regarding the necessity of a new arrangement on this matter.

2. The Military Economy Staff does not deem it compatible with the principle laid down in Number 1, Paragraph 1, if the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy is now placed under the Minister President Colonel General Göring’s command. If the service agency of Colonel General Göring should not continue to exist in case of war and, therefore, would also not be able to assume any responsibility, from this arrangement will ensue a disastrous division of responsibilities.

Should, on the other hand, the intention be to keep Colonel General Göring’s service agency going, also in case of war, for logical reasons, one must go all the way and entrust it, also in peace time, with the full and exclusive responsibility for the preparation of the war economy. Anything else would be a half measure, which would, like any half measure, avenge itself in case of war. But such a solution spells great danger under the prevailing circumstances.

3. So far, the Military Economy Staff has proceeded from the assumption that the service agency of Colonel General Göring is a temporarily established office set up to deal with peace time tasks. If this assumption is correct, in our opinion only the following delimitation of tasks of the Plenipotentiary General and Colonel General Göring’s service agency, respectively, are possible. All measures, which above all, serve peace time economic purposes (e.g. the assurance of the German gasoline and buna (rubber) production) and all measures which, with the consent of the Reich War Minister and of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, will be taken over, totally or in part, into the Four Year Plan, will be carried out responsibly by Colonel General Göring’s service agency and with the cooperation of the Reich War Minister and of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy. All remaining war preparations in the economic field will continue to be the responsibility of the Reich War Ministry or of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy who is bound by the instructions of the deputy chairman of the Reich Defense Council.

4. The Military Economy Staff proposes, after settling the question whether the service agency of Colonel General Göring will remain in existence in case of war or after establishing the fact that it will be dissolved upon outbreak of war, to begin negotiations with Staatssekretaer Koerner. The whole question touches so decisively on the jurisdiction and the responsibility of the Military Economy Staff that the Military Economy Staff has to request, to conduct all further negotiations on this matter in closest understanding with the Military Economy Staff. Every step which is now done in the wrong direction out of ignorance of the inside facts and the effects resulting therefrom, must influence disadvantageously the Military Economy Staff in its work.

Therefore, it is being proposed to advocate absolutely that in case of war the service agency of Colonel General Göring as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan be dissolved and that for the preparation of this measure the following arrangement be prescribed:

a. The delimitation of tasks in peace time in the sense of the above made statement.

b. To keep the individual departments of the present service agency of Colonel General Göring in case of war which would then have to be attached partially to the Reich War Minister (fuels) and partially to the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy.

“Document EC-421: Minutes Taken By A Member Of The Staff Of General Thomas On 3/11/1938 At 1500 Hours [partial translation]”, p. 481.

Present: General Thomas, Chef W Wi, W Rue, W Ro Lt. Col. Becker, Lt. Col. Dreivs, Lt. Col. Huenerm, Major P, and Captain Zinnemann.

Lt. Col. Huenerm reads Directive of the Führer of 11 March concerning the “Action Otto” and informs us that “Economy War Service Law” has been put in force. He then reads Directives 1 and 2 and gives special orders to troops for crossing Austrian borders. After that according to a suggestion by Schacht no requests should take place but everything should be put in Reichsmarks on an exchange basis of two shillings to one Reichsmark.

“Document EC-433: Koenigsberg Speech of President of the Reichsbank and Acting Minister of Commerce, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, at the German Eastern Fair [translation]”, pp. 486-489.

The members of the Government welcome with special pleasure the occasion to come to East Prussia. As it is said in the East-Prussian song “Aennchen von Tharau”; “My life is bound with yours”, our visit should show you, my East-Prussian friends, that the life of Germany is bound with that of East-Prussia eternally and unchangeably. With this feeling and conviction, I bring the greetings of our “Führer”, in whose name and spirit our feeling for German unity sends down stronger and stronger roots, and I also bring you the greetings of the Reichs government, who will always be aware of the care and welfare of East-Prussia, and those of the Prussian government and of the Prussian prime minister, who has become the patron of the Eastern Fair.

My East Prussian friends, you have seen me within your walls several times before. I especially appreciate this visit, because on these previous occasions, it was anxiety which spoke to you; but today, despite all worries, which we still have and some of which are unfortunately caused by ourselves, I am full of a feeling of joy and hope on this visit. I come into a sphere of action, which has, since the National Socialist revolution, attacked its economic and cultural problems with particular vitality, and has solved them to a surprising extent.

At this time, I wish to express, while recognizing the cooperation of all concerned, how much of this success, Herr Oberpraesident, is due to your energy and initiative. An initiative which occasionally reaches for the impossible, and an energy which is not always suitable for weak nerves; but both led and clarified by an understanding of the realities and humanities of life. Whoever has seen East-Prussia in years past and compares her with what has been created today, cannot fail to recognize and appreciate her progress.

Today, we are invited by the Koenigsberg Eastern Fair to test what has just been said. Not only are interested persons and buyers from within Germany herself participating in this test of German achievement, but also a considerable number of representatives from abroad. Also a considerable number of foreign nations took the occasion of this Koenigsberg Eastern Fair, to acquaint us with their own products, and with particular pleasure, I welcome this year several new nations who had not been represented at previous fairs. During this period, certain circles abroad find pleasure in calling every broken windowpane in Germany a cultural infamy, without considering that these circles themselves smashed more windows than can ever be paid for by the political leaders of the world with their efforts towards peace; in such a period, I wish to emphasize, to establish in the name of the government, that we have the heartiest desire to conduct peaceful economic and cultural exchange with all people and nations of the earth. During a time when credit and confidence have almost disappeared from the world, we wish to emphasize that self-esteem demands the esteem of others, that the assertion of our characteristics does not mean the belittling of the characteristics of others, that the recognition of foreign achievement can only improve our achievement, and that economic competition can only be won by exemplary performance, and not by force or cunning. I therefore welcome it that our visitors from abroad at this Eastern Fair, will find many opportunities, and exploit them, to become familiar with the achievements, not only of our industry and craftsmanship, but also of our agriculture, which is especially here in East Prussia, a bountiful source of supply, in the cultivation of seed grain and animal-breeding.

The emphasis on the real achievement, which is brought at such a fair, is more suitable than anything else to distract us from the cheap slogans of certain political economists, who, as Goethe said, substitute violence for the truth and power they lack. Germany is today in the midst of one of the greatest problems, which has come to her in history, and the whole world is amazed how a nation impoverished by war and war tribute, by inflation and deflation, is able to make these tremendous economic sacrifices, which this problem necessitates. Those thoughtless amateurs do not have the slightest idea what financial and economic-political efforts are necessary for the solution of this problem. For example, a prominent newspaper speaks about the new spirit, which made science supreme over economics, and according to which economics is forced to keep pace with science, “even if it loses its breath”. The writer apparently supposes that asthma is a special stimulant toward the achievement of better performance. Whose heart would not beat higher when he reads these slogans: “The flag is more than a bank account”, “The people is of the first importance, and not business”. Such slogans are disarmingly correct but can the economist use them for his practical work? A short time ago when I emphasized in public that German economy must be kept free from alarm, I could read that the questioning, whether a measure alarms the economy, was “liberalistic”. My indication that the rearmament of our people demands the concentration of everyone, as well as all economic and financial forces, was done away with by the argument, that only old women would still wring their hands and ask: “Who will pay for all this.” Taking a chance of being called an old woman, I wish to explain with all clarity, that the question of the actual execution of this problem which has been put to us, gives me a considerable headache.

My German compatriots, to dismiss the seriousness of our German mission with cheap slogans, not only does not make any sense, but also is damned [Verdammt] dangerous. The whole world around us is in the midst of depression, worries, and difficulties, and it would be ridiculous to imagine that we are an exception. On the contrary, our problem is considerably more difficult than that of foreign countries. Germany, who lost the greatest war of all times, with a tremendous expenditure of blood and material sacrifice, from whom after the war tributes were extorted to the extreme by the most stupid peace treaty of all times, who was cheated during the inflation out of the savings of her most industrious workers, and finally, who was hit hardest during the world depression, which already has lasted six years; Germany, this much tried land, pulls herself together with a tremendous harnessing of the means left to her, to regain the political liberty of the nation. She does that, because a “Führer” has risen within her, who brings home to millions the conviction that no people can gain and safeguard material security without this political liberty. Especially East-Prussia already has lived through a similar period, at a time when our great-grandfathers lived, when every single citizen contributed toward the winning of political freedom by the utmost economic sacrifices. But what is happening today is far above the position and performance of this small Prussian territory of the wars of liberation. But woe unto us, if we only want to be contemporaries of such an enterprise instead of co-fighters and helpers. Adolf Hitler has called the German people to this new, almost impossible effort, with boundless courage, statesmanlike skill, and with an unerring sense of responsibility toward history; and the impossible has become fact. A people, weakened by two decades of poverty, under its Führer shakes off the paralyzing weakness, arises in the midst of a world, full of dislikes of former enemies, and regains its national honor and freedom from the rest of the world, to secure for all times its material and cultural foundations. The entire national policy is governed by this historical problem; all parts of this national policy, of which financial and economic politics are primarily a part, are aimed at this goal. Whoever meddles with this economic life must have the feeling that he is in the service of the whole. The obligation and will to serve in the armed forces compares to the obligation and will to serve the national economy.

Unfortunately, not all of our compatriots are conscious of this. First, there are the 10% who cannot be taught, who are known opponents and saboteurs, and to whom the Führer recently directed very plain words. Then there are those of our contemporaries, about whom it is best to pray: “Lord, save me from my friends”. Those are the people who heroically smear window panes in the middle of the night, who brand every German who trades in a Jewish store as a traitor, who condemn every former free-mason as a bum, and who, in the just fight against priests and ministers who talk politics from the pulpit, cannot themselves distinguish between religion and misuse of the pulpit. The goal at which these people aim is generally correct and good. There is no place in the Third “Reich” for secret societies, regardless of how harmless they are. The priest and preachers should take care of the souls, and not meddle in politics. The Jew must realize that their influence is gone for all times. We desire to keep our people and our culture pure and distinctive, just as the Jews have always demanded this of themselves since the time of the prophet Ezra. But the solution of these problems must be brought about under state leadership, and cannot be left to unregulated individual actions, which mean a disturbing influence on the national economy, and which have therefore been forbidden repeatedly by governmental agencies as well as party agencies. As always, according to the stage of legislation as well as several declarations of the Führer’s deputy, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (not to mention the Minister of Economics), Jewish enterprises are permitted to carry on their business activities. It is for the national government to decide whether and when these should be limited. However, all those who will not subordinate themselves to this decision of the government, act without discipline, and I shall hold them responsible, if their actions make impossible, the carrying out of the economic and financial policies, which were entrusted to us by the Führer.

Economy is a very sensitive organism. Every disturbance, from whatever direction it may come, acts as sand in the machine. Since our economy is closely allied with that of foreign countries, not one of us, especially myself, as the minister responsible for the maintenance of the German economic machinery, can be indifferent to what consequences these disturbances can have at home and abroad. It is absolutely necessary for the leadership of our economic policies that confidence in Germany as a constitutional state remain unshaken. No one in Germany is deprived of his rights.

According to point 4 of the National-Socialist party program, the Jew can neither become a citizen or a fellow German. But point 5 provides legislation for him, that means, he must not be under arbitrary action, but under the law. This legislation is being prepared and must be awaited. Until such time, the existing laws must be observed. I also mention this here in connection with the whole of the church problem, which has for Germany a far greater importance than the Jewish question.

Without mutual confidence among those engaged in economic life, no economic policies can be carried out. One of the main causes for the long duration of the depression is the fact that this confidence is so little held in the whole world today. Every economic task is disturbed by this lack of confidence. Even if I ignore these people, who cannot do otherwise because of customary enmity, than utter doubt and suspicion toward our economy; I still would like to present to the well-meaning doubter at home and abroad some facts and figures, which will illustrate our economic policies.

In one point, indeed, I agree with my foreign critics, namely that the foreign debts which we have are a heavy load for us. In this respect also, we have in Germany several unswerving individuals who cannot understand at all that we concern ourselves about paying our debts. The lack of consideration of private property, which has been shown by our enemies during war and in the peace treaty, has found its imitators. That in which the enemy governments have sinned a great deal we can rightfully call, the worst type of barbarism in history. This planned and considered barbarism is, in fact, far worse than American lynch justice, or individual action, which also occurs elsewhere. But we, as Germans, do not desire to imitate such barbarism. We do not want to forget that our foreign creditors are not the governments, but thousands of individual foreign citizens, who loaned us their savings. Especially, we do not want to forget, that among them were numerous pro-German people, who had the good faith to help us with those loans. I regret it extremely that Germany is not at present in the position to honor her foreign obligations fully because of the difficulties of transfer [Transferschwierigkeiten], but I shall not cease to make every effort possible to satisfy the existing obligations.

In a second point, I disagree somewhat with my foreign critics. These critics apparent!y like to spread the opinion that Germany is not able to procure the needed raw materials from abroad. My German compatriots, it has been exactly a year since I with the consent of the Führer, declared it to be the basis of German economic policy, not to buy more than we can pay for, and mainly to buy what we need, and only secondly to buy what is unnecessary and superfluous for us. Since the proclamation of the so called “New Plan”, we have been in an almost uninterrupted series of conferences with many countries about the mutual exchange of goods. I have not found as yet, that any one of the foreign countries has given any indication of excluding itself. It is correct, that our trade relation to the different countries has changed a great deal; but just this has created for a number of countries entirely new possibilities of export to the German markets, which has contributed greatly toward the relief of the depression in those countries. And especially those countries which have not been hampered by excessive political foreign debts or other political ties in their trade policy, have benefited a great deal by this “New Plan” of German economic policy. The real cause for these changes lies in the fact that the international credit-machinery, which has formerly financed the three-sided or many-sided trade exchanges unfortunately does not function any more. This has of a necessity led to an increase of the two-sided exchange of trade. The international credit machinery will only then function again, when the old obligations of political debts, caused by the war and the peace treaty, will have disappeared. Only then will a real revival of world trade take place, and I do not doubt that Germany will participate. But until that day, we will help ourselves through thick and thin, with the present methods, although they have reduced the volume of trade; but they function well within this reduced volume.

At last, I come to the third point; the internal financing of our entire reemployment program inclusive of rearmament. There are also some very important people and experts at home and abroad, who break their heads, over the question of where the money for reemployment should come from after all. I cannot belittle this question which concerns me daily; but I can assure that neither witchcraft nor tricks are used. The secret consists solely of the universal and strict centralization of the entire financial and economic policy, which is only possible in an autocratic state. The problem could not be solved with a democratic parliament. The fact is that the tax income has increased greatly with the progress of gainful employment. The fluidity of the money market made it possible for the Reich to issue to a considerable extent interest-bearing and non-interest bearing treasury bonds. The Reichsbank was able to give aid, as long as it was possible, because private business called on it to a decreased extent. The loosening up of bank debtors because of increased gainful employment, made it possible to transfer some of the credit, necessary for reemployment, to private agencies of the banking trade. The money, which was put into the economic process by public works is thus put at the disposal of the Reich for its great problems again by business itself. The very minor increase of the cash circulation, and the somewhat greater increase of payment without cash, but by check, is a natural consequence of the increased trade turnover.

Thus, we have anticipated, at the expense of some short term money, a later permanent financing. This later consolidation is of course, an important and inescapable problem, and it is not above me, to declare that the main difficulty still lies ahead of us. My German compatriots, no one may forget, that thanks to the government’s reemployment program, and especially the rearmament program, that the vast army of unemployed has almost been done away with. The amounts necessary for this are according to normal standards enormously high and they must be financed by the achievement and savings of the people. I must say again to the German people, that we do not live in a Utopia. Unfortunately, I must say that the theorists, who have dabbled with the cutting of taxes, bank papers, notes and so on, have sinned a great deal. Since my first speech on financial policy in my capacity as President of the Reichsbank in 2/1924 in Koenigsberg, I have never ceased to point out the size and difficulty of our financial problems, and to plead for economy in public expenditures. Today again I raise my voice in warning. The size of the sums, which are being expended for reemployment, can easily lead to the opinion in this or that agency that a few millions more or less do not matter. During a time, when it is impossible for us to consider an increase of wages, every penny, spent unnecessarily, is an obstruction of the entire situation, and one cannot appeal enough to the sense of responsibility of all spending agencies.

There is a modern theory, which is of the opinion, that the more one spends the richer one becomes. This type of economist is to be considered the same way that scientists consider the inventor of perpetual motion.

If we have chosen for the present financing of the reemployment program the course of the short-term money market, that is, not a careless financial policy, but a well thought out transitory measure until the day when sufficient savings have accumulated for a longer term consolidation. It is the capacity of our people for saving, to which we finally have to entrust this consolidation. But capacity for saving will only show itself if there is a will for saving; and I hope, that all the money theorists, who always want to present these works of art, realize from my explanations the damage they do, when they propose again and again these plans for devaluation and similar plans. Whoever has followed my explanations will realize, that the financial execution of the Führer’s great task stands and falls with the confidence in the security and stability of the Reich and its agencies. It would really be suicide and would make the carrying out of the reemployment and rearmament program impossible, if the government would violate the interests of the thrifty persons. In the final analysis, the reemployment must be financed by the saved surpluses of business and labor; never may or can this be done at the expense of the currency standard. Also, never can or may business and labor get away from this problem.

From time to time a certain psychology of real property [Sachwertpsychose] appears with certain people, that means the attempt to escape a supposed danger of devaluation by the purchase of valuable property, stocks and bonds and other real property. My German compatriots, I believe the Minister of Finance and myself, have already shown by the measures taken so far, that we know how to handle these sly fellows. I emphasize now that all of us are in the same boat, and no one will be given the opportunity to get out. There is only one thing. Confidence in the seaworthiness of this ship and in the captain’s leadership of the German ship of state. But this captain has given a speech on 21 March 134 about the formation of German savings capital, and he spoke these words: “We shall promote the formation of capital, and in the process, we shall use no means whatsoever, which will in any way violate the rights of private property, or terms of contracts. The confidence of the German savers will in the future as well, not be disappointed by arbitrary interference or by careless financial policy.”

My German compatriots, there is for no German a better or more useful investment of his savings than to put them at the disposal of Germany for the accomplishment of the reemployment program. It is only the government, who made a savings program possible again by its courageous and all-embracing measures for the removal of unemployment. Every individual, therefore, must contribute in his own interest, that the Führer’s gigantic work of reconstruction can be continued and completed; in that everyone should place his savings at the service of these urgent problems which are important for everyone until such a time when normal trade conditions have returned in the world.

This is the only way, by which the peaceful work and peaceful existence of our people can be assured.

This eastern fair, opened today, is evidence of this will for peaceful work, of this confidence in our own efforts. May it be stimulating at home and abroad, and especially, may it appear to our neighbors near and far in the East as a pillar for a bridge, which will facilitate our getting together and which will increase the mutual exchange of our economic and cultural products.

“Document EC-453 [translation]”, pp. 510-511.

9/21/1943 Vienna Place 5

Reichleader SS Heinrich Himmler Berlin

Dear Reichleader:

I thank you very much for your kind letter of the 14th of this month with which you made me very happy. At the same time I am enclosing a list with the total amount of funds made available to you by your circle of friends and totaling RM 1 million. We are very glad indeed to render some assistance to you in your special tasks and to be able to provide some small relief for you in your still further extended sphere of duties.

Wishing you, dear Reichsleader, the best of luck I remain in old loyalty and esteem

Yours very truly [signature illegible] SS Brigadeleader

Contributions to special account “S” in the year 1943.

by Herrn Dr. R. Bingel of/Siemens-Schuckertwerke A.G.: 100000.

by Herrn Dr. Buetefisch and Herrn Geh. Rat Schmit of/J. G. Farbenindustrie A.G.: 100000.

by Herrn Dr. Friedr. Flick of/Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke G.m.b.H.: 100000.

by Herrn Ritter von Halt of/Deutsche Bank, Berlin: 75000.

by Herrn Ewald Hecker of/Ilseder Huette: 25.000.

by Herrn Staatsrat Helfferich of/Deutsch Amerikanische Petroleum-Ges.: 10.000.

by Herrn Staatsrat Lindemann of/Deutsch Amerikanische Petroleum-Ges.: 10.000. and myself: 4.000.

by Herrn Dr. Kaselowsky of/Fa. Dr. August Oetker, Bielefeld: 40.000.

by Herrn Dr. Alfred Olscher of/Reichs Kredit-Gesellschaft A.G.: 30.000.

by Herrn Prof. Dr. Meyer and Herrn Dr. Rasche of/Dresdner Bank, Berlin: 50.000.

by Herrn Staatsrat Reinhart of/Commerz and Privatbank A.G. Berlin: 50.000.

by Herrn Gen. Dir. Roehnert of/Rheinmetall Borsig A.G.: 50.000.

by Hermann Göring Werke: 30.000.

by Herrn Dr. Voss of/Hermann Göring Werke: 30.000.

by Herrn Gen. Dir. Roesterg of/Wintershall Akt. Ges.: 100.000.

by Herrn Fregattenkapitaen Otto Steinbrinck of/Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G.: 100.000.

by Herrn Kurt Frhr. v. Schroeder of/Braunkohle/Benzin A.G: 100.000. of/Felton and Guilleaume Carlwerk A.G.: 25.000.-of/Mix and Cenest A.G.: 5.000.- of/C. Lorenz A.G.:20.000. of/Gewerkschaft Preussen: 30.000.- interest and myself: 16.000.-

[total:] RM 1.100.000.

“Document EC-454 [translation]”, p. 512.

8/27/1943

Wiener Platz 5. Berlin. Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler,

My very honorable Reichsführer,

With great joy I learn of your appointment as Reichsminister of the Interior and take the liberty to extend my heartiest congratulations to you on assuming your new post.

A strong hand is now very necessary in the operation of this department and it is universally welcomed but especially by your friends that it was you who were chosen for this by the Führer. Please be assured that we will always do everything in our power at all times to assist you in every possible way.

I am pleased to inform you at this opportunity that your circle of friends has again placed at your disposal this year a sum slightly in excess of RM 1 million for “special purposes”. An exact list showing the name of the contributors will be sent to you shortly.

Again all my best wishesas well as those of my familyI remain yours, in old loyalty and esteem.

Heil Hitler!

Yours truly, [signed] von Schroeder

“Document EC-456 [translation]”, pp. 512-513.

Reich Bank President (retired) Dr. Hjalmar Schacht

Berlin SW 111, 11/12/1932.

Mr. Adolf Hitler, Brown House, Brienner Strasse, Munich.

Dear Mr. Hitler:

Permit me to congratulate you on the firm stand you took immediately after the election. I have no doubt that the present development of things can only lead to your becoming chancellor. It seems as if our attempt to collect a number of signatures from business circles for this purpose was not altogether in vain, although I believe that heavy industry will hardly participate, for it rightfully bears its name “heavy industry” on account of its indecisiveness.

I hope that in the next few days and weeks the slight difficulties which necessarily appear in the course of the propaganda campaign will not be so great as to provide the opponents with a reason for justified indignation. The stronger your internal position is the more dignified can be your fight. The more the cause develops in your favor, the more you can renounce personal attacks.

I am quite confident that the present system is certainly doomed to disintegration.

With German Greetings,

Yours very truly, (signed) Hjalmar Schacht.

“Document EC-457 [translation]”, pp. 513-514.

The President of the Reichsbank (in retirement) Dr. Hjalmar Schacht

Guhlen Post Lindow (Mark), 8/29/1932.

Dear Herr Hitler,

May I hope, that you will allow me to use this form of addressing you, since the only purpose of my letter is to assure you of my unchanging sympathy in these times of great trials. I realize, that you are not in need of consolation. The rise to a total of 14 million votes cast for you, the perfidious counterblow by the othertheoretically strongerside, and the loss of the votes of political profiteers, all these are things which could not seriously surprise you. But what you could perhaps do with in these days, is a word of most sincere sympathy. Your movement is carried internally by so strong a truth and necessity, that victory in one form or another cannot elude you for long. During the time of the rise of your movement you did not let yourself be led astray by false gods. I am firmly convinced, that now, when you are forced into a position of defence for a short time, you will likewise resist the temptation of an alliance with false idols. If you remain the man that you are, then success cannot elude you.

You know, that I do not intend to give you any tactical advice, since I admit absolutely to your superiority in this subject. But perhaps as an economist I may say this; if possible, do not put forward any detailed economic program. There is no such program on which 14 millions could agree. Economic policy, is not a factor for building up a party, but at best collects interest. Moreover, economic measures vary with time and circumstances. It merely depends on the spirit out of which they are born. Let this spirit be the deciding factor.

Wherever my work may take me to in the near future even if you should see me one day within the fortressyou can always count on me as your reliable assistant.

I felt the need of writing the above to you, as in our time so few understand, that everything depends on the inner strength.

With a vigorous “Heil”,

(signed) Hjalmar Schacht. CL / ACF.

“Document EC-458: Affidavit Of Major Edmund Tilley [translation]”, p. 514.

Major Edmund Tilley, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I am a major in the British Army and have been assigned to field Information Agency, Technical. In my official capacity I had an interview with Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, former President of the Reichsbank and former Minister of Economics, on 7/9/1945, at an Internment Centre in the vicinity of Frankfurt.

2. During the course of the discussion Schacht stated to me that he had had numerous talks with Hitler from 1933-1937. Schacht stated that from these talks he had formed the impression that in order to make his hold and government secure the Führer felt that he must present the German people with a military victory.

3. The above statement is based on my recollection of the conversation and also on my notes made contemporaneously.

[signed] Edmund Tilley Major.

Sworn to before me 11/21/1945 [Witnessed] T. G. S. Combe Major.

“Document EC-460 [translation]”, p. 515.

FRANZ REUTER, “SCHACHT”, German Publishing Establishment [Deutsche Verlagsanstalt 1937, Pages 113-114.

A strong personality, inspired with national German passion which indeed has to merge with the great movement, whose extraordinary abilities and experiences in turn mean a strengthening for others, he joins the national movement. By word and deed and through the effect of his personality on the inner circles and the people whom he is able to influence and among them are the best of the nationSchacht from now on becomes a conscious helper of the National Socialist movement and one of those, who take valuable part in its final victory. For him, who, by his struggle as the president of the Reichsbank, already be longed to the movement for a long time and who sacrificed for it his office by maintaining his principles, corresponding to those of the movement, his becoming a regular member certainly is only a question of secondary importance. By not doing soat least, until the final assertion and victory of the partyhe was able to assist it (the party) much better than he would have been able to do had he become an official party member.

“Document EC-472: Directives for the Operation of the Economy in the Newly-Occupied Eastern Territories (Green Folder)

Part I (2nd edition) Functions and Organization of the Economy [partial translation]”, pp. 539-540.

2000 copies

The Reich Marshall of the Greater German Reich For Official Use Only

Berlin, 7/1941.

THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

A. In General

For the uniform direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas of the future political administration, the Reich Marshall has created the “Economic Executive Staff, East” which is responsible directly to him and which, in the absence of the Reich Marshall, is directed by State Secretary Koerner. The Chief of the “Wehrwirtschafts- und Ruestungsamts”, General of the Infantry Thomas, in his capacity as a member of the Economic Executive Staff, East, acts as a representative of the military interests during the preparation and execution of the military operations.

The orders of the Reich Marshall cover all economic fields, including nutrition and agriculture. They are to be executed by the subordinate economic offices (infra under B).

The orders of the “Economic Executive Staff, East” are transmitted for execution by the Chief Wi Rue Amt to the “Economic Staff, East” which is proceeding into the occupied territory and which, during operations, is located in the immediate vicinity of the OKH/ Gen Qu (High Command of the Army; Headquarters).

B. Economic Organization in the Area of Operations

IV. The particulars of the organization of the economic offices.

1. Economic Staff, East

The Economic Staff, East, as the advance command offices of the Economic Executive Staff, East, is located in the immediate vicinity of the OKH/Gen Qu (High Command of the Army; Headquarters). It has the function of representing, at the OKH/ Gen Qu, the commands directed to it by the Reich Marshall via the Economic Executive Staff, East and the Chief Wi Rue Amt; and it has the function of securing their execution through the channels stated supra under B III.

The Economic Staff, East is sub-divided into:

Chief of the Economic Staff, together with the group of leaders (function: questions of leadership; in addition, assignment of work).

Group La (functions: nutrition and agriculture, the economy of all agricultural products, provision of supplies for the army, in co-operation with the army groups concerned).

Group W (functions: industrial economy, including raw materials and public utilities, forestry, finance and banking, enemy property, trade and commodity transactions.) The special staff of the Plenipotentiary for Motor Transportation is a member of Group W.

Group M (functions: needs of the army, military economy, transportation of economic goods).

“Document EC-472-A: War Diary of Armament Inspectorate from 4/10/1940-9/30/1942 [partial translation]”, pp. 540-542.

6/5/1940

“Department Business (Ge Wi) begins its activity; Chief: Reg. Rat Dr. Heinemann (Reich Ministry of Economics) Armament Inspectorate arranges with Reich Commissar, that directives to “Business” (Ge Wi) as a department of the Armament Inspectorate are given only thru Armament Inspectorate. The Chief of Department for direct reports to Reich Commissar first of all applies for consent of the Armament Inspectorate.”

“When considering the incorporation of the Department Business (apparently of the Office of the Reich Commissar) into the Armament Inspectorate Netherlands and its activity up to date, it must be ascertained that the scope of tasks of the Department jurisdiction is divided into two parts. Firstly it has to control raw materials found in Holland according to the instructions from the Ministry of Economics and to execute the rationing, secondly it has the tasks which are given to the Rationing Offices [Wirtschaftsaemter] in the Reich.

It is a matter of fact that in the control and distribution of raw materials a close connection with the Ministry of Economics had to exist and as also the entire personnel was incorporated in the plan of organization of the Reich Commissar, an intimate connection with the General Commissar for Finance and Economics resulted therefrom. The directive contained in the Situation report of 6/18/1940, according to which the Chief of the department “Business” should get his official directives only thru the Armament Inspector and report to the General Commissar for Finance and Economy only after notification to the Inspector, remained without consequence as the fundamental directives concerning the raw material economy were issued from the Reich Ministry of Economics. This interlacing was expressed in the letter head used by the Department “Business” in which under the government eagle was marked “The Reich Commissar for the Occupied Dutch Territories” “The General Commissar for Finance and Economics” and only in the third place “Armament Inspectorate Netherlands”.

In the scope of tasks of the Rationing Office, in the unification of all affairs of the general economy concerning war economy under the direction of the Armament Inspector, the caretaking activity of the Department “Business’ has up to now not become manifest substantially.”

“With the Department “Business” a special section “Rationalization” with its seat in the Hague was established, the task of which is to transfer present orders important for the war with the aim of a consolidation and to exclude at the same time all productions not important for the war and close down a great number of enterprises on all fields and to use the released working means and production goods in other more productive work places, even outside Holland.”

“Document EC-493 [translation]”, pp. 552-555.

Obersalzberg, 8/221937

Prime Minister General Göring Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan St.M.Dev.5/34

To the President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics.

Dear Mr. Reichsbank President!

To your letter of 5 August in which you make detailed statements on matters of principle regarding my activity in the Four-Year Plan I should like to reply today, the more so as your expositions require the correction of a number of individual points. I shall now state my point of view for this purpose. In accord with the comprehensive viewpoint contained in the “closing remarks” of the above-mentioned letter, I, too, am separating my reply into three sections: financial policy, foreign exchange policy, and production policy. I should like to emphasize here that, in my reply, I have only stressed the most essential things, and that I am really in a position to add many examples which would clearly show that, in many points, your letter does not state the actual facts completely or consistently. Thus, in my opinion, it is not supremely important whether things are carried out and measures taken because they belong to the proper functions of a ministry, but rather that this ministry has borne the actual initiative and has been the author of these measures. I can well imagineand there are proofs of thisthat things have been done within the functions of a ministry, even though this ministry contribute little thereto, yes, was often even basically opposed to them. Yet I have omitted to give here such examples regarding your ministry since, in my answer, I care more about stressing matters of principle.

I. Financial Policy

Regarding your remarks about financial policy I can be relatively brief. I really do not see with what you want to reproach me in this regard because, in essential matters, I completely agree with your expositions and have up to now acted accordingly.

I give especial recognition to your achievements in the matter of financing the armament program. I further agree with you that an endangering of this policy by the question of wages must be avoided. My fundamental viewpoint regarding the wage question within the framework of the Four-Year Plan I have expressed, among other things, in a letter on 12/2/1936 (St.M. foreign exchange 1270) to the Reich Minister of Labor of which I enclose a copy. From the beginning of the Four-Year Plan I have also decisively opposed the “unregulated competition of the building and armament industries in the labor market”, which you criticize. This purpose was especially served by the 2nd and 4th decrees for the execution of the Four-Year Plan (Deutscher Reichsanzeiger No. 262) which I issued on 11/7/1936. At that time the number of unemployed still amounted to more than a million. Now that, meanwhile, the number of unemployed has sunk to 1/2 million, and an undesired, wage-raising fluctuation of labor has recently set in, my authorized offices are making new efforts to check this development. The corresponding proceedings passing through the offices of the price commissioner and the compulsory war emergency employment are quite in line with what you, too, believe to be the right thing.

I am glad, however, to acknowledge your cooperation in the matter of financing individual projects of the Four-Year Plan, for instance the increase in the production of mineral oil and the enlarging of the electrical service. The principle employed here and generally proclaimed by you, of relegating industry as much as possible to self-financing, I consider unreservedly correct. I have also instructed the office for German raw and synthetic materials accordingly, which since then has been operating as far as possible on this principle. Out of about 960 million RM the office has succeeded in raising something over 830 million RM by means of self-financing of industries; only to the amount of 8 million RM were subsidies granted. If I have given to the “Hermann Göring” A.G. for the Mining of Ore and for Iron-works the form of Reich plants, this was done only to give the work of the company the necessary impressiveness and to facilitate the work as much as possible. Financial participation of the private economy in question is by no means excluded thereby, but rather quite possible, yes, actually desired. Discussions on this matter are already taking place. The magnitude of the financial needs of the plants has not yet been established, so that the fears you have expressed in this regard are premature. In so far as claim has had to be laid to public funds, the matter has been discussed with the Reich minister of finance, who gave his consent. In the future I shall act likewise. Thereby I shall also come into touch with your ministry.

Concerning your pointing out of a development which, you believe, will end in inflation, I am naturally under the necessity of putting forth every effort to preserve the equilibrium of political economy and finance-politics. In so far as you work at these matters you may be completely assured of my cooperation, on principle. What importance I attach to questions relative to this matter may be seen from the fact that, within the frame-work of the Four-Year Plan, I requested the appointment of a price commissioner whose authority would go considerably beyond that of the previous price control office. The results of his activity up to now you may see in the weekly report of the institute for research into economic cycles of 14 July of this year in which to the figures of the week in the introductory remarks, after pointing out the price developments in the United States, Great Britain and France the following facts are added:

“Compared to these the price movement in Germany distinguished itself through a remarkable stability. Wholesale prices have been raised, during the past year, approximately 2 to the hundred and the standard living cost has risen only to the amount of 0.7 to the hundred. This stability of German price development is primarily a successful result of the comprehensive price policy.”

II. Foreign Exchange Policy.

My judgment of your expositions on foreign exchange policy, in which I find certain misconception and errors, is essentially different. The first point in your criticism is the claim that after the Führer had assigned to me the carrying out of the Four-Year Plan, I had made one of my “first measures the seizure of foreign securities in the possession of Germans as well as the demand for speediest delivery of goods owed to Germany by foreign countries and the liquidation, in so far as was possible, of German investments abroad. Our chief aim, on the other hand, was to be the increase of native raw materials and the increase of foreign exchange receipts through exports.” This claim is erroneous.

I have handled the seizure of foreign exchange reserves since midsummer in 1936. If you figure my activity for the Four-Year Plan from the time of the Führer decree of 10/18/1936, then I began to handle the foreign exchange reserves previously. Actually, however, the beginning of my work at the tasks of the Four-Year Plan dates back to the authority given me by the Führer in 4/1936 to take charge of the raw material economy and the foreign exchange economy. Looking at it this way, I only began to handle the foreign exchange reserves toward the last, that is, not until the moment when I had already taken all necessary measures for the promotion of export and the increase of production within the country. Yet I have always been aware of the connection between these three fields of assignment and of the sequence to be followed in attacking these problems. The details of the matter developed as follows:

On 4/4/1936 I was assigned by the Führer and Reich Chancellor to investigate and institute all measures required by the raw material and foreign exchange situation. After the first organizational preparations I began, as early as the beginning of May, to deal with the export question, first in the small ministerial council, soon also in larger meetings in which you and the other ministries involved as well as many economic representatives participated. In the course of these discussions in which the export question was thoroughly examined from the standpoint of principle as well as in all its details, an entire series of measures for the promotion of exports have been put in force of which some were based on suggestions made by yourself.

How much importance I attached to the export problem from the very beginning is also shown by the fact that I immediately called a special committee under the chairmanship of State Secretary Trendelenburg, retired, whose workwhich as far as I know is recognized without reservationon the inevitable repercussions of an adjustment of currency was exclusively caused by the German export interest. Besides this, still other programs were in progress in which, at my instigation, Professor Ernst Wagemann participated, among others, by drawing up an extensive memorandum about the problems of the German foreign economy.

Only when this work seemed completed for the time being and had shown that the tasks assigned to me could not be solved from the export angle aloneI shall come back to this subject further onI turned to the foreign exchange reserves of the German national economy. In the meantime the Führer too, in his memorandum on the Four-Year Plan drawn up shortly before the 1936 party rally, pointed out that an examination of the outstanding foreign exchange assets of the German economy abroad was to be undertaken immediately.

That later in the course of the Four-Year Plan I supported your point of view on the export question, you, yourself, acknowledged elsewhere in your letter. I therefore need refer only briefly to my corresponding efforts. You know what role the consideration of exports continuously played in the discussions about the fixing of iron quotas. The export quota, which was made as large as possible and which, in consideration of the present iron shortage, can, I dare say, be regarded as satisfactory, has never been curtailed and, as my deputy, the plenipotentiary general for the iron and steel economy, declared in a discussion held at your house on July 27 of this year, it will remain uncurtailed in the future. The meeting of May 5, which I called and at which I ordered the increase of the exports by about 1.5 billion in the calendar year 1938, is likewise still fresh in your memory. Finally, you will also recall the evaluation of this discussion by my letter of May 7 of this year, in which I founded the committee for the settlement of conflicting interests among Wehrmacht, Four Year Plan, and exports, which has the special task of opening the way for exports, if necessary even by deferring urgent home orders. I know that since taking over the Reich Ministry of Economics you have been successfully trying to promote exports; I cannot, however, recognize a criticism of my attitude toward exports. I can also clearly see the future export prospects and demands as well as the consequences which would follow a decrease in foreign exchange returns from exports. On the other hand, it is of no significance if some of my offices may once have taken an attitude not in accord with the general export policy. Isolated deviations from the basic line can never be fully avoided, in view of the differences in the tasks to be solved by the various offices, but they are not decisive for the total success of an action. The total success of the export policy can surely very well make a showing within the framework of the Four-Year Plan!

If, besides the execution of all measures which may serve the expansion of exports, I also ordered the utilization of the foreign exchange reserves, I decided on this only after conscientious examination of all reasons pro and con. I could of course not assign any fundamental significance to the objection advanced by you, that with the dissolving of the reserves the interest on them is also lost; you yourself probably will not do so, if you visualize the volume and significance of this interest revenue. I have, however, asked myself seriously whether it is in fact advisable and justifiable to consume one of the last reserves of the German national economy even in the present situation. Decisive for the affirmative answer to this question was, in the last analysis, the realization that with the extension of German raw material synthetic production under the Four-Year Plan of the German economy I would open up new sources of supply, which some day will be able to replace foreign exchange reserves or contribute materially to the formation of new foreign exchange reserves. There was also the consideration that the reserves which a national economy possesses abroadas Germany has just learned from sad experiencecan in part no longer be realized in serious political conflicts with these foreign countries, but are as a rule lost. If one wishes to make use of these reserves, one must utilize them before such conflicts arise. I had no other choice in the situation then existing than to draw on the foreign reserves immediately.

In the part of your statement entitled “warnings” you say that you have long seen the dangers threatening from the scarcity of foreign exchange and have repeatedly informed the Führer and Reich Chancellor of this.

I do not doubt that, but must nonetheless state that an exact picture of the situation was first formed when at my instigation, through my office in close collaboration with your Ministry, the first estimated foreign exchange balance was drawn that contained all the necessary details. The situation shown by this balance was, however, such that the foreign exchange economy seemed on the verge of collapse, as only a small fraction of the foreign exchange needs could be satisfied from the current accrual of foreign exchange. This situation had arisen in spite of the success of your export policy, to which you repeatedly refer. It was unfortunately also evident that it could not be improved by even the most intensive export policy alone. If the great national tasks set by the Führer were to be carried on in the interest of the survival of the German nation, the only alternatives were to curtail to an unbearable degree the foreign exchange need for other purposes in favor of these tasks or to open new extraordinary sources of foreign exchange. Thus the taking over of the foreign exchange reserves has not been the result of a decision that I could make freely but has rather been an inevitable necessity arising out of the circumstances that I faced in the foreign exchange field on taking up my economic-political assignment. This is also shown by the fact that even you were not able to help yourself except by trying to raise the accrual of foreign exchange by special measures for the acquisition of foreign exchange demands as well as by gold sales, until my special project to gain control of the foreign exchange reserves were ordered. In 1936 a total of 46.5 million Reichsmark were acquired by special measures of the Reichsbank, of which only 12 million were due to my project. Along with that, 42.5 million Reichsmark worth of gold were sold in that year. As a result of these sales, furthermore, the Reichsbank’s modest gold reserve became, as you pointed out to me yourself, ever smaller and threatened to disappear completely. The taking over of the foreign exchange reserves as undertaken by me protected the gold reserve of the Reichsbank from liquidation. Through the cancellation of the debits already noted by you, it (the gold reserve) is today better than before.

The inevitability of the seizure of the foreign exchange reserves has meanwhile become fully clear through the development in the food field. As you know, nearly half the proceeds of the special project have had to be devoted to urgent food requirements of the nation, although I met the need in the necessary degree through the initiation of a fats consumption regulation in the autumn of 1936 and also in the grain problem arranged all possible measures for the insurance of a thrifty economic management. If the foreign exchange from the reserves had not been available, the national food needs could not have been secured. No one conscious of the responsibility connected with the food policy will deny the necessity of avoiding under all circumstances any disturbances in the provision of foodstuffs. The foreign exchange proceeds from exports in no way covered this; they could satisfy the needs in the agricultural field just as little as those in the industrial field. The export trade, seen as a whole, not only did not make the special foreign exchange project unnecessary but even was supported by it, insofar as foreign exchange from the special project was claimed for export purposes.

As regards the use of the remaining proceeds of the special foreign exchange project, I cannot understand your remark that the foreign exchange proceeds are “not to be used for purposes of the Four-Year Plan.” Insofar as the special foreign exchange was not expended for the nation’s foodstuffs and for export purposes but for the “maintaining of our industrial occupation,” they were in fact of benefit above all to the objectives of the Four-Year Plan which include, as is well known, the completion of the armament program. For industry is to a large extent occupied on behalf of the Four-Year Plan and of the armament program. You emphasize this yourself in another place in your letter when you speak of a “disproportionate claim on raw materials and manpower for public works as well as armament and the Four-Year Plan,” and conclude that this is a danger to the export trade.

I agree with you regarding the care that is connected with the necessity of now realizing the foreign securities that have not yet been seized. This measure has become necessary because the proceeds of the special foreign exchange project must be used quicker than was foreseen and planned, because of the great need for foreign exchange for food and on account of the extraordinary rise in raw materials prices on the world market at the beginning of the year. I also am aware of the difficulty that exists in this connection and in view of the as yet incomplete German production of synthetic materials as well as in consideration of the new foreign exchange needs which may arise in the coming year (for example with the end of the moratorium). I must, however, insist on the request made to you that you make the necessary preparations for the seizing of the remainder of the foreign securities still in German hands. I will, however, leave nothing untried in finding ways and means to overcome the obstacles that confront the Four-Year Plan.

III. Production Policy.

The first statement in your critical remarks regarding the production policy asserting that the development in the agricultural sector has rendered the economic policy more difficult, is undebatable. However, opinions differ as to the cause of this fact. In this connection the Reich Food Minister gives different figures on the results of his production policy from those contained in your letter. According to the statement of the Reich Food Minister we had record grain crops in the years 1932-1933 which can hardly be compared to the crops of other years. During the years 1934-1936 the grain crops having been considerably below the above level still were higher than during the years preceding 1932 and did not reveal a tendency to decrease. This year’s harvest cannot yet be accurately estimated but it is expected to be better than might be assumed from the estimate you submitted. In regard to potatoes prospects are still more favorable. Although potato crops since 1930 fluctuated regularly with a good year always being followed by a bad one, the potato crop in 1936 was especially good and a still better yield is expected from the coming harvest. According to the above, one could hardly speak of the failure of the production policy in regard to grain and potatoes. That is particularly true if one takes into account that during the past years agricultural acreage has actually decreased as a result of use of the land for other purposes, a fact which hardly can be blamed on the agrarian policy. The yields of agricultural production are also satisfactory in regard to crops of sugar beets, root fodder and hay which clearly show a tendency to increase. Livestock and milk production show a tendency essentially in the same direction. In regard to your remark about the failure of the agricultural market regulations, the Food Minister emphasizes that they, in any case, had kept the bread price constant since the seizure of power while during the same period in other countries bread became more expensivepartly considerably more so.

If despite this, as you state correctly, the dependence of the German food situation on foreign countries could not be decreased but if, on the contrary, the need of the agrarian sector for imports recently became particularly pressing, this had hardly been influenced by technical deficiencies such as wrong estimates, etc., as asserted by you and as denied by the Reich Food Minister. In this respect an important role is played primarily by the increase of population, as cited by you, and the increase in consumption. In regard to population as a political factor, one must take into consideration that 67.8 million people live in the present Reich territory in 1936 against only 61 million in 1914. Through the re-incorporation of the Saar territory, 800000 people have returned to the Reich and since 1933 we note a birth surplus of 1.8 million. For the increase of consumption the re-incorporation of 5 million unemployed into the labor process naturally had to become of decisive importance. In addition, the difficulties in the field of food were caused mainly by the almost complete exhaustion of provisions. In regard to the policy of provisions the Reich Food Minister points out that he himself had always attached great importance to maintenance of sufficient reserves and particularly to current replenishment through imports. On the other hand, you Herr Reich bankpraesident had been the one who, since 10/1934 demanded that the reserves be dissolved and even suggested the export of grain as possible and desirable. In a letter of 8/14/1945VI Dev. 197/35you had explicitly expressed your regrets that 2 million tons of wheat at a price of 40 Reichsmark per ton had not been exported which would have brought 80 million Reichsmark in foreign currency. Had this wheat been exported at that time it would have had to be brought back now, of course for a sum three times as high as the original sales price. Furthermore, you declared in a conference of the chiefs held with me on 10/15/1935 that carefully planned purchases of grain abroad would not be necessary because you would at any time provide sufficient amounts of foreign bills of exchange if the import of cereals should become necessary at a later date. Under these circumstance it must be stated that you yourself share the responsibility for the development that today the grain provision actually have melted down to a level which caused me to contemplate the most serious measures.

As to my personal activity in the field of food policy, since I had to pay special attention to it within the framework of the Four-Year Plan, it has been clear and is generally known. Despite the fact mentioned above, that not export but the falling back on foreign exchange reserves provided the means of payment necessary to assure food for the people, I instituted the well-known fertilizer project in 3/1937 which came just in time to have a decisive and most favorable influence on this year’s crops of fodder and root vegetable. Furthermore, in direct discussions with the Reich Food Minister and the Reich Finance Minister I straightened out the existing differences of opinion about the means to be provided in the Reich budget for food and used my personal influence to secure the sums which must absolutely be made available for increasing agricultural production. During the past weeks, in spite of the great psychological difficulties to be taken into consideration in connection with it, I accomplished the delivery of the total amount of bread grain to safeguard the feeding of the population. I also set in motion negotiations the conclusion of which will affect the decision to be made by the Führer on consumer regulations for grain. If you should extend your criticism of the food policy also to my participation in it, I could therefore easily refute the criticism.

But your objections to my measures for the increase of industrial production are also unfounded. The figures on domestic raw material production before the beginning of the Four-Year Plan as given by you at the beginning of your letter, are essentially correct. Only if it could be proved that domestic raw material production had reached the highest possible figures, could it be said as concerns the above mentioned figures that export has proved to be the most effective means of satisfying demands. But that is debatable, as is well known. I suppose I need not mention from whom came the initiative for the execution of this increase in production and I only want to point briefly to the work done in this field by the Reich War Ministry, the Reich Aviation Ministry, and by the delegate of the Führer for Economy.

It is undebatable that the tasks set by the Führer for the Four-Year Plan could not be fulfilled in time if the increase in German production in the Four-Year Plan had continued in the same manner, particularly at the same tempo as previously. First of all, at the beginning of the Four-Year Plan, there was lack of co-ordinated planning for the advancement of raw material production as well as for the development of German synthetic materials the handling of which was still in the first stages. Systematic general planning was first carried out by my office for German raw and synthetic materials. But even execution of perfected plans was unable to give satisfaction. In my efforts to do everything possible for the expansion of German production, I repeatedly sensed in your ministry the attitude that production was of little importance in comparison to foreign trade and for this reason, deserved correspondingly little help. In contrast to this I am able to state that the import savings resulting from the work of the office for German raw and synthetic materials will bring noticeable results in the year 1937, which will rise considerably in the year 1938. Therefore, it cannot be overlooked that the increase in domestic production started by me in the Four-Year Plan affords a very effective chance for the assurance of the independence of Germany as regards the procurement of raw materials. Furthermore, the German synthetic materials developed in this connection represent valuable export articles, to a certain extent even today, and will continue to gain in importance in this respect.

This same restraint has also been observed by your house in the long drawn out negotiations on the increased production of German iron ore and, I believe, has fundamentally always been preserved. Despite this, certain plans were finally worked out after pressure was brought to bear by Keppler and, later, by myself.

This was the reason why I decided to undertake the preparation myself of the great national tasks of the absolutely decisively important German iron Question with great effort. But it is not true that I had left you completely uninformed in this matter. I had previously made my ideas known to the Chief Superintendent of Mines and expressly commissioned him to inform you accordingly. With the founding of the new Reich plants the former plans will not immediately be frustrated or become pointless. On the contrary, we reserve the right to combine what had already been correctly planned and prepared in the past with the work which is to be accomplished in the future. I would welcome your energetic cooperation in the new system in increasing the German iron ore yield. I have already established contact with industry in order to request its cooperation in this matter; it told me that it was quite willing to cooperate. The necessary precautions will be taken to see to it that the development and direction of the work are kept within sensible limits and that economic principles are respected as far as possible.

In conclusion I should like to refer to remarks which you made in a paragraph of your letter entitled “the Four-Year Plan” about your general attitude toward my work in regard to economic policy. I know and am pleased that at the beginning of the Four-Year Plan you promised me your loyal support and cooperation and that you repeatedly renewed this promise even after the first differences of opinion had occurred and had been removed in exhaustive discussions. I deplore all the more having the impression recently, which is confirmed by your letter, that you are increasingly antagonistic toward my work on the Four-Year Plan. This explains the fact that our collaboration has gradually become less close. I emphasize therefore that, as before, I would be pleased if I could again count on your unlimited cooperation in reaching the goals set by the Four-Year Plan. These remain of course the same as long as the Führer clings to them, who himself laid down the content and the execution of the Four-year Plan in the memorandum which is also known to you. It is right for the Führer to recognize that in certain raw materials and foodstuffs Germany’s independence of the rest of the world cannot be achieved in the near future, and we all know that the German people must continue to be fed and employed until that time. However, the Führer did not draw the conclusion from this, that only the labor and material investments not needed elsewhere should be expended for the execution of the Four-Year Plan.

In agreement with the Führer, on the contrary, I look upon my tasks in this light, that the Four-Year Plan permeates the whole economy and that in the interest of its fulfillment certain difficulties in the “advance of economy” must be taken into account insofar as Germany’s survival is not affected. This is completely justified, because the Four-Year Plan, besides its importance for the security of Germany, will some day be of considerable value, especially to the economy. If you want to talk to me again about this and about the resultant form of the necessary collaboration between us, I am only too glad to be at your disposal.

After the representation thus far made I stress the following statements in order to avoid any misunderstanding:

At no time did I failand I should like to emphasize this once more hereto recognize fully and completely your great service in the shaping of our currency and finance, your support in important problems of economy. This recognition is in no way reduced by this letter. On the other hand, I had to clarify things as they appear from my standpoint and on the basis of my information.

Since you have transmitted a copy of your letter to the Reich War Minister, I will also send him a copy of this. I also have reported this to the Führer and Reich Chancellor.

Heil Hitler!

Your [unsigned]

The Adjutant of the Reich Minister of Aviation.

Berlin W.8, 68-70 Behrenstrasse Telephone: A2 Flora 007 Telegram address: Reichsluft Berlin

To: Miss Grolmann

1. Please send first carbon copy to Schacht

2. The second carbon copy is to be sent to Blomberg

3. The copy which is in your hands is yet to be corrected

4. Schacht’s letter of 5 August 37 to General [Generaloberst] Göring to be filed.

[illegible signature]

“Document EC-494 [translation]”, pp. 565-566.

[Rubber stamp] President of the Ministerial Council General Göring Zentralsekretariat Rec’d. 12/10/1937

The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Berlin W 8, 12/8/1937 Wilhelmstr. 78

RK. 366 B g Rs. To the President of the Ministerial Council General Göring

My dear Mr. President!

I most respectfully submit, with the request for acknowledgment, the following copy of my letter of today to Reich Minister Dr. Schacht, concerning the office he held up to the present as Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy.

Heil Hitler!

Yours most respectfully.

(signed) Dr. Lammers

Copy of KK. 366 B g Rs. The Reichsminster and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Berlin, 12/8/1937

RK. 366 B g Rs. To Reich Minister Dr. Schacht.

My dear Reich Minister!

By order of the Führer and Reich Chancellor I have the honor of informing you that the acceptance of your resignation from the leadership of the tasks of Reich Minister for Economy also includes the resignation from your Office as Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy, which you submitted at an earlier date.

Special mention need not be made of the fact, that the thanks tendered you by the Führer and Reich Chancellor at the time of your departure from the Office of Reich Minister for Economy also extends to your activity as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy.

Heil Hitler!

Yours most respectfully.

(signed) Dr. Lammers

“Document EC-495 [translation]”, pp. 566-567.

Copy

Berlin, 11/16/1937

President of the Reich Bank Dr. Hjalmar Schacht

My Führer! My dear Mr. Reich Chancellor!

At your instigation President of the Ministerial Council Göring asked me to attend a conference on 1 November of this year, which led in an entirely friendly manner to the working out of a series of proposals, which President of the Ministerial Council Göring promised to have presented to me in writing on the following day by his State Councillor Neumann, so that, after having reached an agreement, we could present a mutually approved text to you, my Führer. This agreement, even though I repeated it to State Councillor Neumann on the next day, has not to this date been carried out by President of the Ministerial Council Göring.

Since the office of President of the Ministerial Council Göring in the meantime is interfering repeatedly with the authorities of the Reich Ministry of Economy, and since I as Reich Minister of Economy have been on leave of absence since the 5th of September of this year and it is not possible that the Ministry remain any longer without a chief, I should therefore like most humbly to ask you once more in the interest of a uniform government management for the carrying out of the release from the Ministry of Economy which was promised me.

It goes without saying that I am available, here or on the mountain, for an oral report at any time.

Thanking you cordially in advance I am

As ever your devoted Dr. Hjalmar Schacht

To the Führer and Reich Chancellor Mr. Adolf Hitler Obersalzberg

“Document EC-497 [translation]”, pp. 567-570.

The Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics Berlin W 8, 8/5/1937 Behrenstr. 43. [Receipt stamp of central secretariat: Prime Minister General Göring, dated 8/6/1937]

Prime Minister General Hermann Göring Berlin

Most honored Prime Minister!

Your ordinance concerning the union of persons authorized to carry on mining of 23 July of this year and your letter of 28 July of this year relative to obtaining foreign securities cause me to make the following statements of basic principles.

Supply of Raw Materials

When, on 8/2/1934, the Führer and Reich Chancellor entrusted to me the leadership of the economic policies of the Reich, the expansion of German raw material procurement already played a decisive role. This was possible

1. By increased domestic production of raw materials,

2. By increased import of raw materials.

While I was in charge (that is, before the Four-Year Plan began to function) domestic production of raw materials from 1934-1936 was developed as follows:

[marginal note in pencil:] Lead (from German ore): 1933, tons: 52000; 1936, tons: 60000 rise: 15%. PLEIGER SCHEMATOS: Zinc (from German ore): 1933, tons: 106000; 1936, tons: 130000 rise: 23%. Aluminum: 1933, tons: 18900; 1936, tons: 97500 rise: 416%. PLEIGER: Iron ore (home requirement): 1933, tons: 2.55 million; 1936, tons: 6.812 million rise: 167%. Iron ore (Fe-content): 1933, tons: 928700; 1936, tons: 2.14 million; rise: 130%. PLEIGER: Anthracite coal: 1933, tons: 110 [Million]; 1936, tons: 158 [Million] rise: 44%. Motor fuels and oils: 1933, tons: 915000; 1936, tons: 2.039 million; rise: 123%. KELSOL: Rayon: 1933, tons: 28000; 1936, tons: 46100; rise: 60%. Cellulose wool: 1933, tons: 4000; 1936, tons: 46300 rise: 1057%.

The import of raw and semi-finished materials during the same period was increased from 26 millions to not less than 46 millions by the new trade policies inaugurated by me. It is already evident from this comparison that the more rapidly effective chance for an increase of our raw material supply lay in foreign trade. This was taken cognizance of by me through a transfer of our export to countries supplying raw materials and by suitable management of the accounting system with a view to avoiding cash payment of foreign exchange. In conjunction with the increase of internal production of raw materials, which naturally could only take effect more slowly, it was important that a disturbance of the capital market as well as of the labor market should be avoided. Prerequisites for the success of rearmament were, on one hand, stable wages and prices and, on the other hand, concentration of all profits and savings toward financing the Reich. Therefore, by the initiative of my ministry, the particular powers of private industry were harnessed for the increase of domestic raw material production.

Financing of Armaments.

The greatest possible commitment of industry to self-financing and the central supervision and exploitation of the money and capital market for the tremendous requirements of armament have made possible the maintenance of German currency up to now. The confidence of savings investors in the stability of our money value has even permitted a not inconsiderable part of the financing to be undertaken by long-term national loans. A threat to this policy arises from wages which are already experiencing considerable increases in numerous regions and plants due to the unregulated competition of the construction and armament industries for the labor market, which has led to a price-elevating increase in the use of everyday consumer goods.

The Food Situation.

An aggravation of the currency and raw materials policy has arisen from the agricultural sector. Contrary to the oft-repeated public affirmations of the competent government agencies the food situation of the German people is becoming constantly less satisfactory. In the years 1933-1936 the harvest steadily declined. Counting potatoes along with grain, the average harvest proceeds for the years 1931/33 were about 34.7 million tons and for the years 1934/36 only 32.8 million tons. The figures based on a three-year average make it quite evident that it is not merely a matter of unfavorable weather conditions. Far rather it is the agrarian market and production policies which have failed. Besides, the agriculturally useful land surface has decreased 2.1% in the period 1933-1936, the tillable surface for grain even 4.1%, due to the numerous uses of land for other purposes, such as by the Wehrmacht, for factory sites, sports, highway construction, etc. The efforts of the Reich Food Commission for a decreased dependence on foreign countries have therefore had no success; rather this still increases because of the growth of the population and the increase of consumption. The harvest estimate with reference to bread and feed grain for the current year is again 800000 tons less, compared to the previous year. The foreign currency requirements for food purposes have therefore, despite all production battles, not grown less but rather increased. It is particularly regrettable that the food sector has repeatedly been the victim of miscalculations which have not only seriously impaired our foreign currency reserves but also destroyed opportunities for trade policy negotiations by the sudden need for importing certain foodstuffs.

Trade Policies.

In spite of this, trade policies have shown themselves to be the only favorable factor, even in the realm of food.

In 1934, when I took over the Ministry of Economics, German exports amounted to RM4.167 million. They rose to RM4.270 million in 1935, RM4.768 billion in 1936, and to RM2.711 billion for the first half year of 1937 (compared to RM2.242 Billion in the first half year of 1936). Whereas I was faced with an import surplus of RM284 million in 1934 my first year in office, this unfavorable balance changed as early as 1935 into an export surplus of 111 million RM, which increased further in 1936 to RM550 million, and to RM192 million for the first half of 1937 (as against RM131 million for the first half of 1936). In this way, funds were procured not only for the enormous increase in our importing of raw materials but also for the supplementation of our food supply from abroad.

Foreign Debts.

Trade policies are further complicated by the foreign debts contracted during the Weimar period (Systemzeit). Following the announcement of our moratorium, in the summer of 1933, the creditor nations made repeated efforts to exact the interest from us by applying pressure through commercial policies. By means of constantly renewed negotiations, more severe trade pressure against us has been averted; in fact, we even succeeded in the course of time in materially lowering with the consent of various countries the rate of interest owed them, which according to the agreements averaged 6%. Our trade policy is always exposed to the danger of serious injury, however, should we become unable to transfer at least these reduced sums of interest abroad. A further hindrance to our foreign trade lies in the fact that in clearing transactions with countries furnishing raw materials and food products we have bought in excess of the goods we were able to deliver to these countries (namely Southeastern Europe and Turkey) roughly RM0.5 billion. These countries hesitate, therefore, to make further deliveries to us as long as this balance can not be taken care of. Furthermore, a number of countries are raising difficulties because we are no longer in a position to furnish them certain raw and semi-finished materials which we urgently need for our own use.

Four Year Plan.

The Four Year Plan was intended to help relieve all these difficulties. The aim and the idea of the Four Year Plan were and remain entirely correct and necessary. It stands, essentially, for the application of increased energy to the efforts already undertaken by my ministry since 1934 with the results shown in the above statistics. As you will remember, I welcomed it when your energy, my dear Prime Minister, was recruited by the Führer for these tasks, and from the very beginning I gave you my most loyal support and cooperation, with the particular plea that I be given a hearing from time to time, since I believed that my more than thirty years of experience in economic life, half of them in public service, could be of value to you. I can only regret that you have made so little use of my offer. I have of course promised the Führer and Reich Chancellor my fullest cooperation likewise, at the same time drawing to his attention the fact that the investment in materials required under the Four Year Plan for the current provisioning of our industry, and thereby for the tempo of our industry, and thereby for the tempo of our rearmament, must result in raw material shortages. In regard to this the Führer directed: “One does just what one can.” This directive means that the work performed and the material investment made in the carrying out of the Four Year Plan should not be in excess of what is consonant with the course of our economy. (Marginal note: Führer Memorandum). This is what determines the limitations of the program and the scope and tempo of the Four Year Plan. The Führer has recognized, at all times, that Germany cannot be made independent of foreign sources for certain raw materials and especially for food within the foreseeable future and that all efforts toward that end must require a considerable length of time, even if they had prospects of success, during which time the German people must continue to be fed and employed. This has impelled me to cover the deficiencies through my foreign trade policy. [Interlineal note: Neumann].

Increasing of Exports.

In the meantime, I have repeatedly stressed the need of increased exports and have worked to bring it about. The very necessity of bringing our armament up to a certain level as rapidly as possible must place in the foreground the idea of as large returns as possible in foreign exchange and therewith, the greatest possible assurance of raw material supplies, through exporting. On the other hand, the undue claims made upon our industry by domestic orders are naturally prejudicial to the willingness to export. I have urged again and again that industrial exports be increased and that exaggerated demands should not be made upon industry in the placing of State orders, but I have never received proper support from your staff, although I realize that you yourself have repeatedly taken the opportunity to support my standpoint. I have indicated above to what degree the Ministry of Economics has succeeded in increasing exports and, also, therefore, raw material imports. The prospects for a further increase of exports are not unfavorable. But the undue drain upon raw materials, as well as labor resources, for public construction projects, rearmament, and the Four Year Plan, threatens, in spite of the favorable chances, to bring about a decline in our exports, a decline already apparent here and there. I want to point out quite clearly that, if the foreign currency [Devisen] which we receive from export becomes less, the necessary result is that the import of raw materials must become less and more gaps must appear in the supply not only of building activity and armament but also, of course, of the Four Year Plan.

This view of the economic situation which I have explained above, I have held from the first moment of my collaboration. I have never tired of pointing out the dangers which result for Germany from this situation.

On 10/18/1934 (a few weeks after I had taken over the Ministry for Economics), in a discussion under the presidency of the Führer and Reichschancellor, I, for the first time in a responsible position, pointed out there the large gap between our assets in foreign currency and our requirements of foreign currency and explained the critical situation of our raw material supplies and foodstuffs. In the beginning of 5/1935, I presented two memoranda to the Führer in which I pointed out the necessity of the careful nursing of our commercial relations with foreign countries as well as the necessity for a unified financial control at home, if the rearmament program was to succeed. Later on, I considered it my duty to point again and again, on every occasion, to the economic limits which are imposed upon us by our raw material and foodstuff potentials. I have never made a secret of the fact that I considered and still consider our agrarian policies inadequate. You and other gentlemen were present, when I reported to the Führer in 11/1935 the exact statistics especially about our situation with respect to foreign currency, and already then I stated that at least 250 million Reichsmarks in foreign currency were lacking for the period alone from 10/1935-3/1936 for carrying out the program at that time. The same calculations have been repeated by me at many occasions later on.

Foreign Currency Situation.

While our main objective, accordingly, had to consist of increasing the current income of foreign exchange through export, at the same time increasing our domestic raw materials, you, my dear Prime Minister, as one of your first measures after the execution of the Four Year Plan had been assigned to you by the Führer, ordered the seizure of foreign bonds in German possession, as well as the speedy collection of German merchandise credits and the conversion into cash to the greatest possible extent of German interests abroad. You have thereby undertaken an encroachment on capital elements, the interests and dividends of which furnished a regular revenue in foreign currency, that is now missing in our current receipts of foreign currency. The objections which were made from foreign economic reasons on my part against coercive measures in the field into which you had entered could, indeed, have been avoided with your approval by conducting the whole project in private negotiations on the part of the Reich Bank. However, my fundamental objections were not removed, namely, that this last foreign currency reserve of the German people should not be used unless a real emergency should arise (famine, political conflicts or something like that). It was and is an unbearable thought for me to have to face such an economic or political risk without any reserve of gold or foreign currency. The total amount of foreign currency produced by this special project is about 1/2 billion Reichsmarks and has in the meantime has been completely spent. I should like to point out especially that it has not been used for the purposes of the Four Year Plan, but for the current import of raw materials and foodstuffs in order to maintain our nutrition and our industrial employment as much as possible.

Your Suggestion of July 28th, This Year.

You now also want to seize and use up the balance of the foreign securities which have not yet been collected. Here I must again give even stronger expression to all my earlier objections concerning the psychological effects of a seizure by force (counter measures abroad, exposure of our critical situation, shaking the confidence of even national security owners etc.). Since it is obviously far from my intention to hinder your decisions, I have ordered the Reich Bank to put the technical material for the execution of your project at your disposal. But I want to express clearly that I must refuse to take any responsibility for these policies. I consider it especially irresponsible, in every respect, that such last reserves are being used up, without supplying any other provisions for emergencies in coming years, and before the results of the Four Year Plan have actually become evident in a practical way.

Extraction of Iron Ore.

I now come to your order of July 23rd of this year, my dear Prime Minister, and state that this new project has ensued, without your having consulted with me, at all. I furthermore state that this project encroaches upon my own projects about which your office has been instructed in detail by my officials. According to that, the first ore extraction plan which is known to you has been more or less fulfilled. This plan was in effect up to the end of 1936 and was agreed upon by the owners of the mines and the mining department of my Ministry. After that, the owners of the mines had promised an increase of the production which up to a short time ago came close to the figure your office requested. The greatly increased demands recently made by you were not discussed with me at all. The company never lacked readiness to do the utmost in order to promote iron ore production. If the point of view of economy is to be eliminated, the plant would even then still be substantially more economical if operated by the company itself, namely by utilizing its already existing installations and equipment together with a subsidy from the State, than if the entire plant were to be newly organized by the Reich at its expense.

The Question of Costs.

That brings me to the question of cost. Lacking more detailed information from you, I must limit myself to the statement that your proposal would obviously entail the expenditure of many hundreds of millions of Reichsmarks, for which, according to information furnished me by the Reich Ministry of Finance, no financial provisions exist as yet. I can claim for myself that, for the tasks of the Four Year Plan also, I have not refused my cooperation in the field of financial policy within the limits of reason. I recall that I not only financed the first plants of the Lignite-Gasoline, Inc. [Braunkohle-Benzin A.G.], which were constructed three years ago, but that I have also taken care of the financial aspects of the many plants, now in the process of construction, for extracting gasoline from lignite as well as from anthracite coal, and of the new electric power plants, and the enlargement of existing ones. But I am not in a position to raise the financial means for projects, the effectiveness of which cannot be anticipated any more than their extent, or the length of their period of productivity. To make banknotes and ledger credits available does not mean that raw materials and foodstuffs are simultaneously made available. With paper one can neither bake bread nor cast guns. Investing raw materials and manpower in new enterprises on the-scale planned by you must cause a further reduction of raw material allocations to those factories working for export or producing consumer goods for the people. The scarcity of a good many consumer goods is already making itself felt in public life today. It cannot be eliminated by increasing the amount of money or credit in circulation. If the output of consumer goods diminishes while the amount of money and credit increases, the inevitable consequence is an increase in the price of consumer goods and devaluation of the currency, leading eventually to inflation.

Concluding Remarks.

I ask you to believe me, my dear Prime Minister, that it is not my intention at all to wish to impede your policies in any way whatsoever. I offer no opinion, either, whether my views, which deviate from your economic policy, are correct or not. I have full sympathy for your activities. I do believe, however, that in a totalitarian state it is wholly impossible to conduct an economic policy divided against itself. You will recall that already months ago I stated to you that uniformity of economic policy is indispensable for its success, and that I suggested that you have the Reich Ministry of Economics transferred to you. I have explained above that I believe your foreign exchange policy, your policy regarding production, and your financial policy to be unsound, and that I am not in a position to share the responsibility for them. The fact that you constantly intervene with the policies of the Ministry of Economics in all these fields, must, however, create the impression that I also advocate these policies of yours. This has now openly become a matter of debate because of your Mining Ordinance, since the Mining Administration is subordinate to me in all its parts. It is wholly untenable to give the economic groups affected thereby, who ask my opinion of your ordinance, an opportunity to allege contradictions within the economic leadership of the Reich Cabinet. For that reason I have today given a report to the Führer and Reich Chancellor.

I remain, with greatest esteem and with Heil Hitler!

Yours most sincerely (sgd) Hjalmar Schacht

PS: The Reich Minister of War will receive a copy of this letter.

“Document EC-606: Minutes Concerning conference with Field Marshal Göring at Karinhall 1/30/1940 [translation]”, pp. 588-589.

Chief Wi Rue Amt

Berlin, 1/30/1940.

Present: Lt. Col. Conrath, for a time. Dir. Lange, Ec. Group Machine Building [handwritten remark] “Written by Officer!” [initialled by Thomas]

Field Marshal Göring told me in the beginning that he had to inform me of the intentions of the Führer and of the economic measures resulting therefrom. He stated:

The Führer is firmly convinced that he will succeed in reaching a decision of the war in the year 1940 by a big attack in the west. He reckons that Belgium, Holland and Northern France will get into our possession, and he, the Führer, had figured out the industrial areas of Douai and Lens and those of Luxembourg, Longwy and Briey could, from the point of view of raw material replace the supplies from Sweden. Therefore, the Führer had decided now to make use of our reserves of raw material without regard to future times, at the expense of incidental later war years. The correctness of this decision i fortified with the Führer by the conception that the best way of building up of stocks is not the building up of stocks of raw material but of ready made war material. Furthermore one must keep in mind, thatif the air war had begunalso our factories might be destroyed. Furthermore the Führer is of the opinion that it is the main thing to reach maximum efforts in the year 1940 and that one therefore should put aside programs giving results only later in order to accelerate those giving results still in 1940.

For our work, therefore, the decision follows to exploit everything to the utmost in 1940 and accordingly to exploit raw materials reserves at their expense in later years. It will be necessary to act in future according to this principle.

I replied to Field Marshal Göring that I was grateful for this clear program, and that I give him the advice, however, to build up reserves of ready war material, too, as experience shows that ready war material on hand may be reemployed always at once and may be used for new set-ups. We, therefore, would have to put on the brakes in this respect in order not to face one day difficult surprises. Field Marshal Göring agreed.

[initialled] Th 30/1

“Document EC-611: Speech of Dr. Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, on the Miracle of Finance and the New Plan before the Economic Council of the German Academy at Berlin on 11/29/1938 [translation]”, pp. 589-593.

Taken from special print of the Reichsbank [nach dem Sonderdruck der Reichsbank].

Since the seizure of power by National Socialism, critics abroad have used two special arguments against Germany in the economic field. The first was, that German finances were developing in a disastrous manner which had to lead to collapse in a very short time, and the second, that Germany would be shipwrecked by the shrinking of her foreign trade, her elimination from the world market and her efforts at self-sufficiency. Only recently, after a long but vain period of waiting for the collapse, people are beginning to correct themselves and to speak occasionally in a somewhat envious tone of the financial miracle, which has been built up in Germany, and of the commercial-political achievements of the so-called new plan. The catchword of the German financial miracle has even inspired a foreign journalist to write a biography of me, in which he depicts Schacht as a magician. (Note-N. Muehlen, “Der Zauberer”. The Life and Loans of Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht “Zuerich 1938.”)

And the Schacht commercial-political policy of the New Plan is the constant bane of all Most-Favored-Nations fanatics abroad who, from out of the abundance of their wealth, cannot conceive that a poor nation can yet have the courage to live according to its own laws instead of suffering according to the prescriptions of the rich. The unwilling recognition of our new economic-political methods also gave rise to further explanation and defense at home, in the process of which it did happen that I sometimes actually could not recognize my two brainchildren. Of course it is quite true that one cannot, during a period of formation exactly express oneself concerning all details, but the inner fundamentals must sometimes fail to be understood by the outsider, since too much talking endangers action. Now, however, that things have taken on a completed form, I believe that it would be both unobjectionable and useful for me as the originator to express myself publicly on these two questions. It will then be seen that there can be no question whatever of magic or artfulness, that the success of the two tasks was based, rather, on very simple, clear, fundamental ideas.

Yet I willingly agree with people abroad that it is difficult to comprehend the rise which Germany experienced after the changeover to National Socialism since, as was the case with our opponents, there was no understanding of any kind for the unheard-of oppression, deprivation of rights and economic misery which we were forced to undergo prior to 1933.

The collapse of German economy after Versailles had its climax in the credit crisis of 1931 (Note 7/13/1931). It was unleashed by the “run” of our creditors abroad who would have liked to collect the entire debt of no less than 25 billion Reichsmark on three months notice. The fraction which was actually transferred was still large enough to destroy our economy. All credit transactions ceased, payments had to be considerably restricted, all large banks showed themselves to be in need of restoration and one (Notethe Danat Bank) was even beyond restoration. Rates of interest reached insane heights, the number of bankruptcies mounted by leap and bounds. Each individual collapse of necessity released a new chain of suspensions of payment and thus entire branches of economy, among them primarily agriculture, were soon facing ruin. The state of public finances became hopeless. Each increase in the tax rate only brought a decrease in receipts. All of these manifestations of economic decay had unequalled social misery as their inevitable result. The most staggering proof of this is found in the number of unemployed, which passed the 6-million mark in the winter of 1932/33 (Note the peak was reached 2/16/1933 with 6047289 unemployed by actual count) and which. including invisible unemployment, amounted to almost 7 million. If in addition to this one considers that since 1926 the number of unemployed had never averaged less than 1.3 million per year, and that by 1930 the number already amounted to more than three million, then no further proof is needed that such constant mass unemployment constituted a political danger of the most serious order.

If the government of that time was incapable of any effective undertaking against this disaster, this was due to the fact that it disintegrated into party and interest groups and was enmeshed in inflexible parliamentary methods. A fatalistic resignation to a fate regarded as inevitable characterized national policy. It found a kind of economic justification in the classic national economy’s widespread dogma concerning the powers of. selfhealing, which are supposed to be latent in every crisis and to manifest their value in the natural course of events. The handling of this dogma was so unrealistic, so steeped in purely mechanical thinking, so lacking in any feeling for causes and relationships, that the result is a model of an economic policy as it should not be. Even a fleeting glance shows that the 1931 crisis cannot be compared to the prewar crises. In 1908 Germany had 25 billion marks worth of foreign assets, in 1931 an equal amount of foreign debts; in 1908 a few percent of the employable population were unemployed, in 1931 nearly a third. Between 1905-1908 suspensions of payment rose 21%, between 1928-1931 they rose 95%. The causes of the economic crises before the World War were almost always based on economic events, which were influenced by crop fluctuations, technical achievements, human miscalculations, etc. The economic crisis of 1931, on the other-hand, was nothing but the economic finis to senseless, violent political measures which turned all normal economic development topsy-turvy. It was not the economy which had failed the German economy least of all; it was the policy of the victorious powers of Versailles that had failed. As a result economy could not help, only politics, which helped Germany with the seizure of power by National Socialism.

The National Socialist government did not hesitate a moment with its measures for starting the economy going again, and in this connection it is very interesting to note that National Socialism never acted according to a preconceived theoretical economic program. Since I had been in personal contact with the leading men of National Socialism since the end of 1930, I was a witness of how the Führer repeatedly rejected the manifold attempts to set up a detailed National Socialist economic program and clung to the ideological foundation of the party program. In 1933, therefore, economic declamation was immediately replaced by economic action. The ideas of so-called consumption financing, which were at first much talked about and which had in mind the indiscriminate distribution of a windfall of money by the state, were completely put aside. Thus the mistakes were avoided which we have today seen in the economic policy of the United States of America and France and which show how closely deflationary and inflationary crises are related.

Instead, all state aid was devoted from the very beginning to increasing production, at first in a so-called work-creating program through credit for restoration, repairs, etc. (NoteAbove all by the law for the reduction of unemployment of 6/1/1933-Dokumente der Deutschen Politik Vol. 1, Doc. 71.) and then by the great and constantly growing armament program. The extent of this program and of the highway construction undertaken very soon showed that these two tasks alone would put all idle manpower to work, so that the other work-creating measures very soon became superfluous.

Of course all this work-creating and armament program could be put into operation only by the state and only with the aid of generous financing. There was no capital available for this financing. Rather, help had to be obtained through the creation of money. The classic theory of national economics permits the creation of money only when the goods circulating in the economy have already increased; on the other hand, it forbids production financing and above all any sudden and extreme expansion of credit. This theory is correct only in the free, unregulated economy which served the classical national economists as the source of their knowledge. In such an unregulated economy an extensive increase in money must lead to wage and price increases and thus to tensions which as an end result unleash an economic crisis. With National Socialism, however, Germany came under an economy regulated to the greatest possible degree and to a constantly increasing extent by the state, which made it possible to prevent price and wage increases. Thus one of the main objections to production financing by credit was eliminated, and the credit money was used to produce a greater amount of goods. It remained only to establish limits for the amount to which the creation of money could go; for the creation of money by the state always carries with it the danger of excess, which leads to inflationary phenomena. It was not only important that the newly created money be covered by newly created goods; the type of goods produced was also important. Reduced to a simple formula, the problem is as follows: The credit money made available for armament purposes produces a demand for consumers’ goods through the payment of wages and salaries. The armament manufacturers, however, deliver military goods which are produced but not put on the market. From this follow two consequences: first, care must be taken that aside from armament manufacture an amount of consumer goods is produced which is sufficient to sustain the population including all those working for the armament industry; second, the less there is consumed the more labor can be used for armaments, but the higher consumption rises the more manpower must be left for the production of consumer goods. Therefore, the standard of living and the extent of armament production are in an inverse ratio. The less I consume the more I save, and the more I save the more I am able to put into armaments. This means that armaments can in the last analysis be financed only by the building up of savings and not by the creation of money.

When the Führer again appointed me to head the Reichsbank (on 3/16/1933) to support the financing of work-creation and armaments, these connections were quite clear to me since in the decades of my work with economic problems I had learned to distinguish the means of exchange which is money from the means of production which is savings capital. But I saw just as clearly that first I would have to build a bridge to this normal way of financing through savings because our income from taxes had decreased to a minimum and our capital market was empty. As long as the economy remained at its low level this state of affairs could not be changed. Consequently, the only correct way was for the bank of issue to put at our disposal the credits necessary for work-creation and armament production until the economy would yield profits again which would render possible a sufficient building up of savings and consolidation. Only then a change to the way of financing through taxes and loans could be-and would have to bemade. It was also clear to the Reichsbank that it could release the forces to start the economy but could not rule them alone without the state. Despite this fact the Reichsbank took the risk of credit expansion which, from the first, was planned for sums of billions, because it was sure of finding the full support of the entire state machinery in its supreme task of currency protection.

The numerous measures which were taken in closest collaboration by all competent agencies during the time to follow all had the purpose of controlling the course of the credit expansion, of preventing a discrepancy between money and goods, and of putting superfluous money into armament loans. These measures fall into two groups according to their point of application. The first group is concerned purely with credit and finance policy. This includes the entire finance policy, lowering of interest, stockfloating legislation, supervision of banks, constant skimming of the money market by promissory notes of the gold discount bank, and, as the most important measure, control of share issuing. I especially stress this last-named measure, to which there is much opposition, because it will be essential for a long time yet, in order to safeguard the currency and maintain the interest level, to concentrate the means collecting on the capital market as far as possible on the financing of armament and the Four-Year-Plan. The second group of measures, on which the Reichsbank had to place the greatest emphasis, includes the direct effects on prices and wages, which are entrusted to the Reich commissioner for price-fixing (Note Appointed on 10/29/1936. Cf. Dokumente der deutschen Politik Vol. 4, Doc. 47) and the trustees of labor. They are to take the brunt of the pressure which is felt in spite of control of credit and finance policy and are thus to protect our currency from alternate price and wage increases, which are rightly considered the characteristic symptom of an inflation. The importance of this function in itself means that price and wage control must be maintained and if necessary even strengthened, until an adequate consolidation of the short-term armament credits from the capital market has resulted.

The simultaneous operation of all the measures named has hitherto effected the maintenance of German currency. Spring 1938 signified a cut in our financial policy, because the German economy had reached a condition of full employment. As soon as a national economy has employed all available labor and means, however, any further extension of credit becomes not only senseless but harmful, for then newly created money can no longer cause new production of goods, but only competition for the available labor and raw materials; and such competition must, in spite of all state supervisory measures, drive prices and wages up. Now, the term full employment is of course flexible. A national economy as great as the German one will still be able to mobilize a certain labor reserve and achieve certain results in the way of simplification and systematization. But a credit expansion in the previous manner was no longer possible, and from this the responsible parties drew the consequences. On 4/1/1938 the granting of credit by the issuing bank was discontinued and the financing of-government contracts then became dependent on methods of taxation and loans. The issuance of treasury bonds against deliveries was the instrument used in preparing the transition.

Nevertheless the Reichsbank is not by these means freed of all risks. For the Reichsbank has, in addition to the credits granted by itself, gone even farther in that it has drawn in very considerable resources of the money market for the work-creation and the financing of armaments. While the term “capital market” includes all savings capital which is at the disposal of industry for a considerable length of time, the term “money market” is understood to mean the short term funds which mainly serve as the means of carrying on business; these are not invested as savings, but only loaned for a very short period as they are being circulated all the time. These funds form as it were the treasury of the German national economy. The Reichsbank has created fluctuating investments for these short-term moniesfor which interest (even if at a low rate) is sought for the time when they are not being usedby offering them partly in the form of bills of exchange on the Gold Discount Bank and partly by direct sale of short-term securities on the money market, which can be converted by industry at any time into cash at the Reichsbank. Here therefore is one obligation of the Reichsbank, which in times of a limited money market can effect and on occasion already has effected, a harnessing of the Reichsbank, but which at times of a more fluid market must always lighten the burden of the Reichsbank. By means of this ingenious system even short-term cash reserves of German industry, which would otherwise lie idle or go into other short-term investments, are drawn into the financing of work-creating and armament. It is also apparent from this representation that in addition to the control of the capital market, central supervision of the money market was also necessary and will remain so for the time being in the interests of finance on the whole.

And now all of you will be curious to learn what sums were and are involved. Naturally I do not disclose that. But one thing I should like to state emphatically and frankly. The figures which are disseminated about the total German foreign debt are fortunately considerably higher than the actual debts, and if it again becomes possible, which I hope will be the case in the not too distant future, to publish the actual figure of our total debt, the world will be astonished at how so much in the way of workcreation and armament could be achieved with so little use of credit.

The criticism of the extent of our money circulation which i occasionally heard should also be more restrained. In 1929 the total German circulation of legal tender was about 5980 million marks. In the meantime the population of the German Reich has been increased by 14.9 million through the increase in births and through the addition of the Saar, of former Austria, and of the Sudeten Gau. This means, with the same circulation of money per capita, a sum of 7370 million marks. Compared to this figure, the average circulation of legal tender for the first ten months of the current year is about 7930 million marks, that is, only 560 million higher in comparison to 1929. Of course the circulation of legal tender was greatly increased in the critical month of September of this year; this is, however, less than the circulation increase of other states.

It is possible that no bank of issue in peacetimes carried on such a daring credit policy as the Reichsbank since the seizure of power by National Socialism. With the aid of this credit policy, however, Germany created an armament second to none, and this armament in turn made possible the results of our policy. Nevertheless, we are not dealing with a miracle, at least not in the financial field. The success is corroborated among other things by the increase in tax revenues (1932: 6.6, 1937: 14.0 billion marks) and the amount of the consolidation loans issued [from 1934 to date (NoteConcerning loans from 1934-1937 cf. Dokumente der Deutschen Politik Vol. 5 p. 334. Note 3. In 1938 there were also three 41/2-percent Reich treasury bonds1/3-18/1938 first series: 1400 million marks; 4/19-5/4/1938 second series: 1966 million marks; 10/10-24/1938 third series: 1850 million marks.) about 13.5 billion without the loan at present being offered.] (NoteFrom 11/28/1938-1/9/1939 the fourth series of the 4.5% treasury bondsto the amount of 1.5 billion marks was offered for subscription.) That is a finance policy of which we can be proud, but it is no miracle. The miracle is in an entirely different field. The basic political attitude of our people has changed miraculously in the few years since 1933. Fatalistic resignation has been replaced by iron will and fanatical faith in the future of our nation. Egotism and disunity have given way to strict national discipline. Instead of a weak and vacillating government. a single. purposeful, energetic personality is ruling today. That is the great miracle which has actually happened in Germany and which has had its effects in all fields of life and not least in that of economy and finance. There is no German financial miracle. There is only the miracle of the reawakening of German national consciousness and German discipline, and we owe this miracle to our Führer Adolf Hitler.

I now turn to the second great complex of questions, that of commercial policy. First I should like to make a remark for the benefit of my friends at home. It is often very amusing for me to observe how, without prejudice to all work really achieved, one is repeatedly judged by slogans which have long since been cast off. One of the most popular slogans is that a man like Schacht can think only in terms of money and therefore, to paraphrased Lessing, cannot possess the only genuine ring of National Socialism. Such attitudes have such a tragic-comic effect because they come from people who are constantly calling for money but at the same time assert that money is of no importance.

The conception of the so-called New Plan (notewent into effect on 9/24/1934; cf. Dokumente der deutschen Politik Volume 5 Page 352 f) with which we will now deal, proves exactly the opposite of so-called thinking in terms of money. The New Plan is the completely logical recognition that money alone is not enough; the important thing is the kind and amount of goods I can afford for money. One can neither make cannon nor bake bread with printed banknotes. What matters is simply and solely the possibility of supplying a sufficient amount of goods, and if one cannot produce these quantities of goods oneself, they will have to be obtained from somewhere through barter. In this barter money plays only the part of middleman in commerce.

The first point which must be established is that there is a variety of goods which Germany cannot manufacture, at least not in sufficient quantities for her population. It should really be self-evident that from this state of affairs arises the effort to tap as far as possible all productive sources of the country which have not yet been opened up. An industrial country which depends on imports cannot always be assured of disposing abroad of its goods in exchange for which it wants to import other goods; economic or political crises may prevent this. Criticism of the so-called efforts toward autarchy therefore appears more than ridiculous to me. The furtherance of production of domestic raw materials has very little relation to the rejection of foreign trade. Foreign trade is founded not only on economic necessity but also on efforts toward cultural exchange. Even if all countries were autarchic in the most fundamental necessities of life, there would still develop an international trade in innumerable cultural goods and in the consumer articles characteristic of an advanced civilization. Proof of this is found in the fact, among others, that highly developed industrial countries generally maintain a more active commercial trade among one another than with more primitive economic areas. The trade between Great Britain and Germany was never so active as at the time of their keenest competition in the international markets.

But Germany is certainly not autarchic and never will be in all fields. She is dependent to a large extent on the import of foodstuffs and raw materials. The imports must be paid for with “Devisen”, that is, with foreign currency. We do not possess this foreign currency; we can obtain it only by exporting our goods. I have already mentioned that Germany entered the crisis of 1931 with a foreign debt of no less than 25 billion marks. If more proof had been needed, it was shown beyond any doubt in the course of this crisis that German exports could not be increased so far as to cover not only the necessary imports in goods, but also the payments on the debts. The impossibility of this was caused not so much by the fact that Germany could not have produced the necessary amount of export goods, but rather by the fact that foreign nations were either unable or unwilling to accept this quantity of German goods. The American and English tariff increases, the French continental quotas, etc., prove this with absolute clarity. And so Germany was laid under the necessity of, first, paying for a certain quantity of imports, and second, continuing the unproductive payments on the debts. Both together exceeded German strength, and therefore the first measure that had to precede a new German trade policy was to limit the payment on loans. Thus there was no other possibility than to introduce, to an increasing extent, the transfer moratorium, with which you are familiar.

When the payment on foreign debts had thus been restricted, goods traffic also had to be regulated, if the foreign currency problem was to be mastered. Entrusted by the Führer with the task of solving this problem, I, as Minister of Economics (Notefrom 7/30/1934-11/26/1937) reverted to quite simple and primitive thought processes. I told myself that one should never buy more than one can pay for and if one cannot pay for everything that one would like to buy, one must first buy what one needs most urgently and must buy it where one can obtain it most advantageously. This again involves the danger of an incorrect application of the principles of the Classic National Economy which has lost its basis. The classic theory immediately answers the question, where can one buy to the best advantage: of course, where it is cheapest. That is completely unthinkable today, for if one has no foreign currency for payment, the question of where it is cheapest is not so important as the question of where one can get the goods at all. And if the seller of the goods does not insist on selling only for foreign tender, which I do not have, but is willing to take goods in exchange, the whole classic national-economic law loses its basis. All in all, this simple and primitive economic thought was based on the main question of whether the rest of the world was willing or able to renounce a market which consisted of almost 70 million people at that time and which today consists of almost 80 million, or whether they wanted to retain this market. According to the classic theory one should have assumed that anyone who cannot receive the payment he wants in foreign currency for his goods would renounce the sale of these goods. Far from it. It has been shown that, in contrast to everything which classical national economy has hitherto taught, not the producer but the consumer is the ruling factor in economic life. And this thesis is somewhat connected with general social and political observations, because it establishes the fact that the number of consumers is considerably larger than the number of producers, a fact which exercises a not inconsiderable social and political pressure.

The new foreign trade system demanded that export and import be subjected to a certain control, but it would not necessarily have forced the whole German trade policy into the extreme of bilateral trade agreement systems, which we find today as the ruling factor not only in German trade policy but alsoconnected with the German distressin the rest of Europe, and which is so very distasteful to our rich cousins in America. This extreme bilateral trade agreement system was forced on us by our foreign creditors; for they thought that with the control of our exports to their countries they would have a suitable means of obtaining payment for their capital demands, which could no longer be fully satisfied from Germany. A surprising development resulted here: in the creditor countries, which resorted to this clearing traffic toward us, a difference of opinion very soon arose as to who should be given preference, the exporter of goods, who wants to export to Germany, or the creditor, who wants to collect interest from Germany. The practical development of this problem was effected essentially in favor of the producer of goods and less in favor of the capital creditor. And if I just now said that the consumer and not the producer has become the decisive factor in economic life, one would almost be tempted to add here that in credit and capital traffic the debtor and not the creditor has the decisive position, in the last analysis. If the debtor absolutely cannot pay, it is up to the creditor to help him, or he must dispense with payment. Of course it is different if the debtor does not want to pay; the keeping of contracts and respect for private property will of necessity always form the basis of all communal society. At any rate, it is a false assumption that the bilateral trade system, with which Germany is today supporting her economy, arose from our deliberate judgment. Oh, no. It is a natural and necessary result of the war tributes and the clearings which were forced on us. As soon as our creditors are ready to cooperate with us in removing the effects of the war tributes, a door will be opened through which we can come to many-sided trade and to free international payment traffic.

The New Plan, therefore, is not anything unnatural or fantastic. It arose from the emergency conditions into which Germany wa forced by the rest of the world. The unusual aspect of the New Plan was only that its conception freed itself from all preconceived theoretical dogmas and in practice took those measures which could bring relief.

If there is anything remarkable about the New Plan it is again only the fact that German organization under National Socialist leadership succeeded in conjuring up in a very short time the whole apparatus of supervision of imports, direction of exports, and promotion of exports. The success of the New Plan can be proved by means of a few figures. Calculated according to quantity, the import of finished products was throttled by 63% between 1934-1937. On the other hand, the import of ores was increased by 132%, of petroleum by 116%, of grain by 102% and of rubber by 71%. According to value, the passive trade balance, which amounted to 284 million marks in 1934, gave way to an active balance of 550 in 1936, and of 443 million marks in 1937. The so-called new goods debts, finally, were cut down to about half within two years.

These figures show how much the New Plan contributed to the execution of the armament program as well as to the securing of our food. Of course, we had to pay a high price for this success. At the time I called my own New Plan horrible, and today I hold the same opinion. I have been told that once at an exposition, a merchant, who knew how to combine annoyance and humor happily, decorated his booth with the approximately 40 forms which an export merchant must fill out today in order to carry on his business. I am of exactly the same opinion as this man, but for the time being this cannot be helped. I certainly do not believe tat the main function of a merchant is to carry out the demands of an economic bureaucracy. In fact I am of the opinion that his business should be as voluminous and good as possible and that he should fill out as few forms as possible. As long, however, as our scarcity of foreign currency exists our foreign trade control must be kept up.

I do not know when we will be able to reduce it. I hope that it will be soon. Among the prerequisites therefor are the improvement of our raw material situation and the elimination of the conflicts between credit and trade policy. In this connection I still hope that a national-economic textbook going at least a little further than pre-war thinking, might finally be published in the United States of America. As long as these prerequisites have not been fulfilled the New Plan must remain in effect. It demands sacrifices, but it also guarantees success. Yes, the weight of the 80 million German consumers so strongly affects particularly the European countries around Germany that it cannot as yet be foreseen which economic-political changes in the European trade will result. In any case, the New Plan has shown that we do not intend to have our economic life directed from the outside, but wish to form it ourselves and are in a position to do so.

I do not wish for these two statements about the financial miracle and the New Plan to imply a purely polemic attitude toward the rest of the world.

In fact, I hope and desire that my statements might lead to an understanding within and without our borders. This understanding is that the nations serve the prosperity of their fellow countrymen better by a peaceful policy of mutual regard of interests and the will to understand each other than by attempts at suppression and violence as were made by Versailles. The national economic and cultural will to live of a great nation cannot be permanently enslaved Even from times of greatest weakness and worst enslavement national forces always grow again for which a leader rises at the proper time, as Adolf Hitler arose for us. We are going through a time of struggle today, and measures during a time of struggle are often rough and not always conventional. It is foolish to cling to these disadvantages of fighting methods and, therefore, to be less peaceable. When the foreign countries are ready to respect our rights to life and our possibilities of existence, the methods also will become peaceable.

“Document L-18: Solution of Jewish Question in Galicia [translation]”, pp. 755-758.

State Secret

The SS and Police Leader in the District of Galicia

6/30/1943 2 Copies 1st copy

Ref. 42/4 g.R.-Ch/Fr

Concerning: Enclose Report Enclosure: 1 Report (executed in triplicate) 1 bound Copy

The Superior SS and Police Leader East SS Obergruppenführer and General-of Police Krueger or deputy Cracow

Enclosed I am submitting the 1st copy of the Final Report on the Solution of the Jewish Question in the District of Galicia for your information.

[Signed] KATZMANN SS Gruppenführer and Lt. Gen. of Police

SOLUTION OF THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN THE DISTRICT OF GALICIA

Owing to the term “Galician Jew,” Galicia probably was the spot on earth which was best known and most frequently mentioned in connection with Jewry. Here they lived in immense multitudes, forming a world of their own, out of which the rising generations of world-Jewry were supplied. In all parts of Galicia one found Jews in their hundreds of thousands.

According to obsolete statistics of 1931 the number of Jews then was about 502000. This number should not have decreased from 1931 up ,to the summer of 1941. Precise statements on the number of Jews present at the time when the German troops invaded Galicia are not available. By the Committees of Jews the number was stated to have been 350000 at the end of 1941. That this statement was incorrect will be seen from the statement at the end of this report with regard to the evacuation of Jews. The town of Lemberg alone had about 160000 Jewish inhabitants in 7-8/1941.

The influence of this Galician Jewry, being considerable already under Austrian and Polish rule, increased to an almost incredible extent when the Soviets occupied this district in 1939.

Every important appointment within the country was filled by them. This explains the fact that in 7/1941, after the occupation by German troops, Jews were found everywhere. Hence it was considered to be also our most urgent task to find a solution for this problem as soon as possible.

Our first measure consisted of marking every Jew by a white armlet bearing the Star of David in blue. By virtue of a decree of the Governor General the Department of the Interior was responsible for the marking and registrating of Jews as well as for the formation of Committees of Jews. Our task, that of the Police, was first of all to counter effectively the immense black market carried on by Jews throughout the entire district and especially to take measures against loafing idlers and vagabonds.

The best remedy consisted of the formation, by the SS and Police Leader of Forced Labor Camps. The best opportunities for labor were offered by the necessity to complete the “Dg.4” road which was extremely important and necessary for the whole of the southern part of the front, and which was in a catastrophically bad condition. On 10/15/1941, the establishment of camps along the road was commenced, and despite considerable difficulties there existed, after a few weeks, only seven camps containing 4000 Jews.

Soon more camps followed these first ones, so that after a very short time the completion of 15 camps of this kind could be reported to the Superior Leader of SS and Police. In the course of time about 20000 Jewish labourers passed through these camps. Despite the hardly imaginable difficulties occurring at this work I can report today that about 160 km of the road are completed. [Photographs omitted].

At the same time all other Jews fit for work were registered and distributed for useful work by the labor agencies. When the Jews were marked by the Star of David as well as when they were registered by the labor agencies, the first symptoms appeared of their attempts to dodge the orders of the authorities. The measures which were introduced thereupon, led to thousands of arrests. It became more and more apparent that the Civil Administration was not in a position to solve the Jewish problem in an approximately satisfactory manner. When, for instance, the Municipal Administration in Lwow had no success in their attempts to house the Jews within a close district which would be inhabited only by Jews, this question too was solved quickly by the SS and Police Leader through his subordinate officials. This measure became the more urgent as in winter 1941 big centres of spotted fever were noted in many parts of the town whereby not only the native population was endangered but also, and to a greater extent, the troops themselves, those stationed there as well as those passing through. During this removal of the Jews into a certain quarter of the town several sluices were erected at which all the work-shy and a social Jewish rabble were caught, during the screening and treated in a special way.

The owing to the peculiar fact that almost 90 of artisans working in Galicia were Jews, the task to be solved could be fulfilled only step by step, since an immediate evacuation would not have served the interest of war economy. With regard to those Jews, however, who had a place in the labor process, no real effect could be found of their work. They used their job mostly only as a means to an end, namely in order first to dodge the intensified measures against Jewry and secondly to be able to carry on their black market activities without interference. Only by continuous police interference was it possible to prevent of these activities. After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews had succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their employers by providing them with goods in scarce supply etc., it was considered necessary to introduce really draconic measures. Unfortunately it had to be stated that the Germans employed in the district, especially so-called “Operational Firms” or the “ill-famed Trustees” carried on the most extravagant black market activities with Jews. Cases were discovered where Jews, in order to acquire any certificate of labor, not only renounced all wages, but even paid money themselves. Moreover, the “organizing” of Jews for the benefit of their “employers” grew to so catastrophical extents that it was deemed necessary to interfere in the most energetic manner for the benefit of the German name.

Since the Administration was not in a position and showed itself too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police Leader simply took over the entire disposition of labor for Jews. The Jewish Labor Agencies which were manned by hundreds of Jews, were dissolved. All certificates of labor given by firms or administrative offices were declared invalid, and the cards given to the Jews by the Labor Agencies were revalidated by the Police Offices by stamping them.

In the course of this action again thousands of Jews were caught who were in possession of forged certificates or who had obtained surreptitiously certificates of labor by all kinds of pretexts. These Jews also were exposed to special treatment.

Army administration offices in particular had countenanced Jewish parasitism by giving special certificates to an uncontrollable extent.

Of the great number of certificates caught, only three will be enclosed; you will be able to conclude what methods were used with the intention to sabotage the measures of the SS.

1. CERTIFICATE ALSTER

Benjamin (Recte Hasten) born 6/3/1900 at Takinow is employed by the Army Accommodation Administration, Lwow as a foreman for urgent work

Members of his family are ALSTER Hasten, Githa, Mother. Valid until 7/31/1942 Extended until 8/31/1942 Lowo, 6/22/1942 Army Billet Office Signature [Stamp]

The persons mentioned above are registered. They are to be exempted from evacuation.

2. The Jewess ATLAS Rosa Keeps house for the “A” Jew No. 20 008 employed by H.K.P. 547 whose identity card has been stamped by the SS and Police Leader. She is registered, and it is requested to leave her in Lwow.

Lwow, 8/10/1942 Army Car Park 547 Signature, [Stamp.]

3. Army Building Office Lwow.

CERTIFICATE For Family Members of Jew in Employment

The Jewess HIRSCHFELD Mina born 1894, resident in Lwow, 2 Sonnen street, is the wife of the Jew provided with an employment Certificate by virtue of decree of 3/12/1942 HIRSCHFELD Oscar (No. 4181) Valid until 7/31/1942 Signature [Stamp]

Lwow, 7/1/1942

There were cases when arrested Jews were in possession of 10-20 of such certificates.

Where Jews were arrested in the course of these check-ups most of their employers thought it necessary to intervene in favor of the Jews. This often happened in a manner which had to be called deeply shameful.

An especially exaggerated example is the action of a certain Schmalz, a wholesale butcher working for the Army in Lwow, who sent from Berlin the following telegram to the Office of the SS and Police Leader:

“Urgent SS Untersturmführer Loehner c/o SS Police Leader Lwow District Office

The two certificate holders are craftsmen watchmakers; are resident in my future factory a night watchmen and watchmakers in day time. I should not wish to be guilty of their death; after my return you can have them both, they do not run away. I beg of you

When steps were taken to investigate the actions of this butcher, it transpired that the fellow had carried on the most incredible black market business with the Jews. Schmalz was arrested and put at the disposal of the Public Prosecutor.

Despite all these measures concerning the employment of Jews their evacuation [Aussiedelung] from the-district of Galicia was commenced in 4/1942, and executed step by step.

When the Superior SS and Police Leader once again intervened in the solution of the Jewish problem by his Decree Concerning the Formation of Districts inhabited by Jews of 11/10/1942 already 254989 Jews had been evacuated [Ausgesiedelt], resp. resettled [umgesiedelt].

Since the Superior SS and Police Leader gave the further order to accelerate the complete evacuation [Aussiedelung] of the Jews, again considerable work was necessary to regulate the status of those Jews who, for the time being were permitted to be left in the armaments factories. The Jews in question were declared Labor Prisoners of the Superior SS and Police Leader and they were put into barracks, either within the factories or in camps established for this purpose. For the town of Lwow a Giant Camp was established at the borders of the town, in which at the time of writing 8000 Jewish Labor Prisoners are confined. The agreement with the Army concerning the disposition and treatment of these Labor Prisoners was executed in writing. The decree which contained the measures now in force is attached herewith.

Lwow, 10/23/1942

The SS and Police Leader in the District of Galicia XIII-688/42 (g)

Re: Disposition of Jewish Labor Your Ref: Letter of the Inspection of Armaments of 9/21/1942 and letter of Command of Armaments of 10/19/1942

To the Command of Armaments Lwow

The Inspector of Armaments in the GG. and the Superior SS and Police Leader East, Secretary of State for Security in the GG. have issued special orders and rules for the uniform treatment of the Jewish laborers used in the armament factories. Following a conference between the Officer commanding the armaments enterprises Lwow, and the SS and Police Leader in the District of Galicia the ensuing agreement was reached on 10/17/1942:

On principle the Jewish laborers are to be put into barracks and when in camps are subjected to control by the SS and Police Leader Galicia and in this respect the police offices under his orders. Since the establishment of Police Camps has not yet been completed everywhere the work administrations for the time being have themselves to place the Jewish laborers into camps. In case it should be impossible for a factory to provide housing in a camp, the Jewish laborers employed there are to be housed in certain blocks of the Jewish Quarter still remaining. With regard to this housing the work administrations will communicate with the local offices of the Security Police. It has to be emphasized that under no circumstances the relatives of the Jewish laborers may be allowed to find accommodation within the same block. With regard to the Jewish laborers employed in factories situated in Lwow, a separate order will be issued. For the time being they will be housed together in the Jewish Housing District in the same manner. (This question will be regulated by the SS and Pol. L.).

Feeding of the Jewish laborers has to be provided by the factories. It will take place within the factory without exception. Besides a main meal, breakfast and supper will be provided. Full board will be provided also in case of illness. The factories will apply for provisions at, and receive them from, the GG., Principal Department, according to the rules issued by the Government. Feeding and agriculture department, Market Order IIIa Ia/100 18.8.42.

III. Clearing of Payments.

Commencing on 11/1/1942 the Jewish laborers will not receive any payment in cash. The factory administrations will pay to the SS and Pol. L. Galicia for each Jewish Laborer pro calendar day and shift 6 Zloty a man, 4 Zloty a woman. Salary tax and insurance contributions do not arise. From the above sums of 5, and 4 Zl. respectively, the expenses for feeding and the overhead expenses will be deducted. This amount to be deducted may not surpass Zl. 1.60 a day. The office of the SS and Pol. L. is entitled to examine accounts. The sums to be paid will be paid into the Account concerning payments of factories, maintained by the SS and Pol. L. Galicia at the Emission Bank in Lwow. Payment has to be completed the third of every month for the preceding month. For the purpose of proving the correctness, copies of the wage-lists for each day will be sent to the administration of the SS and Pol. L. Galicia, Lwow, Siegfriestreet 3.

IV. Clothing.

The Jewish laborers when sent to the camps will be permitted to take with them ample clothing, especially winter clothes. The local Police Offices have been especially informed of this order. With a view for supplementing and renewing, the factories may request supplementary clothing through the SS and Pol. L. but only for special reasons.

V. General Ruling.

The SS and Pol. L. Galicia and the Armament Command agree on the necessity of keeping the Jewish laborers fit for work, and that therefore appropriate housing, clothing, and medical care have to be provided. In case of difficulties, if any, the factory administrations are requested to agree with the local offices of the Security Police. The SS and Pol. L. Galicia and the Armaments Command, Lwow are to be informed in such cases. If difficulties should not be solved by such local discussions, application for a decision will have to be addressed without delay to the SS and Pol. L. of the District of Galicia.

Signed Hofmann SS Brig. Leader and Gen. Maj. of Police

Distribution: Schwarz and Co, Lwow, Textilia Lwow, Metrawat AG. branch Lwow, Training factories AW Lwow, Hobag-Holzbau AG branch Lwow, Barril Store factory in Bolechau, Furniture Factory in Bolechau, Carpathiaus Oil AG

For information to:

Commander of the Security Police and SD in the Galicia District Lwow, with copies to the foreign agencies.

Commander of the Order Police [Ordungspolizei] in the Galicia District Lwow with copies to the Military Police District Leaders.

SS. Ustuf Fichtuer in the Staff. SS. Ustuf Loehnert in the Staff. SS. Ustuf Hildebrand in the Staff.

In the meantime further evacuation [Aussiedelung] was executed with energy, so that with effect from 6/23/1943 all Jewish Residence Districts could be dissolves. Therewith I report that the District of Galicia, with the exception of those Jews living in the camps being under the control of the SS and Pol Leader, is Free from Jews

Jews still caught in small numbers are given special treatment by the competent detachments of Police and Gendarmerie.

Up to 6/27/1943 altogether 44329 Jews have been evacuated [ausgesiedelt].

Camps for Jews are still in existence in:

Lwow, Weinbergen, Ostrow, Kurowice, Jaktorow, Lackie, Pluhow, Kosaki, Zborow, Jezierna, Tarnapol, Hluboczek, Borki-Wielki, Kamienki, Drohobycz, Boryslaw, Stryj, Belechow, Broschniow, Njebelow

containing altogether 2116 Jews. This number is being reduced currently.

Together with the evacuated action, we executed the confiscation of Jewish property. Very high amounts were confiscated and paid over to the Special Staff “Reinhard”. Apart from furniture and many textile goods, the following amounts were confiscated and turned over to Special Staff “Reinhard”:

As per 6/30/1943:

25580 kg Copper Coins 53190 kg Nickel Coins 97581 kg Gold Coins 82600 kg NecklacesSilver 6640 kg NecklacesGold 432780 kg Broken Silver 167740 kg Silver Coins 18490 kg Iron Coins 20050 kg Brass Coins 20952 kg Wedding RingsGold 22740 kg Pearls 11730 kg Dental GoldDentures 28200 kg Powder BoxesSilver or Metal 44655 kg Broken Gold 482900 kg CutlerySilver 343100 kg Cigarette BoxesSilver or Metal 20880 kg Rings, Gold with stones 39917 kg Brooches, Ear Rings etc. 18020 kg Silver rings 6166 kg Watches, all kinds 3133 kg Watches, Silver 3425 kg Wrist WatchesSilver 1256 Wrist WatchesGold kg 2892 kg WatchesGold 68 kg Cameras 98 Binoculars 7 Stamp Collections-complete 5 Trunks filled with loose stamps 100550 kg 3 bags with rings, not genuine 3290; 1 box with corals kg 460 kg 1 chest with corals 280 kg 1 chest with corals 7495 kg 1 box with fountain pens and propelling pencils 1 basket with fountain pens and propelling pencils 1 suitcase with fire tongs 1 suitcase with pocket knives 1 suitcase with watch-parts Banknotes: PaperMetal 261589.75 USADollarsPaper Gold Dollars: 3 a 5, 18 a 10, 28 a 20, 2,515.75 Canadian Dollars 124 Argentine Pesos 18,766,64 Hungarian Pengoe 231,789 RoublesPaper Gold Roubles: 1 a 7 1/2, 11 a 10, 29 a 5 4316 Rouble Paper 513 French Francs 2460 Swedish Francs 52 Austrian DucatsGold Austrian Crowns 36 a 10, 25 a 20 8 a 100 2229,18,60 English Pounds 23 African Pounds 13490 Roumanian Lei 25,671 Russian Cerwon 4600,70 Czechoslovakian CrownsPaper 185 Dutch Florins 5277 Palestinian Pounds 9,300 Palastinian Mille 160 Lithuanian Oere 360 English Schillings 1 Irish Lst. Irish Pounds 1 Hungarian Pesos 2 Mexican Pesos 10 Norwegian Crowns 381770 Slovakian Crowns 435 Karbowanez 16.79 million Zloty

Following the “Fur-action” in 12/1941 35 Wagons of Furs were handed over.

Earned Moneys from Forced Labor Camps and from. W. and R. Factories 25.5.1943

1. Forced Labor Camps

Wages: 11511606.98 Zl.

Hidden money found in clothes: 1232143.71 Zl.

Proceeds from useless tools: 807.93 Zl.

[total:] 12744558.62 Zl.

b. Outgoings (Board for Prisoners)

1. Food, Clothes, Medicine: 3108866.62 Zl.

2. Wages, Custody by Ukrainian Police: 47358.51 Zl.

3. Camp-sustenance Repairs, Rents: 118063.15 Zl.

4. Means of Conveyance: Horses: 1,448,863.57 Zl. Cars: 83324.14 Zl. Tools: 3037.10 Zl.

5. Purchases of Furniture: 2410.15 Zl. Postage and Telephone: 5678.44-Zl. Office needs: 29005.59 Zl.

6. Buildings: 220000.00 Zl.

[total:] 5066607.27 Zl.

2. W. and R. Factories Takings: 7711428.92 Zl. [total:] 7711428.92 Zl.

3. Amount paid over to the SS Cashier: a. Camp: 6876251.00 Zl. b. W. and R. Factories 6: 556513.69 Zl.

[total:] 13423764.69 Zl.

Further payments to the SS-Cashier are effected every month. Owing to the great number of Jews and the vast area to be combed out these actions were performed with the assistance of detachments from the Security Police, the Order Police, the Gendarmerie, the Special Service, and the Ukrainian Police, all acting together in numerous single sweeps. Page 19 of this report contains a map intended to show how Jews lived scattered throughout the whole of the District, until the special Jewish residence districts were established. The detachments continually were exposed to serious physical and mental strains. Again and again they had to overcome the nausea threatening them when they were compelled to enter the dirty and pestilential Jewish holes. During the searches there has been found, moreover, a number of leaflets in the Hebrew language, inciting the Jews to breed lice carrying spotted fever, in order to destroy the Police Force. In fact several phials filled with lice were confiscated. Nothing but catastrophical conditions were found in the Ghettoes of Rawa-Ruska and Rohatyn. The Jews of Rawa-Ruska, fearing the evacuation, had concealed those suffering from spotted fever in underground holes. When evacuation was to start the Police found that 3000 Jews suffering from spotted ever lay about in this Ghetto.

From this map one is able to see how the Jews lived scattered throughout the whole of the district, until the special Jewish Residence Districts were established. The large dots refer to localities of more than 1000 Jews, the smaller ones where less than 100 Jews lived.

At once every Police Officer inoculated against spotted fever was called into action. Thus we succeeded to destroy this plague boil, losing thereby only one officer. Almost the same conditions were found in Rohatyn. Moreover our detachments again and again discovered smaller or larger centres of pestilence in many towns and villages. Despite all our precautionary measures 120 officers fell ill of spotted fever, of whom only 18 died, owing to the protective measures introduced by us.

Some photos of these dirt caves may give an idea of the degree of effort which every officer had to apply to force himself to merely enter these centres of dirt. [Photographs omitted.]

On the occasion of these actions, many more difficulties occurred owing to the fact that the Jews tried every means in order to dodge evacuation [Aussiedelung]. Not only did they try to flee, but they concealed themselves in every imaginable corner, in pipes, chimneys, even in sewers, etc. They built barricades in passages of catacombs, in cellars enlarged to dugouts, in underground holes, in cunningly contrived hiding-places in attics and sheds, within furniture, etc.

The smaller the number of Jews remaining in the district, the harder their resistance. Arms of all kinds, among them those of Italian make, were used for defense. The Jews purchased these Italian arms from Italian soldiers stationed in the District for high sums in Zloty currency. The ensuing photos give a small selection from the arms confiscated. Especially dangerous were the sawed-of carbines of all kinds. [Photographs omitted.]

Underground bunkers were found with entrances concealed in a masterly manner opening some times into flats, some times into the open. In most cases the entrances had only so much width that just one person could crawl through it. The access was concealed in such a manner that it could not be found by persons not acquainted with the locality. Here nothing succeeded but the assistance of some Jews to whom anything whatever was promised in exchange. What these dug-outs looked like will be shown by the ensuing photographs together with their comments: [Photographs omitted.]

In the course of the evacuation action we furthermore discovered that the Jews attempted more than ever to escape to foreign countries. These attempts were made by Jews in possession of considerable amounts of money, jewels, and of forged papers. They tried every means to effect their purpose and often approached members of the German and allied Forces with the request to transport them to or beyond the frontier by way of military cars. They offered in exchange disproportionally high amounts, in many cases up to 5000 Zl. and more a person. Although in a few cases members of foreign forces, especially Hungarians, came to an agreement with them and fulfilled their part, in by far the most cases the Security- Police was informed in time by V-men so that the necessary countermeasures were applied, the Jews caught, and the valuables confiscated. By way of illustration some cases are described:

In 9/1942 the office of the SS and Police Leader was informed by an Italian soldier (of German blood resident in Switzerland) that some Jews were concealed within the Italian barracks in Lwow, who were to be smuggled across the frontier by members of the Italian Forces within the next days. Shortly before they intended to start, two leaders in mufti entered the barracks and succeeded in arresting a group of seven persons and confiscating 3,200 gold dollars and a large amount of diamonds and jewels. They made the interesting discovery that already 970 gold dollars had been paid for bribing 4 members of the Italian Forces. This money was confiscated also. The Italian soldiers thereupon were sent home.

On 5/13/1943 two German Drivers of the Luftwaffe Headquarters in Cracow reported that a Jew had approached them with the request to transport about 20 to 30 Jews from the Jewish camp Lwow to Brody; some of them were in possession of arms; they would provide forged transport orders; directed to these military drivers. In exchange they offered 20000 Zl. The drivers were ordered to accept the offers, to load the Jews on the Luftwaffe car the 15 May at 5 p.m., to start in the direction of Brody, but to turn the car as soon as it passed the office of NSKK Lwow which was situated at this street, and to drive into the court yard of this office. In fact the car, manned with 20 Jews and one Pole, arrived in this court yard at 5:30 p.m. The Jews, some of whom were armed with charged pistols and sawed-off carbines with the safety devices released, were overwhelmed by a waiting detachment and disarmed. The following arms were confiscated:

1. 1P. Beretta-pistol, Kal. pp

9. further specifications.

The pistols, mentioned sub. 1. and 2. had been purchased by the Jews from members of the Italian Forces for 2000 Zl. each. The names of the sellers could not be ascertained. After a diligent search, considerable valuables were found and confiscated. A diligent interrogation of the arrested Jews led to the discovery that a certain Jew by the name of Horowitz who was staying in the woods near Brody together with a larger group of Jews, used to organize such transports. As a result of this interrogation it was possible moreover to arrest those Jews who forged identity papers for fugitives. The Pole who was arrested at the same time, confessed to be a member of the Polish Resistance Movement “PPR”. Furthermore he named the Jew Horowitz as the Chief Executive of the “PPR” in Lwow. The place of communication in the woods near Brody having been discovered by these interrogations, the whole of this wood area was surrounded and combed out by detachments of the Gendarmerie and of the Ukrainian Police, and two companies of the German Army on the same day. These forces met smaller forces of armed bandits who had established themselves in several furnished dug-outs and trenches dating from the Russian occupation. The bandits in all cases used their arms, but they all were overwhelmed and rendered harmless.

33 Jewish bandits were shot. Some sawed-off carbines and some quick-firing rifles and pistols of Russian make were confiscated. Polish game-keeper taking part in the combing-out action was shot dead by the bandits. During the arrests in Lwow, one SS-man was wounded by a shot into the left shank. The 2 German drivers were paid as recompense for their exemplary conduct 2000 Zl. each. The forged marching-orders and transport orders found in possession of the Jews are reproduced below. [Transport order omitted.]

In the same way we succeeded on 5/21/1943 in destroying a Jewish gang who again were armed with 0.8 cal. pistols of Italian origin. (In the meantime all Italian soldiers left the district of Galicia.)

Only some days later, the 31 May, we succeeded again, during a new comb-out, in destroying 6 dug-outs of major size containing 139 Jewish bandits.

On 6/2/1943, again some Jews who attempted to escape to Hungary by means of a military car owned by the Hungarian Army, were arrested and, since they resisted, shot. Here again considerable values were confiscated. The Hungarian soldiers participating in the action were adequately rewarded.

The evacuation having been completed, nevertheless, still minor actions are necessary in order to track Jews in hiding and concealment. This is proved by the fact that every day some persons are caught in possession of forged identity cards and passes. Some forged identity cards, passes, marching orders, and leave passes are enclosed herewith. [Cards and photographs omitted.]

Since we received more and more alarming reports on the Jews becoming armed in an ever increasing manner, we started during the last fortnight in 6/1943 an action throughout the whole of the district of Galicia with the intent to use strongest measures to destroy the Jewish gangsterdom. Special measures were found necessary during the action to dissolve the Ghetto in Lwow where the dug-outs mentioned above had been established. Here we had to act brutally from the beginning, in order to avoid losses on our side; we had to blow up or to burn down several houses. On this occasion the surprising fact arose that we were able to catch about 20000 Jews instead of 12000 Jews who had registered. We had to pull at least 3000 Jewish corpses out of every kind of hiding places; they had committed suicide by taking poison.

Our own losses suffered in these actions:

Spotted Fever: dead1 man fallen ill: 120 men Shot by Jews: dead7 men wounded: 12 men Stabbed by Jews: dead1 man Lost by accident in evacuation action: dead: 2 men, wounded: 5 men.

Despite the extraordinary burden heaped upon every single SS-Police Officer during these actions, mood and spirit of the men were extraordinarily good and praiseworthy from the first to the last day.

Only thanks to the sense of duty of every single leader and man have we succeeded to get rid of this PLAGUE in so short a time.

“Document L-37: Collective Responsibility Of Members Of Families Of Assassins And Saboteurs [translation]”, pp. 782-783.

Radom 7/19/1944

The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service (S.D.) for the district of Radom

SECRET STATES MATTER

The commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service for the District of Radom Foreign Service Office Tomaschow Entry on 5/22/1944 Section IV Log. No. 21/44

IV B5/4 gR To the Foreign Service Office in the hands of SS-Captain Thielo.V.i.A. iz Tomaschow. Previous correspondence: None

The higher SS and police Führer Ost has issued on 6/28/1944 the following order:

“The security situation in the General Government has in the last months grown worse to such an extent, that from now on the most radical means and the harshest measures must prevail against the alien assassins and saboteurs. The Reichsführer SS in agreement with the general government has ordered, that, in all cases of attack and attempted assassination against German, or where saboteurs have destroyed installations essential to life, that not only the seized perpetrators be shot but that all male kin also be executed and their female relatives over 16 years of age be put into Concentration camps. Strict presumption is hereby taken for granted, that if the perpetrator or the perpetrators are not seized, their names and addresses will be readily ascertained. Male kin may be considered to include, for example: the father, sons, (so far as they are over 16 years of age), brothers, brothers-in-law, cousins and uncles of the perpetrator. Against the women, proceedings must take place in.the same manner. With this procedure it is intended, to insure a total liability of all male and female kin of the perpetrator. It furthermore affects to the utmost the family circle of the political criminal. This practice has shown for example already at the end of 1939 the best results in the new eastern territories especially in the Warthe district. As soon as this new method for combating assassins and saboteurs becomes known to these foreign people, this may be achieved by oral propaganda [Mundpropaganda] the female kin of members of the resistance movement or of bands will, as shown by experience, exert a curbing influence.”

I hereby give notice of this and request in the pertinent cases (not previous ones) to locate and to arrest immediately, with the greatest possible speed the corresponding family members. I am then to be notified of the results and further instructions are to bo awaited.

[signed] ILLMER Temaschero, 7/29/1944

1. Confer in details with the section chiefs Sachgebietsleiter] F.K. R

2. Z.d.A. IV L

The commander of the Security Police and the Security Service of the Radom District IV L 21/44 gRs

“Document L-38 [translation]”, p. 783.

Freising, 8/1/194

I, Pister Hermann, SS Oberführer [SS Brigadier General], born 2/21/1885, Commanding Officer of the Concentration Camp Buchenwald, from 1/1942-4/1945, testify as follows:

With exception of the mass delivery of prisoners from the concentration camps of the occupied territory all prisoners were sent to the concentration camp Buchenwald by order of the Main Security Office of the Reich Berlin. [Reichssicherheitshaupamt]

These orders for protective custody (red forms) were in most cases signed with the name “Kaltenbrunner”. The few remaining protective custody orders were signed by “Foerster”.

When the war conditions destroyed the contact between the Gestapo Offices and the Main Security Office the individual Gestapo Offices were authorized by the Main Security Office to send in prisoners independently and to have the protective custody orders signed by the executive officer of the command headquarters.

Hermann Pister.

This statement has been written by me on 1 page in Freising, Germany, on the 1st of August at 10 a. m. voluntarily and without compulsion. I swear to God the Almighty, to ay nothing but the truth, that I shall suppress nothing, and shall add nothing.

Hermann Pister.

“Document L-41: [Increased Recruitment For Concentration Camps] [translation]”, pp. 784-785.

COPY OF COPY

Chief of Security Police and SD No. IV656/42 Secret

Berlin, 12/17/1942 SECRET [Stamp] [pencil noteIncreased Recruitment For Concentration Camps]

To be sent “Secret” To all commanders of the Security Police and SD. To all Inspectors of the Security Police and SD. To all unit commanders of the Security Police and SD. To all directors of State Police Headquarters.

For the information of: SS Lieutenant General Pohl Chief of the Main Office for Economics and Administration. To all higher SS and Police Officials. To all Inspectors of Concentration Camps.

For reasons essential to the war effort but which cannot be discussed here, Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered as of the 12/14/1942 that until the end of 1/1943 at least 35000 inmates who are able to work are to be inducted into concentration camps.

In order to reach this quota the following is necessary:

1. Effective immediately (provisionally until 11/1/1943) workers from the East and other foreign labor who are runaways or have broken their contract and are not members of Allied, friendly, or neutral countries are to be sent as quickly as possible to the nearest concentration camp whereby the necessary formalities as described in No. 3 are to be observed. In order to avoid and in any case adjust complaints it is essential in dealing with other agencies that in every case each one of the above directives is explained as an essential security measure of the police, whereby a reasonable explanation based upon the case at hand should be given.

2. The commanders and unit commanders of the Security Police and SD and the directors of the State Police Headquarters are to inspect immediately:

a. All areas of detention.

b. All workers’ correction camps whereby especially strict and high standards should be set.

All inmates able to work are to be sent if it is physically and humanly at all possible according to directives cited below to the nearest concentration camps even where a ban suit has been or is to be brought against the individuaL Only such inmates who in the interest of further investigation, are to remain without fail in solitary confinement, may remain.

Every Individual Laborer is Essential

This inspection is to be started immediately. To withhold any inmates capable of work is forbidden. Exceptions need my approval.

3. Inmates who are delivered to a concentration camp up to the 11/1/1943 are to be listed solely in rosters, reference to be made to this decree (serial number, first and family name, date and place of birth, domicile, reason for apprehension in catch words). One copy of this roster is to be sent to the Chief Office of Reich Security, and counts as a collection requisition for protective custody as well as for the transfer into a concentration camp; it can be assumed in advance that these requisitions will be granted.

For workers from. the East, that is, those who carry the emblem “Ost” the indication of the number of arrestees is sufficient. One copy is to be sent with the shipment to the commanding officer of the concentration camp. A further copy is to remain with the agency from which the shipment originated.

In order to simplify procedure all rosters should only be written on one side and there should be sufficient space between each individual record of the inmate that names can be cut out.

The rosters are to be sent to the Chief Office or Reich Security Sect. IV C-2.

(signed) Mueller (LS)

Certify: [signed]: Helmuth Chief Police Secretary

Certified copy: [signed] Kolberg Chancellery employee

Certified copy: [signed]: Jahr Chancellery employee

COPY

Berlin, 3/23/1943

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD IV C 2 General No. 656/42 Secret

a. All Commanders of the Security Police and the SD

b. All Inspectors of the Security Police and the SD

c. Unit Commanders of the Security Police and the SD

d. All Directors of State Police (district) offices

For information, to:

e. Chief of SS economics and Administration Main Office, SS Obergruppenführer Pohl.

f. All higher ranking SS and Police officers.

g. SS Economics and Administration Main Office Section D, Concentration Camps at Oranienburg. (with 30 copies for the Camps)

Subject: Increased transfer into the Concentration Camps.

Reference: My decree dated 12/17/1942 IV 656/42 secret.

The measures ordered in the above-mentioned decree which were originally limited to a period ending 1 February, can be carried out until further notice for the moment, however, only until 4/30/1943.

Care must, however, be taken, that only prisoners who are fit for work are transferred to concentration camps and adolescents only in accordance with the given directions; otherwise, the concentration camps would become overcrowded and this would impair the intended aim. With regard to any adolescents who have already been transferred who are not covered by the directions for the transfer into camps, (Reich Germans of over 18 years of age, Poles and workers from the East of 16 years of age) application for removal must be made without delay. These prisoners are to be restored to their former place of employment in cooperation with the employment office concerned, unless a request for institutionalization in a camp for juvenile delinquent seems necessary. In each case an action report is to be given.

Shipments of prisoners eligible for concentration camps are not necessary if the prisoners are already engaged in armament industry, or actually with war essential work or are occupied in the occupied territories of the East with urgent tasks, for the supply system of the eastern front. In case the removal of such labor forces would endanger the productivity of any plants or would even cause work stoppages or would hamper transport facilities of supplies for the Eastern front; individuals are to be put into concentration camps in order to safeguard the interests of the Wehrmacht.

Transfer is always to be made into the nearest concentration camp which is also a reception camp. The Herzogenbosch concentration camp is for prisoners from the Dutch area but it is only suitable to receive prisoners from that area, while the Sachsenhausen concentration camp which is quite full at the moment, is barred to all larger transports for the time being.

No prisoners can be transferred to the Niederhagen Concentration Camp (not a reception camp), while transfer to the Gross-Rosen concentration camp (also not a reception camp) can be undertaken only after direct inquiries have been made.

Female prisoners are to be sent either to the Ravensbrueck Concentration Camp for women, or to the sections for women in the Lublin or Auschwitz Concentration Camps. Members of the Eastern countries are to be sent preferably to the two last-named camps.

If these directives concern prisoners on whom special orders have been issued or which represent special problems, the sections concerned are to be informed with reference to this and the previous decree and if necessary they are to be asked for a decision, in advance or afterwards which ever the case may be.

Poles capable of Germanization and prisoners for whom special petitions have been made are not to be sent into concentration camps, but are to be disposed of according to the individual decision made or pending.

In order to avoid overcrowding of concentration camps short reports are to be submitted on the fifth of April and the fifth of May indicating: The number of prisoners sent in 2/1943 and during the past months due to the above order. The number of Eastern workers contained in the above number who are still not[words evidently missing]. Further facts are not necessary

For workers from the East who according to the decree of 12/17/1942 are only to be reported by numbers; in no case-as has partly happenedare lists or forms to be submitted for them. Neither should protective custody file cards be sent.

This answers numerous individual questions, which were asked on this subject.

This decree is not for district or local police authority.

For and on behalf of: (signed): Mueller

Certified copy [sgd.] Kolberg Chancellery employee

Witnessed: [sgd.] Bleeck Chancellery employee

[Rubber stamp: Security Police Special Purpose Unit 1/II Chancellery 4]

“Document L-43: [Air Force Organizational Study, Year 1950] [partial translation]”, pp. 788-789.

Berlin, 5/2/1938

The Chief of the Organizational Staff in the General Staff of the Air Force.

No. 50/38 TOP SECRET

3 copies copy No. 1

To the: Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. In the following I submit the “Organizational Study 1950”

The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air Force. The result gained is termed “Distant Objective”

From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942; this will be called “Final Objective 1942”

This in turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaue, Air Divisions, etc. which is called “Interim Solution as of 10/1/1938”

[signed] Kammhuber

Table of Contents

Section I. Assumptions, with it: Inclosure No. 1 (Map) [see Chart No. 10]

Section II. Consideration of the Principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in section I.

Section III. Consideration of further questions.

Section IV. Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the “Distant Objective.” with it: Inclosure No. 2 (Distant Objective)

Section V. Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the organization of the Air Force according to the hitherto accepted final objective 1942. with it: Inclosure No. 3 (Final Objective 1942)

Section VI. Conclusions drawn from the Study regarding the reorganization as of 10/1/1938. with it: Inclosure No. 4 (Interim Solution as of 10/1/1938).

b. Special Inclosures:

Proposal for the setting-up of flight formations until 1942 (New Final Objective 1942)…..Incl. No. 5

Proposal for dispersal of these formations…..Incl. No. 6

Proposal for the setting-up of AA artillery until 1942 (New Final Objective 1942)…..Incl. No. 7

Proposal for dispersal of these formations, including increase of mobilization…..Incl. No. 8

The Chief of the Organizational Staff.

Berlin, 5/2/1938

No. 50/38 TOP SECRET Organizational Study 1950

I. Assumption.

1. Frontiers of Germany, see Map, Inclosure No. 1. [see Chart No. 10]

2. Organization of Air Force in peacetime: 7 Group Commands: (1 Berlin, 2 Brunswick, 3 Munich, 4 Vienna, 5 Budapest, 6 Warsaw, 7 Koenigsberg). 1-3 flight corps are subordinated to each Group Command. Each flight corps consists of 2 flight divisions, each of which comprises 3 mixed combat Geschwader (2 combat groups, 1 dive bomber group). 1 heavy fighter Geschwader.

Total strength: 18 flight corps - 36 flight divisions - 108 mixed Geschwader: 36 heavy fighter Geschwader: - 144 Geschwader 25 reconnaissance groups (F)

Minimum :performance: Range: 6-8,00 km Speed: 600 km

2-4 Air Gaue are subordinated to each Group Command. [Footnote: In the study 32 Air Gaue are assumed without sea)]

The Air Gaue are Corps command. They are in charge of:

1. Air defense (AA, light fighter).

2. The Air Gau signal units.

3. The ground organization.

5. Everything pertaining to replacements (also for flying troops and schools).

6. The administration.

7. The civil aviation offices.

II. Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in section 1:

1. Attack Forces: Principal adversaries: England, France, and Russia.

a. One front war, for instance against England. If all 144 Geschwader are employed against England, they must be concentrated in the Western half of the Reich, that is, they must be deployed in such a way, that by making full use of their range they can reach all English territory down to the last corner and save themselves unnecessarily long flight routes. 144 Geschwader require 4 2 operational airfields. Concentration in one Air Force Group, for instance, in Air Force Group 2, which is closest to England, is therefore impossible. There must be a deployment in depth, which must be distributed over Air Force Groups 2, 1, and 3 at least.

Regardless of whether or not Germany respects neutrality, that is, whether or not planes fly to England via the German Bay, in any case the framework of one single Air Force Group will be split:

1. Because it is impossible spacially, to accommodate so large an attack force in one Air Force Group.

2. Because it is too much for one Command to have to lead so large a number of formations (18 corps), even if it is given authority over all neighboring Airfield Regional Commands occupied by the attack force.

Hence it follows, that the Supreme Command-er of the Air Force himself must take over the leadership of the attack. A further, and not the least important reason for this is that otherwise he would be eliminated, for all practical purposes, if he subordinated the entire attack force to a single Command.

It remains to be decided, whether he is to lead by giving direct orders to the Flight Corps, while the Air Force Group Commands would be responsible only for ground organization and supply, or whether the Group Commands are to be established as intermediate authorities also in regard to operations. The decision is determined

a. By the numerical strength of the flight troops.

b. By their dependence on ground organization and supply.

Concerning a: What has been said above apropos a single Air Force; Group with regard o numerical limitation, also applies to the Supreme Commander of the Air Force himself. As a rule one Command should not be in charge of more than 6 larger tactical units. Since in the example chosen 18 flight corps are presumed to exist, these cannot possibly be all under the direct command of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force; it is necessary to establish higher commands on an intermediate level. These are the Air Force Group Commands; as the Air Force grows these automatically acquire an intermediate position as operational commands.

Concerning b: Moreover, the dependence on ground organization and supply is an argument in favor of establishing the Air Force Group Commands as intermediate operational authorities, at the same time leaving them in operational charge of ground organization and supply in one form or another. Ground organization and supply are elements of operational command and ca? not be separated from the latter without disadvantage. If, for instance, the Air Force Groups were established purely as operational command for the purpose of dealing the attack forces, the Supreme Commander of the Air Force himself would have to take charge of ground organization and supply and adjust them to the requirements of the troops. In new of the assumed extent of the German Reich with its 18 Flight Corps and its 22 large Air Gaue, this task is too large for;one central authority to be able to handle it. Since preparations for attack are to be made for several fronts and for several possible contingencies, decentralization by means of intermediate command authorities is indispensable. These intermediate authorities can only be those, which are personally interested in leading the attack, that is (they must be) command authorities, which are in charge of attack forces in wartime and which must also be in charge of the respective ground organization and supply. How necessary this line of authority shown by the fact that not a single Air Command is willing to rely on the Air Gaue concerned to “make its bed” “by order” of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force, and that each demands to be put in charge of the Air Gau or Airfield Regional Command concerned (see the subordination of the Airfield Regional Commands near the Bavarian Ostmark under Air Force Group 1 in the event of “Case Green” and the applications by Air Force Group 3 to be put in charge of Air Gaue XII, Giessen, in the event of “Case Red”). The channel for “applications via the Supreme Commander of the Air Force” simply is too long, there are too many day-to-day frictions and punctures. He who leads the attack will and must not be deprived of control, regardless of whether or not his formations on the ground are properly supplied. “Operational Command” does not start in the air, but on the ground, and preparation by the ground organization is part of the operation, just as much as the tactical preparation of the flight.

Thus the above discussion leads to the result that the Air Force Group Commands must be commands in charge of the attack force and at the same time commands in charge of the ground organization and supplies for this force.

Furthermore, they must be locally bound, because this enables them to make the most of the advantage flying troops have over all other troops, that is, that they can push forward the preparations for war already in peacetime to such an extent that the highest degree of preparedness for action is achieved.

If it is assumed, as in the present study, that in peacetime the existing 18 Flight Corps are distributed over the whole Reich, while in war they operate, for instance, from the three Air Force Group Commands Nos. 2, 1 and 3 to fight against England, it immediately becomes clear that these 18 Corps Commanders cannot be let loose independently on these three Air Force Groups in order to make their preparations there in peacetime. Since the same preparations must be made on the other fronts, the Corps Commanders would be travelling most of the time, without there being any guarantee that their preparations are sufficient, since they have no command authority in the deployment area and cannot obtain such authority. Therefore they can only submit “requests” to the Supreme Commander of the Air Force; the fulfillment of these requests can hardly be handled, still less controlled, centrally.

The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air Force grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have locally bound commands which prepare the air way on their fronts according to the orders and instructions of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force, and which during the war have a responsible share in the leadership.

b. War on several fronts, for instance, against France and Russia. Assuming that the Supreme Commander of the Air Force intends to deliver the first blow against France, the 144 attack Geschwader will be deployed in Air Force Groups 3, 2, and 1, and the attack will be carried out as in a one-front war. The Air Force Groups 6 and 7 meanwhile make the last preparations in the way of ground organization, so that they can start with the attack as soon as the formations are transferred from the West.

This is a schematic procedure by which one adversary after the other is defeated by concentrating the attack on him. In this case operational mobility consists merely in a swift transfer from West to East, by which, however, it is by no means exploited to the full. Since the operational Air Force is presumed to have a range of 6000-8000 km (individual German aircraft have reached this even today, cf. world record of the Do 18), it can theoretically fly from its home-port to Paris today and to Moscow tomorrow. It can therefore without difficulty operate against the East from operational airfields selected for an attack on France without changing air fields. Since, however, Air Force Group Commands 1-3 are oriented towards France and are the ones most strongly tied down, they cannot at the same time lead an attack against the East, bypassing the Eastern Air Force Group Commands. In such cases the Supreme Commander of the Air Force takes immediate charge of the Flight Corps concerned and directs the attack against the East himself. Air Force Group Commands 1-3 merely take care of preparations on the ground. The formations start from the operational airports they have used hitherto, they fly for instance against Moscow, and return to the airports whence they started. When the action against the East is completed, they are put once more at the disposal of Air Force Groups 1-3 to continue their attacks against the West.

V. Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the organization of the Air Force according to the hitherto accepted final objective 1942. For this compare Inclosure No. 3 (final objective 1942).

1. The following will exist in 1942 (without sea):

I. 3 Air Force Group Commands (Berlin, Brunswick, Munich). 1 Air Force Command East Prussia. 1 Air Force Command Austria.

II. 11 Air Gau Commands (Koenigsberg, Berlin, Dresden, Breslau, Hanover, Muenster, Wiebaden, Nurnberg, Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna).

III. 18 Combat Geschwader. 6 Dive bomber Geschwader. 6 Heavy fighter Geschwader.

VI. Conclusions drawn from the Study regarding the reorganization as of 10/1/1938. For this compare Inclosure- No. 4. (Interim Solution as of 10/1/1938.)

1. The following will exist on 10/1/1938 (sea excepted):

I. 3 Air Force Commands (Berlin, Brunswick, Munich). 1 Air Force Command East Prussia. 1 Air Force Command Austria.

II. 11 Air Gau Commands (Koenigsberg, Berlin, Dresden, Breslau, Hanover, Muenster, Wiesbaden, Nurnberg, Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna).

III. 12 Combat Geschwader 3 Divebomber Geschwader 3 Heavy fighter Geschwader (scheduled) (including the new units to be set up at the end of the year)

2. It will not yet be possible to form mixed combat Geschwader, since the insufficient ranges of the divebombers will not permit this. Nor, will it be possible yet to form flight divisions, composed as assumed for the Final Solution, since the heavy fighter plane-is only now in production.

3. In view of the small number of defense forces and certain personnel reasons, it does not as yet seem justified to establish the Air Gau Commands at once as Corps Command Staffs (Commanding Generals and Commanders of the Air Gaue).

Therefore only an interim solution can be chosen on 10/1/1938. This, however, must be of such a nature that the Final Solution is not obstructed, but prepared and enabled to grow out of it slowly and organically.

This results in the following Proposal for the Interim Solution as of 10/1/1938:

d. The establishment of the flying formations will be carried out according to program, 80 far as their contents are concerned. For organizational reasons it is urgently desired that the establishment period be advanced to the time from 11/1/-12/1/1938, in order to achieve as soon as possible clear organizational and command relationships, which are the basis of any fruitful work. The disadvantage this entails from the point of view of training can be eliminated by letting the flying and part of the technical personnel continue its training at the parent units and schools as long as is necessary, and by not transferring it to the new formations until the middle of December.

This will make it possible to start the next mobilization year already on 1/1/1939, and thus to cut short the extremely unpleasant period from October to the start of the new mobilization plan, whose foundations will be completely changed in all decisive points as of 10/1/1938.

“Document L-49: [Sworn Statement of Otto Hofmann] [translation]”, pp. 795-796.

I, Otto HofmannSS Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen SS und Polizei [Lt. Gen. of SS and police], up to now Hoeherer SS and Polizeiführer [higher SS and police leader] in Wehrkreis 5 declare herewith:

1. From 1941-4/1943 I was chief of the main office for Race and Settlement questions. As such it was my duty to provide for the instruction (with respect to agriculture) of crippled members of the SS, so that these could be settled on farms in the occupied territories, including Poland. I was, therefore, as a rule, kept informed about all order concerning resettlement in Poland.

2. The executive power, in other words the carrying out of all so-called resettlement actions, that is to say, sending away of Polish and Jewish settlers and those of non-German blood from a territory in Poland destined for Germanization, was in the hands of the Chief of the RSHA (Heydrich and later Kaltenbrunner, since the end of 142). The Chief of the RSHA also supervised and issued orders to the so-called immigration center (EWZ) which classified the Germans, living abroad who returned to Germany and directed them to the individual farms, already freed. The latter was done in agreement with the chief office of the Reichsführer SS.

3. I know these facts mentioned in paragraph 2 through the orders concerned as well as owing to the continuous contact between the two chief offices and various case of friction. Questions of conflicts as to competence were mostly decided in favor of the chief of the RSHA (Heydrich later Kaltenbrunner). Reichsführer Himmler had a decisive influence in all these questions.

[Signed]: Otto Hofmann

This declaration has been written down by my own hand on two pages at Freising, Germany, on the 8/4/1945 at 1400 hours. This has been done of my own free will.

I swear to God the Almighty that I will say nothing but the truth, that I will withhold nothing nor add anything.

[Signed]: Otto Hofmann

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Freising, Germany, 8/4/1945.

[Signed]: Ernest H. Bloch 1st Lt. MI AUS Investigating Officer

“Document L-50: [Sworn Statement of Kurt Lindow] [translation]”, pp. 796-797.

8/2/1945

I, Kurt Lindow, born 2/16/1903 in Berlin, director of the Office for criminal affairs in the RSHA, declare herewith:

1. I worked since 1938 in the office of the Secret State Police [Gestapo], respectively in office IV of the RSHA and then in the years 1938, 1939 and beginning of 1940 in the department of preventive arrests in which the political prisoners who were in the concentration camps were registered; furthermore, I worked in 1940-1941 in group IV E (counterespionage), department IV E1 and 1942-1943 in department IV/A 1 (combatting of communism) and finally in 1944 in the department for education of office I (I B).

2. On the basis of general experience as well as of individual cases I can confirm that the Gestapo (office IV) wrote reports about practices of the.administrative authorities in the concentration camps and that these were given by the chief of office IV to the Chief of the Security Police for signature and were submitted to the Reichsführer Himmler.

3. The office chief IV has repeatedly attempted to get the attitude of the Gestapo in the judgment of individual cases to bear more weight, so much the more as the administrations of- the concentration camps, respectively the chief office for economy and administration, office D is reported to have hardly considered the attitude or wishes of office IV in the last years. According to information received by me such a report which also referred to the general undignified conditions in the camps was prepared by ; the chief of office IV for the, Reichsführer SS Himmler and was submitted a short time ago to the Chief of the Security Police Kaltenbrunner for signature. Kaltenbrunner is said to have repudiated this report, to have sent it on, however, signed with a marginal note to the Reichsführer Himmler. In this note of the Chief of the Security Policeso I was toldhe brought out that now even Mueller got apprehensions or became soft or something similar and that he, at any rate, did not share Mueller’s opinions. The Reichsführer Himmler returned then the report concerned to the chief of office IV with corresponding notation. As I was further told by criminal commissary Duchstein who worked in the ante chamber of the chief of office IV and who was arrested with me, the position of chief of office IV was weakened thereby for a certain time, so that even a contemplated promotion of Mueller to the rank of Obergruppenführer was cancelled.

4. To my knowledge no chief of office or any of the officials of the RSHA, authorized to sign, had the right to sign, in any fundamental affairs of particular political significance, without consent of the Chief of the Security Police not even during his temporary absence. From own experience I can furthermore declare that particularly the chief of office IV, Mueller, was very cautious in signing documents, concerning questions of general nature and in some cases of greater importance, and that he put aside events of such nature in most cases for the return of the Chief of the Security Police, whereby, alas, often much time was lost.

[Signed]: Kurt Lindow

This declaration has been written down by my own hand on three pages at Freising, Germany, on 8/3/1945 at 15-16.30 hours. This has been done of my own free will.

I swear to God the Almighty that I will say nothing but the truth, that I will withhold nothing nor add anything.

[Signed]: Kurt Lindow

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Freising, Germany, 8/3/1945.

[Signed]: Lloyd M. Rausch Capt., FA Investigating Officer.

“Document L-51: [Statement of Adolf Zutter] [translation]”, pp. 798-799.

Before me, Capt. A. J. Hackl being authorized to administer oaths, personally appeared Adolf Zutter, former adjutant of Mauthausen, who, being by me first duly sworn in German, made and subscribed the following statement in his own handwriting:

My name is Adolf Zutter, born 2/10/1889. I was the adjutant at Mauthausen since 6/1942 and I give the following statement:

Standartenführer Ziereis, the commander of Camp Mauthausen, gave me a large number of orders of executions after opening the secret mail, because I was the adjutant and I had to deliver these to 1st Lt. [Obersturmführer] Schulz. These orders of execution were written approximately in the following form:

Agency (Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) Reich criminal Police Office)

To: Commander of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen.

Berlin…..(date)

Subject: Executions

Reference: Your letter from (date) of ….., File No …..

The prisoners, mentioned above name: ….. born….. at….. are to be executed according to the sentence of the special court of justice [Sondergericht]or tribunal of the people[Volksgerich] (followed by locality).

A report that the order has been executed must be sent.

Orders for execution also came without the name of the court of justice. Until assassination of Heydrich, these orders were signed-by him or by his competent deputy; later on, the orders were signed by Kaltenbrunner, but mostly they were signed by his deputy Maj. Gen. [Gruppenführer] Mueller.

Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner who signed the above-mentioned orders, had the rank of SS-General SS-Obergruppenführer] and was the chief of Reich Security Main office [RSHA].

Dr. Kaltenbrunner is about 40 years old, height about 1,76 to 180 m, and has deep fencing scars in his face.

When Dr. Kaltenbrunner was only a Higher SS and Police Officer he visited the camp several times, later on as the chief of Reich Security Main Office [RSHA] he visited the camp too, though this occurred much more infrequently. During these visits the commander usually received him outside the building of the camp headquarters and reported concerning the American military mission, which landed behind the German front in the Slovakian or Hungarian area in 1/1946.

I remember, when these officers were brought to Camp MauthausenI suppose the number of the arrivals were about 12015 menthey wore a uniform which was American or Canadian: brown-green color, shirt and cloth cap. Eight or ten days after their arrival the execution order came in by telegraph or teletype. Standartenführer Ziereis came to me into my office and told me: Now Kaltenbrunner has given the permission for the execution. This letter was secret and had the signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. Then, these people were shot according to martial law and their belongings were given to me by 1st Sgt. [Oberscharfeuhrer] Niedermeyer. Spring 1945, the written orderbased on an Army Manualto destroy all files was received by the security officer in Mauthausen, SS first Lt. [Obersturmführer] Reimer. This order was sent by SS 2nd Lt. [Understurmführer] Meinhardt, security officer of the office D in Oranienburg. Reimer himself gave this order in written form to the various officers and supervised execution. Among the files were also all the execution orders.

[signed] Adolf Zutter

This declaration has been written down by me with my own handwriting on 3 pages, at Linz, Austria, Germany on 8/2/1945 at 1045 hours voluntarily and without duress.

I swear by God Almighty, that I will say nothing but the full truth, that I will not keep anything silent, and will not add anything.

Adolf Zutter Police Prison, Linz

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Linz, Austria 8/2/1945. I have a comprehensive knowledge of the German language.

A. J. HACKL, Capt. OD Investigating officer

“Document L-52: Memorandum and Directives for Conduct of the War in the West [translation]”, pp. 800-802.

COPY

The contents of this Memorandum are for the personal attention of the Commanders-in-Chief, and of the Chief-of-Staff, OKW, only.

They are responsible for its secrecy.

Distribution:

1. C-in-C, Army, Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch.

2. C-in-C, Navy, Grand-Admiral Dr. (honoris causa) Raeder.

3. C-in-C, GAF, Gen-Fieldmarshal Göring.

4. C of S, OKW, Col-Gen. Keitel.

Berlin, 10/19/1939.

The dissolution of the First German Reich as ratified by the Treaty of Muenster (1648) resulted in that arrangement of European States, known as the “balance of power,” which made possible the formation of the French and, above all, the British Empire. The decisive factor of this state of affairs (also desired by England) was the disintegration of the mass of the German people combined with the prevention by treaty-terms of its later reunification into one uniform state. Every attempt to form the German people into such a new state was therefore considered upsetting to the European equilibrium and was attacked. Even the British friendship with Prussia, for what it was worth, cooled off the moment the latter became conscious of its German mission and attempted to reconstruct a Prusso-German Reich. The farsighted Bismarck and Moltke recognized the probability of again having to defend their newly formed Reich at a later stage against those interested in maintaining the European “balance of power,” and the necessity of carrying this through. World War I, set in motion by a minor external event, was therefore supposed to divide the unity of the Reich again or to remove possible preconditions for a future greater unification. The present war of the Western Powers against the new Reich also serves the same ends. The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or disintegrate the 80-million state again so that in this manner the European equilibrium, in other words the balance of power, which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle therefore will have to be fought out by the German people one way or another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first month of war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing of peace, to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially to such an extent that from the German viewpoint there would be no objection to ending the war immediately, so far as the present achievement with arms is not jeopardized by the peace treaty.

It is not the object of this memorandum to study the possibilities in this direction or even to take them into consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively to the other case: the necessity to continue the fight, the object of which, as already stressed, consists so far as the enemy is concerned in the dissolution or destruction of the German Reich. In opposition to this, the German war aim is the final military despatch of the West, that is, destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe.

As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of our Western enemies.

The German situation

The German people enter this battle with a population more than double that of the French, and almost equal to that of France and England together.

The military application of our people’s strength has been carried through to such an extent that within a short time at any rate, it cannot be markedly improved upon by any manner of effort. Any increase in military power which is to be expected in the next few years will not be compensated by France, but by England, which is constantly growing stronger. France alone, on account of her weak call-up classes, is not in a position to undertake the setting up of new formations beyond a certain limit, unless she dispenses with all useful forms of replacements for incidental battle-casualties, which is improbable. England is able, within the next few months or years, to set up a comparatively large number of formations, whose value however will be more defensive than strategically operational.

Time in this war, as in all historic processes, is in itself not a factor of intrinsic value, but one of which full account must be taken. In the present situation, under these conditions, time may be reckoned more probably as an ally of the Western Powers rather than of ours.

The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without any hope of realization; that is to say, Germany is able to enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a few covering troops.

The remaining European states are neutral either because they fear for their own fates, or lack interest in the conflict as such, or are interested in a certain outcome of the war, which prevents them from taking part at all or at any rate too soon.

The following is to be firmly borne in mind:

By no treaty or pact can a lasting neutrality of Soviet-Russia be insured with certainty. At present all reasons speak against Russia’s departure from this state of neutrality. In 8 months, 1 year, or even several years this may be altered. The trifling significance of treaties of agreement has been proved on all sides in recent years. The greatest safeguard against any Russian attack lies in an obvious display of German superiority, viz: in a prompt demonstration of German strength.

Italy

As long as the Italian Government sees the future of Italy as a reproduction of a great imperial Roman Empire, its trend of politics will, in general, fit in with Germany’s. For this imperial conception is only to be realized at the expense of France or England. The realization itself is probable only with the help of Germany, or is dependent on German success. Fascism is the bearer of this imperial idea, and in the front rank stands its creator, Benito Mussolini. A weakening of the Fascist influence in Italy, or even the death of the Duce, would lead to a strengthening of the influence of the Crown, and thus finally to the forsaking of these aims, inspired by the people, but dangerous and therefore distasteful to monarchies. As surely as Mussolini heads for a fight with the democracies and will take it on under generally favorable conditions, so non-Fascist Italy, and the Crown in particular, will turn aside from these and similarly dangerous ideas. They will at least not be prepared, ever to take any active steps in the matter themselves. At the most, and in the most favorable circumstances, they will wait, and let events pass by. For a trifling payment or reward however these powers will also be prepared, merely because of their own stupid short-sightedness, to sell the birthright of the Italians in the Mediterranean, and then fall in with the enemies of Germany. The hope of Italian support for Germany in its fateful battle is therefore dependent on the continuation of Fascist influence in that country, and therefore largely on the Duce’s remaining alive. Time, here, can therefore under no circumstances be considered as an ally of Germany’s. It can, in this case, at most, be a danger.

Belgium and Holland

Both countries are interested in preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the securing of their interior economy, even of their very life, depends wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore, in their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions, both countries are dependent upon the West, in the highest degree. If England and France promise themselves a successful result at the price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality, they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality. Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch neutrality, time is not a factor which might promise a favorable development for Germany.

The Nordic States

Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible even in a war of long duration.

The South-Eastern States

At the moment their neutrality appears very probable but cannot be prophesied for the future with absolute certainty. Not only psychological and propaganda influences, or general economic factors, but also financial personal bribery can lead to a change in the attitude of these states at any time.

The attempt of certain circles of the USA. to lead the American Continent in a direction hostile to Germany, is definitely unsuccessful at the moment, but could still in the future lead to the desired result. Here, too, time is to be viewed as working against Germany.

Eastern Asia

Japan will definitely act according to her own interests. It will be her aim to make use of every weakening of the European states in Eastern Asia with the minimum expenditure of her own power. Here, too, time cannot be considered as an ally of Germany; only success will be.

The Dangers of the German Position

The first danger for Germany lies in the fact that in a war of long duration under certain circumstances, states may be drawn to the opposite side for reasons which may lie in their economic needs, or in the weakening of particular interests.

The second danger is that, through a war of long duration, states which in themselves might be inclined to take sides with Germany, might, in retrospect of the last war, think that they see a warning in the duration of the war itself, and therefore abstain from a positive course of action favorable to Germany.

The third danger, in a lengthier war, lies in the difficulty, owing to the limited food and raw material basis, of insuring the food supply of the people, and of finding the means for carrying on the war. The morale, at least of the people, will be affected by that.

The greatest, and most difficult danger lies in the following:

The essential factor for each victorious conduct of the war is to safeguard Ruhr production. Each serious stoppage in production in this area cannot be made good elsewhere. Sooner or later this must lead to the collapse of the German war-economy, and thus of the capacity to resist.

But the enemy knows this too.

The first danger to the Ruhr is that of stoppages caused by air attacks. The possibilities of defense by day by means of AA and fighter aircraft are still present in a high degree. The possibility of defense by night is a limited one even now. The possibility of defense by reprisal at present seems to be the safest. It must, however, be taken into account that in a war of long duration any belligerent who considers he has attained absolute supremacy in a certain arm of the service will use this supremacy regardless of reprisals thereby incurred. The longer this war lasts, the more difficult will be the preservation of German air superiority. And of offensive air superiority in particular. As long as neutral Belgium and Holland remain as protective zones in front of the Ruhr, attack by aircraft is still somewhat difficult, bombardment by long-range artillery impossible. But, in the event of the cessation of Belgian-Dutch neutrality, the military boundary would be withdrawn to a distance which would bring at least the South-West Ruhr,zone within the range of super-long-range guns, and Dusseldorf, even within the range, even of long-range batteries. From this moment the Ruhr, as an active factor of the German war-economy, would either drop out or at least be crippled. There is no means of replacing it.

As this weakness is recognized just as clearly by England and France as by ourselves, an Anglo-French conduct of war aiming at the utter destruction of Germany will strive to reach this goal at all costs. Indeed, the less hope England and France have of being able to destroy the German armed forces in a series of actual battles, the more both states will strive to create the conditions for an effective long drawn-out war of attrition and annihilation. But this condition requires the moving up of Anglo-French forces to the German frontier with a consequent termination of Belgian-Dutch neutrality.

The possible course of action

Under no circumstances are France and England compelled to violate the Belgian-Dutch frontier by attack, thereby attacking these countries. Their means of exerting pressure are, as already indicated, so vast and so forceful, that they will succeed at any time in causing both countries to give up their neutrality at any particular moment which seems suitable, or necessary to the English or French Governments.

As a motive for such a course of action in the eyes of the rest of the world (as far as that may be considered necessary at all), it is sufficient to portray the dangers of a German breach of neutrality and to make full propaganda value of that in order to cause Belgium and Holland to declare that they are threatened and to request Anglo-French assistance. And first of all, in such an event, Belgian forces will be transferred from the Belgian-French to the German-Belgian frontier; the defensive front, which would thus be gradually built up, could, without difficulty and in the shortest space of time, receive Anglo-French reinforcements which would cause any German counterattack which might be undertaken to fan. Then, within a few days, an extensive deployment of Anglo-French forces on the German-Belgian-Dutch frontier could take place thereby bringing the war near to the heart of our armaments industry.

The probability, indeed the certainty of such an Anglo-French decision is strengthened by the indisputable fact, that, from the opposite point of view, the possession of this area by Germany would be one of the few factors that would at all be of help to Germany in the event of a long war.

German Possibilities in the event of a long war

Germany’s military means of waging a lengthier war are, as far a our main enemy is concerned, the Air Force and the U-boat arm.

The U-boat can, even today, if ruthlessly employed, be an extraordinary threat to England. The weaknesses of German U-boat warfare lie in the great distances to the scenes of action, in the extraordinary danger attached to these journeys and in the continuous threat to their home bases. That England has not, for the moment, laid the great minefield, as in the World War, between Norway and the Shetland Isles is possibly connectedprovided the will to wage war exists at allwith a shortage of necessary barrage materials. But, if the war lasts long, an increasing difficulty to our U-boats must be reckoned with in the use of these only remaining inward and outward routes. The creation of U-boat strongpoints outside these constricted home bases would lead to an enormous increase in the striking-power of this arm.

The German Air Force

The GAF cannot succeed in efficient operations against the industrial center of England and her South and SW ports, which have increased in importance in wartime, until it is no longer compelled to operate offensively from our present small North sea coast, by extremely devious routes involving long flights. If the Dutch-Belgian area were to fall into the hands of the English and French, then the enemy air forces would be able to strike at the industrial heart of Germany and would need to cover barely a sixth of the distance required by the German bomber to reach really important targets. If we were in possession of Holland, Belgium, or even the Straits of Dover as jumping-off bases for German aircraft then, without a doubt, Great Britain could be struck a mortal blow, even if the strongest reprisals were attempted.

Such a shortening of air routes would be all the more important to Germany because of our difficulties in fuel supply. Every 1000 kg of fuel saved is not only an asset to our national economy, but means that 1000 kg more of explosives can be carried in the aircraft; that is to say, 1000 kg of fuel would become 1000 kg of bombs. And this also leads to economy in aircraft, in mechanical wear-and-tear of the machine, and above .11 in valuable airmen’s lives.

These very facts are reasons for England and France to secure for themselves these regions under all circumstances, just as they compel us, on the other hand, to prevent such an occupation on the part of France and England.

The German War Aim

In the event of a final clash with France and England, the German war aim can consist only in the annihilation of Anglo-French forces, which is desirable in all circumstances. Territorial gain will be of importance only to the extent and measure in which it helps to make possible the destruction of our enemies or because of its strategic importance for the same purpose in a prolonged war. The destruction of enemy forces is therefore to be aimed at primarily, the occupation of enemy territory comes only second. There is of course a compulsory relationship between both these aims.

The Possibility of a Military Clash with France and England

The German soldier was always superior to the French. The historically recognized defeats of Germany by France were the exclusive result of the necessity for isolated German cities or states, unaided by a Reich, to fight alone and to depend entirely on their own resources against the French centralized state. German lack of unity was the only reason for all French victories. On the other hand, the German people, particularly in the last war, proved its soldierly superiority countless times.

The achievements of commanders on the German side have also been greater and more obvious in their results than on the Anglo-French side. The German collapse which took place in spite of this, derived from weaknesses which may be regarded as having been better overcome particularly in the present Reich than in the present day in France or England. This feeling of superiority is not only mine, personally, but is peculiar to all German people and German soldiers. This feeling of superiority is justified. It does not merely depend on the evaluation of earlier historical achievements, but also on the actual course of history in the last few years. The warlike equipment of the German people is at present larger in quantity and better in quality for a great number of German divisions, than in the year 1914. The weapons themselves, taking a substantial cross section, are more modern than is the case with any other country in the world at this time. They have just proved their supreme war worthiness in a victorious campaign. In the case of the armaments of other countries, this has yet to be demonstrated. In some arms, Germany today possesses clear, indisputable superiority of weapons.

The tank-arm and air force, at the present time, have not only achieved technical heights unattained by any other state as weapons of attack, but also in supplementary defense. Their operative commitment potential is insured by means of their organization and well-practiced leadership, which is better than in any other country. Their ammunitioning cannot be judged from an absolute, but only from a relative standpoint. Even today, after the conclusion of the Polish war, it is at least two or three times as great per gun as at the beginning of the year 1914. The AA ammunition supply for AA can be described as overprosperous. There is no evidence available to show that any country in the world disposes of better total ammunition stock than the German Reich. The preponderance of weapons that France today possesses lies exclusively in the province of heavier, but also older, mortars; and heavier, but at the same time mostly older, long-range artillery. These weapons are of no decisive significance whatsoever in mobile warfare. The superiority of Germany, on the contrary, consists as far as weapons are concerned, in its new light and medium caliber field artillery, in the great number of heavy infantry weapons, and in the overwhelming superiority in numbers of equipment with antitank weapons and devices, as well as the new machine gun and excellent ammunition.

The tank arm during operations in Poland surpassed the highest expectations. The air force at present is numerically the strongest in the world; the standard of training of the pilots is a maximum one. The superiority of German aircraft has not only been demonstrated in Poland, but is also being revealed by the battles in the West. The AA artillery is not equaled by any country in the world. Its supply of ammunition is, as already indicated, more than ample.

If it must be the aim of the German conduct of the war to destroy the active offensive and defensive forces of our opponents, then time is mostly in our favor so long as the development of British fighting power does not bring to France a new fighting element which would be psychologically and materially of great value to her. What must be prevented above all is that the enemy should make good the weakness of his own armaments particularly in antitank and AA, thereby creating a balance of power.

In this respect the passing of every further month represents a loss of time unfavorable to the German power of offensive. Also, from the psychological point of view, speed of action betokens a momentum, not to be underestimated, which is favorable to Germany and terrifying to her enemies. At present the German soldier is again the best in the world. His respect for himself is as great as the respect he commands from others. Six months of delaying warfare and effective propaganda on the part of the enemy might cause these important qualities to weaken once more.

The course of the campaign in Poland has not caused any kind of serious losses to the formations concerned. The losses in any unit do not even approach the average losses in one of the offensive or defensive battles in the west. This easily replaced casualty figure of at the most forty thousand men (of whom part of the wounded will soon be fighting fit, and which in any case is easily replaceable), is offset by war experience of both officers and men which never could be learned or replaced by any amount of peacetime maneuvers. As regards numbers, the strength of the German army forming up in the West is more favorable in proportion to that of the Anglo-French forces than was the case in in the year 1914. This proportion, as already mentioned, can hardly grow less favorable to us in the future, as far as France is concerned, but it may well do so by the gradual arrival of English formations. Much as I refuse to overestimate the value of the present French army, I must at the same time issue a warning against underestimating the British formations. After a certain time their armament program will be accomplished by the demands upon the International industry at their disposal. At the very worst, there is the possibility of their being able to fall back on stocks of weapons remaining from the world war. That they can be employed in a defensive role is certain; for this purpose the English mentality is particularly suited in practice. Practically the appearance of numerous formations of English origin will make the withdrawal of the French people from the war more difficult and above all will weaken the argument, at present so effective from a psychological and propaganda point of view, that France’s sacrifice in human lives is greater than that of England.

Therefore, in all circumstances, attack is to be preferred to defense as the decisive war-winning method. The start, however, cannot take place too early. The coming months will not lead to any important increase of our own offensive strength, but an important strengthening of the defensive strength of our enemies.

The German Attack The German attack is to be mounted with the object of destroying the French army; but in any case it must create a favorable initial situation which is a prerequisite for a successful continuation of the war. In these circumstances the only possible area of attack is the sector between Luxemburg in the South and Nijmegen in the North, excluding the Liege fortress. The object of the two attacking groups thus formed is to attempt to penetrate the area of Luxemburg-Belgium-Holland in the shortest possible time, and to engage and defeat the opposing Belgian-French-English forces. Meanwhile an attempt should be made to maintain the assault on such broad fronts as will deny the formation of a coherent Anglo-British defensive front with their available forces. The policy will be to occupy only those towns and fortresses which are essential for the continuance of operations. The armored forces must be allotted tasks which will yield the best results, bearing in mind their characteristics. They are not to be lost amongst the maze of endless rows of houses in Belgium towns. It is not necessary therefore for them to attack towns at all, but it is essential for them to maintain the flow of the army’s operative advance, to prevent fronts from becoming stable by massed drives through identified weakly held positions.

In view of the latest experiences gained in the Polish campaign I consider it valueless to launch an armored formation about in a northerly direction toward Antwerp as suggested. The task of the armored formations breaking through East and West of Liege will be one of mutual support, that is, by using their mobility either for the Southern column to facilitate the canal crossing for the Northern one, or for the Northern armored formations to assist the breakthrough of the armored divisions perhaps struggling South of Aachen by attacking the pillbox lines from the rear, after having achieved their own break-through. More important than the assault on Antwerp appears to me to be a rapid bypassing of it to the West, thereby preventing the withdrawal of the Belgian armed forces presumably concentrating there and thereby also severing the link between the British Expeditionary Corp probably operating there and the Belgian forces. As soon as Antwerp is cut off from the Wet, the city will be forced to capitulate in a very short time. Its closing off can be left to second- or third-rate troops.

It is impossible at this early stage to work out a more detailed plan of operation or to envisage or lay down ensuing events and the subsequent decisions and actions to be taken. It is, however, possible and imperative to be aware of the major objective right from the start, namely, to concentrate solely on the annihilation of the living enemy resources. If this should not succeed for reasons not clear at the moment, then the secondary objective will be to attempt to secure an area possessing favorable conditions for the successful conduct of a long drawn-out warif possible-not only for the German Air Force, but also for the U-boat arm. Decision for the distribution of forces is, firstly, the realization that this plan of action under certain circumstances may result in a most rapid conclusion of the war, and that therefore there should be no limit to the number of troops employed in the operation and that, second, that third-rate troops will be required to fulfill many of the tasks originating during the operation. Secondly, that particularly in order to mount large-scale counterattacks, the enemy will be forced to employ only his really first rate formations and that after their subsequent repulse or even defeat, he will dispose of second- or third-rate divisions only. Finally, German forces are to be disposed so far as possible from the start with due attention to identified, estimated, or even likely enemy defenses or to the confirmed or estimated concentration of his defensive power. The holding and breaking of these counterattacks is to be considered and insured right from the planning stage of the complete operation, as far as personnel are concerned, by the allotment of weapons. The peculiar nature of this campaign may make it necessary to resort to improvisations to the uttermost, to concentrate attacking or defending forces at certain points in more than normal proportion (for example, tank or antitank forces), and in subnormal concentrations at others. If necessary, mass commitment of AA for defense or attack must be used. The effect of such a concentration of massed effort particularly of 8.8 cmwill be terrible on attacking enemy tanks, advancing infantry or artillery. The execution of the actual operation demands the highest protection of our own skies by AA defenses and air cover. The conditions experienced in Poland are not to be compared with those which will occur in the West. On the other hand it will be the German Air Force’s task not only to destroy or at least put out of action enemy ai forces, but also primarily to hinder or prevent the enemy High Command from putting its decisions into effect.

To this end, thorough planning for a scheduled employment of ammunition is to be made. In general, enemy transport will not be attacked at the stations but on open lines, where a maximum effect can be achieved by low-level attack and minimum of explosive. In this way the object can be attained without the destruction of rolling stock, which is undesirable from our point of view. Repair possibilities on open stretches of line are incomparably harder than in stations because alternative tracks are lacking, and attacking aircraft are not subject to so much danger from AA fire. For this type of target the fastest types of aircraft, employed singly, if no others are available, are to be loaded with only few 10 or 50 kg bombs. The certain interruptions of a railway route is of more value than the shooting down of an enemy aircraft. Attacks on dense columns moving up from the rear, which are of no battle value but merely of supply value, do not need to cause demoralization but only the destruction of the columns themselves. 10 kg bombs suffice to destroy vehicles, to damage or wound wagons and horses, thereby creating blockages on the roads and obstructing the supply system. The demoralizing effect of bombs is to be employed mainly where required to break the enemy’s offensive or defensive spirit. 50 kilogram or heavier bombs are to be used primarily in attacking gun positions, enemy infantry concentrations identified strong points, crowded woods, and columns moving forward to the attack. Attacks on actual towns are to be limited to an absolute minimum since it is not the intention to capture towns or fortresses immediately at all costs; artillery and bombers are to be employed with a maximum of economy. The object of all attacks is not the destruction of inert installations but the annihilation of living offensive or defensive forces. Reprisal raids for attacks on German cities will, initially at any rate, be carried out with very small numbers of aircraft. All those in charge of these impending operations must keep firmly fixed in their minds the fact that the destruction of the Anglo-French forces is the main objective, the attainment of which will enable suitable conditions to obtain for later and successful employment of the German Air Force. The brutal employment of the GAF against the heart of the British will-to-resist can and will follow at the given moment.

Time of Attack

The attack is to take place in all circumstances (if at all possible) this autumn. It is essential, therefore, to press on to the utmost with the refitting especially of the armored and motorized formations. It must be realized that in actual warfare in the future it will be impossible to lay up motor vehicles for 3 months after they have been in action for 4 weeks. Similarly, the replenishment of normal infantry divisions, with such small casualty losses as was the case in Poland, is to be limited to the shortest possible time. The advantage gained from a long rest period, in spite of all the training possible, will be less owing to the lack of actual battle-usage which would set in. The fresh “running-in” of formations by their staffs, and the embodiment of fresh personnel, is not to take longer than a fortnight in any division.

Most important is the maximum speed in setting-up the new formations already envisaged, risking the danger that they will not come up to standard of normal first-rate troops. One only needs to recall the condition of even first-class divisions after a long drawn-out battle, to be prepared to expect more modest requirements of newly set-up formations without at the same time doubting their employability in the field. The immediate withdrawal of the so-called fortress regiments and the Fortress Division Trier is essential, to be followed by their conversion into six infantry divisions, if need be on only 2 regiments each, or 3 regiments of 2 battalions each, if the third regiment cannot be formed by increasing or reorganizing the existing ones. An expansion of this sort may not be turned down by any formal objection; it is the same as the replacement of an infantry division which has been badly knocked about in major operations, with one difference onlythat during the World War these had to receive not just a third, but often two-thirds of replacement personnel within a fortnight, with officer casualties far exceeding this proportion. The establishment of division artillery has to be effected in a similar manner if necessary, by completing several companies of the army artillery with men and material from the reserve army, so that such a process requires only a small percentage of the army artillery itself.

To facilitate the assembly of a material reserve to meet any eventuality, the Eastern Army in particular is to be rapidly equipped with captured Polish and Czech weapons.

Preparation and disposition for this attack will be camouflaged by use of proven World War methods. For this purpose an accurate study of the methods used at that time and of the corresponding orders issued is recommended.

The time for the attack will be laid down according to the number of available formations and approximately suitable weather, the decisive factor being suitable conditions for tank and air warfare during the opening weeks. A successfully introduced offensive may be executed right into severe winter. The weather endurance of the French soldier is no better than that of the German. So far as the campaign does not assume, or if it loses, the character of positional warfare, the ideas “defender” and “attacker” cease to apply and instead there are left on both sides only marching and fighting soldiers. The employment of colored troops is absolutely impossible in the bad season. The German Air Force will lose operational importance the moment the enemy air forces as such will have been badly hit or destroyed. Otherwise the climatic conditions will have an equal effect on both sides. But the German is still the best bad-weather airman.

An offensive which does not aim at the destruction of the enemy forces from the start is senseless and leads to useless waste of human life. To attack with weak and insufficient forces is equally useless. In spite of this in the event of an early surprise attack by French formations against Belgian or Dutch territorya line North of Aachen and in Holland offering better defensive possibilities will be reached at all costs.

Finally at every hold-up, even during the big attack, construction of a defensive line in the rear will be begun, using the materials which otherwise would serve to reinforce the West Wall.

“Document L-53: Clearance of Prisons [translation]”, pp. 814-815.

[Stamp:] Commandant of the Sipo and SD for the Radom District Branch Office Tomaschow. Received 7/24/1944 1225 Dept. IVL Diary No. 22/44 Radom 7/21/1944 Commandant of the Sipo and SD for the Radom District.

4143 TOP SECRET

To: The Branch Office for the attention of SS-Hauptsturmführer Thielor acting deputyin Tomaschow.

Reference: None.

The Commander of the Sipo and SD in the General Government issued the following order in his teletype message No. 14002 dated 7/20/1944, IV 6 No. 82/44 Top Secret:

I again stress the fact that the number of inmates of the Sipo and SD prisons must be kept as low as possible. In the present situation, particularly those suspects, handed over by the Civil Police [Ordnungspolizei] need only be subjected to a short, formal interrogation, provided there are no serious grounds for suspicion. They are then to be sent by the quickest route to a concentration camp, should no court-martial proceedings be necessary or should there be no question of discharge. Please keep the number of discharges very low. Should the situation at the front necessitate it, early preparations are to be made for the total clearance of prisons. Should the situation develop suddenly in such a way that it is impossible to evacuate the prisoners, the prison inmates are to be liquidated and their bodies disposed of as far as possible (burning, blowing up the building, etc.). If necessary, Jews still employed in the armament industry or on other work are to be dealt with in the same way.

The liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy, be it the WB or the Red Army, must be avoided under all circumstances nor may they fall into their hands alive.

The above is to be noted and strictly complied with.

[signature illegible]

[Stamp:] The Commandant of the Sipo and SD for the Radom District Branch Office Tomaschow IV L 22/44 Top Secret.

[in writing] Tomaschow 26.7.44 Top Secret

SS-Obersturmführer Pruess personally within the office for his information.

By order: [signature illegible]

Information received 25/7 [signed] Preuss [in writing] Tomaschow 25.7.44

[stamp:] The Commandant Sipo and SD in the Radom District IV L 22/44 Top Secret.

The 1. Direction of depts. III, V and the technical direction of IV 1, IV 2, IV 3, and IV 6 have been informed.

2. returned [?] IV L

By order: [Signed] R.

“Document L-61: Employment Of Jews Here: Exchange Of Jews In Essential Employment Against Polish Labor [translation]”, pp. 816-817.

COPY

Saarlandstr. 96 Berlin S.W.11 11/26/1942

The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan. The Plenipotentiary General for Manpower.

Va 5431/768/42 q Express letter

To the Presidents of the “Landes” Employment Offices (Employment Office Brandenburg excepted).

In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, Jew who are still in employment are, from now on, to be evacuated from the territory of the Reich and are to be replaced by Poles, who are being deported from the General Government.

The Chief of the Security Police advises under the date of 10/26/1942 that it is anticipated that during the month of November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district will begin, in order to make room there for the settlement of persons of German race [Volksdeutsche].

The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure will be put into concentration camps and put to work where they are criminal or as social elements. The remaining Poles where they are suitable for labor, will be transported, without family, into the Reich, particularly to Berlin; there they will be put at the disposal of the labor allocation offices to work in armament factories instead of the Jews who are to be replaced.

The Jews who will become available as a result of the employment of Polish labor will be deported on a shuttle system. This will apply first to Jews engaged in menial work since they can be exchanged most easily. The remaining so-called “qualified” Jewish laborers will be left to the industries until their Polish replacements have been made sufficiently familiar with the work processes by a period of apprenticeship to be determined for each case individually. Loss of production in individual industries will thus be reduced to the absolute minimum.

I reserve the right to issue further instructions. Please inform the labor offices concerned accordingly.

To the President of the “Landes” Labor Office Brandenburg,Berlin W.62

I transmit the foregoing copy for your information. So far as the removal of Jews (still) in employment concerns your area [Bezirk] too, I request that you take the necessary measures in cooperation with the competent offices of the Chief of the Security Police and of the SD.

[Signed]: Fritz Sauckel

The Regierungs President Economics Admin Staff for War Economics Area XII [Wehrwirtschaftsbezirk XII]. Wilhelmstr. 48 Wiesbaden 12/12/1942 Tel. 5948

III/11-B.E. 10. 23/3205/42 g

to the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Manual Workers’ Guilds [Handwerkskammern] in War Economics Area XII.address to individuals or acting deputyfor your information: By order:

[Signed]: Dr. Schneider

Certified Hellbach Employee

[Stamp] The Regierungspraesident Landes Office of Economics Coblenz 12/16/1942 Diary No. 2627 Clerk

[Stamp] The Regierungspraesident Wiesbaden Economics Admin Staff for War Economics Area XII

For information:

a. Chambers of Economics. b. “Landes” Master Mechanics. c. “Landeg” Economic Offices Koblenz and Saarbruecken for War Economics Area XII-address to individuals or acting deputy.

“Document L-70: Speech by Reichsführer SS Himmler at Bad Schachen, 10/14/1943: The Question of Security [partial translation]”, p. 818.

[Pages 23, 30.] I consider that in dealing with members of a foreign country, especially some Slav nationality, we must not start from German points of view and we must not endow these people with decent German thoughts and logical conclusions of which they are not capable, but we must take them as they really are.

Obviously in such a mixture of peoples there will always be some racially good types. Therefore I think that it is our duty to take their children with us, to remove them from their environment, if necessary by robbing or stealing them … Either we win over any good blood that we can use for ourselves and give it a place in our people or … we destroy this blood.

For us the end of this war will mean an open road to the East, the creation of the Germanic Reich ill this way or that … the fetching home of 30 million human beings of our blood, so that still during our lifetime we shall be a people of 120 million Germanic souls. That means that we shall be the sole decisive power in Europe. That means that we shall then be able to tackle the peace, during which we shall be willing for the first twenty years to rebuild and spread out our villages and towns, and that we shall push the borders of our German race 500 Kilometres further out to the East.

“Document L-79: Indoctrination On The Political Situation And Future Aims [translation]”, pp. 847-849.

Top Secret To be transmitted by officer only

Minutes of a Conference on 5/23/1939

Place: The Führer’s Study, New Reich Chancellery. Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt. Present: The Führer, Field-Marshal Göring, Grand-Admiral Raeder. Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt.-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Comd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

The Führer defined as the purpose of the conference:

1. Analysis of the situation.

2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from the situation.

3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.

4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success.

The Führer’s observations are given in systematized form below.

Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:

1. The actual development of events between 1933-1939;

2. The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.

In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as “Encroachments”. The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.

A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problems by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’ time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.

We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further success cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no “supplementary enemy”. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problems. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Rememberblockade.

If fate brings us into conflict with the West, possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.

The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour.

The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

Therefore, the Führer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers (France and England).

If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France.

Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Polandbeginning with an attack on Polandwill only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.

The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.

Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.

If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and death struggle.

What will this struggle be like?

England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resistance.

The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications, in order officially to force them into cooperation.

Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure.

Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line’ on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle.

The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.

Question: Short or long war?

Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-16 years’ duration.

History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power.

England is the driving force against Germany. Her strength lies in the following:

1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organizers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.

2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies. This power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force, embracing the entire world. ‘Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.

3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.

England’s weaknesses:

If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of World War. It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet, landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.

The moment England’s food supply routes are cut she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and fuel depend on the fleet’s protection.

If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.

Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:

1. Betrayal from the wider circle of military experts.

2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise.

3. Human incompetence.

4. Weather conditions.

The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

This must be regarded as a most unfavourable basis of action.

1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow right at the start. Considerations of right and wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.

2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.

The army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.

England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade.

Consequences:

England will not be able to fight on the Continent;

Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her lifelines;

Time will not be on England’s side;

Germany will not bleed to death on land.

Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:

1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.

2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an Air Force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defensive counter-measures.

3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

4. Once the army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army’s battles and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.

The Army must therefore be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available counter-measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940-1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

Where straight forward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.

This is the plan of attack.

The plan demands:

1. A correct estimate of weapons and their effectiveness: e.g. (a) Battleship or aircraft carrier; which is the more effective? Individually or considered as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy.

(b) Is air attack more important on a factory than on a battleship? Where are bottle-necks in production located?

2. Immediate preparedness on the part of the Army. The Army must move straight from its peace stations to overrun neighboring states. [Literally: Neighbouring states must be overrun direct from barracks.]

3. A study of the enemy’s weak points.

These studies must not be left to the General Staffs. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.

The Führer has therefore decided to order the formation of a small planning staff at OKW. It will keep the Führer informed and report to him.

The planning staff is responsible for the planning of operations on the highest level and of the technical preparations and organization necessarily required by the decision taken.

The purpose of certain regulations concerns no-one outside the staff.

However great are the increases in the armaments of our adversaries, they must, at some time, come to the end of their resources, and ours will be greater. French recruiting120000 men in each age class.

We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall not be able to avoid one.

Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan. The break-through through the Maginot line is still a possibility for Italy, and must be studied. The Führer considers that such a break-through is possible.

The close combination of the services, for the study of the problem in its entity, is important.

1. Study of the problem in its entity.

2. Study of the procedure.

3. Study of the necessary requirements.

4. Study of the necessary training.

The staff must include men with great imaginative power and the best technical knowledge, as well as officers of sober and sceptical judgment.

Working principles:

1. No one must be admitted who is not concerned.

2. No one may know more than it is necessary for him to know.

3. When must the person concerned know, at latest? No one may know of a matter earlier than is necessary for him to know of it.

At the request of Field Marshal Göring, the Führer decrees that:

a. The various services shall decide what construction is to be undertaken.

b. There shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding program.

c. The armaments programs are to be considered with regards to 1943-1944.

Certified correct record

(Sgd) Schmundt, Lt Col.

“Document L-89: Intensified Interrogations [translation]”, pp. 868-869.

TOP SECRET

The commandant of the Security Police and of the SD for the Radom district. [Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD fuer den Distrikt Radom].

Radom. 2/24/1944

IV ANo. 28/43 top Secret-

11 copies. 3rd copy

Branch Office [Aussendienststelle] Tschenstochau for the attention of SS-Capt. Dette or his deputy. Branch Office [Aussendienststelle] Kielce for the attention of SS-Capt. Essig or his deputy. Branch Office. [Aussendienststelle] Tomaschow for the attention of SS-Capt. Thiel or his deputy. Branch Office [Aussendienststelle] Petrikau for the attention of SS-Capt. Altmann or his deputy. Branch Office [Aussendienststelle] Ostrowiec for the attention of SS-1st Lt. Kurth or his deputy. Branch Office [Aussendienststelle] Jedrzejow for the attention of SS-2nd Lt. Berhalter or his deputy. Branch Office [Aussendienststelle] Konskie for the attention of SS-2nd Lt. Weiss or his deputy. Branch Office [Aussendienststelle] Busko for the attention of SS-2nd Lt. Fischer or his deputy. Branch Office [Aussendienststelle] Starachowice for the attention of SS-2nd Lt. Becker or his deputy. Branch Office [Aussendienststelle] Radomsko for the attention of SS-1st Lt. Prehn or his deputy. Section V in this building for the attention of SS-Capt. Boeck or his deputy. Previous Correspondence: None

In view of the variety of methods used to date in intensified interrogations and in order to avoid excesses, also to protect officials against eventual criminal proceedings, the commander of the Security Police and of the SD in Cracow has issued the following order for the Security Police in the General Gouvernement, which is based on the regulations in force for the Reich:

a. Should it become necessary to submit Reich Germans or members of German minorities in other countries [Volksdeutsche] or nationals of friendly or neutral states to intensified interrogation, the instructions issued by the Chief of the Security Police and SDB. No. IV226/42Top Secretdated 12 June 42 are to be followed.

All cases, but especially those requiring the permission of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, are to be reported to me immediately.

Foreign police officials are not to take part in intensified interrogations of Reich Germans or racial Germans [Volksdeutsche-] or of nationals of friendly or neutral states.

b. The following procedure is to be adopted as far as the rest of the foreign population of the General Gouvernement and nationals of the Soviet Union are concerned:

Intensified methods of interrogation may only be applied if the prisoner refuses to divulge information he possesses about important matters inimical to the State or to the Reich, connections, major crimes, whether already carried out or planned, (e.g. murder, robberies also the whereabouts of booty, etc.) which cannot be ascertained or cleared up by normal methods of investigation, or if he is strongly suspected of having such knowledge. A further constant pre-requisite is, that all usual methods of interrogation should have met with no success. They may not be applied to persons who have been handed over temporarily by the judicial authorities for further inquiries to be made. Exceptions to this rule require my special previous permission.

According to circumstances the intensifications may, among other things, consist of:

Very simple diet (bread and water), hard bed, dark cell, deprivation of sleep, exhausting exercises, also in beatings on the buttocks (with a stick).

No intensified method of interrogation may be used unless permission has been granted.

Two officials at least must be present at beatings.

Beatings of foreign prisoners in connection with ordinary (Criminal) police matters may only be carried out by foreign police officials.

The nature and extent of an intensified interrogation may not be exceeded.

Should a prisoner on whom intensified methods have been used, be brought before the judge, the Attorney-General concerned must at the same time be informed by Top Secret letter that for briefly stated reasons the prisoner has been subjected to intensified interrogation, the manner of which should be described. In the proceeding itself, or in fact in all proceedings, there must be no mention of the intensified interrogation. In cases, where I have not reserved to myself the right to grant permission for intensified interrogations I delegate decisions about the method and extent of these interrogations to the Leader of Section IV and V and to the Leaders of the Branch Offices [Aussendienststelle]. Permission must be given in writing before intensified method are used.

c. In exceptional cases, particularly on missions carried out away from the station, the senior official in charge may be empowered before the start of the mission to carry out an intensified interrogation away from the station. A report on this must be made immediately after return to the station.

Permits will be collected centrally at Section IV in Radom and kept for three years.

Both applications and permits to carry out intensified interrogations will be handled as Top Secret maters.

In all cases where I have granted permission to carry out intensified interrogations, the result is to be reported to me.

The leaders of the Sections resp. of the Branch Offices (Aussendienststellen) are personally responsible for the strict compliance with these instructions; they must see to it that the officials concerned are instructed accordingly, attention being paid to the duty of maintaining absolute secrecy about thee instructions and the individual cases.

Infringements of this order will be punished by legal and disciplinary action.

Signed: ILLMER

Attested: AUSTERUBIN Chancellery employee.

L IV File No. 6/44 top Secret.

Tomaschow, 2/28/1944

1. Noted WIE(SE)

2. All male officials of the station to be informed at the next conference. (Done, 29 Feb. 44).

3. To be filed with the Top Secret documents in the IV L steel safe.

(Signed) RETTINGER, SS-1st Lt.

“Document L-90: Prosecution Of Offenses Against The German State Or The Occupying Power In The Occupied Territories [partial translation]”, pp. 871-872.

SECRET

Metz, 5/14/1942

The Officer Commanding Security Police and SD in Lorraine-Saar Palatinate

1. Report: By order of the Commander I personally submitted today to Mr. Welsch, Advocate General, the Decree of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of 2 Feb. 42 (Copy) Office Foreign Countries (Ausl. Amt) Counter Intelligence Dept. CI (Abwehr) II Nr. 570/1.42 secret (ZR/IIIC 2)for his approval and had it returned to me in a sealed envelope.

2. Submitted to the Commander for his information and further orders. (Mr.) Pistorius wishes the Decree to be returned to him.

[signed] Ram [?] 5/14/1942

Returned to Pistorius 5/14/1942 [signed] Ram

(k) stamp Berlin, 2/2/1942

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Office Foreign Countries (Amt Ausl.) Counter Intell./Dept. Abwehr III Nr. 570/1.42 (ZR/lII C 2) Secret.

Your Ref. none Enclosures: 3

Enclosed please find:

1. Decree of the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of 7 Dec. 41.

2. Executive order of the same date.

3. Communication of the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of 12 Dec. 41.

The decree introduces a fundamental innovation. The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces order that offenses committed by civilians within the occupied territories and of the kind mentioned above, are to be dealt with by the competent Military Courts in the occupied territories only, if

(a) the death penalty is pronounced, and

(b) sentence is pronounced within 8 days of the prisoner’s arrest.

Unless both these conditions are fulfilled, the Führer and Supreme Commander does not anticipate that criminal proceedings within the occupied territories will have the necessary deterrent effect.

In all other cases the prisoners are in future to be transported to Germany secretly, and further dealings with the offenses will take place here; these measures will have a deterrent effect because

(a) the prisoners will vanish without leaving a trace,

(b) no information may be given as to their whereabouts or their fate.

This order will entail only very slight alterations in the activities of the Counter Intelligence [Abwehr] Offices. Now as before these offices decide the actual time when people suspected of espionage or sabotage are to be arrested. When deciding this time, it must now nevertheless be taken into consideration that before the arrest is made there will if possible have to be enough proof to convict the prisoner, for there will hardly be an opportunity for further inquiries, confrontations etc. since sentence has either to be pronounced within 8 days or otherwise the removal of the arrested person to Germany will make further investigations on the spot impossible. Before the arrest is made, therefore, contact must be made with the appropriate Military Court and the question examined with them as to whether or not the proof collected is sufficient.

In case the competent Military Court, resp. the Military Commander are of the opinion that an immediate decision on the spot is impossible, and the prisoners are therefore to be transported to Germany, the Counter Intelligence Offices have to report this fact directly to the RSHA in Berlin SW 11, Prinz Albrecht Street 7, c/o Dr. Fischer, Director of Criminal Police, stating the exact number of prisoners and of the groups which belong together as the case may be. Isolated cases where the Superior Commander has an urgent interest in the case being dealt with by a military court, are to be reported to the RSHA. Copy of the entire report has to be sent to Office Foreign Countries Intelligence Dept. Abwehr III.

The RSHA on the basis of available accommodation will determine which office of the State Police has to accept the prisoners. The latter office will communicate with the competent Counter Intelligence Office and determine with it the particulars of the removal, particularly whether this will be carried out by the Secret Field Police, the Field Gendarmerie, or the Gestapo itself, as well as on place and the manner of the actual handing over.

For the time being, the Führer’s Decree is to be applied only within the occupied areas of the West (Norway, Holland, Belgium and the North of France, France).

The Counter Intelligence offices will report orally to the Chiefs Staff on the above instructions of the Foreign Countries/ CounterIntelligence [Abwehr].

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

by Order [signature illegible]

Copy of Copy

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 14 n 16 WR (I 3/4), Nr. 165141 confidential

Subject: Prosecution of offences committed within the occupied countries against the German State or the Occupying Powers.

It is the carefully considered will of the Führer that now measures should be conceived in order to counteract attacks against the Gerinan State or the occupying power in the occupied territories. The Führer is of the following opinion. If these offences are punished with imprisonment, even with hard labor for life, this will be looked upon as a sign of weakness. Efficient and enduring intimidation can only be achieved either by capital punishment or by measures by which the relatives of the criminal and the population do not know the fate of the criminal. This aim is achieved when the criminal is transferred to Germany.

The enclosed directives for the prosecution of the offences comply with the Führer’s point of view. They have been examined and approved by him.

[signed] Keitel

SECRET Copy of Copy

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

[stamp] SECRET

Directives for the prosecution of offences committed within the occupied territories against the-German State or the occupying power, of 12/7/1941.

Within the occupied territories communistic elements and other circles hostile to Germany have increased their efforts against the German State and the occupying power since this Russian campaign started. The amount and the danger of these machinations oblige us to take severe measures as a determent. First of all the following directives are to be applied:

I. Within the occupied territories, the adequate punishment for offences committed against the German State or the occupying power which endanger their security or state of readiness is on principle the death penalty.

II. The offences listed in paragraph I as a rule are to be dealt with in the occupied countries only if it is probable that sentence of death will be passed upon the offender, at least the principal offender, and if the trial and the execution can be completed in a very short time. Otherwise the offenders, at least the principal offenders, are to be taken to Germany.

III. Prisoners taken to Germany are subjected to military procedure only if particular military interests require this. In case German or foreign authorities inquire about such prisoner, they are to be told that they were arrested, but that the proceedings do not allow any further information.

IV. The Commanders in the occupied territories and the Court authorities within the framework of their jurisdiction, are personally responsible for the observance of this decree.

V. The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces determines in which occupied territories this decree is to be applied. He is authorized to explain and to issue executive orders and supplements. The Reich Minister of Justice will issue executive orders within his own jurisdiction.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed] Keitel

A true copy. [signature illegible] Major

Copy of Copy

[stamp] Secret

First Ordinance for the execution of the directives of the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed-Forces concerning prosecution of offenses committed within the occupied territories against the German State or the occupying power.

Based on paragraph V of the directives of the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces concerning prosecution of offenses committed within the occupied territories against the German State or the occupying Power, of 12/7/1941 I decree as follows:

[] As a rule, the provisions of paragraph I of the Directives apply in cae of the following:

1. Attacks against life or body,

2. Espionage,

3. Sabotage,

4. Communistic conspiracy,

5. Offenses likely to create disturbance,

6. Assistance to the enemy, through: a. Smuggling of persons b. Attempt to join an enemy force, c. Assisting enemy soldiers (parachutists, etc.)

7. Illegal possession of arms.

(1) The offenses mentioned in I of the Directives are to be brought to trial in the occupied territories only in the following cases:

1. It must be likely that death sentence will be pronounced upon the offenders, at least upon the principal offenders.

2. It must be possible to complete trial and execution within a very short time (on principle within a week after arrest).

3. No particular political objections should be present with regard to immediate execution.

4. Apart from sentences for murder or for participating in guerilla warfare, a death sentence against a woman should be improbable.

2) If a sentence passed in accordance with subs. I has been squashed the subsequent procedure may be continued in the occupied country provided the stipulations of paragraph 1, Nr. 1, 3 and 4 are complied with.

(1) With regard to offenses defined in paragraph I of the Directlves, the Court Official decides in agreement with the Counter Intelligence offices whether the conditions for trying the case within the occupied country are present. If in the affirmative he convokes the court martial. If in the negative he submits the file to his superior commander (s. 89, subs. 1 Code of Military Procedure). The latter may reserve his decision.

(2) The Superior Commander has the final decision as to whether the conditions are present for trying the case in the occupied country. In the affirmative he delegates further procedure to an; authority within his area. In the negative, he orders the Secret Field Police to transport the Prisoner to Germany.

(1) Prisoners transported to Germany are subjected there to military procedure only when the High Command of the Armed Forces or the Superior Commander, while deciding according to par. III, state that particular military interests call for adjudication by a military court. When such a statement has not been issued, the order to transport the offender to Germany is equivalent to a transfer in the meaning of par. 3, subs. 2, par. 2 Code of Military Procedure.

(2) If the Superior Commander exercises the authority invested in him under Art. I, he should submit the documents to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, through the usual service channels. The prisoners are to be designated “Military Prisoners” as regards the Secret Field Police.

(3) The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces determines the powers of the Court, trying those prisoners, who under Art. I, come under military procedure. The Supreme Command can renounce the competency of the Military Tribunals and can furthermore suspend the proceedings until such time as it may desire.

If the trial takes place in Germany it should take place with the Public strictly excluded, owing to the endangering of State Security. Alien witnesses may be heard only with the consent of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The instruction on the procedure in military courts contained in the Decrees of the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of 9/14/1941 concerning the situation in Norway (Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces Dept. L (IV/Qu) No. 002034/41) Top Secret and of 9/16/1941 re. Communist Resistance Movements in the occupied territories. (Ops. Staff of Armed Forces, Dept L (IvQu) No. 002060/41 Top Secret) are replaced by the directives and this Execution order.

(1) The directives take effect three weeks after having been signed. They are to be applied in all occupied countries with the exception of Denmark until further notice.

(2) The rules issued for newly occupied eastern countries are not effected by these rules.

(3) Par. 1 of the directives applies to pending cases. The court official and the Superior Commander are entitled to apply par. III of this execution order in such proceedings. In case the Superior Commander orders transport of an offender to Germany, par. IV is applicable. With regard to prisoners transported to Germany before the directives came into force, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces may apply para. IV, subs. 3.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed] Keitel.

“Document L-103: Experiments with Akonitinnitrate-Bullets [translation]”, pp. 877-879.

Reich-Surgeon of the SS and Police The Supreme Hygienist Diary No.: Secret 364/44 Dr. Mru./Eb

Berlin-Zehlendorf 9/12/1944 Spanische Allee 10-12

To the Institute of Technical Criminology for the attention of Dr. Widmann Berlin Stamp: Institute of Technical Criminology Chemistry dept. received: 9/13/1944 Diary No. G 53/44 Expert:

On 9/11/1944, in the presence of SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Ding, Dr. Widmann and the undersigned, experiments with Akonotinnitrate bullets were carried out on five persons who had been sentenced to death. The calibre of the bullets used was 7.65 cm and they were filled with the poison in crystal form. Each subject of the experiments received one shot in the upper part of the left thigh, while in a horizontal position. In the case of 2 persons, the bullets passed clean through the upper part of the thigh. Even later no effect from the poison could be seen. These two subjects were therefore rejected. The bullet entrance showed no peculiarities. The Arteria Femoralis of one subject was apparently damaged. A light coloured flow of blood issued from the entrance hole. The bleeding however stopped after a short time. It was estimated that the amount of blood lost was at most 3/4 of a litre, so it was by no means fatal.

The symptoms shown by the three condemned persons were surprisingly the same. At first, nothing special was noticeable. After 20 to 25 minutes, a disturbance of the motor nerves and a light flow of saliva began, but both stopped again. After 40 to 44 minutes a strong flow of saliva appeared. The poisoned persons swallowed frequently, later the flow of saliva is so strong that it can no longer be controlled by swallowing. Foamy saliva flows from the mouth. Then, a sensation of choking and vomiting start.

After 58 minutes, the pulse of two of the persons could no longer be felt. The pulse of the third had 76 beats. After 65 minutes, his blood-pressure was 90/60 min. Hg. The sounds were exceedingly low.

There was therefore a noticeable lowering of the blood pressure.

During the first hours of the experiment, the pupil. showed no change. After 78 minutes those of all three person enlarged to a medium extent and were slow in reacting to light. At the same time the breathing was maximum with deep intaking respiration. It subsided after a few minutes. The pupils narrowed again and reacted better. After 65 minutes, the reflexes of the knee and Achilles tendons in the three poisoned persons, no longer functioned. In two of them, the reflexes of the abdominal wall had also failed. The third person still maintained the reflexes of the upper abdominal wall the lower ones no longer reacted. After 90 minutes one person began again to breathe already; this was accompanied by an increasing disturbance of the motor nerves. The breathing then became superficial and rapid.

At the same time there was pronounced nausea. One of the poisoned persons tried in vain to vomit. In order to succeed, he put 4 fingers of his hand, up to the main joint, right into his mouth. In spite of this, no vomiting occurred. His face became quite red.

The faces of the other two subjects were already pale at an early stage. Other symptoms were the same. Later on the disturbance of the motor nerves increased so much that the persons threw themselves up and down rolled their eyes and made aimless movements with their hands and arms. At last, the disturbance subsided, the pupils were enlarged to the maximum, the condemned lay still. Massetercramp and loss of urine was observed in one of them. Death occurred 121, 123, and 129 minutes after they were shot.

Conclusion: In spite of an insignificant injury, the bullets, filled with about 38 mg. Akonitinnitrate in solid form caused death after about 2 hours. The effect of the poison begins to how 20 to 25-minutes after the wound is received. The main symptoms were a flow of saliva, alteration in the size of the pupils, failure to function of the tendon reflexes; disturbance of the motor nerves and pronounced nausea.

signed: Doz. Dr. Mrugowsky SS-Oberführer and Department Head

“Document L-154: [Terror Fliers] [translation]”, p. 904.

[handwritten] PG. Buckemueller Gauleiter Service, 2/25/1945

The Gauleiter and National Defense Commissioner of the Gau Westfalen-South

1. To all County Councillors, Mayors and police officials

2. To County Leaders, for information

3. County Staff Chiefs of the Volkssturm are to give corresponding instructions to the men of the Volkssturm.

Fighter-bomber pilots who are shot down are on principle not to be protected against the indignation of the people. I expect from all police offices that they will refuse to lend their protection to these gangster types. Authorities acting in contradiction to the popular sentiment will have to account to me. All police and gendarmerie officials are to be informed immediately of this my attitude.

[signed] Albert Hoffmann

Taken down: Schmidt

initialed by: Buckemueller (SA-Obersturmbannführer and County Staff Chief of the Volkssturm)

“Document L-158: Measures To Be Taken Against Escaped Officer And Non-Commissioned Officer POWs Who Are Exempt From Work, With The Exception Of British And American POWs On Recapture [translation]”, pp. 906-908.

TOP SECRET

The Commander of the Security Police and the SD of the Radom District IV A1-No. 313/44 gRs.

Radom, 3/28/1944 11 Copies from the 26th Copy 4th Copy

To All Branch Offices (except Radom)sealed matter addressand Section V. The Commander of the Security Police and the SD of the Radom District Branch Office.

Rec. 3/30/1944 Section IV A Journal No. 11/44.

On the 3/2/1944. the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Berlin, forwarded the following OKW order:

1. On recapture every escaped officer and non-working NCO POW, with the exception of British and American POWs, no matter whether he escaped from a prisoners’ convoy, during a mass escape or by himself, is to be handed over to the Chief of the Sipo and SD, with the key word “Grade III (Stufe III)”.

2. As the fact that POWs are being handed over to the Sipo and SD must under no circumstances become known to outsiders, other POWs must not be informed of the recapture in any case. The Wehrmacht recaptured persons have “escaped and not been recaptured”. Their mail should be dealt with accordingly. The same information should be given in reply to inquiries by the protecting power, the International Red Cross and other similar institutions.

3. Should escaped British and American officers or nonworking NGOs be recaptured, they are temporarily to be placed under guard in the custody of the police, outside of the POW camp and out of sight of POWs.

The decision as to whether or not they should be handed over to the Chief of the Sipo and SD is to be asked for immediately in each individual case by the “W.Kdos.” from the OKW/OIC. Prisoners-of-War” [Chef Kriegsgef.]

In this connection the Chief of the Sipo and the SD has issued the following instructions:

1. The Stapo Leitstellen will take over from the camp commandants the escaped officers who have been recaptured and take them in accordance with the procedure hitherto in force, should circumstances not necessitate special transport, to the Mauthausen concentration camp. During the transportnot on the way to the station, if this could be seen by the publicthe POWs are to be chained. The camp commandant of Mauthausen is to be informed that the prisoners are being handed over under the operation “Bullet” [Kugel]. The Stapo Leitstellen will make half-yearly reports, giving the numbers only of the handing over of POWs. The first will be made on the 5.7.44. The reports are to be made referring to: “Treatment under the operation “Kugel” of escaped officer POWs who have been recaptured.” Any special incidents have to be reported immediately. Detailed lists are to be maintained at the Stapo Leit-Stellen.

2. In the interests of camouflage the OKW has been asked to instruct POW camps not to send recaptured POWs direct to Mauthausen but to hand them over to the local Stapostelle.

3. Should suitable Wehrmacht accommodations not be available escaped British and American officers and non-working NCOs who are recaptured should be placed in the custody of the police at a place where there is a Stapodienststelle. In view of the already overcrowded conditions in police prisons, these recaptured prisoners can only be taken over by the Stapo only if suitable Wehrmacht accommodations are actually unavailable. On receipt of this order contact should be made immediately with the Stalag commandants regarding accommodation. In the interests of keeping this order secret there can be no question of accommodating them outside police prisons, esp. in labor training camps.

4. If escaped officer and non-working NCO prisoners-of-war, with the exception of British and American POWs, are recaptured by police stations and it appears inopportune, they need not be handed over to the Stalag command after the findings have been established beyond doubt [nach eindwandfreier Klaerung des Sachverhaltes] for reasons of expediency. The Stalag should be informed of the recapture and asked to hand them over with the key words “Stufe III”. Escaped British and American officers and non-working NCOs are always to be handed over to the Wehrmacht.

5. The local [Ort] and county [Kreis] police authorities are not to be informed of this order.

The list of the recaptured officers and non-working NCO prisoners-of-war will be kept here by IV A1. To enable a report to be made punctually to the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Berlin, statements of the numbers involved must reach Radom by the 20.6.44.

Signed: ILLMER [Typewritten]

Certified: MATHEI Clerk

DISTRIBUTION: Tschenstochau1 Radomsko1 Petrikau-1 Tomaschow-1 Kielce1 Knoskie1 Yedrzejour-1 Busko-1 Starachowice-1 Ostrowiec-1 Abt. V-1 -11

“Document L-172: The Strategic Position In The Beginning Of The 5th Year Of War [translation]”, pp. 920-923.

Lecture by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (West) to the Reich and Gau leaders, delivered in Munich on 11/7/1943.

I. Review of the most important questions of development up to the present.

II. The Italian betrayal, how it was parried, and its consequences.

General Outcome:

III. The present situation.

Consideration of the individual theaters of war and their characteristic features. Finland. Norway. Denmark: Keystone of communications with Norway. France with the Netherlands and Belgium the battlefield of the year 1944. Italy: A narrow front with deep flanks. The Balkans: Guerilla warfare Supply The East: Comparison with the Western front, 1917/18

IV. The enemyHis resources and their grouping. His further strategic intentions.

V. The morale of the confederates and neutrals.

VI. The problems of the German Command in this situation of the struggle long the inner line.

a. The distribution of forces throughout the theater of war as a whole. b. The formation of operative reserves. c. Comparison between requirements in soldiers and munitions workers. d. Exhaustion of manpower reserves in the territories under one domination. The problem of the Confederates and of alien soldiers. e. Mastering the enemy terror raids from the air. f. The renewal of effective U-boat warfare.

VII. The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.

a. The German people and its leadership. b. The German armed forces. c. The ethical and moral foundation of our struggle. d. The unified political and military aim of the Confederates [Verbundeten], protection from Bolshevism. e. Unified political and military command. f. The diverging political, military, social and economic tendencies of our opponents, the moral inferiority of our opponents in the West and the purely materialistic foundations of their struggle. g. The genius at the head of the command.

Introduction

Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you a review today of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th year of war.

I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say openly what is. No onethe Führer has orderedmay know more or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your Gaus, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumors concentrate that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, oras they call ita political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncolored account of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by force of arms but by the will to resist of the whole people. Germany was broken in 1918 nob at the front but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected butthrough the cowardice of these criminal traitorsa fate a thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people.

The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and in that of Russiathese also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:

I. A review of the most important questions of development up to the present.

II. Consideration of the present situation.

III. The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.

In view of my position as military adviser to the Führer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way be giving expression only to one side of events.

1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in reawakening the will to fight [Wehrwillen]; in nurturing fighting strength [Wehrkraft] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed and has so happily been successful in bringing about was the fusion of these two forces.

2. The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereign [Wehrhoheit] (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and rearmament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armored and air arm.

3. The Austrian “Anschluss,” in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now inclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigor before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive.

This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the West Wall, which, in contradistinction to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignatiion but one intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in the East.

4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises.

5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Polandin itself unavoidablewas favorably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt since the opponentafter all not inconsiderable in himselfcollapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course taken by the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means, i.e., the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Greater Germany.

6. The main effect of this success was however that we now had no opponent in the East and that in view of the agreements with Russia the two-front problem might be regarded as for the time being solved.

7. As a result of all this the point of gravity in the conduct of the war naturally shifted to the West where the most urgent task was clearly defined as the protection of the Ruhr area from the invasion of Holland by the British and French. Even before the Polish campaign had been concluded the Führer had already decided upon an attack against this enemy the aim of which could only be complete subjection of the opponent. The circumstance that this decision was not carried outas originally planned that is, in the late autumn of 1939was mainly due to weather conditions but in part also influenced by our situation with regard to armaments.

8. In the meantime, however, we were confronted by yet another problem which must be settled promptly: the occupation of Norway and Denmark. The point here lay in opening up a theatre of war which while it lay outside the zone of immediate danger yet possessed twofold importance from the point of view of our general conduct of the war. In the first place there was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the North would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes. Secondly, it was realization of our own maritime necessities which made it imperative for us to secure for ourselves free access to the Atlantic by a number of air and naval support points on the Norwegian coast. Here too, therefore, defensive and offensive requirements combined to form an indissoluble whole.

The course and conclusion of this campaign are known. In the main it was completed in such good time that it was possible to start upon the campaign in the West with the setting in of the most favorable season of the year, in 5/1940.

9. The decisive success of this campaign improved our position in the best possible way. We gained possession not only of the French potential of armamentsdestined to do us important service in the further course of the warbut above all the entire Atlantic coast fell into our hands with its naval ports and air support points. Direct threat to the British motherland had by this means become possible.

The question now arose whether or not we should carry the war into England by a landing on the grand scale. Furthermorein view of the possible eventuality of the USA entering the warit was necessary to take into consideration the occupation of a number of advanced support points in the Atlantic (for instance, Iceland and the Azores on which in the meantime the enemy had laid his hand). From these islands we should be able both to carry on particularly effectively the fight against British supplies and to defend the territory of Europe in exactly the same way as Japan now holds Greater East Asia secure by means of its island advanced bases in the Pacific. However, very wisely the Führer refrained from adopting these objectives. Not alone their initial execution but the subsequent maintenance of communications by sea would have involved a measure of strength which our naval and air equipment could not have provided permanently.

10. Instead of these considerations the winter of 1940/41 provided another opportunity of combatting England. Although outwardly our action only took the form of aid to our Italian ally, yet ultimately the point at issue was British command of the seas in the Mediterranean which in its turn represented a heavy menace to the Southern flank of the European continent.

In the measure as the weakness and failure of Italy became more and more manifest, North Africa became more and more a German theater of war. Employing our forces in this wayincidentally, no great force was involvedappeared to be all the more justified since by this means strong British land, sea, and air forces, and a very considerable tonnage in the way of sea transport would be kept tied down, away from German “living space” [Lebensraum].

11. What was however less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an ally in the Balkans in consequence of the unnecessary expedition of the Italians against Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part whichtaking a long view of the matterwould have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the North was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that country.

12. Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik Eastthat danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the Führer himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decisions to take steps against this danger the moment our military position made it at all possible.

13. Following on the interlude of the overthrow in Yugoslavia, the Balkan campaign which followed this, and our occupation of Crete; this decision was translated into action. If put into effect at all, it had of necessity to take us deep into Russian territory a circumstance entailing dangers to an extent not yet encountered in our previous campaigns.

14. In spite of the fact that we were not able either in 1941 nor in 1942 completely to annihilate the enemy’s fighting forces and thereby to force Russia to her knees, yet we can definitely claim it as a positive result that the.Bolshevist danger has been driven back far from our own frontiers.

If today, in view of the repeated and prolonged setbacks of the year 1943, the question comes up again and again, whether we had not thoroughly underestimated the strength of the Bolshevik opponent, the answer to this question in regard to the execution of individual part-operations, may certainly be said to be ‘Yes.’ But as regards the decision to attack as a whole and that of holding on to this decision for as long as possible, there can be no doubts. As in politics so in the conduct of warthe issue is not merely one of arithmetical sums, and one of the most important lessons taught by war is that correct estimation of the opponent is one of the hardest of all tasks, and that even when everything has been correctly summed up, there still remains much that is imponderable and only becomes clear in the course of the battle itself.

One clarification of the situation is however to be perceived in that, as a result of our advance into the dark unknown which is Russia, we have taken the measure not only of the strength in personnel involved but also of a standard of equipment which has forced us in our turn to institute a state of totalitarian warfare and a technical counterblast such as left to ourselves we were hardly likely to have produced. One can only think with a shudder of what would have happened if we had adopted a waiting attitude in the face of this danger and, sooner or later, have been overrun by it.

15. Within the framework of this short sketch of the sweep of our strategy all that remains to mention is the occupation of Tunis effected as a countermeasure to the landing of Anglo-American forces on the North and West coasts of French North Africa, the rapid loss again of which position is probably specially likely to evoke doubt in the correctness of our wider strategy.

Taking it all in all, however, fighting along the periphery has built up for us a capital sum of space which we are now living upon.

In recapitulation, a brief summary of the course of the great tactical events up to the autumn of 1943:

The first two years of war saw Germany and its later allies running a victorious course almost unparalleled in history. The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, in North Africa, in the Balkans, and the attack on Russia as far as the Donetz, up to the gates of Moscow and up to the Volkhov created a wide forefield for the defense of Europe and as a result of the occupation and making safe of rich areas of raw materials and food, provided the premises for a long war. Superior leadership, better employment of the modern means of war, a superior air arm and the exceptionally high fighting value and morale of our troops faced by opponents inferior on each of these counts have produced these successes. Nevertheless, during this period of the war, in which our superiority on land was undisputed, and our superiority in the air was able to make good, at all events in the coastal district, our hoped less inferiority at sea, in our last grasp at the palm of victory success has eluded us. The landing in England, prepared for down to the smallest detail but with improvised transport resources only, could not be dared while the British Air arm had not been completely beaten. And this we were not able to do, just as we have not been able completely to shatter the Soviet Armed Forces. Later generations will not be able to reproach us with not having dared the utmost and spared no effort to achieve these aims which would have decided the war.

But no one could take it upon himself to allow the German air arm to bleed to death in the Battle of Britain in view of the struggle which still lay before us against Soviet Russia.

In the East however, the natural catastrophe of the winter of 1941 imposed an imperative halt on even the sternest resolution. [Following paragraph struck out:]

Our third objective, that of drawing Spain into the war on our side, and thereby creating the possibility of seizing Gibraltar, was wrecked by the resistance of the Spanish or, better say, Jesuit Foreign Minister, Sorano Sunjer.

It therefore became clear that we could no longer count upon an early end to the war, but that it would be hard and difficult and confront the whole nation with great hardships. [Forsays Clausewitzevery attack which does not lead either to an armistice or to peace must of necessity end in defense.]

After the first setbacks on the Eastern front and in the North African theater of war in the winter of 1943, the Reich and its Allies once again gathered together all their strength in order to defeat this Eastern opponent finally by a new assault and to deprive the British of their Egyptian base of operations. The great operation against the Caucasus and the Delta of the Nile failed, however, owing to insufficient strength and inadequate supplies. For the first time our Western opponents showed themselves to be superior both on the technical side and numerically in the air over the Mediterranean. The Soviet Russian Command also continued to stabilize the front at Stalingrad and before the Caucasus, and after that in wintertime using newly-formed strong reserves continued to break-through the petrified over-extended fronts on the Volga and along the Donlargely occupied moreover by the troops of our Allies. The 6th Army, consisting of the best German formations, inadequately supplied and exposed to the storms of winter, succumbed to enemy superiority.

Similarly, the Western Powers were able to bring together in Egypt a concentration of land, sea, and air forces which held us up at the very gates of Egypt and after the battle of El Alamein forced us to retreat, and finally, following on the landing of strong Anglo-American armies in French North Africa, to surrender the entire African position. Again some of the best German divisions fell a victim to the stranglehold of a superior enemy air force on our supplies by sea, although not before they had won for us a certain gain in time which was worth every sacrifice.

At the end of the winter fighting of 1942/43 and after the loss of the African Army the armed forces of Germany and her allies were strained to the utmost. It proved possible to re-form the 5th Armored Army and the 6th Armybut four armies of our allies were lost for good.

The tactical reserves in the East would, it is true be exceptionally well equipped, but their numbers would no longer be increased to such a pitch as to make it possible to envisage any extensive operations. Gone was the great mobility of the Army and, excepting on the Russian theater of war, gone also our superiority in the air. The superior economic strength of our opponents and their greater reservoir of manpower, concentrated to form a point of gravity against Europe, was beginning to tell. The complete failure of Italy in all domains and the absence of any munitions production worthy of the name among our other Allies could not be adequately compensated by the tremendous efforts made by Germany.

Of necessity therefore the initiative was bound to pass over to the opposing side and the Reich, and the European nations fighting at Germany’s side, to go over to the defensive.

So when the positions pushed out beyond the European front to the South had been taken by the enemy, in 7/1943, the enemy attack started: In the East to regain the territories lost there and in the South against the Fortress Europe proper at its weakest point. In the meantime the air arms of the Anglo-Americans had already begun the grand assault on the production hearths and morale of our people at home.

In the Far East Japan’s struggle has developed on much the same lines, with the difference, however, that the Japanese had pushed their advanced positions very much further away from the Motherland proper and the Anglo-Saxons did not here undertake any attacks on a large scale for the reason that they had directed their point of gravity against Europe.

It was at this stage of the war that the Italian betrayal took place. Its main features will be known to you from what appeared in the press. Actually it was even more dramatic than the newspapers showed. For the Supreme Command it was perhaps one of the hardest problems which it had as yet had to master. That the removal and arrest of the Duce could not end otherwise than by the defection of Italy was completely clear to the Führer from the first, although many politically less well-trained eyes thought to see in it rather an improvement in our position in the Mediterranean and our cooperation with the Italians. There were many personages at this time who failed to understand the Führer’s GHQ in its political and military actions. For these were directed towards overthrowing the new Government and liberating the Duce. Only the smallest possible circle might know of this. On the military side in the meantime everything was to be done to stop enemy penetration of the Southern front as far South as possible, that is, on Sicily.

That the enemy would bring this point of gravity to bear on some point further West in the Mediterraneanof that there was not the slightest doubt; the distribution o his shipping and landing space made this clear. Where however would this point be? On Sardinia, on Corsica, in Apulia, in Calabria, orif the thesis of betrayal were true why not in Rome itself, or near Leghorn or Genoa? If he did not do this, then our job was to hold as much of Italy as possible in order not to let the base of the enemy air forces come near to the Alps. If the enemy is successful in a landing in Northern Italy then all the German formations in Central and Southern Italy would be lost. Moreover no grounds must be given which might serve the Italians as a moral pretext for their betrayal, or-by premature hostile action to commit the betrayal ourselves. In the meantime the traitors simply oozed with amiability and assurances of faith, and even got as far as to make some of our officers who came into contact with them daily doubtful of the truth of the betrayal-hypothesis. This was nothing to be wondered at, for to the German officers such depths of infamy were simply incomprehensible.

The situation became more and more difficult. It was perhaps the only time in this war when at times I myself hardly knew what should suggest to the Führer. The measures to be taken in the event of open betrayal had been decided in every detail. The watchword ‘Axis’ would set them in motion. In the meantime however all the divisions, which the Führer at once caused to be moved from the West to Upper Italy, were operatively idle thereand that at a time when the East front, subjected to severe assault, was begging for reserves more urgently than ever.

How much meanwhile we had been able to find out through our troops and through the bordering Gau’s keen as sleuthhounds on the track of Italian machinations in the matter of manifestly hostile actions and preparations is known to you all. However, somehow or other the Italians explained it all ways, either as a misunderstanding or with excuses.

In this insupportable position the Führer agreed to slash through the Gordian knot by a political and military ultimatum. Then on the morning of the 7 September the enemy landing fleet appeared at Salerno and on the afternoon of 8 September news of the Italian capitulation flew through the ether. Even now however, at the last moment, the freedom of action of the Command was still held up: the Italians refused to admit the authenticity of the wireless message. The password itself therefore would not be given but only the ‘stand-by’ for the troops, until at last at 19.15 this most monstrous of all betrayals in history was confirmed by the Italian political authorities themselves. What followed was both a drama and a tragedy. Only at a later date will it be possible to gather together and set forth all the grotesque details. The more disillusioned the troops and the German Command, the harder the reaction.

General Outcome: Appendix

WFST/ORG/1st STAFFEL

Armed Forces Operation Staff/Organization/1st Section

List of Italian Booty

1. Arms: Rifles: 1255606 Pistols: 17703 MP: 13627 A.T. Rifles: 167 MG: 38383 Mortars: 8606 A.T. guns: 961 A.A. guns: 3679 Army guns: 5346 Ammunition (tons): 287502 Motor cycles: 2295 Armored cars: 1938 Lorries: 12708 Motor busses (KOM): 90 Trailers: 471 Tractors: 293 Tanks and assault guns: 970 M.T. fuel: 123114 Horses, mules: 67600

2. Aircraft: Front line aircraft: Fighters: 1379 Bombers: 886 Reconnaissance: 512 Transports: 363 2nd line aircraft: Seaplanes: 90 Passenger planes: 125 Training craft: 1198 Aircraft engines: 499

3. Ships: 10: Torpedo boats: 8 Destroyers: 2 51: Corvettes: 2 S-boats: 14 Anti-submarine boats: 6 Mine-layers: 4 Mine-detectors: 7 Escort vessels: 7 R-boats: 13 Other small war vessels: 11 Merchant ships: 34

4. Clothing: Overcoats: 551000 Capes: 408000 Tunics: 524000 Pullovers: 552000 Trousers, prs: 494000 Shirts: 1.139 million Pants, prs: 4.243 million Shoes, prs. 3.286 million Caps: 486000 Tent squares: 509000 Cloth, meters: 352000 Linen (in m2): 3.036 million Blankets: 2.522 million

5. Raw materials: [Note in ink: In far larger quantities than might have been expected] Iron and steel: 196200 tons Iron and steel scrap: 16900 tons Nonferrous metals:78780 tons Minerals: 500 tons Coal: 41000 tons Timber: 90000 cbm. Mercury: 3400 tons Asbestos: 100 tons Buna: 462 tons Chem. products (Chloric acid, hydrochloric acid): 1900 tons Industrial oils and fats: 240 ton. Tanning materials: 515 tons Alcohol: 400 tons Hides and tallow: 21925 pieces Leather: 200 tons Tyres (cars and cycles): 21000 pieces Raw material for textiles: 493 tons Quinine: 13 tons Raw tobacco: 8800 tons

6. Prisoners of war or military internees:

Italians: 547531 of whom 24744 officers British: 34160 of whom 2615 officers Americans: 1427 of whom 201 officers

Italian Booty

Arms: Rifles: 1255660 Machine guns: 38383 Guns: 9986 M. T. vehicles: 15500 Tanks and assault guns: 970 M. T. Fuel (cubic meters): 123114 Horses, mules: 67600 Aircraft: Front line aircraft: 2867 Other aircraft: 1686 Ships: Torpedo-boats and destroyers: 10 Other small vessels of war: 51 Clothing for: 500000 men

Raw materials in far larger quantities than might have been expected in view of the constant economic demands.

PW’s or military internees:

Italians: 547531 of whom 24744 officers British: 34160 of whom 2615 officers Americans: 1427 of whom 201 officers

Disarmed Italian Divisions

Definitely disarmed: 51 divisions Probably disarmed: 29 divisions Not disarmed: 3 divisions

Disarmed: Rhodes: Regina Division: 1 Crete: Siena Division: 1 Greece: Cagliari, Piemonte, Forli, Pinerolo, Casale, Modena, Aqui Divisions: 7 Albania: Brennero, Arezzo, Parma, Firenze, Puglie, Emilie Divisions: 6 Montenegro: Perugia, Venezia, Ferrara, Taurinense Divisions: 4 Croatia: Murge, Marche, Messina, Bergamo, Zaro, Lombardia Divisions: 6 [total:] 25

Not yet disarmed up to the present; Main part of Cuneo Division (Samos) and Re Division and Macerata division (North-west Croatia)

Disarmed: Area of Army Group C:

(a) Main portion of divisions probably disarmed: Julia, Tridentina, Cuneense, Rovigo, Alpi Graie, 201st Coastal Division, Ersatz Brennero Division, Ersatz Firenze Division, Ersatz Pistoia Division, Ersatz Ravenna Division: 10

(b) Main portion of divisions probably disarmed: 206th Coastal Division, Principe Amedeo Duca d’Aosta Division, Cosseria, Trento, Assieta, Livorno, and Torino Divisions: 7

(c) Some parts of the divisions probably disarmed: Veneto, Vicenza, Napoli and Aosta Divisions: 4 [total:] 21

In addition a considerable number of special units not forming part of a divisional formation were disarmed.

Area of Supreme Command South (“B. SUD”)

a. Main portion of divisions definitely disarmed: 221st Coastal Divisions, Piave, Grenatieri Di Sardegna, Sassari, Piacenza, Centavro, Ariete Divisions, 220th Coastal Divisions, 215th Coastal Division, Ravenna: 10

b. Parts of the divisions definitely disarmed: 211th Coastal, Mantua, 212th Coastal, 227th Coastal, 214th Coastal, Picino, 210th Coastal, 200th Coastal, 222d Coastal, Pasubio, Legnang: 11

c. Parts of divisions probably disarmed: Priuli, Cremona, Calabria,-204th Coastal, Bari, 200t Coastal, Sabauda, (on Corsica and Sardinia): 7 [total:] 28

Disarmed: Main portion of divisions definitely disarmed:

Em. Filiberto, Pusteria, Taro, Lupi Di Toscana, 223d Coastal Division, 224th Coastal Division In all 6 Divisions

I should like briefly to set out the characteristic features of the individual theaters of war.

See Appendixes: [Note in pencil: “Delivered etempore with the help of maps”]

To III Finland

The Finnish front, the Northern abutment of the European defense system. The outermost wing of the East Front, and at the same time the rear cover of the Norwegian front.

Total length of front approx 1,400 km (-2/3 of the total length of the East front), occupied along wide stretches only by means of support points.

Terrain: South-East: forest and swamp; North-East: treeless partly rocky Tundra.

Weather: Very various over the terrain as a whole. (Temperatures on 1.11. from plus 8 degrees to minus 18 degrees). In the North long polar night, mud period not materially important.

War supply: Important nickel mines at Kolosjoki near Petjamo (32% of the total European output).

Total population: 3.8 millions.

Operational possibilities:

No operations on a grand scale possible owing to absence of roads. High capacity lines of communication for supplying own offensive do not exist only one railway in North-South direction as far as Rovaniemi, branch line Eastwards (Kandalaksha) still under construction. Only one high capacity trunk road running North-South (Helsinki-Petjamo). As against this, on the Russian side, high-capacity Murmansk line.

Conduct of war: Consequently, in the main, confined to assault unit activities and enterprises by Jeager detachments, action along the flanks and for roads of special importance. Nevertheless because of the great length of front a strong own (German) force of 176,800 is tied to this front, consisting of the best troops capable of withstanding the nature of the country. Own divisions in good fighting trim, fully equipped, trained as in peacetime, good body of officers.

For air activity on the whole very unfavorable. Terrain affords new possibilities for laying out airfields.

Protection of the North-Western flank of Europe. Total front length 2,800 km (about equal to East front). Part of the front occupied only by support points islands not all occupied.

Terrain: Medium-mountain and alpine in nature deeply indented by fjords and valleys.

War Supply: Transportation of Swedish ore via Narvik (22% of total European output). Emphasis in supply lies on communications by sea. Several good big and small ports suitable for distribution traffic.

Coastal district suitable for enemy landings with limited objective.

Operationson land only possible with limited forces. Railway and road systems very widely meshed, of low capacity, easily blocked (bridges, tunnels). For these reasons the British operations/940 (plus absence of bigger harbors) were greatly hampered.

Own forces in Norway are 380000 men.

The greater portion of the 13 divisions are employed in coastal defense, partly permanently posted.

(In Norway about 1000 guns of over 10 cm. cal. are employed in coastal defense).

Counterattack reserves: 1 Inf. Div. in Central Norway, 1st Infantry and 1 Armored Divisions in South Norway.

Opportunities of action of own air arms dependent to a very high degree on weather, particularly in North Norway.

Navy: Important U-boat support points, berths for heavy naval combat forces. Supply for the AOK (Army Command) depends on the security of sea communications. Mean supply efficiency per month by sea: 190140 BRT.

Key position at entrance to the Baltic the possession of which would make possible far-reaching enemy operations both in the direction of Scandinavia and in that of Germany and extend their influence into the Baltic.

Total length of front: approx. 700 km.

Terrain: For landings from the sea on a large scale the Western coast is little suited (storms, surf); East Jutland and the islands are better suited (but owing to long approach routes and good defensive possibilities unlikely).

Especially open to the danger of a landing: Esbjerg (West Jutland) and Aalborg (North-West Jutland).

For tankspossible almost everywhere. Landings from the air possible in the open as well as on the well-developed airfields.

Coastal defenseby support points. Coastal defense forces 3 divisions, of limited fighting value. In addition, counterattack reserves. Reinforcements have been ordered.

Total formations of the Wehrmacht employed106,500 men.

1. Terrain: In all 2,100 Km. of coastal front on the Channel and Atlantic and 500 Km on the Mediterranean all of whichin contra-distinction to the coast in Norwaywith a few inconsiderable exceptions admit of landings with modern resources.

The interior of the country offers no obstacles to the employment of all formations including tactical armored formations (Western campaign).

A good well-developed communications system both by rail and road enables our resources to be moved rapidly but will also benefit the enemy once he has gained a footing.

Weather conditions do not completely exclude landing operations with modern equipment at any time of the year. In the autumn and winter however storms may make a landing on the grand scale a difficult matter.

2. Own possibilities: The position as described makes it necessary to repel and destroy the enemy before he can reach the coast. For this reasonconstruction of the Atlantic Wall. This construction has been in hand for a long time; it is however impossible along a front of 2,600 Km to reinforce the coastal front with a system of fortifications in depth at all points. Nevertheless the number of positions and built-in weapons is greater than in any other construction as yet known, including the West Wall and the Maginot Line.

2,692 guns of cal 7.5 cm. up to the heaviest long-range batteries, not including the AA guns and the artillery of the divisions employees. 2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons alone, without counting the equipment of the employed divisions. 8,500 (8,449) positions of the permanent construction type have been handed over to the troops. In all over 5.3 million cubic meters of concrete have been used on the constructions.

A belt of fortifications of this kind has the effect however of tieing.down considerable forces of one’s own. For this purpose we have put in fortress divisions of whom however, needless to say, only a small section in every case can be effective against the enemy. For this reason it is essential to have strong, mobile and especially well-equipped reserves in the West for the purpose of forming points of gravity. Any weakening of these tactical reserves required in the West is a risk and acutely endangering the general situation.

Strength-in the West: In all 1.37 million men.

Italy

1. Ground conditions. Along the front: mountains some of which are Alpine in nature. Less steep country only along the West and above all the East coast. As a result it is possible in part to cut out some sectors of the Alpine regions; on the other hand infantry must be employed in strength to prevent infiltration. Transverse movements behind the front are very difficult. Good possibilities of blocking roads for a long time.

In addition to these conditions along the front (length app. 150 km.), the factor determining the employment of own troops is the double coastline (on both sides), total length approx. 1600 km. In addition to landings directly behind our front, the sectors especially threatened are Genoa, La Spezia, Rome, and the whole of the East coast south of Ravenna.

2. The point of next importance to the terrain in determining tactical conditions in Italy is the superiority of the enemy on land, in the air, and on the sea. This enables him to advance methodically, taking no undue risks, supported by a number of smaller and greater landings directly behind our front. Strong enemy artillery action.

Absolute supremacy in the air. In addition to direct and heavy effect on the troops this air superiority also means constant interference with traffic (especially on the railroads) in the rear areas. Troop movements and supply are affected right far back into the Hinterland.

The enemy’s rearward communications across the sea are practically unhampered as our own sea and air forces are nothing like strong enough.

3. In view of these conditions our own troops are confronted with an immense task.

In spite of the fact that our forces are hampered at the coast and in the back areas (total ration strength of all branches of the Armed Forces and auxiliaries rather over 400000), we have so far contrived to delay the enemy advance very considerably and to keep down our own losses in men and equipment to a minimum since the islands were evacuated. This may be regarded as a success, since, apart from his having gained a foothold in Europe proper, the enemy has not up to the present gained any decisive tactical success. However, it will not be possible in the near future to wrest the initiative from the enemy as he is in a position to supply and reinforce his formations in practically unlimited measure.

Own air arm-in a difficult position owing to the multivariousness of its duties and the vast extent of the tactical theaters of warmust confine itself to forming points of gravity.

Navy: Apart from the employment of a few U-boats and speedboats, possesses few possibilities of becoming effective against the enemy.

4. Along the coasts-preparation for defense.

Total length of front about 1,400 km.

Finland: (equals 2/3 of total length of Eastern front). Important: Nickel mines Kolosjoki near Petsamo (32 of total European output). Total number of inhabitants 3.8 millions. Own strength: 176800 men

Total length of front 2000 km (equal to length of Eastern Front). Narvik: Clearing port for Swedish ore (22% of total European output). Own strength: 315000 men Approx. 1000 guns over 10 cm.

Total length of front: approx 700 km. Own strength: 106500 men

In all 2100 km of coastal front along the channel and the Atlantic and 800 km. along Mediterranean. Atlantic wall: 2692 guns of cal. 7.5 up to the heaviest long range batteries of 2354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons 8500 positions, constantly being extended. Over 5.3 million cbm of concrete laid. Own strength: 1.37 million men.

Length of front: approx. 150 km. Both coasts: in all approx. 1600 km. Own strength: 329000 men.

Balkans 50% of European output in mineral oil. 100% of European output in chromium ore. 60% of European output in bauxite. 29% of European output in antimony. 21% of European output in copper. Length of coast line (incl. Crete and Rhodes). Approx. 4200 km., or twice the distance from Leningrad to the Black Sea. Own strength: 612,000 men.

East:

Length of front: 2100 km. In view of the length of front our own strength is inadequate for a continuous line of positions as in the last world war. Artillery: Monthly production 1200 guns. Tanks: At the outbreak of the war 21000 tanks, mainly light and out of date. Russian losses in tanks from 6/1941-10/1943: 52000. Railway sabotage: July 1560, August 2121, September 2000 line demolitions with great effect on operations and an evacuation transport. Reinforcement of the Red Army (lowest point) 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions. Today highest point up to date: 5.5 millions. Own strength: 3.9 million.

1. Importance of the South-East. Domination of the Balkans as an integral part of the Fortress Europe is decisive from the point of view of winning the war for tactical, military-political, and economic reasons.

The Balkans provide50% of the total European output in mineral oil 100% of the total European output in chromium ore 60% of the total European output in bauxite 29% of the total European output in antimony 21% of the total European output in copper

2. Tactical possibilities. In view of the coast length (including Crete and Rhodes) of approx. 4200 km, that is, twice the distance from Leningrad to the Black Sea, in the event of an attack by the enemy our own troops would have the following advantages and disadvantages:

Advantages. For coastal defense in general all that is necessary is to occupy the harbors and river mouths on the point of gravity principle.

Should the operations move inland, the hills offer good opportunities for blocking and defense.

Disadvantages. A sparse rail and road system involves difficulties in the matter of supply and the movement of reserves.

Grave danger from the air on all the few roads and mountain railway lines all of which possess many artificial constructions. (To Greece only one single-track railway line with an efficiency of 12 trains per day.)

Difficulties in supplying the many islands of the Aegean (low own tonnage, shortage of naval tactical forcesonly a few Italian torpedo-boatsvery few security vessels. Ration strength on Crete 47000, on Rhodes 8000 and 30000 Italian military internees).

3. Present position. Army: In the parts of the Balkans occupied by us, guerilla warfare is now being waged against guerilla bandssome of them well-armedsupported by the Anglo-Saxons to a total strength of approx. 140000-150000 men. The bands are all anti-German, but disunited amongst themselves. A distinction should be made:

a. In Croatia and Serbia between

aa. Communist bands under the command of Tito to a strength of approx. 90000 men.

bb. Chetniks under the command of Drazha Mihailovich, to a strength of 30000 men.

b. In Greece: Nationalist bands under the command of Zervas to a strength of 10000 and approx. 15000 Communists.

For the defense against Anglo-Saxon attack and for putting down the guerilla bands we have at our disposal at the present time own forces to the strength of 612000 men.

Landings of any size in the wintertime are unlikely so that the main task of these forces is to put down the guerillas in order to be able in the spring of 1944, after defeating and destroying the larger bands, to employ the largest possible forces in coastal defense.

From the forces of the confederates stationed in the South-Eastwith the exception of the Bulgarian formations who however are requested to defend Bulgariano material assistance may be expected.

Air arm: At present, in view of the great distance to their jumping-off bases, the numerical superiority of the Anglo-Saxon air arm has not made itself felt excepting in the Western Balkans where the fact that Southern Italy is occupied by the enemy has become noticeable.

Length of front: 2100 km. (distance from-frontier to Reich to Moscow 900 km., to Urals 2300 km.)

Terrain: Flat plateau, swamp, and forest in the North, deeply indented (steppe ravines) in the South. In view of the great length of the front the ratio of our own strength is not sufficiently high to admit of a continuous line of positions as in the World War and makes it necessary to occupy by a system of support points and mobile warfare in which threats to the flanks and rear must be accepted. Our line of defense is therefore rather thin and there is difficulty in forming larger gravity points. Where we are opposed by enemy concentrations our forces are always locally inferior.

Russian infantry’s fighting value has sunk to a still lower level although their training is noticeably better; on the other hand their equipment is rapidly improving (automatic and heavy infantry weapons). The Russian artillery is being built up on a grand scale. Monthly output 1200 guns.

Armored troops: On the outbreak of war 21000 tanks, mainly light and out-of-date.

Strength on 10/1/1943: 9000 heavy tanks of the most modern types. Monthly production 1700.

Russian tank losses from 6/1941-10/1943: 52000. Creation of tactical tank formations for extensive tasks (thrust into the depth of the enemy’s terrain and destruction by envelopment) employment in the form of points of gravity.

Formations of special units on a large scale (A.T. regiments, mortar regiments).

Railway sabotage: July 1560, August 2121, September 2000 line demolitions with far-reaching effect on operations and evacuation transport.

Guerilla warfare: The purpose of this is to impede German supply, to make it impossible to use the land, to subvert the territorial formations, organize an armed popular rising, reconstruct the Party organization in occupied territory. Although losses in personnel have been high, remorseless exploitation of all the provisions in regard to fitness for service and extreme restrictions have brought about a gradual reinforcement of the Red Army (Lowest level on 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions today highest level as yet known 5.5 millions), in addition to this, continuous calling-up of replacements Ersatzgestellungen] and the creation of tactical winter reserves (approx. 50 divisions).

Total strength, of Russian formations: 327 rifle divisions 51 armored divisions

Own strength in the East: 200 German 10 Roumanian 6 Hungarian divisions4.183 million men

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op (H3/North No. 006650/43 TOP SECRET

Führer’s GHQ, 31.10.1943 3 copies

Subject: Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staffcopy

Length of Front: 2100 km (Distance of frontier of Reich to Moscow 900 Km., to Urals 2,300 Km.)

Terrain: Flat table land, swamp, and forest in the North, deeply indented (steppe ravines) in the South. Owing to the length of the front ratio of own strength does not admit of continuous line of positions as in the World War and makes it necessary to occupy by means of support points and mobile warfare, in which threats of defense therefore rather thin. Great difficulty in forming larger points of gravity. Where opposed by enemY concentrations own forces always locally inferior.

Russian infantry’s fighting value sunk to still lower level although their training noticeably improved; on the other hand their equipment with weapons is rapidly rising (automatic and heavy infantry weapons). Large-scale building up of Russian artillery. Monthly production 1200 guns.

Principles of employment: Fire concentration on narrow sector on the German pattern. For this, fresh formation of artillery brigades and artillery corps. Maximum employment of ammunition.

Armored troops: At the outbreak of war 21000, mostly light and out-of-date tanks. Strength on 10/1/1943, 9000 heavy tanks of the latest types. Monthly production 1700. Russian tank losses from 6/1941-10/1943: 52000. Creation of tactical armored formations for extensive tasks. (Thrust in depth and destruction by envelopment.) Employment by points of gravity.

Formation of special units on grand scale (A.T. regiments, mortar regiments).

Own Air Arm: Length of front in comparison with available forces makes it necessary to concentrate own air arm at the focal points. As a result it is unavoidable that on many sectors of our own land front own troops see little of the activities of their own air arm. However the air arm is there, in spite of this, and contributes very materially to the success of the defense.

The Russian air arm: remains as before far inferior to our own, but it must be admitted that its command, organization and equipment have greatly improved. The command is maneuverable and strict, organization admits of rapid displacement or follow-on of the formations. Specially unpleasant for our own troops on land is the new Russian battle aeroplane now appearing in large numbers. The Russian air arm is being employed almost exclusively in support of the army; so far operational employment has been quite secondary. Since 1941 the Soviet Russian Command has adapted itself to the principles of the German command. As against the principle “Not a step back!” of the year 1941, since the summer of 1942 tactical withdrawal movements have been the rule. The command has become more mobile, quickly seizes any moment of weakness and makes good use of initial successes. The situation with respect to communications is very bad (wide-meshed low efficiency rail and road system, during the mud season the roads cannot be used at all) so that it is difficult for us to move our reserves. Add to this steadily increasing sabotage on the railways: July 1560, August 2121, September 2000 line demolitions with great repercussions on operations and evacuation transport.

Guerilla warfare: Purpose is to impede German supply, prevent use of the lard, the organization of armed popular risings, reconstruction of the Party organizations in occupied territory.

In spite of high losses in personnel, remorseless exploitation of all provisions in regard to fitness for service and extreme restriction have made it possible gradually to reinforce the Red Army (lowest level 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions, present day highest level so far 5.5 millions); in addition continuous calling up of recruits and the formation of tactical winter reserves (approx. 50 divisions). Own strength in East [Div: 200 German 10 Roumanian 6 Hungarian] 4.183 million.

Munitions industry: Evacuation (methodically prepared for beforehand) made it possible by the summer of 1942 to return again to the production level of the previous period.

At the present time the Russian food situation cannot be regarded as likely to decide the fate of the war.

Economic losses due to the withdrawal of the front:

Pig iron products: 338000 tons Loss in coal production: 460000 tons Loss in grain and oil crops: 1.854 million tons Production of raw timber 6.2 fm Loss of steel products: 10000 tons Potatoes approx.: 1 million tons Meats and fats: 50000 tons Men fit for service: 677000

The Finnish front is the Northern abutment of the European system of defense. Outer wing of the East front and at the same time rear corner of the Norwegian front. Total length of front approx. 1400 km (2/3 of the total length of the East front), wide stretches of the front occupied by means of support points only.

Terrain: South-East: forest and swamp; North East: treeless and partly rocky Tundra.

Weather: Varies greatly over the area as a whole (Temperatures 1.11 from 8 to minus 18 degrees!), in the North long polar night, mud period is in considerable.

War Supply: Important nickel mines at Kolosjoki near Petsamo (32% of the European production).

Total number of inhabitants: 3.8 millions.

Tactical possibilities: Operations on a large scale impossible owing to absence of roads. High capacity lines--of communication for feeding an offensive are lacking (only-one in North-South direction as far as Rovaniemi branch line Eastward (Kandalaksha) still under construction. Only one high capacity trunk North-South road HelsinkiPetsamo). As against this on the Russian side the high capacity Murmansk railway.

Conduct of war therefore limited in the main to activities of assault troops and enterprises by Jaeger detachments. Fighting on the flanks and for roads of special importance. In spite of this owing to the length of the front strong own forces (20th Mountain Army 212000 men) formed of the best human material capable of standing up to the nature of the terrain are tied down to it. Own divisions in excellent fighting trim, fully equipped, trained as in peacetime, good body of officers.

With respect to air activity, on the whole very unfavorable conditions. Terrain affords few possibilities for laying out airfields. In winter time, owing to the short hours of daylight flying activities are very restricted. Supply in the purview of the air arm very difficult.

Our own air arm is highly superior in value to the Russian, as is regularly proved in all air battles fought in the course of Russian attacks on German convoys by the specially high numbers of aircraft brought down.

Coastal defense is equal to the Russian forces. Combined Anglo-American-Russian landing operations in the area of the Varanger fjordPorsangerfjord unlikely for political reasons. Collaboration with Finns (trained in forest and winter fighting) good, as before.

Protection of the North-West flank of Europe. Total length of front 2,500 km (about the same length as the East front). In part occupied only by support points. Some of the island unoccupied.

Terrain: Medium mountains and Alpine in nature, deeply indented by fjords and valleys.

War Supply: Transport of Swedish ore via Narvik (22 of the total European output).

The points of gravity of supply rests on communications by sea. Several good big ports and many small ones suitable for distribution traffic. Coastal areas suitable for enemy landings with limited objectives.

Operations: On land possible only with limited forces. Rails and road system very widely meshed, of low capacity and easily blocked (bridges, tunnels). These factors (plus the lack of larger harbors) greatly impeded British operations in 1940. Own forces in Norway number 380000. The main body of the 13 divisions occupied in coastal defense, partly permanently employed. (In Norway approx. 1000 guns over 10 cm. caliber employed in coastal defense).

Counterattack reserves: 1 Inf Div in central Norway, 1 Inf and 1 Armored divisions in South Norway.

Possibilities of action of our own air arm greatly dependent on the weather, especially in North Norway. Tactical activities directed in the first place above the sea against enemy ships. Possibilities with regard to laying out airfields limited owing to the nature of the terrain, supply difficult. Possibilities of action on the part of the enemy equally restricted owing to the great distance to their flying bases. In central and North Norway fighters can be employed only from aircraft carriers.

Navy: Important U-boat support points, berths for heavy naval fighting forces. Supplies for the Army Command depend on sea communications [illegible note in German script:

Key-position at entrance to Baltic, the possession of which would make possible extensive operations in the direction of Scandinavia as also in the direction of Germany and make it possible to influence the area of the Baltic.

Total length of front: approx 700 km.

Terrain: West coast little suited to landing operations on a grand scale (storms, surf), East Jutland and the Islands better adapted but improbable, owing to long approach routes and possibilities of defense.) Specially threatened by landings Ebsjerg (West Jutland) and Aalborg (North-West Jutland). Passable by armor almost everywhere. Air landings also possible off the air-fields which are very well laid out: Coast protected by support points. Coastal defense forces three divisions of very limited fighting value. In addition counterattack reserves. Reinforcements ordered. Conditions for the employment of own air forces are good. Communications good. Supply secured. Total strength of all formations of all branches of arms: 110000.

The defense of Denmark is largely determined by the attitude of Sweden.

Distribution: Chief of Armed Forces Operation Staff: 1st copy Deputy Chief/KTb: 2d copy Op/H): 3d copy

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op. H/South No. 006652/43 Very Secret

FÜHRER’S G.H.Q., 11/2/1943 3 draft copies draft copy

Material for the Lecture by the Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff on 11/7/1943 Position in Italy

1. Ground conditions: Along the front mountains, partly Alpine in character, only on the West and above all on the East coast rather less steep terrain. This makes it possible in places to cut out sectors in the Alpine area but also makes it necessary to employ strong Infantry forces in order to avoid infiltration. Troops movement along the front line very difficult. Good possibilities of blocking roads durably. Opponents, mainly Canadians, clever at making use of terrain.

In addition to the above conditions at the front (length approx. 150 Km.) the employment of own forces is also determined by the long coast lines on both sides (Total length approx. 1600 Km.). Besides landings directly behind our front the sectors mainly threatened are Genoa, La Spezia, Rome and the whole of the East coast South of Ravenna.

2. Next to ground configuration the factor determining tactical conditions in Italy is the tremendous [stricken in pencil] superiority of the opponent on land, in the air, and on the sea. This enables him to advance methodically, taking no undue risks, supported by repeated landings large and small directly behind our front. Strong enemy artillery active.

Absolute superiority in the air. In addition to heavy direct action on the troops, continued interference with communications, especially by rail, in the back areas. Troop movements and supply affected to a great depth in the Hinterland. River communications of enemy overseas practically undisturbed, as our own naval and air tactical forces are far too small.

3. In view of these conditions our own troops are confronted with immense task. In spite of the fact of our troops being hampered at the coast and in the back areas (total ration strength of all branches of arms with auxiliaries rather over 400000), we have so far contrived to delay the enemy advance very considerably and to keep down to a minimum our own losses in men and material since the islands were evacuated. This may be regarded as a success, as apart from his having gained a foothold in Europe proper up to the present the enemy has not gained any decisive tactical success. However it will not be possible in the near future to wrest the initiative from the enemy, he being in a position to supply and reinforce his formations in practically unlimited measure.

Own air armin a difficult position owing to the multiplicity of its duties and the vast extent of the tactical theaters of warmust confine itself to forming points of main effort.

Navy: Apart from employing a few U-boats and speed-boats, no great opportunities of becoming effective against the enemy.

4. Along the coastspreparations for defense.

5. In the Hinterland mopping up operations on considerable scale have been in progress for some time past in the guerilla infested areas of Slovenia and Istria influenced from the Balkans. When these operations have been concluded it will still be necessary to keep forces here to maintain pacification. The guerilla activities which break out again from time to time in several other areas are of no great importance. The Italians are not in a position to maintain law and order with their own forces. [Paragraph stricken in pencil.]

6. Disarmament of the Italians after some short and in some cases sharp fighting in spite of our being outnumbered (51 Italian divisions disarmed by 17 German divisions and 2 German brigades) also represents a thwarting of enemy plans which aimed at cutting off the German forces. [Paragraph stricken in pencil.]

7. The enrollment of Italian forces for service at present in progress in collaboration with the Italian Government is made more difficult by indifference and war-weariness. [Paragraph stricken in pencil.]

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op(H) South-East No. 006651/43

VERY SECRET FÜHRER’s GHQ, 1.11.1943 6 copies st copy

Material South-East for Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff on 7.11.1943

1. Importance of the South-East: Domination of the Balkans as an integral part of the Fortress of Europe is decisive from the point of view of winning the war for tactical, military-political and economic reasons.

The Balkan furnish:

50% of the total European production of mineral oil 100% of the total European production of chromium ore 60% of the total European production of bauxite 29% of the total European production of antimony 21% of the total European production of copper

2. Tactical possibilities: In view of a length of coast (with Crete and Rhodes) of approximately 4,200 km, equal to twice the distance from Leningrad to the Black Sea, the enemy, in the event of an attack on their own troops is confronted by two main directions of attack:

a. Making use of Southern Italy as jumping-off place for a landing on the Dalmatian coast.

b. After breaking through the island belt position in the Aegean, to advance on Saloniki and the Thracian coast.

This would afford the following advantages and disadvantage:

a. For the enemy:

Advantages: Support by the guerilla bands.

Disadvantage: The coast with the exception of the ports and river mouths is generally unsuitable for a landing (step coast, lagoons). After landing the terrain is generally speaking mountainous and sort of water, with a sparse system of roads and railways. Troops who presumably will be unused to fighting in the hills.

b. For own troops:

Advantages: The coast can be defended, generally speaking, merely by occupying the ports and river mouths. In the event of operations advancing, good opportunities for blocking and defense in the hills.

Disadvantages: Only a sparse road and rail system. Supply difficulties and poor conditions for moving reserves.

Grave danger from the air on all the few roads and mountain railway lines all of which possess many artificial constructions. (To Greece only one single-track line with capacity of 12 trains per day.)

Difficulties in supplying the many islands in the Aegean (own tonnage is lowshortage of naval tactical forcesonly a few Italian torpedo-boatsvery few security vessels. Ration strength on Crete 47000, on Rhodes 8000, and 30000 Italian military internee).

Further possible enemy operations from the European bridgehead of Turkey and operations against the Bulgarian-Roumanian Black Sea littoral would have to be taken into account should Turkey change the attitude of neutrality she has maintained up till now, or if the unfavorable position in the East should develop still further.

3. Present position:

Army: In the part of the Balkans occupied by ourselves, guerilla warfare is rife against bands of whom some are well-armedsupported by the Anglo-Saxons to a total strength of 140000-160000 men. The bands are all anti-German, but not in agreement among themselves. A distinction should be made between:

a. Croatia and Serbia:

aa. Communist bands under the command of Tito to a strength of about 90000.

bb. Chetnik’s under the command of Drazha Mihailovich to a strength of 30000.

b. Greece: Nationalist bands under the command of Zervas to a strength of 10000 men and approximately 15000 Communist.

For the defense against Anglo-Saxon attack and for putting down the guerilla bands we have at our disposal at the present time own forces to the strength of in all of 24 divisions [The words “21 divisions” struck out: pencil note in margin ‘612000 men’] with a total strength of 408000 men.

Landings in any strength during the winter are unlikely, that the main task of these forces is to put down the guerillas in order to be able in the spring of 1944, after having defeated and destroyed the larger bands, to employ the largest possible forces in coastal defense.

From the confederate forces stationed in the South-East area, with the exception o the Bulgarian formations who however are required for the defense of Bulgaria, no material assistance may be expected.

Air Arm: At the present time, in view of the great distance to their starting bases, the numerical superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air Arm has not yet become effective excepting in the Western Balkans where the fact that South Italy is occupied by the enemy is beginning to make itself felt.

4. In September units of 12 German divisions, in spite of some sharp resistance on the part of the Italian formations and great difficulties connected with the terrain, continued to disarm 25 Italian divisions, including Corps and Army units.

Up to the present in all 304,098 Italians (including 12,575 officers and 291,519 men) have been evacuated from the area High Command South-East.

Distribution: Chief of Armed Forces Operation Staff: 1st copy Deputy Chief: 2d copy Op (H) South East (army): 3d copy Op (L) (Air): 4th copy Op (M) (Navy): 5th copy KTb [?]: 6th copy

VERY SECRET

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op Army/WEST

FÜHRER’S GHQ, 11/2/1943 2 draft copies draft copy

Western Theater of War including the Netherlands and Belgium

Subject: Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff.

1. Terrain. In all 2100 km of coastal front on the Channel and the Atlantic and 500 km on the Mediterranean, whichin contradistinction to the coast in Norwayadmit of landings with modern resources.

The interior of the country presents no difficulties to the employment of all formations including tactical armored formations (Western Campaign).

Good system of communications, road and rail, highly-developed, enables own reserves to be moved quickly but will also aid the enemy should he continue to gain a footing.

Weather. Does not exclude landing with modern resources at any time of the year. However in the autumn and winter, storms may make a landing on the grand scale difficult since this requires continuous good weather at sea for some days. The possibilities of employing the air arm are sometimes restricted in the autumn and winter owing to presence of extensive fields of fog, particularly over England.

2. The enemy. The enemy possesses possible starting bases along an almost continuous circle from Eastern England via the USA, North Africa to Corsica and Sardinia with at some points shortest possible approach routes to the Continent. In all areas the opponent has at his disposal locally superior forces. The enemy formations are fresh and have gained experience in the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. He has developed his landing technique and tactics to a high level, so that we must now reckon at all timeswith the afore-mentioned reservationswith a landing on the grand scale.

Enemy Air Arm. Numerically greatly superior. Will enable the enemy both to defend his own forces and their supply and to effect the employment of air landing forces on a big scale.

Possibilities for the enemy. A demand on the part of Russians for the establishment of a Second Front in the West and the endeavor on the part of the Anglo-Americans to acquire more weight in opposition to the Russian political demands by gaining a thorough military success are the leading features of the position in the West. Successful penetration of the Western defenses would very soon break through to the Belgian, North-French and West-German industrial areas and so prove fatal. At the same time this operation would also cut off the U-boat support points in the Atlantic.

Even a minor enemy success involving the creation of a bridgehead would spell danger, since in view of the enemy’s superiority in equipment and personnel he would have no difficulty in extending this bridgehead into a breach of our defenses.

3. Our possibilities. The position as described makes it essential to repel and destroy the enemy before he can reach the coast. For this reasonconstruction of the Atlantic Wall. The work has been in hand for a long time; it is however impossible to provide a coastal front of 2,600 km. at all points with a system of fortifications in depth. Nevertheless the number of positions and built-in weapons is greater than any other construction as yet known, including the West Wall and the Maginot Line, for instance 2,692 guns of 7.5-cm. cal. up to the heaviest long range batteries, not counting the AA guns and the artillery of the employed divisions. [Illegible scribbled question in margin and note ‘5.3 millions.’] 2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons alone, not reckoning the equipment of the employed divisions. 8,449 installations of the permanent construction type have been handed over to the troops. [In pencil: In all … dbm concrete have been used in the construction].

A belt of fortifications of this type however has the effect of tying down considerable forces of one’s own. We have put in for this purpose fortress divisions, of which however, naturally, only a small proportion in each case can be effective against the enemy. Because of this it will be essential to have strong, mobile, and particularly well-equipped reserves in the West. Any weakening of these tactical reserves required in the West is a risk and will acutely endanger the situation as a whole.

However in the event of an attack in force in the West, even if the said tactical reserves are there, the forces at our disposal will not be adequate. [Pencilled note: 370000 men.] It will be necessary in this event which will decide the war to employ every German man able to bear arms, laying the home country largely bare.

4. Internal security. The British are continually trying to form organizations intended to engage in sabotaging the French industries working for the German munition industry and the lines of communication. They are supplied by air. The Army units employed in security duties, the SD [Security Service], and the French police, as well have been able to keep these organizations under control. In the period from the 20th to the 30th October alone these terrorists lost 12 dead and 380 prisoners.

Strong forces of the Ersatz Army have been transferred to France for the pacification of the country.

5. Disarmament of the 6 Italian divisions numbering approximately 50000 men employed along the coast of the Mediterranean is proceeding smoothly. The employment of units of 2 divisions proved sufficient to nip all will-to-resistance in the bud.

VERY SECRET

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op (Army) West

FÜHRER’s G.H.Q., 11/3/1943 4 copies 1 copy

Strength of Army Command West (to date 1/1/1943)

1. Employed in coastal defense: 27 divisions and 2 Rgt.

2. Employed in 2d line: 1 Inf Div. 2 Inf div being formed. 3 Tactical groups (I.D.) 1 Armored div. 3 Reserve armored divisions.

3 SS armored divisions, 4 Motorized divisions.: being formed

3. In addition 5 Reserve divisions

[total:] 46 Divisions plus 2 Regts.

4. New formations ordered (no formations HQs and cadres available as yet). 5 Inf divisions 3 Parachute division 1 SS motorized division [total:] 7 divisions

5. Ration strength (without armed forces auxiliaries and PWs)1370708.

Ration strength including armed forces auxiliaries and PW’s-1708990.

Distribution:

Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff: 1st copy. Deputy Chief: 2d copy. Op (Army)/West: 3d copy. KTb [?]: 4th copy.

How are the resources of our opponents distributed at the present time, and what are his strategic and tactical intentions likely to be?

England, America, Mediterranean, Far East: separate appendixes

It was doubtful for a time whether the enemy would not transfer his point of gravity to the Far East. This assumption proved wrong. The main mass of the British-American formations capable of employment is undoubtedly in the Mediterranean. Consequently we must reckon in every event with the continuation of the operations there. The only questions remaining open are: in what direction and on what scale ? The supplies observed passing through the straits of Gibraltar per month amount to approx. 1.8 million tons, of which approx. 300000 tons go through the Suez Canal to the Far East. This leaves approx. 1. million tons for the Mediterranean to be divided between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. That is not much more than is required for normal supply. Presumably therefore it is not proposed to send any new and stronger forces to the Mediterranean.

Distribution of the American Army

16 Inf divisions. 3 Armored divisions. 3 Armored brigades. 3 Airborne divisions. 7 Mixed brigades.

29 Inf divisions. 10 Armored divisions. 1 Airborne division.

14 Inf divisions. 2 Marine infantry divisions. 1 Armored brigade. 2 Mixed brigades.

Strength of the forces in Great Britain suitable for employment in attacking operations

40-41 Infantry divisions (of whom 4-5 Americans). 4 Independent Inf brigades. 9 Armored divisions. 11 Armored brigades (of whom 1 American). 2 Airborne divisions. 7 Paratroop battalions (of whom 3 Americans).

Of these employed in South-East and South England only, in direct proximity to the starting ports:

18 Infantry divisions. 2 Infantry brigades. 1 Airborne division. 8 Armored divisions. 4 Army armored brigades.

In addition about 1000 2-4 engined transport aircraft are able to put in approx. 20000 airborne troops.

It is also possible to reckon with the employment of approx. 20000 paratroops.

Troop transport and landing boat tonnage is available for at least 11-12 infantry divisions and 1-2 armored divisions.

The forces and resources at the disposal of the enemy are already sufficient for a large-scale operation intended to force the issue on the Continent. These forces and resources will presumably be reinforced still further in the course of the next few months.

Distribution of British Forces

10 Infantry divisions. 2 Armored divisions. 3 Armored brigades. 1 Airborne division. 5 Commandos.

Western Mediterranean (Gibraltar: garrison approx. 20000):

3 Infantry divisions. 2 Armored divisions. 2 Armored brigades. 1 Airborne division.

Middle East and Near East:

15 Infantry divisions and 4 Polish Infantry divisions. in all 19. 4 Inf brigades and 2 Greek 1 Czech 1 Yugoslav brigades in all 8. 5 Armored divisions. 5 Armored brigades. 1 Paratroop division.

[] According to my experience, there is yet another anxiety stalking the land. It concerns the morale of our own Allies and the fear that yet other, as yet neutral states, might join the ranks of our enemies. At this point, of course, I enter upon the ticklish question of foreign policy which is not my business and which I will traverse as speedily as possible.

Of the neutral countries, we are not loved by Sweden and Switzerland. The latter is surrounded, of no danger to us from the military point of view, and will not harm us. She lives on our bounty and benefit from her.

The same does not apply to Sweden. In the last few years she has been arming hard, and possesses 12-14 Infantry divisions, 3-4 armored brigades, and in addition a few cyclist brigades, in all 400000 men under arms. Sweden sways between fear of Bolshevism and hope of British-American aid. This latter is far away for as long as we in the Skagerrak cut off Sweden’s contact with England.

Should an enemy landing in Norway or Denmark prove successful, Sweden may become dangerous but not before.

Spain and Portugal have decided to remain neutral. They have not the necessary strength to defend themselves against England and America. Everything depends therefore on the good will of our Western opponents as to the measure in which they recognize this neutrality. Latest events in Portugal have shown this. I do not believe however that it is in the interest of the Anglo-Saxons either for political or military reasons to unleash war on the Iberian Peninsula and that is what would undoubtedly happen were Spain to be attacked. Whether the simpler methods of political disintegration which are at present being employed will be successful is doubtful, at all events in the case of Spain.

Turkey so far has maintained a clear policy of neutrality. Its ideal would have been agreement between England and Germany and consequently reliable security against her traditional enemy: Russia. However, the closer the Soviet Power approaches the Balkans, and the more Englandin order to win the war enters into the tow of the Bolshevists, the more difficult the position of Turkey becomes, for against Soviet Russia and England she cannot possibly maintain her neutrality. Attack by surprise on the part of Turkey against the Axis powers is not to be expected. No more likely however is it that England should allow the Dardanelles to pass into the hands of Soviet Russia and so lose her own safety in the Mediterranean which is her aim. Nevertheless even if England were merely to occupy the Dardanelles, this would at once be regarded by the Soviets as a hostile act. Turkey’s future attitude is dominated by this problem of ‘Haute Politique.’ She is able to maintain her neutrality thanks to the diverging interests of Soviet Russia and the Western Powers. Expansionist plans she has none, not even against Bulgaria.

Our own Allies on the other hand are united and kept at our side by the fear of Bolshevism. That is understandable, for no people fights for another but only for its own existence.

Concerning the internal morale of Finland and Bulgaria there can be no doubt.

Roumania contains two worlds, the rigorous policy faithful to the alliance with us looks two ways. We must be clear with ourselves as to that.

In Hungary, as a feudal state on the old pattern, social contrasts are still present in their acute form. The country is therefore particularly liable to infection with the Communist idea. In no city in Europe however does this fact appear to be less recognized than in Budapest. In that city a dissolute and strongly Judaified society strata is living and dancing on a volcano. However in contradistinction to Italy, here the main mass of the officer caste at least has recognized the danger. For the present at all events for Hungary there is no political way out.

Japan: There a heroic people is fighting decisively for its existence just as we are. From the political-strategic point of view a great gap yawns in the Far East in the clear line of the fronts. Roosevelt and Churchill want Russia to join in the fight against Japan. We ourselves, from the purely military point of view, would be glad to see the Manchurian Armies cross the Amur or advance against Vladivostok. But on this point both the Asiatic powers stop their ears to the siren songs of the West. The reasons for this do not lie solely in the supplementary military burdens which both States would have to take upon themselves by such a decision, but more probably in their own long-term political considerations. For why should Japan start a war against Russia for as long as it can be certain that there will be no American-British air base at Vladivostok and while on the distant horizon there still looms large a conflict of the Western powers against Soviet Russia?

Leaving the slippery ground of politics, I now turn to the problem which confronts the High Command today and will confront; it in the near future. We are fighting along the inner line, that is, we are in a position to transfer strong forces from one theater of war to another in a much shorter time. Our great successes in the East in 1917/18 and in Italy in 1917 we owe to able exploitation of the inner line. Today this tactical advantage of the inner line is not so marked; at the moment the enemy is so strong on all fronts that in spite of our shorter lines of communication we are scarcely in a position to produce more than local superiority. This state of affairs may change if the Anglo-Saxons steps to form a second or third front in addition to the Italian. At the present time, however, the hardest task of all of the Command is to distribute its forces throughout the theater of war as a whole in such a way that we may be sufficiently strong at those points at which the enemy delivers the low. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that we are not in a position rapidly to reinforce the South-East, or Finland, or Norway, because the necessary technical facilities-are not present there. We have won advanced position-s in Finland, Norway, Denmark, in the West, in Italy and in the South-East in order to keep the core of the Reich itself alive. The same reasons which compelled us to take these positions also compel us now, at this particular time, when the superior range of the enemy air arm is inflicting grave injury to the center of the Reich, to maintain them. To do so a certain measure of strength is necessary. That things are getting warm on the East front, must be admitted; however no success gained by the enemy is directly fatal there, with the exception of the loss of the Roumanian oil region. None the less the Command cannot close its eyes to the fact that the brand is now held in readiness at some time or other to start a conflagration in the West which if not extinguished then and there will pass beyond control.

It is at this point the various fronts ceaselessly drag on the nerves and decisions of the Führer. Stegemann once put this into words as follows: “In war there is always the same conflict: the swing between spending and saving the forces accumulated. This has been and still is a problem not easy to solve. War with its unpredictabilities, its intangible dynamics, and its fluctuations of luck and chance cannot be determined beforehand. He who expends everything on one throw may later on, as the result of circumstances, be left with empty hands, and he who expends his accumulated forces sparingly may, as the result of circumstances, never come to win the upper hand. Only he who is able to solve this problem is able to master war. One thing however has always been so, namely, that whatever may be done must be done with all one’s might if it is to pay. That is the only rule which in war has never failed.”

Where the enemy will strike to obtain that decision, we do not know. He has a jumping-off base in the Mediterranean and a jumping-off base in England.

No theater of war can be weakened below a certain level. Our uttermost efforts can therefore only take the form of creating, in spite of all our manpower problems, new tactical central reserves over and above the necessary minimum of occupying forces. That is now being done. (Appendix.)

This however brings us to the next difficult problem which always arises in every long war: the inter-play and conflict between the need for soldiers at the front and the need for workers at home. Never before has this problem presented itself in so acute a form as in this highly mechanized war. Herewith a few figures. (Appendix.)

How therefore is the Command to decide? The front needs soldiers and the front needs weapons. Many weapons, and the better weapons the higher the value attached to the life of the fighting man himself.

If we had not the Führer at the head with sovereign rights of decision there would be black murder done on this question. One thing however is sure: it is a crime to keep a man able to bear arms working at home if he can be replaced by some other worker or if his work is not vital. Fortunately Italy’s betrayal has its good side in this question. The flow of military internees and workers from Italy will afford considerable relief in this domain.

This dilemma of manpower shortage has led to the idea of making more thorough use of the manpower reserves in the territories occupied by us. Here right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up together. I believe that in so far as concerns labor, everything has been done that could be done. But where this has not yet been achieved, it appeared to be more favorable politically not to have recourse to measures of compulsion, exchanging for these order and economic aid. In my opinion however the time has now come to take steps with remorseless vigor and resolution in Denmark, Holland, France, and Belgium also to compel thousands of idle ones [Nichtstuer] to carry out the fortification work which is more important than any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been given.

The question of recruiting alien peoples as fighting men should however be examined with the greatest caution and skepticism. There was a time when something in the nature of a neurosis emanated from the East Front with the slogan “Russia can be conquered only by Russians.” [In the typescript the word was typed as ‘liberated.’ This has been scratched out in favor of ‘conquered.’] Many heads were haunted by the notion of an immense Vlasjov army. At that time we recruited over 160 battalions. Our experiences were good while we were ourselves,-attacking successfully. They became bad when the position changed for the worse and we were compelled to retreat. Today only about 100 Eastern battalions are available and hardly one of these is in the East. One Cossack and one Turkmen division are at the moment undergoing their test by fire in the South-East. At the moment the Reichsführer of the SS is engaged in draining the defensive resources of Estonia and Latvia as well as the Croatian, Moslem, and Macedonian manpower supplies.

However, what weighs most heavily today on the home front, and consequently by reaction on the front line also