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7. THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES.
In one respect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces is to be distinguished from the other groups and organizations against which the prosecution seeks declaration of criminality. The Leadership Corps of the NSDAP, for example, was the instrument by which Hitlerism rose to full power in Germany. The SA and the SS were branches-large branches to be sure-of the Nazi Party. The German police had certain roots and antecedents which antedated Hitlerism, but was almost entirely a creature of the party and the SS. The Reichs Cabinet was in essence, merely a committee or set of committees of Reichs Ministers, and when the Nazis came to power these ministerial positions were filled for the most part by Nazis. All those groups and organizations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to Naziism, or automatically became nazified when Hitler came to full power.
That is not true of this group, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. It is common knowledge that German armed might and the German military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many decades. The war of 1914-18, the Kaiser, and the “scrap of paper” are modern witnesses to this fact.
As a result of the German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles, the size and activities of the German armed forces were severely restricted. The last few years have made it abundantly apparent that these restrictions did not destroy or even seriously undermine German militarism. The full flowering of German military strength came about through collaboration between the Nazis and the career leaders of the German Armed Forces-the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen. When Hitler came to power in 1933, he did not find a vacuum in the field of military affairs; he found a small Reichswehr and a body of professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German military history.
The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in the Indictment-the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men. Needless to say, it is not the prosecution’s position that it is a crime to be a soldier or sailor, or to serve one’s country as a soldier or sailor in time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one, and can be honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man who commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in uniform.
It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the prosecution’s position, that all members of this group were wicked men, or that they were all equally culpable. But this group not only collaborated with Hitler and supported many Nazi objectives. They furnished one thing which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program for Germany-skill and experience in the development and use of armed might.
Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? The answer is simple. The answer is that they agreed with the basic objectives of Naziism, and that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a major part in achieving those objectives. The generals, like Hitler, wanted Germany to aggrandize at the expense of neighboring countries, and to do so if necessary by force or threat of force. Force-armed might-was the keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would have been possible.
As they came to power and when they had attained power, the Nazis had two alternatives: to collaborate with and expand the Reichswehr, or to ignore the Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The generals feared that the Nazis might do the latter. So they were the more ready to play along with the Nazis. Moreover, the Nazis offered the generals the chance of achieving much that the generals wished to achieve in the expansion of German armies and frontiers. And so the generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon. They saw it was going in their direction for the present. No doubt they hoped later to take over the direction themselves. In fact, it was ultimately they who were taken over by the Nazis. Hitler attracted the generals to him with the glitter of conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically. As the war proceeded they became his tools.
But if the leaders of the Armed Forces became the tools of Naziism, it is not to be supposed that they were unwitting, or that they did not participate fully in many of the actions which are charged as criminal. The willingness, indeed eagerness, of German officers to become partners of the Nazis will be fully developed.
A. Composition and Functions of The General Staff and High Command Group.
During the first World War there was an organization in the German Armed Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name persists in the public mind, but the Grosse Generalstab no longer exists in fact. There has been no such single organization, no single German General Staff, since 1918. But there has of course been a group of men responsible for the policy and acts of the Armed Forces. The fact that these men have no collective name does not prevent us from collecting them together. Men cannot escape the consequences of their collective acts by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a general staff or a high command lies not in name but in function. And the men comprised within this group do constitute a functional group, welded together by common responsibility, of those officers who had the principal authority and responsibility under Hitler, for the plans and operations of the German armed forces.
(1) Structure and Organization of the German Armed Forces. When the Nazis came to power in 1933 the German Armed Forces were controlled by a Reich Defense Minister, at that time Field Marshall von Blomberg. Subordinate to von Blomberg were the chiefs of the army staff (at that time von Fritsch), and of the naval staff, the defendant Raeder. Owing to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the German Air Force at that time had no official existence whatsoever.
In May 1935, at the time that military conscription was introduced in Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices but the structure remained basically the same. Field Marshall von Blomberg remained in supreme command of the armed forces, with the title of Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch became Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The army and naval staff were renamed “High Commands"-Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, from which are derived the initials by which they are usually known (OKH and OKM).
The German Air Force came into official and open existence at about this same time, but it was not put under von Blomberg. It was an independent institution under the personal command of Goering, who had the double title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
In February 1938 a rather fundamental reorganization took place, both in terms of personnel and organizational structure. Although Raeder survived the reshuffle, von Blomberg and von Fritsch were both retired from their positions, and Blomberg’s ministry, the War Ministry, was wound up. This ministry had contained a division or department called the Wehrmachtamt or “Armed Forces Department,” the function of which was to coordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From this Armed Forces Department was formed a new over-all Armed Forces authority, known as the High Command of the Armed Forces-Oberkommando der Wehrmacht-usually known by the initials OKW. As the Air Force as well as the Army and the Navy was subordinated to OKW, coordination of all Armed Forces matters was vested in the OKW, which was in effect Hitler’s personal staff for these matters. It combined staff and ministerial functions. Keitel was appointed chief of the OKW. The most important department of OKW was the operations staff, of which Jodl became the chief. Jodl’s immediate subordinate was Warlimont, with the title of Deputy Chief of The Armed Forces Operations Staff from 1941. (The genesis of this department is explained in L-79.)
This reorganization and establishment of OKW were embodied in a decree issued by Hitler on 4 February 1938 (1938 RGBl., Part I, page 111):
“DECREE ON THE COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES
“Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from now on exercised directly by me personally.
“The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry with its functions becomes 'The High Command of the Armed Forces' and comes directly under my command as my military staff.
“The head of the Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces is the Chief of the former Armed Forces Department, with the title of Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. His status is equal to that of Reich Minister.
“The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the affairs of the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces as my representative exercises the functions hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister.
“The High Command of the Armed Forces is responsible in peace time for the unified preparation of the defense of the Reich in all areas according to my directives.
“Berlin, 4 February 1938.
“The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor “(S) Adolf Hitler
“The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery “(S) Dr. Lammers
“Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces “(S) Keitel”
Under OKW were the supreme commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces: OKH, OKM, and the Air Force, which did not receive the official designation of Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) until 1944. Raeder remained after 1938 as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and von Fritsch was replaced by von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Goering continued as Commandeer-in-Chief of the Air Force. In 1941 von Brauchitsch was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Army by Hitler himself, and Raeder was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy by Doenitz early in 1943. Goering continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force until the last month of the war, when he was replaced by von Greim.
OKW, OKH, OKM, and the Air Force each had its own staff. These four staffs did not have uniform designations; in the case of OKH, the staff was known as the Generalstab (General Staff); in the case of OKW, it was known as the Fuehrungstab (Operations Staff); but in all cases the functions were those of a General Staff in military parlance. It will be seen, therefore, that there was in this war no single German General Staff, but rather four, one for each branch of the service plus one for the OKW as the over-all interservice supreme command.
Under OKH, OKL, and OKM were the various fighting formations of the Army, Air Force and Navy respectively. The largest army field formation was known to the Germans, as it is among the nations generally, as an “army group". An Army group was a headquarters controlling two or more “armies.” In some cases, e.g. in the campaigns in Norway and Greece where only one army was used, “armies” were directly subordinated to OKH, rather than to an “army group.” Under the armies come the lower field formations such as corps, divisions, regiments, etc.
In the case of the German Air Force (OKL), the largest formation was known as an “air fleet” (Luftflotte) and the lower units under the air fleet were called “corps” (Fliegerkorps or Jagdkorps) or “divisions” (Fliegerdivisionen or Jagddivisionen).
Under OKM were the various “naval group commands,” which controlled all naval operations in a given area, with the exception of the operation of the high seas fleet and the submarines, which by their nature, were too mobile to be restricted to an area command. The Commanders of the fleet and submarines, and certain other specialized units, were directly subordinate to the German Admiralty.
(2) Composition of the Group Charged as Criminal. The group charged in the Indictment (Appendix B) as criminal comprises, first, German officers who held the top positions in the four supreme commands described above, and second, the officers who held the top field commands.
The holders of nine of the principal positions in the supreme commands are included in the group. Four of these are positions of supreme authority: the chief of the OKW, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. Four other positions are those of the Chiefs of Staff to the four Commanders-in-Chief: the Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of the Naval War Staff. The ninth position is that of Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW. The particular responsibility of the holder of this office was planning, and for this reason his office has been included in the group.
The group named in the Indictment comprises all individuals who held any of these nine staff positions between February 1938 and the end of the war in May 1945. February 1938 was selected as the opening date because it was in that month that the top organization of the German Armed Forces was reorganized and assumed substantially the form in which it persisted up to the end of the war. Twenty-two different individuals occupied these nine positions during that period, of whom eighteen are still living.
With regard to the officers who held the principal field commands, the Indictment includes as members of the group all Commanders-in-Chief in the field who had the status of Oberbefehlshaber in the Army, Navy, or Air Force. The term Oberbefehlshaber defies literal translation into English: literally the components of the word mean “over-command-holder,” and it is perhaps best translated as Commander-in-Chief. In the case of the Army, commanders of army groups and armies always had the status and title of Oberbefehlshaber. In the Air Force, the Commander-in-Chief of air fleets always had the status of Oberbefehlshaber, although they were not formally so designated until 1944. In the Navy, officers holding the senior regional commands, and therefore in control of all naval operations (other than of the high seas fleet itself) in a given sector, had the status of Oberbefehlshaber. Roughly 110 individual officers had the status of Oberbefehlshaber in the Army, Navy, or Air Force during the period in question, and all but approximately a dozen of them are still alive.
The entire General Staff and High Command group as defined in the Indictment comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed still to be living. These figures are the cumulative total of all officers who at any time belonged to the group during the seven years and three months from February 1938 to May 1945. The number of active members of the group at any one time is, of course, much smaller; it rose from about 20 at the outbreak of the war to 50 in 1944 and 1945.
The structure and functioning of the German General Staff and High Command group have been described in a series of affidavits by some of the principal German field marshalls and generals. A brief description of how these statements were obtained may be helpful. In the first place two American officers, selected for ability and experience in interrogating high-ranking German prisoners of war, were briefed by an Intelligence officer and a trial counsel on the particular problems presented by this part of the case. These interrogators were already well versed in military intelligence and were able to converse fluently in German. The officer who briefed these interrogators emphasized that their function was objectively to inquire into and to establish facts on which the prosecution wishes to be accurately and surely informed; the interrogators were not to regard themselves as cross-examiners. The German officers to be interrogated were selected on the basis of the special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of positions held by them during the past generation. After each interview the interrogator prepared a report. From this report such facts as appeared relevant to the issues now before the Tribunal were extracted and a statement embodying these facts was prepared. This statement was then presented to the officer at a later interview. It was presented in the form of a draft and the officer was asked whether it truly reproduced what he said at the previous interview. He was also invited to alter it in any way he thought fit. This careful and laborious, but necessary, process had as its object the procuring of the best possible testimony in the form of carefully considered statements.
These affidavits fully support the prosecution’s description of the group, and conclusively establish that this group of officers was in fact the group which had the major responsibility for planning and directing the operations of the German Armed Forces.
The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Halder (3702-PS), who held the rank of Generaloberst (Colonel General), the equivalent of a four-star general in the American Army. Halder was chief of the General Staff of OKH from September 1938 to September 1942 and is, accordingly, a member of the group. His statement reads:
“Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the Head of State who prior to 2 August 1934 was Field Marshall von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945 was Adolf Hitler.
“Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State), that is to say the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision in their official capacity and by virtue of their training, their positions and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the instructions of the OKW in the name of their respective Commanding Officers and were presented by them to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State).
“The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of preparing for military operations within their competent fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as were to be undertaken by troops in the field.
“Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and given appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign. The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. This was in effect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.” “(S) Halder” (3702-PS)
A substantially identical statement (3703-PS) was made by von Brauchitsch, who held the rank of Field Marshall, and who was Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941. Von Brauchitsch was also, therefore, a member of the group. The only difference between the two statements is worth noting occurs in the last sentence of each. Halder states that the group described in the Indictment “was in effect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces,” (3702-PS), whereas von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently, saying “in the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.” (3703-PS)
Both von Brauchitsch and Halder have stated under oath that the General Staff chart (Chart Number 7) accurately portrays the top organization of the German Armed Forces. The statements by von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the prosecution’s statement that the holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters.
Another affidavit by Halder (3707-PS) sets forth certain less important matters of detail:
“The most important department in the OKW was the Operations Staff-in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in status with Jodl, but in the planning and conduct of military affairs they and their departments were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl’s staff.
“The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was chief. It was called the 'National Defense' Section and was primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.
“There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.
“Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out by the group of high-ranking officers described in my Statement of 7 November (in the Army: 'General Staff of the Army'; in the Air Force 'General Staff of the Air Force').
“Operational matters in the Navy were even in World War I not worked out by the 'Great General Staff' but by the Naval Staff.” “(Signed) Franz Halder” (3707-PS)
This affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General Staff of the four Commanders of OKW, OKL, OKM, and OKH and fully supports the inclusion of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services in the indicted group, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff, with his strategic planning responsibilities.
An affidavit (3708-PS) by the son of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, who had the rank of Oberst (Colonel) in the German Air Force, and who was personal aide to Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, furnishes a few details on the Luftwaffe:
“Luftflottenchefs have the same status as the Oberbefehlshaber of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority and accordingly exercised no territorial jurisdiction.
“They were the highest troop commanders of the air force units subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
“Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation 'Befehlshaber' and from then on that of 'Oberbefehlshaber.' This change of designation carried with it no change in the functions and responsibilities which they previously had.” “(Signed) Brauchitsch” (3708-PS)
(3) Functioning of the General Staff and High Command Group. In many respects, the German military leaders functioned in the same general manner as obtains in the military establishments of other large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants at OKW, OKH, OKL, and OKM, in collaboration with the field generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the highest level, and the making of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions as well as purely military considerations. When the decision was made, to attack Poland, for example, the top staff officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the Commanders of the Army groups and Armies who were to be in charge of the campaign. Consultation would follow between the top field commanders and the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, and the plans would be revised, perfected, and refined in detail.
The manner in which the group worked, involving as it did the interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers at OKW and OKH and the principal field commanders, is graphically described in two affidavits by Field Marshall von Brauchitsch (3705-PS):
“STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945
“In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him as amended by a change which he desired.
“After the operational and deployment orders had been given to the two Commanders of the army groups and the five Commanders of the armies, conferences took place with them about details in order to hear their desires and recommendations.
“After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch with the Commanders-in-Chief of army groups and of armies by personal visits to their headquarters as well as by telephone, teletype or wireless. In this way I was able to obtain their advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In fact it was the accepted policy and common practice for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate Commanders-in-Chief and to maintain a constant exchange of ideas with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff communicated with army groups and, thru them as well as directly, with armies; thru army groups on strategical and tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and the administration of conquered territory occupied by these armies. An army group had no territorial jurisdiction. It had a relatively small staff which was concerned only with military operations. In all territorial matters it was the Commander-in-Chief of the army and not of the army group who exercised jurisdiction. “(Signed) von Brauchitsch” (3705-PS)
“SUPPLEMENT TO MY STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945
“When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of his political objectives through military pressure or through the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.
“Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the OKM. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies involved. Details of the operational and deployment plans were discussed by the OKH with the Commanders of the army groups and armies and with the Chiefs of Staff of these Commanders.
“During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio and courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the Commanders of army groups, armies and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them. In the war against Russia the Commanders of army groups and of armies were individually and repeatedly called in by Hitler for consultation.
“Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army groups and for all matters concerning supply and territorial jurisdiction from the OKH directly to the armies.” “(Signed) von Brauchitsch” (3705-PS)
The Oberbefehlshaber in the field, therefore-and in the case of the army that means the Commander-in-Chief of army groups and armies-participated in planning, and directed the execution of the plans. The Oberbefehlshaber were also the repositories of general executive power in the areas in which their army groups and armies were operating. This fact appears from a directive of 13 March 1941 signed by Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (447-PS). This directive sets out various regulations for the impending operations against the Soviet Union (which were actually begun on 22 June 1941). Under paragraph I, is entitled “Area of operations and executive power (Vollziehende Gewalt)", subparagraph 1 and 2(a) provide:
“It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General-Government an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Commander in Chief of the Army small be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief [Oberbefehlshaber] of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.”
“The area of operations created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power [Vollziehende Gewalt] in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief [Oberbefehlshaber] of the Army Groups and Armies.” (447-PS)
The official command invitation to participate in consultations at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941, eight days prior to the German attack on the Soviet Union, also shows the group at work (C-78). This meeting is referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavits by Halder (3702-PS) and von Brauchitsch (3703-PS) mentioned above. This document, signed by Colonel Schmundt, Chief Wehrmacht-Adjutant to Hitler, and is dated at Berchtesgaden, 9 June 1941, begins:
“Re: Conference 'Barbarossa'
“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on Barbarossa [the code name for the invasion of the U.S.S.R.] by the Commanders of Army Groups and Armies and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.”
This document likewise includes a list of the participants in this conference which closely parallels the structure of the group as set forth in the Indictment. The list includes General Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and a member of the group; and General Halder, who was chief of the Army Staff, and a member of the group. Then there are three subordinates who were not members of the group: Paulus, Heusinger, and Gyldenfeldt. Next is navy Captain Wagner, who was chief of the Operations Staff, Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, not a member of the group. On the air side there were General Milch, State Secretary and Inspector of the Air Force, again not a member of the group; General Jeschonnek, chief of the General Staff of the Air Force and a member of the group; and two of his assistants. Passing to the OKW, High Command of the Armed Forces, we find that Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, all members of the group, were present, with an assistant from the General Staff. Then there were four officers from the office of the adjutant, who were not members of the group. Present from the Field Commanders were General von Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway, member of the group; General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5, member of the group; Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stuelpnagel, Schobert, Kleist, all from the Army, all members of the group. Of the Air Force officers present, General Loehr, Air Fleet 4, was a member of the group; General Fromm and general Udet were not members. One was director of the Home Forces, commander of the Home Forces, and the other the Director General of Equipment and Supply. Turning to the Navy, those present were Raeder, a member of the group; Fricke, chief of the Naval War Staff, and a member of the group; and an assistant who was not a member, Carls, Navy Group North, member of the group, and likewise Schmundt were present. Then from the Army, Leeb, Busch, Kuechler, all members of the group as Oberbefehlshaber, and Keller, a member of the group, were present. Also Bock, Kluge, Strauss, Guderian, Hoth, Kesselring, all members of the group, were present. It will be seen that, except for a few assisting officers of relatively junior rank, all the participants in these consultations were members of the group, and that in fact the participants in these consultations included the members of the group who were concerned in the impending operations against the Soviet Union.
B. Criminal Activities of the General Staff and High Command Group.
The General Staff and High Command group is well represented among the individual defendants in this case. It must be kept in mind that this group may be declared criminal in connection with any act of which an individual defendant who is a member of the group may be convicted (Charter, Article 9). Five of the individual defendants, or one-quarter of the total number accused, are members of this group.
In the order of listing in the indictments, the first is Goering. Goering is a defendant in this case in numerous capacities. He is a member of the General Staff and High Command group by reason of having been the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force from the time when the Air Force first came into the open, and was officially established, until about a month prior to the end of the war. During the last month of the war he was replaced in this capacity by von Greim, who committed suicide shortly after his capture at the end of the war. Goering is charged with crimes under all counts of the Indictment.
The next listed defendant who is a member of the group is Keitel. He and the remaining three defendants who are members of the group are all four in this case primarily or solely in their military capacities, and all four of them were professional soldiers or sailors. Keitel was made the chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) when the OKW was first set up in 1938, and remained in that capacity throughout the period in question. He held the rank of Field Marshall throughout most of this period, and in addition to being the Chief of OKW, he was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich. Keitel is charged with crimes under all four courts of the Indictment.
The defendant Jodl was a career soldier; he was an Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) when the Nazis came to power, and ultimately attained the rank of Generaloberst (Colonel General). He became the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht, and continued in that capacity throughout the war. He also is charged with crimes under all four counts of the Indictment.
The defendant Raeder is in a sense the senior member of the entire group, having been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy as early as 1928. He attained the highest rank in the German Navy, Grossadmiral, and in addition to being Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. He retired from Supreme Command of the Navy in January 1943, and was replaced by Doenitz. Raeder is charged with crimes under counts 1,2, and 3 of the Indictment.
The last of these five defendants, Doenitz, was a relatively junior officer when the Nazis came to power. During the early years of the Nazi regime he specialized in submarine activities and was in command of the U-boat arm when the war broke out. He rose steadily in the Navy and was chosen to succeed Raeder when the latter retired in 1943. Doenitz then became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and attained the rank of Grossadmiral. When the German Armed Forces collapsed near the end of the war, Doenitz succeeded Hitler as head of the German government. He is charged with crimes under counts 1,2, and 3 of the Indictment.
Four of these five defendants are reasonably typical of the group as a whole. Goering is an exception: he is primarily a Nazi party politician nourishing a hobby for aviation as a result of his career in 1914-18. But the others made soldiering or sailoring their life work. They collaborated with and joined in the most important adventures of the Nazis, but they were not among the early party members. They differ in no essential respect from the other 125 odd members of the group. They are, no doubt, abler men in certain respects than some of the other members, as they rose to the highest positions in the German Armed Forces, and all but Jodl attained the highest rank. But they are generally representative of the group, and their expressed ideas and actions are fairly characteristic of those of the other group members.
It is not, of course, the prosecution’s position, and it is not essential to its case, that all 130 members of this group, (or all the members of any other organization or group named in the Indictment), actually committed crimes, under Article 6 of the Charter. It is the prosecution’s position that the leadership of the group and the purposes to which the group was committed by the leaders were criminal under Article 6. The individual defendants were among the leaders of the General Staff and High Command group, and, acting in the official capacities which made them members of the group, they performed and participated in acts which are criminal under Article 6 of the Charter. Other members of the group performed such acts. The German Armed Forces were so completely under the group’s control as to make the group responsible for their activities under the last sentence of Article 6 of the Charter.
(1) The Planning and Launching of Wars of Aggression. It is, of course, the normal function of a military staff to prepare military plans. In peacetime, military staffs customarily concern themselves with the preparation of plans of attack or defense based on hypothetical contingencies. There is nothing criminal about carrying on such exercises or preparing such plans. That is not what these defendants and this group are charged with.
This group agreed with the Nazi objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force. They joined knowingly and enthusiastically in developing German armed might for this criminal purpose. They joined knowingly and willfully in initiating and waging aggressive wars. They were advised in advance of the Nazi plans to launch aggressive wars. They laid the military plans and directed the initiation and carrying on of the wars. These things are criminal under article 6 of the Charter.
Aggressive war cannot be prepared and waged without intense activity on the part of all branches of the Armed Forces and particularly by the high-ranking officers who control such forces. To the extent, therefore, that German preparations for and waging of aggressive war are historical facts of common knowledge, or are proved, it necessarily follows that the General Staff and High Command group, and the German Armed Forces, participated therein.
This is so notwithstanding the effort on the part of certain military leaders of Germany, after defeat, to insist that until the troops marched they lived in an ivory tower of military technicalities, unable or unwilling to observe the end to which their work led. The documentary evidence which follows fully refutes any such contentions.
The purposes and objectives of the German General Staff and High Command group during the period prior to the absorption of Austria may be summarized as follows:
(i) Secret rearmament, including the training of military personnel, the production of war munitions, and the building of an air force;
(ii) The creation of a military air force, announced by Goering on 10 March 1935;
(iii) The law for compulsory military service, of 16 March 1935, fixing the peace-time strength of the German Army at 500,000; and
(iv) The reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 and the refortification of that area.
These events are historical facts not requiring proof. Likewise, the impossibility of the Nazis' achieving these ends without cooperation by the Armed Forces is indisputable from the very nature of things.
Events and circumstances during the period 1933-36 are discussed in Section 2 of Chapter IX. Chief among these were the secret expansion of the German Navy in violation of treaty limitations, under the guidance of Raeder; the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, adopted the same day that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament provision of the Versailles Treaty (2261-PS); von Blomberg’s plan, 2 May 1935, for the reoccupation of the Rhineland (C-139); and von Blomberg’s orders of 2 March 1936 under which the reoccupation was actually carried out (C-159). All these events clearly required the closest collaboration between the military leaders and the Nazis.
The state of mind and objectives of the German military leaders during this early period are significant. The viewpoint of the German Navy on the opportunities which Naziism offered for rearmament so that Germany could achieve its objectives by force or threat of force, is reflected in a memorandum published by the High Command of the German Navy in 1937 entitled “The Fight of the Navy against Versailles, 1919-35” (C-156). This memorandum was compiled by a naval captain named Schuessler in the German Admiralty. The preface contains the following statements:
“The object and aim of this memorandum is to draw a technically reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part, of the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.”
“This compilation makes it clearer however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition for an effective rearmament, in the coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and spiritual powers, could the work of the soldier find its fulfillment.
“The frameword of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will.” (C-156)
Thus, the German Navy and the Nazis were in comradely agreement and full collaboration. Hitler was giving the military leaders the chance they wanted. Jodl stated the situation clearly in his speech to the Gauleiters on 7 November 1943 (L-172):
“1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight [Wehrwillen] in nurturing fighting strength [Wehrkraft] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at-and has so happily been successful in bringing about-was the fusion of these two forces.
“2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first place restoration of fighting sovereignty [Wehrhoheit] (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and rearmament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.” (L-172)
Nor were the high-ranking German officers unaware that the policies and objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the direction of war. Notes made by Admiral Carls of the German Navy in September 1938 by way of comment on a “Draft study of Naval Warfare against England,” read as follows:
“A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.
“1. If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.
“2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.
“3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a large number of countries overseas, in fact against one-half to one-third of the whole world.
“It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.” (C-23)
The German Air Force, during this prewar period, was developing even more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement of the Reich. A study prepared by the chief, Kammhuber, of a branch of the General Staff of the Air Force called the “Organization Staff", contained recommendations for the organization of the German Air Force in future years up to 1950 (L-43). The recommendations are based on certain assumptions, one of which was that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany would be as shown on the map which is attached as an inclosure to this study (Chart Number 10). On this map Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included within the borders of the Reich. Kammhuber also envisaged the future peacetime organization of the German Air Force as comprising seven “Group Commands.” Four of these were to lie within the borders of Germany proper, at Berlin, Brunswick, Munich and Koenigsberg, but the three others are proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw. (L-43)
The basic agreement and harmony between the Nazis and the German military leaders cannot be overemphasized. Without this agreement on objectives there might never have been a war. In this connection, an affidavit (3704-PS) by von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshall, Reich War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces until February 1938, is significant:
“From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr and Memel.
“I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers, believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety percent of the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe out the desecration involved in the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity. This was one of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament which began about ten years before Hitler came to power and was accentuated under Nazi rule.
“Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler since he produced the results which they desired. After this time some generals began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of his judgment. However they failed as a group to take any definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their positions.
“Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in January 1938, Hitler asked me to recommend a successor. I suggested Goering, who was the ranking officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and diligence. I was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by no officer, but Hitler personally took over my function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a Chef de bureau. As far as I know he was never named Commander of the Armed Forces but was always merely a 'Chief of Staff' under Hitler and in effect conducted the administrative functions of the Ministry of War. At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself desired and had furthered as Reichswehrminister and Reichskriegminister. To do the opposite would have led to a civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But it is the truth.
“As I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler’s measures. He became a willing tool in Hitler’s hands for every one of his decisions.
“He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him.” (3704-PS)
This statement by von Blomberg is paralleled closely in some respects by an affidavit by Colonel General Blaskowitz (3706-PS). Blaskowitz commanded an army in the campaign against Poland and the campaign against France. He subsequently took command of Army Group G in southern France, and held command of Army Group H, which retreated beyond the Rhine at the end of the war.
His statement is as follows:
“* * * After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter of fact we felt that, if political negotiations came to naught, the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not only with Poland herself, but also with the Western Powers.
“When in the middle of June 1 received an order from the OKH to prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion was only strengthened by the Fuehrer’s speech on 22 August 1939 on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality. Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members of my staff who were engaged in preparations, participated in various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical, strategic and general nature were discussed as had to do with my future position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army during the planned Polish campaign.
“During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he, as well as the Fuehrer, visited my headquarters. In fact it was common practice for commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their recommendations by telephone, teletype or wireless, as well as by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually became advisers to the OKH in their own field so that the positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the German Armed Forces.” (3706-PS)
It should be noted that General Blaskowitz, like Colonel General Halder and Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group as described by the prosecution.
It is, accordingly, clear beyond dispute that the military leaders of Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the expansion of the Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties. The objectives they had in mind are obvious from the affidavits and documents to which reference has been made. In these documents and affidavits we see the Nazis and the Generals in agreement upon the basic objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force, and collaborating to build up the armed might of Germany in order to make possible the subsequent acts of aggression.
(a) Austria. Notes taken by Colonel Hossbach of a conference held in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937 show that this conference, at which Hitler presided, was small and highly secret (386-PS). The only other participants were the four principal military leaders, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (von Neurath), and Hossbach acting as Secretary. The four chief leaders of the Armed Forces-Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister for War, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces, von Fritsch for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Goering for the Air Force-were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of Germany’s diplomatic and military policy, and stated that the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential preliminary “for the improvement of our military position” and “in order to remove any threat from the flanks". (386-PS)
The military and political advantages envisaged included the acquisition of a new source of food, shorter and better frontiers, the release of troops for other tasks, and the possibility of forming new divisions from the population of the conquered territories. Von Blomberg and von Fritsch joined in the discussion and von Fritsch stated:
“That it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications” (386-PS).
In the following Spring, March 1938, the German plans with respect to Austria came to fruition. Entries in the diary kept by Jodl show the participation of the German military leaders in the absorption of Austria (1780-PS). As is shown by Jodl’s diary entry for 11 February 1938, Keitel and other generals were present at the Obersalzberg meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler:
“In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol". (1780-PS)
Two days later Keitel and others were preparing proposals to be submitted to Hitler which would give the Austrian government the impression that Germany would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg agreement was ratified in Vienna:
“In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval". (1780-PS)
These proposals are embodied in a document 14 February 1938 and signed by Keitel (1775-PS). Portions of Keitel’s proposals to the Fuehrer are as follows:
“1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.
“2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria,
“a. through V-men (V-Maenner) in Austria,
“b. through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier,
“c. through travelling agents.”
“4. Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich.
“5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier.
“6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.” (1775-PS)
As Jodl’s diary entry for 14 February shows, these deceptive maneuvers and threats of force were very effective in Austria:
“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.” (1780-PS)
About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg’s decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in accordance with the preexisting plans for the invasion of Austria (these plans were known as “Case Otto") in order to absorb Austria and stop the plebiscite. Jodl’s diary entry for 10 March 1938 states:
“By surprise and without consulting the ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.
“Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering, General V. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General V. Schobert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District Leader [Gauleiter] Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General V. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.
'Prepare case Otto'.” (1780-PS)
In an order 11 March, initialed by Keitel and Jodl, Hitler laid down the general instructions for the invasion, and directed that the Army and Air Force be ready for action by 12 March (C-102). On the same evening Hitler ordered the invasion of Austria to commence at daybreak on 12 March. The order was initialed by Jodl. (C-182)
The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of aggression in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance. This was so simple because the invasion was precipitated by an outside event, Schuschnigg’s order for the plebiscite. But although for this reason the element of deliberately timed planning was lacking, the foregoing documents make abundantly clear the participation of the military leaders at all stages. At the small policy meeting in November 1937, when Hitler’s general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was outlined, the only others present were the four principal military leaders and the Foreign Secretary (386-PS). In February, Keitel, Reichenau, and Sperrle were present at Obersalzberg to help subject Schuschnigg to “the heaviest military pressure” (1780-PS). Keitel and others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of military threat and deception for frightening the Austrian Government into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol (1775-PS). When the actual invasion took place it was, of course, directed by the military leaders and executed by the German Armed Forces. Jodl has given a clear statement of why the German military leaders were delighted to join with the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence. In his lecture to the Gauleiters in November 1943 (L-172) Jodl explained:
“The Austrian 'Anschluss', in its turn, brought with it not only fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with vigour before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive.” (L-172)
The steps in the planning for the invasion of Czechoslovakia ("Case Green” or Fall Gruen) bear the evidence of knowing and willful participation by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the General Staff and High Command Group.
The Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and the four principal German military leaders on 5 November 1937 show that Austria and Czechoslovakia were then listed as the first intended victims of German aggression (386-PS). After the absorption of Austria in March 1938, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the armed forces lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. In the Hitler-Keitel discussions on 21 April 1938 a nice balance of political and military factors was worked out (388-PS): “A. Political Aspect
1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.
2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.
3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration).
B. Military Conclusions
1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2 and 3. Case 2 is the undesired one since “Gruen” will have taken security measures.
4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize “Gruen".
Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pi past Pr) [Pilsen, Prague]. (388-PS)
From this point on, nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt file (388-PS) and in Jodl’s diary (1780-PS). These two sources of information demolish in advance what will, no doubt, be urged in defense of the military defendants and the General Staff and high Command Group. They will seek to create the impression that the German generals were pure military technicians; that they were uninterested and uninformed about political and diplomatic considerations and events; that they passed their days mounting mock battles at the Kriegsakadamie; that they prepared plans for military attack or defense on a purely hypothetical basis. They will say all this in order to suggest that they did not share and could not estimate Hitler’s aggressive intentions, and that they carried out politically conceived orders like military automatons, with no idea whether the wars they launched and waged were aggressive or not.
If these arguments are made, the Schmundt file (388-PS) and Jodl’s diary (1780-PS) make it abundantly apparent that aggressive designs were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals; that the military leaders were fully posted on the aggressive intentions of the Nazis; that they were fully informed of political and diplomatic developments; that indeed German generals had a habit of turning up at diplomatic gatherings.
If the documents did not show these things so clearly, a moment’s thought must show them to be true. A highly successful program of conquest depends on armed might, and cannot be executed with an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to soldiers alone. It is equally true that aggressive diplomacy is far too dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and military support.
No doubt some of the German generals had qualms about Hitler’s timing and the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather amusingly reflected in an entry in Jodl’s diary for 10 August 1938:
“The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer’s attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams [die er noch dazu dem General Adams in den Mund legt] that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. 'I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years.' The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it [the General Staff] is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the General’s opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes.” (1780-PS)
But if this entry shows that some of the German generals at that time were cautious with respect to Germany’s ability to take on Poland and the Western Powers simultaneously, nonetheless the entry shows no lack of sympathy with the Nazi aims for conquest. And there is no evidence in Jodl’s diary or elsewhere that any substantial number of German generals lacked sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Furthermore, the top military leaders always joined with and supported his decisions, with formidable success in the years from 1938 to 1942.
If it is said that German military leaders did not know that German general policy toward Czechoslovakia was aggressive, or based on force and threat of force, it may be noted that on 30 May 1938 Hitler signed a Most Secret directive to Keitel (388-PS Item 11) in which he said:
“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment.
“An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe Creating a surprisingly favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take early action.
“The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.” (388-PS Item 11)
Jodl was in no doubt what this meant. He noted in his diary that same day:
“The Fuehrer signs directive 'Green', where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line". (1780-PS)
The succeeding evidence in the Schmundt file (388-PS Items 14, 16, 17) and in the Jodl diary (1780-PS) shows how those military preparations went forward “all along the line.” Numerous examples of discussions, planning, and preparation during the last few weeks before the Munich Pact, including discussions with Hungary and the Hungarian General Staff in which General Halder participated, are contained in the Jodl diary (1780-PS) and the later items in the Schmundt file (338-PS Items 18 to 22, 24, 26 to 28, 31 to 34, 36 to 54-PS). The day the Munich Pact was signed, Jodl noted in his diary:
“The Munich Pact is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.” (1780-PS)
Plans for the “liquidation” of the remainder of Czechoslovakia were made soon after Munich (388-PS Item 40; C-136; C-138). Ultimately the absorption was accomplished by diplomatic bullying in which Keitel participated for the usual purposes of demonstrating that German armed might was ready to enforce the threats (2802-PS). Once again, Jodl in his 1943 lecture (L-172) explained clearly why the objective of eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of the German military leaders as to the hearts of the Nazis:
“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it then became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises.” (L-172)
This serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg (3704-PS) and Blaskowitz (3706-PS) already quoted:
“The whole group of German staff and front officers believed that the question of the Polish Corridor would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms.”
“A war to wipe out the political and economic losses resulting from the creation of the Polish Corridor was regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity.”
“Before 1938-39, the German generals were not opposed to Hitler.”
“Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired.”
(c) Poland. The story of the German attack on Poland furnishes an excellent case study of the functioning of the General Staff and High Command Group.
Reference is made to the series of directives from Hitler and Keitel involving “Fall Weiss” (C-120). The series starts with a re-issuance of the “Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed Forces". This periodically re-issued directive was encountered previously in the case of Czechoslovakia.
In essence these directives are (a) statements of what the Armed Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political and diplomatic policies and developments, and (b) indications of what should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the military tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They constitute, in fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and strongly demonstrate the mutual inter-dependence of aggressive diplomacy and military planning. The distribution of these documents early in April 1939, in which the preparations of plans for the Polish war is ordered, was limited. Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: one to Brauchitsch (OKH), one to Raeder (OKM), one to Goering (OKL), and two to Warlimont in the Planning Branch of OKW. Hitler lays down that the plan must be susceptible of execution by 1 September 1939, and that target date was adhered to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is clearly brought out by the following part of one of those documents:
“1. Political Requirements and Aims. German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland.
“The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich-territory at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest.
“The political leadership considers it its task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only.
“The development of increasing internal crises in France and the resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in the not too distant future.
“Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this would imply Poland’s destruction by Bolshevism.
“The attitudes of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German military exigencies.
“On the German side, Hungary cannot be considered a certain German ally. Italy’s attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis.
“2. Military Conclusions. The great objectives in the building up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the 'Western Democracies'. 'Fall Weiss' constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the Western opponents.
“The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.
“The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air over them.” (C-120)
It cannot be suggested that these are hypothetical plans, or that the General Staff and High Command Group did not know what was in prospect. The plans show on their face that they are in earnest and no war game. The point is reinforced by Schmundt’s notes on the conference in Hitler’s study at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939 (L-79). At this conference Hitler announced:
“There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision: to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity". (L-79)
Besides Hitler and a few military aides and adjutants, the following were present: Goering (C-in-C Luftwaffe); Raeder (C-in-C Navy); Keitel (Chief, OKW); von Brauchitsch (C-in-C Army); Col. General Milch (Inspector General of the Luftwaffe); Gen. Bodenschatz (Goering’s personal assistant); Rear Admiral Schnievindt (Chief of the Naval War Staff); Col. Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff); Col. Warlimont (Planning Staff of OKW). All except Milch, Bodenschatz, and the adjutants are members of the Group as defined in the Indictment.
The initial and general planning of the attack on Poland, however, had to be examined, checked, corrected, and perfected by the field commanders who were to carry out the attack. In a document issued in the middle of June 1939 (C-142), von Brauchitsch as C-in-C of the Army passed on the general outlines of the plan to the field commanders-in-chief (the Oberbefehlshaber of Army Groups and Armies) so that they could work out the actual preparation and deployments in accordance with the general plan:
“The object of the operation is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. High policy demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. The intention of the Army High Command is to prevent a regular mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise invasion of Polish territory and to destroy the mass of the Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the Vistula-Narve line. This is to be achieved by a concentric attack from Silesia on one side and Pomerania-East Prussia on the other side. The possible influence from Galicia against this operation must be eliminated. The main idea of the destruction of the Polish Army west of the Vistula-Narve Line with the elimination of the possible influence from Galicia remains unchanged even if advanced preparedness for defense on the part of the Polish Army, caused by previous political tension, should have to be taken into consideration. In such a case it may be a question of not making the first attack mainly with mechanized and motorized forces but of waiting for the arrival of stronger, non-motorized units. The Army High Command will then give the correspondingly later time for the crossing of the frontier. The endeavour to obtain a quick success will be maintained.
“The Army Group Commands and the Army Commands (A.O.K.) will make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy. There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to be abandoned: these will have to be developed simply and quickly on the same basis: they are to be prepared mentally to such an extent, that in case of an order from the Army High Command they can be carried out quickly.” (C-142)
A document of approximately the same date reveals an Oberbefehlshaber at work in the field planning the attack (2327-PS). This document, signed by Blaskowitz, at the time the commander-in-chief of the Third Army Area Command and commander-in-chief of the 8th Army during the Polish campaign, states in part:
“The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out of a plan of deployment against Poland which takes in account the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war by surprise and for quick success.
“The order of deployment by the High Command, 'Fall Weiss' authorizes the Third Army Group [in Fall Weiss, 8th Army Headquarters] to give necessary directions and orders to all commands subordinated to it for 'Fall Weiss'.”
“The whole correspondence on 'Fall Weiss' has to be conducted under the classification Top Secret [Chefsache]. This is to be disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgment of the chief of the responsible command is harmless in every way-even in connection with other documents.
“For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered later on. Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army Group before 10 July.
“I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to limit the extent of the information and ask that all suitable measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting information.
“The Commander-in-Chief of Army Area Command “(signed) F. Blaskowitz.”
“Aims of Operation 'Fall Weiss'
“1. a. The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly bringing up other parts of the army as well to counteract the marching up of the Polish Army.
“Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the foe by quick action and ruthless attacks.” (2327-PS)
Finally, a week before the actual onslaught, when all the military plans have been laid, The General Staff and High Command Group all gathered in one place, in fact all in one room. On 23 August 1939 the Oberbefehlshaber assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler’s explanation of the timing of the attack, and to receive political and diplomatic orientation from the head of the State (798-PS). This speech, the second of the two examples referred to in the initial affidavits by Halder (3702-PS) and Brauchitsch (3703-PS), was addressed to the very group defined in the indictment as the General Staff and High Command Group.
(d) The War Period, September 1939-June 1941: Norway Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece. On 1 September 1939 Germany launched the war. Within a few weeks, and before any important action on the western front, Poland was overrun and conquered. German losses were insignificant.
The “three principal territorial questions” mentioned in the Blomberg (3704-PS) and Blaskowitz (3706-PS) affidavits had all been solved. The Rhineland had been reoccupied and fortified, Memel annexed, and the Polish Corridor annexed. And much more too. Austria had become a part of the Reich, and Czechoslovakia was occupied and a Protectorate of Germany. All of western Poland was in German hands. Germany was superior in arms, and in experience in their use, to her western enemies, France and England.
Then came the three years of the war-1939, 1940, 1941-when German armed might swung like a great scythe from north to south to east. Italy, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria had become German allies. Norway and Denmark; the Low Countries; France; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia and Greece; the western part of the Soviet Union-all this territory was invaded and overrun.
In the period from the fall of Poland in October 1939 to the attack against the Soviet Union in June 1941, occurred the aggressive wars, in violation of treaties, against Norway, Denmark, Holland Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece. But one thing is certain: neither the Nazis nor the generals thought during this period in terms of a series of violations of neutrality and treaties. They thought in terms of a war, a war for the conquest of Europe.
Six weeks after the outbreak of war, and upon the successful termination of the Polish campaign, on 9 October 1939, there was issued a “Memorandum and Directive for the Conduct of the War in the West” (L-52). It is unsigned, was distributed only to the four service chiefs (Keitel, Brauchitsch, Goering, and Raeder) and gives every indication of having been issued by Hitler. The following are pertinent extracts:
“The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or disintegrate the 80 million state again so that in this manner the European equilibrium, in other words the balance of power, which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle therefore will have to be fought out by the German people one way or another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first month of war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing of peace to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially to such an extent that from the German viewpoint there would be no objection to ending the war immediately, insofar as the present achievement with arms is not jeopardized by the peace-treaty.
“It is not the object of this memorandum to study the possibilities in this direction or even to take them into consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively to the other case; the necessity to continue the fight, the object of which, as already stressed, consists so far as the enemy is concerned in the dissolution or destruction of the German Reich. In opposition to this, the German war aim is the final military dispatch of the West, i.e. destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe.
“As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of our Western enemies.”
“The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without any hope of realization, that is to say, Germany is able to enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a few covering troops.
“The remaining European states are neutral either because they fear for their own fates, or lack interest in the conflict as such, or are interested in a certain outcome of the war, which prevents them from taking part at all or at any rate too soon.
“The following is to be firmly borne in mind * * *”
“Belgium and Holland-Both countries are interested in preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the securing of their interior economy, even of their very life, depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore, in their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions, both countries are dependent upon the West, in the highest degree. If England and France promise themselves a successful result at the price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality, they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality. Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Beglo-Dutch neutrality time is not a factor which might promise a favorable development for Germany.
“The Nordic States-Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible even in a war of long duration.” (L-52)
Six weeks later, on 23 November 1939, the group of Oberbefehlshaber again assembled and heard from Hitler much of what he had said previously to the four service chiefs (789-PS):
“For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first. It the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation.”
“Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so anymore.”
“England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon the favorable instant". (789-PS)
Thereafter the winter of 1939-40 passed quietly-the winter of “phony war". The General Staff and High Command Group all knew what the plan was; they had all been told. It was to attack ruthlessly at the first opportunity, to smash the French and English forces, to pay no heed to treaties with, or the neutrality of, the Low Countries.
“Breaking of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won.” (789-PS)
That is what Hitler told the Oberbefehlshaber. The generals and admirals agreed and went forward with their plans.
The military leaders may contend that all the steps in this march of conquest were conceived by Hitler, and that the military leaders embarked on them with reluctance and misgivings. Or they may be restrained by pride from taking so undignified and degrading a position as to suggest that German military leadership, the bearers of the tradition of Schlieffen, Moltke, Spee and Hindenburg, was cowed and coerced into war and plans of which they did not approve by a gang of political adventurers. But whether they make the argument or not, it is utterly without foundation.
Hitler’s utterances in October (L-79) and November (789-PS) 1939 are full of plans against France, England, and the Low Countries but contain no suggestion of an attack on Scandinavia. Indeed, Hitler’s memorandum of 9 October 1939 (L-52) to the four service chiefs affirmatively indicates that he saw no reason to disturb the situation to the North:
“The Northern States-Providing no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed. The continuance of trade with these countries appears possible even in a war of long duration.” (L-52)
But a week previous, on 3 October 1939, Raeder had caused a questionnaire to be circulated within the Naval War Staff, seeking comments on the advantages which might be gained from a naval standpoint by securing bases in Norway and Denmark (C-122). Raeder was stimulated to circulate this questionnaire by a letter from another Admiral named Carls, who pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany (C-66). (Rolf Carls later attained the rank of Admiral of the Fleet, and commanded Naval Group North from January 1940 to February 1943. In that capacity he is a member of the General Staff and High Command Group as defined in the Indictment.)
Doenitz, at that time Flag Officer Submarines, on 9 October 1939, replied to the questionnaire that from his standpoint Trondheim and Narvik met his requirements, that Trondheim was preferable, and proposed the establishment of a U-boat base there (C-5). Raeder’s visit to Hitler the next day and certain subsequent events are described as follows (L-323):
“Entry in the War Diary of the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff) on 'Weseruebung'. 1. 10 October 1939. First reference of the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff), when visiting the Fuehrer, to the significance of Norway for sea and air warfare. The Fuehrer intends to give the matter consideration.
“12 December 1939. Fuehrer received Q & H.
“Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to make mental preparations. The C-in-C of the Navy is having an essay prepared, which will be ready in January. With reference to this essay, Kapitan zur see Krancke is working on 'Weseruebung', and OKW.
“During the time which followed, H maintained contact with the Chief of Staff of the C-in-C of the Navy. His aim was to develop the Party Q with a view to making it capable of making a coup, and to give the Supreme Command of the Navy information on political developments in Norway and military questions. In general he pressed for a speeding-up of preparations, but considered that it was first necessary to expand the organization. The support which had been promised him in the form of money and coal was set in motion only very slowly and came in small quantities, and he repeatedly complained about this. It was not until the end of March that Q considered the coup [Aktion] so urgent that the expansion of his organization could not wait. The military advice of H was passed on to the OKW.” (L-323)
On 12 December the Naval War Staff discussed the Norwegian project with Hitler at a meeting which Keitel and Jodl also attended (C-64). In the meantime, illustrating the close link between the service chiefs and the Nazi politicians, Raeder was in touch with Rosenberg on the possibilities of using Quisling (C-65). As result of all this, on Hitler’s instructions Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27 January 1940. The directive related that Hitler had commissioned Keitel to take charge of preparation for the Norway operation, to which he then gave the code name “Weseruebung.” On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive setting forth the general plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark (C-174). The invasion itself took place on 9 April 1940. The directive was initialed by Admiral Kurt Fricke who at that time was head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, and who at the end of 1941 became Chief of the Naval War Staff. In that capacity he too is a member of the Group as defined in the Indictment.
So, as these documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark was not conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military leaders. On the contrary it was conceived in the naval part of the General Staff and High Command Group, and Hitler was persuaded to take up the idea. Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General Staff and High Command Group as to the Nazis. Launching aggressive war against inoffensive neighboring states gave the generals and admirals no qualms.
As for the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders were disturbed about Treaty considerations. At the conferences between Hitler and the principal military leaders in May 1939 (L-79), when the intention to attack Poland was announced, Hitler in discussing the possibility of war with England said:
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality will be ignored". (L-79)
And in the speech to the Oberbefehlshaber in November 1939 (789-PS), after the Polish victory, Hitler made clear his intention to attack France and England by first invading the Low Countries.
“No one will question that when we have won", he said.
Accordingly, the winter of 1939-40 and the early spring of 1940 was a period of intensive planning in German military circles. The major attack in the West through the Low Countries, and the attack on Norway and Denmark had to be planned. Jodl’s diary for the period 1 February to 26 May 1940 (1809-PS) contains many entries reflecting the course of this planning. These entries show that during February and early March there was considerable doubt in German military circles as to whether the attack on Norway and Denmark should precede or follow the attack on the Low Countries; and that at some points there even was doubt as to whether all these attacks were necessary from a military stand point. But there is not a single entry which reflects any hesitancy, from a moral angle, on the part of Jodl or any of the people he mentions to overrun these neutral countries.
On 1 February 1940, General Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff and a member of the Group as defined in the Indictment) visited Jodl and suggested that it might be wise to attack only Holland, on the ground that Holland alone would “be a tremendous improvement in conducting aerial warfare". On 6 February, Jodl conferred with Jeschonnek, Warlimont, and Col. von Waldau, and what Jodl calls a “new idea” was proposed at this meeting: that the Germans should “carry out actions H (Holland) and Weser exercise (Norway and Denmark) only and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war” (1809-PS). The German Air Force may have felt that occupation of Holland alone would give them sufficient scope for air bases for attacks on England, and that if Belgium’s neutrality were preserved the bases in Holland would be immune from attack by the French and the British armies in France. If, to meet this situation, the French and British attacked through Belgium, the violation of neutrality would be on the other foot. But whether or not the “new idea” made sense from a military angle, it appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a diplomatic angle. It was a proposal to violate, without any substantial excuse, the neutrality of three neighboring small countries, and simultaneously to guarantee the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such circumstances it is difficult to imagine and in fact the “new idea” projected at this meeting of military leaders is an extraordinary combination of cynicism and naiveté.
In the meantime, as Jodl’s diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the “special staff” for the Norway invasion met for the first time and got its instructions from Keitel (1809-PS). On 21 February Hitler put General von Falkenhorst (who subsequently became an Oberbefehlshaber and a member of the Group) in command of the Norway undertaking; and Jodl’s diary records that “Falkenhorst accepts gladly” (1809-PS). On 26 February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first into Norway or the Low Countries, but on 3 March, he decided to do Norway first and the Low Countries a short time thereafter. This decision proved final. Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the venture was certain by the first of May; the invasion of the Low Countries took place 10 days thereafter.
France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on the side of Germany, and the African campaign began. In the meantime, Goering’s Air Force hammered at England unsuccessfully, and the planned invasion of Britain ("Operation Seeloewe") never came to pass. In October 1940 Italy attacked Greece and was fought to better than a standstill. The Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of Yugoslavia were embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the attack on the Soviet Union was being planned in the winter of 1940-41, and Germany felt she could not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans.
Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to Italy’s aid, and the Yugoslavian coup d'etat of 26 March 1940 brought about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also. The aggressive nature of the German attacks on Greece and Yugoslavia are demonstrated in 444-PS; 1541-PS; C-167; 1746-PS. The decisions were made, and the Armed Forces drew up the plans and executed the attacks. The onslaught was particularly ruthless against Yugoslavia for the special purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final deployment instructions were issued by Brauchitsch (R-95):
“1. The political situation in the Balkans having changed by reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be considered as an enemy even should it make declarations of loyalty at first.
“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible * * *”
“5. Timetable for the operations. a. On 5th April as soon as sufficient forces of the Air Forces are available and weather permitting, the Air Forces shall attack continuously by day and night the Yugoslav ground organization and Belgrade.” (R-95)
(e) The Soviet Union. It is quite possible that some members of the General Staff and High Command Group opposed “Barbarossa,” the German attack on the Soviet Union, as unnecessary and unwise from a military standpoint. Raeder so indicated in a memorandum he wrote on 10 January 1944 (C-66):
“1. At this time the Fuehrer had made known his 'unalterable decision' to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situation had arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of Naval War Staff, I was never convinced of the 'compelling necessity' for Barbarossa.”
“The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts with Russia, doubtless his general ideological attitude played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this idea.
“The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the autumn of 1940 could no longer be attained-a realization which the Fuehrer, no doubt, gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on England (our own losses)-surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back as August and September, to consider whether-even prior to victory in the West-an Eastern campaign would be feasible with the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the Continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear, however, until well into September.”
“7. As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL and myself, it is perhaps because the arguments the Fuehrer used on such occasion (dinner speech in the middle of July to the Officers in Command) to justify a step he had planned, usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to the 'inner circle,' than on those who often heard this type of reasoning.
“Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941, whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very skeptical.” (C-66)
But the passage last quoted indicates that the other members of the General Staff favored “Barbarossa". Raeder’s memorandum actually says substantially that Blomberg’s affidavit (3704-PS) says; that some of the generals lost confidence in the power of Hitler’s judgment, but that the generals failed as a group to take any definite stand against him although a few tried and suffered thereby. Certainly the High Command Group took no stand against Hitler on “Barbarossa” and the events of 1941 and 1942 do not suggest that the High Command embarked on the Soviet war tentatively or with reservations, but rather with ruthless determination backed by careful planning. The plans themselves have already been cited. (446-PS; C-35; 872-PS; C-78; 447-PS)
(f) Nature of the General Staff and High Command Group Responsibility for Aggression. The nature of the accusation against this Group for plotting and launching wars of aggression must be clearly understood. They are not accused on the ground that they are soldiers. They are not accused because they did the usual things a soldier is expected to do, such as make military plans and command troops.
It is among the normal duties of a diplomat to engage in negotiations and conferences; to write notes and side memoires to the government to which he is accredited; and to cultivate good will toward the country he represents. Ribbentrop is not indicted for doing these things. It is the usual function of a politician to weigh and determine matters of national policy and to draft regulations and decrees and make speeches. Hess, Frick, and the other politician-defendants are not indicted for doing these things. It is an innocent and respectable business to be a locksmith but it is none the less a crime if the locksmith turns his talents to picking the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And that is the nature of the charge against all the defendants, and against the General Staff and High Command Group as well. The charge is that in performing the functions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers, sailors, or whatever they happened to be, they conspired to and did plan, prepare, initiate, and wage wars of aggression and in violation of Treaties.
The Charter (Article 6(a)) declares that wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances are crimes against peace. It is no defense for those who commit such crimes to plead that they practice a particular profession, whether it is arms or the law. It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military plans to meet national contingencies, to carry out such plans and engage in war if in so doing they do not knowingly plan and wage illegal wars.
There might well be individual cases where drawing the line between legal and illegal conduct would involve some difficulties. That is not an uncommon situation in the legal field. But there can be no doubt as to the criminality of the General Staff and High Command Group, nor as to the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the Group. The evidence is clear that these defendants, and the leaders of the Group, and most of the members of the Group, were fully advised in advance of the aggressive and illegal war plans, and carried them out with full knowledge that the wars were aggressive and in violation of treaties.
In the case of defendants Goering, Keitel, and Jodl, the evidence is voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and wars is constant. The same is true of the defendant Raeder, and his individual responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway and Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against Doenitz is less voluminous, for the reason that he was younger and not one of the top group until later in the war, but his knowing participation in and advocacy of the Norwegian venture is clear.
Numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including its other leaders, participated knowingly and willfully in these illegal plans and wars. Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and his Chief of Staff, Halder; Warlimont the deputy to Jodl and chief repository of plans-in the nature of things these men knew all that was going on, and participated fully, as the evidence has shown. Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau and von Schobert, together with Goering, were immediately sent for by Hitler when Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. At later date, Blaskowitz as an Oberbefehlshaber in the field knowingly prepared for the attack on Poland; Field Marshal List educated the Bulgarians for their role during the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; von Falkenhorst “gladly” accepted the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and Denmark. On the air side, Jeschonnek had proposed that Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and Holland, and simultaneously assured Belgium that there was nothing to fear. On the naval side, Admiral Carls foresaw at an early date that German policy was leading to a general European war, and at a later date the attack on Norway and Denmark was his brainchild; Krancke was one of the chief planners of this attack; Schniewindt was in the inner circle for the attack on Poland; Fricke certified the final orders for “Weseruebung” and a few months later proposed that Germany annex Belgium and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia to vassalage. Most of these 19 officers were at the time members of the Group, and the few who were not subsequently became members. At the final planning and reporting conference for “Barbarossa,” 17 additional members were present. At the two meetings with Hitler, at which the aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were fully disclosed, the entire group was present.
The military defendants may perhaps argue that military men are pure technicians, bound to do whatever the political leaders order them to do. Such a suggestion must fail, on any test of reason or logic. It amounts to saying that military men are a race apart from and different from the ordinary run of human beings-men above and beyond the moral and legal requirements that apply to others; men incapable of exercising moral judgment on their own behalf.
It stands to reason that the crime of planning and waging aggressive warfare is committed most consciously, deliberately, and culpably by a nation’s leaders-the leaders in all the major fields of activity necessary to and closely involved in the waging of war. It is committed by the principal propagandists and publicists who whip up the necessary beliefs and enthusiasms among the people as a whole, so that the people will acquiesce and join in attacking and slaughtering the peoples of other nations. It is committed by the political leaders who purport to represent and execute the national will. It is committed by the diplomats who handle the nation’s foreign policy and endeavor to create a favorable diplomatic setting for successful warfare, and by the chief ministers who adapt the machinery of government to the needs of a nation at war. It is committed by the principal industrial and financial leaders who shape the national economy and marshall the productive resources for the needs of an aggressive war program. It is no less committed by the military leaders who knowingly plan aggressive war, mobilize the men and equipment of the attacking forces, and execute the actual onslaught.
In the nature of things, planning and executing aggressive war is accomplished by agreement and consultation among all these types of leaders. If the leaders in any notably important field of activity stand aside, resist, or fail to cooperate in launching and executing an aggressive war program, the program will at the very least be seriously obstructed, and probably its successful accomplishment will be impossible. That is why the principal leaders in all these fields of activity share responsibility for the crime, and the military leaders no less than the others. Leadership in the military field, as in any other field, calls for moral wisdom as well as technical astuteness.
The responsible military leaders of any nation can hardly be heard to say that their role is that of a mere janitor, custodian, or pilot of the war machine which is under their command, and that they bear no responsibility whatsoever for the use to which that machine is put. Such a view would degrade and render ignoble the profession of arms. The prevalence of such a view would be particularly unfortunate today, when the military leaders control forces infinitely more powerful and destructive than ever before. Should the military leaders be declared exempt from the declaration in the Charter that planning and waging aggressive war is a crime, it would be a crippling if not fatal blow to the efficacy of that declaration.
The American prosecution here representing the United Nations believes that the profession of arms is a distinguished and noble profession. It believes that the practice of that profession by its leaders calls for the highest degree of integrity and moral wisdom no less than for technical skill. It believes that in consulting and planning with leaders in other national fields of activity, the military leaders will act and counsel in accordance with International Law and the dictates of the public conscience. Otherwise, the military resources of the nation will be used, not in accordance with the laws of modern civilization, but with the law of the jungle. The military leaders share responsibility with other leaders of a nation.
Obviously the military leaders are not the final and exclusive arbiters, and the German military leaders do not bear exclusive responsibility for the aggressive wars which were waged. If the leading German diplomats and industrialists and other leaders had not been infected with similar criminal purposes, the German military leaders might not have had their way. But the German military leaders conspired with others to undermine and destroy the conscience of the German nation. The German military leaders wanted to aggrandize Germany and if necessary to resort to war for that purpose. As the Chief Prosecutor for the United States said in his opening statement, “the German military leaders are here before you because they, along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war.”
(2) War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. It is proposed to show that members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the five defendants who are members of the Group, ordered and directed the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the Indictment. It is also proposed to show, in certain instances, the actual commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces, as a result of these orders, or as a result of other orders or arrangements made by members of the General Staff and High Command Group, which controlled the German Armed Forces and bears responsibility for war crimes committed by them.
It is not proposed, however, to make a full showing of war crimes committed by the German Armed Forces. The full presentation of this evidence is to be made, pursuant to agreement among the Chief Prosecutors, by the French and Soviet delegations.
It will be shown that the General Staff and High Command became wedded to a policy of terror. In some cases, where the evidence of this policy is in documentary form, the activating papers which were signed by, initialed by, and circulated among the members of the Group will be presented. In other instances, where the actual crimes were committed by others than members of the German Armed Forces (where, for example prisoners of war or civilians were handed over to and mistreated or murdered by the SS or SD), it will be shown that members of the Group were well aware that they were assisting in the commission of war crimes. It will be shown that many crimes committed by the SS or SD were committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General Staff and High Command, and that frequently members of the German Armed Forces acted in conjunction with the SS and SD in carrying out tasks then known by such respectable sounding terms as “pacification,” “cleansing,” and “elimination of insecure elements.”
(a) Murder of Commandos, Paratroopers, and Members of Military Missions. This story starts with an order issued by Hitler on 18 October 1942 (498-PS). The order began with a recital that allied commandos were using methods of warfare alleged to be outside the scope of the Geneva Conventions, and thereafter proceeded to specify the methods of warfare which German troops should use against allied commandos, and the disposition which should be made of captured commandos. This order reads as follows:
“1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.
“2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.
“3. I therefore order:
From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW. for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.
“4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW Stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.
“5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who in the course of normal hostilities (largescale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after battles.
“6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed. “(S) Adolf Hitler” (498-PS).
This order was issued by the OKW in twelve copies, and the distribution included the three supreme commands and the principal field commands. (498-PS)
On the same day Hitler issued a supplementary order (503-PS) for the purpose of explaining the reasons for the issuance of the basic order. In this explanation, Hitler pointed out that allied commando operations had been extraordinarily successful in the destruction of rear communications, intimidation of laborers, and destruction of important war plants in occupied areas. Among other things Hitler stated in this explanation:
“Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops (OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 October 1942) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.
“This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.
“The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus.
“The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and copies made thereof.
“The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces “By order of “Jodl”
“I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare noncompliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree.
“As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.”
“The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.
“Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these activities.
“England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare as long as they can truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worse, all they have to do is to successfully commit their attack on people, traffic installations, or other installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate.
“If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man.
“This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly exterminated.
“The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communiqué will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.
“I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail, or under circumstances when there is danger in delay to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.
“These are the reasons for the issuance of this decree.
“If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation. “(signed) A. Hitger” (503-PS).
Ten days later, on 28 October 1942, while Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Germany Navy, the Naval War Staff in Berlin transmitted its copy of the basic order of 18 October to the lower Naval commands. The copy distributed by the Navy and the covering memorandum from the Naval War Staff (C-179) shows clearly the secrecy which surrounded the dissemination of this order:
“Enclosed pleased find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units.
“This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.
“After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above authorities must hand this order over to the next highest sections which is responsible for its confiscation and destruction. “(s) Wagner” (C-179).
“Note for Distribution:
“These instructions are not to be distributed over and above the battalions and corresponding staffs of the other services. After notification, those copies distributed over and above the Regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must be withdrawn and destroyed.” (C-179)
On 11 February 1943, just twelve days after Doenitz had become Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, the Naval War Staff promulgated a further memorandum on this subject in order to clear up certain misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic order of 18 October 1942 (C-178). It was stated in this subsequent memorandum that all commanders and officers who neglected their duty in failing to instruct their units concerning the order would run the risk of serious court martial penalties:
“From the notice given by 3/SKL [Naval War Staff] on February 1st 43, it has been discovered that the competent departments of the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force Operations Staff have a wrong conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A telephone inquiry at 3/SKL proved that this Naval authority was not correctly informed either. In view of this situation, reference is made to figure 6) of the Fuehrer order of October 18, 42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL I Ops 26 367/42 Top Secret of October 28, 42) according to which all commanders and officers, who have neglected their duty in instructing their units about the order referring to treatment of saboteurs, are threatened with punishment by court martial.
“The first Fuehrer order concerning this matter of October 18, 42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 2108/42 Top Secret of October 27, 42) was given the protection of Top Secret merely because it is stated therein:
“1. That, according to the Fuehrer’s views the spreading of military sabotage organizations in the East and West may have portentous consequences for our whole conduct of the war and
“2. That the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be carried out even after they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon.
“On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle is not at all to be kept secret but on the contrary to be currently published in the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a deterrent, will not be achieved, if those taking part in enemy 'Commando Operations' would not learn that certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be annihilated immediately, unless their statements are first needed for military reasons, it is necessary that not only all members of the Armed Forces must receive instructions that these types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be annihilated, but also all departments of the home staff, dealing with this kind of question, must be informed of the course of action which has been ordered.” (C-178)
The Hitler order of October 1942 was actually carried out in a number of instances. During the night of the 19-20 November 1942, a British freight glider crashed near Egersund in Norway. The glider carried a British commando unit of 17 men, of whom 3 were apparently killed in the crash. All were in English uniform. The 14 survivors were executed in accordance with the Hitler order in the evening of 20 November 1942. The proof is contained in the following document (508-PS):
“1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a British freight glider at Hegers and in the night of November 20:
“a. No firing on the part of German defense.
“b. The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed the ground. 7 man crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer order has been carried out.”
“On November 20, 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 Km NE of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are severely, the others slightly wounded.
“All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia. Furthermore following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skis and radio sender, exact number is unknown. The glider carried rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number unknown. At present the prisoners are with the Bn. in Egersund.”
“Beside the 17 member crew extensive sabotage material and work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely proved. The 280th Inf. Div. (J.D.) ordered the execution of the action according to the Fuehrer’s order. The execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks and serial numbers.”
“In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew, the Armed Forces Commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order to the district commanders, according to which the interrogation by G-2 (Ic) and by BDS are important before the execution of the Fuehrer order; in case of No. 4 of the Fuehrer order the prisoners are to be handed over to the BDS.” (508-PS)
In three specific instances the Hitler order was carried out in Norway (512-PS). The procedure was to take individual commandos prisoner and interrogate them to extract military intelligence before executing them. This procedure was in accordance with the last sentence of Hitler’s supplementary order (503-PS), and is obviously in flat contradiction of the requirements of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The reason for this procedure is explained as follows:
“TOP SECRET- According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer order of 18th October (CHEFS), individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proven in the cases of Glomfjord, Twoman torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane Stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore, Armed Forces Commander (WB) referred to above mentioned (OA) last sentence of the Fuehrer order (Liquidation only after short interrogation).” (512-PS)
Another instance from the Norwegian theater of war (526-PS):
On 30 March 1943, 10 Norwegian navy personnel were taken prisoner from a Norwegian cutter at Toftefjord. The 10 prisoners were executed by the SD in accordance with the Hitler order, but the published report announced only that the unit was destroyed:
“On the 30:3 1943 in Toftefjord (70 Lat.) an enemy cutter was sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners.
“Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian Navy.”
“Purpose: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and bridges.
“Assigner of Mission in London: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.
“Fuehrer order executed by S.D. (security service).
“Wehrmacht Report of 6.4 announces the following about it:
“In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and destroyed on approaching the coast.” (526-PS)
Similar action took place in the Italian theater. A telegram (509-PS) from the Supreme Commander in Italy to OKW, dated 7 November 1493, shows that on 2 November 1943 three British commandos captured at Pascara, Italy, were given “special treatment” (Sonderbehandelt), which, as previous evidence has shown, (3040-PS) means death. What happened to the remaining nine prisoners of war who were wounded and in the hospital is not known. (509-PS)
An affidavit (2610-PS) dated 7 November 1945, by Frederick W. Roche, a Major in the Army of the United States, furnishes other evidence of the carrying out of the Hitler order. Major Roche was the Judge Advocate of an American Military Commission which tried General Anton Dostler, formerly Commander of the 75th German Army Corps, for the unlawful execution of 15 members of the United States Armed Forces. His affidavit states:
“FREDERICK W. ROCHE being duly sworn deposes and says:
“I am a Major in the Army of the United States.
“I was the Judge Advocate of the Military Commission which tried Anton Dostler for ordering the execution of the group of fifteen United States Army personnel who comprised the 'Ginny Mission.' This Military Commission consisting of five officers was appointed by command of General McNarney, by Special Orders No. 269, dated 26 September 1945, Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 512.
“The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945 and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed four days and the findings and sentence were announced on the morning of 12 October 1945. The charge and specification in this case are as follows:
“'Charge: Violation of the law of war.'
“'Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then General, commanding military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war, order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army personnel, consisting of two officers and thirteen enlisted men who had then recently been captured by forces under General Dostler, which order was carried into execution on or about 26 March 1944, resulting in the death of the said fifteen members of the Army of the United States identified as follows * * *'.”
“I was present throughout the entire proceeding. I heard all the testimony, and I am familiar with the record in this case. The facts developed in this proceeding are as follows: On the night of 22 March 1944, two officers and thirteen enlisted men of the 2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All fifteen men were members of the Army of the United States and were in the military service of the United States. When they landed on the Italian coast they were all properly dressed in the field uniform of the United States Army and they carried no civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail line was being used by the German Forces to supply their fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead fronts. The entire group was captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a patrol consisting of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of the German Army. All fifteen men were placed under interrogation in La Spezia and they were held in custody until the morning of 26 March 1944 when they were all executed by a firing squad. These men were never tried nor were they brought before any court or given any hearing; they were shot by order of Anton Dostler, then General Commanding the 75th German Army Corps.
“Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified by way of defense that he ordered the fifteen American soldiers to be shot pursuant to the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 on commando operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and not taken prisoners of war, even after they had been interrogated. He also testified that he would have been subject to court martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler order.
“The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler, as these findings and sentence appear in the original record of the trial and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy on 12 October 1945:
“'FINDINGS: General Dostler, as president of this commission it is my duty to inform you that the commission in closed session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all the members of the commission concurring in each finding of guilty, finds you of the specification and of the charge: “GUILTY'.
“'SENTENCE: And again in closed session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all of the members of the commission concurring, sentences you:
“'TO BE SHOT TO DEATH BY MUSKETRY'.” (2610-PS)
The order of 18 October 1942 remained in force, so far as the evidence shows, until the end of the war. On 22 June 1944 in a document initialed by Warlimont (506-PS) the OKW made it clear that the Hitler order was to be applied even in cases where the commando operation was undertaken by only one person:
“WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the army group judge [Heeresgruppenrichter] with the Supreme Commander Southwest of 20 May 44 (Br. B. Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order is to be applied even if the enemy employs only one person for a task. Therefore, it does not made any difference if several persons or a single person take part in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of participants in a commando operation in that such operations do not correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.” (506-PS)
The allied landing in Normandy early in June 1944, in the course of which large scale air-borne operations took place, raised among the Germans the question as to how far the Hitler order would be applied to Normandy, and in France behind the German lines. A memorandum (531-PS) dated 23 June 1944 and signed by Warlimont, starts by quoting a teletype from the Supreme Command in the West inquiring what should be done about applying the Hitler order to air-borne troops and commandos:
“Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 44:
“The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried out according to the order referred to. With the largescale landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and 4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the troops how far the concept 'within the limits of normal combat operations, etc.' is to be extended.
“The application of number 5 for all enemy soldiers in uniform penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest solution.” (531-PS)
Warlimont’s memorandum (531-PS) continues by reciting the position taken with reference to the request by the OKW Operations Staff, of which Warlimont was the Deputy Chief:
“Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff:
“1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after the enemy landing in the west.
“2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that the order is not valid for those enemy soldiers in uniform, who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to and including corps headquarters.
“3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is encumbent to determine whether the Commando order is to be applied or not.
“4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando undertakings of 18 Oct. 42 along with the above explanation.” (531-PS)
On 25 June 1944 the OKW replied to this inquiry in a teletype message (551-PS) signed by Keitel and initialed by Warlimont and Jodl:
“Subject: Treatment of Commando Participants.
“1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage units of 18 Oct. 1942 remains fully in force.
“Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the Corps Commands, according to No. 5 of the basic order of 18 Oct. 1942, remain exempted.
“2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to be turned over to the SD.
“3. All troops, committed outside the combat area of Normandy, are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the directives, issued for it.
“4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily, how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces Communiqué to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done toward previous commando undertakings in the same manners.” “[Initial] W [Warlimont] “[signature] Keitel (551-PS).
In July 1944, the question was raised within the German High Command as to whether the order of October 1942 should be applied to members of foreign military missions, with special regard to the British, American, and Soviet military missions which were cooperating with allied forces in Southeastern Europe, notably in Yugoslavia. A long document signed by Warlimont (1279-PS) embodies the discussions which were had at that time at OKW. It discloses that the Armed Forces Operational Staff recommended that the order should be applied to these military missions and drew up a draft order to this effect. The order which actually resulted from these discussions (537-PS), dated 30 July 1944 and signed by Keitel, provides:
“Re: Treatment of members of foreign 'Military Missions,' captured together with partisans.
“In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest members of foreign so-called 'Military Missions' (Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as speculated in the Special Orders regarding the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs but in conformity with the Fuehrer’s order are the elimination of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW/WFSt. 003830/42 g. Kdos).
“This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the Armed forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be destroyed after being made record.
“The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht “Keitel” (537-PS)
Pursuant to this order, approximately 15 members of an allied military mission to Slovakia were executed in January 1945. An affidavit (L-51) signed by one Adolf Zutter, who was the adjutant at the camp where the executions took place, reads in part:
“Concerning the American Military Mission which had landed behind the German main line of resistance in Slovakian or Hungarian territory in January 1945, I remember when in January 1945 it was brought to the concentration camp at Mauthausen. I suppose there were about 12 to 15 newcomers. They wore an American or Canadian uniform, of brown-green color, blouse, and cap made of cloth. Eight or ten days after their arrival the order for execution came in by radiogram or teletype. Colonel Ziereis came to me in the office and said: now Kaltenbrunner has authorized the execution. The letter was secret and had the signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. These people were then shot according to martial law and T/Sgt [Oberscharfuehrer] Niedermeyer handed their belongings over to me. In spring 1945, a written order based on an Army manual to destroy all files was received by the security officer in Mauthausen, 1st Lt. [Obersturmfuehrer] Reimer; this order had been sent by Lt [Untersturmfuehrer] Meinhardt, security officer of Section D in Oranienburg. Reimer forwarded this order personally in written form to the various sections and supervised the compliance with it. Among the files were also all the execution orders.” (L-51)
The foregoing documents with respect to the order of 18 October 1942, and its subsequent enforcement and application, clearly demonstrate that members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the defendants Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raeder, ordered and directed the commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces, and that these orders were carried out in numerous instances.
(b) War Crimes on the Eastern Front. The order of October 1942 with respect to the murdering of captured commandos operated chiefly in the Western theater of war, against British and American commando troops. This was natural since Germany occupied almost the entire Western coast of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that period land fighting in Western Europe was largely limited to commando operations. The Mediterranean Theater likewise lent itself to this type of warfare.
On the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale land fighting in Poland and the Soviet Union from 1941 on, the German forces were fighting amongst a hostile population and had to face extensive partisan activities behind their lines. It will be shown that the activities of the German Armed Forces against partisans and other elements of the population became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial policies, and a cloak for the ruthless and barbaric massacre of Jews and of numerous segments of the Slavic population which were regarded by the Nazis as undesirable. It was the policy of the German Armed Forces to behave with the utmost severity to the civilian population of the occupied territories, and to conduct its military operations, particularly against partisans, so as to further these Nazi policies. It will be shown that the German Armed Forces supported, assisted, and acted in cooperation with the SS Groups which were especially charged with antipartisan activities. Members of the General Staff and High Command Group ordered, directed, encouraged, and were fully aware of these criminal policies and activities.
It is not proposed to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes committed by the Nazis on the Eastern Front; evidence of those crimes are to be presented by the Soviet delegation. Evidence concerning the activities of the SS, SD, and Gestapo will be discussed only to the extent necessary to clarify the relations between these organizations and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe.
These policies of ruthless severity to the civilian population of the occupied Eastern territories were determined upon and made official for the German Armed Forces even before the invasion of the Soviet Union took place. An order by Hitler, dated 13 May 1941, and signed by Keitel as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (C-50) provided: “Order
“Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and PROCEDURE IN THE AREA 'Barbarossa' and special military measures.
“The application of martial law aims in the first place at maintaining discipline.
“The fact that the operational areas in the East are so farflung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task.
“This is possible only if the troops take ruthless action themselves against any threat from the enemy population.
“For these reasons I herewith issue the following order effective for the area 'Barbarossa' (area of operations, army rear area, and area of political administration).
“I. Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians.
“1. Until further notice the military courts and the courtsmartial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.
“2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military, whether they are fighting or in flight.
“3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed.
“4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible, persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.
“On the orders of an officer with the powers of at a least Battalion Commander, collective despotic measures will be taken without delay against localities from which cunning or malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.
“5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of civil courts.
“6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce military jurisdiction for civilians, in areas which are sufficiently settled.
“For the area of the 'Political Administration' this order will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
“II. Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants by members of the Armed Forces and its employees.
“1. With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution is not obligatory even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offence.
“2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent suffering of the German people and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.
“3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal measures are necessary. In the case of offences against inhabitants it will order a court martial only if maintenance of discipline or security of the Forces call for such a measure. This applies for instance to serious offences originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores or other captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a rule be judged no less severely.
“The order to institute proceedings requires in every single case the signature of the Judicial Authority.
“4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.
“III. Responsibility of the Military Commanders.
“Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are personally responsible for seeing that:
“1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on principles set out under I above.
“2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instructions and of verbal information in which the political intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs.
“3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command. “IV. Security.
Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as “Most Secret": “By order “Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. “(signed) Keitel” (C-50)
Less than three months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, these instructions were amplified and made even more drastic. An order dated 16 September 1941 and signed by Keitel, was widely distributed (C-148). This order was of general application in all theaters of war, but was clearly of primary importance for the Eastern Front:
“Subject: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories.
“1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare.
“It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed by Moscow, who is also responsible or the apparently trivial isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise quiet.
“In view of the many political and economic crises in the occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that nationalist and other circles will make full use of this opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by associating themselves with the Communist insurrection.
“This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort, which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces to the main centers of disturbance.
“2. The measures taken up to now to deal with general insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The Fuehrer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with the most drastic means in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time.
“Only this course, which has always been followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of influence of great peoples, can restore order.
“3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following general directions:
“a. It should be inferred, in every case of resistance to the German occupying Forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.
“b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most drastic measures should be taken immediately on the first indication, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier’s life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect.
“The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not accord with these principles and should therefore not be followed.”
“4. The Commanding Officers in the occupied territories are seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay to all military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist measures of insurrection.” “[Indecipherable initial] “Keitel” (C-148)
The German military leaders took up, sponsored, and instructed their troops to practice the racial policies of the Nazis. On 10 October 1941 a directive was issued by Field Marshal von Reichenau, the Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the German 8th Army, then operating on the Eastern Front (UK-81). Reichenau (who died in 1942) was therefore a member of the group, and here is what he had to say:
“Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.
“Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations.
“Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e., the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.
“The combating of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle.
“The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the Armed Forces from Army kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply.
“When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories. The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative considering the long and vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation of the battle so the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male population who were in a position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous apparently anti-Soviet elements which originates from a 'wait and see' attitude, must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judges and treated a member of the Soviet System.
“The fear of the German countermeasures must be stronger than the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far from all political considerations of the future the soldier has to fulfill two tasks:
“1. Complete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces.
“2. The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in Russia.
“This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger. “Commander-in-Chief “(Signed) von Reichenau
“Field Marshal.” (UK-81)
Immediately preceding Reichenau’s order is a memorandum, dated 28 October 1941, which shows that Reichenau’s order met with Hitler’s approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. It is also clear that Reichenau’s order was thereafter circulated down to divisional level, and was received by the 12th Infantry Division on 27 November 1941. (UK-81)
These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German military leaders, it is no wonder that the Wehrmacht joined in the monstrous behavior of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front. Units (known as Einsatzgruppen) were formed by the SIPO and SD and sent out to operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in order to combat partisans and to “cleanse” and “pacify” the civilian population.
In a directive dated 19 March 1943, the Commanding Officer of one of these units praised and justified such activities as the shooting of Hungarian Jews, the shooting of children, and the total burning down of villages (3012-PS). The officer directed that in order not to obstruct the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry,
“as a rule no more children will be shot.” (3012-PS)
A report covering the work of the Einsatzgruppen in the German occupied territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October 1941 disregards every vestige of decency (R-102). It states cynically that, in the Baltic areas,
“spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not been recorded, on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination” (R-102).
This report shows clearly that “pacification” and “anti-partisan activity” are mere code words for “extermination of Jews and Slavs” just as much as “Weserubung” was a code word for the invasion and subjugation of Norway and Denmark.
Documents quoted earlier show that the German Army was operating under similar policies and directives. It only remains to show that, in these practices, the Army and the SS worked hand in glove. The report describing the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto (1061-PS) stresses the close cooperation between the SS and the Army:
“The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the Waffen SS, Police and Wehrmacht became; they fulfilled their duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted from early morning until late at night. At night, search patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their stores from abandoned dugouts and for contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news with them.” (1061-PS)
To the same general effect is a report dated 5 June 1943 by the German General Commissioner for Minsk (R-135). This report describes an anti-partisan operation in which 4,500 “enemies” were killed, 5,000 suspected partisans were killed, and 59 Germans were killed. The cooperation in this adventure by the German Army is shown in the following excerpt:
“The above mentioned figures show, that we have to count with a strong annihilation of the population. The fact that only 492 rifles were found on the 4,500 enemy dead, demonstrates that the numerous peasants from the country were also among the enemy dead. The battalion Direwanger is particularly known to have destroyed numerous human lives. Among the 5,000 partisan suspects who were shot, are numerous women and children.
“Units of the troops [Wehrmannschaften] also took part in the action, by order of SS Lt. General [Obergruppenfuehrer] von dem Bach. SA Colonel [Standartenfuehrer] Kunze led the troops [Wehrmannschaften], who included also 90 members of my authority and of the district-commissariat Minsk-Stadt. Our men returned yesterday from the action without any losses. I refuse the use of officials and Reich-Employees of the General Commissariat in the rear areas. The men who work for me have not been classified as essential, after all in order to fight the partisans actively in the place of the Armed Forces and the Police.
“Of the troops [Wehrmannschaften], one railroad employee had been wounded (shot through the lung). The political effect of this large scale action on the peaceful population had been disastrous, because of the numerous executions of women and children. The town BEGOMIE was cleared by the Armed Forces and the Police in December. The population of Begomie was predominantly favorable to us. Begomie, which has been fortified as a strong point by the partisans, has been destroyed by German Air Attacks during the fighting.” (R-135)
The SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach referred to in this quotation is mentioned in Himmler’s speech to a gathering of SS generals at Posen on 4 October 1943 (1919-PS). In this speech Himmler announced the appointment of von dem Bach to be Chief of all anti-partisan units:
“In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of the Anti-partisan Units” [Bandenkampf-Verbunde]. Our comrade SS-Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly political one. Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful.
“It is notable that, by setting up this department we have gained (P. 58) for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army, and the next step, which is the High Command of an army or even of a group-if you wish to call it that.” (1919-PS)
The report of Einsatzgruppe A, (L-180) covering the period up to 15 October 1941, makes clear beyond doubt the participation of the German military leaders and Armed Forces in these extermination policies:
“Action-Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June 1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group North consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer-Group 4 had left the day before. Our task was to hurriedly establish personal contact with the commanders of the Armies and with the commander of the army of the rear area. It must be stressed from the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer-Group 4 under Col. Gen. Hoeppner, it was very close, almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the first days, were cleared up mainly through personal discussions.”
“Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period.”
“After the failure of purely military activities such as the placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to look out for new methods. The Action-Group undertook to search for new methods. Soon therefore the Armed Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their methods of combating the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous reports concerning the struggle against the partisans.”
“1. Instigation of self-cleansing actions.
“Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered very heavily under the government of Bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be expected that after the liberation from that foreign government, they (i.e., the population themselves) would render harmless most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to set in motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less important in view of the future to establish the unshakable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities could not be found out. “In Lithuania this was achieved for the first time by partisan activities in Kowno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. KLIMATIS, the leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25. to 26.6 the Lithuanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several Synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a Jewish Dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind.
“These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.
“It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar cleansing actions in Latvia. Essentially the reason was that the whole of the national stratum of leaders had been assassinated or destroyed by the Soviets, especially in Riga. It was possible though through similar influences on the Latvian auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against Jews also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed and about 400 Jews were killed. As the population of Riga quieted down quickly, further pogroms were not convenient.”
“5. Other jobs of the Security Police.
“1. Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and became a danger to the general security; therefore
in Aglona (Lithuania) … 544 lunatics
in Mariampol (Lithuania) … 109 lunatics and
in Magutowo (near Luga) … 95 lunatics
“When it was decided to extend the German operations to Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Action Group A to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941 to parts of Action Detachments 2 and 3 and to the Staff of the Group to advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Action Group A which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer-Group 4.”
“Action detachment of Action Group A of the Security Police participated from the beginning in the fight against the nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength, equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on.” (L-180).
Certain affidavits, furnished by responsible officials in both the Wehrmacht and the SS, fill in much of the background for the documents quoted above. An affidavit (3710-PS) by Walter Schellenberg who, at the time under discussion, was an important official in the RSHA, states:
“In the middle of May 1941, as far as I remember, the Chief of Amt 4 of the RSHA (SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller), in the name of the Chief of the RSHA (SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich), held discussions with the Generalquartiermeister of the Army (General Wagner) about questions connected with the operations of the SIPO and SD within the bounds of the Field Army during the imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could come to no agreement with Mueller and therefore asked Heydrich to send another representative. I was at that time Chief of Section E in Amt 4 of the RSHA under Chief of Amt Mueller and was sent by Heydrich to Wagner because of my experience in matters of protocol for the purpose of drawing up the final agreement. According to the instructions given to me, I was supposed to make sure that this agreement would provide that the responsible headquarters in the Army would be firmly obligated to give complete support to all activities of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD. I discussed the problem of this mutual relationship in great detail with Wagner. In accordance with this discussion I then presented him with the completed draft of an agreement, which met with his full approval. This draft of an agreement was the basis for a final discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May 1941.
“The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember, were substantially as follows. Its basis was the Fuehrer’s command, mentioned at the very beginning of the agreement, that the SIPO and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field Army, with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in conquered front-line areas as well as in conquered rear supply zones by every means and as quickly as possible. The various areas were then set down in which the SIPO and SD were to be active and operating. The individual Combat Groups were then assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the campaign and the individual Combat Commandos to the respective armies which were to take part in the campaign.
“The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in detail:
“1. In front-line areas: in complete subordination to the Field Army, tactically, functionally and administratively;
“2. In rear operational areas: in merely administrative subordination to the Field Army, but under command and functional control of the RSHA;
“3. In rear Army areas: arrangement as in 2;
“4. In areas of the civil administration in the East: same as in the Reich.
“The tactical and functional authority and responsibility of front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the Combat Commandos found no limitation in the agreement and therefore needed no further clarification.
“The agreement made it clear that the administrative subordination embraced not only disciplinary subordination but also the obligation for rear headquarters of the Field Army to support the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos in matters of supply (gasoline, rations, etc.) as well as in the use of the communications network.
“This agreement was signed by Heydrich and Wagner in my presence. Wagner signed it either 'acting for' or 'by order of' the OKH.
“After Wagner and Heydrich had affixed their signatures, both of them asked me to leave the room for half an hour. Just while leaving I heard how they both wanted to discuss in complete privacy the Fuehrer’s command, which was apparently known in advance by each of them personally, and its far-reaching implications. After the half hour was over I was called in once more just to say goodbye.
“Today I read the 'Operational and Situational Report No. 6 of the Combat Groups of the SIPO and SD in the USSR (covering the period from 1 to 31 October 1941),' as well as the 'Comprehensive Report of Combat Group A up to 15 October 1941.' The whole substance of these reports shows that the prime mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD was to undertake and carry out mass executions of Jews, Communists and other elements of resistance. It is also clear from the above-cited 'Comprehensive Report,' which embraces no more than the first four months of these operations, that the cooperation of the respective Oberbefehlshabers with Combat Group A was 'in general good and in individual instances, for instance that of Panzergruppe 4 under Colonel General Hoeppner, very close, in fact almost cordial' (page 1). From an inclosure to this same report, bearing the title 'Summary of the Number of Executed Persons,' particularly from the figures arranged according to the successively conquered areas, it is evident that the SIPO and SD operated in front-line areas so as fully to carry out their prime function of conducting mass executions of all elements of resistance even from the very beginning of the advance against Russia. I acknowledge the reliability and authenticity of both of the above cited reports. Therefore I must today express my firm conviction that the Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to take part in the Russian campaign were accurately informed through the normal OKH channels of communication about the extensive future mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD as including planned mass executions of Jews, Communists and all other elements of resistance.
“In the beginning of June 1941 all of the Ic counter-intelligence officers, and, as far as I remember, all of the Ic officers of all army groups, armies, army corps and some of the divisions which were to take part in the coming Russian campaign were called in by Wagner, together with Heydrich and the Chief of the Amt for Counter-Intelligence Abroad in the OKW (Admiral Canaris) for a general conference in the OKW Building at Berlin. The responsible leaders of the combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD were for the most part likewise present. I was also there. The essential substance and purpose of this meeting was to outline the military strategy against Russia and to announce the above-mentioned details of the written agreement reached by Wagner and Heydrich.
“This group of Ic counter-intelligence officers and Ic officers remained at Berlin a few days longer and was carefully instructed in several additional conferences, at which I was not present, about further details of the coming Russian campaign. I assume that these discussions were concerned with the exact delineation of the Fuehrer’s command 'to smash utterly all resistance in occupied areas by every means and as quickly as possible,' including even planned mass executions of all elements of resistance. Otherwise the cooperation between the Field Army and the Combat Groups, which in the above-cited documents is clearly revealed as existing but a few weeks thereafter, could not in my opinion have been forthcoming. In any event there is hardly any reason to doubt that these Ic counter-intelligence officers, immediately upon their return from Berlin, accurately informed their own superiors, including all Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to march against Russia, about the full extent of the agreement.”
“(signed) Walter Schellenberg
“26. XI. 45” (3710-PS)
Another affidavit which sheds light on the relations between the Wehrmacht and the SS at the top level with respect to antipartisan warfare (3711-PS) is sworn to by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army who worked in the War History Section of OKW from 1941 to 1945:
“I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the war History Section of the OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.
“Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in the Fuehrer’s headquarters with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the Fuehrer’s appointee for the compilation of the history of the war.
“Counterpartisan warfare was originally a responsibility of Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces to handle this matter.
“In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW had to give it particular attention. In the Army Operations Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a specific officer was assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his special job. It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations against the partisans with Wehrmacht troops in Russian as well as Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while threatened to cut off the lines of communication and transport routes that were necessary to support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that period, causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to 300 locomotives.
“It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-known that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the Army’s General Staff. It was further well-known that Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as deterrents.
“I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to Generaloberst Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS-Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the German side.”
“(Signed) Wilhelm Scheidt
“Retired Captain of the Reserve” (3711-PS)
The foregoing documents show the arrangements which were made between the OKW, OKH and Himmler’s headquarters with respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively that the plans and arrangements were made jointly, and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of but an active participant in these plans. The same is true of the field commanders. General Roettiger, who attained the rank of General of Panzer Troops (the equivalent of a Lt. General in the American Army), has made three statements (3713-PS, 3714-PS). Roettiger was Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group Center, on the Eastern Front during the period of which he speaks:
“As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had occasion to concern myself officially with antipartisan warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security battalions.
“At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In accordance with orders, Jews, political commissars and agents were delivered up to the SD.
“The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order from highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the antipartisan war can have been intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the military struggle of the army against the partisans.” (3713-PS)
Roettiger’s second statement reads:
“Supplementary to my above declaration I declare:
“As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war against the partisans more severely than was required at the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them could very well be used as members of native volunteer units against the partisans.
“Alongside the necessary active combating of partisans there was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the women too were continually urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries and then from time to time were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account on the orders of the Army Group to give up security forces to the neighboring army to the south.
“(signed) Roettiger” (3713-PS)
Roettiger’s third statement reads:
“During my period of service in 1942/3 as chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Central Army Group, SD units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose of counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the local civilian population with the result that my commanding officer therefore asked the commander-in-chief of the army group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The reason for this first and foremost was that the excesses of the SD units by way of execution of Jews and other persons assumed such proportions as to threaten the security of the Army in its combat areas because of the aroused civilian populace. Although in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as possible, because of the danger which existed for our troops.
“(Signed) Roettiger” (3714-PS)
An extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff (Warlimont), dated 14 March 1943, deals with the problem of shipping off suspected partisans to concentration camps in Germany (1786-PS). It appears clearly from this extract that the Army was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment for suspected partisans, without at the same time obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied territories:
“The General Quartermaster [General Quartiermeister] together with the Economic Staff (East) [Wirtschaftsstab Ost] has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison camps or to 'training centres in their own area,' and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.
“In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff [Wehrmachtfuehrungstab] this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the 'peaceful population' which has been called upon to work. He recommends therefore transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] in the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader [Hoehrer SS und Polizeifuehrer] and orders that the difference between 'punitive work' and 'work in Germany' is to be made clear to the population.” (1786-PS)
A final group of four affidavits show that the SD Einsatzgruppen on the Eastern Front Operated under the command and with the necessary support of the Wehrmacht, and that the nature of their activities were fully known to the Wehrmacht. The first of these is a statement (3715-PS) by Ernst Rode; who was an SS Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor of the Police, and was head of Himmler’s personal command staff from 1943 to 1945:
“I, Ernst Rode, was formerly chief of the Command Staff of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, having taken over this position in the spring of 1943 as successor to former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt Knoblauch. My last rank was Generalmajor of Police and of the Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish forces necessary for antipartisan warfare to the higher SS and police leaders and to guarantee the support of army forces. This took place through personal discussions with the leading officers of the Operations Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General von Buttlar, Generaloberst Guderian, Generaloberst Zeitzler, General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg and Colonel v. Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was under the sole command of the respective Army commander-in-chief in operational areas (for instance in the Central Army Group under Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch) and since police troops for the most part could not be spared from the Reichscommissariates, the direction of this warfare lay practically always entirely in the hands of the army. In the same way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the OKH. SS and police troops transferred to operational areas from the Reichscommissariates to support the army groups were likewise under the latter’s command. Such transfers often resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the Reichscommissariates. According to a specific agreement between Himmler and the OKH, the direction of individual operations lay in the hands of the troop leader who commanded the largest troop contingent. It was therefore possible that an army general could have SS and police under him, and on the other hand that army troops could be placed under a general of the SS and police. Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas could never be ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the OKH to order it, until 1944 mostly through the intervention of Generalquartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary Ganzenmueller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the army groups concerned, for compliance.
“The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had already resulted in Draconian laws being issued by Hitler for its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops as well as to those of the SS and police. There was absolutely no difference in the manner in which these two components carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as embittered against the enemy as those of the SS and police. As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried out by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping with Himmler’s desires or intentions. As proof of this the order of the OKW and OKH can be adduced, which directed that all captured partisans, for instance such as Jews, agents and political commissars, should without delay be handed over by the troops to the SD for special treatment. This order also contained the provision that in anti-partisan warfare no prisoners except the above named be taken. That anti-partisan warfare was carried on by army troops mercilessly and to every extreme I know as the result of discussions with army troop leaders, for instance with General Herzog, Commander of the XXXVIII Army Corps and with his chief of staff, Colonel Pamberg in the General Staff, both of whom support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that anti-partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.
“(Signed) Ernst Rode” (3715-PS)
Another and shorter statement by Rode reads:
“As far as I know, the SD Combat Groups with the individual army groups were completely subordinate to them, that is to say tactically as well as in every other way. The commanders-in-chief were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the missions and operational methods of these units. They approved of these missions and operational methods because apparently they never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews, agents and commissars, who were handed over to the SD underwent the same cruel death, as victims of so-called 'purifications,' is a proof that the executions had their approval. This also corresponded with what the highest political and military authorities wanted. Frequent mention of these methods were naturally made in my presence at the OKW and OKH, and they were condemned by most SS and police officers, just as they were condemned by most army officers. On such occasions I always pointed out that it would have been quite within the scope of the authority of the commanders-in-chief of army groups to oppose such methods. I am of the firm conviction that an energetic and unified protest by all field marshals would have resulted in a change of these missions and methods. If they should ever assert that they would then have been succeeded by even more ruthless commanders-in-chief, this, in my opinion, would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.
“(Signed) Ernst Rode” (3716-PS)
In an affidavit by Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, who at the beginning of the Russian campaign was a staff officer with the 17th Panzer Division, the following statement is made:
“At the beginning of the Russian campaign I was the first General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had the mission of driving across the Bug north of Brest-Litovsk. Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division received through channels from the OKW a written order of the Fuehrer. This order directed that Russian commissars be shot upon capture, without judicial process, immediately and ruthlessly. This order extended to all units of the Eastern Army. Although the order was supposed to be relayed to companies, the Commanding General of the XXXVII Panzer Corps (General of Panzer Troops Lemelsen) forbade its being passed on to the troops because it appeared unacceptable to him from military and moral points of view.
“(Signed) Bogislav v. Bonin “Colonel” (3718-PS)
Finally an affidavit (3717-PS) by Heusinger, who was a Generalleutnant in the German Army, and who from 1940 to 1944 was Chief of the Operations Section at OKH, states as follows:
“1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940 I was Ia of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn 1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.
“When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to the chief of the General Staff of the Army the Function of advising him on all operational matters in the Russian theater.
“This made the chief of the General Staff of the Army responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the east, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the operational areas, for instance, all troops (security units, SS units, police) stationed in the Reichscommissariates.
“All police and SS units in the Reichscommissariates were also subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. When it was necessary to transfer such units into operational areas, this had to be done by order of the chief of the OKW. On the other hand, corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered by the OKW with the concurrence of the chief of the General Staff of the Army.
“The high SS and police leaders normally had command of operations against partisans. If stronger army units were committed together with the SS and police units within operational areas, a high commander of the army could be designated commander of the operation.
“During anti-partisan operations within operational areas all forces committed for these operations were under the command of the respective commander-in-chief of the army group.
“2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW (Keitel) to the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of these orders to army groups, for instance such orders as those concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the population, as well as those establishing the basic principles governing reprisals against the inhabitants.
“3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the treatment of the local populace as well as anti-partisan warfare in operational areas, in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was the responsibility of the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.
“4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare in operational areas presented the highest political and military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out their plans, namely the systematic extermination of Slavism and Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always regarded these cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult.
(At this point, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was called upon for oral testimony. His testimony on direct examination was substantially to the same effect as his affidavit 3712-PS.)
(c) Responsibility of the Group for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment. The foregoing evidence against the General Staff and High Command Group is such that no German soldier can view it with anything but shame. The German High Command developed and applied a policy of terror against commandos and paratroopers, in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, on the Western Front. On the Eastern Front it descended to savagery. In advance of the attack against the Soviet Union, the High Command ordered the troops to take “ruthless action", left it to the discretion of any officer to decide whether suspected civilians should be immediately shot, and empowered any officer with the powers of a Battalion Commander to take “collective despotic measures” against localities. Offenses committed against civilians by German soldiers, however, were not required to be prosecuted, and prosecution was suggested only where desirable in order to maintain discipline and security from a military standpoint.
Soon after the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were told by the OKW that “a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing” and were encouraged to observe a punitive ratio of 50 to 100 Communists for one German soldier. German troops were told that they were to take “revenge on subhuman Jewry” and that they were not merely soldiers but “bearers of ruthless national ideology and avengers of bestialities". The High Command and the chief lieutenants of Himmler jointly planned the establishment of the Einsatzgruppen, the behavior of which has been shown in detail. These groups when in operational areas were under the command of the German Army, and German soldiers joined in their savagery. The Einsatzgruppen were completely dependent upon the Armed Forces for supplies with which to carry out their atrocities. The practices employed against the civilian population and against partisans were well known to all high ranking German officers on the Eastern Front. No doubt some of them disapproved of what was going on. Nonetheless, the full support of the military leaders continued to be given to these activities.
The record is clear that the General Staff and High Command Group, including the defendants, who were members of the Group and numerous other members ordered, directed, and participated in war crimes and crimes against humanity as specified in counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment.
The world must bear in mind that the German High Command is not an evanescent thing, the creature of a decade of unrest, or a school of thought or tradition which is shattered or utterly discredited. The German High Command and military tradition have in the past achieved victory and survived defeat. They have met with triumph and disaster, and have survived through a singular durability not unmixed with stupidity. An eminent American statesman and diplomat, Mr. Sumner Welles, has written ("The Time for Decision", 1944, pp. 261-262) that:
“* * * The authority to which the German people have so often and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of to-day, but the German General Staff.
“It will be said that this insistence that the German General Staff has been the driving force in German policy is a dangerous oversimplification. I am not disposed to minimize the importance of other factors in German history. They all have their place. But I am convinced that each of them has played its part only in so far as it was permitted to do so by the real master of the German race, namely, German militarism, personified in, and channelled through, the German General Staff.”
“Whether their ostensible ruler is the Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or Adolf Hitler, the continuing loyalty of the bulk of the population is given to that military force controlled and guided by the German General Staff. To the German people, the army to-day, as in the past, is the instrument by which German domination will be brought about. Generations of Germans may pass. The nation may undergo defeat after defeat. But if the rest of the world permits it, the German General Staff will continue making its plans for the future.”
The German General Staff and High Command is indicted not now at the bar of history, but on specific charges of crimes against International Law and the dictates of the conscience of mankind as embodied in the Charter. The picture that emerges from the evidence is that of a group of men with great powers for good or ill who chose the latter; who deliberately set out to arm Germany to the point where the German will could be imposed on the rest of the world; and who gladly joined with the most evil forces at work in Germany. “Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired", Blomberg and Blaskowitz say, and that is obviously the truth. The converse is no less clear; the military leaders furnished Hitler with the means and might which were necessary to his mere survival, to say nothing of the accomplishment of those purposes which seem to the world so ludicrously impossible in 1932 and so fearfully imminent in 1942.
It was said above that the German militarists were inept as well as persistent. Helpless as Hitler would have been without them, he succeeded in mastering them. The generals and the Nazis were allies in 1933. But it was not enough for the Nazis that the generals should be voluntary allies; Hitler wanted them permanently and completely under his control. Devoid of political skill or principle, the generals lacked the mentality or morality to resist. On the day of the death of President Hindenburg in August 1934, the German officers swore a new oath. Their previous oath had been to the Fatherland; now it was to a man, Adolf Hitler. It was not until 18 days later that the law requiring this change was passed. A year later the Nazi emblem became part of their uniform and the Nazi flag their standard. By a clever process of infiltration into key positions, Hitler seized control of the entire military machine.
No doubt these generals will ask what they could have done about it. It will be said that they were helpless; and that to protect their jobs and families and their own lives they had to follow Hitler’s decisions. No doubt this became true. But the generals were a key factor in Hitler’s rise to complete power and a partner in his criminal aggressive designs. It is always difficult and dangerous to withdraw from a criminal conspiracy. Never has it been suggested that a conspirator may claim mercy on the ground that his fellow-conspirators threatened him with harm should he withdraw from the plot.
In many respects the spectacle which the German General Staff and High Command group presents today is the most degrading of all the groups and organizations charged in the Indictment. The bearers of a tradition not devoid of valour and honour, they emerge from this war stained both by criminality and ineptitude. Attracted by the militaristic and aggressive Nazi policies, the German generals found themselves drawn into adventures of a scope they had not foreseen. From crimes in which almost all of them participated willingly and approvingly were born others in which they participated because they were too ineffective to alter the governing Nazi policies, and because they had to continue collaboration to save their own skins.
Having joined the partnership, the General Staff and High Command group planned and carried through manifold acts of aggression which turned Europe into a charnel-house, and caused the Armed Forces to be used for foul practices foully executed of terror, pillage, murder and wholesale slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that the military uniform shall be their cloak, or that they may find sanctuary by pleading membership in the profession to which they are an eternal disgrace.
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES
Document Description Vol. Page
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 9 … I 6
International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H); Appendix B … I 29,27
3737-PS Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Articles 4, 23 … VI 590, 594
3738-PS Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to treatment of Prisoners of War, Articles 2, 3 … VI 600
Note: A single Asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court.
*375-PS Case Green with wider implications, report of Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1938. (USA 84) … III 280
*386-PS Notes on a conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. (USA 25) … III 295
*388-PS File of papers on Case Green (the plan for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, April-October 1938. (USA 26) … III 305
*444-PS Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl, 12 November 1940, concerning plans for prosecution of war in Mediterranean Area and occupation of Greece. (GB 116) … III 403
*446-PS Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl, Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, concerning the Invasion of Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) … III 407
*447-PS Top Secret Operational Order to Order No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March 1941, concerning Directives for special areas. (USA 135) … III 409
*498-PS Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA 501) … III 416
*503-PS Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October 1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation of his commando order of the day before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) … III 426
*506-PS Draft of top secret letter, 22 June 1944, initialed by Warlimont, concerning enemy agents. (USA 549) … III 430
*508-PS OKW correspondence, November 1942, about shooting of British glider troops in Norway. (USA 545) … III 430
*509-PS Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, reporting “special treatment” for three British commandos. (USA 547) … III 433
*512-PS Teletype from Army Commander in Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning interrogation of saboteurs before shooting; and memorandum in reply from OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546) … III 433
*526-PS Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, concerning saboteurs captured and shot in Norway. (USA 502) … III 434
*531-PS OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing inquiry from Supreme Command West about treatment of paratroopers. (USA 550) … III 435
*537-PS Order signed by Keitel, 30 July 1944, concerning treatment of members of foreign “Military Missions", captured together with partisans. (USA 553) … III 439
*551-PS Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, concerning treatment of Commando participants. (USA 551) … III 440
*728-PS Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) … III 526
729-PS Handwritten note initialed Keitel, 14 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators … III 529
730-PS Draft of letter to Foreign Office, attention Ambassador Ritter, 15 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy aviators … III 530
731-PS Memorandum initialed by Jodl, 22 May, concerning measures to be taken against Anglo-American air crews in special instances … III 531
732-PS Letter from Feske to Keitel, 19 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators … III 532
733-PS Telephone memorandum, 26 June 1944, concerning treatment of terror aviators … III 533
*735-PS Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to fix the cases in which the application of Lynch Law against Allied airmen would be justified. (GB 151) … III 533
737-PS Conference Notes, 4 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators … III 536
*740-PS Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators. (GB 153) … III 537
741-PS Secret memorandum, 5 July 1944, concerning terror aviators … III 538
*789-PS Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, 23 November 1939, to which all Supreme Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) … III 572
*798-PS Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 29) … III 581
*872-PS Memorandum of Discussion between the Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case “Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” (African operation). (USA 134) … III 626
*1061-PS Official report of Stroop, SS and Police Leader of Warsaw, on destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. (USA 275) … III 718
*1279-PS Minutes of meeting concerning treatment of members of foreign “Military Missions” captured with partisan groups and draft of order, 7 July 1944 pertaining thereto. (USA 552) … III 857
*1541-PS Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13 December 1940. (GB 117) … IV 101
*1746-PS Conference between German and Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; speech by Hitler to German High Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27 March 1941; plan for invasion of Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) … IV 272
*1775-PS Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 February 1938. (USA 73) … IV 357
*1780-PS Excerpts from diary kept by General Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA 72) … IV 360
*1786-PS Excerpt of 14 March 1943 of War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. (USA 561) … IV 369
*1809-PS Entries from Jodl’s diary, February 1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) … IV 377
*1816-PS Stenographic report of the meeting on The Jewish Question, under the Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, 12 November 1938. (USA 261) … IV 425
*1919-PS Himmler’s speech to SS Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA 170) … IV 558
*2261-PS Directive from Blomberg to Supreme Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) … IV 934
*2327-PS Two top secret memoranda, 14 June 1939, concerning operation “Fall Weiss". (USA 539) … IV 1035
*2385-PS Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30 August 1945. (USA 68) … V 23
*2610-PS Affidavit of Frederick W. Roche, Major, U.S. Army, 7 November 1945. (USA 548) … V 330
*2802-PS German Foreign Office notes of conference on 13 March 1939 between Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) … V 443
*3012-PS Order signed Christiansen, 19 March 1943, to all group leaders of Security Service, and record of telephone conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March 1943. (USA 190) … V 731
*3040-PS Secret order of Reichsfuehrer SS, 20 February 1942, concerning commitment of manpower from the East. (USA 207) … V 744
*3702-PS Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531) … VI 411
*3703-PS Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA 532) … VI 413
*3704-PS Affidavit of Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, 7 November 1945. (USA 536) … VI 414
*3705-PS Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA 535) … VI 415
*3706-PS Affidavit of Colonel-General Johannes Blaskowitz, 10 November 1945. (USA 537) … VI 417
*3707-PS Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533) … VI 419
*3708-PS Affidavit of Colonel Bernd von Brauchitsch, 20 November 1945. (USA 534) … VI 419
*3710-PS Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 26 November 1945. (USA 557) … VI 420
*3711-PS Affidavit of Captain Wilhelm Scheidt, 26 November 1945. (USA 558) … VI 424
3712-PS Affidavit of General von dem Bach, 27 November 1945 … VI 425
*3713-PS Affidavit of General Roettiger, 8 December 1945. (USA 559) … VI 429
*3714-PS Affidavit of General Roettiger, 28 November 1945. (USA 560) … VI 430
*3715-PS Affidavit of Major General Rode, 30 November 1945. (USA 562) … VI 431
*3716-PS Affidavit of Major General Rode, 30 NOVEMBER 1945. (USA 563) … VI 433
*3717-PS Affidavit of General Heusinger, 1 December 1945. (USA 564) … VI 434
*3718-PS Affidavit of Colonel v. Bonin, 1 December 1945. (USA 565) … VI 435
*3739-PS Memo on General Staff and High Command and affidavit thereto. (USA 778) … VI 624
*3868-PS Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning execution of 3,000,000 people at Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA 819) … VI 787
*C-5 Memorandum to Supreme Command of the Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) … VI 815
*C-23 Unsigned documents found in official Navy files containing notes year by year from 1927 to 1940 on reconstruction of the German Navy, and dated 18 February 1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA 49) … VI 827
*C-35 Entry in Naval War Diary, January 1941, p. 401. (USA 132) … VI 852
*C-50 Covering letters and order of 13 May 1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless treatment of civilians in the USSR for offenses committed by them. (USA 554; GB 162) … VI 871
*C-63 Keitel order on preparation for “Weseruebung", 27 January 1940. (GB 87) … VI 883
*C-64 Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB 86) … VI 884
*C-65 Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder concerning visit of Quisling. (GB 85) … VI 885
*C-66 Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” and “Weseruebung". (GB 81) … VI 887
*C-78 Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, convening conference on Barbarossa on 14 June. (USA 139) … VI 909
*C-102 Document signed by Hitler relating to operation “Otto", 11 March 1938. (USA 74) … VI 911
*C-102 Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 for “Fall Weiss", operation against Poland. (GB 41) … VI 916
*C-122 Extract from Naval War Diary. Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 October 1939. (GB 82) … VI 928
*C-126 Preliminary Time Table for “Fall Weiss” and directions for secret mobilization. (GB 45) … VI 932
*C-136 OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 October 1938, signed by Hitler and initialed by Keitel. (USA 104) … VI 947
*C-138 Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the OKW. (USA 105) … VI 950
*C-139 Directive for operation “Schulung” signed by Blomberg, 2 May 1935. (USA 53) … VI 951
*C-142 Intention of the Army High Command and Orders, signed by Brauchitsch. (USA 538) … VI 956
*C-148 Keitel Order, 16 September 1941, Subject: Communist Insurrection in Occupied Territories. (USA 555) … VI 961
*C-156 Concealed Rearmament under Leadership of Government of Reich, from “Fight of the Navy against Versailles 1919-1935". (USA 41) … VI 970
*C-159 Order for Rhineland occupation signed by Blomberg, 2 March 1936. (USA 54) … VI 974
*C-167 Report of meeting between Raeder and Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) … VI 977
*C-174 Hitler Order for operation “Weseruebung", 1 March 1940. (GB 89) … VI 1003
*C-178 Order of Navy concerning treatment of saboteurs, 11 February 1943. (USA 544) … VI 1012
*C-179 Hitler’s second decree, 18 October 1942, regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units. (USA 543) … VI 1014
*C-182 Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander Armed Forces, initialed Jodl, 11 March 1938. (USA 77) … VI 1017
*D-39 Telegrams relating to activities against partisans in Italy. (GB 275) … VI 1023
*D-411 Letters of 26 and 28 November 1941, enclosing orders concerning protection of troops against Partisans and sabotage. (USA 556) … VII 49
*D-569 File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer SS, the OKW, Inspector of Concentration Camps, Chief of Security Police and SD, dating from 29 October 1941 through 22 February 1944, relative to procedure in cases of unnatural death of Soviet PW, execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) … VII 74
*D-730 Statement of P W Walther Grosche, 11 December 1945. (GB 279) … VII 177
*D-731 Statement of PW Ernst Walde, 13 December 1945. (GB 278) … VII 183
*D-762 Order of Hitler, 30 July 1944, concerning combating of “terrorists” and “saboteurs” in Occupied Territories. (GB 298) … VII 221
*D-763 Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, regarding penal jurisdiction of non-German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 300) … VII 222
*D-764 Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, concerning combating of “terrorists” and “saboteurs” in Occupied Territories and jurisdiction relative thereto. (GB 299) … VII 223
*D-765 Directives of OKW, 2 September 1944, regarding offenses by non-German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 302) … VII 225
*D-766 Circular of OKW, 4 September 1944, regarding offenses by non-German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 301) … VII 226
*D-767 Memorandum, 13 September 1944, on offenses by non-German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 303) … VII 228
*D-769 Telegram signed by Gen. Christiansen, 21 September 1940, relative to application of capital punishment in connection with Railway strike in Holland. (GB 304) … VII 229
*D-770 Circular, 24 September 1944, on offenses of Non-German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 305) … VII 229
*D-774 Directive of Chief of OKW to German Foreign Office at Salzburg, on Treatment of Allied “Terrorist"-flyers, 14 June 1944. (GB 307) … VII 231
*D-775 Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from OKW to Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe", regarding treatment of Allied “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 308) … VII 232
*D-776 Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15 June 1944, to German Foreign Office at Salzburg, concerning treatment of Allied “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 309) … VII 233
*D-777 Draft of Directive, 15 June 1944, from OKW to Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of Allied “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 310) … VII 234
*D-778 Notes, 18 June 1944, concerning treatment of Anglo-American “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 311) … VII 235
*D-779 Letter from Reichsmarschall to Chief of OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding treatment of Allied “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 312) … VII 235
*D-780 Draft of communication from Ambassador Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 June 1944, on treatment of Allied “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 313) … VII 236
*D-781 Note of OKW to Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe", 23 June 1944, regarding treatment of Allied “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 314) … VII 239
*D-782 Note from German Foreign Office, Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB 315) … VII 239
*D-783 Note of a telephone communication, 26 June 1944, with regard to treatment of “Terrorist"-aviators. (GB 316) … VII 240
*D-784 Note from Operation Staff of OKW signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, concerning treatment of Allied “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 317) … VII 240
*D-785 Note from OKW to Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe", 4 July 1944, concerning “Terror"-flyers. (GB 318) … VII 241
*D-786 Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror"-flyers. (GB 319) … VII 242
*L-43 Air Force “Organizational Study 1950", 2 May 1938. (GB 29) (See Chart No. 10.) … VII 788
*L-51 Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August 1945. (USA 521) … VII 798
*L-52 Memorandum and Directives for conduct of war in the West, 9 October 1939. (USA 540) … VII 800
*L-79 Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, “Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims". (USA 27) … VII 847
L-166 Minutes of conference on Fighter Aircraft with Reichsmarshal on 15 and 16 May 1944 … VII 911
*L-172 “The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of War", a lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34) … VII 920
*L-180 Report by SS Brigade Commander Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group A", 15 October 1941. (USA 276) … VII 978
*L-323 Entry in Naval War Diary concerning operation “Weseruebung". (USA 541) … VII 1106
*R-95 Army Order signed by von Brauchitsch, 30 March 1941, concerning deployment instructions for “Action 25” and supplementary instruction for action “Marita". (GB 127) … VIII 70
*R-102 Report on activities of The Task Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 October 1941, (USA 470) … VIII 96
R-118 Drafts of letters and memoranda of General Staff of Armed Forces concerning treatment of enemy fliers … VIII 127
*R-135 Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret reports from Kube on German atrocities in the East, 18 June 1943, found in Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) … VIII 205
*TC-54-B Von Brauchitsch appeal to the people of Danzig, from Documents of German Politics, Part VII, p.596. (GB 73) … VIII 410
*UK-66 Report of British War Crimes Section of Allied Force Headquarters on German reprisals for partisan activity in Italy. (GB 274) … VIII 572
UK-81 Letters of 26 November and 28 October 1941, with enclosed orders on protection of troops against Partisans and Sabotage and conduct of troops in Eastern Territories … VIII 582
Affidavit A Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January 1946, substantially the same as his testimony on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1 December 1945 … VIII 587
Affidavit B Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 November 1945, substantially the same as his testimony on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946 … VIII 596
Affidavit D Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 January 1946, substantially the same as his testimony on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 4 January 1946 … VIII 622
Affidavit H Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November 1945 … VIII 643
Affidavit I Affidavit of Leopold Buerkner, 22 January 1946 … VIII 647
Affidavit J Affidavit of Erhard Milch, 23 January 1946 … VIII 653
Statement III The Origin of the Directives of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 15 September 1945 … VIII 669
Statement IV The Position and Powers of the Chief of the OKW, by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 9 October 1945 … VIII 672
Statement V Notes Concerning Actions of German Armed Forces During the War and in Occupied Territory, by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 19 October 1945 … VIII 678
Statement IX My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, fall 1945 … VIII 707
**Chart No. 7 Organization of the Wehrmacht 1938-1945. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.) … VIII 776
**Chart No. 10 1938 Proposals for Luftwaffe Expansion 1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29) … VIII 779